Skip to main content

Human Rights Watch today urged Indonesia's donors to delay an annual donor conference until the Indonesian government takes effective action against militia violence in West Timor. The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), convened by the World Bank, is planning to meet in Tokyo in late October to determine aid commitments for the coming year. The CGI includes both bilateral donors such as the European Union, Japan, the U.S. and Canada, as well as multilateral agencies such as the Asian Development Bank.

Donors should set very specific conditions and tell the Indonesian government that the donor meeting will not be scheduled until those conditions are met," said Sidney Jones, Asia director of Human Rights Watch. The donors should also agree on a verification mechanism to ensure compliance with the conditions before scheduling the CGI meeting, she said.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political, Social, and Security Affairs, told the U.N. Security Council yesterday that the government would give militia members until September 24 to voluntarily give up their weapons and thereafter would forcibly disarm them. Such verbal commitments have been made repeatedly over the past year and have not resulted in meaningful improvements in security.

"We've had enough promises," said Jones. "Now we want results."

Human Rights Watch said the donor conditions should include the following:

Immediate formation of an independent fact-finding team, with international representation, to investigate the murders of humanitarian workers, local villagers, and a militia leader on September 5 and 6, 2000. The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights has recommended such an investigation as an alternative to the army-police investigation now underway. The team should have clear and public terms of reference, including full and secure access to refugee camps and local detention facilities. Its members should also include Indonesian non-governmental organizations experienced in investigations in the area, as well as other outside experts as appropriate.

Clear steps toward disarming and disbanding the militia in a way that does not simply export the thuggery to another location. The suggestion that all militias move to a separate island is not a useful solution, as it leaves the militia organization and leadership intact, punishes no one, and gives known criminals a new base of operations. This has to be a serious program; it cannot be a repeat of the symbolic turnover by militias of a few handmade or out-of-date weapons that took place periodically during the run-up to the U.N.-supervised vote in East Timor last year, and Indonesian authorities cannot rely on militia forces to be forthcoming about what weapons they have and where they are.

Credible security guarantees for humanitarian workers in West Timor. Meaningful progress in resolving the crisis requires the return of a full complement of both local and international aid workers, but this cannot happen until conditions are secure. Nothing the Indonesian armed forces have said or done since early 1999 suggests they can be relied on to provide the necessary security. One alternative is the extension of the UNTAET mandate to cover protection for U.N. workers in West Timor, but such a solution would have to take place with Indonesia's acquiescence.

Separation of armed combatants from refugees in the camps and creation of conditions such that refugees are absolutely assured of their right to choose without fear or intimidation whether to return to East Timor or resettle elsewhere. These are necessary preconditions to the earliest possible closure of the camps.

Formal indictments and arrests by the Indonesian police of the nineteen men included on the list of suspects issued by the Indonesian attorney general on September 1, 2000, all of whom are believed to have been key perpetrators of the 1999 East Timor violence.

Beginning of trials in the cases of the nineteen, and steps to ensure that Indonesian prosecutions for the 1999 crimes do not end with this first group of suspects. Getting trials underway is essential to show the militias that there is indeed some threat of prosecution, perhaps deterring further violence. It would also show the East Timorese that justice through the court system is an attainable goal and would give the international community a chance to assess whether the Indonesian justice system is capable of holding anyone accountable for grave human rights violations in East Timor.

Systematic prosecution of all officers and militia leaders against whom there is sufficient prima facie evidence of criminal wrongdoing in East or West Timor to warrant an arrest. At a minimum, Indonesian justice officials should move to build prosecutable cases against army, police, and militia members named in the January 31, 2000 report by the Indonesian Commission of Inquiry on East Timor.

Full cooperation by the Indonesian government with a proposed delegation from the U.N. Security Council. That delegation should complete its visit to Indonesia prior to the donor meeting and should have a clear mandate to verify Indonesia's compliance with the terms of Security Council Resolution 1319, adopted on September 8, 2000, calling for "immediate and effective action" to resolve the ongoing crisis in West Timor.

Your tax deductible gift can help stop human rights violations and save lives around the world.

Region / Country