We write to express our profound disappointment at the November 13, 2006 decision of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) to weaken the already modest EU sanctions regime on Uzbekistan, and to urge you to ensure that the EU formulates specific benchmarks for the Uzbek government to fulfill in order to be considered as making meaningful progress in human rights.
The decision to extend the arms embargo for another twelve months and the visa ban for six months, and to make these measures subject to review already in three months’ time, can be seen only as backtracking by the EU on its own criteria for review. No EU interlocutor with whom we communicated disputed that the Uzbek government had failed to take any meaningful steps towards meeting the conditions the EU set in the October 2005 GAERC conclusions. It made several gestures in advance of the November 13 decision, including proposing an expert meeting on the Andijan events and offering to engage in a human rights dialogue with the EU. We would have hoped for the EU to respond by welcoming these as initial signs of willingness to address the EU’s concerns, and signaling its preparedness to reconsider its sanctions policy as soon as this willingness had produced concrete results. The decision instead to ease the sanctions was premature.
The fact that the Uzbek government made these gestures at all was clearly due to the looming decision on the sanctions, indicating—contrary to what some had argued—that the sanctions did in fact carry a real potential for positive change. Recognizing this potential, the EU should have felt emboldened to make full use of it by proactively seeking concrete, measurable progress in exchange for any serious consideration of easing the existing sanctions, rather than depriving itself of critical leverage and losing an opportunity to press for meaningful change.
But perhaps most unfortunate was the absence in the GAERC conclusions of any expression of concrete concern by the EU regarding the massive crackdown on civil society perpetrated by the Uzbek government since the Andijan events. References to “the lack of progress with regard to the human rights situation in Uzbekistan” and to the Council remaining “profoundly concerned by the human rights situation in the country” simply do not come close to reflecting the unrelenting government persecution suffered by Uzbek human rights defenders, independent journalists, political activists, and NGOs. The failure to explicitly recognize these abuses, especially when contrasted with the statements “welcom[ing] the Uzbek proposal… to discuss the Andijan events”— makes the EU appear disconnected from the reality on the ground, and sends a profoundly demoralizing message to those suffering persecution in Uzbekistan about the extent of the EU’s commitment to bringing an end to the crackdown.
It is now incumbent on the EU to make the most of the leverage it still has. Most urgently, it should formulate specific benchmarks against which the Uzbek government will be assessed at the three-month review in February 2007 in order to determine whether in fact meaningful progress in human rights has been achieved. This is crucial in order to maintain the apparent momentum for change that the EU argues now exists (and which it used to justify the easing of the sanctions), and to move beyond gestures to concrete, measurable action.
The release of the more than dozen imprisoned human rights defenders and their relatives should top the list of EU demands; the list of imprisoned activists circulated by the Uzbek human rights organization Ezgulik is an excellent touchstone in this regard. Other key short-term steps the EU should require from the Uzbek government include:
Finally, we would like to urge you to ensure that the expert meeting on the Andijan events, to be held in Tashkent in mid-December, will not be viewed as a substitute for the independent inquiry that the EU and other actors of the international community have long called for. As we are confident you understand, the Uzbek government will be doing its utmost to use this meeting for its own domestic and international propaganda purposes. The EU must ensure that its engagement with the Uzbek government does not facilitate this.
In order to do so, the EU must insist that the results of the meeting be fully transparent and available to public scrutiny; ensure that experts from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are invited to attend the meeting; ensure that independent human rights organizations in Uzbekistan have the opportunity to participate; actively consult with civil society, particularly with Uzbek human rights defenders, in advance, during and after the meeting; and use the meeting to secure concrete commitments from the Uzbek authorities on key demands, such as the release of jailed human rights defenders. The enclosed memorandum provides a more detailed overview of our concerns and recommendations regarding this meeting.
The Council decision of November 13th has a very real potential not only to bring into question the EU’s credibility as a principled promoter of human rights, but also to undermine the prospects for reversing the cycle of human rights abuse in Uzbekistan. Urgent, proactive efforts are needed if these risks are to be avoided.
We thank you for your attention to these concerns.
Sincerely,
Holly Cartner
Executive Director
Europe and Central Asia Division
Lotte Leicht
EU Director
Human Rights Watch
CC: High Representative Javier Solana, External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Special Representative for Central Asia Pierre Morel, Political Directors and PSC Ambassadors
