Geneva, Switzerland
Thank you for the opportunity to speak, Mr. President.
We noted in our remarks yesterday that the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) has been and can be an important international humanitarian instrument. That assessment does not apply to CCW Amended Protocol II, despite the laudatory words we have heard today from states.
The truth is that Amended Protocol II is now largely irrelevant, and where it is not irrelevant, it is largely inadequate. The protocol contains restrictions on antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines, as well as provisions related to post-conflict measures. Let's look at each of these.
Post-conflict measures are more thoroughly covered in both CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war and in the Mine Ban Treaty.
The provisions related to antivehicle mines are now likely the most important aspects of Amended Protocol II, but many States Parties have spent the past few years emphasizing that those provisions are not adequate to address the humanitarian dangers of antivehicle mines, and that a new protocol is needed. Regrettably, states were unable to agree on stronger measures last November. We fully agree with the comments just made by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that work in this area should continue.
Amended Protocol II primarily exists because of, and is best known for, its provisions on antipersonnel mines. But clearly the Mine Ban Treaty with its comprehensive prohibition has completely overtaken the restrictions in the protocol. The Mine Ban Treaty is establishing a new international norm that is taking hold throughout the world. The ban treaty now has 155 States Parties, including all but 10 of the 88 members of Amended Protocol II. Thus, nearly all states party to Amended Protocol II are bound to a higher standard. In reality, with respect to antipersonnel mines, Amended Protocol II is only relevant for 10 countries. It is a very small club - Amended Protocol II members that want to be able to use, produce and stockpile antipersonnel mines - and it is a club to which no one should want to belong.
Pakistan was mostly accurate when it stated earlier today that Amended Protocol II is a credible instrument for all mine-producing and mine-using nations-though one could argue just how credible. But the main point is that there should be no mine-producing and mine-using nations. The essence of the Mine Ban Treaty is that any use, production, stockpiling or trade of antipersonnel mines is unacceptable to the international community. There can be no "complementarity" between Amended Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty on antipersonnel mines.
This is a major concern that we have with respect to the CCW and any potential future protocol on cluster munitions. If Amended Protocol II is instructive, then a CCW protocol will legitimize cluster munitions instead of stigmatizing them. It will be used to justify future use of cluster munitions, with assurances that it is being done in accordance with the protocol. It may result in new production of cluster munitions that meet the requirements of the protocol, as we have seen with new production of antipersonnel mines in the name of the CCW by India, Pakistan, and others, most recently South Korea-production of antipersonnel mines that the rest of the world has banned as too costly from a humanitarian perspective.
Mr. President, we would also like to echo the deep concerns expressed by the ICRC about the need for States Parties that exercised the nine-year deferral period on detectability and self-destruct/self-deactivation mechanisms to be clear about whether they have taken the necessary steps to come into compliance. With the deadline looming on 3 December 2007, only Pakistan today clearly stated that it has made all the necessary technical changes, and we wish that Pakistan had provided some details about the steps it has taken rather than one sentence declaring the job done.
It was unclear from China's statement if it has taken the required measures, and we did not hear at all about compliance from Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine, all of which declared the deferral. It is hard to take the CCW seriously if States Parties do not take these fundamental compliance issues seriously.
In closing, we are pleased to note that many countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including some of the CCW States Parties, are acting in accordance with the treaty's provisions. This is especially notable with respect to new use of antipersonnel mines, as in the past year only two governments have newly laid antipersonnel mines: Myanmar and Russia.
We are also pleased that a number of governments not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty expressed today their support for the objectives of the treaty. We look forward to the time in the not too distant future when all nations, including the ten hold-out nations from Amended Protocol II, join the rest of the international community in banning and eradicating antipersonnel mines from the face of the earth.
Thank you.
