Human Rights Watch calls on the Commission on Human Rights to adopt a strong resolution on the conflict in Chechnya, condemning ongoing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by both parties to the conflict; urging the Russian authorities to establish a genuine accountability process for these abuses; calling on Russia to desist from coerced returns of internally displaced persons and to ensure their well-being; calling for visits to the region by key U.N. thematic mechanisms, in particular the Special Rapporteurs on torture and on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; and urging Russia to renew the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Assistance Group's mandate.
Background
Human Rights Watch continues to monitor the conduct of the Chechnya conflict, now entering its fourth year, through periodic field missions. In December 2002 we conducted a mission to Ingushetia to research continuing abuses inside Chechnya and the precarious position of displaced persons.
As in previous years, Russian forces in dozens of sweep operations have rounded up thousands of men, looted homes, physically abused villagers, and in some cases committed extrajudicial executions. Those detained face beatings and other forms of torture, aimed at coercing information or confessions about Chechen forces. Federal forces routinely extort money from detainees' relatives as a condition for release, and also require detainees upon release to sign statements that their treatment in custody was adequate.
In hundreds of cases those last seen in the custody of Russian forces "disappear," never to be seen again by their relatives. In 2001 and 2002 Human Rights Watch published two reports documenting more than two hundred forced disappearances, and our current research indicates that they continue unabated.
Russian forces continue to commit extrajudical executions. The November 2002 murder of Malika Umazheva, the former head of administration for the village of Alkhan-Kala, by Russian forces appeared to be a clear act of retribution for her outspoken criticism of the conduct of those forces.
In the wake of the hostage-taking in a Moscow theater in October 2002, the situation in Chechnya grew even more tense as Russian troops stepped up their operations. For example, during an October sweep in Chechen-Aul Russian soldiers detained eight men, two of whom were later released. Eighteen days later, villagers found the mutilated corpses of five of the men. One man remains missing. Twice in 2002 the authorities ordered military and security forces to take steps to curb abuse by making the operations more transparent, but our research has shown the orders are routinely ignored.
IDP crisis
Since last year's Commission, Russian authorities have put undue pressure on displaced persons to return to Chechnya where they remain at risk. In June authorities cut off electricity, gas and rations in smaller settlements for IDPs in Ingushetia in an attempt to pressure them to return to Chechnya. In July and December officials closed two tent camps housing displaced persons from Chechnya-one in northern Chechnya, in an area generally safe from human rights violations, the other in Ingushetia-and have vowed to close all such camps in Ingushetia by spring 2003.
The Russian government claims that all returns to Chechnya are strictly voluntary, and points to offers it makes to tent dwellers of alternative housing in Ingushetia. But alternative shelters inspected by Human Rights Watch in December 2002 have proved either nonexistent or uninhabitable. The combination of incentives and pressure on displaced persons to return to Chechnya belies the claim of voluntary return. Moreover, because migration officials deny the ongoing human rights crisis in Chechnya, they do not acknowledge security concerns as a legitimate impediment to return. While the Russian government considers the security situation in Chechnya good enough for the return of the IDPs, it cited security concerns to cancel a scheduled October 2002 visit by the Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on internally displaced persons to Chechnya.
Abuses by Chechen fighters
Chechen rebels staged a mass hostage taking at a Moscow theater in October, threatening to kill all 700 hostages if Russia refused to withdraw its troops from Chechnya. In the three days before Russian special forces launched their rescue operation, the rebels killed several hostages. Rebel fighters were also thought to be responsible for dozens of assassinations of civil servants and others who cooperated with the Moscow-appointed administration of Chechnya. Mines laid by rebel fighters on roads claimed the lives of federal soldiers and also of numerous civilians.
Accountability
Russia continued to resist establishing any meaningful accountability process for crimes committed by its forces. Although the procuracy opened hundreds of criminal investigations into abuses by Russian troops, in most cases officials failed to conduct even the most basic investigative steps (including questioning eyewitnesses and relatives). As a result, most investigations remained unsolved and almost none made it to the courts. In an unprecedented disclosure about how such investigations are conducted, the Russian government informed the European Court of Human Rights of steps taken to investigate the December 2000 "disappearance" of Said-Khussein Imakaev, whose parents had filed an application about his disappearance to the court. Investigators questioned two individuals, one of whom was his mother, and wrote three letters to police and security officials requesting information about the case. When the latter replied that they had no information, officials suspended the investigation.
The only trial of a high-ranking officer, Yuri Budanov, ended in acquittal after two controversial forensic psychiatric assessments found that Budanov had been temporarily insane at the time of the murder. Budanov was charged with the March 2000 murder of Kheda Kungaeva, an eighteen-year-old Chechen woman. Two earlier psychiatric assessments conducted immediately after Budanov's arrest in March 2000 had found he was sane at the time of the murder.
Access
Although the OSCE and the Council of Europe maintained monitors in the region throughout 2002, Russia has sought to downplay or remove altogether their human rights mandates. Russia's insistence that the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya limit its 2003 activities to humanitarian issues resulted in the technical closure of the group's office in Znamenskoe when its mandate expired on December 31, 2002. In the three years of the conflict, Russia has not complied with U.N. resolutions calling for deployment of U.N. thematic mechanisms, with the exception of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on children in armed conflict. Russian authorities cancelled a visit by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, citing security conditions. Despite three years of calls, they have failed to issue invitations to the Special Rapporteur on torture and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, and arbitrary executions.
Recommendations
The Commission on Human Rights should:
- Condemn ongoing violations of human rights and humanitarian law by both parties to the conflict. The resolution should call on the Russian authorities to immediately put an end to arbitrary detention and to observe international and Russian legal standards; to end the use of torture and ill-treatment; to put an end to the pattern of enforced disappearances; and to end extrajudicial executions. It should call on Chechen rebel leaders to hand over fighters who were involved in planning the hostage taking in Moscow to competent law enforcement officials in Russia or elsewhere so that they can be brought to justice; and to stop assassinating Chechen civilians who cooperate with the Russian authorities.
- Insist on accountability. The resolution should call on the Russian authorities to ensure meaningful investigations into all reported crimes by Russian troops against civilians in Chechnya or Ingushetia, and for the prosecution of the perpetrators; it should call on the Russian authorities to publish a detailed list of all current and past investigations into such abuses and indicate their current status; it should renew its call for a national commission of inquiry to document abuses by both sides to the conflict; and make clear that continued failure on the part of Russian authorities to make progress on accountability will result in the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to document abuses and produce an official record of them.
- Call on Russia to desist from coerced returns of internally displaced persons and to ensure their well-being. The resolution should strongly condemn Russia's efforts to force internally displaced persons to return to Chechnya. It should call on the Russian authorities to stop moving any displaced persons to parts of the conflict zone where their safety and security cannot be guaranteed and where international humanitarian agencies do not have free and safe access.
- Call for visits to the region by key U.N. thematic mechanisms. The resolution should renew calls for visits by the Special Rapporteur on torture, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, and the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons.
- Call for renewal of the OSCE Assistance Group's mandate, as required by the previous CHR resolutions. The resolution should call on the Russian government to agree to the renewal of the Assistance Group's mandate that expired on December 31, 2002.
