Geneva, Switzerland
[Note: These remarks were accompanied a PowerPoint presentation.]
[Slide 1 - Title page - Cluster Munitions, ERW, and Protocol V]
Thank you for the opportunity to make this presentation today. I am going to stretch the boundaries of this session a bit, though within the context of the agreed discussion topic of preventing munitions from becoming explosive remnants of war (ERW). The presentation focuses on cluster munitions, discussing why cluster munitions pose a greater threat than other munitions that become ERW, and why CCW Protocol V on ERW is not adequate to deal with the threat of cluster munitions.
To do justice to this topic, however, one cannot only speak of the post-conflict, ERW side of the equation. Indeed, the reason NGOs have for the past five years tried to get States Parties to focus on cluster munitions, and the reason we have stressed that cluster munitions are the conventional weapon system most in need of specific new international regulation, is that cluster munitions are unique in the double dangers that they pose to civilians, danger both at the time of the attack, and the lingering danger when they inevitably produce large amounts of ERW.
[Slide 2 - Cluster Munitions are Greatest Threat]
Cluster munitions are the greatest threat because of their wide area effect and the large number of hazardous duds (akin to landmines) that they leave behind.
It should be self-evident that it is impractical, if not impossible, to accurately target a weapon designed to produce area effect. This effect that makes cluster munitions appealing in order to achieve a military objective can also be the feature that causes unacceptable humanitarian risks. The remote target acquisition used with clusters means the user is not observing or distinguishing fires. This in turn has implications under international humanitarian law. The information available to the commander in reviewing proportionality and military necessity is not adequate.
The failure of a large number of submunitions to function as designed is an inherent and wholly predicable aspect of use of cluster munitions. Militaries have routinely reported that various types of submunitions have failure rates of 5 to 15 percent under test conditions, and have acknowledged that the failure rates can be exacerbated by foreseeable environmental factors.
But just how predictable failure rates are is open to question. Experience in Lebanon and other recent conflicts has shown that the failure rates reported from testing have little relationship to the failure rates in operational, combat conditions. The U.N. Mine Action Service's (UNMAS) top expert in Lebanon has estimated that the average failure rate of Israeli submunitions is 50 percent. Even Israel's M85 submunition, which has a self-destruct device and is touted to be one of the safest in existence with a failure rate of one percent, performed miserably, with nearly 700 duds found in the first two weeks after the cease-fire. This certainly calls the future standard being proclaimed by a number of states of a one percent failure rate into question.
It should be apparent that existing military doctrine, tactics and procedures are not a solution to the cluster munition problem. We have seen inappropriate use of cluster munitions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and most egregiously Lebanon, yet all of the user nations have claimed to follow international humanitarian law. Israel has stressed that its use in Lebanon was in accordance with international standards. If that is the case, clearly the standards must be changed.
[Slide 3 - ERW Threat]
Cluster munitions pose a special post-attack ERW threat because of the large number of submunitions they contain, which results in a large number of hazardous duds, and because of their wide area distribution. Take the Multiple Launch Rocket System used by Israel in Lebanon and the U.S. in Iraq. A typical volley of six M26 rockets contains 3,864 submunitions; the Pentagon has reported the failure rate at between 5 and 23 percent, meaning more than 800 hazardous duds could be left behind each time the weapon is used.
CCW delegates have heard over the years considerable testimony from mine clearance personnel about the special dangers of cluster munitions and the high priority that must be assigned to locating and destroying them once the fighting stops. Earlier this week, UNMAS told delegates that the horrific cluster dud problem is the number one clearance priority in Lebanon, above all other ERW.
Experts have noted the volatility of cluster duds compared to other types of ERW. They have noted that many types of cluster duds are attractive in size, shape and color to unwitting civilians, particularly to children. As internally displaced persons return home shortly after conflict, they immediately encounter the cluster munition threat. Existing mine risk education programs are often not aimed at the cluster threat, so civilians have not been properly alerted to the dangers.
Moreover, deminers are often not trained to deal with different types of cluster submunitions. Finally, delegates can see the special threat posed by cluster munitions by looking at the Table of Explosive Ordnance that has been developed during these military and technical experts meetings. Only cluster munitions cut across the entire table, since they are delivered from both the air and ground, by bombs, missiles, rockets, artillery, mortars and more.
[Slide 4 - Global Overview]
The terrible situation in Lebanon demonstrates the need to halt the use of inaccurate and unreliable cluster munitions, but the cluster munition problem is not yet extremely widespread, as was the case with antipersonnel mines. Use of cluster munitions has been confirmed in 21 countries, and there are allegations or indications of use in about eleven others.
However, the danger of the problem growing exponentially is great. Consider these statistics: 73 countries stockpile cluster munitions; 34 countries produce over 210 different types of cluster munitions; at least 12 countries have transferred over 50 different types of cluster munitions to at least 58 other countries.
We must deal with this issue now in order to avoid a future humanitarian disaster that could make the landmine crisis pale in comparison.
[Slide 5 - Why Protocol V is an Inadequate Solution to the Problems of Cluster Munitions]
Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War was not conceived as an instrument designed to address all the humanitarian concerns caused by cluster munitions. It only addresses post-conflict generic remedial measures. Yet, time-of-attack effects on civilian populations must also be considered. Cluster attacks caused more civilian casualties in Iraq during the 2003 invasion than any other type of weapon except small arms.
Protocol V's "best practices" technical annex on generic preventive measures is likely to have little impact. Experience has shown that binding rules are needed. With clusters, even the binding rules of international humanitarian law have not been uniformly followed. Best practices fall far short of what is needed.
Protocol V does not address use and targeting issues, and it does not address technical requirements or reliability standards, all of which should be considered in any effort to address the impact of cluster munitions.
Finally, as a more general comment, the protocol is replete with qualifiers and ambiguities, to the extent that its key provisions could be considered voluntary in nature.
[Slide 6 - Steps to Reduce Civilian Harm]
Human Rights Watch has for many years identified the most important steps that could be taken to minimize the harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions:
- Use of cluster munitions in or near populated areas should be prohibited
- Use of cluster munitions with high dud rates should be prohibited
- Transfers of unreliable and inaccurate submunitions should be prohibited
- Stockpiles of unreliable and inaccurate submunitions should be destroyed
These recommendations might lead to the question, "What constitutes an unreliable and inaccurate submunition?" Some submunitions are clearly more unreliable and inaccurate than others. Human Rights Watch has distributed this week a fact sheet identifying a "Dirty Dozen" submunitions that are particularly objectionable. But conflict experiences have shown that virtually all, or nearly all, existing cluster munitions are unacceptably unreliable and inaccurate from a humanitarian perspective. It is up to States to demonstrate conclusively that any specific cluster munition is accurate and reliable enough to avoid excessive harm to civilians.
Thank you.
END
