Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine

This Background Briefing surveys the types of landmines used in Ukraine since the full-scale Russian invasion began on February 24, 2022. It is not currently possible to systematically determine the number of landmines casualties or the humanitarian impact of new mine use since the invasion.

Summary

Russian forces have used at least seven types of antipersonnel mines in at least four regions of Ukraine: Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy. This marks an unusual situation in which a country that is not party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty uses the weapon on the territory of a party to the treaty.[1]

There is no credible information that Ukrainian government forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2014 and into 2022.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have extensively used anti-vehicle mines (also called anti-tank mines) in at least six regions: Donetsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia. Hand-emplaced TM-62 series anti-vehicle mines appear to be the type most frequently used. 

All manner of landmine delivery methods have been documented: hand-emplaced, mechanically-laid, and remotely-delivered. Several new, never-before-seen landmines have made their combat debut in the armed conflict, including some produced as late as 2021.

Russian forces have also emplaced many victim-activated booby-traps as they retreated from positions taken during the initial phase of the invasion. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel mines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Landmine casualties have been reported in the conflict in Ukraine and the impact of new mine use can also be seen in the denial of access to civilian homes, infrastructure, transportation routes, and agricultural lands. Evidence indicates that agricultural production is being affected by the use of landmines in fields and on rural paths and roads.

Russia-backed forces in eastern Ukraine previously used landmines in Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014-2015 and sporadically in the following years, including antipersonnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, and victim-activated booby-traps.[2] Ukraine’s armed forces and security services have regularly confiscated caches of antipersonnel mines in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including MON-50 directional mines,[3] MON-90 directional mines,[4] PMN-1 and PMN-2 blast mines[5], OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines,[6] and POM-2 mines.[7]

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of the technical features and regardless of the mine’s predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).[8] Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on February 24, 1999 and became a state party on June 1, 2006. Russia has not joined the treaty, but is bound by the prohibitions and restrictions on mines, booby-traps, and other devices found in Amended Protocol II of the UN Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), as well as Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law. Belarus, which is supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on September 3, 2003, and became a state party on March 1, 2004.[9]

Recommendations

All parties to the armed conflict in Ukraine are obligated to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor and destroy any antipersonnel mines that they have seized or otherwise acquired.

1. Ukraine needs to ensure that its forces respect their obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty in all circumstances. The Ukrainian government should confirm that remaining stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines currently in storage awaiting destruction cannot be used in combat operations.
2. Russia needs to fully abide by the prohibitions and restrictions of CCW Amended Protocol II including the detectability and reliability of any mines it uses in this conflict as well as marking, monitoring, and ensuring the effective exclusion of civilians from these mined areas.[10]
3. As a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Belarus needs to ensure that its joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibition on assisting, encouraging or inducing a non-party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty.[11] This means avoiding participating in the planning for use of antipersonnel mines; not committing to rules of engagement that permit use of antipersonnel mines; not accepting orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use antipersonnel mines, not knowingly deriving military benefit from the use of the weapon by others; and not providing security, storage, transportation or transit for antipersonnel mines.

Methodology

This Background Briefing draws on information collected, including from witness accounts, by Human Rights Watch researchers in Ukraine. It also relies on several other sources, including:

• Verified videos and photos, obtained directly or via social media, showing landmines or evidence of their use.
• Information shared with Human Rights Watch by international and national demining experts and armament research specialists.
• Technical publications including the Explosive Ordnance Identification Guide for Ukraine (1st ed.) published by the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining in May 2022 and Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2008 yearbook published by Jane’s Information Group. Also consulted was “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume 1 – Army, 1996-1997,” published by Military Parade.
• Reference and identification materials aggregated and shared on social media by specialist organizations including CAT-UXO.com, Armament Research Services, Fenix-Insight, and the Collaborative Ordnance Data Repository. Special appreciation to @JakeGodin, @N_Waters89, @blueboy1969, @johnismay, @oryxspioenkop, and @RALee85.
• Displays of weaponry seized or recovered by the governments or militaries of the parties to the conflict.
• Landmine Monitor Report mine ban profiles of Russia and Ukraine.[12]

This document should be considered an interim overview because active hostilities continue and access by independent observers to battlefield areas remains limited. Some of the data presented here is taken from government sources or posted to social media by third parties and should be treated with care, particularly in attributing responsibility for landmines use and its compliance with treaty obligations and international humanitarian law. 

I. Types of Landmines Used in Ukraine in 2022

Human Rights Watch has identified at least seven types of antipersonnel mines and six types of anti-vehicle mines used through June 2022 in the war in Ukraine (see table below). Russia is the only party to the conflict known to have used antipersonnel mines and both Russia and Ukraine have used anti-vehicle mines. All manner of landmine delivery methods have been documented: hand-emplaced, mechanically-laid, and remotely-delivered.

All antipersonnel landmines used by Russian forces were manufactured by the Russian Federation or its predecessor state, the Soviet Union.

With some notable exceptions, most hand-emplaced landmines identified by Human Rights Watch are of Soviet-origin, with production markings from the 1970s and 1980s, and have been stockpiled by both Ukraine and Russia. More modern remotely-delivered mines, some with markings indicating production in 2021, have also been used by Russian forces.

Category	Designation	Origin	Type	Initiation	Used in 2014-2015?
Antipersonnel	MON-50	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	Yes
	MON-100	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	Yes
	OZM-72	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	Yes
	PMN-4	Russia	Blast	Pressure	Yes
	POM-2/ POM-2R	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/self-destruct
	POM-3	Russia	Fragmentation	Seismic
Anti-vehicle	PTKM-1R	Russia	Shaped-charge	Top-attack
	PTM-1/PTM-1G	USSR/Russia	Blast	Pressure/self-destruct	Yes
	PTM-4M	Russia	Shaped-charge	Magnetic influence
	TM-62M	USSR/Russia	Blast	Pressure	Yes
	TM-62P3	USSR/Russia	Blast	Pressure

MON-series antipersonnel mine

MON-series mines are a family of hand-emplaced directional fragmentation munitions that are designed for use to various distances or as warheads for booby-traps.[13] Ukrainian deminers in Bucha told Human Rights Watch that they found victim-activated booby-traps incorporating MON-series mines emplaced in the town by Russian forces prior to their withdrawal.[14]  

MON-series munitions are multi-purpose antipersonnel munitions that can be emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, they are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. There were a large number of reports and photographs of MON-series directional fragmentation mines being seized or recovered in eastern Ukraine from 2014 onwards.[15]

OZM-72 antipersonnel mine

The OZM-72 bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine is a multi-purpose munition that can be emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner.[16] When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, they are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. Prior to 2022 there were frequent reports of OZM-72 mines being sighted, seized, or recovered in eastern Ukraine.[17]  According to local Ukrainian police, on May 19, two men were killed by an OZM-72 mine that police said was emplaced by Russian troops in a field between the villages of Lypivka and Korolivka in Bucha district of Kyiv region.[18]

Ukraine possessed stocks of OZM-72 antipersonnel mines in the past, but it is unclear if it still has them.[19]

PMN-4 antipersonnel mine

The PMN-4 antipersonnel blast mine was first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993. It has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.[20] Ukrainian police reportedly located and cleared two PMN-4 mines and two OZM-72 mines near the village of Malyyy Vystorop in the Sumy region on April 12.[21]

POM-2 and POM-2R antipersonnel mines

The POM-2 antipersonnel mine is a tripwire activated, bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means.[22] Video and photographs released by Ukrainian national police after two women were killed by a landmine near the town of Tsyrkuny north of Kharkiv show POM-2 mines and their delivery cannisters.[23]

In 2020 and 2021, Russia-backed forces in eastern Ukraine fabricated and used an improvised antipersonnel mine by combining a POM-2 mine with the rocket motor of a rocket-propelled grenade to create a short range, remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system.[24] Russian forces were filmed using these weapons near Horlivka in Donetsk region on May 21.[25]

Kharkiv emergency services photographed the remotely delivered POM-2 mines and their KPOM-2 dispensers near villages in the Brovary and Vyshgorod districts of the Kyiv region on April 17.[26] Additional POM-2 antipersonnel mines and TM-62M anti-vehicle mines were photographed together in a mined area in the forest near the village of Stara Buda, northwest of Kyiv on April 20.[27] Additional POM-2 antipersonnel mines were photographed at other locations in the Kyiv region.[28]

The POM-2R is a factory-produced variant of the POM-2, designed for use in conjunction with a URP igniter assembly, allowing manual hand-emplacement.[29]

POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia, but not by Ukraine.

POM-3 antipersonnel mine

Human Rights Watch has reported on the use by Russian forces of the remotely-delivered POM-3[30] antipersonnel mine also known as “Medallion.”[31] These antipersonnel mines were located by Ukrainian explosive ordnance disposal technicians near Kharkiv city on March 28, 2022. The rockets that delivered the mines were launched from specially designed multi-barrel ground launch vehicles that were recorded on video on an unknown date and posted to social media on March 26.[32]

This never-before-seen-in-combat antipersonnel bounding fragmentation mine is equipped with a seismic proximity fuze that makes it prone to destruct when approached. The mine launches to a height of 1 to 1.5 meters then detonates midair, producing fragments that are lethal up to about 16 meters away. The POM-3 also has a self-destruct feature that sets the mine to explode after a certain period.

Markings on a remnant of a delivery canister pictured with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate it was newly produced in 2021. The consultancy Armament Research Services has produced a detailed technical reference for POM-3 antipersonnel mines.[33]

The ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher delivers the POM-3 mines from 5 to 15 kilometers away. It was first publicly displayed during annual Russian military exercises in 2021.[34] Anti-vehicle mines can also be deployed by the ISDM launcher.[35] The POM-3 can also be scattered at short range by other types of truck-mounted launchers. 

Ukraine does not possess the POM-3 mine or its delivery system.

PTKM-1R anti-vehicle mine

The Russian PTKM-1R is a modern and novel anti-vehicle mine system.[36] The mine cannister is hand-emplaced and its sensors detect the seismic and thermal signatures of vehicles to distances of 200 to 300 meters.  Once a target is detected, a sensor-fuzed submunition is ejected into the air and scans for a precise target.  Once a target is located, a shaped charge is fired downwards onto the top of the target. On April 26, photographs of the PTKM-1R anti-vehicle mine circulated on social media.[37]

PTM-1 and PTM-1G anti-vehicle mines

The PTM-1/PTM-1G is a remotely-delivered, plastic-cased anti-vehicle mine with a soft plastic explosive filling and hydraulic self-destruct mechanism.[38] This mine is delivered from helicopter, 122mm Grad rocket system, and—as seen in Ukraine—by the 9M27K2 Uragan 220mm rockets to a minimum range of 10 kilometers and a maximum range of 35 kilometers. Each 9M27K2 rocket contains 24 mines.

The New York Times first documented the use and subsequent clearance of PTM-1/PTM-1G anti-vehicle mines in a neighborhood in eastern Kharkiv city on April 8.[39] During the hours between its use and the emergency response clearance process, many of the mines self-destructed at random intervals, increasing the dangers to nearby civilian and clearance personnel.

Numerous PTM-1/PTM-1G mines were subsequently encountered and cleared by Kharkiv emergency services on April 11.[40] The Kharkiv prosecutor’s office posted detailed photographs of PTM-1/PTM-1G mines on April 12 in the Nemyshlyanskyi and Kyivskyi districts.[41] Ukrainian Public TV recorded video of clearance personnel encountering PTM-1/PTM-1G mines in another village in the Kharkiv region on April 27.[42] 

Ukrainian security services also documented the presence of this type of mine in the Donetsk region on April 30.[43] PTM-1/PTM-1G mines were found and cleared by Donetsk emergency services on May 12, in the Kramatorsky and Pokrovsky districts.[44] Additional PTM-1/PTM-1G mines were found by the Ukrainian national police in the villages of Yelizavetovka and Kostiantynivka in the Maryinsky district on May 25.[45]

The use of PTM-1/PTM-1G remotely delivered mines is not limited to the Russian armed forces.  Russia-backed fighters in the “Donetsk People’s Republic” displayed remnants of PTM-1G mines and a 9M27K2 220mm Uragan artillery rocket on April 27.[46] Other images of the remnants of 9M27K2 mine-dispensing rockets were photographed on April 26.[47]

PTM-4M anti-vehicle mine

The PTM-4 is a modern remotely delivered, magnetic influence anti-vehicle mine with a shaped charge that is delivered by a variety of means including vehicle and helicopter-mounted dispensers.  The suffix “M” indicates a modernized version of the original item. On May 30, Kharkiv region police investigated battle damage in the town of Elitne and photographed a delivery cannister marked as “ПТМ-4М” (PTM-4M).[48] This mine has not been documented previously and the marking on the disperser indicate production in 2021.[49]

TM-62 series anti-vehicle mine

The most numerous mine type identified in use in the conflict is the hand-emplaced TM-62M anti-vehicle mine equipped with MVCh-62 pressure activated fuze.[50] TM-62-series anti-vehicle mines appeared in social media from the outset of the conflict. One February 27 video shows a man removing a fuzed TM-62 series mine from a road near the port city of Berdyansk.[51] There is also evidence of Ukrainian military forces using a mechanical mine-layer to emplace TM-62M mines on the beaches near the city of Odesa.[52]

 

Also in use is the low metal content TM-62P3 anti-vehicle mine with MVP-62M low metal content pressure-activated fuze.[53] These mines were filmed in Kharkiv oblast in May.[54] This mine use was attributed to the Ukrainian battalion named “Stugna.”

Victim-activated booby-traps

In mid-April 2022, Ukrainian police and emergency services in the Kharkiv region distributed numerous images of victim-activated booby-traps that were emplaced by retreating Russian forces.[55] One example of a victim-activated booby-trap used is a hand grenade with a trip wire attached as an initiating mechanism that when disturbed explodes the grenade. 

Human Rights Watch spoke with the head of the Ukrainian government’s demining unit for Bucha region, Lt. Col. Roman Shutylo, as well as the commander of an anti-tank brigade assisting with demining in Bucha, Ihor Ostrovsky. Both said that victim-activated booby-traps had been used in the town. Shutylo said that on April 8 the deminers had found two dead bodies that had victim-activated booby-traps placed on them. In total, they found 20 victim-activated boobytraps and antipersonnel mines, including those constructed with the F-1 and RGD-5 fragmentation hand grenades, as well as MON-50, MON-100, and OZM-72 mines.[56]

Ostrovsky shared video of an ordnance item attached to wire, which he said was found in a yard in Bucha, that had been configured to detonate when enough tension was exerted on the wire. The demining team said they found at least one other similar device in a building that Russian troops had occupied. A third deminer in Bucha showed Human Rights Watch a photograph on his phone that he took of one of the two victim-activated improvised explosive devices his team uncovered in Bucha.[57]

Other types of mines

Other types of mines reported in the Ukraine conflict by various sources and media outlets have not been included in this interim accounting for various reasons. Some have dubious sourcing, visual materials that appear to be staged, or appear to show mines from displays and inert models of mines and explosive remnants of war used for recognition or risk education training. 

Media outlets have sporadically circulated pictures and videos showing remotely delivered PFM-1 series antipersonnel mines lying in situ. The Sumy Regional Military Administration issued a warning to Sumy residents on March 17 after it alleged that Russian aircraft used PFM-1 antipersonnel mines during night raids.[58] Another video reportedly taken in Popasna town in the Sievierodonetsk district of Luhansk region  on April 4 shows a few individual PFM-1 mines.[59] A video recorded May 26 appears to show the remnants of the 9M27K3 220mm mine-dispensing rocket that allegedly hit the Russian-controlled village of Novovoskresenske in Kherson oblast. [60]  

This interim briefing note does not cover mines other than antipersonnel landmines that have been transferred to Ukraine by other countries as military assistance. Germany has provided Ukraine with DM-22/PARM-2 off-route and DM-31 magnetic influence/shaped charge anti-vehicle mines.[61] The United States has transferred commanded-detonated M18A1 Claymore mines (without their victim-activated fuzes).[62]

This briefing note also does not address sea mines or anti-landing mines such as the PDM-1M.

II. Impact of Landmines on Ukrainian Civilians

Landmine casualties have been reported in the conflict in Ukraine, but many may go unrecorded, especially if the victim was alone at the time of the incident. The impact of landmine use can also be seen in the denial of access to civilian homes, infrastructure, transportation routes, and agricultural lands.

During the 2022 sowing season, using  tractors in agricultural fields and while traveling on rural paths and roads has become a high-risk activity. There have been at least 10 reports of tractors detonating landmines in the Kyiv region since the start of the conflict.[63] Most recently, on May 19, a man was injured when the tractor he was driving hit a landmine in the village of Andriyivka near Makarov.[64] The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that a man in the Chernihiv region was injured on May 19 when his tractor hit a landmine.[65]

 

A farm owner in the village of Malaya Rohan, about four kilometers east of Kharkiv city, told Human Rights Watch that his employee was ploughing fields in mid-May when the tractor hit a landmine emplaced by Russian forces. The driver was not wounded, but the tractor was severely damaged. The incident took place in a field between Malaya Rohan and Stepanky village, both of which Russian forces had occupied from February 25 to March 26. A deminer from Ukrainian emergency services who cleared the site said that Russian forces were responsible and that two more TM-62 mines were found 100 meters away on a dirt road in the field. Local residents told Human Rights Watch that the withdrawing Russian forces did not clear the mines they had emplaced, provide any warnings to avoid the area, or share maps of the mine locations.  

Currently, there is no systematic reporting on the number of mine incidents and victims, nor is any disaggregated casualty information available publicly. However, there are isolated reports such as on June 7, an unknown number of civilians were injured when the van they were using to collect firewood detonated a landmine in a forest outside Kyiv.[66]

III. Mine Ban Treaty and the International Response

All parties to the conflict in Ukraine are bound by treaties that prohibit or regulate landmines.

Ukraine signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibiting antipersonnel mines on February 24, 1999 and became a state party on June 1, 2006. There is no credible information that Ukrainian government forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2014 and into 2022.  Russia has alleged that Ukraine has violated the treaty but has not offered any information or details.

Russia has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. However, it is bound by the prohibitions and restrictions on mines, booby-traps, and other devices found in Amended Protocol II of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.[67] Russia is also bound by prohibitions against deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians found in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Protocol I)[68] and customary international humanitarian law.[69]

Ukraine is also party to CCW Amended Protocol II but their obligations on antipersonnel mines are superseded by the stricter prohibitions contained in the Mine Ban Treaty.

Since March 28, 2022, Ukraine and at least seven other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine: Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Italy, Poland, New Zealand, and the United States.[70]

Landmine use in Ukraine has also been condemned by the Mine Ban Treaty president and its special envoy for universalization, as well as by US congressional representatives such as Senator Patrick Leahy.[71] The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate, has condemned the use of landmines in Ukraine, as has its members organizations, including its chair Human Rights Watch.[72]

In November 2020, Russia told the United Nations General Assembly that it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines,” but views antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia’s borders.”[73]