Introduction
Political killings are on the rise again in Sri Lanka. According to local human rights groups and Tamil political parties, at least thirty-eight people have been killed or were abducted and remain missing in politically motivated attacks against opponents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran signed a ceasefire agreement in February 2002. Hundreds of others have been threatened, assaulted, and injured.
Most of the victims were members or former members of Tamil political groups opposed to the LTTE,1 including some senior officials. Among those killed were Tamils who had worked for the Sri Lankan security forces.
All of these cases appear either to be politically motivated or indicate the possibility of political motivations. In some instances witnesses have identified the perpetrators as members of the LTTE. In others, evidence of LTTE involvement is more circumstantial. Many local observers believe that the killings are indicative of a systematic campaign to silence the LTTE’s opposition.
The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (Varathar) EPRLF(V), at present the LTTE’s two main political opponents, have together lost thirty-two members or supporters killed or missing since February 2002.2 This includes persons who had ceased active political involvement with the parties. The People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) has had at least fifteen members or former members killed or injured in the same time period. On May 13 a single grenade attack on a volleyball game in front of the PLOTE office in Batticaloa killed five and injured six. TELO (Varathan), a breakaway unit of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization that worked with the elite police Special Task Force in eastern Sri Lanka, has reportedly had at least four members killed or missing.
The ceasefire between the government and the LTTE, which has been in place since February 2002, has offered an important respite from two decades of conflict-related violence and security restrictions that have taken a heavy toll on civilians. It has also given the LTTE free access to towns like Batticaloa, Jaffna, and Trincomalee, previously under army control, for the purpose of opening political offices. Although the pact prohibits LTTE cadres from carrying arms in these areas, the prohibition is not well enforced. According to critics, the LTTE’s new political offices have become useful points from which to coordinate surveillance, recruitment, and extortion and, when necessary, the assault, abduction, and assassination of rivals.
Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission
Articles 1 and 2 of the February 2002 ceasefire agreement called for a halt to all military action, including assassinations and abductions, and prohibited hostile acts against the civilian population.3 Under article 3 of the ceasefire agreement, the mandate to oversee the parties’ compliance with the terms of the ceasefire was given to the Norwegian-led Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM).4
The SLMM is tasked with inquiring into complaints made by the parties and the people of Sri Lanka, and assisting parties in the settlement of disputes.5 It has no executive power. The SLMM consists of monitors from the Nordic countries, including Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. 6 By April 2003 it had forty-seven members, and in July announced plans to increase its team of naval monitors following a series of sea clashes. Its headquarters is in Colombo. The SLMM has liaison officers to the Sri Lankan government in Colombo and to the LTTE leadership in Kilinochchi and has six district offices in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Ampara. Two naval monitoring teams are based in Jaffna and Trincomalee. From the outset, there has been no agreement for a monitoring presence at the key LTTE bases in Killinochchi or Mullaitivu.
Local monitoring committees work alongside the SLMM District Offices. Each local committee has five members: two persons appointed by the Sri Lankan government, two appointed by the LTTE, and an international SLMM monitor acting as chairman.7
During the sixth session of peace talks at Hakone, Japan from March 18-21, 2003, the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE agreed to strengthen the mandate and capacity of the SLMM to undertake preventive measures to avoid serious incidents at sea and on land. As a precondition for the SLMM to take on a stronger role, the parties pledged to ensure full compliance with the rulings of the SLMM, guarantee the security of its personnel in all situations, and take disciplinary action against anyone endangering the lives of SLMM personnel.8
From the start the SLMM has interpreted its mandate narrowly.9 Although it has increasingly addressed complaints of abuse against civilians (especially abduction of children for recruitment and extortion cases), it has not reported publicly on apparent political killings by the LTTE. No substantial investigation of most of these cases has even been attempted.
A spokesperson for the SLMM claimed that investigating these murders was beyond the monitors’ mandate. Reuters quoted Agnes Bragadottir on July 6, 2003, as saying: “The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission should not be drawn into internal politics. This is not a monitoring issue for us, this is a criminal case. The police have to monitor law and order.”10 The only way to know if a case is political in nature is to investigate. And, as the spokeswoman herself conceded, at least some of the killings are political, not simply criminal, apparently perpetrated by a party to the conflict against persons protected by the terms of the agreement.
The SLMM appears to lack both sufficient political distance from the negotiating process and a genuine capacity to investigate these incidents. As a Norwegian-led initiative, the monitoring effort is too closely tied to the politics of the peace process. The SLMM has (with rare, but notable exceptions) been cautious about criticizing the parties. And without a capability for police-style criminal investigations, there is currently no way for the SLMM to conduct adequate inquiries.
The police remain primarily responsible for investigations, but they have often failed to undertake them. With the current ceasefire in place and the military confined to barracks, police are once again the main security force active in the north and east. But they are relative strangers to the areas they police and are vulnerable to attack should hostilities resume. The result is that they either forge relationships with the more powerful and locally influential LTTE, or try to stay out of the way. Police officers are well aware that when the LTTE broke a fifteen-month cease-fire in 1990, LTTE forces overran police stations throughout the north and east, abducting and killing hundreds of police officers.
The current violent campaign against opponents of the LTTE constitutes both a violation of the ceasefire and systematic human rights abuse. It is important for both the Norwegian government and the SLMM to publicly acknowledge and condemn this, and for serious investigations to be conducted into all such incidents, both to bring perpetrators to justice and as part of a strategy to stop future violence. These attacks are eroding public confidence in the peace process and increasing the likelihood that violent retaliation will perpetuate Sri Lanka’s two-decade cycle of violence.
Killings and other Attacks since the Ceasefire
Attacks on current or former members of Tamil political groups who are perceived as opponents of the LTTE have occurred regularly since the beginning of the ceasefire.
The attacks escalated dramatically in May and June 2003 following the withdrawal of the LTTE from the peace negotiations. Political parties at risk and human rights defenders began to publish lists of the attacks, hoping that the evidence would compel the international community, particularly the SLMM, to speak out.
The following is a selection of cases reported by Tamil political parties, human rights groups, and newspapers in Sri Lanka. This list, although incomplete, indicates a grave pattern of abuse that requires immediate investigation.
1. In Batticaloa on December 3, 2002, the LTTE reportedly abducted three senior EPDP members: EPDP organizer Sellathurai Thangarajah (known as Viji), 32, Nagarajah Nesarajah (Nivas), 48, former provincial council member for the North-East, and Kandasamy Gnanajothi (Navam), 46. According to local sources, a passenger van driver who was linked to the LTTE befriended the three men and invited them to an evening party at Kallady beach. The men became intoxicated at the party and the van driver led them to a waiting LTTE van. The van is reported to have taken them to the LTTE-controlled area through Chenkalady. The men have not been heard from since, and van driver has vanished. A complaint from family members and the EPDP was lodged with the police and the SLMM.
2. On the evening of December 16, 2002, P. Alahathurai, 35, of Mandur, a member of the EPRLF(V) and chairman of the Porativu local council, left his party office for his sister’s home. At around 7:30 p.m., witnesses saw him being led away by two known LTTE affiliates. Two days later near a lagoon at Kannapattai, Alahathurai’s body was discovered tied up and showing signs of torture. His hand and ear had been severed.
The two men seen abducting Alahathurai were Ramiah Rajendran (Rajan) and Mylvaganam Paramanathan. Ramiah Rajendran had been a watchman for the local council, who had spent a year in detention for possession of a bomb. He was known to be attached to the local Porativu intelligence office of the LTTE. Paramanathan is known to be attached to the LTTE’s political office in Mandur. The post-mortem on the victim’s body was delayed by several days because the attendant physicians were afraid to handle the case. After the post-mortem was carried out and, on the basis of the evidence before him, the Batticaloa magistrate ordered the arrest of Rajan and Paramanathan, but the police took no action.
On January 5, 2003, Kausalyan, the LTTE political head for Batticaloa and Amparai issued a statement claiming that Alahathurai was an LTTE supporter and that they were searching for the perpetrators of his murder. A few days later, Kausalyan and another LTTE leader, requested the Sri Lankan authorities to investigate the murder and other disappearances. The North-East provincial administration, which is dominated by the LTTE, directed the Porativu local council, which Alahathirai had chaired and which was dominated by EPRLF(V), to reinstate Rajan as their watchman and pay his salary in arrears. To date the police have failed to act to arrest Rajan or Paramanathan for the murder.
3. In an incident a month earlier, P. Alahathirai’s younger brother, Poopalapillai Vijayarajah, in Mandur was approached by LTTE members saying that an LTTE political officer wanted him to come to their office in Palugamam to discuss a local dispute. Vijayarajah refused to go saying that if he needed help he would go to the police. This remark, as well his brother’s affiliation with the EPRLF(V), was reportedly passed on to the LTTE leader.
On November 12, 2002, the LTTE officer arrived at Vijayarajah’s home in a pickup truck, beat him and tried to take him to Palugamam by road. The police Special Task Force refused to let them pass. He was then taken to Palugamam across the lagoon by boat. There he was beaten again, and suffered serious injuries. The LTTE officer chastised him for failing to obey the LTTE and said that except for the ceasefire, he would have been shot. Vijayarajah was then returned to Mandur and warned not to tell anyone about his abduction.
On November 13, Vijayarajah was admitted to Kaluwanchikudy Hospital; a complaint was also lodged with the SLMM in Batticaloa. The SLMM went immediately to the relevant LTTE officials and warned them against committing violence against civilians. LTTE members nonetheless went to Kaluwanchikudy Hospital and demanded that the doctor discharge the patient to them. The doctor refused and transferred him to Batticaloa Hospital for safety. The SLMM then took video pictures of his injuries. When his brother Alahathurai was murdered a month later, Vijayarajah became convinced he could not ever return to Mandur.
4. On the morning of January 5, 2003, the body of a Muslim auto rickshaw driver, A.T.M. Hussain (Kalanthar), 68, was found in the Tamil neighborhood of Kalmadu in Oddaimavady. He had last been seen at about 1:30 a.m. at an auto rickshaw stand. He was found with a cut on his neck caused by a sharp object and his hands were tied behind his back. At the inquest, the Judicial Medical Officer said he had died from blood loss, shock, and cardiac arrest.
Local auto drivers implicated a Tamil auto driver, with whom Hussain had reportedly had a disagreement. The driver was known to be close to Reggie, the LTTE area leader in Valaichenai, and had a record of complicity in criminal activity by the LTTE.11
Reggie’s brother, LTTE eastern commander Karuna, denied accusations about the LTTE’s role in the murder and pledged to help find the culprits. Reggie reportedly told the SLMM that someone else was responsible for the crime and had dumped the body in Kalmadu to put the blame on the LTTE and the Tamil community.
At the time of the killing, the LTTE was reportedly threatening Tamils not to do business with Muslims. Three days earlier, on January 2, a grenade had been thrown into the Muslim Market, injuring five Muslims, including a policeman.
5. Late in the evening of March 18, 2003, unidentified perpetrators on a motorcycle shot and killed Kadirgamanathan Ragupathy, 35, on Galle Road in the Colombo suburb of Mt. Lavinia. Ragupathy, a resident of Karaitivu in Ampara district who had been living in Colombo for more than a year, was attacked as he was approaching the place where he had rented a room. Ragupathy had been a member of the PLOTE and had been working for the Sri Lankan Directorate of Military Intelligence. Ragupathy had earlier told Military Intelligence that he believed he was being followed. The day Ragupathy was killed, people considered under threat from the LTTE in Colombo received a warning that Mylvaganam Sivakumar, head of LTTE intelligence in Batticaloa, had left Batticaloa for Colombo. Sivakumar is known to have returned to Batticaloa the day after Ragupathy’s murder. According to the Island newspaper on May 24, Sivakumar was named as the prime suspect in the case.
6. In Araiampathy on the morning of April 2, 2003, Seenithamby Ranjan (Varathan), a local council member and leader of a breakaway faction of TELO, was seen talking to a senior police officer from the Kattankudy police station in front of the Araiampathy Hospital. According to several people standing outside the hospital, Mylvaganam Sivakumar, LTTE intelligence head for Batticaloa town, passed them on a motorcycle heading in the direction of Kalmunai. Sivakumar turned around, rode back towards them, pulled out a pistol and fired at Varathan. Varathan, who was not armed, tried to flee. Sivakumar got off his motorcycle, pursued Varathan on foot, then shot and killed him. Sivakumar, who observers say continues to move freely in the area, has not been questioned in relation to this murder. The Batticaloa magistrate reportedly issued an arrest warrant for Sivakumar.
7. On the evening of June 1, 2003, unknown gunmen shot and killed Kalirajah Ramanan, 35, in the area of Punochchimunai, north of Batticaloa town. Ramanan was reportedly seen being followed by two youths who shot him at pointblank range with handguns and disappeared. Ramanan died instantly. The police are reportedly investigating the murder.
Ramanan had belonged to several Tamil political organizations, most recently the EPRLF(V). He was elected to the Batticaloa Municipal council as a TELO candidate. After the dissolution of the council, he left TELO and joined the EPDP. He later joined the EPRLF(V). Ramanan had recently returned from the Middle East where he had been working, and was living in Navatkuda with his wife and children.
8. In downtown Trincomalee on June 2, 2003, at about 8:00 p.m., unidentified gunmen shot dead EPRLF(V) member S. Kirubairaja at the Madathady junction. Kirubairaja was reportedly returning home from the EPRLF(V) party office on Sea View Road, close to Inner Harbour Road junction. The police are reportedly investigating the murder.
9. Sinniah Samuel (Vinnoth), 31, aformer member of TELO and later of the EPDP, and his fifteen-month-old baby daughter Abhisha were killed by an exploding grenade in Araiyampathi, Batticaloa district at 9:40 p.m. on June 6. Another child, eight-year-old Sivagnanam Laveena, was injured in the explosion. Samuel, who had left politics and was working as a mason in Araiyampathi, was riding a bicycle with his daughter on Amarasingam Road in Araiyampathi after attending a festival at the Kannakai Amman Temple when he was killed. The police are reportedly investigating.
10. Raju Wijenathan (Wijeyan), 33, a member of the EPDP was shot and killed in the early morning of June 7, 2003, in Trincomalee, by unidentified gunmen. Wijenathan was staying in his brother's restaurant when he was killed.
11. On June 12, 2003, unknown assailants on the Sabapathipillai Road, Chunnakam, Jaffna, attacked former EPRLF(V) member Nagamuthu Nagendran with sharp weapons, severing both his hands.
12. On June 14, 2003, at 6:15 a.m., a sniper shot and killed Thambirajah Subathiran (Robert), Deputy Leader of the EPRLF(V), age 46, as he exercised in his third floor office at EPRLF(V) headquarters in Jaffna. Subathiran is the most senior Tamil political figure to be killed since the beginning of the current ceasefire. The gunman reportedly fired from the neighboring Vembadi Girls College. Witnesses place Easwaran, the LTTE area leader for Nallur, at the school the day before Subathiran was killed. According to local sources, the police have not questioned Easwaran.
13. On June 15, 2003, Ponniah Ramachandran, 42, a senior member of EPDP in Batticaloa, was returning home after work when two young men on bicycles shot him dead on the Kalladi-Thiruchenthoor road. Seven bullets were recovered from his body. A grenade was also thrown at him.
14. On June 23, 2003, at about 6:45 p.m. in Veeramunai, Amparai district, unknown assailants traveling in an auto rickshaw shot and killed Kumarasamy Kumarathasan, 36, a former member of the EPRLF(V) and a father of two, as he road home from work on a motorcycle.
15. On July 4, 2003, at about 6:15 p.m., Vairamuththu Mehanathan (Justin), 32, a longtime member of PLOTE, was shot dead by two attackers on a motorcycle as he rode his bicycle home from the PLOTE office on Vaidiyamalai Road in Puthur, Batticaloa district. His assailants used a handgun and Mehanathan was reportedly shot at close range. Batticaloa police said they were investigating. On July 5, 2003, members of the funeral possession for Mehanathan carried the coffin to the office of the SLMM in Batticaloa. The mourners demanded that the SLMM bring the LTTE under control.
A week later, unknown gunmen in Puthur on July 11, 2003, shot and killed LTTE member Velupillai Paraneetharan, 18, in broad daylight. A police investigation reportedly found that Paraneetharan had been shot four times. Local sources believe that PLOTE was responsible for the murder as retribution for the murder of Mehanathan.
16. On July 8, 2003, Selvin, a member of the EPRLF(V), was admitted to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital and underwent surgery for injuries sustained as a result of a sword attack on him in the Gurunagar neighborhood of Jaffna town. Selvin was an associate of the late Thambirajah Subathiran, the EPRLF(V) deputy leader who was killed on June 14 by a sniper in Jaffna. The police said they were investigating the case.
1 Several Tamil groups served as auxiliary forces for the Sri Lankan security forces, and most had at some point in their history functioned as armed guerilla groups before entering electoral politics. All carried arms, and many engaged in violence including both internecine clashes and abuse of civilians. The ceasefire agreement contains a broadly worded provision for the disarmament of “Tamil paramilitary groups.” This in practice meant all Tamil parties except the LTTE were required to relinquish weapons. Members say this decision left members of these groups vulnerable to attack.
2 The EPRLF is split into two wings. Former chief minister of the North East province, Annamalai Varathajaperumal leads one section, which is called “Varathar” wing. The other wing, “Suresh,” is led by Secretary General Suresh Premachchandran and is aligned with the LTTE.
3 Agreement On a Ceasefire Between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Ceasefire Agreement),February 22, 2003 (accessed at http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/insidepages/Agreement/agceasefire.asp#A3). Article 1.2 states: “Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as: a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units….” Article 2.1 states: “The Parties shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.”
4 Ibid., article 3.
5Secretariat for Co-ordinating the Peace Process, ”Peace Process of Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission” (accessed at http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/insidepages/Partners/SLMM/srilankamonitoringmissin.asp.)
6 Ibid.
7 Ceasefire Agreement, article 3.7 (“The [government of Sri Lanka] and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.”).
8 “European Commission to support peace process in Sri Lanka.” European Union Press Release – European Commission, June 4, 2003. In June 2003, the European Union adopted a 3.27 million Euro plan to support the peace process. A portion of this funding is intended for support of the SLMM.
9 The Preamble to the Ceasefire Agreement states in part: “The Parties further recognize that groups that are not directly party to the conflict are also suffering the consequences of it. This is particularly the case as regards the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this Agreement regarding the security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.”
10 Lindsay Beck, “Tamil groups say targets of Sri Lanka rebel killings,” Reuters, July 6, 2003.
11 On February 13, 2002, the Tamil driver had reportedly participated in the LTTE abduction of Nahamutthu Lohitharajah of the EPRLF(V) at the Valaichenai Bazaar, by driving Lohitharajah to Pandimedu. Lohitharajah later escaped.
