VII. VIOLATIONS BY MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS
From the earliest years of the conflict in Kashmir, militant organizations fighting for independence or accession to Pakistan have committed grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The most egregious of these abuses have been the murders of hundreds of civilians, both Muslim and Hindu, who have been targeted because of their suspected support for the Indian government, or because they otherwise opposed the policies or practices of one or another of the militant groups.
There are no accurate statistics on the numbers of these killings and other abuses, but anecdotal evidence from Kashmir indicates that most of these abuses have increased since 1994. The rise in some abuses parallels a rise in crime generally by militant groups; many abductions and assaults appear to be linked to extortion. Members of some of the groups have also committed rape, have threatened and attacked journalists, and have kidnaped tourists and others as political hostages. As the groups have lost ground to the security forces, they have also increasingly made use of land mines and other explosive devices against the security forces, with predictable civilian casualties.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which is applicable to both government forces and armed insurgents in an internal armed conflict such as that in Kashmir, expressly prohibits "cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." Explicit threats to kill are barred by these provisions.72 Rape by militant groups is a violation of international humanitarian law under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits murder, torture and ill-treatment of non-combatants by both government and militant forces. Armed militants have used rape as a weapon: to punish, intimidate, coerce, humiliate and degrade. The fear of rape has reportedly been a factor in the flight of Muslim families from Kashmir.73
Militant organizations have issued threats against government officials assigned to prepare for the elections.
On April 16, 1996, the Hezb-ul Mujahedin threatened government officials making arrangements for the elections, stating that "any government official ... found taking part in poll duties ... will be dealt with severely."74 Various militant groups have employed threats to force shopkeepers, businesses and the media to desist from activities considered "un-Islamic" or detrimental to the militants' objectives. Targets of such threats have included liquor dealers and cinema hall owners, among others. Militant groups have also issued threats to journalists and have assaulted or kidnaped journalists whom they accuse of "biased" reporting. They have also issued bans on newspapers, and have enforced these bans through kidnapings of distributors and other assaults.
The criminal activities of the militant groups have alienated Kashmiris; many now openly condemn the groups' abusive behavior. Even political leaders aligned with militant groups have acknowledged that the abuses have undermined the militants' support in Kashmir. However, little, if anything, has been done to curb the abuses.
Militant Operations
At least six major militant organizations, and perhaps dozens of smaller ones, operate in Kashmir.75 They are roughly divided between those who support independence and those who support accession to Pakistan, and include both Kashmiri-groups and those made up largely of Afghan or Pakistani recruits.76 The oldest and most widely known militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), has spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir. Its student wing is the Jammu and Kashmir Students Liberation front (JKSLF). In September 1995 the JKLF split into two factions, one of which remained loyal to long-time leader Amanullah Khan, who lives in Pakistan, and the other of which recognized JKLF leader Yasin Malik.77
A large number of other militant organizations have emerged since 1989, some of which also support independence, others of which support Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Although all groups reportedly receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistani groups are reputed to have been favored by Pakistan's military intelligence, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and by the Jamaat-e Islami party in Pakistan. The most powerful of these is the Hezb-ul Mujahedin. Other major groups include:
· Al Umar - The military arm of the Quami Action Committee, this group of an estimated 600 operates mainly in Srinagar.
· Al Barq - The military arm of the People's League operates in Kupwara, Baramullah and parts of Srinagar with an estimated 1,000 members.
· Muslim Janbaz Force - A smaller group of about 300, this group supports Shabir Shah and is presently consolidating itself in Doda, Poonch, Ranjouri and parts of Srinagar.
· Harkat-ul-Ansar - A group of an estimated 1,000 of which 750 are believed to be foreign militants and operates in Anantnag and Doda. Committed to fighting for accession to Pakistan.
· Lashkar-e-Taiba - A group of 300 Afghans and Pakistanis which reportedly coordinates its activities through local groups. Operates in Kupwara, Baramullah and Badgam.78
The militant forces do not control territory in Kashmir, but until 1995, certain parts of the valley had gained a reputation as strongholds of particular militant groups, particularly towns near the Line of Control which separates the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir from the territory controlled by Pakistan. Since mid-1995, these groups have lost ground to regular Indian forces and to state-sponsored militias.
The militants' military operations are generally characterized by ambushes of security force patrols and convoys and hit-and-run attacks on security force bunkers and pickets, for which they generally use grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Some militant groups have organized commando units responsible for attacking specific targets, such as security force bunkers. The militants also engage army troops and other security forces in gun battles. For these operations they rely on weapons such as AK-47 and AK-56 assault rifles, light machine guns, revolvers and other light weapons. Since 1994, the militants have increasingly made use of land mines and timed explosive devices. The militants are also reported to have sophisticated night vision and wireless communication equipment. State authorities claim that nearly 13, 544 AK series assault rifles, 715 rocket launchers and 16,513 grenades have been recovered since 1990.
The Arms Pipeline
Much of this weaponry reaches Kashmir from Pakistan. Militant leaders have claimed that they have received support from Pakistan's ISI.79 Although many long-time observers of the region believe that Pakistan has directly provided weapons to militants in Kashmir,80there are many complexities about the arms supply relationship. Most of these weapons have come from the arms bazaar in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (nwfp)—a vast black market for weapons—and members of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (isi), operating either on their own or with the tacit or explicit complicity of the central Pakistani government. Many of the weapons acquired from these sources were siphoned off from U.S. arms transfers to Afghan mujahidin fighting Soviet forces—the so-called "Afghan pipeline" in which the U.S. funneled vast supplies of arms through the isi to the Afghan resistance.81 However, the extent to which the isi actively assists and directs the flow of weapons from Pakistan to India remains unclear, as does the level of sanctioning authority within the isi and the Pakistani government.
On May 16, 1994, The Washington Post reported that Pakistan had temporarily ceased direct support for Kashmiri insurgents in 1993 after the U.S. threatened to add it to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, which would trigger a severing of economic ties. The article also noted that during this period, Pakistan funneled support through "private organizations," frequently operated by former army and isi officials.82Ostensibly private organizations have continued to supply arms to the militants, in operations overseen by the Pakistani army. Jamaat-I-Islami, the major Islamist political party in Pakistan, allegedly claimed in April 1994 that it collected 25 million rupees (almost one million dollars) in a nationwide fundraising campaign to support the militant cause in Kashmir. And, at times, the transfer of arms to Kashmiri militants may be carried out by members of the isi without explicit authorization.83 In addition to weaponssupplies from the isi and other official or quasi-official sources, it also appears that significant quantities of weapons are purchased through commercial channels, in particular through the arms bazaars in the nwfp.84
Killings and Other Abuses by Militant Groups
In the years before tensions in Kashmir erupted into near-civil war, the JKLF and other militant groups deliberately targeted civilians for assassination. The principal targets included members of the Hindu community in Kashmir,85 civil servants and political figures, particularly Muslim political leaders associated with the National Conference party and other political groups opposed by the militants. Militant groups have also abducted and executed civilians, both Hindu and Muslim, whom they have accused of being government informers or of otherwise supporting the government of India.86 As a matter of policy, militant groups summarily executed captured security personnel. These executions violate international humanitarian law.
Some groups, particularly but not exclusively those led by non-Kashmiri militants from Afghanistan or Pakistan, have also exploded bombs in buses and cars with the intention of killing civilians. Members of militant groups have used rocket-propelled launchers to fire grenades into government buildings of the civil administration, injuring and killing employees. Armed militant groups have also launched targeted bomb attacks against civilians in Jammu district and in Delhi.
A number of militant organizations have claimed responsibility for some of the assassinations, kidnapings and other attacks carried out by their forces in Kashmir. There are many other cases in which no group has taken responsibility, and it is impossible to say which of the many groups operating in the state have committed these abuses. In each of the cases described in this chapter, militants killed, assaulted or threatened civilians with death; these actions directly violate international humanitarian law, which protects civilians and other non-combatants from abuse.
There are no precise figures for the number of killings of this kind that have taken place since the conflict began. Government sources report that more than 4,000 civilians have been killed by militant groups since 1990, and another 6,000 injured. The cases described below are illustrative of the kind of murders of civilians that militant groups have committed and continue to commit.
Killings and Attempted Assassinations
· On April 15, 1996, Taj Mohideen, a candidate from the Congress party, escaped assassination when militants threw a grenade at him during a rally in Dayalgam, Anantnag district. 87
· On February 14, 1996, the Muslim Janbaz Force (MJF) issued "shoot-on-sight" orders to kill five former militant leaders who had attempted to initiate negotiations with the government of India. In its statement, the MJF called on all militants to shoot Babar Bader, Bilal Lodhi, Imran Rahi, Ghulam Mohideen Lone and Ahsan Dar on the grounds that their move to start peace talks was "a conspiracy hatched by India's Research and Analysis Wing. (RAW) [India's intelligence organization] against the freedom movement of Kashmiris."88
· Parvez Imroz, a Kashmiri human rights activist, was shot on April 12, 1995, when he was driving home after visiting a friend some eight kilometers from Srinagar. At 7:45 pm, as Imroz reached the outskirts of Kanipura, two men armed with automatic weapons signaled for him to stop. Imroz sped up, and as he passed he was hit in the upper left back. He lost control of the car and stopped in front of a mosque. Someone came out of the mosque and drove Imroz to the SMHS hospital. Fragments of AK-56 bullets were found in Imroz's upper back, and his left lung was damaged. After six days, Imroz was transferred to a hospital in Delhi, where he remained for fifteen days. When he returned to the valley, several militants of Hezb-ul Mujahedin apologized for shooting him, claiming that it was a case of mistaken identity.
Killings and other Attacks on the Hindu Minority
The militants have also used threats to compel Hindu families and suspected political opponents to leave the Kashmir valley. Beginning in 1988, many Hindus were made the targets of threats and acts of violence by militant organizations, and this wave of killing and harassment motivated many to leave the valley.89 With government assistance, a large part of the Hindu community in Kashmir, numbering more than 100,000, left the valley in 1989-90.90 The threats have continued. According to a report in 1992, when one militant group, the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin, appealed for the Kashmiri Hindus to come back to the valley, two others, Al-Umar and Al-Jehad, immediately issued press releases warning them not to return.91 Such threats and violence constitute violations of the laws of war, and Human Rights Watch/Asia was able to document many specific cases that occurred early in the conflict.
· On January 4, 1996, fifteen Hindu villagers from the Barshala village in Doda were killed after unidentified gunmen reportedly ordered them to line up before separating Hindus from Muslims. Official sources claimed that Harakat-ul Ansar was responsible.
Summary Executions and Other Abuses Against Accused Informers
The killings of suspected police informers or others accused of undermining the militant's political or military objectives have been ordered by senior commanders of the militant organizations. While some individual militants maymurder political rivals or carry out vendetta killings on their own, the assassinations of political figures and suspected government agents are carried out as a matter of policy.92
A number of militant organizations have claimed responsibility for executions of suspected informers, political figures and civil servants. There are many other cases in which no group has taken responsibility, and it is impossible to say which, if any, of the many groups operating in the state may have committed the crime. Such executions have been reported frequently since 1990.
Militant leaders have admitted that they execute members of the security forces who have been captured by their forces. Such executions represent grave violations of international humanitarian law.
Indiscriminate Attacks
Common Article 3 prohibits not only murder but other forms of "violence to life and person," including violence that results in injury and not death. Militant bombings and grenade attacks on civilian government buildings and civilian transport vehicles are violations of the laws of war. Militants have also planted land mines on public roads, posing a serious risk to civilian traffic, including medical vehicles.
· The increase in bomb blasts in late 1995 appeared to mark a new phase in the militants' strategy. At least six bombs exploded during the first week of September in the center of Srinagar, an area where attacks had been rare, with the largest bomb killing at least thirteen people and injuring more than two dozen.93
· A bomb exploded on December 3, 1995 at a crowded bus stop in Anantnag. At least eight people were killed and twenty injured. All of the victims were civilians. No group claimed responsibility for the December blast.94
· A bomb exploded in the Sadar Bazar business district of Srinagar in early January 1996 killing seven people and injuring up to thirty-five others. A little known Kashmiri separatist group, the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front, claimed responsibility for the bomb. A spokesman for the group said it was in protest against "atrocities" committed by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and that the JKIF would "retaliate outside Kashmir." The same group claimed responsibility for a bomb that injured at least twenty-two others in Delhi in November 1995.95 Indian police arrested two suspected Kashmiri rebels believed to belong to the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front in connection with the bombing.96
· At a parade site in Srinagar on Republic Day, January 26, 1996, a rocket with a timing device was detected before detonation.97
· On November 10, 1995, two civilians and a soldier were killed when an army vehicle struck a landmine near the village of Jahalas about 145 miles west of Jammu. No group claimed responsibility for planting the mine.98
Militants have also opened fire indiscriminately at civilian vehicles.
Kidnaping
Kidnapings, long a favored tactic of some of the militant groups, has continued unabated. As this report went to press, three European and one American kidnaped by the little known Al-Faran group in July 1995 were still missing. The group executed a Norwegian hostage in August 1995. Less publicized have been the kidnapings of hundreds of Kashmiris by militant groups over the years. Many of these kidnapings have also ended in murder. The motives for kidnaping are both political and criminal: civilians have been held as hostages for detained colleagues, or as a means to extort funds from their families; many of these hostages have been murdered.
Common Article 3 prohibits the "taking of hostages." The International Committee of the Red Cross commentary on Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions explains that hostages are persons
detained for the purpose of obtaining certain advantages. This means that hostages are persons who find themselves, willingly or unwillingly, in the power of the enemy and who answer with their freedom or their life for compliance with the orders of the latter and for upholding the security of its armed forces.99
Since the conflict began, militants have engaged in frequent kidnapings of civilians, some of whom have been held as hostages for detained colleagues, or as a means of exerting pressure on family members of the victim who support a rival militant organization. Particularly in 1991, militant groups also kidnaped foreigners, apparently as a means to attract international attention. Militants have also kidnaped civilians in order to extort funds from their families. Human Rights Watch/Asia has documented numerous cases of kidnapings that occurred between 1989 and 1993.100 According to government sources, over 2,000 persons have been kidnaped by militant groups since 1990, 548 in 1995 alone.
The Al Faran Kidnaping
The most prominent case in 1995 was the kidnaping of five tourists by a previously-unknown militant group, Al-Faran. On July 4, 1995, two American tourists, Donald Hutchings and John Childs, and two British tourists, Paul Wells and Keith Mangan, were kidnaped near Pahalgam. Childs later managed to escape. Only July 8, Al-Faran kidnaped a German tourist, Dirk Hasert. The next day, one last hostage, a Norwegian, Hans Christian Ostro, was taken in the Zojibal area. For about two months, a tense dialogue was kept alive between Indian negotiators and Al-Faran, with the militant group demanding the release of twenty-one jailed militants including four senior leaders of different groups and refusing to compromise on their demands.101 Less than six weeks after the last hostage was taken, Ostro's body was found decapitated with the words "Al-Faran" carved on his back. The murder was widely condemned by other militant organizations in Kashmir and the All Parties Huriyat Conference. Undeterred, the group has repeatedly threatened to kill the remaining hostages . After the murder, commando forces were dispatched and negotiators from the U.S. and Britainwere flown in to assist the Indian Security forces in locating the hostages.102 By October, New Delhi's credibility in handling the situation had been seriously damaged. Foreign diplomats claimed that the Indian government had begun censoring information that was exchanged between them and Al-Faran.103 As this report went to press, there was no further information about the fate of the remaining hostages.
72 Article 13 of Protocol II provides, "Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited."
74 "India: Kashmir Guerrillas Threaten Indian Poll Officials," Reuters, April 16, 1996.
75 "Who's Who of Militancy," India Today, September 15, 1995, p. 24.
76 The influx of foreign fighters has reportedly increased since 1994; however, these groups represent a small proportion of the militants fighting in Kashmir. See Harinder Baweja, "Losing Control," India Today, p.27.
77 "Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front Reportedly Splits," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring Service in Reuters, September 30, 1995.
78 "Who's Who of Militancy," India Today, September 15, 1995, p. 24.
79 Under Pakistan's late president Zia ul-Haq, the ISI gained increased powers over domestic and foreign intelligence operations. The ISI has also been the conduit for outside covert assistance to the Afghan resistance and has reportedly provided some of that weaponry to a number of militant groups in Kashmir. See Selig S. Harrison, "Showdown in Kashmir," Peace and Security, Vol. 5, Number 3, Autumn 1990, pp. 8-9. See also, Steve Coll,"India, Pakistan Wage Covert `Proxy Wars'," The Washington Post, December 8, 1990.
80 See, for example, John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, "After Cold War, U.S.-Pakistani Ties are Turning Sour; U.S. Threatens Sanctions, Alleging Support for Terrorism," The Washington Post, April 21, 1993. This report notes that the U.S. State Department was considering formally naming Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism because of official assistance to Sikh and Kashmiri militants, and indicates that the cia "long has had solid information that Pakistan has trained, funded and supplied such rebels."
81 The Washington Post also cited a former isi official who claimed that Pakistani officials developed close ties to Indian Muslims who fought alongside the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, segregating them in special training camps, and later providing assistance through them to insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam. Anderson and Moore, "After Cold War...," The Washington Post.
82 John Ward Anderson, "Pakistan Aiding Rebels...," The Washington Post.
83 See Human Rights Watch/ Arms Project, Arms and Abuses in Indian Punjab and Kashmir (New York: Human Rights Watch: September 1994). Anderson, "Pakistan Aiding Rebels...," The Washington Post.
84 See Arms and Abuses. See also R.A. Davis, "Kashmir in the Balance," International Defense Review, April 1991; Christopher Thomas, "Indian Border Forces Masses as Kashmir 'War Season' Looms," The Times, June 24, 1990.
85 When the conflict escalated in 1989, militant groups issued widespread threats to members of the minority Hindu community in Kashmir. Attacks on Hindus since 1988, and particularly in early 1990, have driven more than 100,000 Hindus to flee Kashmir to Jammu and Delhi, where most remain in increasingly desperate conditions in refugee camps. Tens of thousands of Muslims have also fled.
86 Militants have also killed and wounded members of the security forces -- the CRPF, BSF and others -- operating in Kashmir. These are not violations of the laws of war if the killings occur in combat or ambush and are not the result of perfidy. Insofar as members of the security forces have combat duties and are actively engaged in hostilities, they are military targets, subject to direct attack. Although policemen, customs agents and other government personnel authorized to bear arms are excluded from the definition of "armed forces" and are not proper military targets, policemen with combat duties are military targets. See Report of Working Group B, Committee I, 18 March 1975 (CDDH/I/238/Rev.1; X, 93), in Levie, Howard S., ed., The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 67. BSF, CRPF and other national security forces operating in Kashmir routinely engage in combat with militants. In many situations, they are, in effect, acting in lieu of army soldiers to perform purely military functions. Under international humanitarian law applicable in internal armed conflicts, the government may try members of guerrilla forces for sedition, treason and murder in violation of state laws, but must afford them due process.
87 "India: Congress Candidate Escapes Kashmir Grenade Attack," Reuters, April 15, 1996.
88 Sheikh Mushtaq, "India: Kashmir Rebel Group Orders Killing of Breakaways," Reuters, February 14, 1996.
89 The government role in encouraging the exodus, particularly the part played by former Governor Jagmohan, is a matter of considerable controversy in Kashmir and among the Hindu refugees in Jammu and New Delhi. Some reports suggest that while many Hindus left the valley out of fear of militant violence, some may have been encouraged to leave by authorities who hoped to undermine support for the militant movement.
90 The precise number of Kashmiri Hindus who fled the valley during this time is not known. Estimates vary widely. According to one press report, as of November 1990, some 50,000 Hindu families had fled. See James P. Sterba, "Valley of Death," Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1990. India Today previously had reported almost 90,000 Hindus having left the valley for Jammu or Delhi. India Today, April 30, 1990, p. 10. Many began leaving in 1988, and the migrations continued through 1990.
91 Harinder Baweja, "Living on the Edge," India Today, July 15, 1992, p. 48.
92 Militant leaders have stated that they conduct judicial proceedings against anyone captured by their forces who is accused of informing on the militants to the security forces or otherwise harming the political and military objectives of the militants. During interrogation of suspected informers, the militants have resorted to brutal methods to coerce confessions or other information. Although the militants claim to hold trials of those in custody, these procedures are so rudimentary and biased that they constitute a clear violation of internationally-recognized standards of due process, and executions carried out on the basis of such procedures represent gross abuses of international humanitarian law.
93 "Blast Sends Fearful Shudder though Kashmir," Reuters, September 8, 1995.
94 "At Least Three Killed in Kashmir Blast," Reuters, December 3, 1995.
95 "Seventh Victim Dies after Delhi Bomb Explosion," Reuters, January 4, 1996.
96 "India Arrests Two Kashmiris for Delhi Blast," Reuters, January 4, 1996.
97 "Bomb Blasts Mar Indian Day of Celebration," Reuters, January 26, 1996.
98 "India: Road Accidents, Land Mine Kill 22 in India," Reuters, November 10, 1995.
99 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987) p. 874. Although the Additional Protocols do not bind the parties to the Kashmir conflict, as elaborations upon the principles outlined in common Article 3, they provide rules of authoritative guidance which may be used in evaluating the parties' conduct.
101 "Sticking to their Guns," India Today, August 15, 1995, p. 37.
102 "The Hostage Crisis," India Today, September 15, 1995, p. 19.
103 "Credibility on the Line," India Today, October 31, 1995, p. 48.
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