Aung San Suu Kyi's release on May 6, though an important step, did not produce an inevitable momentum toward change in Burma. The euphoria that immediately followed her freedom has now faded. But this week's visit to Burma by United Nations special envoy Razali Ismail opens the door for progress toward restoring democratic, civilian rule and basic human rights.
After nearly 20 months under house arrest, Ms. Suu Kyi, head of the National League for Democracy, emerged with a clear agenda for next steps. These included release of all political prisoners, immediate talks to continue political dialogue between the NLD and the ruling State Peace and Development Council and movement from "confidence building" gestures to discussions about a transition process.
But the secret two-way dialogue, begun in October 2000, is in limbo. There has been no word of further talks since Ms. Suu Kyi's release, and at the time neither she nor the government announced an agreed upon schedule for the dialogue. Nor did Ambassador Razali publicly suggest a timeframe for further talks. At a U.N. press briefing, he insisted that the SPDC's leaders are committed to "make the transition from military government to civilian constitutional government," without hinting at any road map for when or how that might take place.
More than 300 political prisoners, including NLD activists and members of parliament, have been freed; including 32 who were released in advance of Ambassador Razali's mission. But hundreds more are still imprisoned. Overall human-rights conditions in Burma remain dreadful, with severe restrictions on political freedoms and continued use of forced labor, torture, child soldiers and other serious abuses.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that nothing has changed in the last three months, or that the situation is back to square one. In some ways, Ms. Suu Kyi's release is simply the tip of the iceberg. Above and below the surface, internal and external factors are at work that could result in at least some incremental progress, facilitated by Ambassador Razali's Aug. 2-6 visit.
Both the government and the opposition have been testing each other, cautiously measuring each other's intentions, as well as the level of suspicion and mistrust between them. Closing the confidence gap remains a key objective.
Twice since May, Ms. Suu Kyi has left her compound and traveled outside of Rangoon. An attempt to travel into the Burmese countryside triggered her confinement back in 2000, but during her most recent forays to meet with NLD supporters and ethnic minority groups, the government did nothing to intervene. In late July, she was greeted by a crowd of thousands in Moulmein, southeast of Rangoon, where she opened an NLD office and publicly renewed her call for democracy.
No doubt the military finds this kind of open political activity alarming and potentially threatening. But the cautious tone and pace of Ms. Suu Kyi's reemergence on the Burmese stage seems designed to reassure the SPDC, as she also signals her desire to resume a private dialogue.
Ambassador Razali must now build on these recent developments, pushing the SPDC to expand the space for the NLD and other opposition groups to operate, without fear of retaliation or punishment. Persuading Rangoon to allow more NLD township offices to reopen would be a clear step forward, as well as getting agreement on a general amnesty for all political prisoners.
But the U.N. must also refuse to be coopted, and avoid cosmetic gestures aimed mainly at improving Burma's international image. The SPDC's invitation last week to Sergio Vieira de Mello, the newly appointed U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, to visit the country was premature and ill timed. Mr. de Mello won't even be officially confirmed in the position until September, and in any case, he shouldn't consider going to Rangoon unless a visit would have concrete results.
Externally, the Burmese government is dealing with a more complex international environment than it faced prior to Ms. Suu Kyi's release. Her freedom raised expectations of more to come. If the SPDC does nothing to deliver on those expectations, it risks losing any possibility of establishing more normal relations with the outside world or obtaining the aid and investment the country desperately needs. A recent assessment mission to Burma by the International Monetary Fund found a troubled economy and deteriorating social conditions.
No Western government has announced plans to lift sanctions on economic or military ties with Burma, but there are some expanded opportunities for humanitarian assistance. By taking positive steps to improve human rights and resume the dialogue, the SPDC can greatly improve the climate for such assistance.
At a U.S. Congressional hearing on June 29, the U.S. State Department said that American sanctions would remain in place, but "significant reform and improvement in observance in human rights will spur a positive response." At the same hearing, an official from the U.S. Agency for International Development described plans for spending $1 million in the current fiscal year's budget on a limited program for HIV/AIDS inside Burma, delivered through NGOs and U.N. agencies and administered in consultation with the NLD. The U.S. might give more aid after receiving a report from a field mission to Burma by the Centers for Disease Control. This two-track American approach -- keeping sanctions but increasing targeted humanitarian aid -- makes sense, and enjoys bipartisan congressional support.
The European Union has adopted a similar posture, maintaining sanctions while exploring possibilities for increased humanitarian assistance and providing funds to deal with Burma's urgent HIV/AIDS crisis.
But Japan, once Burma's largest bilateral aid donor, has gone further. After Ms. Suu Kyi's release, Tokyo disbursed $4.9 million of a $29 million Official Development Assistance loan approved earlier for renovation of a hydroelectric power plant in eastern Burma. This was a mistake, since Tokyo should not have taken such a step without first receiving assurances that the aid would trigger concrete human-rights progress. New ODA to Burma for infrastructure projects had been suspended since 1988.
In a major political gesture, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi will visit Burma from August 3-5, the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister in 20 years. She will meet with military leaders to urge progress in the dialogue, and may also see Ms. Suu Kyi. Such a meeting would clearly be useful. Ms. Kawaguchi should express firm support for Ambassador Razali's mission, but not give the ruling generals any promises of additional ODA absent significant changes on the ground.
Both the Japanese foreign minister and U.N. envoy should raise, in their talks with the SPDC, the serious problems of Burma's ethnic minorities, whose representatives are not yet included in the dialogue.
Ambassador Razali should discuss the persecution of Burma's Muslim population, enduring the aftermath of violent confrontations with Buddhists last year in eastern Burma and in Arakan state, near the Bangladesh border. Not only did the authorities fail to intervene quickly to stop beatings and deaths and the destruction of Muslim shops, homes and mosques, but there were credible reports in some cities outside Rangoon of military intelligence officers stirring up anti-Muslim violence. A key factor behind the violence was the destruction of Buddhist statues by the Taliban in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in March 2001, fueling resentment against local Muslims. Ambassador Razali should try to meet with Muslim residents and leaders, including in areas hit by the violence.
The day she was freed, Ms. Suu Kyi said her release marked a "new dawn for the country." Perhaps. Pressures for change have certainly grown since her previous release from house arrest in 1995. Ambassador Razali must somehow restore the sense of momentum that existed in May, tempered with a realistic assessment of how far Burma still has to go.
Mike Jendrzejczyk is Washington Director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division.
