Human Rights Watch welcomes the opportunity to participate in the public consultation of the Responsible Gold Guidance Version 10 (“the Guidance”), the certification standard by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA).
Human Rights Watch is providing comments in this submission and through the online consultation feedback form. Our comments and recommendations are informed by over a decade of research on human rights abuses in gold mining, including on child labor and mercury exposure in small-scale gold mining (in Ghana, Mali, the Philippines, and Tanzania), as well as environmental harm, organized crime, and violence by security forces against local miners or residents in the context of large-scale gold mining (in Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Tanzania, and Venezuela). Furthermore, we have conducted research on the human rights responsibilities of companies in the gold supply chain and on the role of certification schemes.
1. Transparency of supply chains
The Responsible Gold Guidance Version 10 incorporates new rules established in January 2026 through its recent Disclosure Guidance. Human Rights Watch welcomes the LBMA’s effort to enhance transparency in gold supply chains. Under the new rules, LBMA refiners need to disclose 1) the names of industrial gold mines from which they are sourcing, when the companies operating them are World Gold Council (WGC) members; 2) the countries from which they source mined material; and 3) the identity of intermediate refiners and local exporters in “red flag locations.” Intermediate refiners are those that have performed a refining process on material prior to delivery to an LBMA-accredited refiner, for example by consolidating jewelry and electronic scrap into batches for refining.
But the concept of “red flag locations,” understood narrowly in the Disclosure Guidance and Responsible Gold Guidance Version 10, is problematic. While the definition of “red flag locations” stems from the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“OECD Guidance”), the OECD’s definition of “red flag locations” goes much further than what the Disclosure Guidance and, by extension, the Responsible Gold Guidance Version 10 suggest. The OECD Guidance defines gold as originating from “red flag locations” in four scenarios, including situations in which the gold originates from or has been transported through a conflict-affected or high-risk area. It states that conflict-affected and high-risk areas are characterized by the “presence of armed conflict, widespread violence or other risks of harm to people,” as well as “widespread human rights abuses and violations of national or international law.” High-risk areas are defined as areas of “political instability or repression, institutional weakness, insecurity, collapse of civil infrastructure and widespread violence.”
Instead of using the OECD’s broad definition, the Disclosure Guidance foresees that determination of “red flag locations” must be made by using several country lists, including a list of conflict-affected and high-risk countries drawn up under the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, and current and previous lists of countries with significant money-laundering risks by the Financial Action Task Force, the global anti-money laundering watchdog. While these lists can serve as a starting point, they by no means capture all locations that would meet the definition of “red flag locations.” For example, Peru, Brazil, and Ghana are not listed on any of them, despite each of these countries fulfilling several criteria of the OECD’s definition as “red flag locations” (see Human Rights Watch’s report on serious human rights abuse and organized crime in Peru’s gold mining sector). Most lists also fail to include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a global gold trade hub where Human Rights Watch has documented repression and violations of international human rights law. Human Rights Watch has documented attacks in violation of international humanitarian law during the UAE’s multiple foreign interventions in neighboring conflicts where the UAE has economic and trade interests in support of abusive local forces. The UAE was listed by Financial Action Task Force as a country with a high risk of money-laundering, but removed in 2024.
We recommend that the LBMA expands its transparency requirements in the Guidance, requiring disclosure of the names and locations of all mines of origin and all direct and indirect suppliers, as well as disclosure of suppliers of secondary gold. Full supply chain transparency would help hold all companies accountable for their actions and could contribute to ensuring respect for human rights in global supply chains. When human rights abuses occur, public disclosure of supply chain information can enable affected communities, trade unions, civil society, consumers, supply chain actors, officials, investors, or the wider public to respond to these abuses. An expansion of disclosure requirements to all supply chains would also have the advantage that intermediate refiners and other companies that are not LBMA members, but certified by other due diligence schemes and supplying LBMA members, would be obligated to disclose supply chain information.
Recommendations:
- Require disclosure of the names and locations of all mines of origin and all suppliers;
- Require disclosure of suppliers of secondary gold;
- At a minimum, use the OECD’s definition of “red flag locations” and “high-risk countries” properly and develop a roadmap towards full supply chain transparency; and
- Use a searchable online database such as Open Supply Hub, backed up by more detailed country of origin and audit reporting on the LBMA website.
2. Transparency of third-party audits
The Guidance requires approved third-party auditors—called Approved Assurance Providers—to publish an independent assurance report on the refiner’s compliance report and country of origin annex. However, the full audit report and other deliverables are not made public but just provided to the LBMA. Such lack of transparency makes it harder for stakeholders to understand problem areas that need attention, as well as the certification decision of the LBMA.
Recommendations:
- Require publication of the full audit report;
- Require publication of the auditor’s non-conformance findings; and
- Require publication of corrective action plans and their outcomes.
3. The Incident Review Process (IRP) and Special Assurance
The IRP and Special Assurance, as describedin the introduction of the Guidance, lack clarity and transparency. In particular, the following information is lacking:
- Whether every allegation of criminal activity or a serious breach of the Guidance triggers an IRP, or whether additional specific criteria need to be met;
- What exactly is understood by a “serious breach” of the Guidance, and whether this is different than “high-risk non-conformances,” “breaches,” “incidents,” and “zero-tolerance non-conformances” (as referred to in 5.1.3);
- Where external actors can file allegations of criminal activity or a serious breach of the Responsible Gold Guidance;
- The timeframe for an IRP;
- What an IRP consists of when it does not include a Special Assurance;
- Which criteria need to be met to trigger a Special Assurance;
- If IRPs and Special Assurances can trigger a corrective action plan;
- If IRPs and Special Assurances can trigger suspension of membership or expulsion;
- The timeframe for a Special Assurance; and
- How the progress and outcome of the IRP or a Special Assurance are communicated to the party providing the allegations.
According to the introduction to the Guidance, information will be kept strictly confidential; it does not foresee publication of any information relating to the IRP or Special Assurance. Such lack of transparency is problematic because it means that affected communities, local civil society groups, consumers, and international non-governmental groups are unable to learn about potential human rights abuses and measures taken to address them. The text does not mention refiners’ reporting on incidents (under 5.1.3), grievance mechanisms, or reports by non-governmental organizations as sources of allegations that could trigger a Special Assurance.
Recommendations:
- Include information on IRP and Special Assurances in the body of the Guidance;
- Provide missing details in answer to the questions outlined above; and
- Publish progress updates and results of each IRP, including all Special Assurance reports.
4. Consequences of non-compliance by LBMA members
The proposed Guidance does not explain clearly what steps the LBMA will take if a member fails to comply. It lacks an explanation under which circumstances membership (and listing on the Good Delivery List) will be suspended or ended, and the role of corrective action plans or remediation in that context. There have been several cases where non-conformances with LBMA requirements have not resulted in consequences, according to the European Union. Human Rights Watch has identified one such case as well.
Recommendations:
- Provide detailed information on what measures the LBMA will take if refiners do not comply with requirements of the Guidance; and
- Make explicit what kind of breach will result in suspension or expulsion of a member, and under which circumstances an IRP or Special Assurance will lead to suspension or expulsion.
