The US vice president should not ignore the plight of foreigners who came to fight alongside the Bosnian Army in the 1991-1993 civil war, who are facing detention and deportation. As U.S. Vice President, Joe Biden, and EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, visit Sarajevo this week, they will usher in a new chapter in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s relations with the West.
Many people in Bosnia and beyond thought they would never see Radovan Karadzic standing before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It seemed almost beyond the dreams of the rape victims that I interviewed in Bosnia in 1993, or those held in concentration camps. But even then, in the midst of the conflict and in very difficult circumstances, local civilians had painstakingly gathered detailed testimonies from survivors in the hope that one day, there would be justice for these crimes.
It’s the day many in Bosnia believed would never come – the delivery of Radovan Karadzic to the Hague face genocide and war crimes charges. But Karadzic’s trial, a milestone for justice, will not be enough to solve Bosnia’s complex human rights problems, many linked to the bloody legacy of the war directed by Karadzic and his military partner General Ratko Mladic, who remains at large. It won’t even be enough to settle wartime accounts, especially with those who pulled the trigger, rather than those who gave the orders.
John Laughland suggests that human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, are more concerned about the conviction of former heads of state than about them getting fair trials. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Skepticism in Serbia about the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is nothing new, but the recent judgment against Naser Oric has provoked a storm of criticism. The court sentenced Oric, the wartime commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica, to two years’ imprisonment for command responsibility in the murder of five Serb prisoners and cruel treatment of ten others, committed by individuals under his control in 1992 and 1993.
The furore over the death in prison of Slobodan Milosevic weeks before he was due to be sentenced should not obscure the debate about how criminals of the Balkans Wars are to be brought to justice. There is a huge 'impunity gap'.
Slobodan Milosevic conducted his legal defense much as he did his political life: with bombast, bullying and belligerence. Observing Milosevic for weeks and weeks in The Hague in the first half of his four-year trial, it became quickly clear to me that he was undertaking a political offensive in the courtroom rather than presenting a rebuttal of the 66 charges he faced.
Bringing to justice those who commit atrocities has obvious appeal. It provides redress for victims and their families, punishes perpetrators, and deters others from replicating their crimes. But is the price too high? Critics argue that the threat of prosecution compels dictators to cling to power rather than step down, or that it encourages abusive combatants to fight on rather than sue for peace. Yet a decade of experience with international tribunals suggests these fears are overblown.
The 1995 massacre in Srebrenica occurred because Bosnian Serb leaders, intoxicated by hatred and an illusory sense of omnipotence, lashed out savagely against the country’s Muslim population. But the international community also bears responsibility for the worst crime in Europe since World War Two. After promising protection to the inhabitants of Srebrenica, the United Nations and NATO allowed the “safe area” to fall. That responsibility is compounded by the continuing failure to bring to justice Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the two men indicted as the principal architects of the Srebrenica genocide.
A recent article by Vlado Rajic in Vjesnik (“Leveling On the Part of Human Rights Defenders,” October 16, 2004) about Human Rights Watch’s report on domestic war crimes trials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, misrepresents both the report and the actual state of war crimes prosecutions in Croatia.
The US vice president should not ignore the plight of foreigners who came to fight alongside the Bosnian Army in the 1991-1993 civil war, who are facing detention and deportation. As U.S. Vice President, Joe Biden, and EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, visit Sarajevo this week, they will usher in a new chapter in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s relations with the West.
Many people in Bosnia and beyond thought they would never see Radovan Karadzic standing before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It seemed almost beyond the dreams of the rape victims that I interviewed in Bosnia in 1993, or those held in concentration camps. But even then, in the midst of the conflict and in very difficult circumstances, local civilians had painstakingly gathered detailed testimonies from survivors in the hope that one day, there would be justice for these crimes.
It’s the day many in Bosnia believed would never come – the delivery of Radovan Karadzic to the Hague face genocide and war crimes charges. But Karadzic’s trial, a milestone for justice, will not be enough to solve Bosnia’s complex human rights problems, many linked to the bloody legacy of the war directed by Karadzic and his military partner General Ratko Mladic, who remains at large. It won’t even be enough to settle wartime accounts, especially with those who pulled the trigger, rather than those who gave the orders.
John Laughland suggests that human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, are more concerned about the conviction of former heads of state than about them getting fair trials. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Skepticism in Serbia about the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is nothing new, but the recent judgment against Naser Oric has provoked a storm of criticism. The court sentenced Oric, the wartime commander of the Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica, to two years’ imprisonment for command responsibility in the murder of five Serb prisoners and cruel treatment of ten others, committed by individuals under his control in 1992 and 1993.
The furore over the death in prison of Slobodan Milosevic weeks before he was due to be sentenced should not obscure the debate about how criminals of the Balkans Wars are to be brought to justice. There is a huge 'impunity gap'.
Slobodan Milosevic conducted his legal defense much as he did his political life: with bombast, bullying and belligerence. Observing Milosevic for weeks and weeks in The Hague in the first half of his four-year trial, it became quickly clear to me that he was undertaking a political offensive in the courtroom rather than presenting a rebuttal of the 66 charges he faced.
Bringing to justice those who commit atrocities has obvious appeal. It provides redress for victims and their families, punishes perpetrators, and deters others from replicating their crimes. But is the price too high? Critics argue that the threat of prosecution compels dictators to cling to power rather than step down, or that it encourages abusive combatants to fight on rather than sue for peace. Yet a decade of experience with international tribunals suggests these fears are overblown.
The 1995 massacre in Srebrenica occurred because Bosnian Serb leaders, intoxicated by hatred and an illusory sense of omnipotence, lashed out savagely against the country’s Muslim population. But the international community also bears responsibility for the worst crime in Europe since World War Two. After promising protection to the inhabitants of Srebrenica, the United Nations and NATO allowed the “safe area” to fall. That responsibility is compounded by the continuing failure to bring to justice Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the two men indicted as the principal architects of the Srebrenica genocide.
A recent article by Vlado Rajic in Vjesnik (“Leveling On the Part of Human Rights Defenders,” October 16, 2004) about Human Rights Watch’s report on domestic war crimes trials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro, misrepresents both the report and the actual state of war crimes prosecutions in Croatia.