Thank you all for coming to our briefing today. I will first give a brief assessment of the past week here at the CCW, and then lay out what we believe is the necessary and appropriate way forward.
It has been a very good week for the CCW, and a very good week for those who are supporting a preemptive prohibition on fully autonomous weapons. This has been by far the richest, most in-depth discussion that diplomats have ever had on the issue. The high level of engagement and interest on the part of states has been encouraging.
Clearly, a consensus exists to continue the work next year, though questions remain about the nature, content, and duration of the work. Not a single state has suggested that further work is not needed and desirable.
It was a good week from our perspective in no small part because so much of the discussion centered around the concept of meaningful human control and around our call for a preemptive prohibition. On Monday, two-thirds of the opening statements from states referred to the need for meaningful (or “effective” or “adequate”) human control, and that trend held up during the week. While not understood by everyone the same way, and not yet defined in a legal way, the concept has emerged as a point of convergence for many.
And as we utilize the term, it simply mirrors our call for a comprehensive ban. A prohibition on development, production, and use would be a negative obligation; a requirement for meaningful human control would be a positive obligation. But the result is the same. Meaningful human control is not a concept intended to foster the creation of “good” fully autonomous weapons; it is intended to ensure they never come into existence.
It is striking that not a single state has said that they are actively pursuing fully autonomous weapons, or that their armed forces will have to have them in the future. Still, the week featured extensive discussion about the potential benefits of such weapons, and the desire to wait and see what technological advancements might bring.
The United States and Israel were the only states to explicitly say that they were keeping the door open to the acquisition of fully autonomous weapons.
We were pleased to hear the United Kingdom and France say several times that they do not plan to ever acquire fully autonomous weapons, but we were then immediately disappointed by their insistence that a preemptive prohibition, or any type of new law, is unnecessary and undesirable.
The week has also been notable for states’ willingness to engage on the full range of concerns related to fully autonomous weapons. Indeed, in a somewhat historic but largely unremarked fashion, states parties are breaking new ground for the CCW.
I believe that it is unprecedented for the CCW to have such lengthy and detailed presentations and discussions on international human rights law, as the CCW in the past has rarely strayed from the international humanitarian law framework. But fully autonomous weapons, if they are ever fielded, would no doubt be used in situations other than international armed conflicts, and thus human rights law concerns must be addressed. We congratulate states parties for doing so this week, and for the support we have heard for human rights law to continue to be part of future CCW work on this issue.
Similarly, I do not believe that the CCW has ever taken up moral and ethical considerations for any issue in the way that it has this week, and in last May’s session. Moral and ethical concerns are perhaps paramount for most of those calling for preemptive prohibition, as well as for many who call for lesser measures than an international ban. Thus the attention devoted to moral and ethical aspects is warranted, but states parties are again to be congratulated for their willingness to do so, in a way without much precedence in this forum.
Finally, we were pleased that there was significant attention devoted to the Martens Clause and its applicability to this issue, including by Russia. We believe that there is already strong evidence that fully autonomous weapons run counter to the dictates of public conscience and the principles of humanity.
Turning now from the assessment of this past week to the way forward.
As already noted, there is consensus that CCW work on this should continue next year. The crucial unresolved matters are the nature of the work going forward (formal or informal), the content of a future mandate (areas of focus), and the amount of time to devote (one week again, or additional time).
As CCW states parties consider these matters, which must be agreed at the annual meeting in November, we implore you: don’t go slow and don’t aim low. That approach has been the downfall of the CCW too many times in the past. This time, be ambitious, and act with the urgency that the issue demands, as technology races forward.
The German delegation earlier stated that states parties must take care not to be surprised, and must not allow themselves to be overtaken by technological developments. These are good precautions, but it can easily be argued that the technology is already far out in front of the diplomacy on fully autonomous weapons, and that diplomats and politicians have a lot of catching up to do.
With that in mind, we believe that the following steps are the necessary and appropriate way forward. States should in November of this year agree to establish a formal Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). It should be an open-ended GGE with broad participation, not a small group working in isolation. A formal GGE is needed to advance the CCW’s work to a new level, to demonstrate progress, and most important to emphasize that the work is outcome-oriented and that the CCW is not just a discussion forum.
The GGE’s work should be undertaken with a view to future negotiation of a new legally-binding Protocol VI on fully autonomous weapons—a protocol that preemptively bans the weapons, just as Protocol IV preemptively banned blinding laser weapons.
The GGE should meet for a total of three to four weeks of work. In the past, it has only been when states parties have devoted that much time in a single year to an issue that progress has been made; with lesser time, the CCW wheels tend to spin around and around, without gaining much traction.
In addition to establishing an open-ended GGE with three to four weeks of work undertaken with a view to future negotiations, the mandate that states parties agree to in November should instruct the GGE to focus on a number of areas. First and foremost should be the proposal for a preemptive prohibition and the concept of meaningful human control over targeting and attack decisions.
A mandate that focuses solely on transparency and legal weapons reviews, as a small number of states have suggested, would not be sufficient, though they could be useful elements of a broader mandate.
We also urge that the GGE continue to give prominence to ethical and moral concerns, international security concerns (including proliferation, robotic arms races, and global instability), and legal concerns—under both International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. The Martens Clause should also be a key consideration.
The GGE’s work throughout 2016 should lead to an agreement at the Fifth Review Conference in late 2016 to begin formal negotiations on a new protocol. Those negotiations should be concluded within one or two years, culminating in Protocol VI, comprehensively prohibiting the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapon systems.
This would without question be the CCW’s greatest achievement by far. It would have the most far-reaching and positive impact, both on how wars are fought and on ensuring the protection of civilians.
Thank you.
