Geneva, Switzerland
We welcome the entry into force of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW) and encourage all States Parties to ratify quickly. We especially congratulate the International Committee of the Red Cross and the government of the Netherlands for their leadership on this issue and on the protocol. The protocol will reinforce the ever-growing awareness that the detritus of war must be cleaned up as soon as possible, and that the user of weapons that become explosive remnants of war have special responsibilities, including on territory not under their control.
But will Protocol V make any real difference in ERW-affected countries? Will Protocol V contribute anything beyond what is being done under the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, and national initiatives? These questions have yet to be answered.
As noted by Cornelio Sommaruga this morning, the language of Protocol V is very weak, and is replete with qualifiers and ambiguities-so much so that key provisions could be considered largely voluntary. Thus, the success of the protocol will depend on aggressive and thorough implementation by governments.
What states are prepared to increase their resources for clearance, risk education and victim assistance as a result of Protocol V, including clearance of existing ERW? We are not aware of any state that has yet indicated its intention to do so. In this context, it is important to note that according to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines' Landmine Monitor Report 2006, global funding for clearance of mines and ERW decreased in 2005 for the first time.
As a result of Protocol V, will states that have engaged in conflict provide information and assistance to facilitate clearance of ERW in a more rapid and comprehensive fashion than in the past? Again, this question is yet to be answered. But it did not happen with respect to Israel and Lebanon earlier this year; the UN still awaits vital information from Israel on its cluster munition strikes. Of course, Israel is not yet a party to the protocol.
In 2003, we criticized CCW States Parties negotiating Protocol V for their unwillingness to specifically address cluster munitions-even though the discussions on and negotiations of the protocol were largely spurred by international attention and outrage over the use of cluster munitions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
The political will to address all aspects of the cluster munition problem did not exist in 2003. We believe that it does today. Protocol V is clearly not sufficient to deal with all of the humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions. A new international instrument is required, and urgently; a new international instrument that prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of unreliable and inaccurate cluster munitions.
Thank you.
