On April 3, 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Angolan government announced the beginning of a Staff Monitored Program (SMP). This program is an ambitious agreement to implement a wide range of economic and institutional reforms in Angola that could lead to further lending and cooperation with the IMF and World Bank, but it is unclear whether the government will be able to comply with its requirements. The SMP includes a provision to monitor oil revenues known as the "Oil Diagnostic."1 Human Rights Watch believes that should the Oil Diagnostic be implemented, it could mark a limited, but positive first step toward promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance in Angola and, ultimately, greater respect for human rights. But there are pitfalls in the process that could impede the success of this program. This backgrounder details recent developments regarding the Oil Diagnostic and other issues related to oil and human rights in Angola.
The World Bank and government of Angola are supervising the Oil Diagnostic and, KPMG, an international accounting and consulting firm, is implementing it. The diagnostic is not a comprehensive audit despite persistent allegations of government corruption and financial mismanagement. It is principally a forward-looking agreement to monitor oil revenues; to help the Angolan government develop an effective mechanism for determining how much revenue the central bank should receive from oil production; and to encourage good governance.2 The first Oil Diagnostic report is due in April 2001.3
The Oil Diagnostic is particularly significant because oil revenue has been and remains the Angolan government's principal source of income, and has generated most of the resources enabling the government to pursue its conflict with Jonas Savimbi's rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) movement. Between 1995-1999, oil revenues comprised approximately 70 to 89 percent of government revenues and approximately 85 to 92 percent of exports, according to the IMF.4 In 2000, oil accounted for U.S. $3.26 billion of government revenue.5 On February 23, 2001, the Angolan government announced that oil revenues would account for 90.5 percent of the current year's budget, or approximately U.S. $3.18 billion.6
The opaqueness of the Angolan government's budget and expenditures has generated concern among multilateral financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and governments, as well as within Angola itself. At issue are the use of public funds, derived from oil revenues, to secretly finance arms purchases and the mortgaging of future oil revenues in return for immediate oil-backed loans to the government. In some cases in the recent past, oil revenues bypassed the Ministry of Finance and the central bank (the Banco Nacional de Angola, or BNA) and went through the state-owned oil company, Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola (Sonangol), or through the Presidency, and were used secretly to procure weapons.7 This sparked allegations of official corruption.8 The government's lack of transparency engendered further controversy in June 2000 when André Tarallo, former Africa director of France's Elf Aquitaine (now TotalFina-Elf) oil company, testified to French authorities that Elf kept a multimillion dollar slush fund, derived from oil proceeds (up to U.S. $0.40/barrel went into the fund), in Liechtenstein. These funds were allegedly used to pay African leaders, including Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, from the 1970s to 1990s.9 Dos Santos and TotalFina-Elf have denied the allegations.10
The Angolan government's practices have not met basic standards for fiscal transparency and accountability, such as those detailed in the IMF's Code of Good Practices for Fiscal Transparency. The code calls for open disclosure and reporting in order to encourage public debate about fiscal policy and ensure governmental accountability.11 The secret dealings of the government made it impossible for the Angolan public and media to hold the government accountable for its use of public funds. In addition, the government has responded to public and press criticism of its use of the country's oil revenues by clamping down on journalists and restricting freedom of expression. In this regard, fiscal transparency, political accountability, and human rights are inextricably intertwined in Angola.
Further Details on the Oil Diagnostic
The initial agreement to carry out the Oil Diagnostic was reached in April 2000, but procedural delays held up the announcement of the monitoring contract for several months. On November 20, 2000, the Angolan government announced that the international accounting and consulting firm KPMG had been awarded the U.S. $1.6 million contract to conduct the Oil Diagnostic. The government will pay 68 percent of the costs of the program while the World Bank will pay the remainder.12
The Oil Diagnostic will not examine how the government uses its oil revenues after they are deposited in the central bank. To do this, the government should be required to publish a detailed budget and an account of actual expenditures. The purpose of the Oil Diagnostic will be to assess only whether the amount of oil revenues generated are equal to the amount of funds deposited in the central bank, and to develop mechanisms that enable the government to monitor revenues accurately. To achieve these goals, KPMG will be responsible for carrying out the following seven components:
• The creation of a database that contains an assessment of proven and probable oil reserves, production, and exports.
• The development of projections of export oil prices, production, exports, and subsequent revenues payable to the government on a quarterly basis from mid-2000 to the end of 2001, and annually until 2005.
• Monitoring of the actual revenues received by the government and comparing these figures to the projections of revenues on a quarterly basis from June 2000 to December 2001. This includes signature bonus payments.
• Assessing the government's existing monitoring of exports, the government's data management, and financial and procurement procedures.
• Providing recommendations to improve institutional and regulatory controls within the government to "support the sound management of oil revenues."
• Designing and implementing a monitoring system for the government so that it can accurately assess oil revenues.
• Training of Angolan staff and providing proposals for institutional strengthening so that the government can continue monitoring of oil revenues.13
Ideally, this agreement will lead to a substantial improvement in the government's management of oil revenues and greater transparency and accountability in its use of such income. However, the agreement has limitations that could hinder such developments. These include:
• The government of Angola has not made a commitment to make the KPMG reports public, although one of the key objectives of the Oil Diagnostic is "to assist the Government in increasing transparency with respect to revenues from petroleum production."14 The Oil Diagnostic reports are technically the property of the Angolan government, and it has given no commitment to make the reports public. This is particularly troubling. According to the IMF Code of Good Practices for Fiscal Transparency, "a public commitment should be made [by the government] to the timely publication of fiscal information;" and "the integrity of fiscal information should be subject to public and independent scrutiny."15 Moreover, recent World Bank research suggests that media independence, judicial independence, and public scrutiny are crucial for ensuring government accountability in countries where there is weak governance.16 Human Rights Watch urges the Angolan government to make a firm commitment to release all Oil Diagnostic reports to the public as soon as they become available, and to ensure that they are disseminated in Portuguese.
• The IMF and World Bank cannot release the Oil Diagnostic reports without the government's permission, even though they receive copies of the reports and the World Bank is funding approximately 32 percent of the diagnostic. KPMG is not allowed to release these reports independently because it is a government contractor, and the reports are considered government property. The IMF and the World Bank could insist that the government publish the reports as a measure of the successful implementation of the Oil Diagnostic, and a condition for further cooperation between these institutions and the government. So far, the IMF has said that it will insist on the public release of the reports, but not what it will do if the government refuses to publish the reports.17 Human Rights Watch believes that the World Bank and the IMF should insist that the government release the Oil Diagnostic reports as an explicit requirement of any further cooperation with the international financial institutions.
• It is not clear that the Angolan government will have the capacity to independently report on oil revenues by the time that the Oil Diagnostic expires in 2002. KPMG is responsible for comparing projected with actual revenues during the last two quarters of 2000, and throughout 2001. KPMG's first report is due in April 2001, and is expected to include their initial assessment of oil revenues. Subsequently, KPMG is to submit reports to the Angolan government, the World Bank, and the IMF every three months until the agreement ends. During this time, KPMG will also provide monthly updates on its findings to the Angolan government.18 After the final KPMG report, the government is expected to assume direct monitoring itself. However, it is by no means clear that the government will have the capacity to report on these issues independently by the end of 2002. Human Rights Watch urges the World Bank, IMF, and the Angolan government to continue the diagnostic under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank until the government adequately demonstrates its ability to publicly report on these matters.
• The Oil Diagnostic is not retroactive despite previous controversies over oil-for-arms deals and oil mortgaging. KPMG is expected to examine data going back to approximately 1998 as a basis for comparison with current production and revenues.19 It is not clear whether this data will be included in the quarterly monitoring reports. Human Rights Watch believes that the pre-2000 data should be included in the first Oil Diagnostic report.
• The government should provide a detailed and public accounting in response to any discrepancies identified by KMPG. If discrepancies emerge between the projected and actual revenues deposited in the central bank, the Oil Diagnostic requires only that the government provide a "sufficient explanation" of such discrepancies.20 In some cases, discrepancies may be due to fluctuations in oil prices, changes in the price of oil due to variation in oil quality, or lesser (or greater) production than initially recorded.21 However, other types of discrepancies are also possible-such as off-the-books arms purchases or loan repayments funneled through Sonangol or the Presidency. KPMG's ability to account for these discrepancies is completely dependent on the quality of information it receives from the government. It is critically important, therefore, that the government should provide-and the multilateral institutions insist on-the most thorough, verifiable, and public explanation from the government of all discrepancies to establish transparency and accountability.
• The Oil Diagnostic is not an investigation into the use or misuse of oil revenues by individuals within the government. In fact, the agreement between KPMG and the government explicitly states that "the consultants [KPMG] shall not be expected or required to consider or investigate or conduct any form of enquiry into the conduct, practices, honesty, integrity or standards of, or nature or quality of work performed by, any person who has or may have had, any involvement in or connection with, directly or indirectly, the facts, matters, circumstances or events which shall be diagnosed, monitored, studied, assessed or considered by the consultants during the performance of these services." [original emphasis] 22 Rather than avoiding a full audit, Human Rights Watch strongly believes that the IMF, World Bank, and government of Angola should negotiate a comprehensive audit of discrepancies if such discrepancies emerge.
• As yet, it remains unclear whether the Angolan government will make public KPMG's final report and recommendations, as it should do, and subsequently report on its progress in implementing those recommendations. KPMG will have eighteen months from the end of 2001 to prepare a final report to the government, IMF, and World Bank. This report will contain recommendations, including safeguards against "concluding of contracts for the procurement of goods and services without adequate competitive bidding or on a basis other than arm's length; and any other fraudulent or unprofessional practices which it [KPMG] deems worthy of attention."23 Given the serious nature of the recommendations likely to be made, Human Rights Watch believes it is essential that the Angolan government should publish this final report in full, and should subsequently issue further information periodically to report on its implementation of those recommendations to the Angolan public
1 In addition to the Oil Diagnostic, the monitoring program sets out a series of ambitious reforms that the government must undertake before becoming eligible for Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility loans from the international financial institutions, including: creating an integrated financial management system; eliminating domestic fuel subsidies; limiting subsidies to indebted state-owned enterprises; eliminating tax exemptions that are not a part of international agreements; eliminating import licenses and non-tariff barriers; simplifying commercial licensing; progressively adjusting tariffs for public services such as water and electricity to market levels; liquidate the Caixa de Credito Agropecuria (CAP); defining a strategy to deal with the country's external debt; clearing arrears payments to multilateral financial institutions; gradually eliminating external commercial credits to the central bank; creating a register of debt service payments, including oil-backed loans; preparing a restructuring of the financial system, including privatization of state banks; revising of the special foreign exchange regime; presenting a policy document on privatization; implementing a pilot program involving the privatization of five state-owned companies; publishing comprehensive statistics on government accounts and macroeconomic indices; and preparing a plan for tax reform.
2 In June and September 2000, Human Rights Watch released "The International Monetary Fund's Staff Monitoring Program for Angola: The Human Rights Implications" a backgrounder that detailed certain provisions and weaknesses of the Oil Diagnostic and recommendations to ensure greater transparency and accountability on the part of the Angolan government. Some statistical figures regarding government revenues and expenditures have been revised since the release of this document, reflecting updated information by the World Bank and IMF.
3 Additionally, the international accounting and consulting firm, Ernst & Young, is conducting an audit of the Angolan central bank (the Banco Nacional de Angola, or BNA) that should be completed by March 2001. The state-owned diamond company, Empresa Nacional de Diamantes de Angola (ENDIAMA), has agreed to conduct its own diamond diagnostic. The IMF and World Bank may negotiate a more comprehensive study of the diamond sector after reviewing the findings of the ENDIAMA diagnostic.
4 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Angola: Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report Number 00/111, August 2000 pp. 13, 41. In general, the country's reliance on oil peaked in 1995 but appears to have surpassed this in 2001.
5 Government of Angola, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, memorandum for the IMF, February 2001.
6 Ibid; and "2001 State Budget Presented," ANGOP, February 23, 2001. According to recent estimates, Angola produces approximately 766,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd). Oil production is estimated to increase to 1 million bpd by the end of 2001 and 1.4 million bpd by 2003.The vast majority (approximately 474,000 bpd) of oil production occurs in Block 0 located offshore the enclave of Cabinda. The companies involved are a joint venture between Sonangol (41 percent), TotalFina-Elf (10 percent), ENI-Agip (9.8 percent), and the operator Chevron (39.2 percent) through its Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC) subsidiary. At the end of 1999, total production in Block 0 reached 510,000 bpd, or approximately 67 percent of Angola's total oil production. The second largest area of production is Block 3 located offshore the northern coast of Angola, producing approximately 174,000 bpd. TotalFina-Elf (50 percent) is the operator and the other joint-venture partners include Ajoco (25 percent), ENI-Agip (15 percent), INA-Naftaplin (5 percent), and Naftagas (5 percent). Block 2, offshore of the northern city of Soyo produce approximately 84,000 bpd and is a joint venture between the operator Texaco (20 percent), Petrobras (27.5 percent), TotalFina-Elf (27.5 percent), and Sonangol (25 percent).
7 Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p. 95, citing Human Rights Watch interview with a Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) representative, Luanda, August 1998.
8 See, for example: Global Witness, "A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets," December 1999.
9 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report," August 2000, p. 18; Paul Webster, "Elf Spent Dollars 60 m a Year on Bribes, Investigators Told," The Guardian, July 12, 2000; and "New Corruption Allegations at French Oil Group Elf," Reuters, July 11, 2000.
10 "Angola Denies Elf Charges," The Oil Daily, July 21, 2000; and "Angolan President Refutes Elf Bribe Claims," Hart's Africa Oil and Gas, July 26, 2000.
11 IMF, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency-Declaration of Principles. This document is available at: www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htmg.
12 "Petróleos sob Auditoria Internacional," Jornal de Angola, November 20, 2000; and "Angola Announces Audit of Oil Industry," Associated Press, November 21, 2000.
13 Contract for the Oil Diagnostic between the World Bank, the Government of Angola, and KPMG, Appendix A, "Description of the Services," p. 23. Human Rights Watch has confirmed with KPMG and oil companies that this document accurately details the services provided by KPMG.
14 Ibid.
15 IMF, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency-Declaration of Principles, Principles 2.2 and 4.1. This document is available on the Internet at: www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code.htmg.
16 Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, "Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for Evaluation," The World Bank, December 2000, p. 10.
17 Human Rights Watch interview with IMF representative, Washington, D.C., January 23, 2001.
18 "Description of the Services," p. 26.
19 Human Rights Watch interviews with KPMG representatives, Luanda, December 6, 2000.
20 "Description of the Services," p. 23.
21 Human Rights Watch interviews with World Bank representatives, Washington, D.C., May 22, 2000.
22 "Description of the Services," p. 24.
23 Ibid., p. 27.
24 Ibid., p. 24.
25 Human Rights Watch interview with KPMG representatives, Luanda, December 6, 2000.
26 Human Rights Watch interviews with oil company representatives, Luanda, December 5 and 6, 2000; Human Rights Watch interview with IMF representative, January 23, 2001; Human Rights Watch correspondence with Royal Dutch/Shell, February 6, 2001; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report," February 2001, p 17.
27 Human Rights Watch interview with IMF representative, January 23, 2001.
28 BP Amoco (now BP), "BP Social Report, 1997 (London: BP Amoco, 1997), p. 19.
29 Undated letter from BP Amoco (now BP) Chairman Peter Sutherland to House of Lords Member Lord Averbury regarding Averbury's May 18, 1999 letter of inquiry about the government of Angola's use of signature bonus payments paid by BP Amoco.
30 Letter dated February 6, 2001 from BP to Global Witness; and "Campaign Success: BP Makes Move for Transparency in Angola," Global Witness press release, February 12, 2001.
31 BP Exploration (Angola) Limited, "Annual Report and Accounts 1999," October 16, 2000, p. 11. BP published this payment because it was considered a "material payment" that had to be disclosed to Companies House in London. The other payments were not detailed because they were cash payments and did not require the same level of disclosure.
32 At the time Block Thirty-One was awarded, the press estimated that the total bonus payment would be approximately U.S. $350 million. For example, see "Signature Bonuses In Angola 'Much Higher' Than Expected-Sonangol," Dow Jones Energy Service, April 13, 1999. Based on the figures supplied in the BP annual report, the calculated total appears to be approximately U.S. $333 million. Since joint-venture partners in oil blocks pay amounts according to their percent ownership of the block, the BP payment represented 26.67 percent of the total bonus payment. The total bonus payment would have been about U.S. $416,531,684, but Sonangol is a 20 percent owner of the block and would not have paid a bonus payment, so 20 percent (approximately U.S. $83,306,336) of the total can be subtracted. The new total, minus Sonangol's share, would be approximately U.S. $333,225,347, which is consistent with estimates that the bonus payment would be about U.S. $350 million. Based on this figure, Exxon-Mobil (25 percent) paid approximately U.S. $104,132,921; Statoil (13.33 percent) paid approximately U.S. $55,398,714; Marathon Oil (10 percent) paid approximately U.S. $41,653,168; and TotalFina-Elf (5 percent) paid approximately U.S. $20,826,584.
33 Government of Angola, Memorandum of Economic and Fiscal Policies, memorandum to the IMF, February 2001.
34 Angola: Recent Economic Developments, p. 43.
35 Human Rights Watch interview with a representative of the Angolan Ministry of Defense, Luanda, August 1998.
36 Angola: Recent Economic Developments, p. 43.
37 Ibid.
38 For a comprehensive account of violations by all parties to the conflict see generally Angola Unravels; and Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994).
39 Human Rights Watch field work in Angola in August 1998. These included: (1) seeing new minefields being prepared in Luena in August 1998, and also establishing that the provincial authorities had refused to allow mine clearance operations in these areas; (2) interviewing newly-arrived refugees in Zambia who said that the Angolan National Police had protected their police station in Cazombo by placing mines on their roof; and (3) speaking with Angolan soldiers who admitted to planting mines under orders from their superiors in August 1998 during operations in Piri and in Uige. Human Rights Watch fieldwork in Angola and Zambia, May 2000; and IRIN, "Namibia: Angolans faces terror charges," May 24, 2000.
40 See generally Angola Unravels, p. 108.
41 See generally Ibid., pp. 108-154; The United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violation of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, U.N. Security Council Report S/2000/203, March 10, 2000; and The United Nations, Final Report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, U.N. Security Council Report S/2000/1225, December 21, 2000.
42 See generally Angola Unravels, pp. 103-108.
43 See generally Angola Unravels, pp. 98-103.
44 See generally Angola Unravels, pp. 92-108.
45 Angola Unravels., pp. 94-98; and Human Rights Watch interview with Foreign Minister Venâncio de Moura, Luanda, December 9, 1998.
46 U.S. Energy Information Agency, "Angola: Country Analysis Brief," July 2000.; Angola Unravels, pp. 97-98 citing Africa Confidential vol. 40, no. 10, May 14, 1999; and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola Country Report, 2nd Quarter, 1999," p. 26; and Human Rights Watch interview with French intelligence source, Lisbon, December 1999. The other joint-venture partners in Block Thirty-Three are ExxonMobil (the operator), Naphta, Petrogal, Sonangol, and TotalFina-Elf.
47 Alexandra Brunais, "Mitterrand's Son Posts Bail in Arms Case; Inquiry Sullies Fame of French Ex-Leader," The Washington Post, January 13, 2001.
48 "Mitterrand's Scandal Associated with ZTS-French Press," Czech News Agency, January 10, 2001.
49 Dennis Wagner, "French Detain Local Jet-Setter Falcone Accused in Angolan Arms Deal," The Arizona Republic, January 5, 2001.
50 President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, "Remarks on the Occasion of the Presentation of Credentials by the New French Ambassador to Angola," Luanda, February 23, 2001.
51 "Russian Billionaire Sought in Probe on Weapons Sales to Africa," Agence France-Presse, December 8, 2000.
52 "Mitterrand Son Faces Christmas in Jail," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World News, December 22, 2000.
53 "Mitterrand Affair: Fugitive Businessman Declares His Innocence in Israel," Agence France-Presse, December 29, 2000.
54 Alexandra Brunais, "Mitterrand's Son Posts Bail in Arms Case: Inquiry Sullies Fame of French Ex-Leader," The Washington Post, January 13, 2001.
55 Suzanne Daley, "Mitterrand's Son Free on Bail After 21 Days," The New York Times, January 12, 2001.
56 "France: Court Maintains Mitterrand Arms Traffic Probe," Dow Jones International News, February 23, 2001.
57 Alexandra Brunais, "Mitterrand's Son Posts Bail in Arms Case: Inquiry Sullies Fame of French Ex-Leader," The Washington Post, January 13, 2001.
58 "Mitterrand Son Probe Widens to African Fish Factory," Reuters, February 7, 2001.
59 Catherine Reagor, "Falcones Hold Record for the Priciest Estate," The Arizona Republic, January 12, 2001; and Catherine Reagor, "Hopping on the Trail of a Real Estate Maze," The Arizona Republic, January 12, 2001.
60 Republican National Committee (RNC), Report of Receipts and Dibursements to the U.S. Federal Election Commission, pp.12, 53, June 15, 2000 and addendum.
61 Arizona Republican Committee, Report of Receipts and Disbursements: July 15 Quarterly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission, July 13, 2000, p. 12; and Governor George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory Committee, Report of Receipts and Disbursements: July 15 Quarterly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission, July 15, 1999, p. 1211.
62 Eileen Bailey, "The Scoop: Daddy Bush Down to Earth on Valley Visit," The Arizona Republic, October 7, 2000.
63 Dennis Wagner, "Falcone Firm Gave $100,000 to GOP," The Arizona Republic, January 24, 2001.
64 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mark Pfeifle, RNC spokesperson, Washington, D.C., February 16, 2001.
65 McCain 2000 Inc., Report of Receipts and Disbursements: October 15 Quarterly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission, October 15, 1999; and McCain 2000 Inc., Report of Receipts and Disbursements: Monthly Report to the U.S. Federal Election Commission, March 20, 2000.
66 Democratic National Committee (DNC), Report of Receipts and Disbursements: July 31 Mid Year Report, July 30, 1999.
67 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Rick Hess, Democratic National Committee spokesperson, Washington, March 8, 2001.
68 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 (New York: Human Rights Watch), pp. 32-33.; and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report, June 2000," p.27.
69 "Angola Bound Ship Carrying Arms is Ukrainian, Not Georgian," Agence France-Presse, March 1, 2001.
70 Ibid.; and "Angola Bought Weapons from Ukraine in 'Totally Legal' Transaction," Rádio Ecclesia, Luanda, March 2, 2001.
71 Human Rights Watch interviews with shipping broker, London, September 21, 2000 and March 19, 2001.
72 Human Rights Watch interviews with British customs officials, Plymouth, January 14, 1994; and see generally: Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War.
73 Angola: Recent Economic Developments, pp. 15, 39.
74 Dennis Wagner, "Jet-Setter's Life Marked by Intrigue: Arms-Deal Allegations Don't Fit, Many Say," The Arizona Republic, January 12, 2001; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report 2nd Quarter, 1999," p.26.
75 Human Rights Watch interview with Banco Nacional de Angola official, Luanda, August 1998.
76 Human Rights Watch has seen a copy of the confidential memoranda between Glencore staff and representatives of Sonangol. See also, Africa Confidential, vol. 39, no. 14, July 10, 1998.
77 "Oil Company Signs 575m-dollar Loan Agreement," Reuters, May 21, 1999.
78 Human Rights Watch interview with an oil industry source, London, May 21, 1999.
79 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report," February 2001, p. 28.
80 "Sonangol: U.S. $455 Million Crude Oil Contract Repayment Facility," Standard Chartered Bank Press Release, March 9, 2001. According to banking and oil industry representatives that Human Rights Watch spoke to in March 2001, the loan scheduled for early repayment is reportedly from a UBS-backed oil mortgaging agreement and BP is reportedly the purchaser of the mortgaged oil.
81 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report," August 2000, pp. 17-18
82 Angola: Recent Economic Developments, p. 43. Social spending was lower in 1996, amounting to 9.3 percent of government expenditures.
83 The World Bank, Angola: Country Brief, September 2000. This document is also available on the Internet at: www.worldbank.org/afr/ao2.htm.
84 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000 (New York: UNDP, 2000), p. 160.
85 Angola: Recent Economic Developments, p.19.
86 The United Nations Children's' Fund (UNICEF), State of the World's Children 2001 (New York: UNICEF, December 2000), Table 1: Basic Indicators.
87 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2001 Global Appeal, Addendum I: Angola IDP Programme in Short, January 2001, pp.12-16. This document is also available on the Internet at: www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/ga2001/addago.pdf; and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Angola: Country Report, November 2000," p. 14.
88 Human Rights Watch interviews, Luanda, December 1999 and London, May 2000.
89 Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, p. 473; and U.S. Department of State, Country Human Rights Reports 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2001), Angola country chapter.
90 Country Human Rights Reports 2000, Angola country chapter.
91 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with PADPA representative, Luanda, March 1, 2001; and Human Rights Watch interview with Fernando Macedo of the Angolan human rights organization, Justice, Peace and Democracy, London, March 13, 2001.
