Geneva, Switzerland
Thank you for the floor, Mr. President.
The Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) has been and can be an important international humanitarian and disarmament instrument, though it has often fallen far short of its potential. Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW) can be an important international humanitarian instrument.
CCW and Protocol V are part of a tapestry of protection that is being weaved by the international community-a tapestry of protection for civilians from the effects of war, protection both during and after armed conflict. In recent years, the tapestry has included most notably the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, and the prohibition on the use of child soldiers, but also includes the CCW Protocol IV's ban on blinding lasers, and (less so) the restrictions in Amended Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices, and of course, Protocol V on ERW.
Protocol V serves to reinforce the ever-growing awareness that the detritus of war must be cleaned up as soon as possible, and that the user of weapons that become ERW have special responsibilities, including on territory not under their control.
But it remains to be seen how important Protocol V will be, and whether it will make any real difference in ERW-affected countries. I have listened carefully to the statements this morning about steps taken or planned to implement the protocol, and it is not clear that anything new is being done. Will Protocol V contribute anything beyond what is already being done under the Mine Ban Treaty, Amended Protocol II, and various national initiatives? Are states prepared to increase their resources for clearance, risk education and victim assistance as a result of the protocol? Will states that engage in conflict provide information and assistance to facilitate clearance of ERW in a more rapid and comprehensive fashion? These questions have yet to be answered. But if Protocol V is to make a difference, it will only be because of the political will and determination of states parties.
What is evident from statements and actions over the course of the past year is that nearly all states agree that Protocol V is not sufficient to deal with cluster munitions. Protocol V does not directly address cluster munitions, and will not have any impact on the use, production, trade or stockpiling of clusters. It addresses only the post-conflict issues, and not the use and targeting issues, the time-of-attack wide area effects, nor the lack of accuracy and reliability concerns.
We meet today at a time when public concern about cluster munitions is rapidly increasing. Today is the Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, coordinated by the Cluster Munition Coalition. It will include activities in at least 40 countries around the world, calling for immediate national moratoria and for support for the Oslo Process for an international ban treaty in 2008.
We believe the Oslo Process is the only approach that will result in new international law that effectively addresses the humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions, and will do so with the appropriate urgency. We believe the Oslo Process will stigmatize and eliminate cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, while-as with antipersonnel mines-the CCW is likely to legitimize the use of cluster munitions, including some that are known to cause unacceptable harm.
Non-governmental organizations said all of last year, and especially in the November meeting, that the CCW should be given a chance to deal with cluster munitions, but states parties were unable to agree on anything meaningful, rejecting a proposal for a negotiating mandate. Now, spurred by the Oslo Process-or perhaps more accurately put, alarmed by the Olso Process-some states are saying, "Give the CCW another chance."
The worst outcome would be unending, unproductive talks on cluster munitions in the CCW, as happened for five years with antivehicle mines. If the CCW is to be given another chance, it must deliver in the upcoming annual meeting of states parties. A weak and amorphous mandate would be a clear failure.
To be considered in any way serious, any CCW mandate must be: a negotiating mandate; negotiations on a legally-binding instrument; a legally-binding instrument that contains a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, not just regulations that repeat existing international humanitarian law; and there must be deadline to complete negotiations, which should be the end of 2008.
If there is not a specific mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument with a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm by the end of 2008, the CCW effort on cluster munitions will be considered a failure by the NGO community and by the general public that today is calling loudly for an urgent ban on these weapons.
Thank you.
