“Our City Was Gone”

Russia’s Devastation of Mariupol, Ukraine


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Summary

Methodology

I. Applicable Legal Standards

II. The Taking of Mariupol

III. Civilians Denied Access to Critical Infrastructure

IV. Struggling to Survive in Shelters

V. Fleeing the City

VI. Extent of Damage to the City

VII. Case Studies: Attacks Harming Civilians

VIII. The Dead, Missing, and Injured

IX. The Aftermath: Demolition, Reconstruction, Russification

X. Russian Chain of Command

XI. Delivering Justice

XII. Acknowledgments



Summary

The story of Russia’s assault on Mariupol is one of horror.

On February 24, 2022, the day Russia began its all-out invasion of Ukraine, the Russian military and Russia-affiliated forces attacked Ukrainian armed forces defending the thriving city in southeastern Ukraine, home to iron and steel plants, a deep-water port, music and art festivals, and an iconic drama theater. Russian forces besieged Mariupol and, for eight weeks, hundreds of thousands of the city’s inhabitants faced devastation and death. Residents cowered in basements, living in fear of airstrikes, incessant shelling, and clashes between the armies. By mid-April, when Russian forces had almost full control of the city, thousands of civilians were dead and thousands of buildings, including high-rise apartments, hospitals, and schools, were damaged or lay in ruins. An estimated 400,000 residents had fled the city by mid-May, but those remaining were left for months without basic services, including electricity, running water, and health care.

This report is based on nearly two years of research conducted by Human Rights Watch and Truth Hounds, a leading Ukrainian human rights organization, as well as 3D reconstructions and visual and spatial analysis by SITU Research. We interviewed 240 people, mostly displaced Mariupol residents, and reviewed and analyzed dozens of satellite images and over 850 photos and videos. The report provides supporting documentation and complements our online feature, “Beneath the Rubble: Documenting Loss in Mariupol, a Ukrainian City Besieged and Devastated.”

The report describes civilians’ lack of access to critical infrastructure and the struggles and risks they faced while sheltering in basements during the Russian assault on the city. It also outlines the repeated, largely unsuccessful attempts by Ukrainian authorities and volunteers, the United Nations (UN), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to organize official evacuations and the delivery of humanitarian aid in the face of Russian intransigence. Our comprehensive building damage assessment found that, by mid-May 2022, 93 percent of the 477 multi-story apartment buildings in the central part of the city had been damaged. All 19 hospital campuses city-wide were damaged, and 86 of the 89 educational facilities that we identified across the city were also damaged.

We documented in detail 14 case studies covering 18 locations, many of which involved apparently unlawful Russian attacks, including attacks on two hospitals, the city’s famous drama theater, a food storage facility, an aid distribution site, a supermarket, and residential buildings serving as shelters. In each of these incidents, we found no evidence of a Ukrainian military presence in or near the building that was struck, which would have made the attack unlawfully indiscriminate. Or we found a limited military presence, which likely made the attack unlawfully disproportionate.

Our research found that thousands of civilians died during Russia’s siege and in the months that followed. Yet the full extent of those who died or were injured during the battle, or who remain missing, may never be known. Our assessment of satellite imagery and analysis of photos and videos of the city’s cemeteries that saw a significant increase in the number of graves shows that more than 10,000 people were buried in Mariupol between March 2022 and February 2023, of whom we estimate at least 8,000 likely died from war-related causes, whether direct attacks or from lack of health care or clean water.

These figures are based on an analysis of the graves in four of the city’s cemeteries and in Manhush town cemetery nearby and is likely a significant underestimation of the total number of dead. Many graves likely contained multiple bodies. The remains of others were likely buried in the rubble and taken away during demolition efforts. Some of those buried in makeshift graves may never have been transferred to the bigger cemeteries, and others either died or were buried outside of Mariupol. We were also not able to determine whether those buried in the city were civilians or military personnel, or how many died as a result of unlawful attacks.

Behind each of the gravesites is a lifetime cut short, a story and, in many cases, a family that was never able to properly mourn or bury their loved one. Relatives of the missing posted information and inquiries on various online platforms; many are still waiting to learn of their fate. Thousands of others were injured during the siege, including those whose wounds were permanent.

Nearly two years since Russian forces captured and occupied Mariupol, the physical landscape of the city has changed profoundly. Damaged multi-story buildings have been demolished, together with countless irreplaceable personal items. Occupying forces have begun the process of building new high-rise apartments, part of Russia’s plans to complete the reconstruction of the city by 2025, and the further development of the city by 2035, if Russia still occupies it. Efforts to clear debris and bring down unsafe structures are consistent with an occupying forces’ obligations to ensure security for the population. However, by not creating the conditions to allow independent human rights investigators, forensic experts, and judicial officials to examine the damaged buildings before demolition, Russia effectively erased the physical evidence at hundreds of potential crime scenes across the city. This makes the digital damage assessment, 3D modeling, and other documentation in this project and others all the more necessary.

To identify the Russian commanders and military units that may have been responsible for laws-of-war violations in Mariupol that could amount to war crimes, we conducted an extensive review and analysis of Russian social media posts, obituaries of Russian personnel, Russian government and military statements, and photos and videos posted by or showing specific units present in Mariupol. We identified a total of 17 units of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces that were operating in the city in March and April 2022. We also concluded that the following 10 individuals may be responsible for war crimes in Mariupol as a matter of command responsibility:

  • Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation and commander-in-chief of the military

  • Sergei Shoigu, defense minister and military second-in-command

  • Valery Gerasimov, first deputy defense minister and chief of the general staff of the armed forces

  • Sergei Rudskoy, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces

  • Alexander Dvornikov, then-commander of the Southern Military District

  • Viktor Zolotov, commander-in-chief of the Russian National Guard

  • Andrei Mordvichev, commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army

  • Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic and Chechen national guard forces

  • Adam Delimkhanov, commander of Chechen forces in Mariupol during the assault on the city

  • Denis Pushilin, head of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and commander-in-chief of the armed groups organized under the DNR at the time of the assault on Mariupol

These individuals, and potentially other commanders of the 17 units identified in Mariupol, should be investigated and appropriately prosecuted for their alleged role in serious violations committed during the Russian forces’ assault. Reparations should also be paid to the victims and their families. Concerted international efforts towards justice and accountability are crucial to demonstrate that unlawful attacks carry consequences, to deter future atrocities, and to reinforce the principle that accountability for grave crimes cannot be eluded because of rank or position.

The battle for Mariupol has been among the most destructive of the war in Ukraine thus far. It left behind an unrecognizable wasteland of destroyed apartment buildings, charred streets, shells of cars and buses, and looted shops, with unknown numbers buried beneath the rubble. For months there was no functioning electricity, water, gas, or basic services such as hospitals and schools. By mid-2022, only an estimated fifth of the original population remained, living under Russian occupation.

In the nearly two years since the devastation of Mariupol and loss of civilian life from heavy weapons, other smaller cities and towns in Ukraine have endured similar destruction. To help protect civilians affected by armed conflicts in Ukraine and around the world, all countries should join and abide by the international Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. They should condemn and seek to end all use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in cities, towns, and villages – no matter where or by whom.


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Methodology

For this report and the accompanying web feature, Human Rights Watch and Truth Hounds—a leading Ukrainian human rights organization—interviewed 240 people. Of these, 26 were Mariupol city officials and volunteers, 11 were healthcare workers in Mariupol, 168 were other Mariupol residents, 7 were national Ukrainian government officials, and 28 were interviewed in other capacities, including volunteers based outside of Mariupol, infrastructure company staff living outside of Mariupol, international and Ukrainian humanitarian staff, Ukrainian and international human rights officials and activists, experts on the Russian military, and Ukrainian and international journalists who reported on Mariupol.

On December 4, 2023, we sent the Russian government a summary of our findings and a list of questions. At time of writing, we had not received a response.

Human Rights Watch and Truth Hounds were unable to visit Mariupol due to the fighting and subsequent occupation of the city, which prevented us from being able to safely conduct interviews in person without undue risk of reprisals against those we spoke to. Instead, we interviewed displaced residents in person or by phone between March 2022 and January 2024.

Nearly all interviews were conducted in Ukrainian, with some conducted in Russian and English. Researchers informed all interviewees about the purpose and voluntary nature of the interviews, and the ways in which we would use the information. We obtained informed consent from all interviewees, who understood they would receive no compensation for their participation. For reasons of personal security, we have withheld the names and identifying information of some of the individuals featured in the report to ensure their anonymity and have given them pseudonyms.

Human Rights Watch analyzed dozens of high and very high-resolution commercial satellite images of the locations where attacks documented in this report occurred and damage done to other parts of the city. Open source research by Human Rights Watch, Truth Hounds, and SITU Research also involved analyzing photographs and videos that were shared directly with researchers or collected from social media platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, TikTok, X (formerly known as Twitter), VK, and YouTube. We verified these photographs and videos, geolocated them to Mariupol, and determined the time period in which they were recorded. In total, this report and the accompanying web feature use 850 photographs and videos captured between February 24, 2022, and June 17, 2023.

By matching landmarks in the videos with satellite imagery, street-level photographs, or other visual material, and comparing this with accounts from witnesses, we determined the location and approximate time and date of the specific attacks mentioned in the case study chapter. We also studied the imagery to determine the types of weapons used during some of those attacks and more generally during the assault on the city. Some of these images were used to help us photogrammetrically reconstruct 3D models of seven buildings mentioned in the case studies in the report. The 3D reconstructions demonstrate the state of these buildings before and after the attacks. The 3D reconstructions were also a helpful tool when conducting interviews as they allowed witnesses to describe or point out very specific locations when describing an attack, and to give us more specific details about what they saw.

For the damage assessment and demolitions, we identified a 14-square-kilometer area of focus in the center of the city, where most of the buildings for which we obtained detailed accounts from witnesses of attacks are located. This area does not follow any specific district or city boundaries but is demarcated by major roads to the north and south of Myru Avenue (see image below). To analyze the extent of damage and demolition in at least part of the city in more detail, we restricted our assessment to buildings in this area.

To determine the damage to civilian infrastructure inside Mariupol’s city boundaries, including hospitals, schools, and universities, we analyzed high and very high-resolution commercial satellite images.

To obtain a rough estimate of the minimum number of bodies that were buried in and around Mariupol between March 2022 and February 2023, we used very high-resolution commercial satellite images and drone footage to assess the gravesites at five cemeteries that saw a significant increase in the number of graves and that contain both individual graves and trench-type graves.

To identify the Russian commanders and military units that may bear responsibility for the violations documented in this report, we reviewed social media posts by Russian soldiers present in Mariupol or involved in the assault; obituaries of Russian military personnel killed in Mariupol; awards given to Russian military commanders for their “service” in Mariupol; other public statements by Russian government and military officials; and Russian media reports.

Chapter I Applicable Legal Standards

Russian and Russia-affiliated forces conducting military operations against Ukrainian forces in their assault on Mariupol committed numerous apparent violations of international humanitarian law, or the laws of war. Violations include deliberate or indiscriminate air and ground attacks on civilian objects, including on a hospital, that killed and injured numerous civilians; an apparently unlawful strike hitting part of the electricity infrastructure; the apparent blocking of civilian evacuations and the arbitrary denial of humanitarian aid; and the forced transfers of Ukrainian citizens to Russia and Russian-occupied territory.

War crimes are serious violations of the laws of war committed by individuals with criminal intent.1 Those who order, carry out or are responsible as a matter of command responsibility may be found liable for war crimes.2 States are obligated to investigate alleged war crimes committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their territory.3

Crimes against humanity are certain crimes committed by members of government armed forces or non-state armed groups that are knowingly committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a specific civilian population. Relevant crimes include murder, torture, deportation, or other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.4

Many of the unlawful strikes on Mariupol civilian structures may amount to war crimes, including the attack on the Mariupol Drama Theater. The forced deportations of Ukrainians to Russia and forced transfers to other areas occupied by Russia is also a war crime and a potential crime against humanity. War crimes investigations are needed with respect to other attacks on civilian buildings and critical infrastructure, and the blocking of humanitarian aid and evacuations of Ukrainian civilians.

The war between Russia and Ukraine constitutes an international armed conflict, governed by international humanitarian treaty law - primarily the four Geneva Conventions of 19495 and its First Additional Protocol of 1977 (Protocol I),6 as well as the rules of customary international humanitarian law.7 Both Russia and Ukraine are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.

The laws of war provide protections to civilians and other noncombatants from the hazards of armed conflict. They also address the conduct of hostilities-the means and methods of warfare-by all sides to a conflict. Foremost is the rule that parties to a conflict must distinguish at all times between combatants and civilians. Civilians may never be the deliberate target of attacks. Parties to the conflict are required to take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects and to refrain from attacks that fail to discriminate between combatants and civilians, or that would cause disproportionate harm to the civilian population.8

Individuals who commit serious violations of the laws of war with criminal intent-that is, deliberately or recklessly-can be held liable for war crimes.9 Commanders who knew or should have known about abuses by their forces and failed to stop them or punish those responsible can be prosecuted as a matter of command responsibility.10

Populations also remain protected by international human rights law, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights11 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.12 The destruction and damage to the civilian infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, schools, and markets, threatens the enjoyment of basic rights such as the right to health, education, and an adequate standard of living, including food, housing, and water.

Unlawful Attacks on Civilians and Civilian Objects

The two fundamental tenets of international humanitarian law are those of “civilian immunity” and “distinction.”13 They impose a duty, at all times during the conflict, to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and to target only the former. While the laws of war recognize that some civilian casualties are inevitable, parties to a conflict may not target civilians and civilian objects and may direct their operations against only military objectives.

Military objectives are anything that by their nature, location, purpose, or use provides enemy forces a definite military advantage in the circumstances prevailing at the time.14 Combatants, weapons, ammunition, and materiel are military objectives. In general the law prohibits direct attacks against what are by their nature civilian objects, such as homes and apartments, shops, places of worship, hospitals, schools, and cultural monuments, unless they are being used for military purposes.15 Even though a residential home is presumed to be a civilian object, for example, its use by enemy soldiers to deploy or to store weaponry, renders it a military objective and subject to attack for the duration of that use. Hospitals and other medical facilities have special additional protection under the laws of war.

International humanitarian law prohibits indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. Indiscriminate attacks are those that strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. Examples of indiscriminate attacks are attacks that are not directed at a specific military objective or that use weapons that cannot be directed at a specific military objective.16

Prohibited indiscriminate attacks include area bombardment, which are attacks by artillery or other means that treat as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in an area containing a concentration of civilians and civilian objects. Military commanders must choose a means of attack that can be directed at military targets and will minimize incidental harm to civilians. If the weapons used are so inaccurate that they cannot be directed at military targets without imposing a substantial risk of civilian harm, such as Grad rockets, then they should not be deployed. Anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions are prohibited by international treaty and should never be used because they are inherently indiscriminate.17

Attacks that violate the principle of proportionality are also prohibited. An attack is disproportionate if it may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated at the time of the attack.18

Armed Conflict in Populated Areas

The laws of war do not prohibit fighting in urban areas, although the presence of many civilians places greater obligations on parties to the conflict to take steps to minimize harm to civilians. Parties to a conflict must take constant care during military operations to spare the civilian population and to “take all feasible precautions” to avoid or minimize the incidental loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects. These precautions include doing everything feasible to verify that the objects of attack are military objectives and not civilians or civilian objects, and giving “effective advance warning” of attacks when circumstances permit.19

Warring parties must also take all feasible measures to minimize the risk to civilians under their control. Forces deployed in populated areas must avoid locating military objectives near densely populated areas and endeavor to remove civilians from the vicinity of military activities.20 Belligerents are prohibited from using civilians to shield military objectives or operations from attack.21

The attacking party is not relieved of its obligation to take into account the risk to civilians simply because it considers the defending party responsible for locating legitimate military targets within or near populated areas.

Framework Governing Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas

The use of explosive weapons in populated areas poses one of the gravest threats to civilians in contemporary armed conflict.22 While there is no specific prohibition against the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, their use in such areas heightens concerns of unlawfully indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks. Explosive weapons include a range of conventional air-dropped and surface-fired weapons, including certain air-delivered bombs, cluster munitions, missiles, unguided rockets, multi-barrel rocket launchers, and large-caliber artillery and mortar projectiles. They can deliver multiple munitions simultaneously that saturate a large area, have a large destructive radius, spread fragments widely, and are inherently inaccurate.

Such weapons kill and injure civilians at the time of attack, either directly, due to the weapons’ blast and fragmentation, or indirectly, as a result of fires, flying debris, or collapsing buildings. They also have long-term ripple, or “reverberating,” effects, including severe psychological harm. They damage civilian buildings, including homes and businesses, and civilian infrastructure such as power plants, healthcare and educational facilities and water and sanitation systems, which in turn interferes with basic services such as health care and education, infringing on human rights. They cause environmental damage and displace communities.

Several types of weapons and weapon delivery systems, both manufactured and improvised, are inherently difficult to use in populated areas without a substantial risk of indiscriminate attack. Weapons such as mortars, artillery, and rockets, such as Grad rockets, when firing unguided munitions, are fundamentally inaccurate systems. In some cases, armed forces can compensate by observing impacts and making adjustments, but the initial impacts and the relatively large area over which these weapons could strike regardless of adjustments make them unsuitable for use in populated areas.

As of December 2023, 83 countries have adopted the “Declaration on the Protection of Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” which seeks to better protect civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.23 The declaration urges compliance with the laws of war but also commits its signatories to adopt policies and practices to restrict or refrain from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas when harm to civilians or civilian objects is expected, including by taking direct and indirect effects into account when planning and executing attacks, and by assisting victims. While the declaration is not legally binding, countries that endorse it commit to take steps to advance the protection of civilians from explosive weapons that go beyond existing law.

Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

Sieges directed at enemy forces and for the purpose of capturing an enemy-controlled area are permitted under the laws of war as a legitimate military objective. However, siege tactics cannot include destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to the civilian population’s survival. Deliberate employment of such tactics, with the intent of starving the civilian population or forcing them to leave the city, violate the laws of war.24 It may also amount to inhumane treatment of the civilian population, a crime against humanity.25 Tactics that arbitrarily deny civilians access to items essential for their well-being such as water, food, and medicine are also prohibited.

Some critical infrastructure, such as electricity generation plants, water infrastructure, and telecommunications facilities, are considered dual-use objects, entities that normally have both civilian and military purposes.26 A dual-use object is a legitimate military target if it is used in a way that makes an “effective contribution to military action” and its partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers “a definite military advantage.” An attack on a dual-use object that is a legitimate military objective still must consider the principle of proportionality.27 This means that attacking forces should verify at all times that the risks to the civilian population from any such attack-that is, the extreme importance of those facilities to the civilian population and the anticipated impact of their destruction-do not outweigh the anticipated military benefit.

The attacking force should also assess whether an attack on other military objectives causing less damage to civilian lives and objects would offer the same military advantage.

Attacks on Hospitals

Hospitals, clinics, medical centers, and similar facilities, whether civilian or military, are considered to be medical units that have special protections under the laws of war. While other presumptively civilian structures become military objectives if they are being used for a military purpose, hospitals lose their protection from attack only if they are being used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit “acts harmful to the enemy.”28

Several types of acts do not constitute “acts harmful to the enemy,” such as the presence of armed guards, or when small arms from the wounded are found in the hospital. Even if military forces misuse a hospital to store weapons or shelter able-bodied combatants, the attacking force must issue a warning to cease this misuse, setting a reasonable time limit for it to end, and attacking only after such a warning has gone unheeded.29

Under the laws of war, doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel must be permitted to do their work and be protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection only if they commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy.30

In May 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously expressed deep concern about the increase in the number of attacks and threats against medical facilities and personnel in resolution 2286 and urged countries around the world to take measures to prevent future attacks. The resolution also strongly condemned what it called the “prevailing impunity for violations and abuses committed against medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities in armed conflict.” It noted that this impunity may in turn contribute to the “recurrence of these acts.”31

The resolution strongly urged states to “conduct, in an independent manner, full, prompt, impartial and effective investigations within their jurisdiction of [relevant] violations of international humanitarian law … and, where appropriate, take action against those responsible in accordance with domestic and international law, with a view to reinforcing preventive measures, ensuring accountability and addressing the grievances of victims.”32

Evacuations and the Delivery of Humanitarian Aid

The laws of war do not prohibit sieges by land of enemy forces so long as they do not cause disproportionate harm to civilians. They require parties to a conflict to facilitate the evacuation of civilians who want to leave conflict areas and not to arbitrarily prevent them from doing so. Whether or not the parties establish humanitarian corridors, they remain responsible for taking all feasible precautions to minimize the harm to civilians from the effects of attacks. Parties should allow access for neutral humanitarian actors to support civilians at risk who may need assistance to leave, including people with injuries, chronic or severe medical conditions, people with disabilities, older people, pregnant people and those who have recently given birth, and children.

International humanitarian law requires warring parties not to withhold consent for relief operations on arbitrary grounds and to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded impartial aid to civilians in need. They may take steps to control the content and delivery of humanitarian aid, such as to ensure that consignments do not include weapons. However, deliberately impeding relief supplies is prohibited. Lawful military restrictions on aid cannot have a disproportionate effect on the civilian population.33

Forcible Transfers of Civilians

Parties to an international armed conflict are prohibited under the laws of war from forcibly transferring inside the country or deporting outside the country the civilian population of an occupied territory, in whole or in part. Violation of this prohibition is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and prosecutable as a war crime and a crime against humanity.34 Provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol I, prohibiting individual or mass forcible transfers are clear that the prohibition is regardless of motive.35

To constitute the crime of deportation or transfer, the transfer needs to be “forcible.” Consent to be moved has to be voluntary and genuine, and not given under coercive conditions. As the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) made clear, the absence of genuine choice making displacement unlawful and forcible can include psychological force caused by “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power,…or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.”36 Therefore, a transfer is not voluntary if civilians agree or seek to be transferred as the only means to escape risk of abuse if they remain. Moreover, transferring or displacing civilians is not justified or lawful as being on humanitarian grounds if the humanitarian crisis triggering the displacement is itself the result of unlawful activity by those in charge of the transfers.37

Warring parties may temporarily displace or evacuate civilians to protect them from the effects of an attack, or if civilian security or imperative military reasons demand such displacement. Protocol I requires that parties to the conflict, “to the maximum extent feasible,” take the necessary precautions to protect civilians and civilian objects under their control from the dangers resulting from military operations, including seeking to remove civilians and civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of military targets.38 Those displaced or evacuated should be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.39

Chapter II The Taking of Mariupol

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Ukrainian forces in the city of Mariupol, on the northern coast of the Sea of Azov in southeastern Ukraine, were among the first attacked.

Map of the Donbas region

Mariupol is the site of two of Ukraine’s largest iron and steel factories, the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works and the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works (Azovstal steel plant). Capturing Mariupol and areas to the west of the city would allow Russia to control a land corridor between the Crimean Peninsula about 200 kilometers to the west, occupied by Russia since 2014, and the Donbas region about 10 kilometers to the east. The Donbas region includes the self-proclaimed, Russia-backed “DNR” and most parts of “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LNR).40

Forces of the so-called DNR and LNR operating in these areas since 2014 were officially integrated into the Russian military in 2022. Capturing Mariupol would also mean control of about 80 percent of Ukraine’s Sea of Azov coastline and related trade: the city’s port was the largest in the Azov Sea region and a key export hub for Ukraine’s steel, coal, and corn.41

Until February 2022, about 540,000 people inhabited the city.42 Former residents and visitors described Mariupol’s distinctly Ukrainian character, its multicultural, multi-religious, and multilingual identity, and its recent development into a modern cultural hub, with a new public transport system, arts events such as Gogol Fest, and its popularity as a summer seaside destination.43

Mariupol is divided into four administrative districts: Tsentralnyi district, the Central District, often called “the City Centre” and home to the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theater; Kalmiuskyi District in the northeastern part of the city, often called “the factory area” as it includes the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works; Livoberezhnyi District, or the “Left Bank” in the easternmost part of the city, home to the Azovstal steel plant and separated from the rest of the city by the Kalmius River; and Prymorskyi District, or “the port,” in the southwestern part of the city.44

Map of Mariupol districts

The following timeline of Russian forces’ attack and capture of Mariupol is based on interviews with dozens of witnesses; reports from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a US-based think tank; and reports from the Ukrainian, Russian, and US governments.

February 24, 2022: Russian and DNR forces based themselves in nearby villages some kilometers to the north, east, and west of Mariupol and began attacking the city with long-distance weapons, including tank shelling and heavy artillery, multi-barrel rocket launchers, missiles, and airstrikes. Attacks from outside of Mariupol were initially focused largely on the Left Bank (Livoberezhnyi District), but soon targeted all of the city and continued in some areas until the end of March.

March 2: Russian forces all but surrounded Mariupol, but took a few more days to occupy certain areas to the north, due in part to significant Ukrainian resistance in the town of Volnovakha, about 50 kilometers to the north of Mariupol.

March 3 or 4: First Russian attacks hit Mariupol’s Central District.

March 9: First Russian ground forces arrived in the Central District.

Around March 10: Russian forces reached Kuprina Street, at the western end of Mariupol’s Central District.

March 12: Ukrainian forces left the Regional Intensive Care Hospital in the Central District, and Russian and DNR forces took over the hospital. Ukrainian forces deployed in a shop called “Tysiacha dribnyts” (“the 1000 Little Things”) on Myru Avenue, and Russian forces moved into a post office close to the Drama Theater.

March 15: Russian and Ukrainian forces deployed about 300 meters apart near the junction of Myru Avenue and Osypenka Street.

March 15 to 22: At least five Russian naval ships in the Sea of Azov started shelling the city.

March 17 to 19: Russian forces took control of the Port City shopping center about three kilometers northwest of the theater, as well as nearby areas. By March 18, Russian forces had pushed out Ukrainian forces from an area near a part of Shevchenka Boulevard.

March 23: Ukrainian forces and DNR forces were deployed a few hundred meters apart near the junction of Mytropolytska Street and Levanevskoho Street.

March 25: DNR forces took over Hospital #3, from where they fought nearby Ukrainian forces between March 28 and April 3.

April 1: Russian forces had captured all of the Left Bank with the exception of the westernmost areas adjacent to the Azovstal steel plant.

April 3: DNR forces took control of Hospital #4, about 1.2 kilometers from the eastern perimeter of the Azovstal steel plant.

April 7: Russian officials said they had “practically cleared” all Ukrainian forces out of the city center.

April 10: Russian forces had captured all of the Central District including Myru Avenue and areas to the north of Myru Avenue, stretching from Kuprina Street in the west to the Kalmius River, about four kilometers to the east of Kuprina Street.

April 20: Russian forces captured all of Prymorskyi District, to the south of Myru Avenue.

April 21: Russia publicly claimed it fully controlled Mariupol, with the exception of the Azovstal steel plant.

May 7: About 500 women, children, and older people, were evacuated from the Azovstal steel plant.

May 16 to 20: 2,439 Azov Regiment fighters and members of the 36th Marine Brigade in the Azovstal steel plant surrendered, cementing Russia’s full control of the city.

Chapter III Civilians Denied Access to Critical Infrastructure

As Russia’s assault on Mariupol intensified, by March 2 the entire city had lost access to power, water, and sanitation services.45 While tens of thousands of people fled Mariupol during the first few days of the assault, at least 450,000 remained. With Russian forces now surrounding the city, civilians were trapped for up to seven weeks in appalling conditions: holed up in the basements of apartment buildings and other shelters without access to running water, electricity, gas, heating, telecommunications, or information about what was happening around them in the city or the broader conflict. The estimated 150,000 people remaining in Mariupol by May only gradually regained access to these services in the second half of 2022.

The fighting significantly damaged the city’s electricity infrastructure, which in turn disabled the city’s telecommunications network as well as water pumping stations, without which piped water could not flow. The lack of water knocked out the city’s heating system at a time of sub-freezing temperatures. By the afternoon of March 1, about half of the city’s electricity grid, including some of the Central District and all of the northeastern Kalmiuskyi District, was offline, most likely due to the significant damage done to power lines and electricity pylons. By midday on March 2, the entire city’s water supply was cut off when a key filtration station that pumped water from a reservoir to the city lost power. Later that day, Russian forces may have intentionally targeted part of one electricity transformer station, Azovska-220, that supplied substations in the Central and Kalmiuskyi Districts. This cut power to the few remaining areas there that still had electricity.

To help people cope, volunteers and city council workers brought food and diesel for generators to shelters and hospitals,46 and transported water to distribution points throughout the city, braving attacks that damaged some of their trucks. Residents were forced to come out of their shelters to wait in line at wells and water distribution trucks, or to cook meals on makeshift wood fires, exposing themselves to the onslaught of shelling and artillery fire. Others resorted to drinking, bathing, and cleaning with rainwater or melted snow.

People in need of medical care—those injured in the fighting or who fell sick due to the dirty water, the extreme cold, or lack of medicine for preexisting conditions—struggled to make it to hospitals, given the dangerous conditions throughout the city.

By the end of the fighting, all 19 of the city’s hospital campuses were damaged, which further inhibited their ability to provide care and likely contributed to the suffering and deaths not just during, but also after the battle for the city.47 At least five of the city’s fire stations were also damaged, likely obstructing the work of emergency responders.

Under international humanitarian law, electricity, water, telecommunications, health care, and emergency response infrastructure are considered “critical infrastructure” and among the “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.”48 In at least one case – the attack on an electricity transformer station on March 2 – it appears that Russian forces deliberately targeted electricity infrastructure. In most cases, however, it remains unclear what caused the damage to the infrastructure.

As discussed above, electricity infrastructure is considered a dual-use object, an object that normally has both civilian and military purposes. Such an object is a legitimate military target if it is used in a way that makes an “effective contribution to military action” and its destruction in the circumstances ruling at the time offers “a definite military advantage.” Such attacks, however, must not have a disproportionate impact on the civilian population. Russian officials did not respond to questions about the intended targets of their attacks. Cutting electricity to the population as a whole would be disproportionate and in violation of international humanitarian law.

The following sections analyze the damage to Mariupol’s electricity, water, telecommunications, natural gas, healthcare, and emergency response infrastructure.

Electricity

Map of the electricity infrastructure

Mariupol depends on four electricity transformer stations.49 The main two, Zoria-330 and Myrna-330, supply two smaller stations, Azovska-220 and Ilyich-110. All four of them transfer electricity to dozens of large substations, which in turn supply medium-size substations that then feed electricity to the thousands of small substations attached to each residential and commercial building. Disabling Zoria-330 or Myrna-330 would have immediately disrupted the whole city’s electricity supply. However, we found no evidence on satellite imagery of damage to either of them, or to Ilyich-110, before March 2, when the entire city was cut off from electricity. Satellite imagery shows the main building at Myrna-330 was damaged between March 14 and 19, but does not show any damage to the electricity infrastructure at the station. Satellite imagery from March 23 shows black marks on the ground near Ilyich-110 that are not present on imagery taken the day before. Imagery from April 4 shows no damage to the transformer stations’ main building, but the next available image, on April 9, shows damage to the rooftop.

Ukraine’s largest private electricity company, DTEK, ran most of the city’s electricity infrastructure.50 The company shared with Human Rights Watch a power line register in which its staff recorded when various parts of the network failed between February 24 and March 2, including any known reasons for the failures.

Between February 25 and March 2, DTEK recorded eight incidents in which 23 of the city’s dozens of electricity substations, including the one powering the Azovstal steel plant, went offline in groups of two or more.51 Simultaneous substation failure suggests that they did not go offline as a result of damage to the substations, but instead because of damage to power lines or electricity pylons, which relay electricity from the transformer stations to groups of substations. During a ninth recorded incident, a single electricity substation in the compound of Starokrymski Filtering Stations #1 and #2, that pumps canal or reservoir water into pipes that run to the city, went down at about midday on March 2, probably due to the downing of the power line that connects it to the Azovska-220 transformer station.52

In two cases, DTEK recorded incidents in which areas dependent on two or more substations lost electricity. The first happened on February 25, when Left Bank residential areas dependent on two substations53 lost electricity at the same time. On February 26, the Mariupol City Council said that 188 “substations”-likely referring to smaller substations at the residential property level-had been damaged,54 leaving 41,229 households55 without power.

The second happened when residential areas in the Central and Prymorskyi Districts dependent on seven substations56 all went offline at the same time for some hours on February 28 and again on March 2. According to DTEK,57 this was because damaged nearby powerlines needed to be repaired. They were “reconfigured by cutting off damaged sections and installing additional switchgear” on February 28 or early on March 1, and were damaged again on March 2.58 Satellite imagery from March 9 shows two damaged electricity pylons located between the Azovska-220 transformer station and the seven substations.

We also analyzed other satellite images taken between March and April 2022 that show damage to a number of power lines and electricity pylons in various parts of the city and its outskirts. Two residents said that at some point in March, attacks by Russian forces hit electricity pylons near the city’s California market59 and about 700 meters south of the western end of Myru Avenue.60 Satellite imagery from between March 9 and May 12 shows damage to 11 of the city’s substations, which appears to have occurred after March 2, by which time the entire city was already cut off from electricity. We were unable to determine whether the substations and lines were intentionally damaged by Russian or Ukrainian forces during the fighting.

Satellite imagery from April 4, 2022, shows a destroyed electricity pylon on Kuprina Street, three kilometers west of Mariupol city center. Image © 2024 Planet Labs PBC

For the above reasons, and because residents living in many different parts of the city said they continued to receive electricity until March 2, the damage to the city’s substations appears to have occurred after March 2, by which time the entire city was already cut off from electricity.

According to DTEK, at 3:30 p.m. on March 2, one of the transformers at the Azovksa-220 station was damaged by reported shelling. This cut electricity to the last three dependent substations supplying electricity to residential areas in the Central and Kalmiuskyi Districts. The station is located about 8 kilometers north of the center of the city and far from any other buildings. Satellite imagery from March 12 shows damage to one of the station’s transformers, as well as damage to what appears to be a communications tower 90 meters away. There is no other damage to the facility, suggesting a targeted attack on the transformer.

Water

The lack of electricity had a knock-on effect for civilians’ access to water.61 Damage to the electricity network on February 25 stopped the pumps that sent canal-delivered river water to the city’s pipes, forcing the city to rely instead on reservoir water.62 An attack on electricity infrastructure on March 2 downed the pumps that transferred the reservoir water, leaving the entire city’s population without access to running water.63 Volunteers tried to help residents cope with the loss of running water by collecting water from wells and springs and trucking them to distribution points across the city. But this came at great risk, as volunteers and residents had to brave the ongoing shelling while they moved across the city to distribute or collect water and wait in line for hours at distribution points.

Map of the water infrastructure

How the Taps Went Dry

The Siverskyi Donets River is Mariupol’s main water source. In Mykolaivska, 200 kilometers north of Mariupol, the water flows into a canal that takes the water 50 kilometers, mostly above ground, to the town of Horlivka, 130 kilometers north of Mariupol. There, the Third Lift Pumping Station of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal pumps water from the canal into at least three sets of pipes.64 This pumping station is one of the most important pieces of infrastructure in the Donbas region and is strategically important to both Ukraine and Russia, supplying water to three million people in the region.65

The water pipes that begin in Horlivka run above ground for some kilometers and then underground to reach the First Lift Pumping Station66 located six kilometers from Vasiylivka village, about 120 kilometers north of Mariupol. The pipes continue underground from Vasiylivka until they reach Starokrymski Filter Stations #1 and #2, located in a compound about 10 kilometers north of Mariupol city center and just to the south of the Starokrymsky Reservoir.67 The filter station pumps and filters water from the underground pipes-and, if needed as a back-up water source, from the Starokrymsky Reservoir-into mostly underground pipes that run to Mariupol, according to the Head of Mariupolvodokanal, one of the two companies supplying the city with water.68

On February 19, part of the Vasilyvika pumping station was damaged by an explosion that was captured on camera.69 We were unable to determine the cause of the explosion.

The head of the Donetska Regional Civil-Military Administration said that on the same day, Starokrymski Filter Stations #1 and #2, about 100 kilometers to the south, switched from pumping canal water to pumping reservoir water to Mariupol, implying that the February 19 incident stopped canal water from reaching the Filter Station.70 A UN committee dealing with water and sanitation issues said that after the incident, 90,000 people in the Volnovakha area had switched to reservoir water and that “cities like Mariupol are similarly shifting to water from reservoirs.”71 This implies that canal water no longer flowed from Vasilyvika to Mariupol or that it was flowing at a reduced rate. However, the director of Mariupolvodokanal, and the deputy administrator of Mariupol City Council, said water continued to flow from the canal to Starokrymski Filter Stations #1 and #2 until February 26, the day on which the stations had to switch to pumping reservoir water because of the complete loss of canal water the day before.72

The loss of canal water on February 25 can be explained by what the UN committee said involved the “de-energiz[ing]” – a term that refers to a loss of power supply – that day of the strategically crucial Third Lift Pumping Station.73 This meant an end to water pumping from the Siverskyi Donets River into the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal. Three million people, including all residents of the Donbas region-people in areas under the control of DNR forces, as well as Mariupol-lost access to canal water that day.74

According to the DTEK register, on March 2, at 12:15 p.m., Starokrymski Filter Stations #1 and #2 stopped functioning because the electricity substation supplying the Filter Stations was “disconnected,” probably because the power line connecting it to the Azovska-220 transformer station was downed. The UN committee said that on March 2, the Voda Dobasa water company informed it that shelling at about 1 p.m. had damaged “a number of power lines” and that this meant that all water pumping stations in Mariupol, including Starokrymski Filter Stations #1 and #2, had stopped functioning.75 Satellite imagery of the filtering stations from March 9 shows damage to the station’s roof and some ground nearby, but not to the compound’s electricity substation.

The director of Mariupolvodokanal said his company’s 1,000 or so staff continued to work until March 2, when the loss of electricity citywide cut power to all the water pumps.76 He also said that 40 percent of the city’s “small pumping stations that supplied water to the upper floors of buildings” were damaged in the fighting after March 2. In May 2022, Mariupol’s mayor, Vadym Boychenko, said that “all 22 [of the city’s] pumping stations had been destroyed or flooded” and that “more than 50 percent of the water supply network was damaged.”77

Collecting and Distributing Water at Great Risk to Volunteers and Residents

“On April 2, my husband went to collect water at a well nearby, but he never returned. A neighbor later told me there had been shelling at a crossroads when he would have been passing through. I looked for him for five days. I never saw him again.”

— Woman from Kalmiuskyi District who survived three months in Mariupol before fleeing the city.78

After the taps went dry on March 2, about 100 Mariupolvodokanal staff and other volunteers started to collect water at informal water sources such as springs and wells, and truck them to distribution points at hospitals and larger shelters, including schools, kindergartens, and basements, according to the director of Mariupolvodokanal.79 After running water stopped, he said, the city’s main source of water became a well about one kilometer to the east of the Drama Theater, where his staff used diesel-powered pumps to extract water. “That well saved many lives,” he said.80 Other water sources included the Kalchyk River,81 a canal close to Mariupolvodokanal’s headquarters, and a fire hydrant near the Drama Theater.82

Mariupolvodokanal staff and volunteers distributed water using eight water tankers, each with a capacity of about 10 cubic meters, as well as two smaller trucks, which allowed them to deliver between 80 and 100 cubic meters of water a day throughout the city in the first few days after March 2.83 Water delivery points included the Drama Theater, the Terra Sport Gym,84 the Savona Cinema next door,85 a location close to Mariupovodokanal’s headquarters, and the city’s central market, called “Tsentralnyi.”86 City officials also tried to inform residents about where to find springs and wells, including in City Garden, the mosque at Nakhimova Avenue 41, the Chaika Café on the Left Bank, and a place near the Open llichyvets Stadium.87

These efforts provided desperately needed water to residents across the city. However, the volunteers organizing the distribution, the water tanks themselves, and the residents braving the city streets to reach the wells or distribution points to then queue up for up to six hours, were exposed to barrages of shelling, rockets, and air-dropped munitions.88

The intensity of the fighting meant the water trucks could not reach the Left Bank after March 10, although Ukrainian police took one of the tankers after that date to deliver water to Hospital #4. Other areas that were impossible to reach at various points in March included the city’s 17th and 23rd Sub-Districts and the whole of Kalmiuskyi District.

Mariupolvodokanal’s headquarters was attacked the night of March 15-16 and again the night of March 16-17.89 Mariupol’s first deputy mayor said that a girl about 10 was injured in a nearby building during one of the attacks.90

An attack in early March near the Shans supermarket at Latysheva Street 23, where city council volunteers distributed water and humanitarian aid, killed three or four people, according to a staffer of the Donetsk Regional Bureau of Forensic Medicine, who saw the bodies.91

By March 18, shelling and other attacks had reportedly damaged or destroyed all but two of the eight water tankers.92 One of the tankers was destroyed on Metalurhiv Avenue, another on Bakhchyvandzhi Street that runs south of, and parallel to, Myru Avenue, and a third was destroyed near the Philharmonic Hall next to the Drama Theater.93

One man described an attack on March 15, at around 8 a.m. when he went to collect ground water from a garage compound about 500 meters south of the Azovstal steel plant in the Left Bank. “There were about 30 of us when the attack happened and it killed 20 people and wounded many others, including two people who had come with me from the building where we were sheltering,” he said. “The Ukrainian forces arrived quickly and took the injured to the hospital.”94

Later that day or the next, the man said he saw the bodies of about 10 people in civilian clothes near another ground water source, which he said was next to a building belonging to an industrial bread manufacturer called Khlibokombinat and an administrative building belonging to a military recruitment center. The man said he did not know how the people died.

A military nurse said she had heard from others that there were “many corpses” near a well in Peremohy Park.95 She had also heard that some of the injured people she saw in a shelter under Hospital #3 between March 17 and April 25 had been injured while collecting water there.

A man described the scene at the well near the Chaika Café on the Left Bank in mid-March:

I saw three corpses near the well. One of them was a girl wearing high boots with fur on the outside. One was a man with a bullet wound in his neck. All three had also been shot in their chests and were wearing civilian winter clothes. Some other people and I moved them behind a nearby building and the owner gave us blankets to cover them. The owner didn’t know what had happened but as far as I understood, there had been some fighting in the area the evening before.96

Another man said that on the morning of March 10, he left his house at Metalurhiv Avenue 117 to collect water from a nearby river, when shelling started:

We didn’t even make it 15 meters from our entrance. I was immediately injured on the right-hand side of my body and my wife’s brother was very badly injured in his back. I took him to Military Hospital #555, and he died during the operation. He was 52.97

A deputy head of Mariupol City Council said that a doctor called Andrii Ivanovyh Hnatiuk was shot dead on March 27 by Russian forces as he walked from Hospital #4 to fetch water at a well to the northwest of the hospital near the local cemetery.98 A health official said that at some point in March she had heard that a doctor working at the city’s Regional Intensive Care Hospital99 was killed while on his way to fetch water for the hospital from a nearby well, though she didn’t know how or by whom.100

A woman said that she had heard that “a lot of [her] neighbors were killed near a water spring near School #31.”101 A man said he had heard that at some point between March 9 and 11 during the early morning, an attack killed three people near a water source on Persha Slobidka Street.102

Another man was killed by a shell fragment as he walked towards a water collection point at the nearby mosque in mid-March.103

A doctor said he heard that at some point after March 8, a woman who was sheltering in a building near his, close to the Savona cinema, was killed during an attack while she was fetching water.104 A man said that on March 12 at about 10 a.m., he saw the body of a man who he had been told had been killed by mortar fire as he walked from 44 Fontanna Street towards the Kalmius River to get water.105

A woman said one of her neighbors went to collect water and returned with a back injury from an attack.106 And a man said he knew of a number of people who left his building, at Morskyi Boulevard 54, and the neighboring building, at number 56, to fetch water who never returned, though he did not know why.107

Natural Gas and Heating

“At nights I cried from the cold.”

— Mariupol resident, who endured three weeks in sub-freezing temperatures.108

Residents of Mariupol rely on natural gas to cook food and to fuel boilers that heat water, including for heating systems.109 By March 6, the natural gas supply was cut off throughout the city because of damage to a major pipeline that supplied gas to the city and half of the Donetsk region.110 But heating systems had already stopped working on March 2: with no electricity to pump water, no water reached the natural gas-fueled boilers. Many residents described how they suffered from the cold during those initial weeks of sub-freezing temperatures. And when their stoves no longer worked, they had to go outside to heat water or prepare warm meals on makeshift fires, exposing themselves to both the cold and the shelling.

In addition to the major pipeline damage on March 6, the fighting damaged 32 of the city’s buildings housing natural gas boilers that transferred heated water through pipelines to about 1,900 residential buildings, as well as to public buildings and companies.111 He also said that the fighting caused damage to about 360 kilometers of the city’s 600 kilometers of pipelines for heated water, including to some of the 5 percent of the pipes that run overland and much of the remaining underground pipelines that were damaged after water froze inside them, causing them to rupture. He said his department estimated the repair cost would amount to 5 billion hryvnia (UAH), or about US$135 million.

Telecommunications

“I remember how we came to a tower and saw Ukrainian soldiers standing nearby with yellow ribbons on their shoulders. We asked them what was going on because we had no internet access, and we were cut off from the rest of the world. We did not understand whether Mariupol was under Ukrainian control or not. We didn’t even know whether our president was in Ukraine.”

— Mariupol resident who went in early March to an old water tower near the Drama Theater after a week without phone network access112

During the first few days of Russia’s assault on Mariupol, residents lost nearly all access to mobile phone networks and the internet, shutting them off from the world and preventing them from communicating with loved ones or accessing news about the conflict, possible evacuation routes, or humanitarian aid distribution points. Throughout the siege, this inability to communicate compounded residents’ daily fears and struggles as they worried about the fate of their relatives, friends, and colleagues. They used word of mouth at water and aid distribution points to try to pass messages on to friends and loved ones in other neighborhoods, to let them know they were still alive and where they were sheltering-or in some cases, to indicate who had died and where they had been buried in makeshift graves. Residents also risked walking the city streets, and exposing themselves to artillery fire, as they searched for one of the few locations in the city where they could still occasionally pick up a signal on their phones.

Mariupol’s city council first posted a message relating to the cutting of phone coverage on February 28.113 Before February 24, Mariupol had three telecommunication providers: Kyivstar, LifeCell, and Vodafone. LifeCell reported that its services in Mariupol were “disconnected” as of February 27 after its “transmission sites” were destroyed and “optical cables in the main and backup routes” were damaged.114

Kyivstar told Human Rights Watch that the lack of electricity citywide by early March made mobile phone coverage impossible, except at two locations: the immediate vicinity of the Drama Theater, from where Vodafone continued to transmit a signal until “its services were destroyed soon after by shelling,” and an area close to Kyivstar’s seven-story headquarters.115

Some residents said they found weak phone signals in certain locations in early and mid-March, including at the Regional Intensive Care Hospital,116 near the Savona cinema,117 and near the Kyivstar building, which allowed them to call or send messages to their relatives.118

Kyivstar’s office contained a core base station, the central hive of mobile telecommunications that was connected to 148 base stations, which in turn transmitted wireless signals throughout the city.119 Kyivstar’s chief technology officer reported that “one by one all these base stations went down [initially in early March] because of the power connection [and] then because of physical damage.”120

Kyivstar told Human Rights Watch that residents could continue to connect to Kyivstar’s signal near its office after March 1 because the company’s engineers placed a diesel-powered transmitter and antenna next to a fourth-floor window.121 A shortage of diesel after March 15 meant they only switched it on for a few hours a day. One of the city’s deputy mayors confirmed that the city council provided the diesel generators.122 The company said a March 15 attack damaged the building’s fifth and sixth floors. The building was then significantly damaged by shelling on March 20, and Russian forces were briefly in the building later that day, according to Kyivstar.123 Satellite imagery from March 29, 2022, shows damage to the fourth, fifth and sixth floors on the southern side of the building. Photos taken on March 19 by employees of Kyivstar inside the building show damage to rooms whose windows are on the southern side of the building, while a video posted on February 8, 2023, on social media shows the damaged façade.124 On March 21, all staff and their families who had been sheltering in the building left, except for two engineers who left on March 24.125

Hospitals

Human Rights Watch identified 19 hospital campuses citywide and found that all of them were damaged during the fighting. The campuses of Hospital #1 and Hospital #4 were among the most heavily damaged, with some buildings destroyed.126 To varying degrees, the physical damage and destruction limited the ability of hospitals to provide life-saving care, compounding the challenges hospitals faced due to limited supplies and medicine, the lack of electricity, and limited fuel to power their generators. For additional information on damage to hospitals, see Damage to Healthcare Facilities in Chapter VI.

Map of hospitals

Fire Stations

At least five fire stations in Mariupol were damaged in March and April-fire stations 22, 23, 24, 25 and 53, likely limiting their ability to respond to major attacks and put out fires throughout the city.127 Human Rights Watch analyzed satellite imagery that showed that station 22 was damaged between March 9 and 12, with significant damage on the roof; station 23 was damaged between March 14 and 19; station 24 was completely destroyed between March 14 and 19; station 25 was completely destroyed between March 30 and April 3; and station 53 was damaged between April 11 and 15.128

An emergency responder who led the fire response in the city between February 24 and March 14 said he was based at Fire Station #22, which was struck on March 10 at a time when 287 people were sheltering in the basement, including first responders and their families. He said that the attack killed one person and injured nine. He also said that his team prioritized putting out fires in residential buildings, not commercial buildings such as shopping centers and offices, and that his teams got their water from reservoirs around the city where he said there was always enough water.129

Truth Hounds spoke with a man who moved with his family to a building that was part of Fire Station #22 and who described the moment the building was struck:

It was between 9 and 10 a.m. on March 10. I was on the third floor with my family when I heard an explosion. It hit the second floor and we ended up on the second floor, under the rubble. My wife and I were rescued after 30 minutes and my son after three hours. Both of them had bad injuries to their arms and legs. Most of the people living there at the time were in the basement and were not hurt. Others who were on the upper floors had minor injuries. A friend and colleague of mine, Pankov Oleksiy Serhiyovych, was killed but they didn’t find his body until months later.130

Services in Mariupol Since May 2022

After taking over the city in April 2022, Russian forces took many months to even partially restore the remaining residents’ access to electricity, water, and basic healthcare services.

According to one city official, as of September 2022, city residents still had limited access to food, water, health care, and other social services.131 In some medical centers, she said, medical care was limited to measuring blood pressure and auscultation, or listening to lungs, the heart, and the abdomen. One of the city’s deputy mayors said that, as of the end of August 2022, attempts to fix part of the electricity grid had resulted in fires and that as of mid-summer, some districts had been sporadically getting electricity, but that none had access to natural gas.132

In early May 2022, the Emergency Situations Ministry of the DPR said that its filtration plant had been relaunched for the first time since a power substation was damaged on March 2 and that, as a result, water supply would be restored in Mariupol on May 12 or 13.133 Yet it was only in early August that some districts started to receive running water for a few hours at a time.134 Even with running water partially restored, city officials raised concerns about the continued risk of water-borne infectious diseases, including cholera, since the sewage treatment and drainage systems had not been restored.135 Mariupol was also still relying on local informal water sources, such as small rivers and water holes that were known from past testing to contain cholera-causing bacteria, as it was still not receiving water from the Donbas canal, which had been damaged in late February.136

On October 9, the DNR’s Ministry of Construction said that water had been restored to all four of the city’s districts.137 The director of Mariupolvodokanal, who fled the city but continued to monitor the water situation in Mariupol after it was occupied, told Human Rights Watch in December 2022 that, according to his assessment, 80 percent of the water supply infrastructure and 50 percent of sewage treatment infrastructure had been restored.138 In March 2023, he said he thought that almost all damaged water infrastructure had been repaired, but that the assault on the city had completely destroyed four sewage treatment plants, including two on the Left Bank, on Azovstalska Street and in Skhidnyi District, and two on the western side of the city: Pumping Station #6 near Zelinskoho Street and one on Mytropolytska Street.139 He said that his company estimated that the cost of repairing damage to the city’s water infrastructure would amount to about US$700 million.140

By February 2023, the occupying forces had largely repaired the electricity and natural gas grids, in addition to the water infrastructure, but there were still regular cuts.141 These cuts were ongoing in December 2023.142

Chapter IV Struggling to Survive in Shelters

Between February 24 and mid-April 2022, tens of thousands of Mariupol residents took shelter for days or weeks wherever they could, to reduce their risk of death or injury from airstrikes, shelling, and other attacks. Some fled to collective shelters in hospitals and in other non-residential buildings, some of which were supported by city officials and volunteers. Others stayed in the basements of their own buildings or fled to other basements.

With no way to bring food into the city or keep shops open, people survived on food they had in their apartments, what volunteers distributed, or food that people risked their lives to find and bring back to the shelters to share with others. Without running water, people tapped radiators, collected rainwater, melted snow, and dodged shelling to fetch water from springs and wells. Without heating and electricity in below freezing temperatures, they huddled together under blankets. With the threat of unpredictable attacks, they risked their lives to cook meals on makeshift wood fires in courtyards and near building entrances, trying to increase their chances of making a swift retreat to basements in case of sudden attack.

The outside world adopted the basements as symbols of Mariupol’s resistance.143 Inside them, civilians survived in the harshest of conditions: terrified, cold, wet, thirsty, and hungry in the darkness. Unknown numbers of people died underground, stricken down by the elements and with no access to drugs and medical treatment.

Shelters Across the City

On February 24, the Mariupol City Council published a list of 1,033 addresses entitled “List of basement and other underground premises, in which, if necessary, it would be possible to shelter the population of Mariupol.”144 Almost all were in residential buildings. Many residents stayed in these designated shelters, while thousands of others sheltered above and below ground in dozens of mostly non-residential buildings.

City officials and volunteers mobilized to support residents during the initial days of the Russian assault, including by providing transport to help people relocate from the Left Bank and villages near the outskirts of the city to shelters and neighborhoods in the city center that were considered relatively safer in the early days of the assault. Volunteers baked thousands of loaves of bread until electricity was cut on March 2, and they collected food from markets to bring to the shelters. They also organized the collection and distribution of water, blankets, clothes, diapers, batteries, and medicine, as well as diesel to power generators at hospitals, coordinating these efforts via radio communication and word of mouth.145

These efforts provided life-saving assistance to thousands of residents, but delivering aid in many parts of the city became increasingly difficult as the Russian attacks intensified. Officials and volunteers faced mounting challenges to communicate, coordinate, and move around the city. By March 5, such efforts had become very dangerous and shelters across much of the city were soon no longer accessible.146 In some cases, though, hundreds of people remained in the same shelter for weeks, supported by volunteers.147

Based on interviews with city officials, volunteers, and residents, as well as posts on the Mariupol City Council’s Telegram channel, we identified 27 locations, including two residential buildings, that functioned as shelters that were supported by city officials and volunteers in late February and March.148

Shelters Supported by City Officials and Volunteers

Central District

Myru Avenue and Nearby

  1. Donetsk Academic Regional Drama Theater, Teatralna Square 1
  2. “Molodizhnyi” Palace of Culture, Kharlampiivska Street 17/25
  3. Social Services Center of the Central District, 80 Myru Avenue
  4. Residential building at Kazantseva Street 19a
  5. A number of University buildings belonging to the Pryazovskyi State Technical University including Myru Ave 68 and University building #2 at Kazantseva Street 3
  6. TSUM Department Store, Myru Avenue 69

North of Myru Avenue

  1. School # 27, Troitska Street 56
  2. Savona Cinema, Budivelnykiv Avenue 134
  3. Terra Sport Gym, Budivelnykiv Avenue 132

South of Myru Avenue

  1. Mariupol Chamber Philharmonic, Metalurhiv Avenue 52
  2. Sports Volleyball Complex, also known as “The Cupola”, Metalurhiv Avenue 52
  3. Palace of Aesthetic Education, also known as “The Palace of Pioneers,” Metalurhiv Avenue 19

Prymorskyi District (southern part of city)

  1. Budivelnykiv Avenue 56
  2. Mariupol Maritime Lyceum, Budivelnykiv Avenue 28
  3. Regional Children’s Tuberculosis Sanitorium, Prymorskyi Boulevard 23
  4. School #26, Chornomorska Street 12
  5. Building formerly housing the Komsomolets Cinema, Nakhimova Avenue 172
  6. Preventive Medicine Sanatorium “Chaika”, Nakhimova Avenue 39

Livoberezhnyi District (Left Bank)

  1. Youth Art Building at Azovstalska Street 32
  2. Left Bank Culture Center on Azovstalska Street
  3. Social Services Center of the Left Bank, Meotydy Boulevard 20a
  4. “Social Dormitory” on Kyivskyi Lane 10
  5. Building housing the offices of the Administration of the Livoberezhnyi District, Peremohy Avenue 16

Kalmiuskyi District (northern part of city)

  1. Hospital #8, Levchenka Street 4
  2. Military Hospital #555, Akademika Amosova Street 54
  3. Neptune Swimming Pool, Akademika Amosova Street 2А
  4. City Palace of Culture “Ukrainskyi Dim,” Metalurhiv Avenue 150

Hundreds, if not thousands, of other ad hoc shelters existed in mostly residential basements across the city. People in them, too, had to organize food and cooking facilities, find drinking water, and manage sanitation. Some hospitals treating the injured became de facto shelters, some of which came under attack.

The non-residential ad hoc shelters, which did not appear to receive any support from city officials and volunteers, included an industrial sized basement149 under the Hleb du Soleil restaurant at Myru Avenue 76; a natural gas company’s building at Mykolaivska Street 16 that sheltered about 70 people;150 School #14 that by March 2 had 300 people sleeping on the concrete floor and where the poor ventilation made it hard to breathe;151 a shelter for about 30 people under the city’s Court of Appeals at Myru Avenue 1;152 the European Hotel at Prymorskyi Boulevard 9;153 the Stymul gym at Sechenova Street 63a;154 and a former confectionary factory owned by the company Roshen.

Attacks on Shelters

As further described in Chapter VII, many people were killed or injured during attacks that damaged or destroyed the buildings where they were sheltering. We also spoke with six other people who witnessed attacks that hit five additional shelters, including at Metalurhiv Avenue 89 on March 20;155 two Palaces of Culture that witnesses said were supported shelters, one north of Myru Avenue and the other on the Left Bank, that were struck on March 6 and March 25, respectively;156 a building housing the Administration of the Livoberezhnyi District at Peremohy Avenue 16 that was struck on March 25;157 and the City Palace of Culture at Metalurhiv Avenue 150, which was struck between March 23 and 26.158 According to the witnesses, no one was killed or injured in these buildings during these attacks.

Deaths and Suffering in Shelters

Many residents described the fear and suffering they endured for weeks on end in the city’s basements and other shelters, expecting attacks at any moment and enduring sub-freezing temperatures with little or no light. People with chronic health conditions had no access to much-needed medication, which meant some of them died. The fact that they were cut off entirely from the outside world compounded the stress and trauma they endured day and night.

A video filmed by Russian videographer and uploaded to Telegram on April 21, 2022, captures the dark and cramped conditions in one of the basement shelters of Myru Avenue 5-7.159

Some shelters were in hospitals, where conditions soon went from difficult to appalling, with medical personnel having to improvise treatment and surgery.

A 57-year-old English teacher told Human Rights Watch how she and her husband sheltered at the city’s Regional Intensive Care Hospital after they were both injured on February 27 during shelling near her home in the Left Bank. Tetiana Burak’s arm was broken, and her husband’s face, jaw, and legs were all injured, leaving him unable to eat or speak. They received some rudimentary treatment at the hospital, but then she said that many of the doctors and nurses started to leave because they were worried about their own families, and they “ran out of medicine, bandages, everything.”

After the hospital was hit during an attack on March 13, she said the patients moved to the basement to shelter. Most were adults who had been wounded from bullets or shelling:

There were hundreds of people in the basement. It’s hard to figure out how many. The basement was packed. There were mattresses and we had some ventilation. But there was only a little light, no water, and no toilets. The hospital had a generator, so we sometimes had electricity.

She said that she knew of at least 10 people who died while she was sheltering in the basement; she said she watched as their bodies were taken out.160

Human Rights Watch also spoke with a military nurse who moved to the bunker under Hospital #3 on March 17 and described the conditions under which she helped provide medical care:

There were about 60 of us there, including a few doctors and nurses, who performed surgery, even amputations, with improvised anesthetics. They saved lives, but one girl died. I helped with dressing and bandaging wounds and with injections. We had some diesel and a power generator.161

A woman who worked as the chief engineer at the Azovstal steel plant said her husband died in the basement of their home at Peremohy Avenue 27 because she could not reach Hospital #4, about 300 meters away at Likuvalnyi Lane 3, to get him medicine for his heart condition:

My husband was 43 years old, and he died in our basement on April 1. He had trouble with his heart before the war and took medicine. It got worse during March, but we couldn’t reach Hospital #4-just a few minutes’ walk away-because of the heavy shelling. I wanted to help him, but I just couldn’t take the risk. I was unable to bury him before I fled the city. I couldn’t even register his death.162

Another woman said that in mid-March two older people died in the basement in which she had taken shelter on the Left Bank for three weeks because they had run out of heart medication.163

A man who took shelter in the basement of a residential building with at least 10 older people said that some of them who had difficulties walking refused to eat because they could not reach anywhere private to relieve themselves.164

A woman who moved from her home in the Left Bank to the basement of a friend in the city center said she survived without natural light between February 28 and April 7:

There was no light because we covered the small ventilation holes to protect us from shrapnel and bullets. I was stressed by the constant darkness. I made a candle from a piece of cotton and cooking oil. When I woke at night and there was darkness everywhere, I almost suffocated. I needed light to breathe and reduce my stress, so I lit my candle and looked at the flame.165

Another woman, who lived in the basement of Enhelsa Street 39 next to the Drama Theater from February 24 until mid-March, also described the challenge of living only by candlelight:

It is hard to understand what it is like to live in darkness, in cold and damp conditions. My husband fell sick after he got hypothermia and then an infection. When we ran out of candles, we poured oil onto plates and made a wick from cotton. That was our only source of light, so there was a lot of soot. All the towels were black. It was only when we left that we all realized we were covered in soot.166

The military nurse, who sheltered at Hospital #3‘s bunker from March 17 until around April 25, said:

Two of the men regularly left the shelter and brought food back for us. We would have starved without them. We found an old water hole in the shelter and so we each had about 100 milliliters of water three times a day for drinking, brushing our teeth, and washing. We defecated in plastic bags that we took outside when it was safe. We wore the same clothes all the time. It was dark and cold, and our collective breath created a lot of moisture. Everything was soggy. At night, I was covered in several blankets, and they all were disgustingly moist and cold.167

A 20-year-old described the conditions in a shelter at the Pryazovskyi State Technical University, where he and his brother fled after an attack hit a supermarket near their home on March 4:

There were already some 900 people there in classrooms about two meters below ground level. People slept in corridors. There was no place for us to sleep there so my brother and I slept in a cold room on a narrow metal table feet to head. We broke radiators to get drinking water.”168

A woman initially sought refuge at the City Palace of Culture at Metalurhiv Avenue 150 and the building of the District of Livoberezhnyi administration at Peremohy Avenue 16, which she said were attacked on March 6 and 25 respectively. She then moved to Hospital #4, where she stayed until April 7:

We didn’t leave the basement as there was constant, really loud fighting. We heard tanks and artillery and planes. There were 15 children and 12 adults, mostly men, in the basement. We made candles out of oil and cloth. We couldn’t charge our phones. We ran out of food after two days. We also ran out of water, so some of the men got water from a sauna nearby. That lasted for about four days. Then we broke the heating pipes of the basement and tried to purify some of the water with cloth. We found a bag of barley, but we didn’t have water to boil it, so we ate it dry and raw. That was our only food for about one week. The children were very hungry. They were crying and their teeth were hurting.169

Yevhen Sosnovskyi, a theater actor, and photographer, said Russian forces compelled his family and the other residents in their apartment building to leave their homes on March 20. They were not able to take any food or belongings with them. Sosnovskyi’s niece and her two young children-all of whom were badly injured in an earlier attack - were staying with Yevhen and his wife. “We weren’t able to go far,” Sosnovskyi said, “because Olena [his niece] could hardly walk. And all the streets at the time were covered in rubble and stones. So we could only make it to the next door building, Metalurhiv 89.” Soon after they arrived, Sosnovskyi said they “heard the horrific cries of a woman.” Her son and husband had left the basement to check on their apartment, and they were both shot dead.170

“The first night in the basement was very scary,” said Sosnovskyi. He added:

The building was attacked, and some apartments on the top floors were burning and no one was extinguishing the fires. … The fire started to reach the basement. We had no water to stop the fire. We couldn’t go outside because of the heavy shelling. So all night long we tried to stop the fires however we could, with whatever means we had. I had burns on my face and elsewhere from droplets of burning plastic. But eventually we protected our basement from the fire.

Sosnovskyi ventured outside the next morning to try to find some food for his family. As he tried to check the homes of nearby relatives to see if any food was left behind, the scene he saw “resembled things from apocalyptic films,” with burned corpses and rubble littering the streets. Twice he was detained, threatened, and questioned by Russian soldiers. He only made it back to the basement shelter with half a stick of butter and a handful of walnuts.

On around March 24, Sosnovskyi said he was able to obtain a limited amount of food for his family for about six weeks at what he called a “Russian field kitchen,” which was there primarily to feed soldiers occupying the buildings in the area.

In addition to the stress of trying to feed his family and treat their wounds without any professional medical assistance, Sosnovskyi described the trauma of not knowing what was happening in the rest of Ukraine. He got hold of a radio, which could only access Russian radio stations. “But even news from there allowed us to understand that Russia had failed to seize Kyiv and Kharkiv,” he said. And that gave them some hope and motivation to keep going until they could find a way to flee the city.

Chapter V Fleeing the City

When Russian forces began their full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many of Mariupol’s approximately 540,000 residents believed the city would not fall, and so stayed. The eastern edge of the city’s Left Bank had been about 10 kilometers from the front line since 2014, when Ukrainian forces repelled attempts by Russia-affiliated forces to take it. They anticipated this time would be the same.

As the scale and intensity of the invasion became clear and parts of the north, east, and west of Mariupol came under attack, tens of thousands of people fled in the last days of February, including on evacuation trains. These stopped running on February 27, after Russian shelling hit the tracks to the north of the city. Many of those living on the Left Bank or in the outskirts of the city moved to the city center, anticipating that it would be spared. Others stayed where they were because they did not have their own transport or were older, looking after sick relatives, or living with disabilities.

By March 2, those who remained in Mariupol were trapped there, as Russian and Russia-affiliated forces had almost fully encircled it. The city quickly became exceedingly dangerous for civilians as Russian air and ground attacks escalated and residents lost access to electrical power, communications, running water, heating, gas, and medicine. The near-constant shelling and bombing made it impossible for people to move around. To our knowledge, only a few dozen of Mariupol’s residents succeeded in fleeing to Ukrainian-held territory during the first half of March.

Russian forces may have deliberately blocked and certainly did not facilitate either the delivery of humanitarian aid from Ukrainian territory or the departure of civilians during the first half of March and, to a less certain extent, in the second half of March and April.

Throughout this period, senior Ukrainian government officials in Kyiv, Mariupol city officials, UN officials, the ICRC, the Ukrainian Red Cross, and volunteers repeatedly-unsuccessfully-attempted to organize evacuations and deliveries of humanitarian aid into the city. This was despite Ukrainian authorities securing initial approval from senior Russian officials in Moscow on several occasions for plans to bring aid from Ukrainian-held areas to Mariupol on trucks, along with buses to pick up civilians who wanted to leave.

Russia has provided no information to show that there were genuine security grounds that would have temporarily permitted restrictions on the delivery of aid or the evacuation of civilians. These seemingly arbitrary blocks on evacuations and aid prevented Mariupol residents from accessing objects indispensable for the survival of the population, such as adequate food, clean water, sanitation, and health care. Russia’s actions should thus be investigated as violations of the laws of war, and if found to be deliberate, possible war crimes.

The trucks with humanitarian aid and the empty buses never made it past Russian checkpoints on the roads leading to Mariupol from Ukraine-controlled territory. Ukrainian officials prepared around 100 buses at Mariupol’s main bus depot to evacuate civilians, but said that Russian forces’ repeated shelling of the bus depot left most of the buses inoperable by mid-March.

Between March 14 and 31, at least around 60,000 people were able to escape the city and the greater Mariupol area in ad hoc convoys of hundreds, even thousands, of private vehicles. Making it to a car that still functioned and then getting out of Mariupol was an ordeal, as shelling and fighting continued to engulf the city. It then took people up to 72 hours to make the nearly 300-kilometer journey from Mariupol to the Ukrainian-controlled city of Zaporizhzhia via Berdiansk, as Russian and so-called DNR officials at some 15 checkpoints repeatedly examined and questioned passengers, in particular men, and searched their vehicles. Another nearly 60,000 people made it to Ukrainian-controlled territory in April and around 4,600 people in May.

Some people remained in the city because they did not have their own cars, or their cars had been damaged in the fighting. Others had no information about when, where, and how they might be able to leave, since the fighting was intense and communications were down. It was still harder for the sick or injured, older people, and people with disabilities and their caregivers to make the perilous journey, and so many of them stayed behind. Others were afraid they would not make it past the checkpoints, because they had links to the Ukrainian military or had publicly expressed anti-Russian sentiments. And some, including many older people, chose to stay because Mariupol was their home.

By March 22, it became even more difficult for people to leave Mariupol for Ukrainian-controlled territory as Russian and DNR forces cemented their control over more of the city. They forced or coerced some residents who wanted to go to Ukrainian-controlled territory onto buses that took them to Russian and DNR-held villages and towns, where they underwent an abusive security screening process called “filtration.”171

The ICRC, the UN, and Ukrainian authorities continued their efforts to negotiate an official humanitarian corridor. But it took until early May before they were able to evacuate about 650 civilians from the Azovstal steel plant and other parts of the city, just after UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and raised “the imperative” of allowing humanitarian access and evacuations out of Mariupol.

By mid-June, around 150,000 people were estimated to still be in the city.172 In addition to those who made it out to Ukraine-controlled territory or beyond, others were transferred-in many cases forcibly-to Russia, while others died or were killed during the assault.

Fleeing During the Last Days of February

“No one could imagine the horrors to come.”

— Lifelong resident of Mariupol173

Ukrainian officials estimate that between 100,000 and 130,000 people had fled Mariupol by early March.174 But many residents thought that Russia’s attack on the city would be short-lived, recalling that Russia briefly backed a failed insurgency in Mariupol by DNR forces in April 2014. These forces retreated to territories about 10 kilometers from the eastern edge of the Left Bank, where they had remained until the full-scale invasion.175 Vaagn Mnatsakanian, a city council staffer who oversaw burials until mid-March, said:

Nobody believed that such a war could happen. At a city council meeting on February 23, everyone said we were safe and that everything would be okay. When it started the next day, a lot of people like me thought it would be like in 2014. But we were wrong. A few people left the city on February 24, but the rest of us didn’t.176

On February 24, Ukraine’s state-owned train operator Ukrzaliznytsia announced it had started to run free-of-charge evacuation trains on an adjusted timetable.177 However, many trains left the city half or nearly empty during the initial days of the invasion.178 A woman said that when the attacks started on February 24, she and many others were not worried: “Everybody thought the attacks would be limited to small-scale shelling of suburbs, so we didn’t think the information about evacuation trains was important. No one could imagine the horrors to come.”179

Then, at some point between February 25 and 27, Russian shelling damaged railway tracks near the town of Volnovakha, about 65 kilometers north of Mariupol, a public transport official from Mariupol city council told Human Rights Watch.180 He and other officials had organized five or six city buses to evacuate train passengers from Volnovakha to Zaporizhzhia. After this, he said, no trains left or entered Mariupol. Human Rights Watch reviewed satellite imagery from March 14, 2022, which shows damage to the rail tracks around the train station that would have made it impossible for trains to use the line.

In the last two days of February, many residents moved from the city’s northern outskirts to the city center, calculating that it would be spared. A man from Sartana, Mariupol’s northeastern-most suburb, about 10 kilometers from the center, said he moved to the center on February 26, and organized two buses to bring others from Sartana because “everyone thought that only the outskirts of the city would be attacked.”181

By February 28, Russian forces were already blocking aid from coming into the city; they prevented a truck from Zaporizhzhia loaded with medical equipment and antibiotics and other medicine from reaching Mariupol.182

Trapped in the City as Evacuation Efforts, Aid Deliveries Fail

Almost no residents were able to leave Mariupol between March 1 and 13, as Russian and Russia-affiliated forces encircled the city, blocked off all exit routes, and intensified their bombardment. At this time, residents lost access to all basic services and were trapped in their basements and other shelters. Throughout this period, senior Ukrainian officials, led by Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk, negotiated with Russian officials, including Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Vasilyevich Fomin, to allow aid trucks and empty buses to drive from Ukrainian-held Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol and to evacuate civilians from the city in those buses.183 But despite these efforts, no aid trucks or buses reached Mariupol until early May.

Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk said that on March 4, both sides exchanged letters that “seemed like Russian officials had given their permission to open [such] a corridor.”184 Early on March 5, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that, based on an agreement with Ukrainian officials, Russian forces would observe a ceasefire beginning at 9 a.m. to help establish a humanitarian corridor for civilians to leave Mariupol.185 But the aid and evacuation convoys that subsequently left Zaporizhzhia for Mariupol were repeatedly blocked at Russian checkpoints on the drive to Mariupol.

The head of the Mariupol District Council said that by March 4, when he was in Zaporizhzhia, he and other volunteers had organized 64 evacuation buses and 10 aid trucks loaded with humanitarian cargo and medicine, and that Russian officials had agreed to let them travel from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol through Orikhiv and Polohy.186 But various attempts to do so between March 3 and 10 failed, due to fighting in Polohy and shelling that hit parts of the agreed route. Russian forces eventually allowed about 10 trucks with aid to reach Berdiansk, but they only allowed Ukrainian volunteers to unload three trucks there and ordered the rest to return to Zaporizhzhia. It is unclear what happened to the aid that was unloaded in Berdiansk.

A priest tasked by Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk to work with 10 priests and other volunteers to get aid trucks and empty buses to Mariupol said they tried to reach Mariupol on March 11, 12, and 13. On March 11, a convoy of 11 trucks with medicine, food, and drinking water as well as about 20 empty buses left Zaporizhzhia but turned back shortly before Vasilievka, about 200 kilometers northwest of Mariupol, due to fighting nearby. The next day, the same convoy reached Vasilievka where Russian forces checked the vehicles and let them pass. Russian authorities directed the convoy by phone to drive via Tokmak to Berdiansk, where at about 9 p.m., DNR forces took some of the pasta, canned food, and cereals from the trucks and then let them enter Berdiansk. The next morning, the convoy tried to leave Berdiansk for Mariupol, but Russian forces said they could not let the convoy proceed due to continued fighting and because “nationalists” [a Russian propaganda term referring to Ukrainian forces] in Mariupol might kill some of the volunteers taking the aid in.187

Human Rights Watch also spoke with a volunteer based in Zaporizhzhia who participated in attempts between March 5 and 12 to bring aid trucks and empty buses to Mariupol.188 He said that at some point Russian forces allowed Ukrainian volunteers in Berdiansk to unload aid from six trucks. The aid was kept in a warehouse and never reached Mariupol. During another attempt, on either March 6 or 7, Russian forces stopped the convoy about 50 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia, but then rapidly abandoned their checkpoint due to nearby fighting. The convoy was unable to proceed along an alternative route due to mines. During a second attempt on March 12, he said that Russian forces in Berdiansk said that there was too much fighting in the area and that they feared Ukrainian forces would attack the convoy.

Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk said that on March 13, the buses and trucks had had to turn back at Berdiansk due to continued fighting in Mariupol.189 The next day, she said Russian shelling had prevented a convoy of buses from reaching the city with humanitarian supplies.190 That same day, the Mariupol City Council said a convoy of vehicles with humanitarian aid that left Zaporizhzhia for Mariupol was stuck in Berdiansk district “due to Russian forces’ non-compliance with the ceasefire agreement.”191

A senior UN official who was involved in the negotiations said that to the best of her knowledge, some DNR authorities were in favor of allowing aid to reach the city from Ukrainian-held territory but that, despite Russian authorities’ claims to the contrary, officials in Moscow did not want aid to go in from there. She also said that Russian authorities repeatedly claimed it was unsafe for aid convoys to proceed to Mariupol from Ukrainian-held territory.192

Ukrainian authorities repeatedly accused Russia of breaking ceasefire agreements.193 Russian officials also accused Ukrainian authorities of breaching ceasefire agreements and otherwise preventing Ukrainians civilians from leaving the city.194 Whether or not a ceasefire agreement is in effect, all parties to a conflict have an obligation to take all feasible steps to minimize harm to civilians and not take actions that would unnecessarily put civilians at risk.

Attacks on Mariupol’s City Bus Depot

Mariupol city officials had hoped to use the 100 or so buses at Mariupol’s main bus depot to help with evacuations, but the depot was repeatedly shelled by Russian forces, starting on March 4. A public transport official said that City Council members prepared 100 buses that together could evacuate over 11,000 civilians in case Russian officials agreed to a ceasefire, and identified police officers who could drive them.195 In early March, the buses were parked in the open or in hangars at the city’s Bus Depot #4, at the intersection of Bakhyvandzhi Street and Gromovoi Street.

Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk and a deputy administrator of the Mariupol City Council said that the evacuation agreement reached with Russian officials on March 4 mentioned that some buses would be leaving from Mariupol as part of the evacuation efforts, in addition to the empty buses coming from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol. Russian officials had reportedly asked for the locations of pre-boarding gathering points, which included the city’s Drama Theater.196

The transportation official said that the depot was attacked for the first time on the night of March 4, followed by more attacks in the following week:

More than 10 buses were damaged that [first] night, mostly their tires and windows. We had no staff left to repair them. There were craters in the ground next to the buses, but there was no damage to the roof of the hangar or to surrounding streets and buildings. We removed the diesel and batteries from the destroyed buses to use in other buses. There were more attacks on the depot and every day we lost a dozen buses. By March 13, there were only five or six undamaged buses left. I later saw on Russian Telegram channels that when the Russians took over the city, they used the remaining six and restored another six from scrap.197

The first available satellite imagery of the depot after March 4, taken on March 12, shows 102 buses parked in the open at the depot, with three or four of them burned. It also shows small holes in the roof of the bus depot and in the roof of an adjacent building. Other damage that may have been done to the buses by March 12, such as damage to their tires, windows, or mechanical parts, is impossible to assess using satellite imagery. Satellite imagery taken on March 29 shows that of the 104 buses parked outside that day, 98 are in the same position that they were in on March 12. Nine of them are burned and there is some debris next to approximately 30 other buses. Photos and footage of the damaged buses at the depot taken by two city officials in early March, including two taken on March 5, show damage to various external parts of some of the buses, including windows and tires.

Damaged buses in Mariupol’s Bus Depot #4, March 5, 2022. © 2022 Private

Satellite imagery taken on March 12 shows at least 29 buses apparently being used as barricades across roads in three locations on the western end of the Central District, including 22 that were burned. Satellite imagery taken on March 13 and 14 also shows 11 buses apparently being used as barricades in three other locations in the same area, of which 14 were burned.198

Mariupol City Council Evacuation Announcements, March 5 to 8

A series of Telegram posts by the Mariupol City Council starting on March 5 announced plans for convoys of private cars to leave the city, but then said all of them had to be canceled as the proposed evacuation route was still unsafe.

March 5, 10:28 - … from 09:00 to 16:00 there will be a ceasefire. The evacuation of the civilian population begins at 11 a.m. The route Mariupol-Nikolske-Rozivka-Polohy-Orikhiv- Zaporizhzhia was selected as a humanitarian “green” corridor. Evacuation of the population on municipal buses will take place from three locations by municipal buses: Sports Arena (Nakhimova Ave 53); Drama Theater (Teatralna Square 1); Kalmiuskyi district administration [building] (Metalurhiv Ave 193). It will be possible to leave the city by private transport.199

march-5-1242-telegram-evac

March 5, 12:18 - As of 10:55, the ceasefire will only take effect on the territory of the Donetsk region. There is fighting in the Zaporizhzhia region. We are negotiating with the Russian side to get confirmation that the ceasefire will include the evacuation route out of Mariupol.200

march-5-1118-telegram-evac

March 5, 13:42 - Urgent! The evacuation of civilians is postponed as there is no ceasefire.201

march-5-1242-telegram-evac

March 5, 14:20 - Today we received confirmation from the Russian Ministry of Defense that the passage from Mariupol is safe. [But] when we were ready to go, the Russian army began shelling along the corridor we were supposed to use. As a result, now there is no ceasefire. This does not give us a sense of security for movement from Mariupol to Zaporizhzhia.202

march-5-1320-telegram-evac

Over the next few days, Telegram posts by the Mariupol City Council reflected the failure of ongoing attempts to evacuate residents using safe evacuation routes.

March 6, 11:00 - Today at 12:00, the evacuation of the civilian population begins. The humanitarian “green” corridor is Mariupol-Portivske-Manhush-not going to Nikolske-Respublika-Rozivka-Bilmak-Polohy-Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia.203

March 6, 16:38 - The evacuation convoy with locals was unable to leave Mariupol today. The Russians began regrouping their forces and shelling the city heavily. It would be extremely dangerous to take people out under such conditions.204

March 6, 17:42 - From 09:00 to 11:00 people were gathered. At 09:20 a Grad attack happened. Eight buses had to take people out of the city. Eight trucks from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol with food and medicine could not come. 30 buses that were supposed to take out women, children, older people didn’t make it.205

March 8, 16:20 - The occupying forces again demonstrated their deception by attempting to break into the city at the moment the green corridor was organized for people. … This video was filmed by a Ukrainian drone on the Melekine highway, which was supposed to become a green corridor.206

Ukrainian officials said that evacuations from Mariupol were suspended on March 6 because Russian forces shelled areas close to the humanitarian corridor that both sides had agreed on.207 On March 7, the director of operations for the ICRC told international media that one of the agreed-upon routes from Mariupol was mined.208

On March 11, Russia proposed evacuation routes for civilians “from Mariupol along two routes to Rostov-on-Don in the Russian Federation via Novoazovsk and Taganrog, then by air, rail, and road to designated destinations or temporary accommodation.”209 As described below, many residents of Mariupol who wanted to flee to Ukrainian-controlled territory were offered no other possibility by Russian forces but to board buses traveling first to Russian-occupied areas and then remain there or travel onward across the border into Russia.

Ad Hoc Car Convoys Leaving the City After March 14

While Ukrainian efforts to organize official humanitarian corridors and evacuation routes failed throughout March and April, tens of thousands of residents were able to escape Mariupol during the second half of March in ad hoc convoys of private cars. It appears that Russian forces largely agreed to allow residents to leave the city and travel to Ukrainian-controlled territory during this period so long as they went through multiple searches at checkpoints of Russian and Russia-aligned forces along the way.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported that a convoy of people in “private vehicles, buses or on foot” left the city on March 14 “towards Zaporizhzhia, after the route and security guarantees for evacuation convoys were agreed upon … by the parties to the conflict.”210 Early on March 15, Ukrainian officials were posting messages on Telegram announcing that convoys of cars should leave the city.211

Between March 14 and 31, the Zaporizhzhia City Council registered 59,067 people who had driven in packed private cars from Mariupol and nearby towns and villages to the Russian-occupied town of Berdiansk and onwards to Ukrainian-held Zaporizhzhia. Most arrived between March 15 and 22.212 Cars continued to arrive after volunteers left the registration center at 5 p.m. each day, and not everyone who made it to Zaporizhzhia during the day came to the center to register.213

On March 31, Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk said that 75,000 people from Mariupol had been evacuated during the month of March.214

Human Rights Watch interviewed dozens of people at a registration center in Zaporizhzhia on March 17, 2022, about their flight from Mariupol between March 14 and 17.215 Many of them said they had left in personally arranged convoys with private cars and that their journeys took between 24 and 72 hours. They described the fear and exhaustion they felt, moving very slowly and passing through 15 to 20 Russian checkpoints where soldiers searched the men and cars, as well as residents’ phones for evidence of connections to Ukrainian forces. Others described seeing Russian personnel detain people at checkpoints, a weapon being fired over a person’s head, and Russian forces firing at a car at a checkpoint near Tokmak on March 16, injuring a girl in the face.216

By 1 p.m. on March 14, at least 160 private cars had left Mariupol for Zaporizhzhia, passing through Russian-held Portivske, Melekine, Manhush, and Berdiansk.217 The next morning, the Mariupol City Council reported that 300 people from Mariupol had arrived in Zaporizhzhia.218

A man said that he left the city on March 14 with his 11-year-old daughter, together with people he had met while sheltering who had two empty spots in their car:

We left the city in a long line of cars and drove to Manhush, where we were stopped at a DNR checkpoint. They inspected all the cars and checked men’s hands for gunpowder traces and let us all pass. In Berdiansk, Russian troops wrote down cars’ number plates and let us pass. We drove to Zaporizhzhia the next day. Just after we passed Kamianske village, there was shelling. We think the Russians were firing at Ukrainian trenches that were not far from the road, so the mortar shells landed all around us. I didn’t see anyone injured. There were more than 200 cars behind us, and I later heard on the news that some people had been killed and injured on the road towards Zaporizhzhia. I did not see them myself. We finally reached the area controlled by Ukrainian troops.219

Many more residents made it out on March 15.

At 10 a.m. that day, Ukrainian officials posted messages on Telegram saying a “humanitarian corridor” had been opened between Mariupol and Zaporizhzhia, passing through Manhush, Berdiansk, Tokmak, and Vasylivka.220 However, the first deputy mayor of Mariupol told Human Rights Watch that “no green corridor” had been agreed upon by Russian and Ukrainian officials for that day.221

By 2 p.m., the city council said 2,000 cars had left Mariupol and that another 2,000 were on the edge of the city, waiting to leave.222 A team from the Associated Press (AP) was in what one of the journalists described as a “5-kilometer-long traffic jam,” part of an exodus of “around 30,000 people … that day.”223 The journalists said the convoy included at least one Red Cross convoy of about 20 cars and that the convoys had to cross 15 Russian checkpoints before reaching safety.

Screen grab from video of a convoy, including vehicles of the International Committee of the Red Cross, leaving Mariupol on March 15, 2022. © 2022 Associated Press

Vaagn Mnatsakanian, the city council staffer who oversaw burials in early March, said:

On March 15, I went to the ICRC office. They said that the road to Melekine was now open though without any guarantees or green corridors. The ICRC had been given the green light from their bosses to try and get out of the city. So I left. Near the edge of the city, there was a horrible traffic jam involving two or three columns of thousands of cars. After about three hours, we got out of Mariupol and then it took nine hours to drive the 90 kilometers to Berdiansk. Between there and Zaporizhzhia, I saw five burned civilian cars by the roadside.224

Another man who fled in mid-March said he had seen at least 10 burned cars on the side of the road or in fields, and in one case, a dead body lying next to a burned car.225

A builder who fled his home on the Left Bank with his wife and two young daughters in early March and sheltered in the city center for two weeks described their escape:

On March 15, we couldn’t get even out of the house. Projectiles were landing all over the place in our district. Then the shelling stopped in our area and the battle moved about 500 meters away. My family jumped in our car, and we drove to the port. There was a huge traffic jam there of between 1,000 and 2,000 cars. Ukrainian soldiers organized the cars into a single column and that’s how we moved out of the city. At about 2 p.m. we passed through Melekine, on the coast, and then drove to Manhush and from there through several Russian and DNR checkpoints to Berdiansk, arriving at 10:30 p.m. The Russians questioned everyone at the Berdiansk checkpoint and then let people pass.226

Another man said he left the city in his car at 9 a.m. on March 15 and drove through 10 Russian checkpoints, including on the outskirts of Berdiansk, and reached Zaporizhzhia by 11 p.m.227 A woman said she was in the first column of about 300 cars to leave Mariupol on March 15 and that the first Russian checkpoint was in Berdiansk.228

Hundreds of people who had been sheltering at the Drama Theater left the city in significant numbers early on March 16.229 Many more left after the theater was bombed later that morning, with “the line of cars leading out of the city and along the coastal road stretch[ing] for miles” on the road to Berdiansk.230

A man whose son was injured during an attack on Mytropolytska Street 175 on March 10, said that doctors said he had to take his son to Dnipro for medical treatment and that he had therefore made a wooden splint the full length of his son’s body and driven out of the city in a convoy of cars on March 20, with his son “crying the whole way to Dnipro because of the pain.”231

Most said they made it out of Mariupol during this period in private cars, but some said they left on foot. One man described how he and his wife and daughter walked and ran out of the city on March 16:

We don’t have a car, so we had no choice. We ran for seven kilometers through the city and left the city just south of the port. It was mid-morning and there was constant intense shelling all around us. There were a lot of dead bodies in the streets. Then a car took us to Melekine and onward to Berdiansk. We passed through seven Russian checkpoints, and they let us through.232

A woman said she and her family fled the city on March 17 on foot and that, although most of the cars that passed them were packed full of people, some drivers took pity on them and gave them lifts for part of the way.233 Another woman said she and her daughter left the city on foot on March 17, and were later given a lift by a driver who took them through the many checkpoints.234

One woman and her daughter said they left by bus. They had survived for eight days in their basement and decided to flee on March 20, just after their apartment was destroyed during an attack on their building. The mother, whose arm had been broken in an earlier attack, said:

Friends told us that there were buses taking people out of the city, leaving Mariupol from somewhere near the district hospital. The registration line was long, so we only managed to register for a bus leaving on March 21. There was heavy shelling that day, but we still decided to make the 15-minute run from our home to the hospital. We were terrified. All we had was a bag with sweaters. Friends of ours with three children also managed to get to the bus. We were overjoyed they’d made it too. As we drove out of the city, we saw it was all burned and black. We cried. Our city was gone. It took us two days to reach safety in Zaporizhzhia.235

Some people who wanted to leave during this period did not make it out, either because the convoy was shelled as they were trying to leave or because they were unable to find transport. A doctor described her daughter’s failed attempt:

My daughter was the only member of our family who still had her identity papers. On March 21, she tried and failed to leave, and came back and told us what had happened. She said she had gone to the departure point near the Komsomolets cinema in Prymorskyi District, where we knew there was also a shelter. There were 70 people waiting to leave the city in a column of cars. When she reached the front of the line, the cars were shelled, so everyone fled.236

A 50-year-old man, who tried to flee the city in mid-March but only managed to escape three weeks later, described the scene outside the Drama Theater on March 16: “There were around 50 people on the road there, women, older people, and children. They were throwing themselves in front of passing cars, begging for a lift. But there was no space in the cars.”237

Satellite imagery taken on March 19 and 21 shows large numbers of cars driving from Mariupol on the road towards Berdiansk.238 The imagery from March 19, taken shortly after noon, shows about 200 cars at the southern exit of Mariupol on the O0545 road that runs along the coast in the direction of Yalta. The imagery from March 21 at the same time of day shows around 250 cars at that location.

Dozens of cars driving from Mariupol to Berdiansk, March 19, 2022. © 2024 Planet Labs PBC

Continued Efforts to Secure Official Evacuation Routes, Aid Delivery

As some people made it out of the city in the ad hoc convoys, and others were transferred by Russian authorities to Russian-controlled territory (see below), Ukrainian officials and others continued their efforts to negotiate an official humanitarian corridor.239

The Zaporizhzhia-based volunteer told Human Rights Watch that Russian forces in Berdiansk continued to deny buses access to Mariupol. After an attack on a nearby Russian navy vessel on March 24, buses were not allowed to enter Berdiansk at all and were forced to stop at the Lunar Circle roundabout, about eight kilometers to the west of Berdiansk.240

On March 27, French President Emmanuel Macron said that within two days he would be speaking to President Putin to help organize civilian evacuations from Mariupol.241 On April 2, Turkish Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar said that his government was working with both Russia and Ukraine to help prepare for the evacuation of civilians and wounded soldiers from the city.242

Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk said on March 31 that the ICRC had confirmed that Russia had agreed to open a humanitarian corridor to Mariupol.243 She said Russian troops had blocked a convoy of 45 Ukrainian buses on its way to the city at a checkpoint near Vasylivka, about 40 kilometers south of Zaporizhzhia. She also said Russian forces had seized 12 trucks with aid meant for people trapped in the city.244

Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk later said that four evacuation buses had left Mariupol on April 20, stayed in Berdiansk overnight, and reached Zaporizhzhia on April 21.245 But some who heard about the evacuation that day never saw the buses. One Mariupol resident said that on April 20 he heard on the radio that there would be an evacuation convoy leaving within an hour from the Port City shopping mall.246 When he arrived with his family, he saw about 200 other people waiting. No buses arrived, and he remained in Mariupol for another 10 days. He tried again a few days later after hearing on the radio that Russian forces would again arrange for buses to evacuate residents from near the same mall.247 Again, the evacuation never took place.

On April 24, Deputy Prime Minister Vereshchuk was quoted as saying that hopes of establishing a humanitarian corridor out of the city earlier that day had failed because Russian forces were continuing to fire weapons.248

A successful humanitarian corridor to Ukrainian-controlled territory was finally established on April 30, which facilitated the evacuation of some children and women.249

The same man who tried to leave twice from Port City shopping center and nearby said he tried again to leave from Port City on April 30.250 However, Russian forces were filming everyone waiting at the shopping center to leave the city, including him and his family, while a loudspeaker warned of an imminent missile attack and directed people to a shelter. He said he thought this was a Russian attempt to claim it was Ukrainian forces who were a threat to Ukrainians in Mariupol, not Russian forces. He left the city with his family later that day by car, together with dozens of other cars he saw lined up at a checkpoint on the western outskirts of the city, and reached Zaporizhzhia on May 4.

In early May, UN Secretary-General Guterres met President Putin in Moscow and stressed “the imperative of enabling humanitarian access and evacuations from besieged areas-Mariupol, first and foremost.”251 On May 3, the UN and ICRC were allowed to access the Azovstal steel plant, from where they evacuated 101 civilians,252 as well as 58 people from the village of Manhush.253 On May 4, they evacuated “more than 320 civilians from the city of Mariupol and surrounding areas.”254 They evacuated 170 more people from the Azovstal steel plant and the Mariupol area on May 8.255

No further official efforts were made to facilitate evacuation efforts or humanitarian aid deliveries, as Russian forces soon took over full control of the city.

Forcible Transfers to Russia and Russia-Controlled Territory

As more of the city came under the control of Russian forces between mid-March and early May, many Mariupol residents who wanted to flee to Ukrainian-controlled territory were instead forcibly transferred to Russia or Russian-occupied territories. A September 2022 Human Rights Watch report documented these transfers in detail.256 Some of those forcibly transferred were rounded up by Russian officials in Mariupol on suspicion that they had ties to the Ukrainian military. Others wanted to leave the city for Ukraine-controlled territory but were offered no other possibility by Russian forces but to board buses that took them first to Russian-occupied areas, where they could remain or from where they could travel onward across the border into Russia.257 Forcibly transferring civilians outside their territory is a serious violation of international humanitarian law and may amount to a war crime.

Russian and Russia-linked officials also subjected thousands of these Ukrainian citizens to a highly invasive process referred to by Russia as “filtration,” a form of compulsory security screening. Officials typically collected civilians’ biometric data, including fingerprints and front and side facial images; conducted body searches, and searched personal belongings and phones; and questioned them about their political views.

Thousands of children from Mariupol were among those forcibly transferred to Russia. These transfers later formed the basis of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s arrest warrants for Russian President Putin and the children’s rights commissioner in his office, Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. They have both been charged with the war crimes of unlawful deportation of children and unlawful transfers of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.258

Chapter VI Extent of Damage to the City

During their offensive against Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol, Russian forces attacked much of the city with explosive weapons with wide area effects, including heavy artillery, large mortar projectiles, multi-barrel rocket systems, missiles, and air-dropped munitions. Attacks struck hospitals, schools, other critical infrastructure, cultural centers, and thousands of high-rise residential buildings containing tens of thousands of apartments. In some cases, the attacks started fires that burned parts of, or entire, buildings. As a result, Mariupol suffered some of the most extensive physical damage and destruction of any city in Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion. Mariupol today would be barely recognizable to many of its former residents.

Human Rights Watch conducted a comprehensive building damage assessment of the city center, as well as an assessment of damage to educational, and health facilities citywide. This damage assessment combines an analysis of satellite imagery, which largely shows damage to the roofs of buildings, with drone footage and other photo and video analysis that demonstrates damage to the facades and interiors of buildings, and accounts from witnesses. The analysis of near real-time satellite imagery, photos, and videos is especially pertinent given that many of the damaged buildings have since been demolished by the Russian occupation authorities, and reconstruction efforts are well underway.

This analysis found that by mid-May 2022, 93 percent of the 477 multi-story apartment buildings in the central part of the city’s Central District had been damaged.259 All 19 hospital campuses city-wide were damaged. Of the 89 educational facilities that we identified across the city, 86 were damaged.

The use of explosive weapons with wide area affects in populated areas heightens concerns of unlawfully indiscriminate attacks. These weapons can have a large destructive radius, are inherently inaccurate, or deliver multiple munitions simultaneously. They not only kill and injure civilians at the time of attack, but also have long-term ripple, or “reverberating,” effects. Damage to civilian infrastructure, for instance, interferes with basic services such as health care and education, infringing on human rights. These weapons also inflict psychological harm and can lead to long-term physical impairments such as traumatic brain injuries, the loss of limbs, and hearing loss. They can further cause environmental damage and displace communities.

Damage to Residential Buildings

Damaged and destroyed apartment buildings in Mariupol, April 3, 2022. © 2022 Reuters

Human Rights Watch focused its comprehensive damage assessment on 14-square kilometers of the city center: the area surrounding the Drama Theater, all along Myru Avenue, the major transport artery of the city, and two city blocks to the north and south of Myru Avenue. The boundaries include Kuprina Street to the west, Shevchenka Boulevard to the north, Bakhchyvandzy Street to the south, and close to the Kalmius River to the east.

The assessment found that the area contained 9,043 buildings and that 4,884 of them, or 54 percent, were damaged. This included 443 of the area’s 477 high-rise buildings, or 93 percent, and 2,673 of the area’s 5,673 single story structures, or 47 percent.

Map of damage within the area of interest

This damage resulted in tens of thousands of Mariupol residents losing their homes and often all their belongings, contributing to mass displacement and homelessness. Beyond the immense financial loss, every family faced acute psychological suffering, as their homes were turned to rubble or made uninhabitable.

Damage to Schools

Image of damaged School #33, posted to X (formerly Twitter) on May 4, 2022. © 2022 User via X (formerly known as Twitter)

We identified 89 educational facilities across the city and found that 86 of them were damaged to some extent.260 This includes 71 out of 74 primary and secondary schools and all 15 university campuses.

Witnesses described Russian attacks on three schools in which Ukrainian forces were deployed. Other witnesses described air-dropped bombs hitting two schools they believed were empty at the time. Mariupol City Council Telegram postings referred to four other schools that were damaged.261

Human Rights Watch also spoke with 12 people who said they saw Ukrainian military forces positioned in February and March inside nine educational facilities in Mariupol: school 11 at Arkhip Kuindzhi Street 95; school 25 at Zelinskoho Street 108; school 27 at Troitska Street 56; school 33 at Pishchanyi Lane 18; school 42 at Karpinskoho Street 25; school 62 at Volhohradska Street 1; school 64 at Pylypa Orlyka Street 92; Kindergarten 113 at Yasnopolyanska Street 23; and the Center for Children for Extracurricular Activities at Azovstalska Street 160.

Map of schools within the area of interest

Schools and other educational facilities are normally civilian objects and protected under the laws of war from attack. It is not unlawful, however, for military forces to deploy in schools. When schools are used for military purposes or are occupied by military forces, they become legitimate military targets.

In 2019, the Ukrainian government endorsed the Safe Schools Declaration, an international political commitment that aims to protect education during times of war by strengthening the prevention of, and response to, attacks on students, teachers, schools, and universities. Russia has not endorsed the declaration. By January 2022, Ukraine had trained about 1,000 military officials on the Declaration and its associated “Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use During Armed Conflict.” In July 2022, a high-level military order was issued to further restrict military use of educational facilities.262

The reported military use of schools and attacks on schools have severely disrupted access to education. This is likely to continue long after, as repair and reconstruction of schools can require significant resources and time. Such attacks also have a significant negative impact on the psychosocial well-being of children, parents, and teachers.

Damage to Healthcare Facilities

Our assessment found that all 19 of the city’s hospital campuses were damaged.263 The campuses of Hospital #1 and Hospital #4 were among the most heavily damaged, with some buildings destroyed.264

The Ukrainian Ministry of Health provided a list of 34 healthcare facilities in Mariupol consisting of 64 buildings, including small clinics, dental centers, and administrative buildings. The list indicated that 26 of these buildings were destroyed and 38 were damaged between February 24 and April 15, 2022.265 An assessment conducted by the Ukrainian Healthcare Center, a Kyiv-based think tank, concluded that 82 out of 106 assessed healthcare facilities (including pharmacies) had been destroyed or damaged, and that 33 out of 46 primary care facilities were damaged.266

In addition to the attack on Hospital #3 (described in Chapter VII), witnesses referred to three attacks that damaged the Regional Intensive Care Hospital. A man who lived a few hundred meters away said he moved into his building’s basement on February 27 or 28 after he saw smoke coming from the hospital.267 A woman who was on the eighth floor of the hospital on March 2 said she heard an attack hit close to the hospital at around midday, damaging some of the lower floors.268 Another woman who was inside the hospital on March 13 said an attack damaged a traumatology unit on the second floor and the ceiling of another room, which collapsed, killing one person and injuring another.269

The damage to healthcare facilities across the city significantly inhibited access to lifesaving medical care as thousands of Mariupol residents desperately needed treatment for injuries, illnesses caused by the deplorable conditions in shelters, and preexisting conditions. In June 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that by the end of March, “all hospitals [in Mariupol] able to receive injured civilians were damaged or destroyed [and] … the damage and destruction coupled with the lack of electricity and medical supplies meant that hospitals had effectively ceased to function.”270

Hospitals, including military hospitals, have special protections under the laws of war, and deliberate attacks against hospitals and other medical facilities that are not being used to carry out attacks are prohibited. Under the Geneva Conventions, while the protection of hospitals ceases if they are being used outside their humanitarian function to commit “acts harmful to the enemy,” adequate warning must first be provided before the hospital can be attacked if the warning goes unheeded. Any attack on a hospital that is being used outside of its humanitarian function must be proportionate in relation to the anticipated military advantage.

As described below, Russian forces occupied the Regional Intensive Care Hospital and Hospital #3, and at the Regional Intensive Care Hospital appear to have committed abuses inside the hospital by firing at civilians passing by in cars. They also launched rockets from the hospital grounds, subjecting the hospital to possible attack.

Regional Intensive Care Hospital

Russian forces began occupying the Regional Intensive Care Hospital on March 12, according to several people, while two people who had been sheltering in neighboring buildings said they were told by Russian forces to move to the hospital for their own safety, as they were occupying it.271

An anesthesiologist at the hospital said the hospital initially treated civilians and wounded Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian soldiers guarded the hospital until early morning on March 12. He said that Russian forces occupied the hospital later that day, and appeared to bring civilians with them to use as human shields:

Russian soldiers with white armbands came to the hospital and brought with them people from neighboring houses and put them in the hospital’s basement. The main commander at the hospital was Russian and they called him “Osietin” [an ethnic Ossetian]. He said he’d fought in Chechnya. His forces used our hospital as a shield. They put tanks and BMPs [armored infantry fighting vehicles] in the open at the back [northern side] of the hospital and fired from there. They also positioned themselves in front of the hospital and fired Grad rockets and projectiles from armored vehicles towards the city center [to the southeast] and then moved to the back, behind the hospital. There was no return fire towards the hospital during the time I was there.272

The same day, he also saw Russian forces firing at civilians from their new base at the hospital:

I heard one of the Russian commanders tell his forces to shoot at any civilian car passing the hospital. Then I saw Russian soldiers on the floor below me firing their assault rifles and shoulder-fired grenade launchers at three civilian cars driving past the hospital on Matrosova Street. Two men got out of a car and collapsed on the road. Others escaped from the cars and ran away and hid. Some of them came to our hospital later and we helped them.

Later that day and the next, I saw some of the forces firing from the hospital at the four tall buildings one block south, on Mytropolytska Street. The block between the hospital and Mytropolytska Street is full of one-story buildings so we could see everything. They hit all four of the buildings. I also saw a plane drop a bomb on one of those buildings during that time.273

A man who was in the hospital with his injured child when Russian forces took it over said that he thought that Russian forces brought civilians from basements of nearby buildings to the hospital to discourage Ukrainian forces from attacking the hospital. The fact that the forces let the civilians leave three days later, when the front line had shifted further east towards the city center, reinforced that conclusion. He also said that he saw Russian forces fire from the hospital grounds towards the nearby front line.274

A woman sheltering in the basement of Troitska Street 32, about 50 meters east of the hospital, said that after her building was struck on March 12, Russian forces told residents in the basement to move to the Regional Intensive Care Hospital, which they did. She said:

There were between 100 and 150 Russian soldiers in the hospital. Many were injured. Russian tanks and small armored vehicles with turrets [revolving low-armored towers] were parked on the hospital grounds. The Russian soldiers behaved neutrally, but the Chechens, including their commander who they called “Osietin,” were aggressive. They didn’t let us leave the hospital or talk to them.275

A man sheltering in the basement at Troitska Street 40, about 150 meters southeast of the hospital, said Russian forces told him on March 14 that he and others could move to the Regional Intensive Care Hospital. He said that he later saw a DNR commander shoot a nurse in the legs at the hospital and pull her out of view:

On March 15, the main DNR commander at the hospital, who soldiers called Osietin, told a nurse to introduce herself. When she said the soldiers should introduce themselves first, one of the soldiers shot her in the legs. Then they pulled her into one of the rooms. I don’t know what happened to her. The DNR forces didn’t abuse any of us civilians in the basement. I left the hospital the next day.276

Hospital #3

The DNR forces set up a base at Hospital #3 from around March 25 until mid-April, according to several people at the hospital.277 They said the DNR forces installed a large communications antenna on the grounds of the hospital and fired rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons at nearby buildings, where Ukrainian forces were apparently positioned. They did not report any abuses by DNR forces against the civilians and medical personnel at the hospital. “The DNR forces were badly equipped, and they treated us well, even sharing some of their food and water,” one of the injured men said.278

The surgeon said the forces were from the 105th DNR Regiment, from the Telmanivskyi district of the Donetsk region. He also said that at the beginning of April, a Russian military communication unit whose members said they came from the North Ossetian village of Roboche took over the oncology and radiology buildings. They had about seven trucks and a number of armored personnel carriers marked with the letter Z, and they set up a field hospital to treat wounded Russian soldiers.279

Chapter VII Case Studies: Attacks Harming Civilians

The laws of war prohibit attacks against civilians and civilian objects that are deliberate, do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, or cause harm to civilians disproportionate to any expected military gain. Also prohibited as indiscriminate are attacks that are not directed at a specific military objective. Parties to the conflict have an obligation to do everything feasible to verify that targets of attack are military objectives. They must do everything possible to cancel or suspend an attack should they determine the target is not a military objective or would cause disproportionate loss of civilian life.

The following 14 case studies involving 18 locations describe Russian airstrikes and artillery attacks that struck presumptively civilian structures-residential buildings, hospitals, the city’s drama theater, a food storage facility, an aid distribution site, and a supermarket. The basements of many of the residential buildings served as shelters. In these incidents, we found no evidence of a Ukrainian military presence in or near the building that was struck, except in a few cases where there was a very limited military presence and where the attacks caused disproportionate civilian harm.

Map of cases

Several of the attacks were carried out with guided weapons, including air-dropped bombs, indicating that the buildings hit were deliberately targeted. Deliberate, indiscriminate, or disproportionate attacks that are carried out with criminal intent-that is intentionally or recklessly by those ordering them or carrying them out-are war crimes.

Several of the cases were apparent Russian laws-of-war violations that may amount to war crimes.

Human Rights Watch asked the Russian Defense Ministry about its basis for each of the attacks in the case studies below, but had not received a reply at time of writing.

The warring parties should impartially investigate the following cases consistent with their obligations under the Geneva Conventions to investigate apparent laws-of-war violations committed on their territory or by their forces.

Food Storage Site North of the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works, March 1

On March 1, 2022, an attack hit a food storage facility, destroying half of the space used to store food, killing one man, and injuring two other people.280 The city’s first deputy mayor said that grocery stores had agreed to give city officials and other volunteers food to store for distribution to those in need around the city. On February 25 and 26, they had stored considerable food in this facility, which belonged to a municipal garbage disposal company called Komunalnyk, about 200 meters to the north of the northeastern-most part of the Azovstal steel plant’s perimeter.281

The company’s director said that on February 24 and 25, six 12-meter-long open trailer trucks brought about 20 pallets with bottled water and food-including pasta, flour, cereals, vegetable oil, sugar, and salt-from the Metro shopping mall to the facility, where his staff unloaded them with forklift trucks and stored them inside the facility.282

A city council member said he and a team of volunteers had gone to organize the storing of food at the facility on March 1, and that they also made bread there to distribute to those most in need.283 Just after they finished organizing the food, the attack struck the building. A second city council member said that she was later told that the attack happened about 20 minutes after she had left the site.284

Komunalnyk’s director said the attack had seriously injured one of the company’s security staff, Dmytro Horbachov, 53, who later died.285 He also said that he later saw the remnant of a Grad rocket protruding from the ground near the building and that the angle suggested it had come from the east.

Satellite imagery taken on March 10, 2022, the first image available after March 1, shows impact craters 100 meters west of the facility, on the other side of Kalmius River, but no damage to the roof of the facility. Satellite imagery taken on March 13 shows damage to the roofs of four buildings next to the facility, including one completely collapsed roof.

Torhova Street 20, March 8

An image uploaded to Telegram by Azov Battalion on March 8, 2022, showing damage to Torhova Street 20. © 2022 Azov_media via Telegram

An attack hit a residential building at Torhova Street 20 on March 8, killing three women and two children. A man who was visiting a friend who lived next door, said:

That day, I went to bring food to a friend with a disability who lived just to the east of the theater. It wasn’t that safe to move around, and I was scared, but I went anyway to help him.

At about 5 p.m., we were smoking a cigarette just outside his building. There were explosions, but they were quite far away. I didn’t see any soldiers or military vehicles in the street at any point that day. I was watching three women, one boy about 10, and a girl, about 12, who were in front of a shop that is on the ground floor of the three-story building that was hit.

Suddenly I heard the slow and heavy sound of something falling from the sky. Then I saw a flash and smoke and saw that part of the building above the store had collapsed. It was all like in slow motion. We were scared, so we ran away, though not very far. We were in shock and waited for about 10 minutes and then went back to where we had been standing to see whether there were any survivors. I saw five bodies lying on the ground: the two children and three women I had seen before. The girl had lost a leg. They were not under the rubble but lying next to it in the street. I didn’t see any blood on their bodies.

About a 30-second walk away, just across the road from where they were killed, there was a playground with a covered sandpit. My friend and I moved the children’s bodies into the sandpit. Then I went home and never returned.286

Satellite imagery from March 10, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows damage to the middle section of the roof, as well as debris next to the eastern side of the building. Analysis of additional satellite imagery shows the building was subsequently damaged four times.287

Hospital #3 and Pryazovskyi Technical University, March 9

Airstrikes hit Mariupol’s Hospital #3 and the neighboring Pryazovskyi Technical University one after the other on March 9, killing at least five people and wounding 18 others.

Hospital #3

Screengrab from video posted to YouTube on March 9, 2022, by the National Police of Ukraine showing injured people leaving a damaged part of Hospital #3. © 2022 Donetsk Oblast police via YouTube

On March 9, images were beamed around the world showing a pregnant woman being carried on a stretcher through a heavily-damaged hospital courtyard in Mariupol.288 She was one of two people known to have died after an air-dropped bomb landed at about 2:50 p.m. that day in one of the courtyards of Mariupol’s Hospital #3, damaging two buildings belonging to the city’s Territorial Medical Association for Children’s and Women’s Health (maternity and pediatric units).289 The woman, Iryna Kalinina, died later that day of her injuries.290 Her baby, delivered by caesarean section, was stillborn.291 Ukrainian officials reported that the attack had killed two adults and a child, and wounded 17 medical staff and patients.292 Among the wounded was Marianna Vyshemirska, whose image was also seen around the globe after she was photographed walking down a flight of stairs and through the bombed courtyard while nine months pregnant.293 On March 10, she gave birth to a girl.294

Russian officials made several claims relating to the presence of Ukrainian military forces at the hospital at the time of the attack.295 Just a couple of hours before the attack, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova claimed that Hospital #3 was empty of staff and patients and was being used by Ukrainian forces as a firing position.296 On March 10, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russian forces had targeted the hospital because it was being used as a base by the Azov battalion.297 The Russian ambassador to the Netherlands accused Ukraine of hiring actors to feign injuries after the attack.298 No evidence was put forward substantiating these claims.

The husband of a nurse said he saw about 15 members of the Ukrainian territorial forces positioned as guards in the hospital in the days before the attack, but the presence of military personnel providing hospital security does not make the hospital a valid military target.299

Human Rights Watch found no evidence that Ukrainian forces were using the hospital as a base or to deploy their forces.

A doctor who was operating on a patient in the hospital’s Oncology Unit, about 60 meters to the east of where the munition struck, said that the blast wave threw him and other medical staff into a corridor next to the operating room and that sandbags that had been covering the building toppled onto the floor.300

A member of the Mariupol city council was making tea with a friend just outside the building where they were sheltering about 500 meters from the hospital grounds.301 He described hearing the roar of an approaching plane, a bomb falling, and then two explosions whose shockwaves pushed him and his friend into the building. They went out and saw smoke coming from the hospital grounds but rushed back in when they heard a plane approach again. The council member said he heard another bomb fall and then two more explosions. The shockwave this time blew out the doors and windows of his building. He later found out that the second attack had hit nearby university buildings. Another man in a separate building also recalled two explosions, the first of which had him running out of bed and into the street, and a second one so strong that the shockwave flung him back inside his building.302

Those who survived the attack inside the hospital or rushed there to help encountered horrific scenes. A volunteer at the hospital, who ran from the Oncology Unit to the maternity unit to help injured people get out, said:

There was a crater in the courtyard, about 15 meters wide and about 5 meters deep. A few of us helped the wounded and pregnant from the first floor come down to the courtyard and took them to ambulances. I saw between 12 and 15 wounded people with different wounds, including some badly torn flesh. We took one of the injured men, about 50 years old and wearing military clothes, into one of the hospital’s buildings. His face was burned, and he smelled badly burned. I watched him die.303

The head of Mariupol city council’s Department of Social Protection also came to the scene shortly after the attack. She had been working out of the Territorial Center of Social Services close to the maternity hospital since February 25.304 The woman, a colleague, and two policemen named Serhii and Oleksandr were all thrown to the ground in their office, she said, and the blast wave shook the doors and shattered windows. Then, it was quiet, and across the courtyard they saw the maternity and pediatric units on fire. She said:

Serhii and Oleksandr radioed for help and then they and a few of us, including a man called Andrii in a cap and red and grey coat, ran to the buildings. Andrii and Serhii appear in this photo of four men evacuating a pregnant woman on a stretcher [Iryna Kalinina, referred to above].305 The woman’s thigh was badly injured, and a doctor said there was no way to save her. While on the stretcher, she shouted, “Don’t touch me! Let it be as it is.” I heard she later died.

We took some of the children to the nearby children’s surgical ward. Newborn children were taken to the Regional Intensive Care Hospital. Soldiers and policemen took pregnant women and women who had recently given birth to a hospital in District #17. We transported people in cars, [they were] on each other’s laps. A lot of people were panicked and bleeding, but none of us knew how many people were injured.306

One man who had brought his injured mother to the hospital was impressed by the doctors’ work, so he decided to stay and help find food for people sheltering in the basement. He said:

Until March 16, seven or eight members of the [Ukrainian] Territorial Defense forces with Kalashnikovs [military assault rifles] guarded the hospital. Two were positioned near the entrance of the Oncology Unit on the first floor and some were near the power generator. Sometimes I saw some of them patrolling inside the children’s section. After March 9, they slept for several days in the maternity unit to protect it from looters. The only vehicles I ever saw on the hospital grounds were two red and white ambulances and a blue truck.307

A doctor said he started treating wounded Ukrainian soldiers at the hospital on March 4.308 A military nurse also said that the hospital was treating wounded Ukrainian soldiers at the time of the attack.309 She said that when Military Hospital #555 at Amosova Street 54 ran out of space, she and other military medics moved wounded soldiers from there to Hospital #3 on March 6 or 7. They received medical care in at least one part of the hospital, the Oncology Unit.

A video recorded by an AP journalist on March 9, 2022, captures the sound of the explosion, shows from a distance smoke rising from the hospital campus, and then shows the damaged facades and interiors of the maternity and children’s units, and some of the wounded.310 Another video, recorded by the Ukrainian military and distributed to the media, shows the damaged upper levels of the maternity unit.311 A surgeon working in Hospital #3 said that the damage was so extensive that the units could no longer be used.312

Satellite imagery from March 12, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows a crater with an estimated diameter of 10 meters in the courtyard of the hospital and damage to the facades of the maternity and pediatric units. An analysis of the crater and the damage to nearby buildings indicates that the explosion was caused by a 500-kilogram aircraft bomb that uses an impact fuze.313

Pryazovskyi State Technical University

Image taken on the afternoon of March 9, 2022, shows damage to part of Pryazovskyi State Technical University. © 2022 Private

Moments after the attack on Hospital #3 on March 9 at about 2:50 p.m., Russian aircraft also attacked buildings belonging to the Pryazovskyi State Technical University, killing at least two people and injuring at least one. None of the seven witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they saw any Ukrainian military forces in the area at the time of the attack.314

The university is near the easternmost buildings of Hospital #3, and about 400 meters to the west of the Drama Theater. Almost all of the university’s buildings are arranged in a closed square campus. By early March, some of these buildings were sheltering hundreds of people who had fled to the city center to escape attacks in the Left Bank.

Mykhailo Puryshev owned a restaurant called Evo in a building at Myru Avenue 68, which has an entrance on Universytets’ka Street and faces the university campus. He said he saw no Ukrainian military at any of the university buildings, including the inner courtyards, on March 8 or 9.315

Puryshev said that he was standing just inside the entrance of the building with his restaurant and recorded videos with his phone at the moment of the March 9 attack on the university, as well as the aftermath in one of the nearby streets.316 He said:

I heard planes and an explosion from the direction of Hospital #3. I went outside with a few others and then I heard another plane coming closer. I warned the others, and we all ran inside. I was the last to enter and was pushed inside by the shock wave of an explosion. I had trouble breathing. I heard children in the basement crying in the darkness. From what I know, nobody died or was injured inside our building.

Shortly after, I went outside with my phone still filming and saw the horror. I started to cry, for the first time since the start of the attack on the city. About 100 meters to the west, I saw the body of a man lying in the street. I also saw a damaged car right opposite my entrance, about 30 meters away. Next to it, I saw the body of an older woman. Then I saw a seriously wounded man crawl out from the car. Later, Ukrainian soldiers who came to our building took him away. I helped the grandson of the dead woman drag her body to the corner of my building.

A university building opposite my building, at Universytets’ka Street 7, was damaged. Some people who were sheltering in my building later told me they had gone into that building a while after the attack and seen one body inside.317

The footage recorded by Puryshev shows the moment of the attack and Puryshev leaving the building shortly thereafter and walking along part of Universytets’ka Street. The footage shows a body lying next to a car close to the entrance of his building.

Another man said he had been staying with a friend in the basement of a university building nearby and that they had been thrown to the floor by the shockwaves of the attacks on Hospital #3 and the university. He said:

We saw two bodies lying in the road on the side of the Evo restaurant. We saw damaged buildings and walked past a car that was burned and saw the remains of a person behind the wheel. We took a photo of the car, and we took photos of the buildings on both sides of the road.318

Another man said he was jolted awake from a nap by an explosion and ran out of his building. He ran swiftly back in, as another attack hit nearby. He said:

As soon as the explosion woke me up, I ran outside to the courtyard. Less than a minute later, I heard an airplane above, loud, like a rocket. I heard a whoosh that started high pitched and then got lower in pitch. I heard an explosion from the direction of the university. I turned and ran back towards the building entrance and a shock wave lifted me off the ground. I picked myself up and ran back into the building.

After dark, I left the basement and went to the university. I saw that part of one of the university buildings had been destroyed and saw debris falling off another university building down the road, so I didn’t go any further. I didn’t see any bodies nearby. A little further down the road there were burning cars. I stayed for a minute and then went back. People in my building told me that the maternity hospital was hit first and then the university. About three or four days later I went to the university to meet someone. I saw a lot of burned cars. I saw a body lying in the street and then four bodies covered in metal sheeting.319

Images taken on March 10 show damage to the southern facade and to part of the inside of the building.320 Further images taken on March 9 show the damage done to the northwest corner of the building, facing Universytets’ka Street 7.321

Satellite imagery from March 12, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows significant damage to the entire northwest corner of the building of Universytets’ka Street 7, the collapsed roof of Universytets’ka Street 9 just to the south, and damage to the roof of at least one other building, at Kazantseva Street 7, that forms part of the enclosed campus.322

Based on witness testimony and images of the damage done to the buildings, we concluded that aircraft-delivered weapons were used in the attack.

Zelinskoho Street 98A, March 9

An apparent air-dropped bomb damaged a nine-story building at Zelinskoho Street 98A on March 9, 2022, killing at least two people. A woman and her husband, who lived in the building with the woman’s mother, said that the building was first hit on March 5 or 6, causing damage to one apartment.323 The woman described the second attack:

Early in the morning of March 9, the worst thing happened. Our neighbor, Vladimir Chupryna, who was about 55 years old, went outside to make coffee. A man called Ivan, who had left his home and was sheltering in our building, went with Vladimir to prepare some baby formula for his child. But then an airplane dropped a bomb. It landed right in front of the entrance and hit one of the cooking stoves. Fragments hit them [Vladimir and Ivan] and they died on the staircase just inside the entrance. Their intestines fell out, so the whole first floor was covered with blood. We wrapped their bodies and some of the men carried the bodies to the other side of the building.324

A series of images taken after the attack show broken windows and smaller damage done to several facades of the buildings.325 Satellite imagery taken on March 14-the first available after the building was hit-shows a small impact on the southern side of the roof.

Marinska Balka Street 67 and Vidkryta Street 23, around midnight March 10-11

Drone footage uploaded to Dzen, a Russia-based social media platform, on June 8, 2022, showing a large crater and extensive damage to Marinska Balka Street 67 and neighboring buildings. © 2022 User via Dzen

At least three people were killed during attacks that damaged the nearby single-story homes at Marinska Balka Street 67 and Vidkryta Street 23 at around midnight on March 10-11, 2022.

A man who lived at Marinska Balka Street 67 said that he, his family, and some of their neighbors had taken to sleeping in his basement after February 28. Every day, he saw Ukrainian armored vehicles passing by his and his neighbors’ homes to distribute aid, but he said they moved on after doing this and were never stationed near his home.326 He described the night of the attack:

At midnight on March 10, I was sleeping in the basement with my wife and two daughters, and a neighbor and their two children. Suddenly I heard something hit the ground above us and part of the basement ceiling collapsed. No one was hurt. I went to the top of the stairs and saw that my house was damaged, but still standing. The garden shed had been blown into the living room. The windows and doors were gone.

Outside, I saw that the building just opposite my house had been hit and was on fire. I didn’t know the people who lived there. I helped a young man and his mother-in-law escape from the house, but his wife and her sister were screaming as they were trapped under the collapsed roof. They burned to death.

I found out that 14 other houses nearby were also damaged in that attack, but I don’t know whether anyone else was killed or injured. That night, many families from the area, including us, fled to shelter in the basement of a clothes shop about 100 meters to the south. Two days later we went back and found a man stuck under the rubble of his house. Somehow, he’d survived, and we managed to free him.327

A doctor who was staying with relatives just 75 meters away described how, in the aftermath of the same attack, she saved the life of a neighbor who was severely injured after an attack hit his house at Vidkryta Street 23 a little after 11:30 p.m. on March 10:

It was around midnight and silent in our area, and we were about to go to bed. I heard an airplane and bombs in the distance. Then bombs exploded close by and suddenly there was a loud explosion. I lost my hearing for some time. I saw a bright light outside and a shock wave hit the house and shattered the windows. My husband was thrown to the ground, and I covered my brother with my body. Part of a wall and a window fell onto my grandmother. Her arm was sticking out from the rubble, but we removed the rubble, and she was okay.

Then I heard someone outside screaming for help. I grabbed a cloth in case I needed a tourniquet and rushed outside. The house opposite ours, number 21, was gone. I saw a man about 20 and a girl about 12 lying where the entrance had been. There were fires all around, so it was very bright. The man said he had lost his legs and that I couldn’t save him and that I should save the girl instead. It looked like the man’s legs had been severed from his body, but I put the tourniquet on the leg that seemed more damaged than the other. The girl seemed ok, but one of her legs had been crushed by the wall.

I worked with other people to free them from under the rubble. It took a long time. One of our neighbors then took them by car to the hospital. I heard they were moved to another hospital which I heard was also hit two days later. I heard afterwards that the girl died of her injuries. In late April [2022], I saw an Instagram story about the injured man I’d helped. I visited him in Mechnikova hospital in Dnipro. He had lost both his legs but was doing okay.328

A video posted online on June 8 of Marinska Balka Street 67 shows DNR officials retrieving a body from under the rubble before moving the body into a marked van.329 The video also includes drone footage of the area, which shows the extent of damage done to Marinska Balka Street 67 and nearby houses. A large crater is visible directly behind the building. Satellite imagery from March 12, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows damage to the southwest corner of Marinska Balka Street 67 and severe damage to the adjacent houses, some of which are completely destroyed.

Mytropolytska Street 98, March 11

Mytropolytska Street 98 in flames on March 11, 2022. © 2022 Associated Press

Between 3 and 6 p.m. on March 11, an air-dropped bomb hit a five-story apartment building at Mytropolytska Street 98, killing at least 17 people and causing significant property damage.330

A man who was in his apartment in a neighboring building just to the east of Mytropolytska Street 98 said he heard the attack and shortly after saw that the central part of the building had collapsed.331 He said:

At about 3 or 4 p.m., I was taping the windows in my apartment. Just as I had finished, I heard a plane and went to the corridor to be safer in case of an attack. Then an explosion blew my windows out. Shortly after, I went to the entrance of my building and saw a fire at number 98. I walked over and saw that the part of the building above the middle entrance had collapsed. In the days before, I had seen many people cook just outside that entrance. Later that day, people who had been sheltering in number 98 came to shelter in our building. They said that people were in the building’s basement at the time of the attack and that some of the wounded had been taken elsewhere.332

Truth Hounds spoke with a woman who lived at Mytropolytska Street 94, about 100 meters to the south of number 98, who said she heard that there were people calling for help from inside the building just after the attack:

The superintendent of our building ran outside to see what happened. When she came back, she said that it was a ‘bloody mess’ and that we should go and rescue people, because she could hear people moaning and calling for help. I refused to go outside. Later, I heard from others that the fire department came to put out the fire but had to go away as the shelling continued.333

Dmytro Lastenko lived at Mytropolytska Street 94, and he moved in late February to the basement at Mytropolytska Street 98, which was listed as an official shelter for civilians in times of need. He told Human Rights Watch about the set-up of the basement:

The basement had six main rooms. There were a few smaller rooms for storing food as well as a toilet. The toilet had a small emergency tunnel leading out of it. There was one staircase to get to the ground floor. There were 18 other people in the room I stayed in. I think there were about 30 people in all parts of the basement at the time of the attack.

The day before the attack, on March 10, Lastenko said that two Ukrainian soldiers entered the basement. “I didn’t speak to them,” he said, “but a man from our basement who was sort of in charge, did. He told me later that they had wanted to take up position inside someone’s apartment above us, but that he had said no, because there were a lot of people in the basement. He said the soldiers then left.” Lastenko didn’t see any other soldiers in or near the building for the rest of that day or the next day.

He described the moment of the attack:

I didn’t hear anything before the explosion. The attack destroyed the room in the basement where I normally stayed. At the moment of the attack, I was in a room right next door. One part of the basement caught fire, although it didn’t spread. There was a lot of dust and pungent smoke. It was so dense that our torches could only light up the space right in front of our eyes. I found air on another side of the basement so I could breathe better.

I walked up the stairs. The exit to the ground floor was not blocked by rubble, although there was a lot of destruction a few meters away. Right after the attack, people crowded the exit to the building trying to leave.

Outside, the trees were littered with belongings from apartments, and cars parked in the courtyard were destroyed. I ran to Mytropolytska Street 100 right next door where I knew there was a shelter in the basement.

Lastenko said he went back to Mytropolytska Street 98 the next day to try to find his backpack, which had his personal documents in it:

I was down there for about 10 minutes but didn’t find it. The only room that was destroyed was the one I had been staying in. There was a lot of rubble. I saw one burned adult body at the entrance of the room. I also saw other body parts: two heads, one arm, and one leg. Everything was charred, clothes and skin. Some relatives of people staying in that room couldn’t find their relatives afterwards, so I fear that more people were killed than the ones I saw.

I shut myself away for two days in building 100 and didn’t speak to anyone. I still have problems sleeping after seeing the scorched bodies, knowing this might have been someone I knew.

Lastenko left Mariupol on March 18. He later returned with his parents in mid-May 2022 and again he went back to the building, where he finally found his identify documents. He said:

There were no bodies in the basement then but there were still remnants of the rubble. Everything was partially burned. Nothing was intact. It was very damp and there was still a bad smell. My stepfather and I used a shovel to dig out my documents. I found two lumps of hair and a cellphone with a case that stank of decaying flesh.

Lastenko recognized a phone that belonged to a young woman he had spoken with while sheltering in the basement, Khyrstyna Antipenko. He tracked down the woman’s mother, Stefaniia, in mid-May and gave her the phone.334

Stefaniia told us in April 2023 that five of her relatives appear to have died in the basement of Mytropolytska Street 98: her 24-year-old daughter, Khrystyna; her 27-year-old son-in-law, Ivan Antipenko; her 3-year-old granddaughter, Aryna Ivanivna Antipenko; her son-in-law’s 47-year-old mother, Svitlana Volodymyrivna Paraschchevina; and her son-in-law’s aunt, Svitlana’s sister, 44-year-old Natalia Volodymyrivna Antipenko.335

She said that they had all moved to the basement of Mytropolytska Street 98 on March 6 and that she had spoken to her son-in-law on March 8, the last time she spoke with any of her relatives. When she received her daughter’s phone in mid-May from Lastenko, she saw that her daughter had written her a text message on March 6 that had never been never sent due to the lack of phone coverage in the city. The message said, “Mommy, I am alive. Everything is fine with me. Love you.”

She said that Lastenko had told her how Khrystyna had prepared food, and that 10 minutes before the attack, she had taken it to the room that was shortly to be destroyed, called on her daughter to come to eat, and then served food to all the people who were in the basement. Lastenko told her that while he was able to escape, he thought everyone who had been in the room where Khrystyna had served the food had died.

Stefaniia later discovered a Telegram group set up by people looking for relatives who they thought might have died in Mytropolytska Street 98.336 A woman she met online through that group told her that five of her relatives, including two teenage girls, had also died in the basement.

On April 15, Stefaniia finally made it to Mariupol to try and find her relatives’ bodies. She said she regularly went to Mytropolytska Street 98 in the second half of April but that she never found their bodies, or saw anyone there removing rubble or bodies. She and her husband did find some of Ivan and Khrystyna’s belongings amidst the rubble, including their marriage certificate, educational certificates, medical records, Aryna’s birth certificate, and photos, including of the day Khrystnyna left the maternity hospital. She also found a bag with Khrystyna’s hat and Aryna’s overalls. She said she recognized Khrystyna’s smell on the hat. She also found a telephone and told members of the Telegram group. The husband of the phone’s owner met Stefaniia and, after charging the phone, showed her a video filmed in the basement on March 6 or 9 which showed Stefaniia's granddaughter playing in the basement. Svitlana, her son-in-law’s mother, and one of the teenage girls were also in the video.

Then in late April, she got news that their bodies may have been recovered. She saw a message posted on the Telegram group for people looking for missing relatives at Mytropolytska Street 98, saying that a recovery team retrieved the last five bodies from the building, including “a girl aged between 3 and 5, a man in dark clothes, a woman in a black jacket and blue jeans, and a woman in a pink robe whose body was decomposed.”

She described how she felt when she saw the post:

I realized that those were my [relatives’] bodies. That’s because they were talking about a small girl and about clothes I recognized. On March 9, Ivan had sent me a video that he had filmed while he was cooking outdoors. He was wearing a dark sleeveless jacket, a hoodie, and sport trousers. Khrystyna was wearing a black jacket and weathered-looking jeans. A woman in the Telegram group who had survived the attack said she knew that Khrystyna was wearing jeans with torn knees and a black coat, that Ivan wore dark clothes, and that Svitlana was wearing a warm pink robe.

I now feel so guilty that I didn’t stay there day and night because at some point while I wasn’t there, workers took their bodies away and now I can’t find them.

It took her until October 5 to find her granddaughter’s body (see Chapter VIII), and as of December 2023 she was still looking for the bodies of her other four relatives.

Pavlo, who was involved in recovering bodies from the building, said he was part of one of many recovery teams made up mostly of staff from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service and volunteers.337 He said that every morning they met at the Metro shopping mall, and that a man he was told was called Sergey Mishenko and some senior officials apparently reporting to him gave the teams instructions about which buildings they should go to that day to recover bodies that might be in the rubble.338

During his first day, on April 21, 2022, he was sent to Mytropolytska Street 98. People living in the area told him that an airplane had bombed the building, collapsing the central part of the five-story apartment complex into the basement. He said that the rubble, about two stories high, was made up mostly of concrete slabs that could only be moved with a crane and excavator.

Pavlo’s team was made up of a truck driver, an excavator driver, a crane worker, Pavlo, and three others who cleared the rubble. The other members of the team had already worked at the building for some days before Pavlo joined them. By April 23, the team had found five bodies and a leg. Two bodies and the leg were in the same destroyed room of the basement under the building’s “section 3,” and three were under rubble from upper levels of the building’s section 3 that had collapsed on top of rubble from the basement. Pavlo said his team was the second of three recovery teams that worked at the building in April. The first team worked at the building for some days during the second week of April and also found five bodies, including two or three in one of the basement’s corridors and the rest higher up in the rubble. The third team worked at the building on April 24 and 25 and found five bodies and two legs, belonging to the same person, all in the same destroyed basement room where Pavlo’s team also found bodies. The three teams found a total of 15 intact bodies and three legs belonging to two people, indicating that at least 17 people died in the attack.

Pavlo described the bodies that he personally uncovered:

We found the first body on April 21. We were removing large slabs with the crane and then there was a bad smell, so we continued with shovels. We found the body of a woman who I guessed was about 60 years old next to a large cooking cauldron near some tea and coffee boxes and canned food.

We also found the body of a young man in the center of the destroyed room. He had been decapitated by the falling concrete and his head was close to his torso. A woman who I think was staying in another section of the basement, said she had the dead man’s passport, and she gave me it. The passport belonged to a man called Dmytro, whose surname I can’t remember, born in 1988. I compared the passport photo to the man’s head and saw it was the same person. We put the passport in his pocket or taped it to his body and then put the body in a black body bag.

We also found a burned leg in a black boot in the destroyed room. I remember we were confused about how it had gotten there. Maybe the explosion had projected it there from some other part of the building where people died.339

Pavlo also said that each time his team found a body, they put it in a black body bag and left it by the roadside to be picked up by a truck, which he said took the bodies to a makeshift morgue near the Metro shopping mall. He said his team did not write anything on, or attach anything to, the outside of the black body bags because no one gave them any materials for that purpose, and that he was frustrated about this as he knew it would make it harder for relatives to later identify the bodies.

One image taken by an AP journalist on March 11 shows the building at Mytropolytska Street 98 on fire and a large section in the middle of the building destroyed.340 In two videos posted online, a woman films just outside the building as part of it is engulfed in flames. Two videos filmed in the days before the strike show residents cooking just outside the part of the building that was destroyed in the attack.341 A video uploaded by Russian media in April 2022 shows DNR officials removing a body from the rubble.342

Satellite imagery from March 12, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows the collapsed central part of Mytropolytska Street 98.

Witnesses said they did not see Ukrainian military forces in the area at the time of the attack.

Human Rights Watch spoke with a man who was in the Regional Intensive Care Hospital, about 400 meters to the north of Mytropolytska Street 98, on March 11.343 He said he saw many Russian ground forces to the south, west, and north of the hospital and that by the end of the day they had surrounded the hospital. He said that for most of the day, he was inside the hospital and didn’t see what was happening nearby. At some point in the mid to late afternoon, he moved to the southern side from where he could see the high-rise buildings of Mytropolytska Street, including 98, which had already been hit earlier in the afternoon and was on fire.

Later he saw a few Russian tanks moving up and down Matrosova Street, some firing at the high-rise buildings on Mytropolytska Street. He said one of the tanks struck Mytropolytska Street 110.

On May 5, 2023, occupation forces added Mytropolyska 98 to their list of buildings slated for demolition.344 Satellite imagery taken on June 2 shows part of the eastern part of the building demolished. A video taken the same day shows the demolition in progress.345 Satellite imagery taken on June 13 shows the demolition had been completed.

Satellite imagery from June 13, 2023, shows the demolition of Mytropolytska Street 98, with heavy machinery next to the rubble. Image © 2024 Planet Labs PBC

The heavy fighting taking place in the area at the time suggests that there may have been Ukrainian forces near the building. The Russian Defense Ministry has not replied to our request for information concerning possible Ukrainian forces in the vicinity at the time of the fighting.

Dzerkalnyi Supermarket, Budivel’nykiv Avenue 86А, between March 4 and 13

The brief re-opening of the Dzerkalnyi Supermarket helped people find food. Six people described to us at least one attack that hit the supermarket. One person said they saw a person killed and another said they saw body parts of what they thought were about five people, while a third person said two people were injured. Witnesses mentioned different dates and it is possible that the supermarket, or areas close by, were hit more than once.346 The first available satellite imagery in March, from March 12, 2022, shows no damage to the building, while satellite imagery from March 14, 2022, shows a hole in the building’s roof.

One man was inside the supermarket with about 50 other people at the time of an attack, which he said was around March 10. He described the devastation:

I was a few meters from the bread section when something exploded near me. It pierced the metal roof and destroyed all the cables hanging from the ceiling.347 I was not injured, but I saw that one woman had been cut into pieces.

I ran out of the shop and about 50 meters south along Budivelnykiv Avenue, hid near the entrance to an office together with a Ukrainian soldier. As soon as I had taken cover, there was a mortar attack. When it stopped, I left. I saw body parts on the pedestrian and parking areas in front of the supermarket, as well as on Budivelnykiv Avenue. One of my friends who had been at the shop told me later that he had dragged what he thought was an injured woman to safety before he realized she was dead. On the day of the attack, the only military I saw was the soldier I hid with.348

Another man who was waiting to enter the supermarket at the time of an attack, which he said was on March 12 or 13, described trying to help seriously injured people:

I was in line with about 200 people waiting to get inside. Then something hit the supermarket and the blast knocked me to the ground. Two men near me, both about 40 years old, were injured. I tried to help them. One had something stuck in his leg and probably survived, but the other one was badly wounded in his stomach and left leg. I don’t know what happened to him.349

Witnesses described seeing blood and body parts at the damaged supermarket after it was attacked. A man who had waited seven hours in line to get into the supermarket on what he said was March 9 or 10 heard an explosion behind him as he was walking away with supplies:

I didn’t look back. I ran straight to my building. Two days later, I went back to the supermarket and saw body parts of what I think were about five people near the northern part of the supermarket. I also saw blood stains on the ground of the supermarket’s parking area, which faces Budivelnykiv Avenue.350

A woman who was inside a nearby apartment heard an explosion on March 4 and said that when she went to the supermarket later that day, she saw body parts on Budivelnykiv Avenue, a half-meter-wide crater outside the supermarket, damage to the roof, and shattered windows in surrounding buildings. She said that while there were often police and Territorial Defense Forces in the area in early March, she saw none that day.351

Another woman said she had heard that one or two days before she visited the supermarket on March 8, something had exploded right next to a line of people waiting to enter and that several people had been killed:

I saw blood on the ground outside the supermarket. I waited in line a long time, but couldn’t get inside, so I went back the next day. On both days, the shop was guarded by [Ukrainian] soldiers. People told me the soldiers brought food from warehouses to the supermarket. I saw some arrive in an armored van filled with groceries. Some cashiers told me that soldiers drove them to work in the morning and took them back at the end of the day.352

The woman explained what happened on March 14 when her husband went to the supermarket to buy groceries: “When he came back, he said people told him a shell had hit the supermarket the day before and that it was badly damaged. He went inside with a flashlight, like other people, to see whether there was any food left and then came home.”

Another man also said that some Ukrainian soldiers were sometimes at the supermarket to keep order among people waiting to get in.353

A video uploaded to YouTube on April 5, 2022, shows the damage to the interior of the building.354 The building appears undamaged in satellite imagery taken on March 12, 2022, the first available date after the building was first hit. The next available imagery, taken on March 14, shows a large hole in the roof.

Myru Avenue 127, around March 13

Myru Avenue 127 on May 12, 2022. © 2022 Associated Press

Human Rights Watch spoke with two people about an attack that struck a nine-story building at Myru Avenue 127 on around March 13.355 It remains unclear how many people were killed or injured in this attack.

A man who had moved from his home to the building’s basement on February 24 said it was sheltering hundreds of people in 11 rooms on either side of a long corridor. He said:

Every evening at about 6 p.m., two of us counted how many people were staying in the basement and we informed the man overseeing the basement. The evening of March 12, we counted about 350 people, including 38 children. Forty-eight of the people on that list were staying in the only room that was damaged by the attack the next morning.

At about 6:30 a.m., an attack hit the building. The basement room that was affected was underneath the part of the building that collapsed. I later saw that this was the part under the two easternmost of the building’s four entrances. At the time, I was in another basement room, about 10 meters from the damaged room. I saw a family of five escape the room and I saw people help a man with broken legs get out. Apart from that, I didn’t see anyone else escape.356

A woman who lived nearby said she had heard about an attack that hit Myru Avenue 127 a few days before, on March 10:

There was lots of artillery landing in our area starting March 2 and on March 9 there was a big fire in our building. Some of the people living in our basement moved to the basement of Myru Avenue 127 and the next day, on March 10, that building was bombed.357

Satellite imagery collected on March 12, 2022, shows parts of the north and south facades collapsed. Imagery collected on March 13 shows additional damage to the southwest corner of the building, with the northeastern side and the roof completely collapsed. Satellite imagery from January 25, 2023, shows demolition of the building underway. Seven images of Myru Avenue 127 posted online show significant damage to the building.358 A video published in February 2023 shows the building almost completely demolished, with three vehicles on top of the rubble.359

Shevchenka Lane 29a, March 13

Satellite imagery from March 14, 2022, showing destroyed building at Shevchenka Lane 29a. Image © 2024 Airbus. Google Earth

On March 13, 2022, between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m., an attack hit a single-story residential building at Shevchenkа Lane 29a, about 800 meters west of the Azovstal steel plant, killing seven people and injuring three.

Human Rights Watch spoke with a survivor of the attack, Tetiana Raizova, who was in the building at the time it was struck.360 She said that in the days before, she heard aircraft overhead, and what she called a “cannon” firing from inside her neighborhood, which she thought was Ukrainian. But the morning of the attack, she said, her neighborhood was quiet.

Raizova said the 12 people with whom she was living in the house were her son, Kyrylo Raizov (2 years old); her husband, Denys Raizov (29), and his paternal uncle, Hryhorii Raizov; her mother, Natalia Susuhorova (47); her father, Viacheslav Senior Susushurov (57); her father-in-law, Valerii Raizov (about 48); her maternal aunt’s husband, Oleksandr (about 48); her brother, Viacheslav Junior Susuhurov (23); her brother’s girlfriend, Veronika Tarasova (23); her mother-in-law, Svitlana Kolomeiko (about 46); and two other relatives whose names she confidentially shared with Human Rights Watch.

She later heard from relatives about six people who had been killed in the attack, including her son, her parents, her father-in-law, her maternal aunt’s husband, and her brother’s girlfriend. She said that three others were injured: her brother, her mother-in-law and another woman. All these casualties were also mentioned by a second witness, who in addition saw the body of a dead man in the street nearby (see below).

Raizova said that all 13 of them stayed in the basement overnight on March 12 and spent the next morning on the ground floor, cooking on a wood- and coal-fired oven in the living room. Her husband, Denys, and his uncle, Hryhorii, left the house sometime between 11 a.m. and midday, and within two minutes, a strike hit a 9 story-building about 50 meters away, she said. Raizova grabbed her son Kyrylo, and ran towards the basement stairs when she was suddenly lifted off the ground: “Without hearing any explosions, I heard ringing in my ears, felt weightless, and then everything went dark, and I heard and smelt how my skin was burning. I thought I had died.”

Human Rights Watch also spoke with a man, Pavlo, who lived about 120 meters northeast of the building and saw the aftermath of the attack. He said he did not see any soldiers or military vehicles in the area the morning of the attack.361 He said he was outside when he heard the humming of a plane above and an explosion nearby, and took shelter in the underground section of an outhouse. About half an hour later, a neighbor told him that a plane had dropped a bomb on a nearby building. Raizova also said that one of the survivors of the attack told her later she had heard a plane overhead just before their building was hit. Pavlo went with the man to help bring the wounded to the hospital.

Pavlo said the walls of the building had collapsed inwards and the roof had fallen onto the collapsed walls: “The building was simply pulverized. There was almost nothing left, just part of a bathroom and part of a corridor.”

Over the next few hours, Pavlo saw six bodies and four injured people, one of whom later died. He said that many of the victims were from the Susuhurov and Raizov families, whom Pavlo recognized since they were neighbors. Those who died, he said, included Natalia Susuhurova and Viacheslav Susuhurov Senior; Kyrylo Raizov; Valerii Raizov; a man called Oleksandr; and Veronika Tarasova who he said died in the hospital after being injured during the attack. Pavlo said he also saw the body of a man who did not live in the building, next to his severed leg, lying in a pool of blood a few meters from the destroyed house.

Pavlo described seeing Viacheslav Susuhurov Jr. near the body of his mother, Natalia: “He seemed like he was in shock and maybe even deafened. He was covered in blood, had blood coming out of his ears, nose, and eyes, and he was crying.” Then he saw Denys Raizov, Kyrylo’s father, who he said was in shock: “He was holding his lifeless child and was talking to him, repeatedly saying, ‘The child is not crying.’”362 He said that Tetiana Raizova was also injured in the attack.363

Pavlo’s wife’s uncle took the injured people first to the Emergency Medical Care Hospital, and then to Hospital #3, where Veronika died the next day.

Pavlo and others used chainsaws to cut parts of the collapsed roof, periodically stopping to listen for voices under the rubble and to look at planes they saw overhead in case it was too dangerous to continue.

Raizova described what she heard once the ringing in her ears had subsided:

Suddenly, I heard my husband’s voice, asking ‘my love, is that you?’ I started to shout. I also heard a woman asking me where the children were, but I didn’t know. I reached out with my right hand to see if I could touch Kyrylo, but I only felt gravel.

Then I heard other voices and chainsaws. I was terrified of being cut. I also heard a woman asking me where the children were. Then they pulled me out from the rubble. It felt like I was under there for an eternity, but someone later told me they freed me quite quickly. They lay me down on a wooden door, maybe from the house, and I lay there while they freed others under the rubble.

I was covered in blood and in a lot of pain. I later found out that one of my shoulders and two ribs were broken. Both my hands were burned. My left hand was charred so badly that the nurses later couldn’t find any veins. Flesh was missing from other parts of my body, and I had shrapnel injuries. Some shrapnel is still in my body, and I will have to live with it inside me.

They put me in a car with my brother and his injured girlfriend, Veronika. I remember wondering how Veronika was able to sit upright, as she was badly burned. Her face and body looked like modeling clay. My brother’s hand was injured, and I later found out he had a concussion. I ended up in Hospital #3, where they treated me.

Pavlo also described finding victims and survivors:

We found the first body by pure chance, touching it accidentally with our feet. It was Oleksandr, who Denys Raizov immediately recognized, saying: ‘This is Uncle Sasha.’ His limbs were torn off and his skull was cracked open. Then we found the body of Denys’ father, Valerii Raizov.364

Soon after, I saw a little finger sticking out from under the rubble. We removed the rubble and found a light-haired woman, about 50, still alive. We cleared dust off her face to help her breathe. She started screaming in pain, I think because her neck was under pressure. I remember saying, ‘Stay with us.’

My wife’s uncle then took the injured woman to the nearby hospital where she got help. We heard a few days later that she was recovering well.

Finally, we found the body of Viacheslav Susuhurov Sr.. His body was still sitting in an armchair in a corner of a room. It was difficult to remove the body because his legs were slightly bent under the armchair, which was underneath a wall that had collapsed.

Denys Raizov eventually told everyone who was helping to find bodies that all 13 people who had been sheltering in the building were accounted for, so they stopped looking for bodies. Pavlo and others then put the seven bodies in a trailer that they attached to his wife’s uncle’s car and took them to the Old City cemetery, 600 meters to the west, where they put them in an open trench, near another trench which he said was already full.

Later that day, Pavlo said he saw the remains of a munition next to his home at Shevchenka Lane 19. He took a video of the conical shaped munition, a screenshot of which he shared with Human Rights Watch.365 He said it was about 500 mm long, that the narrow part was several centimeters, and that the wide part was about 20 centimeters. We identified this as a nose cone from an Uragan rocket. Pavlo’s wife’s uncle told him that at the moment the explosion hit Shevchenka Lane 29a, he had been in his car and had seen the munition falling from the sky and striking outside Shevchenka Lane 19.

Satellite imagery of Shevchenka Lane 29a taken on March 12, 2022, shows the building intact, while satellite imagery taken on March 14, 2022, shows it as being completely destroyed.

Shelter at Kazantseva Street 20, March 15

Screengrab from a video uploaded to YouTube on April 8, 2022, showing damage to the high-rise building at Kazantseva Street 20. © 2022 User via YouTube

An attack on March 15 hit a building at Kazantesva Street 20 that served as a shelter for at least 150 people. The attack killed at least two people and wounded at least three others.366 There was no evidence of Ukrainian forces being in or near the building at the time of the attack.

A member of the Mariupol city council, Halyna Morokhovska, was responsible for the shelter.367 She said the building had previously served as a dormitory for war veterans, but none had lived there for some time before the assault on Mariupol began in February 2022. At the time of the attack, 172 people displaced by the fighting were sheltering there. Most were from Sartana village, about 10 kilometers to the northeast of the city center, which had been attacked in late February. Those seeking safety included about 50 children, 20 older people who had difficulty walking or who had very limited mobility, and one pregnant woman.

Morokhovska said she chose not to leave the city because she felt responsible for the displaced and tried to make sure everyone in the shelter had food and water and was warm. When the attack happened, at around 3 p.m., she was on the second floor of the building with four others, including her 37-year-old daughter, Natalia, and son-in-law, Andrii, discussing how to leave the city. She said:

March 15 was a dark day. There was a lot of shelling, lots of loud explosions … Suddenly I heard a long hum, like a “uuuuuuuuuuuuu” sound, and then my ears were ringing. I was later told that there was a large crater in front of the building. I saw a lot of planes in the sky in the days before, so I think a plane dropped a bomb next to our building. Then I saw Natalia buried under bricks, with parts of her body sticking out. The right-hand side of my body, especially my leg, had been badly injured by shrapnel. My thigh and my face were bleeding, and blood was flowing into my eyes and mouth.368

Andrii, whose back had been to the window, was hit in the head by a “huge stone,” he said. Then, he saw, “There was a man lying on the floor right next to me, covered in blood and screaming in pain. I accidentally stepped on Natalia’s foot, which is how I discovered that she was under the rubble, covered in glass shards.”369

Natalia said she thought she was going to die:

Suddenly, I realized only one of my eyes was open and I saw dust and smoke. My left hand was all broken and bloody. I said to my husband, Andrii, ‘Love, it is over.’ And then I fainted. I regained consciousness briefly while my husband was digging me out from under the rubble, and then blacked out again.370

Andrii said a man helped him carry Natalia down the stairs so he could rush her to the hospital.

Halyna, who was later brought to Hospital #3 separately by ambulance, said: “The [hospital] was in a horrible state, with puddles of blood on the ground. The walls shook under the shelling. Three others who were injured in the attack that hit our building were also brought there.371

Natalia saw two of these people, a man and a woman, die, as doctors tried to operate on them. “I saw people put their bodies on a pile of bodies behind the hospital,” she said. A surgeon at the hospital said that after the hospital’s morgue was full, medical staff put bodies out in the open, including next to a building where they were later hit during an attack, scattering body parts.372

Natalia and her mother survived, but still suffer the effects of the attack. Halyna said:

A doctor stitched up my face which was very painful, even though he injected what I think was lidocaine into my face. There were no beds, so I lay down in the hallway on a bench. When we got to Zaporizhzhia two or three days later, Natalia spent four days in the intensive care unit. She only started eating and holding a spoon on April 21. She lost her right eye and had a broken jaw, skull fracture, and broken bones in her arm and her hand. I’ve been in a lot of pain, especially my face and my leg. But I just worry about my daughter. I feel guilty that this happened to her.373

The director of the city’s water company, Mariupolvodokanal, said that he and his colleagues had delivered food and water to people sheltering at Kazantseva Street 20. They were at the company headquarters when they heard about the attack on the building:

A woman arrived pleading for help, so we all ran to the building while informing the police on our walkie-talkies. There was a fire, which I helped extinguish. I saw two injured people on a staircase, including a 30-year-old woman and a man from Sartana village near Mariupol, called Oleksandr, about 45. I carried him to Hospital #3, but he died.374

A video uploaded on April 9, 2022, shows the damage done to the eastern side of the building and debris in the street near the building.375

Satellite imagery from March 19, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows debris all around the building. Imagery from two days later taken from a different angle reveals damage to the eastern façade of the building. A video uploaded on April 9, 2022, shows the damage done to the eastern side of the building and debris in the street near the building.376

Neptune Pool, Military Hospital #555 and Metalurhiv Avenue 213, March 16

Russian attacks in the Kalmiuskyi district minutes apart on March 16 hit a military hospital, a nearby residential building, and the Neptune swimming pool facility, which was serving as an aid distribution point and makeshift health clinic, killing two civilians near the residential building and 10 people in the hospital.

Witnesses said that at the time of the attacks, military medical personnel were treating wounded soldiers and civilians in the hospital and that soldiers ran back and forth between the pool and the hospital shortly after the attack on the pool.377 Besides this, we found no indications of a Ukrainian military presence in the area at the time of the attack. Military hospitals, like civilian hospitals, are protected from attack under the laws of war.

The Neptune pool, at Akademika Amosova Street 2a, was being renovated to become a training center for Ukraine’s Paralympians.378 At around 11 a.m. on March 16, Russian forces bombed the building. Volunteers had turned the pool into a makeshift aid hub to collect and distribute food.379 Witnesses said that at the time of the attack the Ukrainian Red Cross and military medics from the nearby Military Hospital #555 were using the pool building to treat wounded civilians and soldiers and to provide medical care to pregnant women.380

The military hospital itself was attacked minutes before the pool and between 4 and 10 people were killed, two witnesses said.381 Another witness said that a building between the pool and the hospital, at Metalurhiv Avenue 213, was also hit by an attack just after the strike on the pool and at least two people were killed.382 A military nurse said that some of her colleagues from the nearby military hospital were in the Neptune pool building at the time of the attack, providing care to civilians with minor injuries. They told her that no one was killed in the attack, though some people were injured by falling debris.383

One witness said he saw airplanes overhead at the time; other witnesses said they heard them.384

For the three days prior to the attack, a woman who lived nearby had stood in line in the open square in front of the pool to get basic provisions. She said she saw the moment the pool was hit from her apartment window and saw smoke rising from it. Half an hour later, she and her sister went to see what had happened: “[Ukrainian] soldiers from the nearby hospital were running back and forth between the pool and the hospital, though they were not carrying anyone or anything. There was a hole in the roof and one side of the pool was damaged. The windows and doors at the front were shattered.”385

A man said he narrowly escaped what he thought was an artillery attack near the pool a few minutes after the attack on Neptune:

My wife and I heard a plane. It sounded quite high up and far away. Then I heard two explosions, and a wave of warm air went through our apartment, pushing open our windows. Two minutes later, I ran outside to see what had happened. I ran north along Metalurhiv Avenue. People were running towards and past me. A woman shouted that the pool had been attacked. I reached the corner of the big square in front of the pool and saw that there was a hole in the roof. The front was also damaged, and windows and the door were missing. There were no people on the square in front of the pool. I didn’t see any Ukrainian forces there.

About a minute after I reached the square, I heard a “zzzz” sound and realized there was an artillery attack. I heard it land, at most 200 meters from me, I don’t know where. I threw myself to the ground and crawled back towards our apartment, running the last bit. Later that day, a neighbor told us the military hospital next to the pool had also been attacked.386

One video shows the damage done to the entrance of the building. Another shows the damage done to one of the rooms. An image shows the damage done to the main swimming hall, including a large hole in the ceiling.387

Satellite imagery from March 19, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows two large holes in the building’s roof.

A woman said that as she was walking to her home near the pool after collecting aid there, the pool was hit and then another attack hit a second building, at Metalurhiv Avenue 213. She said she did not see any Ukrainian forces near her building or in the vicinity. She described the moments before and after the attack:

I stood for about 30 minutes with 300 other people in a line that ran from Metalurhiv Avenue through the center of the square to the front door of the pool. There were no Ukrainian forces next to the building or inside it. Then I saw two airplanes circling. I couldn’t tell whether they were right above us because they were so high. Everyone stayed in line. I remember thinking they were going to bomb the nearby [Ilyich Iron and Steel Works] steel factory like they had done before.

I got to the front of the line, went inside to get the aid, and then walked back towards my home through the square.388 Suddenly, when I was about 100 meters from the pool, I heard something falling and the sound of an explosion right behind me. I didn’t turn around and ran to the closest entrance of my apartment building. I saw a woman and a boy of about 12 cooking on a small fire just outside a residential building right next to mine.

A minute or so later, something else exploded on or next to that very building. I ran along the front of my building to reach another entrance that led to my apartment. I looked back and saw the boy and woman lying on the ground… Soon after the attacks, I saw [from my apartment] that medics were walking with stretchers and carrying injured people from the direction of the pool to the military hospital next to my building.389

One video posted on June 18, 2022, shows a section of the roof in the middle of the building missing.390 Satellite imagery from March 19, 2022-the first available after the attack-also shows the central part of the rooftop of Metalurhiv Avenue 213 collapsed.

A nurse who had started working in Military Hospital #555 next to the Neptune pool on February 21 said the hospital was treating soldiers and civilians, that about 200 people were living and working there, and that the March 16 attack killed 10 people. She also said that a few days before, another attack on the hospital had killed four people who were undergoing surgery at the time.391 She said that at no point had military forces been based at the hospital:

Several dozen [Ukrainian] Territorial Defense Forces patrolled the hospital grounds. They wore camouflage uniforms similar to [those worn by] regular army soldiers. Some wore bulletproof vests, some had Kalashnikovs. I only ever saw red and white or olive-colored ambulances in the hospital compound, not military vehicles. There were never any military forces stationed at the hospital, not even for a short time. By early March, we were helping civilians and not only injured fighters.

The first attack on our hospital was maybe two days before the one on the Neptune pool. One bomb hit an operating room and killed four people undergoing surgery. They included a 40-year-old woman who came to the hospital with an abdominal injury caused by shrapnel. She had been in severe pain and had waited for 40 minutes before we took her to the operating theater. Another bomb hit the courtyard to the west of the building and blew out the hospital’s windows.

After that, it took us a day or two to organize the evacuation of patients to the Azovstal and Illich Steel and Iron Works plants. The evacuation was underway when the second attack happened on March 16. It hit an area between the intensive care unit and surgical ward, killing about 10 patients, whose bodies I saw. We left the next day, and I went to the shelter at Hospital #3.392

Another nurse who had also been at the military hospital on March 16, said that civilians with minor injuries who had received care at the hospital in the previous days were not there at the time of the attack because they had been sent to the Neptune pool for further treatment. She said that four soldiers died in the attack on March 16, because the power cut out as they were undergoing surgery. She said the hospital was running at full capacity at the time.393

One woman said that she and many other civilians, including children of medical staff, had been sheltering in one of the hospital’s three basement rooms for several weeks and receiving food and water from volunteers. None of the civilians sheltering in the basement were injured or died from the attack, she said.394

Satellite imagery from March 19, 2022-the first available after the attack-shows damage to the rooftop of one wing of the hospital and to the rooftop of another building in the hospital compound.

The Neptune pool was evidently being used by civilians to collect aid after March 12, with people regularly lining up outside. Even if small numbers of Ukrainian soldiers had been present at or near the building at the time, the attacking forces should have known that their attack had a high risk of harming numerous civilians.

Donetsk Academic Regional Drama Theater, March 16

Satellite imagery from March 14, 2022, shows the Russian word “children” in large Cyrillic script on the ground at both ends of Mariupol’s Donetsk Academic Regional Drama Theater. © 2024 Maxar Technologies. Source: European Space Imaging
Satellite imagery from March 29, 2022, shows damage to the roof and facades of the Donetsk Academic Regional Drama Theater. © 2024 Maxar Technologies. Source: Google Earth

Mariupol’s most famous and distinctive building was the city’s Drama Theater.395

Surrounded by a park in turn encircled by a road, the theater was located at the eastern end of the city’s main road, Myru Avenue. By mid-morning on March 16, it had been all but destroyed by a Russian airstrike. The theater had been sheltering hundreds of Mariupol residents, many of whom had fled the city the day before and the morning of the attack in the ad hoc convoys of private vehicles. Human Rights Watch estimates that several hundred people were in the theater at the time of the attack, and that at least 15 people were killed during the attack, but the total number has not been determined.

We interviewed eight witnesses who were in or near the theater at the time of the attack or in the immediate aftermath, and reviewed reports from Amnesty International, media outlets, and the Ukrainian government.396 We found no evidence that Ukrainian military forces were in or around the theater before or at the time of the attack, making the attack unlawful, and those who ordered it or carried it out apparently responsible for a war crime.

On March 17, the Russian ambassador to the UN denied that Russia had attacked the theater.397

Civilians had begun sheltering in the theater on February 27.398 Beginning around March 5, the center of Mariupol near the theater had begun to come under intense shelling and other attacks. Up to 1,500 people were sheltering at the theater by around March 10. Those sheltering at the theater regularly entered and exited the front entrance, cooking and collecting water next to the building, and receiving aid from Ukrainian soldiers and volunteers. Satellite imagery from March 14 clearly shows the Russian word “deti” (“children”) painted in large Cyrillic script on the ground in the plaza in front of the theater and in the park behind it.399 People sheltering in the theater had painted these signs in the days before the attack to warn Russian forces that the compound held civilians.400

Many were able to leave in convoys between March 14 and early in the morning on March 16.401 It appears that the several hundred people who remained were then able to move, before the attack happened, to parts of the theater that were considered more secure.

Witnesses said members of the Ukrainian army and Territorial Defense Forces would sometimes drive by the theater to drop off food and medicine, and at times patrolled on foot nearby. However, none of them saw any Ukrainian armed forces or vehicles outside the theater at the time of the attack. Amnesty International also found that while small numbers of Ukrainian soldiers, sometimes in civilian or military vehicles, were briefly in or next to the theater in the days before the attack to drop off evacuees from other parts of the city, deliver aid, or share information on evacuation options, they did not use the theater or its immediate surroundings as a base, as a weapons storage facility, or to launch attacks.402

A man who lived on Mytropolytska Street about 300 meters from the theater said he saw a plane approaching the city center from the direction of the Azovstal steel plant just before the attack. The plane descended as it approached Myru Avenue and dropped two bombs. He heard a loud explosion and then he saw the plane turn and fly to the south, towards the sea. Not long thereafter, a neighbor told him the theater had been hit.403

The attack was most likely carried out by Russian aircraft that dropped two 500-kilogram bombs onto the theater’s roof, which then penetrated the building and detonated in the main auditorium at about stage level, possibly with the aid of delayed-action fuses, according to our own analysis and reporting by Amnesty International.404

A woman who was inside the theater during the attack described the bombs slamming through the roof and then discovering a gravely injured friend:

The morning of the attack, I went outside to get water from the tank. I’d just gone back in and was standing close to the entrance when I felt a sudden flow of air and then something in my eyes and mouth. I stood there, holding onto a friend in disbelief.

I saw an older woman crawl slowly from the basement. I went outside and saw a young blonde woman covered in blood. There was debris everywhere. I saw a leg sticking out of it in one place and a hand in another place.

I had gotten to know four people well in the theater, including a woman called Lyubov and her husband, Anatolii, both about 60 years old. The morning of the attack, Anatolii had gone back to his apartment to get food, leaving Lyubov with us in the theater. Suddenly I remembered that she had been on the second floor. I rushed back in and up the stairs, shouting her name. Then I heard her quietly say, ‘I’m here, help me.’ She asked me to remember her name. I looked down and saw that she was lying right next to me. She was the same color as the debris. I have arthritis so I couldn’t carry her. I called for help and some men took her outside on a stretcher. One of her legs was torn off and hanging on by a piece of her trousers or a piece of tendon. The men tried to stop the bleeding, but it was too late. She died.405

A man who survived the attack on the theater said that he saw limbs sticking out of the rubble after the attack and that he later found out that a 61-year-old neighbor of his, Lyubov Svyrydova, had died in the theater.406

Another man sheltering in the theater said he had gone back to his family’s nearby apartment just before the attack happened. His neighbors stopped him from returning to the theater after the attack, saying it was too dangerous. He told us in May 2022 that he had not heard from his 12-year-old daughter or 67-year-old mother, both of whom he had left behind in the theater. He said his daughter knew his Facebook profile and would have contacted him even though he had changed his phone, so he believes they were killed.407

A man who lived across the park behind the theater said during the war he regularly went to the theater’s outdoor kitchen to cook and get water. He described how this proved fatal for some the morning of the attack:

I was cooking with four people in the outdoor kitchen on the southern side of the theater. I didn’t see any Ukrainian forces there. I went with three others to collect water from the water point next to the kitchen. Just then, I heard an airplane and the sound of a bomb falling, with the sound of the whistle getting lower. There was an explosion and I saw the roof of the theater fall off. Parts of the side of the building fell on the four people cooking with me and crushed them. There was a lot of dust. I tried with others to get them out from under the rubble. We could see some of their limbs. But it was impossible to move the rubble. We knew they were dead. I saw a fire inside the theater and four or five people coming out of it covered in blood. We heard more attacks nearby, so I ran home.408

A woman sheltering at the nearby Philharmonic Hall said that one of the people who fled from the theater to the hall after the attack said her father had been killed in the theater.409 A man who lived nearby said that some of the injured people who fled from the theater to his building had broken limbs.410

Based on Human Rights Watch, Truth Hounds, and Amnesty International interviews, and the names of people published in traditional and social media, we believe that at least 15 people died in the attack: Lubov Svyrydova, Masha Halagan, and her grandmother, Lidiia Tarasova, whose names Human Rights Watch obtained; Mykhailo Hrebenetskyi, Olena Kuznetsova and Ihor Chystiakov, whose names Amnesty obtained;411 Anastasia Khadjava, Carolina Khadjava, and Oleksandr Khadjava, whose deaths in the theater were reported by international media;412 Maksym Portasov, Lubov Hvozdeliuk and Oleksandr Shevchenko, whose deaths in the theater were reported on social media;413 and three other people whose first names Amnesty International obtained.414

Witnesses also told us about eight people who died, but whose names they did not know. They include four people who were said to be cooking in the outdoor kitchen onto which the theater’s side wall collapsed. We have not included them in this count since they may be duplicates.

The New York Times reported on claims that between 60 and 200 were killed.415 The AP carried out its own assessment and estimated that up to 600 people died.416

On March 25, 2022, media reports quoted an advisor to the city’s mayor saying about 600 people had been in the building at the time of the attack, half of whom had been killed according to witnesses he and other city officials spoke to.417 Yet Dmytro Gurin, a member of the Ukrainian parliament and originally from Mariupol, told the media on March 17, 2022, that the shelter in the basement of the building had withstood the attack, and that “it looked like most of [the people sheltering there] have survived and are OK.”418

In July 2022, so-called DNR officials said they had found 14 bodies in the theater’s ruins.419

A video recorded by the Azov regiment and uploaded on March 10, 2022, to its YouTube channel before the attack on March 16 shows families sheltering inside the theater.420 A video recorded shortly after the attack shows the theater from the outside, damaged and with smoke rising from the building.421 Two and a half minutes further into the video, the person recording the video and those nearby take cover on the ground as explosions are heard. A video recorded inside the theater shows damage to the inside of the building and people leaving it.422 Drone footage from Reuters shows the overall damage in great detail, including the collapsed central part of the roof and the collapsed northern and southern walls.423 Another video shows the charred interior.424

Satellite imagery of the Drama Theater from March 19, 2022, shows the collapsed central part of the roof and the collapsed northern and southern walls.

In early April, French television journalists accompanied by a “pro-Russian separatist soldier” visited the ground floor of the theater and parts of the outside. The soldier said they could not enter the basement.425 The journalists noticed a hole in the ground leading to the theater’s lower level and said there was a bad smell.

In mid-November 2022, photos posted on social media show that the occupying forces had erected a screen around the theater.426 Satellite imagery shows that by January 25, 2023, much of the building had been demolished with only the western end remaining. A video posted on Russian media in mid-November 2023, shows the same, as well as construction work underway on the eastern side of the site.427

Myru Avenue 42, March 22

Image uploaded to Telegram shows Myru Avenue 42 (cropped by Human Rights Watch). © 2022 MariupolNow via Telegram

At least two people were killed during an attack that struck an apartment building at Myru Avenue 42 on the afternoon of March 22. A man sheltering in the building said he had been cooking in the courtyard, even though he was afraid of being outdoors, when the attack hit the other side of the building. He saw the building shake but nevertheless ran inside to look for a couple he had been sheltering with, because he knew they had gone back upstairs to their apartment to get some things. He found the woman dead and her husband, injured, died soon thereafter. The man said:

I ran inside and straight to the apartment of Asya and Denis, a married couple in their 30s. I had been sheltering with them in the basement for some time, together with their parents and their children, who were 6 and 14 years old. I knew they had gone up to their apartment just before the attack. They were lying in their bathroom under a collapsed wall. A few of us removed Asya, who was dead when we found her. Denis was deeper under the rubble, so it took us longer to get him out. He was in shock, but he talked to us and screamed in pain. He died an hour after we got him out. We left their bodies on the sofa and didn’t bury them because the shelling continued until the next day, when we left the city.

There was constant shelling all around, but I didn’t see any Russian or Ukrainian forces.428

Two images show the extent of the damage to the roof and western side of the building.429 A video uploaded on July 15, 2022, shows fire damage on the inside.430 A video recorded by Reuters also shows residents digging graves outside of Myru Avenue 42 in early April.431 Satellite imagery from March 21, 2022, shows some damage to the roof of the building. Satellite imagery from March 24, 2022, after the March 22 attack, shows additional damage to the roof and smoke rising from the building.

Arkhip Kuindzhi Street 130a, March 23

An attack on a building at Arkhip Kuindzhi Street 130a on March 23 killed one to four people and seriously injured at least one woman. A man who was sheltering in the building described the attack:

When the intense shelling started on March 16, about 35 of us started to live in the basement day and night, never going upstairs. At about 4 a.m. on March 23, incessant attacks began nearby, lasting until midday. Some of them hit our building. At some point, something exploded next to a woman standing near the basement exit, severely injuring her stomach and hand. We tried to help her, but it wasn’t anywhere near enough. I don’t know what happened to her.

And then there were four direct hits, over a 15-minute period, on the same spot in the basement ceiling. I filmed one of them. When part of the ceiling finally collapsed, it fell and crushed one person. I don’t know how many others were injured, because all of us ran up to the ground floor at that moment. Everything was destroyed and burned up there. I ran outside and saw two or three corpses lying about 50 meters from the building. As I ran past School #11 about 200 meters away, I saw Ukrainian soldiers standing by the windows inside the school. I also saw DNR forces very close to the school.432

A video posted online shows the damage done to Arkhip Kuindzhi 130 and 130a,433 while another image shows the buildings later demolished.434 Satellite imagery from March 26-the first available after the attack-shows the eastern side of the building completely burned and debris next to the full length of the building. By March 5, 2023, the building had been demolished.

Chapter VIII The Dead, Missing, and Injured

Thousands of civilians were killed or died during Russia’s assault on Mariupol and in the months that followed. Physical evidence of crimes committed by Russian and Russia-affiliated forces has likely disappeared or been destroyed. With the city currently under Russian occupation, many witnesses to abuses committed during or after the fighting who remain in Mariupol cannot speak about their experiences without risking retaliation. As a consequence, the full extent to which civilians died, were injured, or are still missing as a result of Russian forces’ battle for control of Mariupol against Ukrainian forces is unknown.

Some residents were killed or seriously injured after airstrikes hit and collapsed parts of buildings where they were sheltering. Others were hit by shellfire when they ventured outside to look for food, water, medicine, news about their loved ones, or possible evacuation routes. Many of those who survived these attacks acquired a permanent disability, losing limbs, eyesight, hearing, or memory, including from traumatic brain injuries caused by blast waves. Others, especially older people and those with preexisting medical conditions, died during the siege or in the months following because of the grueling conditions under which they had to shelter in their homes or basements without sufficient access to basic necessities.

Some of those who died during the siege were buried by loved ones and neighbors in makeshift shallow graves in backyards or neighborhood parks. During the first few weeks-while Ukrainian forces still controlled the city center-volunteers, police officers, city council members, and funeral home workers also mobilized to identify and collect bodies lying in the open of people who had been killed during the battle. They took the bodies directly to a trench grave that had hastily been dug in the second week of March on the edge of an old cemetery in the city center, or they took them to hospitals, from where in April occupation authorities took them to the city’s cemeteries.

Once different parts of the city started to fall under the full control of Russian and so-called DNR forces in early April, occupation authorities started to remove bodies from the streets, exhume the city’s shallow graves, and remove bodies from the rubble of residential buildings. They took them to a makeshift morgue on Mariupol’s western edge and then to its rapidly expanding cemeteries. Some bodies likely remained in apartments and were likely crushed and removed with the debris during demolitions that occupying forces began in May, never to be identified.

Based on an assessment of satellite imagery and photo and video analysis, we estimate that at least 10,284 people were buried in four of the city’s cemeteries and in Manhush cemetery between March 2022 and February 2023. We also estimate that around 2,250 people would have died of causes unrelated to war in Mariupol during that period, meaning the city saw at least an estimated 8,034 deaths above a peacetime rate. We are not able to determine how many of those buried in the city were civilians or military personnel, or how many were killed as a result of unlawful attacks.

Map of graves

Some relatives who had fled Mariupol at the start of the assault on the city returned in May or the following months to try to give their loved one’s proper burials. Many people remain missing to this day, with relatives left wondering whether they died under the rubble, were buried anonymously, or survived and were forcibly transferred to Russia or ended up in custody.

What follows is a partial overview of the dead, injured, and missing from Russia’s assault on Mariupol.

Bodies Everywhere: Chaotic Burials at Start of Siege

“I can’t name a single area where there weren’t bodies.”

— Mariupol resident435

As Russia’s assault on Mariupol intensified in early March, city officials and residents were quickly overwhelmed by the growing numbers of dead and scrambled to find ways to bury them amidst the shelling and bombing of the city.

Mass Burials at the Old City Cemetery

Between March 6 and 12, city officials and volunteers organized the temporary burial of at least 200 bodies in the Old City Cemetery. On March 14, they also dug trenches in two other sites, at Prymorskyi Park and the City Garden, but they were still open and not refilled as of April 3. It is not clear from satellite imagery whether they were used after that date, because tree foliage that grew starting in early April obscures the locations.

A Gravedigger’s Story

When Mariupol residents lost access to power, water, and heating on March 2, members of the city council, the mayor’s office, emergency responders, firefighters, and police officers began meeting at 8 a.m. each morning to share information and coordinate their response. They initially worked to dispatch water trucks across the city, bring diesel to hospitals to power generators, direct people who fled their homes to designated shelters, and coordinate food deliveries.

On March 6, Vaagn Mnatsakanian, the 34-year-old head of Mariupol city’s ecology and energy management department, realized that the city had no system in place to collect and bury the dead. His father had died the day before of an apparent heart attack just after witnessing a nearby artillery attack.436 Mnatsakanian asked the deputy mayor where he should take his father’s body. The deputy mayor told him to take the body to the Illichovski morgue in northeast Mariupol, and to tell him what was happening there.437

When Mnatsakanian and a friend arrived at the morgue with his father’s body, they found about 50 dead bodies, but no staff working there. “There was no electricity, so none of the refrigerators were working,” Mnatsakanian said. “I will remember the smell all my life. The smell and the image of what we saw, it was just terrible. I took a piece of paper and wrote my father’s name and age and put it with him. Then there was bombing, bombing, and my friend said we needed to go. The attack was very close. So, we got in the car and went to the city center.”

When Mnatsakanian told the deputy mayor that no one was at the morgue, they decided to try Skorbota, a private funeral home. The people at Skorbota told Mnatsakanian that they had run out of caskets and been unable to go to the city’s two main cemeteries for the past three or four days because of the shooting, and that they were at a loss about what to do with all the bodies. The deputy mayor asked Mnatsakanian to work with Skorbota and “take charge of the situation,” Mnatsakanian said. “Just tell me what you need, and I’ll help you with transport, etc. But there are a lot of dead people, and we need to do something.”

Mnatsakanian had no experience with this, but he quickly mobilized. He found a plot of land in an old cemetery in the central part of the city, about one kilometer north of Myru Avenue, where they could bury bodies. He organized six teams of volunteers, municipality workers, and Skorbota employees to collect bodies and bring them to the cemetery. At the daily 8 a.m. meeting with other city officials, he would get a list of locations where bodies had been identified and then he would dispatch his teams to collect the bodies and bring them to the cemetery, where they had dug two trenches.

Makeshift trench-style graves with bodies dug in early March 2022 in Mariupol’s Old City Cemetery, March 12, 2022. © 2022 Courtesy of Vaagn Mnatsakanian

On March 10, four of his teams were planning to go to Hospital #4 in the eastern part of the city, where 100 bodies had apparently piled up. They were waiting at the Skorbota office for a police escort because the route to the hospital was especially dangerous, when at 9:25 a.m. an airstrike hit just outside the office. “It was the first time that I was hit by the air wave of an explosion,” Mnatsakanian said. “I just went up in the air. Another guy near me, a piece of bomb hit him and took his leg off. I was afraid and shocked.”

The teams never made it to Hospital #4 to collect the bodies, and the situation got even harder in the following days. “There were a lot of Russian airplanes just going voooom,” Mnatsakanian said. “Two airplanes would come in just above people’s homes, throw out bombs, and then I think they would go back to the airport, take new bombs, and do it again. Every 40 or 50 minutes. Even at night-less so, but also at night.”

Some volunteers’ cars broke down and some stopped coming to work. “What can we offer them? What can we give them?” Mnatsakanian said he asked himself. “We had some cookies, some sweets, some water. So, we made some bags and gave it to people to give their families, so they had something to eat. I also had some cigarettes-I don’t smoke, but I gave them out to [the volunteers]. Money was just paper in this apocalyptic situation.”

Despite his efforts, by March 12, the cars of all six of the teams had been damaged and volunteers had stopped coming to work because it was so dangerous. Then, later that day, Mnatsakanian said, there was a mortar attack just 50 meters from the burial location. “We just jumped inside the trenches with all the bodies,” he said. “When you hear this sound, you don’t analyze anything, you just hide; it’s like instinct.”

Realizing that the front line was getting closer, Mnatsakanian and his team closed the first trench on March 12, which by then had about 200 bodies. Mnatsakanian said the Skorbota volunteers had kept a detailed list of the bodies they buried in the first trench. Before March 10, he took photos of some pages of the list, with details of 137 victims, which he shared with Human Rights Watch. He said the originals were all burned in the Skorbota office after it was damaged in an attack on March 10.

Another man described how he brought about seven bodies to the Old City Cemetery on March 13, just after a residential building at Shevchenkа Lane 29 was struck. “Six of us took the bodies to the old cemetery nearby where people had dug two trenches,” he said. “One of the trenches was full, the one closer to the road. We put the bodies in the other trench. At that time, there was shelling nearby, and we saw some of the shells hitting buildings on Shevchenka Boulevard. Then a shell landed in a field close to us and so we quickly left.”438

Satellite imagery from March 12, 2022, shows the two trenches next to each other, one 30 meters and the other 9 meters long. The 30-meter trench has been filled with earth. It is not clear whether the 9-meter trench has been filled in, but according to the witness cited above, the 9-meter trench was still open on March 13. Satellite imagery from July 2022 shows that the bodies were exhumed from the 30-meter trench sometime between July 13 and July 30.

Mnatsakanian’s team then started looking for a new burial location. They found two plots of land in Primorsky Park and the nearby City Garden. He said that after many failed attempts, they found someone willing and able to operate the necessary machinery who dug a total of seven trenches at the two sites on March 14.439

The very next day, on March 15, an airstrike hit just outside the municipality building at Mytropolytska Street 39 at 8:20 a.m., right after the administrators and volunteers had finished their daily coordination meeting. Mnatsakanian was wounded in his right side, ribs, and arm. As he struggled to find medical attention, he realized he and his family needed to leave the city, and they were able to escape later that day.

By that point, Mnatsakanian said, he had lists of 500 to 600 bodies that had been identified by the police and others but had not yet been buried. He also said that on March 12, 13, and 14, he had received information about at least 150 dead bodies each day, just in the Central and Primorsky Districts.

From what Mnatsakanian heard after he left, the morning meetings did not continue after the attack on March 15, and none of the Ukrainian authorities remaining in Mariupol took over the coordination of burials.

According to one of the deputy heads of Mariupol city council, the city’s remaining functioning hospitals were “overflowing with dead bodies” in the first days of March.440 The head of Mariupol’s Dermatological and Venereological Dispensary said that, on a number of occasions in the second week of March, he took bodies of people who had died in various hospitals or whose bodies had been brought to them to the Old City Cemetery and later Primorsky Park for burial.441

On March 10, 2022, the AP published442 an article with photos of trenches in the Old City Cemetery, saying, “Local authorities are hurrying to bury the dead in a mass grave. More than 70 bodies have been interred in the common grave since it was opened Tuesday [March 8].” An AP article on March 16 shows an image of one of the trenches there, saying the reporters saw the bodies of children “stacked together with dozens of others in this mass grave.”443 A woman interviewed and filmed by France Television 2 (France TV 2) in early June 2022 in the Old City Cemetery said that she and her father had buried her husband there on March 16, after he was killed in an attack.444 They said they saw that one of the trenches was full of bodies, placed in three rows with eight bodies stacked on top of each other, and that bodies had already started to be placed on top of each other in another trench.

As noted above, according to satellite imagery analysis, the bodies initially buried in the Old City Cemetery appear to have been dug up in July 2022. It is possible that they were transferred to the larger cemeteries on the outskirts of the city, but what happened to them remains unclear.

Makeshift Graves in Backyards, Schools, Playgrounds, and Along Streets

One of my neighbors left our building on March 19 to get water, and he was killed by shelling. He bled out and died in my arms. We couldn’t bury him properly. There were no shovels, and we couldn’t dig with all the shelling going on around us. So we put his body under some iron sheeting and put bricks on top so the dogs wouldn’t drag him away.

— 50-year-old man living on Nakhimova Street445

Throughout the first half of March, Mariupol residents buried the bodies of their loved ones, neighbors, and strangers who had died in makeshift shallow graves in their backyards, the courtyards of apartment blocks, or in grassy areas nearby. The fighting and bombardment of the city made it too dangerous to bring the bodies to hospitals, morgues, or cemeteries, and city officials only managed to collect a fraction of the bodies from the streets, buildings, or hospitals.

One man said that 11 people killed during the fighting were buried in the courtyard of his building at Budivelnykiv Avenue 189.446 Another said that the courtyard of a nine-story building next to his building on Troitska Street contained the graves of about 20 people.447

A man in Mariupol who spoke to many people about the graves in their courtyards said that most of those buried were older or had been ill, with many dying of “stress” or “heart attacks” or of ailments for which they could not get treatment.448 On March 31, France TV 2 aired imagery of about five graves in a grassy area near residential buildings which the correspondent said contained the bodies of older people who lived nearby and “who had been unable to receive first aid.”449

Mnatsakanian, the city council member who organized burials, described how a wife and husband in their mid-30s came to the Skorbota funeral home to look for a casket:

They had this car, and it was all covered in holes with pieces and glass missing. They said they needed a casket for their two children, born in 2016 and 2020. I remember this moment really well because the couple was about the same age as [my wife and me] and the children are about the same age as our children. So they bought one casket for two children, and buried them in their garden. We helped them put the casket in their car. Because the car was small and pretty destroyed, it wasn’t easy.450

Two men said they had seen dozens of graves in the children’s playground section in the southeastern part of a park in the city’s 26th District.451 Images and footage show about 20 graves in the park452 and between 11 and 15 graves are visible in satellite imagery from March 29, 2022.

A couple said they had seen a number of graves just north of Arkhip Kuindzhi Street 133 in a children’s football field between residential buildings.453 A woman said she saw a significant number of graves near a kindergarten in the eastern part of the city’s Left Bank area.454 One man said that his mother-in-law buried four of her neighbors in a garden at Budivelnykiv Boulevard 140, near their house and Kindergarten 108.455 Another woman said she had seen a lot of graves on land belonging to Kindergarten #61.456 Images posted online show a few graves in Kindergarten #47, Kindergarten #59, Kindergarten #129,School #10, and School #16.457 The graves at Kindergarten #47 are also visible in satellite imagery between March 14 and 29, 2022. The graves at the other kindergartens are not visible in satellite imagery as they are under trees.

Other bodies were buried in makeshift graves on the side of the street. Two people said they had seen dozens of graves in grassy areas in between the two lanes on the western end of Shevchenka Boulevard.458 One of them also said he had seen graves stretching all the way to the east to Budivelnykiv Avenue and to the west to the Metro shopping center.459

A woman said460 she had seen a lot graves by the side of the road near the Coral nightclub on Nakhimova Avenue as well as dozens of graves, some with crosses, in a grassy area underneath trees on either side of Budivelnykiv Avenue near number 163. Another woman said she had seen a number of graves on the corner of Myru Avenue and Levanevskoho Street, including small graves for children, next to the building with a famous mural of a girl who was seriously injured during Russian shelling of the city in January 2015.461 Occupying forces removed the mural around September 20, 2022.462

Many other bodies lay unburied on the streets, in the rubble, or in people’s homes for days, weeks, or even months.

Deaths After the Battle

After the battle for Mariupol ended and Russian forces controlled the entire city, a senior health official who had left the city and who later spoke with cemetery workers and doctors who left after him said that burials continued at a much higher than usual rate, even with much of the population having fled.463 This appears to have been at least in part due the remaining residents having insufficient access to medicine, health care, and clean water, and succumbing to injuries they sustained during the fighting. Older people, people with preexisting medical conditions, people with disabilities, children, and people who were injured during the siege of the city were especially at risk.

The health official said that 27 to 28 people were dying on average per day in Mariupol before the Covid-19 pandemic, when the city’s population was around 540,000. By the summer of 2022, he said that an estimated 50 people were dying per day, when the population was down to an estimated 150,000 people. While he was no longer in Mariupol, he said he received information about the number of burials from cemetery workers and deaths resulting from illnesses from members of the city’s originally 5,000-member-strong medical personnel workforce.

These people “were dying of sickness, not attacks,” he said:

There wasn’t any normal medication in the city or enough doctors or medical equipment. Many people who survived the fighting died a few weeks or a few months later. The conditions people had to live in during March and April contributed to the massive increase in the mortality rate in the summer. … People had reached the acute phase of chronic diseases, including diabetes or chronic cardiovascular diseases. They died after being deprived of medications they normally took. … People who needed regular dialysis [for kidney failure] also died. So did all those sick people who required constant access to other types of medicine, like people with asthma and breathing problems.464

The health official said the higher rate of burials was in part due to intestinal infections that killed some of the people who were forced to rely on contaminated water after delays in repairing some of the city’s water infrastructure that had been damaged during the fighting. He said that before the full-scale invasion, health workers had found cholera in tests they conducted in the sea, rivers, and water holes each summer. “So, cholera was in Mariupol each year, but we controlled it,” he said, including by ensuring people relied on clean, treated water sources from outside of the city. In 2022, they were unable to conduct any laboratory tests for cholera, but he said that people were “forced to use bad water,” and that “resulted in an increase in the number of people with diseases.” Although he didn’t have statistics, he said he heard about many people in Mariupol that summer who “had bloody diarrhea and then died.”

In June 2022, the World Health Organization said it was worried about a possible outbreak of cholera in Mariupol because of a risk of sewage water contaminating drinking water.465

Many people from Mariupol described the vulnerability of older people who stayed behind. “We must understand that there were people who died during the active phase [of the assault], and others who are dying without good water, medicine, and food,” Vaagn Mnatsakanian, the city council staffer who oversaw burials in early March, said in October 2022. “Winter is coming and there is no heating. … About 35 to 40 percent of the population of Mariupol was older people. A lot of the people who stayed are older people who need medicine, care, and so on. How can they live without this? After this winter, there will be more dead people.”466

How Occupying Forces Treated the Dead

As Russian forces gradually gained control over different parts of the city, they began collecting bodies still lying in the streets or in people’s homes, and they exhumed bodies buried in shallow, makeshift graves. By the second week of April, they started removing bodies from rubble across the city.

They took some bodies to the city’s hospitals and then took many, possibly all, bodies they found to a makeshift morgue near the Metro shopping center. According to one witness, Ukrainian prisoners of war were forced to assist with the collection of bodies, while in other cases people were paid. Many of the bodies were taken from the makeshift morgue to the five cemeteries in and around Mariupol: Manhush, Novotroitske, Starokrymske and Vynohradne cemeteries and Pavlov Street cemetery. An unknown number of bodies buried in rubble were likely taken away from the city with the debris as occupying forces prepared for demolitions and reconstruction. Several people we interviewed referred to a database of the dead, which included victims’ photos and other details about the bodies collected by Russian occupying forces. Some also said that the occupying authorities took DNA samples from at least some of the bodies and from residents searching for missing loved ones.

Removing Bodies from Buildings and Streets

Human Rights Watch spoke with a man who helped remove bodies from the rubble at Mytropolytska Street 98 between April 21 and 23.467 He said that he was part of one of many recovery teams working in the city that were made up of staff from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service and volunteers. Every morning, an official named Serhiy Mishenko, and some of his senior colleagues, gave the teams instructions at a gathering point at the Metro shopping mall on which building in the city they would go to in order to recover bodies that might be in the rubble. He said that his team was the second team working at Mytropoloystka Street 98 and that another team had started working there one or two weeks before. In a video, uploaded on April 9, 2022, a body is removed from Mytropolytska Street 98 and placed on the ground nearby.468

A 57-year-old teacher who sheltered for over three weeks at Mariupol’s Regional Intensive Care Hospital said that by early April, bodies were piling up at the hospital, including of injured people who died of their wounds, and bodies picked up from the streets. She said she saw Russian soldiers escorting captured young wounded Ukrainian soldiers as they brought bodies they had found in the streets to the hospital. She said Russian forces told her that they were going to take DNA samples from the bodies and then take them for burial in Manhush. She said, “They used a van to take the bodies. Twice I saw them loading the van with bodies when I went out to get water.”469

A surgeon at Hospital #3 also said that when so-called DNR forces took over the hospital on March 25, they removed adult, children’s, and babies’ corpses from the morgue and “took them away in cars.”470

A resident of Mariupol said the bodies of two men, a father and son who had been killed by snipers on March 20 outside Metalurhiv Avenue 89, lay in the street for eight days before Russian forces brought an orange truck that was half full of corpses to take them away.471 When the mother and wife of the men asked if she could remove her son’s wedding ring before his body was loaded onto the truck, Russian soldiers suggested cutting off the finger, as his hand was swollen. She managed to get it off with grease and convinced the soldiers to wrap the bodies in cloth before loading them onto the truck.

A woman said that in April 2022, DNR forces were offering residents 20,000 rubles (US$300) to remove bodies from the streets.472 Other residents told the media that they were paid about 30,000 rubles.473 A man said that at the end of May, just before a planned visit from the head of the DNR, Denis Pushilin, commercial and military trucks started collecting bodies from the streets and that on one occasion he saw about 50 bodies in the back of one of the trucks.474

A city official told Human Rights Watch in September 2022 that she had spoken to people in the previous weeks who said that occupying forces had paid them with food to help clear rubble, with instructions not to separate the corpses: “People who clear rubble told me they were told not to tell anyone if they found corpses or body parts and that in some places, when rubble is taken away, you can smell decaying bodies.”475

Makeshift Morgue Near Metro Shopping Center and Opposite Hospital #1

By April 21, occupying forces had set up a makeshift morgue in a building at Zaporizke Shose 23, about 500 meters from the Metro shopping center, in a former storage space for fruit and vegetables.476

A man who helped recover bodies from buildings said that between April 21 and 23, trucks collected bodies he and his team removed from Mytropolytska Street 98 and took them to a morgue near the Metro shopping center.477

A woman who lived near Mariupol spent many months looking for the bodies of her granddaughter, daughter, and son-in-law who were sheltering in the basement of Mytropolytska Street 98 when it was attacked on March 11.478 She said that she had first heard about the morgue on Zaporizke Shose 23 from officials working at Ukraine’s State Emergency Service shortly before April 27, 2022, the date on which she first went to the morgue. She then searched for her relatives’ bodies there about every two days until it closed in early August, sometimes staying away for a day to recover from what she said was “the horror” of what she had seen the day before. She described an entrance gate, a warehouse, a small red brick two-story building, and a courtyard where over the course of several weeks she said she saw thousands of bodies on the ground. She added that on the ground floor of the building, officials gave people death certificates and let people look through a database with photographs of the dead, while officials on the second floor arranged funeral services.

She said:

Some of the bodies were in black bags and others were just lying on blankets, some were wrapped in clothes, and some were naked and in a horrible condition. I also saw limbs lying on the ground. I heard the bodies in bags were those recovered by officials and those without bags had been brought in by relatives or neighbors. None of the bags had addresses or names written on them. I saw people making wooden boxes there and putting the bodies inside for burial. They first removed the clothes, footwear, and blankets from the bodies that weren’t in bags, and then they added them to two huge foul-smelling piles of clothes and blankets. One was on the grounds of the morgue, and one was just outside the perimeter. I remember thinking that dead people’s relatives could have identified their relatives’ bodies through the blankets and clothes.

I heard that bodies were removed from the morgue two or three days after they were brought there because there was no place to store the bodies, and the weather was already getting hot. I heard that people whose bodies were found on the western side of the city were brought to the morgue and all buried in the Starokrymske cemetery.

A man who left Mariupol in mid-March but returned to the city in mid-May described what he saw at the morgue when he went there to attempt to find his identity documents:

I saw about 100 bodies, and just before I left, I saw people bring in another 15. Some of the bodies were on the ground, some in bags, and others not. Some were burned, some yellow, some black, and some bloated. … I tried not to look at everything because the smell turned me inside out.479

Another man who went to the morgue in early June said he was told that primarily the emergency services and individuals who charged a small fee were exhuming bodies from makeshift graves or retrieving them from streets or buildings and taking them to the morgue, but that anyone was allowed to bring a body there. He saw dozens of bodies on the ground in an open courtyard when he arrived and said that people working there were wearing civilian clothes. He also saw minivans arrive there with what other people told him were bodies inside.480

The woman who went to the morgue every two days beginning on April 27 said that at some point in early August, the morgue was closed and that a new morgue was opened in Kalmiuskyi District in a place which had previously been a hospital for burn injuries. She said she thought it was in a building at Radina Street 2, opposite Hospital #1, which was known as the only hospital in the city that treated burn injuries.481 She said she went there many times before her last visit on September 18, 2022, the day on which she found her granddaughter’s photo on a database of the dead there, which led her to find the body on October 5.

Satellite imagery taken on July 31, 2022, showed that the courtyard at Zaporizke Shose 23 was empty and that there were fewer vehicles than in previous weeks.

Database of Dead and Collection of DNA Samples

In April 2022, the Russian occupying authorities created a database of the dead that was accessible to relatives searching for their loved ones in the makeshift morgue near the Metro shopping center.

The woman looking for her relatives in the morgue every second day told Human Rights Watch that she saw the database on the first day she went to the morgue, April 27, and that she regularly looked at it from May to September 2022, although the database wasn’t updated between May 18 and sometime around mid-September.482 She said that the database was on a laptop in a small room on the first floor of the small red brick building in the morgue compound, that there were always long lines to access the laptop, and that officials let relatives look at the database in groups of 10. She said relatives of the missing asked the staff to upload the database online for everyone to easily access, but the staff said this would never happen.

She said:

The database had photos of the dead and on each body, there was a sheet of paper with a number written on it in black felt pen, to help people refer to a specific photo when they spoke with the staff. The numbers in the database were not in numerical order. I was told by people at the morgue that many experts examined the bodies, and that one expert might examine 10 bodies on a certain day and then upload the information to the database, while another could examine 15 bodies on the same day but upload the information to the database weeks later. The highest number I saw was in the 9,000s. Until about mid-September, the database only had photos of adults, with two separate sections for men and women. Then, they added photos of dead children, which is when I found my granddaughter’s photo.

She also said had heard from a number of people in Mariupol who were looking for their relatives that there was also a database of the dead in Novoazovsk, about 30 kilometers east of the Left Bank, with photos of the dead who had been found on the Left Bank.

The same woman said that in late June or early July, workers at the morgue near the Metro shopping center told her that people looking for their relatives were obliged to give their DNA sample at an office in the compound of Hospital #1 so that officials could compare their DNA to samples they had taken from bodies before burying them. On July 19, she gave her DNA sample. She said she was not allowed to keep the document confirming she had given it but that she was allowed to take a photo. She also said that she heard people in the city talking at some point in 2023 about the fact that they had just given the authorities their DNA sample.

Mnatsakanian, who had organized burials in early March, said that in May or June 2022, a friend of his had returned to the city to try and find the body of a relative. He said his friend told him that the occupying forces had asked him to give a DNA sample which the forces said they would compare to DNA taken from bodies they had found and registered. His friend also told him that that person in the office where he had given his sample had allowed him to look through a database of the dead, but that even after clicking through images for two days, he did not find his relative’s body.483

Counting the Dead: New Graves in Mariupol’s Cemeteries

By May 2022, Mariupol’s mayor estimated that 22,000 people had died as a result of Russia’s assault on the city.484 The UN Monitoring Mission in Ukraine said that there were nearly 2,000 recorded civilian deaths, but that thousands more civilians had probably died.485

Based on analysis of satellite imagery, drone footage, and photos and videos of burial locations, we estimate that at least 10,284 people were buried in five cemeteries in and around Mariupol between late February 2022 and mid-February 2023: Manhush, Novotroitske, Starokrymske and Vynohradne cemeteries, and Pavlov Street cemetery. This number simply represents the minimum number of people who appear to have been buried in those locations between those dates. It is not an estimate of how many died during military operations or how many died during this period due to other reasons, including a lack of health care and poor water quality, or of causes unrelated to war. Of those who died in attacks, it is not possible to determine how many of those deaths were unlawful. We also do not know how many of those buried were civilians, and how many were military personnel.

We identified two types of graves: individual graves and trench-like graves. Individual graves are in the Manhush, Novotroitske, Starokrymske and Vynohradne cemeteries and in the Pavlov Street cemetery. The individual graves are clearly outlined and can be identified using high-resolution satellite imagery. The trench-like graves are in the Starokrymske and Vynohradne cemeteries. The trenches contain multiple bodies buried head to toe and are marked mostly with plaques-sticks with a small wooden panel-and some crosses that presumably identify where individual bodies are buried.486 The plaques and crosses are too small to be visible on satellite imagery. To count them, we geolocated drone and on-the-ground footage at the two cemeteries, which allowed us to count the plaques and crosses in a given area and compute an average number of bodies per meter square of trench-like graves. We then used that average to extrapolate to other trench-like graves in other parts of the cemeteries. We counted one body per plaque or cross, but if bodies were buried on top of each other in trench-like graves, the number of bodies in those graves may be significantly higher.

Example of single graves in Starokrymske cemetery visible on very-high resolution satellite imagery, February 8, 2023. © 2024 CNES / Airbus. Source: Airbus
Example of trench-style graves in Starokrymske cemetery visible on very-high resolution satellite imagery, February 8, 2023. © 2024 CNES / Airbus. Source: Airbus

The figure of 10,284 is not an estimate of the total number of people who died in Mariupol during this period, and may be far below the actual figure. As noted elsewhere in this report, journalists-and witnesses who spoke to journalists-said bodies were stacked on top of each other in the trench-like grave in the Old City Cemetery, while the city’s deputy mayor said that some individual graves in Manhush cemetery contained more than one body. Bodies may also have been stacked on top of each other in other individual and trench-like graves in the city’s other cemeteries, which would increase, possibly substantially, the total number of bodies. Others will have died outside of the city after they managed to evacuate, as a result of injuries they sustained or the conditions they endured during the siege of the city. Some of those buried in makeshift graves in the city may never have been transferred to the larger cemeteries. Some bodies may have remained in the rubble of buildings, only to be taken away with debris as buildings were demolished.

Most of the burials were in the city’s main Starokrymske cemetery, on the city’s outskirts. Based on a review of satellite imagery between March 9, 2022, and February 15, 2023, as well as drone footage uploaded on June 3, 2022, we estimate that at least 8,580 people were buried there between those dates. This includes 6,687 people buried in trench-type graves covering 34,287 square meters, with the first such graves visible in satellite imagery taken on April 7, 2022. It also includes 1,893 people buried in individual graves covering 16,848 square meters, with the first such graves visible in satellite imagery taken on May 20, 2022, together with the first imagery of earth-moving equipment at the cemetery.487

The head of Mariupol’s Dermatological and Venereological Dispensary said that he thought the rate of burials increased at the Starokrymske cemetery after May 25, 2022, due to an increased presence of Russian forces in the city who began organizing burials.488 A man who went to the cemetery in June 2022 said he saw fresh graves, many of which had crosses with numbers written on them, with some numbers in the 4,000s.489

Other burials took place near the Vynohradne cemetery, about two kilometers east of the easternmost edge of the city’s Left Bank. Based on satellite imagery, we estimate that 864 people were buried there between March 2022 and February 2023, with 311 people buried in individual graves and 553 in trench-like graves.490

A man who went to the site in June 2022 said he saw between 300 and 400 individual graves with wooden signs attached to sticks bearing names or numbers and dates.491

Others were buried in the Novotroitske cemetery, about 2.5 kilometers to the northeast of the central area of the Left Bank. We reviewed satellite imagery of the cemetery taken on October 22, 2021, and the next available imagery on March 11, 2022, which showed an increase of 222 graves between those dates. By February 9, 2023, an additional 258 graves had been dug at the cemetery.

People were also buried next to the Pavlov Street cemetery, about four kilometers north of the Drama Theater. A review of satellite imagery taken on March 11, 2022, and May 12, 2022, suggests 45 people were buried there between those dates, with the first graves visible in imagery taken on March 22. A man who went there in April said he saw around 100 freshly dug graves on the edge of the cemetery and remembered the names of some of those buried, including children.492

Burials also took place in Manhush cemetery, about eight kilometers to the west of the city outskirts. Based on satellite imagery taken between March 9, 2022 and October 12, 2022, we estimate that at least 315 people were buried there in individual graves between those dates.493

The Mariupol City Council said on Telegram on April 21, 2022, that Russian forces had buried between 3,000 and 9,000 people in Manhush.494 On August 31, 2022, one of the city’s deputy mayors told Human Rights Watch that when some of the individual graves were dug up later, there were multiple bodies inside, indicating that more than 315 people may have been buried in the 315 individual graves we identified.495

We also reviewed satellite imagery of three of the cemeteries and the cemetery in Manhush between June 2018 and June 2019, the last full year before the Covid-19 pandemic. The imagery shows 2,459 new burials in Starokrymske cemetery, 1,019 in Novotroitske, 16 in Manhush, and 15 in Vynohradne-a total of 3,509 burials.496 This yearly estimate is not exactly comparable to the gravesites we counted in three cemeteries between March 2022 and February 2023 (and, in the case of Manhush, between March 2022 and October 2022), given that the population between June 2018 and June 2019 was significantly higher than the city’s population between March 2022 and February 2023. Nonetheless, it is a helpful starting point to compare the figure of 2,250 referenced just below in relation to the period between March 2022 and February 2023.

The average mortality rate for cities in Ukraine, and Europe more broadly, is around 1 percent of the population. In any given pre-Covid-19 year, this would have meant about 5,400 of the city’s pre-February 2022 population of about 540,000 would have died, or an average of around 1,350 people during any given three-month period. By June 2022, Mariupol’s population is estimated to have decreased to around 150,000 people. A 1 percent mortality rate between June 2022 and February 2023 would have meant 900 people dying of causes unrelated to war. It can therefore be estimated that around 2,250 people would have died of causes unrelated to war in Mariupol during the one-year period from March 2022 to February 2023.

When compared to our estimate of at least 10,284 people buried during this period in the city, this suggests the city had at least 8,000 deaths above a peacetime rate.

Identifying Those Who Died

Behind each of the gravesites that we counted is a story, a face, and in most cases, a family that was never able to properly mourn or bury their loved one.

The director of the Donetsk Regional Bureau of Medicine said that between February 24 and March 4, 2022, he worked at the city’s Forensics Department at Boika Avenue 60, where he saw between 50 and 60 bodies brought in every day, half of which he thinks were of civilians, based on their clothing.497

Even the limited sample of people from Mariupol interviewed by Human Rights Watch and Truth Hounds referenced a total of 661 people who died in the city, some of whom they knew and strangers they could not identify. This includes two people who between them said they saw about 200 bodies in various parts of the city over a number of days or weeks. There may be some repetition among the bodies witnesses identified. Witnesses accounts, including the two who between them said they saw about 200 bodies lying in the streets in various parts of the city, said that 513 of the deaths were violent, while 15 died because of health conditions, and the remainder were unclear.

In addition to the specific bodies and individuals referenced by interviewees, we reviewed 12 lists from Mnatsakanian, the city council member who oversaw burials in early March of 137 bodies, all in a trench in the Old City Cemetery. The lists include full names of 78 people, the surnames of another 13, and the first names of a further two. The other 44 bodies were unidentified. It also lists a number of addresses where some of the bodies were found. Of the 137, 11 individuals are reported to have died from health-related reasons, including four from pneumonia and one from diabetes. One reportedly died from a traumatic brain injury, while others died from injuries to the leg, chest, abdomen, and the gluteal regions. The cause of death is not noted in the majority of cases.

List of addresses where bodies were retrieved in the first half of March 2022 in various parts of Mariupol, as seen on a mobile phone. © 2022 Courtesy of Vaagn Mnatsakanian

Two further lists shared by Mnatsakanian contain 58 addresses across the city, where police officers had identified bodies that needed to be collected for burial. Mnatsakanian said his teams had been unable to collect those bodies before he was wounded and escaped the city.

He also said that these lists, of both those buried and the addresses, are incomplete, and that he lost other papers with other names and addresses when his team’s office was attacked and burned.

The website Victims.Memorial has also collected the names, photos, and stories of some of the people who died in Mariupol. According to a chief editor of the site, the website allows people who have information about civilians and military personnel who were killed or died in Mariupol to complete a questionnaire that staff verify, sometimes contacting the person to obtain further details. Once approved, the information is posted on the website. The website coordinators also review other sources and post information once verified.498 As of June 1, 2023, Victims.Memorial had published stories and photos relating to 1,364 civilians.

One of the dead was an 11-year-old rhythmic gymnast, Kateryna Dyachenko, who died when a shell hit her house. Victims.Memorial posted a message from her gymnastics coach: “Why? Why did my Katiusha die? A child who had a life ahead of her! And it was taken away from her! Kateryna, my star, ... you will lie in our memory as long as we are alive!”499

Screengrab from Victims.Memorial

Another post on the website is about Viktor Diedov, a photographer, cameraman, and director of one of the city’s television channels. According to his wife, Diedov died as a result of shelling on March 11. After an attack hit their home, he was trapped in the rubble of the kitchen, and then shelling hit the home and he died of injuries sustained in that second attack. “He lived for a few minutes more and then became our angel forever,” his wife wrote. She was not able to bury him because the apartment building burned down four days later.500

On April 23, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted photos taken by Diedov on his Facebook feed and said: “This is what Mariupol looked like before the invasion. A beautiful city of half a million people. Now there is virtually no intact building there. There is no Mariupol. And Viktor Diedov, who took these photos, is also gone.”501

In February 2023, the website www.0629.com.ua set up a section called “Mariupol.Memorial.”502 As of mid-May 2023, it contained the names of about 550 people, virtually all civilians, whose deaths could be verified. Their relatives, direct witnesses to their deaths, or open sources say that they died in the city. The majority of deaths happened between March 9 and April 4, 2022.503

Among the numerous online obituaries is that of Vanda Obiedkova, who survived the Nazi Holocaust. On April 3, 2022, at the age of 91, she died of hyperthermia in a basement where she had sought shelter to avoid the attacks around her. Her daughter, who posted her information online, buried her in a public park by the sea.504

Screengrab from Victims.Memorial

Another is that of Alina Perehudova. A year before Russia’s full-scale invasion, 14-year-old Perehudova won a gold medal at a national weightlifting championship for teenagers. She was planning to participate in international competitions but was killed in late April 2022, according to her coaches.505

The website https://lost.mrpl.life/ also mentions the names of 220 people who are said to have died in Mariupol.506

Screengrab from Victims.Memorial

Tracing the Missing

Several hundred thousand Mariupol residents managed to escape during the assault on the city and in the following weeks, and they ended up in cities and towns across Ukraine, European Union states, other European countries, Russia, Georgia, and elsewhere. They often fled with few belongings, and many lost their phones and identity documents. With phone networks down in Mariupol, and communications restricted for many of those forcibly transferred to Russia, they struggled to get news from or about the relatives, friends, and neighbors they left behind. This was especially stressful when news trickled out about attacks on specific buildings, but with no information about who survived and who remained buried in the rubble.

Nearly two years after the Russian assault on the city, some are still missing, with their relatives and neighbors concluding that they were likely killed in a specific attack and fearing that they will never find their remains.

On July 31, 2023, the Ukrainian Interior Ministry responded to a Human Rights Watch letter asking for information about the missing in Mariupol. The ministry said that between February 24, 2022, and July 28, 2023, a total of 9,016 people were registered as having gone missing in Mariupol, including “possibly” 3,864 civilians. Of the 3,864 possible civilians, 2,082 were men and 1,782 were women. Of these, 953 had been found (447 men and 506 women), leaving 2,911 possible civilians missing as of July 28, 2023.507

Some relatives of the missing posted alerts online about their loved ones, asking if anyone had news of their whereabouts, or to share information about those who were known to have died. This included the Telegram channel MariupolRIP, and other Telegram channels for specific buildings or neighborhoods.508 Members of MariupolRIP publish photos and information about people who died in Mariupol or about residents who are missing. As of June 2022, 1,396 names appeared on the channel, including 17 who were missing.509

Others posted their messages on a website dedicated entirely to people missing from Mariupol, https://lost.mrpl.life, which was set up in April 2022.510 MRLP.life allows anyone to post information about missing friends or relatives on the website and does not verify the content. If people who have posted information ask the website to remove the post because their missing relative or friend has been found or for some other reason, the post is removed.511 As of mid-May 2023, the website mentioned the names of 220 people who had died in the city and the names of 1,873 people from the city who were missing.512

There are also a number of other social media channels and websites dedicated to Mariupol’s missing persons.513

The Injured

Beyond those who died or are missing, many other civilians suffered serious injuries during the Russian assault on the city. Some acquired permanent disabilities, losing limbs, eyesight, hearing, and memory, including as a result of traumatic brain injuries caused by repeated exposure to blast waves. Many others, like a 10-year-old boy whose mother told us that he had a panic attack when he heard fireworks on New Year’s Eve in 2022,514 have symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder from exposure to constant attacks around them.

Several dozen residents whom we interviewed referred to more than 80 people who were injured, some fatally. We also interviewed doctors and nurses about the hundreds of injured people they saw arrive in hospitals.

An anesthesiologist who worked in the Regional Intensive Care Hospital from February 25 to March 15, 2022, said he saw dozens of injured people arrive at the hospital every day, that he helped between 30 and 40 people each day, several of whom died every day, including due to a lack of supplies for post-operative care. On March 13, for example, he said two very young children died shortly after they were brought in with serious injuries caused by flying glass, following a Russian attack on School #27.515

A surgeon who worked at Hospital #3 between March 4 and April 25, 2022, said he treated a “steady flow” of injured civilians beginning on March 10, and that most of the operations were done using local anesthesia or non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. In one case he used a bayonet knife to amputate a patient’s arm. In another case, he removed a piece of glass about 1.5 centimeters long from a patient’s eye and saved the eye. He said he was aware of one patient who died in the hospital’s bunker, of a severe head injury.516

The head of Mariupol’s Dermatological and Venereological Dispensary said he saw hundreds of injured in many of the city’s hospitals. He described some of the injuries he saw before leaving the city on March 25:

Relatives brought in injured people without arms or legs, with internal abdominal injuries or shrapnel wounds in their heads, with half the skull sometimes missing. About half the people brought in died before we could operate on them. We saved some legs, but we had to amputate others. We had some anesthesia medications but to avoid running out, we diluted them with massive doses of painkillers. No one in the hospitals died of pain, but some patients we operated on died of hypothermia because the temperature in the hospitals was like outside, as low as -13 C during the first half of March.517

He and another doctor said Ukrainian forces helped collect medication from the city’s dispensaries and some hospital warehouses and distributed them to the functioning hospitals, including Hospitals #1 and #3, the Regional Intensive Care Hospital, and the Emergency Medical Care Hospital, which all treated both wounded military personnel and civilians.518

A plastic surgeon who operated on injured civilians and soldiers at military hospital #555 between February 24 and March 16, 2022, described some of the injuries he saw: “I remember two civilian women who were brought to the hospital in agony. One had her upper left arm limb torn off near the clavicle. The other woman’s left leg was detached near her groin area, hanging on by remnants of soft tissue. Her arteries and nerves were torn off.”519

One of the deputy heads of Mariupol’s city council said that in the initial stages of the attack on the city, about 80 percent of the injuries he saw were caused by glass shards from shattered windows. He said injuries he saw in subsequent weeks included many more fragment wounds, burns, and concussions. He estimated that in the first week alone, four hospitals between them treated about 1,200 injuries.520

A woman who was sheltering in a milk factory at Svobody Street 20 said that on March 8, shelling injured some of the people in the shelter, including a man who lost his legs:

That morning, there were men outside boiling water for the rest of us. Someone later told me that suddenly the shelling started, and the men shouted at everyone to get back inside. One man was slower than the others and was hit in the legs. They brought him into the basement. His legs were broken and there was blood everywhere. They took him to a hospital nearby and I heard they amputated his legs on March 9 or 10.521

A nurse who worked at Military Hospital #555, which treated civilians during the battle for the city, said that she looked after an 18-year-old who lost both his eyes and his legs in an attack.522

A 58-year-old man who worked as an actor and photographer described how he lost some of his hearing during an attack that hit his relatives’ building at Yevpatoriiska Street 48 on March 15 in the city center:

I was cooking on a fire near the building. Suddenly, the shelling started, and I ran into the building to check whether my wife was taking shelter. I couldn’t find her and as I turned to go back out, I heard a whistling sound and threw myself to the ground. Something landed in a room near me. I heard a loud explosion, then silence, and I was buried under rubble. It was dark and I couldn’t see anything. It felt like those were the last seconds of my life. But I managed to get up and out of the building. There was some kind of yellow fog around me and pungent smoke. I soon realized I had some kind of blast wave trauma and that my hearing was affected. The doctors tell me it’s highly unlikely that they’ll restore my hearing [to what it was before].523

The same man said that three days later, at about 9 a.m., three of his relatives from the same building arrived at his home nearby, seriously injured. He said:

I opened the door and saw my niece and both her children. They were all covered with dust, dirt, and blood. My niece said they had been shelled again and had been injured while hiding in a bathroom. Their neighbor had put on makeshift bandages, which I removed. The two children had serious injuries, with missing flesh and [the girl had] a head injury all the way to the skull bone. My niece’s arm was badly injured. She also had a hole in her leg, with blood oozing from the wound. Some nearby Ukrainian soldiers gave us bandages and some painkillers. I asked a nurse who lived in my building to help but she couldn’t stand looking at the wounds and left. I treated the wounds with hydrogen peroxide. The boy used to wake up at night and cry, so we gave him painkillers and changed his bandages.

A city official said that in early March, the head of one of the city’s private medical clinics told him that he had run out of medication, and that his staff had to amputate arms and legs without anesthesia.524

Chapter IX The Aftermath: Demolition, Reconstruction, Russification

The physical landscape of Mariupol has changed profoundly since the end of the fighting in 2022. Damaged multi-story buildings have been demolished, together with countless irreplaceable personal items, while Russian occupying forces have begun the process of building new high-rise apartment buildings as part of Russia’s plans to reconstruct the city by 2025, and further developing the city by 2023.

Efforts to clear debris and bring down unsafe structures are largely in line with an occupying forces’ obligations under international humanitarian law. However, by not creating the conditions to allow independent human rights investigators, forensic experts, and judicial officials to examine the damaged buildings before demolitions, occupying forces effectively erased the physical evidence at hundreds of potential crime scenes across the city. This makes the digital damage assessment, 3D modeling, and other documentation presented in this project and by others, all the more important. It also appears that residents are only able to benefit from the reconstruction efforts if they show their support for the occupying forces and their Russification efforts.

These efforts involve occupying forces’ attempt to transform the cultural landscape by stripping away markers of Ukrainian identity, enforcing a Russian school curriculum, and requiring residents to obtain Russian passports in order to apply for certain jobs, be eligible for social welfare payments, and benefit from public health care.525

A full analysis of current conditions in Mariupol is beyond the scope of this report. Seeking and confirming information from the city is challenging, as residents fear retaliation should they speak out. The Russian occupation administration in Mariupol limits residents’ ability to freely express their opinions or connect with the outside world, and rewards those who accept the occupation and adopt Russian nationality.

Demolitions

Screengrab from video uploaded to YouTube by a Russian construction company on October 18, 2022, showing heavy equipment demolishing an apartment building in Mariupol. © 2022 VTM via YouTube

By early May 2022, occupying forces began paying residents, sometimes with food, to help remove the rubble, either by hand or with machines. Much of the rubble was taken to areas outside of the city, including a site where before the siege, municipal services took solid waste.526 Satellite imagery shows new piles of rubble or garbage appearing at the site in May and June 2022. Since June 2022, the surface of the landfill has expanded.

Rubble was also taken to a disused site about four kilometers to the northeast of the Drama Theater.527 Satellite imagery taken of the site on July 13, 2022, shows new piles of rubble. Imagery taken after July 2022 shows the full area of the site progressively turning into a landfill, consisting of several mounds of rubble connected by large roads used by trucks and heavy earth-moving machinery.

A comparison of satellite imagery taken on August 16, 2022, and July 30, 2023, shows the evolution of a site used to dump rubble in Mariupol’s Kalmiuskyi District. In August 2022, a few piles of rubble are visible. By July 2023, the site is fully covered by mounds of rubble connected by new roads. Image © 2024 Planet Labs PBC

A media report in February 2023 said that 2.5 million tons of rubble had been collected at an unnamed construction site in Mariupol.528

In February 2023, the “mayor” installed in Mariupol by the Russian authorities, Oleg Morgun, said 287 of 409 buildings slated for demolition had been demolished and that all demolitions would be completed by the end of the year.529 He said that “an extremely small” number of bodies had been recovered during demolitions and that they had been sent for identification, in part to establish whether they were civilians or military personnel.530

As of March 31, 2023, 447 buildings were on the DNR’s list of buildings slated for demolition.531 We compared the list with Open Street Map’s database of Mariupol’s apartment buildings, which shows that most are larger structures, including high-rise apartment buildings.

Reconstruction

Satellite imagery from February 9, 2023, shows new residential buildings under construction along Kuprina Street, west of the city center, surrounded by damaged and destroyed buildings. Image © 2024 Planet Labs PBC

In October 2022, the Russian news outlet The Village said it had obtained a copy of a Russian government plan for rebuilding and redeveloping Mariupol by 2035, commissioned by the Russian Construction Ministry and prepared by a Russian federal organization called the Unified Institute of Spatial Planning.532 The plan estimates Mariupol’s late 2022 population at 212,000 and says Russian authorities expect 350,000 people to be living in the city by 2025, with a further 100,000 by 2030, and a total of 500,000 by 2035.533

The plan focuses on rebuilding damaged residential buildings and private homes and building new apartment buildings from scratch. This work would create over 8.75 million square meters of housing. It also involves repairing and rebuilding utilities, transport, and social infrastructure, including the repair or building from scratch of 105 kindergartens, 92 schools, and 19 health facilities. In February 2023, a Dutch newspaper reported that, according to its analysis of satellite imagery, 19 new blocks of flats had been constructed in Mariupol since June 2022, and a further 15 were under construction.534 It also said that most of the new housing was being allocated to pensioners, people with disabilities, construction workers from Russia, and residents cooperative with the occupying forces.

Personal Identity, Education, and Cultural Identity

According to media reports, Russian occupying forces require residents to obtain a Russian passport from local administrative offices in order to work as a civil servant, including as a teacher, doctor, or police officer, to open a business, or to receive a state pension.535 A woman whose apartment was badly damaged during fighting in March 2022 said that money and materials for repair works are only given to the owner if they can present a Russian passport.536

Media outlets have reported that students in the city are now taught in Russian by newly certified teachers trained in Russia, and that the curriculum includes a Russian state-sanctioned version of history that denies Ukraine’s sovereignty and casts doubt on its history as an independent nation since 1991.537 In the school year starting in September 2023, the curriculum includes a Russian 11th grade post-1945 history textbook covering particularly the post-2014 period, which includes a presentation of Ukraine as “a neo-Nazi state,” photographs and stories glorifying Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine, and other content claiming that there is no Ukrainian state or language.538 The curriculum also includes maps that misrepresent parts of Ukraine as though they were part of Russia.539

A teacher who fled Mariupol but remains in contact with his former students still in the city said occupation authorities pressured parents into enrolling their children in a school where the Russian curriculum includes “basic military training” classes.540 A civic activist who works with a group that supports online education said occupation authorities in Mariupol pressure parents to send children to school and not to attend online classes supported by the Ukrainian Education Ministry.541 Occupation authorities also block Ukrainian online learning platforms, according to the teacher.542

According to news reports, Vladimir Putin’s portraits, his “patriotic” quotes, and portraits of Russian “heroes of the Special Military Operation” are displayed in Mariupol schools. Children are also required to sing Russia’s national anthem.543

In February 2023, media reported that streets and squares have been given names dating back to Soviet times; that television programs are in the Russian language; and that the Russian servers that now control internet traffic block access to many Ukrainian websites. Occupying forces have also destroyed Mariupol’s monument to the “Holodomor,” the starvation of millions of Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 as a result of Joseph Stalin’s policies. In a different part of the city, the forces have erected a monument to Alexander Nevsky, a 13th century Russian prince and military commander.544

Freedom of Movement

Some residents said they had gone through a screening procedure to obtain documents such as a pass to leave the city. The pass, or so-called filtration receipt, was issued by Russian authorities in various occupied areas in 2022 to people who went through the procedure.545 This receipt, in theory, allows holders to pass through Russian checkpoints, including to leave occupied areas.546 Some people were taken away or detained after filtration, especially if they were seen to have strong pro-Ukrainian sympathies or links to the Ukrainian armed forces.547

Chapter X Russian Chain of Command

Using a wide range of open-source materials that were verified and corroborated, Human Rights Watch reconstructed the chain of command of Russian forces and identified at least 17 units that took part in Russia’s assault on Ukrainian forces defending the city of Mariupol from late February until early May 2022. We provide the names of 10 commanders, including Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, who likely bear command responsibility for war crimes committed in Mariupol during this period.

org-chart

Some important gaps remain with respect to our understanding of the command and control of Russian forces engaged in specific operations in Mariupol, including Russian air forces, due in part to the apparent lack of a unified Russian command for its full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Further research is also needed to link specific attacks and other violations to specific units or commanders.

Based on the information available, it appears that the highest levels of the Russian military command had deep knowledge of the situation in Mariupol and were closely involved in the planning, execution, and coordination of military operations of Russian forces and Russia-affiliated forces under their command, as they assaulted and took control of the city and committed numerous apparent violations of the laws of war.

Command Structures of Russian and Russia-aligned Forces in Ukraine

What follows is an overview of the command structures of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces that were involved in the assault on Mariupol. This includes the Russian Armed Forces, the Russian National Guard Forces, and forces from the DNR that were formally incorporated into the Russian military in October 2022.

Russian Armed Forces

Supreme commander-in-chief and minister of defense

Under the Russian Constitution, the president of the Russian Federation is the supreme commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.548 During the Mariupol fighting that was Vladimir Putin, and it remains so. Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu is the second-ranking military official in the Russian command structure.549

General Staff

Immediately below the minister of defense in the chain of command is Valery Gerasimov, the first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.550 The General Staff is the primary organization in the overall command and control of Russia’s armed forces. As chief of the General Staff, Gerasimov bears personal responsibility for the fulfilment of tasks assigned to the General Staff and the military command and control bodies directly subordinate to him.551

The General Staff has many sub-departments. One of them, the Main Operations Directorate, is responsible for directing the operation of the military force and for organizing the interaction between armed forces and other federal bodies.552 The directorate’s head, Sergei Rudskoy, the first deputy chief of the General Staff, reports directly to the chief of the General Staff.553 Another significant component of the General Staff is the National Defense Management Center (NDMC), which centralizes, coordinates, and monitors the armed forces and the Russian government’s response to security threats.554 Until September 2022, the head of the NDMC was Col. Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev.555

A number of forces are below the General Staff level, including Military Districts and the Northern Fleet, and Special Forces (Spetsnaz).

Military Districts

Russian forces below the general staff level are largely organized into Military Districts-the Central, Southern, Eastern, and Western-as well as the “Northern Fleet,” which has the status of a military district.556 The military districts are designated as “Joint Strategic Commands” in times of war.557 Commanders of each military district command an array of forces, including air and naval forces within their respective districts. These commanders are appointed by Russia’s president on the recommendation of the minister of defense. They are subordinate to the minister of defense and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.558

Special Forces (Spetsnaz)

Within the Russian armed forces, there are multiple formations of so-called special forces, or Spetsnaz, units. Some of these units have command and control structures that relate directly to the General Staff, while others are responsible to Military Districts and other combat units like the airborne infantry, which is known as the VDV (Vozdushno-desantnye voyska).559

There are two main branches of special forces units not associated with the organic structure of the VDV or Military Districts. One branch includes units that fall under the control of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (still commonly referred to as the GRU); and the other includes units that fall under the control of the Special Operations Forces Command (KSSO), which also reports to the General Staff.560 The GRU falls under the Ministry of Defense and its General Staff.561 The KSSO reportedly operates independently of the GRU.562 According to a Russian military analyst, special forces units are subordinated to operational commanders when deployed.563

Air Forces

Russia’s air forces, known as the Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS), are a branch of the Russian Aerospace Forces, known as the Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily (VKS). The air forces have an overall service commander in Moscow. The air forces are divided into multiple units, with some subordinated directly to the command in Moscow and others to regional commands. Two main formations subordinated to the Aerospace Command in Moscow are the Military Transport Aviation Command and the Long-Range Aviation Command.564 Other larger formations, referred to as “Armies,” are subordinated to military districts. The units comprise different types of aircraft that have different capabilities and missions, including transportation and attack aircraft.565

The long-range aviation command comprises large bombers whose function is to attack strategic or important targets with large, advanced air-delivered weapons, such as cruise missiles.566 Planning and authority for the use of these assets is normally situated in Moscow. Other aircraft that are largely subordinated to military districts are tasked with supporting maneuvering ground forces with close air support by using attack aircraft. Planning for close air support typically begins at the Army or Military District level, with more specific aspects of the planning happening lower in the force structure.567

The ability of an aircraft to move within potential areas of operation, and thus areas with different overall commanders, is constrained by the distance the aircraft can travel to carry out its mission. Due to the proximity of Russian airfields and bases to Ukraine and the opaque nature of the overall command of Russian forces during the initial months of the full-scale invasion, it is not clear who was responsible for planning, fulfilling, and overseeing specific missions or attacks by Russian air forces.

Russian National Guard Forces

Distinct from its regular armed forces, Russia has a separate force, the National Guard, commonly referred to as Rosgvardiya. The overall head of the National Guard is President Putin who appoints the commander-in-chief of the National Guard forces.568 The commander-in-chief of the National Guard is Gen. Viktor Zolotov.569 The National Guard’s command structure is further broken down into eight districts, each with its own commander. Each district is then further broken down into regions, each with its own commander.570 It is unclear what role district and regional commanders play in individual decisions made by the units that report to them. The National Guard’s responsibilities are broad and include combatting terrorism and organized crime, protecting state facilities, and tasks that expressly involve working with the armed forces.571

Due to the outsized influence the Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, has over the political and security structure in this republic of Russia, it is unclear to what extent Chechen National Guard forces are practically incorporated into the formal national command structure set out in law.572 In July 2020, President Putin awarded Kadyrov the rank of Major General in the Russian National Guard.573 Additionally, during the assault on Mariupol, Kadyrov asserted that he was commanding Chechen National Guard forces and that Adam Delimkhanov, a member of the Russian parliament, was leading forces from Chechnya on the ground and reported directly to Kadyrov.574

Russia-affiliated Forces

Russian forces’ attack on Mariupol included a significant number of forces from the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, made up of areas of the Donetska region currently occupied by Russia in eastern Ukraine. The head of the DNR at the time of the full-scale invasion was Denis Pushilin.575 He was the head of the self-declared republic and the commander-in-chief of the armed groups organized under the DNR.576 The DNR’s largest combat formation was the 1st Army Corp which, according to multiple reports, was apparently commanded by Maj. Gen. Roman Kutuzov, who was reportedly killed in action on June 5, 2022.577

Several factors indicate a high-level of coordination-if not near total Russian control-between Russian forces and the so-called DNR forces in Ukraine. These include Russia’s close coordination with DNR forces since their establishment in December 2015; the close coordination of these units on the battlefield throughout Ukraine during the full-scale invasion; the subsequent absorption of DNR units into the Russian armed forces; and the granting of awards by President Putin to DNR troops for fighting in Mariupol.578

However, the command-and-control link between these forces and Russian forces during combat and other operations following the full-scale invasion is not entirely clear.579

Analysts have in previous years asserted that both DNR forces and forces from the LNR (or the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic, the area of Luhanska region currently occupied by Russia) have operated with significant Russian support.580 The Ukrainian government and other analysts have also asserted that these units have been operationally subordinated to the 8th Combined Arms Army, which is subordinated to the Southern Military District.581 After Russia claimed it had annexed the Donetska and Luhanska regions in September 2022, DNR and LNR forces were formally incorporated into the Russian armed forces in October 2022.582

Lack of a Unified Operational Command During the Initial Phase

The attack on Mariupol began on the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which involved the movement of tens of thousands of Russian troops within Ukraine’s borders as well as the deployment of air and naval forces in support of the military operations. The size and scale of the encirclement of Mariupol would have required significant coordination and interaction between multiple levels of the Russian command structure.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, there does not appear to have been a unified command, indicating that the command and control of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces was likely dispersed throughout established mid- and lower-level Russian military command and control structures, which rely heavily on the military district commanders and their subordinate units. Beyond established command structures, it is unclear exactly how Russia was controlling, organizing, and deploying its forces in Ukraine, which complicates assessments of command responsibility.

Analysts speculated during the first few months of the full-scale invasion that various commanders were appointed by President Putin to act as the overall commander of forces in Ukraine.583 The Russian government did not comment on who had overall operational command of forces in Ukraine until October 2022, after the assault on Mariupol, when it announced that Gen. Sergei Surovikin would have overall command for the grouping of forces in Ukraine.584

In late February 2022 and through March and April, military district commanders most likely reported directly to the General Staff, in accordance with the chain of command structure and responsibilities of the General Staff as articulated by its structure and directives.

In July 2022, a meeting transcript published by the Kremlin indicates that President Putin was receiving daily reports on operations in Ukraine from Shoigu. Shoigu referred in this meeting to General Lapin as the commander in charge of the “center” and General Surovikin as being in command of the southern group of forces. He said both commanders had cooperated with respect to operations with LNR forces in the area of the Luhanska region. He did not further define areas of operational control.585

Specific Units and Commanders Involved in the Assault on Mariupol

Human Rights Watch identified a total of 17 units of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces that we believe were operating in the city in March and April 2022. The full number of units operating in and around Mariupol during this period is likely higher. We identified numerous claims about other units operating there at that time, but we were not able to verify their presence. We also identified 10 commanders who may bear command responsibility for serious crimes committed in Mariupol.

Forces involved in the battle include units of the Russian armed forces’ Southern Military District; special forces units; Russian air forces; units from Chechnya, including one from Russia’s national guard; and units from the DNR forces’ 1st Army Corps.586

Methodology for Identifying Units and Commanders

We reviewed a wide range of public sources to determine which specific Russian and Russia-affiliated units were operating in Mariupol in March and April 2022. The sources include public statements made by Russian government and military officials; reporting from the office of the Russian president, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Russian Defense Ministry; Russian media reports, including obituaries about Russian soldiers and officers killed in action in Mariupol; Ukrainian media reports; and reports from European and US-based think tanks. We also reviewed 143 news reports and social media posts, including photos and videos of units and commanders in Mariupol.

We granted a high degree of credibility to obituaries about soldiers reportedly killed in Mariupol associated with individual units; reports from Russian state media or official Russian government reports about individual soldiers awarded for their service in Mariupol; statements made by individual commanders who said their forces were in Mariupol; and verified photos and videos showing specific units on the ground in Mariupol.

We also collected and assessed claims about the presence of individual units and commanders and their equipment in Mariupol that were posted on social media platforms by analysts and individual accounts that provide assessments of open-source information. For each individual unit, we identified multiple sources to corroborate their presence and, in some cases, geolocated photos and videos of those units in Mariupol during the relevant time frame. As part of this process, we also independently reviewed and verified seven photos and videos.

We reviewed official Russian government and military statements and websites, as well as the analysis of experts on the Russian military, to understand the chain of command above the Southern Military District commander and the General Staff. We also identified public statements, appearances, and reports about meetings or briefings on the situation in Mariupol that indicate that senior-level officials were aware of and/or giving orders regarding the conduct of operations in Mariupol.

Details of Russian and Russia-affiliated Forces Identified in Mariupol

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces attacked Ukraine on multiple axes. Four Military Districts took part in the invasion, with each Military District commander commanding the movement of troops to support the apparent objectives of Russian forces from the start of the invasion. Forces organized under the Southern Military District command deployed in support of the invasion of Ukraine from the south and southeast.587 This included the areas around Mariupol. Gen. Alexander Dvornikov was the Southern Military District Commander from September 2016 until early 2023.588

We verified the presence of particular units from the Southern Military District command, the special forces, and other forces from the DNR and Chechnya, including national guard forces, as having participated in operations in Mariupol from early March to April 2022.

The Southern Military District589

Human Rights Watch identified elements of two major combat formations from the Southern Military District in Mariupol that are permanently part of its organization of battle: the 8th Combined Arms Army and two ground force units from the Black Sea Fleet.

The 8th Combined Arms Army

Units from the 8th Combined Arms Army (8th CAA) were in Mariupol as early as March 4, 2022. Ukrainian General Staff and other Ukrainian officials reported the involvement of elements of the 8th CAA in and around Mariupol in March and April.590 Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) published a report on April 18 identifying Lt. Gen. Andrei Mordvichev as commander of the 8th CAA and commander of operations in Mariupol.591 On March 28, 2022, Russian news and Telegram channels shared a video of Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Chechen Republic, apparently meeting Mordvichev in Mariupol.592 The Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank, and the Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank, identified the 8th CAA as playing a central role in the Russian offensive on Mariupol.593

Within the 8th CAA, we identified elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s 68th Tank Regiment and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.

The 150th Motorized Rifle Division

Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division were in Mariupol as early as March 4, 2022. The Institute for the Study of War concluded that forces of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, among other Russian forces, supported by elements of the “DNR” and “LNR,” were likely engaged in the operation to encircle Mariupol as of March 4.594 On March 15, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated in his nightly address that Ukrainian forces killed a Russian general.595 The Ukrainian Azov Regiment’s Telegram channel published a photo (since deleted) on March 15 reportedly showing a deceased major general.596 Other Ukrainian sources and a senior fellow at the US think tank Foreign Policy Research Institute, Rob Lee, later identified the general as Oleg Mityaev, commander of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, who was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 15, 2022.597 However, Russian officials did not confirm Mityaev’s death.

Human Rights Watch reviewed media reports and verified photos and videos that confirm the presence of one of the division’s tank regiments in Mariupol.

The 68th Tank Regiment

Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment, which are subordinate to the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, were in Mariupol as early as March 12, 2022, when Russian sites were reporting extensively on Russian servicemen killed in action during the offensive on Mariupol, including some from the 68th Tank Regiment.598 Human Rights Watch verified two images posted by a Russian media outlet in April 2022 showing soldiers of the 68th Tank Regiment in Mariupol.599 Human Rights Watch compared and confirmed the emblem visible on one of the soldier’s uniform to images posted elsewhere online.600 The Deputy Commander of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment Svyatoslav Palamar stated on May 13 that the 68th Tank Regiment was active in Mariupol.601

The 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment

Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment were in Mariupol as early as March 6, 2022. Several Russian sites reported on Russian servicemen, including some from the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, who were killed in action in Mariupol as early as March 6.602 Open-source research accounts, including Top Cargo 200, a site that relies on open sources to track the deaths of Russian officers during the invasion of Ukraine, as well as Russian media, and independent users reported that Viktor Maksimchuk, the Deputy Commander of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, was killed in action on March 7 outside of Mariupol.603 On March 7, WarSpotting, a Russo-Ukrainian volunteer-run open-source investigation platform, posted a series of photos sourced from the Ukrainian Azov Regiment, independent TikTok users, and a military blog called Military Land, of captured and/or destroyed equipment the platform claimed belonged to the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.604 Deputy Commander of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment Svyatoslav Palamar stated on May 13, 2022, that the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment participated in the assault on Mariupol.605

The Black Sea Fleet

Units from the Black Sea Fleet-another subordinate unit of the Southern Military District, separate from the 8th CAA-were in Mariupol as early as March 11, 2022. Military blogger Alexander Kots reported on March 20 that the deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Andrey Paliy, was killed in action near Mariupol, and Russian officials and news agencies later confirmed this.606 Specific units from the Black Sea Fleet’s ground forces identified in Mariupol include elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion (which is part of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade).

The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade

Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were in Mariupol as early as March 11, 2022, when memorial sites, Russian government officials, and Russian media agencies began reporting on Russian servicemen of the brigade killed in action during the offensive on Mariupol.607 Semyon Pegov, a Russian military blogger, and Andrei Filatov, a reporter with state-controlled media network RT, posted a series of long videos on Telegram featuring Russian forces of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in Mariupol or speaking about their roles and experiences fighting in the city from March through May 2022.608 An April 5 post by the Russian-language Telegram channel, Special Purpose Channel, captioned “naval infantry of the Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade continue to take Mariupol,” linked three videos showing Russian forces in the city engaging in combat operations.609 Ruslan Khakiev, a correspondent with the pro-Russian military blog WarGonzo and who claims to be a former soldier of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, posted a video in November 2022 of himself walking through the city and describing areas of “military glory,” from when he was involved in the battle for Mariupol.610

Oleksiy Bratchuk, Ukrainian spokesman for the Odesa Regional Military Administration, reported on March 23, 2022, that the commander of a naval infantry brigade, Alexei Sharov, was killed in action in Mariupol on March 22.611 A since-deleted article by ForPost, a Russian news site, identified Sharov as the commander of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade according to “two independent sources close to the Black Sea Fleet.”612 The governor of Sevastopol, in Russian-occupied Crimea, Mikhail Razvozhayev, reported on March 24 that Sharov was killed in action in Mariupol.613 The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 15 that Russian forces in Mariupol had introduced reinforcements from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade.614 The deputy commander of the Ukrainian Azov Regiment, Svyatoslav Palamar, stated on May 13, 2022, that the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade participated in the battle for Mariupol.615

The 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion

The 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion, which is part of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, was in Mariupol as early as March 14, 2022. Russian media and other media sources reported on Russian servicemen from the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion who were killed in action during the offensive on Mariupol from this date.616 The state-controlled media network RT released a film on December 12, 2022, following three commanders of units subordinated to the 382nd Marine Infantry Battalion in Mariupol. In the film, the commanders describe how they were wounded in Mariupol and it follows their journey towards recovery.617 Andrei Filatov, a reporter with RT, posted videos featuring the same commanders of the 382nd Marine Infantry Battalion in Mariupol showing and describing injuries they received during fighting and talking about their recovery.618 A VKontakte social media page, “Morskaya Pekhota,” for Russian veteran and active-duty marines, posted a photo on June 6, 2022, of the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion in Mariupol.619

Special Forces Units

We identified elements of two special forces units in Mariupol that report to the Main Directorate (GRU) within the General Staff: the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade and the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade.

22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade

Elements of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 8, 2022. Russian and online open-source investigators reported on Russian servicemen from the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade who were killed in action during the Russian offensive on Mariupol from that date.620 Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 15, 2022, that soldiers of the Azov Regiment defeated an unspecified unit of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade in the outskirts of Mariupol.621 Ukrainian journalist Roman Tsymbaliuk reported on March 20, 2022, that a unit of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade was destroyed in Mariupol.622 Russian Telegram channel “Voenni Osvedomitel” posted a photo on June 15, 2022, of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade at the entrance of Mariupol and claims the Brigade participated in “important battles” in the city.623

346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade

Elements of the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, which is part of the Special Operations Command, participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 16, 2022. Russian and Ukrainian news outlets and open-source investigators reported on Russian servicemen of the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade who were killed in action during the Russian offensive on Mariupol from that date.624 On March 20, 2022, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces wounded the commander of the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade.625 Ukrainian journalist Roman Tsymbaliuk reported that the commander of the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade was killed in action on March 19, 2022, in Mariupol.626

Forces from Chechnya

We identified forces from Chechnya under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov (whose forces are also referred to as “Kadyrovites” or “Kadyrovtsy”) in Mariupol. These forces include national guard forces from the 141st Special Motorized Regiment and the Special Purpose Police Regiment, a unit from Chechnya’s Interior Ministry.627

In a Telegram post on his channel on March 21, 2022, Kadyrov said that Adam Delimkhanov was commanding the operation in Mariupol and leading Chechen forces there. Kadyrov said Delimkhanov was in constant communication with him.628 On April 26, 2022, Russian President Putin awarded Delimkhanov the title of “Hero of the Russian Federation” for his role in the invasion of Ukraine.629

The 141st Special Motorized Regiment

Ukrainian and Russian sources and photos and videos posted online of the 141st Special Motorized Regiment place the unit in Mariupol from as early as March 15, 2022.630 In an interview on March 15, 2022, with Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, the commander of the DNR’s Vostok Battalion, Alexander Khodakovsky, said his unit had been fighting in Mariupol for two weeks before being reinforced by forces from Chechnya.631 Kadyrov posted a video of the 141st Special Motorized Regiment in Mariupol on March 21, 2022. The post states that forces proceeded to “storm the city liberating block after block,” following “the capture” of the Azovstal plant.632 The Telegraph carried a headline on March 28, 2022, stating, “Chechen special forces tighten the grip on Mariupol.”633 Advisor to the Ukrainian mayor of Mariupol, Petro Andriushchenko, reported on May 28, 2022, that a large group of “Kadyrovites” had entered the city.634

Special Purpose Police Regiment

The Special Purpose Police Regiment, which is part of Chechnya’s Interior Ministry, participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 19, 2022. A video posted by Kadyrov on March 19, 2022, shows the commander of an unspecified unit subordinated to the Special Purpose Police Regiment, Isa Taymaskhanov, with call sign “Hamas,” in Mariupol.635 A video posted by Kadyrov to X (formerly known as Twitter) on April 3, 2022, reportedly shows soldiers of the Special Purpose Police Regiment in Mariupol.636

As was the case with other forces from Chechnya in Mariupol, the Special Purpose Police Regiment was apparently commanded by Adam Delimkhanov.637

The “DNR’s” 1st Army Corps

We also identified multiple units from the DNR’s 1st Army Corps, which at the time had a close operational, and possibly subordinate, relationship to the 8th Combined Arms Army. These units include the “Vostok Battalion;” the 1st Separate Tank Battalion “Somalia;” the 107th Rifle Regiment; the 9th Separate Marine Regiment; and the Operational-Combat Tactical Formation (OBTF) “Kaskad.”

Vostok Battalion

In an interview on March 15, 2022, with Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, the commander of the Vostok Battalion, Alexander Khodakovsky, said his unit had been fighting in Mariupol for two weeks before being reinforced by forces from Chechnya. Based on the date of the interview and the period referenced by Khodakovksy, the battalion likely participated in the offensive as of early March 2022.638 RIA Novosti, a Russian state-owned newspaper, reported on April 17, 2022, that the deputy commander of the Vostok Battalion, Alexander Semenov, said Russian forces had surrounded Mariupol on March 7, 2022.639 On May 16, 2022, Khodakovsky said on the Russian television channel Russia 1 that wounded members of the Azov Regiment had surrendered in Mariupol.640 Footage published by the Russian Ministry of Defense on May 17, 2022, reportedly shows members of the Azov Regiment surrendering to Russian forces.641 A video posted by Komsomolskaya Pravda shows members of the Vostok Battalion at the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol.642

The 1st Separate Tank “Somalia” Battalion

The 1st Separate Tank “Somalia” Battalion was in Mariupol as early as March 3, 2022. Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on April 13, 2022, that the commander of the 1st Separate Tank Battalion, Timur Kurilkin, was awarded the title “Hero of the DNR” by Pushilin and the “Order of Courage” by President Putin for his role in the battle for Mariupol.643 The Russian news Telegram channel “Intel Slava Z” reported on March 23, 2022 that the 1st Separate Tank Battalion had reached the perimeter of the Azovstal plant.644 Multiple videos posted on April 16, 2022, by Semyon Pegov, a military blogger for the pro-Russian military blog WarGonzo, show the 1st Separate Tank Battalion in various parts of Mariupol. One video, which was geolocated by GeoConfirmed, a volunteer open-source investigation account, shows the unit on a beach in Mariupol.645 Another video posted by the WarGonzo account, and reposted by a military blog MilitaryLand.net on April 16, 2022, shows Russian forces hoisting the flag of the 1st Separate Tank Battalion over a police station in the Primorsky District in Mariupol.646 Another video posted by WarGonzo on April 16, 2022, shows the flag of the 1st Separate Tank Battalion over the Main Directorate of the National Police in Mariupol.647 A video posted by WarGonzo on April 16, 2022, shows vehicles in Mariupol with the word “Somalia.”648

The 107th Rifle Regiment

Elements of the 107th Rifle Regiment apparently participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 23, 2022. The Russian Telegram channel “Intel Slava Z” reported on March 23, 2022 that the Russian forces in Mariupol were supported by the 107th Rifle Regiment.649 Semyon Pegov of WarGonzo reported on March 23, 2022 that Russian forces with support from the 9th Separate Marine Regiment, the 1st Separate Tank Battalion, and the 107th Rifle Regiment had surrounded the Azovstal plant.650 RIA Novosti, a state-owned Russian media group, reported that the 107th Rifle Regiment was among the first to enter Mariupol.651 On July 16, 2022, the head of the DNR, Denis Pushilin, awarded servicemen of the 105th and the 107th Rifle Regiments for their role in the “liberation of Mariupol.”652

The 9th Separate Marine Regiment

Elements of the 9th Separate Marine Regiment appear to have participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 9, 2022. Russian Telegram channel “Media Puls” posted a photo on March 9, 2022 reportedly showing the 9th Separate Marine Regiment in Mariupol.653 Footage released by the state-controlled media network RT shows the 9th Separate Marine Regiment in Mariupol on March 14, 2022.654 Semyon Pegov of WarGonzo, Russian military blogger Alexander Sladkov, and state-controlled media network RT reported that Russian forces with support from the 9th Separate Marine Regiment, the 1st Separate Tank Battalion, and the 107th Rifle Regiment participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 16, 2022.655 Footage released by RT also shows the 9th Separate Marine Regiment in Mariupol on April 8, 2022.656 Russo-Ukrainian WarSpotting, a volunteer-run open-source investigation platform, posted a series of photos it said were from March 29 and 31, 2022 of destroyed equipment that it said belonged to the 9th Separate Marine Regiment in Mariupol.657 The platform did not state the basis for its conclusion.

Operational-Combat Tactical Formation “Kaskad”

The Operational-Combat Tactical Formation (OBTF) “Kaskad” participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as February 24, 2022. In a October 31, 2022, Telegram post, Alexander Semenov of OBTF Kaskad stated that the OBTF Kaskad took an active part in the “liberation of Mariupol” starting on February 24.658 Alexander Semenov announced on October 5, 2022 that OBTF Kaskad had launched an official Telegram channel (@abtf_Kaskad) that would post “exclusive videos of the assault and cleansing of Mariupol.”659 The channel has since posted photos, videos, and posts claiming OBTF Kaskad played an active role in Mariupol.660 Several Russian Telegram channels including pro-Russian military blogs WarDonbass and WarGonzo, and military blogger Alexander Semenov, posted photos, videos, and posts claiming OBTF Kaskad played an active role in the assault on Mariupol.661

Statements by Senior Russian Officials about the Assault on Mariupol

Public statements from the upper echelons of the Russian forces, headquartered in Moscow, indicate that there was a high degree of coordination and involvement of the General Staff and higher command, including the Ministry of Defense and the president, from the earliest days of the assault on Mariupol.

On March 5, Col.-Gen. Mikhail Mizintsev, head of Russia’s National Defense Management Center, which monitors the actions of Russia’s armed forces, gave a detailed briefing to the public on the situation in Mariupol.662 In weekly meetings of Russia’s Security Council, Defense Minister Shoigu gave updates about military operations in Ukraine to President Putin and the other permanent members of the council.663 During a March 11 meeting of the Security Council, Shoigu said he was giving updates to President Putin “every day of the week.”664

On March 29, Moscow released a statement following a call between President Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron, stating that Putin told Macron the assault on Mariupol would end when Ukrainian forces surrendered.665

On April 21, at a meeting with Putin in Moscow, Shoigu reported that the city had been seized by the “Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the people’s militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic,” with the exception of some Ukrainian forces who remained in the Azovstal steel plant.666 Putin added: “Let me congratulate you on this occasion, and please convey my congratulations to the troops [. . .] I want everyone to know that they are all heroes for us and for all of Russia.”667 During the televised meeting, Shoigu indicated that the Ministry of Defense was closely monitoring the situation and that Putin had issued specific orders with respect to Mariupol during the fighting, including with respect to the “evacuation” of civilians and the opening of humanitarian corridors.668 President Putin also issued Shoigu a direct order not to assault the Azovstal steel plant.669

These statements, combined with the overall structure of the General Staff, whose responsibility it is to control forces, coordinate, control, and disseminate information, indicate that the highest levels of the Russian command were knowledgeable about the situation in Mariupol and appear to have been directly involved in the planning, execution, and coordination of the actions of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces. This includes President Putin—commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Russia and chair of the Security Council which controls Russia’s National Guard—who was involved in issuing direct orders on a number of specific occasions, as well as Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, and First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov.

Commanders Who May Bear Responsibility for Abuses in Mariupol

Under international law, a person can be held criminally liable for certain violations of international humanitarian law on the basis of “command responsibility,” the legal principle that holds a superior responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates when they knew or should have known that the crimes were being committed but failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or punish them.

Human Rights Watch concluded that the following 10 individuals may bear criminal liability as a matter of command responsibility for possible war crimes that were committed by Russian and Russia-affiliated forces during the assault on Mariupol:

Vladimir Putin, president of the Russian Federation and official head of the military670 Sergei Shoigu, defense minister and second in command671Valery Gerasimov, the first deputy defense minister and chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces672 Sergei Rudskoy, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces673Alexander Dvornikov, then-commander of the Southern Military District674Viktor Zolotov, commander-in-chief of the Russian National Guard675 Andrei Mordvichev, commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army676Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic and Chechen national guard forces677 Adam Delimkhanov, commander of Chechen forces in Mariupol678Denis Pushilin, head of the DNR and commander-in-chief of the armed groups organized under the DNR679

The 10 senior commanders listed above, and potentially other commanders of the 17 units, elements of which were identified in Mariupol, should be investigated and appropriately prosecuted as a matter of command responsibility.

Chapter XI Delivering Justice

“Justice is a way for Ukrainians who have suffered to find some kind of peace.”

— Ukrainian human rights activist680

Numerous Mariupol residents who fled the city said that they wanted to see justice delivered. They want those responsible for the death of their loved ones, the injuries they suffered, the attacks on their homes, and the devastation of their city to be held to account. They also wanted the Russian state and responsible Russian officials to pay reparations that will help Mariupol residents to rebuild their lives. Ultimately, they want to see Mariupol return to Ukrainian control and rebuilt in its former image. Many said that in the meantime, they wanted to ensure that Ukrainians and the wider world remember Mariupol and understand the human and physical losses the city has endured, as well as the vibrancy and beauty of the city that was.

Securing justice for the serious violations that occurred in Mariupol-and across Ukraine-is essential to supporting victims and their families and survivors, and to building confidence in the rule of law globally. It can also play a critical role in deterring future abuses by breaking the patterns of impunity that embolden perpetrators.

After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, governments and international bodies mobilized quickly in support of justice for crimes committed in Ukraine. The UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine in March 2022, with a mandate to investigate alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Ukraine and preserve evidence for future legal proceedings.681

The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC also opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine in March 2022.682 A year later, ICC judges issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the children’s rights commissioner in his office, Maria Lvova-Belova, for the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.683 Ukraine and Russia are not members of the ICC, but Ukraine accepted the court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed on its territory since November 2013 through two declarations, and in doing so, recognized its obligation to cooperate with the court.

Ukrainian authorities have also been conducting their own criminal investigations since Russia’s full-scale invasion. To support these efforts, many governments have offered Ukraine assistance to bolster its judicial capacity.684

Judicial officials in some countries have announced steps to pursue investigations related to serious international crimes committed in Ukraine under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows a country’s domestic judicial authorities to investigate and prosecute certain grave crimes, even if they were not committed on its territory, by one of its nationals, or against one of its nationals.

The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) also established a Joint Investigative Team for Ukraine in March 2022 to facilitate war crimes investigations and enable the exchange of information.685

These efforts to support justice for serious crimes committed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine - unprecedented compared to justice-related initiatives in other conflicts - are a demonstration of the ability to deliver on victims’ rights when political will is strong.

Yet for these efforts to succeed in delivering meaningful justice to victims and survivors from Mariupol and across Ukraine, several factors are key. First, there needs to be effective coordination, strategic prioritization, and a clear division of responsibilities among the various justice initiatives. Second, all these justice initiatives should work to amplify the voices of survivors and families of victims-now spread across Ukraine, Europe, and beyond-and ensure their access to judicial processes. The processes themselves should follow procedures that mitigate the risk of additional trauma and should ensure survivors’ access to legal, psychological, medical, and other necessary support.

Lastly, justice takes time and success will depend on long-term financial and technical commitments and sustained political will in support of the initiatives that have already started. Securing arrests, especially of high-ranking government officials and senior military commanders, is one of the most difficult challenges for the ICC and other judicial bodies. Without its own police force, the ICC relies on states and the international community to assist in arrests. While these arrests can take time, history has shown that they can occur with sufficient international support. Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president, was apprehended to face charges at the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone after three years of finding safe haven in Nigeria. Similarly, after many years of evading justice, high-level suspects were eventually arrested and faced trial by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

The international community should also ensure that justice is not sidelined in any peace negotiations, and that any compromise on justice is rejected. Experience shows that decisions to forego accountability to help secure ceasefires or peace agreements can prove costly in the long term.

For the people of Mariupol with whom we spoke, the shape of their future and their city’s future was uncertain. What they were sure of, however, was that people’s memories needed to be kept alive to provide comfort to those who had suffered and to serve as a bridge to the future.

As the war continues and attention shifts to other parts of the country, and the world, many said they wanted the media and international institutions to keep a spotlight on Mariupol. “Sometimes it seems to me that [the city is off] the agenda, but it cannot be forgotten,” said one Ukrainian activist and journalist.686 For those displaced who sense compassion fatigue-one person said they sometimes felt they “should apologize for how I feel”-it will be essential to weave Mariupol into the fabric of social memory.687 “It would be enough if this tragedy were spoken about, not kept silent, [as if] everyone has forgotten,” a lawyer from Mariupol said. “The hearts of Mariupol residents are filled with pain. If people were simply told: ‘I hear your pain,’ ‘I feel your pain,’ ‘I share your pain.’ This would be more than enough.”688

Yet many are looking for more. Beyond justice and a greater recognition and awareness of the suffering they endured, they are determined to see Mariupol returned to full Ukrainian control. Some spoke of rebuilding the Drama Theater as, one said, “both a symbol of the city and a symbol of tragedy.”689 Another wanted to swim in Mariupol’s sea again: “People can find their solace there.”690 And as one person told us: “I want the city to have a new life again.”691

Chapter XII Acknowledgments

This report was written primarily by Human Right Watch’s Crisis and Conflict Division associate director, Gerry Simpson. Richard Weir, senior researcher in the Crisis and Conflict Division, wrote the chapter on Russia’s chain of command. The report was edited by Anagha Neelakantan, senior editor in the Crisis and Conflict Division, and Ida Sawyer, Crisis and Conflict Division director.

At Human Rights Watch, research for the report was conducted by Alexx Perepölov, researcher consultant; Sumaya Tabbah, research assistant; Robin Taylor, open source research assistant; Ida Sawyer; Gerry Simpson; Richard Weir; consultants Ilja Sperling, Valeriia Voshchevska, and Mariam Naiem; Belkis Wille, associate director; and Emma Wilbur, associate, all from the Crisis and Conflict Division, as well as Yulia Gorbunova, senior Ukraine researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division and Kseniya Kvitka, assistant researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division and, from the Digital Investigations Lab, by Carolina Jorda Alvarez and Léo Martine, senior geospatial analysts; Sophia Jones, open source researcher and capacity building manager; Devon Lum, research assistant; and Sam Dubberley, director of the Digital Investigations Lab.

Researchers from the Ukrainian human rights organization, Truth Hounds, also conducted research for this report, including Viktoriia Amelina, Roman Avramenko, Viktoriia Babii, Vladyslav Chyryk, Bohdan Kosokhatko, Roman Koval, Olena Prokopyshyna, Yaroslav Shyman, Maryna Slobodianiuk, Olha Vovk-Sobina and Natalya Zlyhostieva.

Researchers from the visual investigations practice, SITU Research, conducted visual and spatial analysis and built models of damaged buildings and of the overall damage to parts of the city. The researchers included Gauri Bahuguna, Grisha Enikolopov, Bora Erden, Evan Grothjan, Helmuth Rosales, Brad Samuels, and Candice Strongwater.

James Ross, legal and policy director at Human Rights Watch, provided legal review, and Fred Abrahams, associate program director, provided programmatic review. Specialist reviews were provided by Rachel Denber, Europe and Central Asia Division deputy director; Tanya Lokshina, associate director in the Europe and Central Asia Division; Yulia Gorbunova, senior researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division; Kseniya Kvitka, assistant researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division; Bill van Esveld, Children’s Rights Division associate director; Mark Hiznay, Arms Division associate director; Brian Root, senior quantitative analyst in the Digital Investigations Lab; Bridget Sleap, senior researcher in the Disability Rights Division; Karolina Kozik, assistant researcher in the Disability Rights Division; Hillary Margolis, Senior Researcher in the Women’s Rights Division; Kayum Ahmed, special advisor on the right to health; and Balkees Jarrah, associate director in the International Justice Program, all at Human Rights Watch. Mark Galeotti, Executive Director at Mayak Intelligence, reviewed the chapter on the Russian chain of command.

The report was translated into Ukrainian by Mykhailo Koriukalov. It was prepared for publication by Crisis and Conflict Division associate, Nīa Knighton; Ekin Ürgen, associate with the Digital Investigations Lab; publications officer, Travis Carr; and administrative manager, Fitzroy Hepkins, all at Human Rights Watch.

We are grateful to the staff at the Victims.Memorial who shared information about people from Mariupol who died or are missing. We would also like to thank the many individuals who made this report possible by sharing their extremely difficult experiences with us.

1 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), rule 156; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, art. 8.

2 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), rules 151-153.

3 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), rule 158; see also grave breaches provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

4 Rome Statute, art. 7.

5 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force October 21, 1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force October 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force October 21, 1950; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force October 21, 1950; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Annexed Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (Hague Regulations), 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, 187 Consol. T.S. 227, entered into force January 26, 1910.

6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force December 7, 1978.

7 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).

8 See generally Protocol I, Part IV.

9 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), rule 156; Rome Statute, art. 25.

10 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), rule 152; Rome Statute, art. 28.

11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976.

12 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force January 3, 1976.

13 Protocol I, arts. 48, 51(2), 52(2).

14 Protocol I, art. 52(2).

15 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 8, citing military manuals and official statements.

16 Protocol I, art. 51.

17 See Mine Ban Treaty of 1997 and Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008.

18 Protocol I, art. 51(5)(b).

19 Protocol I, art. 57.

20 Protocol I, art. 58.

21 Protocol I, art. 51(7).

22 “Explosive Weapons Devastating for Civilians,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 6, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/06/explosive-weapons-devastating-civilians; “Protect Civilians from Explosive Weapons,” Human Rights Watch news release, June 2, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/02/protect-civilians-explosive-weapons. Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic, “Key Questions and Answers on a Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” June 2020, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ files/media_2020/06/EWIPA_Q%26A_final_0.pdf; Human Rights Watch (@hrw), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), September 10, 2023, https://twitter.com/hrw/status/1700788832277283216 (accessed November 22, 2023).

23 “Political Declaration on the Protection of Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons inf Populated Areas,” May 25, 2022, https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/ ourrolepolicies/peaceandsecurity/ewipa/ EWIPA-Political-Declaration-Final-Rev-25052022.pdf (accessed November 22, 2023).

24 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, art, 54.

25 Rome Statute, art. 7.

26 Protocol I, art. 52(2).

27 Protocol I, art. 51(5)(b).

28 Protocol I, arts. 12-15.

29 Protocol I, art. 13.

30 Protocol I, art. 15.

31 United Nations Security Council, “Protection of civilians in armed conflict,” Resolution 2286, S/RES/2286 (2016), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2286 (accessed November 22, 2023).

32 Ibid.

33 Protocol I, art. 71(2).

34 Rome Statute, arts. 8(2)(b)(viii) and 7(1)(d).

35 Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 49 and 147; Protocol I, art. 85 (4)(a). International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, with commentaries, 1996, art. 18 also contains a similar prohibition.

36 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), IT-97-25-A, Appeal Judgement, September 17, 2023, para. 229; Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, ICTY, IT-97-24-A, Judgement, March 22, 2006, para. 281; ICC, Elements of Crimes, 2011, footnotes 5, 12, 13, discussing the offense of forcible transfer.

37 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, ICTY, IT-97-24-A, Judgement, March 22, 2006, para. 287.

38 Protocol I, art. 58.

39 Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 49.

40 “DNR” and “LNR” are used in this report as references to these areas, not as recognition of any claims to sovereignty.

41 “Mariupol: Why Mariupol is So Important to Russia’s Plan,” BBC News, March 21, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60825226 (accessed May 11, 2023).

42 “Маріуполь Стратегія 2030,” USAID, December, 2021, https://era-ukraine.org.ua/ wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ Strategy_2030_Mariupol_compressed.pdf#page=13 (accessed August 4, 2023). The City’s First Deputy Mayor told Human Rights Watch that telecommunications billing data from 2021 showed that 541,000 people were living in Mariupol in 2021. Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, June 5, 2023.

43 Human Rights Watch interviews with former Mariupol residents in Kyiv and by telephone, March 14 to March 23, 2023; Emmanuel Grynszpan, “Marioupol, chronique d’un martyre,” Le Monde, April 14, 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/m-le-mag/article/2023/04/14/marioupol-chronique-d-un-martyre_6169454_4500055.html (accessed November 22, 2023).

44 Tsentralnyi District, OpenStreetMap, https://www.openstreetmap.org/relation/4045787 (accessed August 8, 2023);

45 “Ukrainian City of Mariupol ‘Near to Humanitarian Catastrophe’ After Bombardment,” BBC News, March 2, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60585603 (accessed April 19, 2023).

46 The First Deputy Mayor of Mariupol said that volunteers used diesel from the Illich Steel Factory, from the main railway station’s fuel depot, and from the port. Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, April 13, 2023.

47 We defined a hospital campus as any cluster of buildings listed on Open Street Map and Wikimapia as buildings used for medical purposes.

48 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, art, 54.

49 The city’s main electricity infrastructure has been mapped in OpenStreetMap. Mariupol, Open Infrastructure Map, https://openinframap.org/#11.07/47.1395/37.5537 (accessed August 7, 2023).

50 According to its website, DTEK is “The Leader and the Biggest Private Investor in the Energy Sector of Ukraine,” Official website of DTEK, https://dtek.com/en/ (accessed May 11, 2023). Human Rights Watch interview with one of Mariupol’s deputy mayors (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, March 3, 2023. The rest of the city’s electricity network is run by the state-run entity “Ukrenergo.” According to the company, it “manages trunk power grids and substations, but DTEK manages local power grids and Ukrenergo doesn’t transfer electricity to the end-consumers.” Letter from Ukrenergo to Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2023.

51 The eight incidents took place in three phases, on February 25, between February 28 and March 2, and on March 2. On February 25, the Misto 3 and Misto 8 substations on the Left Bank were disconnected. Between February 28 and March 2, seven substations-Misto 1, 2, 6, 9, 11, the Water Treatment Plant substation and the Port substation-were disconnected (February 28), came back online (March 1), and were disconnected again on March 2. On March 2, the remaining four residential substations-Misto 4, 5, 7 and 10-went down in two groups, at 3:30 p.m. and at 3:56 p.m. The register also says that a number of times on March 2, around 10 substations powering the Azovstal steel plant went down because the line between them and the Zoria-330 transformer station was disconnected.

52 Satellite imagery of the filtering station from March 9, 2022, shows damage to the station’s roof and some of the ground nearby, but not to its electricity substation.

53 Electricity substations Misto 3 and 8.

54 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 25, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8499 (accessed May 11, 2023).

55 Mariupol City Council, post to Facebook, February 25, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/mariupolrada.gov.ua/posts/ pfbid02zfvgfEqt82bb1jau8DSGpMFiKeNZst hfhCteLrYCqAts9GgZSdzPBwKWiVNmM5Gfl (accessed May 11, 2023).

56 Electricity substations Misto 1, 2, 6, 9, and 11, and the Water Treatment Plant and Port area substations.

57 Letter from DTEK to Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2023.

58 The First Deputy Mayor of Mariupol confirmed that repairs happened on February 28 and March 1. Satellite imagery from March 9, 2022, shows two damaged electricity pylons located between the Azovska-220 transformer station and the seven substations. Letter from DTEK to Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2023; Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, April 13, 2023.

59 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Myron, June 28, 2022.

60 Human Rights Watch interview with Larysa, Kyiv, September 12, 2022.

61 “Ukraine: Mariupol Residents Trapped by Russian Assault,” Human Rights Watch news release, July 3, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/07/ukraine-mariupol-residents-trapped-russian-assault.

62 “WASH Cluster: Flash Update on WASH Situation in the Donetsk Oblast, 27/02/2022,” UNICEF and Water Sanitation Hygiene (WASH) Cluster, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wash-cluster-flash-update-wash-situation-donetsk-oblast-27022022 (accessed May 11, 2023).

63 “WASH Incident Report No.299,” WASH Cluster, 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wash-cluster-incident-report-299-02032022 (accessed January 31, 2024).

64 WASH Cluster: Flash Update on WASH Situation in the Donetsk Oblast, 27/02/2022,” UNICEF and WASH Cluster, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wash-cluster-flash-update-wash-situation-donetsk-oblast-27022022 (accessed May 11, 2023).

65 Ibid.

66 “WASH Cluster Incident Report №294, 21/02/2022,” UNICEF and WASH Cluster, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wash-cluster-incident-report-294-21022022 (accessed May 11, 2023).

67 “WASH Cluster Incident Report №299, 02/03/2022,” UNICEF and WASH Cluster, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wash-cluster-incident-report-299-02032022 (accessed January 31, 2024).

68 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022.

69 Liveaumap (@Liveuamap), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), February 19, 2022, https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1494948705044152325 (accessed May 24, 2023).

70 Павло Кириленко, post to Facebook, February 19, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donoda/ posts/490229842659575 (accessed May 24, 2023).

71 “WASH Cluster: Flash Update on WASH Situation in the Donetsk Oblast, 27/02/2022,” UNICEF and WASH Cluster, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ wash-cluster-flash-update-wash-situation-donetsk-oblast-27022022 (accessed May 24, 2023).

72 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022; Human Rights Watch interview with an official from Mariupol city council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Dnipro, May 7, 2022.

73 “WASH Cluster: Flash Update on WASH Situation in the Donetsk Oblast, 27/02/2022,” UNICEF and WASH Cluster, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ wash-cluster-flash-update-wash-situation-donetsk-oblast-27022022 (accessed May 24, 2023). Human Rights Watch reviewed satellite imagery of the Pumping Station from April 5 and found no evidence of damage there.

74 Ibid.

75 “WASH Incident Report No.299,” WASH Cluster, 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/wash-cluster-incident-report-299-02032022 (accessed January 31, 2024).

76 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022, and March 23, 2023.

77 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram, May 18, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/9660 (accessed August 7, 2023).

78 Human Rights Watch interview with Liubov, Dnipro, June 8, 2022.

79 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022. A surgeon working at military hospital #555 between February 24 and March 16 said that the hospital regularly received water deliveries, so they never ran out. Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Pasichnyi, Kyiv, March 25, 2023.

80 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022. Mykhailo Kohut, the First Deputy Mayor of Mariupol, also confirmed that city volunteers extracted a lot of water from this well using diesel-powered pumps. The well was at Malofontanna Street 34. Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, April 13, 2022.

81 Human Rights Watch interview with Volodymyr, Dnipro, May 10, 2022. He said a specific point where he and others collected water was here.

82 Human Rights Watch interview with Roksolana, Kalynivka, August 27, 2022. The headquarters of Mariupolvodokanal are located at Soborna Street 7.

83 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022. The smaller vehicles had a water container and pumps that enabled water to be pumped to the top of taller buildings.

84 The gym is located at Budivelnykiv Avenue 132, about 1.2 kilometers west of theater and one kilometer north of Myru Avenue.

85 The cinema is located at Budivelnykiv Ave 134.

86 Human Rights Watch interview with Dmytro Kulyk, Kyiv, March 2, 2023.

87 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022; Human Rights Watch interview with official from Mariupol city council, Dnipro, May 7, 2022.

88 A woman also told Human Right Watch that the number of people waiting for water distribution at school #10, at Azovstalska Street 53 in the Left Bank, led to lines of up to 3.5 hours. Human Rights Watch interview with Zoia, Tallinn, July 24, 2023.

89 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022, and March 23, 2023.

90 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, April 13, 2023.

91 Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), May 4, 2023.

92 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022; Human Rights Watch interview with an official from Mariupol city council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Dnipro, May 7, 2022.

93 Human Rights Watch interview with Lesia, Dnipro, June 16, 2022; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, March 23, 2023.

94 Human Rights Watch interview with Orest, Vinnytsia, August 16, 2022.

95 Human Rights Watch interview with Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

96 Human Rights Watch interview with Anton, Dnipro, June 15, 2022.

97 Human Rights Watch interview with Volodymyr, Dnipro, May 10, 2022.

98 Human Rights Watch interview with a deputy head of Mariupol city council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, May 5, 2023.

99 The Regional Intensive Care Hospital was called Hospital #2 until December 2016, although many residents still refer to it as Hospital #2. Order of the Head of the Donetsk Regional State Administration of December 22, 2026, No.1663, https://web.archive.org/web/20170118053235/ http:/dn.gov.ua/rozporyadzhennya-golovy-oda-vid-22-12-2016- 1163-pro-pryjnyattya-do-spilnoyi-vlasnosti- terytorialnyh-gromad-sil-selyshh-mist-shho-znahodytsya-v-upravlinni-oblasnoyi-rady- tsilisnogo-majnovogo-kompleksu/ (accessed August 10, 2023).

100 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Halyna Vnukova, April 4, 2023.

101 Human Rights Watch interview with Anna, Dnipro, June 11, 2022.

102 Human Rights Watch interview with Tymofii, Dnipro, June 11, 2022.

103 Human Rights Watch interview with Larysa, Kyiv, September 12, 2022.

104 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Denys, May 9, 2023.

105 Human Rights Watch interview with Artem, Dnipro, June 11, 2022.

106 Human Rights Watch interview with Kateryna, Dnipro, June 9, 2022.

107 Human Rights Watch interview with Anton, Dnipro, June 15, 2022.

108 Truth Hounds interview with Valeriia, Kyiv, October 8, 2022.

109 Human Rights Watch interview with one of Mariupol’s deputy mayors (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, March 3, 2023.

110 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a staffer of Mariupolgas, which managed the city’s natural gas supply (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), March 26, 2023. He did not know where the damage had occurred.

111 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with a staffer of an energy company (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), March 26, 2023, and June 29, 2023. List of the 32 buildings on file with Human Rights Watch.

112 Human Rights Watch interview with Varvara, Kalynivka, August 26, 2022.

113 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 23, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8632 (accessed August 7, 2023).

114 Matt Burgess, “The Last Cell Tower in Mariupol,” Wired, March 31, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/mariupol-ukraine-war/ (accessed August 8, 2023); Thomas Brewster, “The Last Days Of Mariupol’s Internet,” Forbes, March 31, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/03/31/the-last-days-of-mariupols-internet/?sh=7075aca55962 (accessed May 24, 2023).

115 Vodafone’s written answer to Human Rights Watch questions, received on March 20, 2023. The Kyivstar headquarters is about 1.2 kilometers west of the Drama Theater.

116 Human Rights Watch interview with Milosh, Narva, July 19, 2022.

117 Human Rights Watch interview with Valentyna, Kryvyi Rih, June 1, 2022.

118 Human Rights Watch interview with Valentyna, Kryvyi Rih, June 1, 2022.

119 Matt Burgess, “The Last Cell Tower in Mariupol,” Wired, March 31, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/mariupol-ukraine-war/ (accessed August 8, 2023).

120 Ibid.

121 Kyivstar’s written answer to Human Rights Watch questions, received on March 20, 2023.

122 Human Rights Watch interview, Kyiv, March 3, 2023.

123 Kyivstar’s written answer to Human Rights Watch questions, received on March 20, 2023.

124 Matt Burgess, “The Last Cell Tower in Mariupol,” Wired, March 31, 2022, https://www.wired.com/story/mariupol-ukraine-war/ (accessed August 8, 2023); “МАРИУПОЛЬ. пр.Строителей сегодня,” February 2023, video clip, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQw0xqo9MzU (accessed May 24, 2023).

125 Kyivstar’s written answer to Human Right Watch’s questions, received on March 20, 2023.

126 Satellite imagery shows damage to the following buildings on the hospital #1 campus: Adult Polyclinic; Children’s Polyclinic, Burns, Neurology; Ophthalmology, Pulmonology, Surgery, and Therapy. Satellite imagery shows damage to the following buildings on the hospital #4 campus: Infectious Diseases, Neurology, Polyclinic, Surgery, Therapy, and Tuberculosis.

127 Located respectively at Mytropolytska Street 175; at Bahrationa Street 63; at Tahanrozka Street 40; at Levchenko Street 1; and here without an address, a few hundred meters to the east of Karpova Avenue.

128 Human Rights Watch also reviewed images of four of the fire stations: 22, 23, 24 and 25.

129 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Oleksii Sharuda, March 24, 2023.

130 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Maksym Povnenkyi, June 23, 2023.

131 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022.

132 Human Rights Watch interview with Denys Kochubei, Kyiv, August 31, 2022.

133 A view of Starokrymsky Reservoir outside the rural town of StaryKrym, northern Mariupol, Imago Images, https://www.imago-images.de/st/0158441493, May 6, 2022, https://www.imago-images.de/st/0158441493 (accessed December 1, 2023).

134 Human Rights Watch interview with one of Mariupol’s deputy mayors (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, August 31, 2022.

135 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, May 18, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/9660 (accessed August 8, 2023).

136 Human Rights Watch interview with a deputy head of Mariupol city council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, March 3, 2023.

137 Ministry of Construction, Housing and Communal Services of the Donetsk People’s Republic (МИНСТРОЙ ДНР) (@minstroydnr), post to Telegram Channel, October 9, 2022, https://t.me/minstroydnr/2193 (accessed August 8, 2023).

138 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022.

139 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, March 23, 2023.

140 Ibid.

141 Door Joris Heijkant, Titus Knegtel, and Hessel von Piekartz en Erik Verwiel, “We are still alive. What is life like in Russian-occupied Mariupol?,” Volkskrant Kijk Verder, https://www.volkskrant.nl/kijkverder/v/2023/we-are-still-alive-what-is-life-like-in-russian-occupied-mariupol~v646390 (accessed August 8, 2023).

142 Residents of the city regularly post on Telegram details about the electricity and water cuts, and on cold or insufficiently warm radiators, in their area. ЧС Чат (@blcklistchat), https://t.me/blcklistchat (accessed December 12, 2023).

143 “Ukraine War: Infection and Hunger as Hundreds Hide in Mariupol Cellar,” BBC News, March 15, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60736845 (accessed August 8, 2023); “Ukraine: Women Giving Birth in Basements and Bunkers,” March 9, 2022, DW, https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-women-giving-birth-in-basements-and-bunkers/a-61070760 (accessed August 8, 2023); “Ukrainian Maternity Ward Moves to Basement for Shelter,” AP News, March 2, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-maternity-ward-moved-56b501dc4ffed870ab78c5d4cbc41e2b (accessed August 8, 2023); Olga Voitovich Murphy Ivana Kottasová, Jack Guy, Paul P., “‘Mariupol Is Now Just Hell’: Survivors and Drone Footage Reveal the Scale of Destruction,”CNN, March 15, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/15/europe/ukraine-mariupol-destruction-footage-intl/index.html (accessed August 8, 2023).

144 Список мест для возможного укрытия населения Мариуполя (АДРЕСА), Official Website of Mariupol City Council, https://mariupolrada.gov.ua/ru/news/perelik-misc-dlja-mozhlivogo-ukrittja-naselennja-mariupolja-adresa (accessed August 8, 2023). On February 25, the City Council’s Department of Culture also published a list of five buildings that could be used as shelters. “В Мариуполе во дворцах культуры открыли бомбоубежища,” 0629 Маріуполя, February 25, 2022, https://www.0629.com.ua/news/3338152/v-mariupole-vo-dvorcah-kultury-otkryli-bomboubezisa (accessed August 10, 2023).

145 Human Rights Watch interviews with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022, and Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a public transport official (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), September 14, 2022; Human Rights Watch interviews with Zoia, Tallinn, July 24, 2022; and Anastasiia, Vinnytsia, August 13, 2022.

146 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022.

147 Ibid; Human Rights Watch interviews with Zoia, Tallinn, July 24, 2022, and Anastasiia, Vinnytsia, August 13, 2022.

148 Human Rights Watch interviews with over a dozen city officials and residents between May 9, 2022, and September 2, 2022; У чотирьох закладах культури відкриті укриття, Official Website of Mariupol City Council, February 25, 2022, https://mariupolrada.gov.ua/news/u-chotiroh-zakladah-kulturi-vidkriti-ukrittja (accessed January 23, 2024); Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 27, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8566 (accessed August 10, 2023).

149 Human Rights Watch interview with Marta, Vinnytsia, August 3, 2022.

150 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Lev, April 22, 2022.

151 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Fedir, April 20, 2022.

152 Truth Hounds interview with Ivan, Kryvyi Rih, April 6, 2022.

153 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

154 Human Rights Watch interview with Mark, Dnipro, June 10, 2022.

155 Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen Sosnovskyi, Kyiv, March 4, 2023. The building is about 800 meters north of the Drama Theater.

156 Human Rights Watch interviews with Oliviia and Halyna, Dnipro, May 7, 2022; Zoia, Tallinn, July 24, 2022; and Dariia, Dnipro, June 9, 2022.

157 Human Rights Watch interviews with Oliviia and Halyna, Dnipro, May 7, 2022

158 Human Rights Watch interview with Dariia, Dnipro, June 9, 2022.

159 Крупнокалиберный Переполох (@bolshiepushki) post to Telegram channel, April 20, 2022, https://t.me/bolshiepushki/1097 (accessed January 19, 2024).

160 Human Rights Watch interview with Tetiana Burak, Lviv, April 22, 2022.

161 Human Rights Watch interview with Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

162 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Khrystyna, April 22, 2022.

163 Human Rights Watch interview with Oliviia, Dnipro, May 7, 2022.

164 Human Rights Watch interview with Marko, Lviv, April 20, 2022.

165 Human Rights Watch interview with Vira, Zaporizhzhia, April 28, 2022.

166 Human Rights Watch interview with Roksolana, Kalynivka, August 27, 2022.

167 Human Rights Watch interview with Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

168 Human Rights Watch interview with Davyd, Dnipro, June 12, 2022. The building was at Kazantseva Street 1.

169 Human Rights Watch interview with Oliviia, Dnipro May 7, 2022.

170 Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen Sosnovskyi, Kyiv, March 4, 2023.

171 See section below, Forcible Transfers to Russia and Russia-Controlled Territory.

172 The estimate was given by Russia’s Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Utilities. “Concept of City Development Master Plan,” Ministry of Construction, Housing and Utilities of the Russian Federation, https://static.ukrinform.com/files/1659604646-3470.pdf (accessed November 22, 2023). In early August 2022, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Marat Khusnullin, said that 212,000 people were living in Mariupol. “Хуснуллин: население Мариуполя к 2025 году должно возрасти до 350 тыс человек,” TASS, August 1, 2022, https://tass.ru/ekonomika/15357347 (accessed December 7, 2023).

173 Human Rights Watch interview with Liudmyla Beiter, Dnipro, September 1, 2022.

174 “‘Why? Why? Why?’ Ukraine’s Mariupol Descends into Despair,” AP News, March 16, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-descends-into-despair-708cb8f4a171ce3f1c1b0b8d090e38e3 (accessed August 11, 2023); Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

175 Decree of President of Ukraine of February 7, 2019, No.32, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/322019-26050 (accessed August 11, 2023).

176 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

177 Ukrzaliznytsia (Укрзалізниця) (@UkrzalInfo), post to Telegram channel, February 22, 2022, https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/1124 (accessed August 11, 2023); Ukrzaliznytsia (@UkrzalInfo), post to Telegram channel, February 23, 2022, https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/1125 (accessed August 11. 2023); Ukrzaliznytsia (@UkrzalInfo), post to Telegram channel, February 24, 2022, https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/1126 (accessed August 11, 2023); Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 24, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8473 (accessed August 11, 2023); Ukrzaliznytsia (@UkrzalInfo), February 24, 2022, post to Telegram channel, https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/1144 (accessed August 11, 2023); Truth Hounds interview with Yurii, Kyiv, March 7, 2023.

178 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022; Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 24, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8473 (accessed August 11, 2023); Human Rights Watch interview with, Stepan Makhsma, head of the Mariupol District Council, Kyiv, December 2, 2022; Truth Hounds interview with Vladyslav Tsekhanovych, Zaporizhzhia, April 29, 2022.

179 Human Rights Watch interview with Liudmyla Beiter, Dnipro, September 1, 2022.

180 Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), September 14, 2022.

181 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022.

182 Human Rights Watch interview with a deputy Head of Mariupol City Council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, May 5, 2023.

183 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Vereshchuk, Kyiv, March 1, 2023.

184 Ibid; “Russia, Ukraine Agree to Set up Evacuation Corridors,” Al Jazeera, March 2, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/4/russia-ukraine-agree-to-set-up-evacuation-corridors (accessed August 11, 2023).

185 Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire Negotiations: Chapter I, Parley Policy, https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/tracking-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-negotiations-chapter-i (accessed August 10, 2023).

186 Human Rights Watch interview with Stepan Makhsma, head of the Mariupol District Council, Kyiv, December 2, 2022.

187 Truth Hounds interview with Andrii Kovalenko, Zaporizhzhia, May 25, 2023.

188 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro, February 27, 2023. He later joined the Ukrainian Red Cross.

189 “Humanitarian Convoy Once Again Failed to Reach Mariupol Due to Shelling,” Ukrainska Pravda, March 13, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/13/7331071/ (accessed August 11, 2023); Office of the President of Ukraine (@OP_UA,), post to Telegram channel, March 13, 2022, https://t.me/OP_UA/5887 (accessed August 11, 2023).

190 Pavel Polityuk, “Convoy of Civilians Leaves Ukraine’s Mariupol after Days of Failed Attempts,” Reuters, March 14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-2500-mariupol-residents-killed-so-far-war-ukrainian-presidential-advisor-2022-03-14/ (accessed August 11, 2023).

191 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 14, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8857 (accessed August 11, 2023).

192 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a senior UN official (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), April 15, 2023.

193 Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire Negotiations: Chapter I, Parley Policy, https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/tracking-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-negotiations-chapter-i (accessed August 10, 2023).

194 Statement of the Joint Coordination Headquarters for Humanitarian Response in Ukraine: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (March 6, 2022), Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/news/more.htm?id=12411952@egNews (accessed August 15, 2023); Meeting of the Joint Coordination Headquarters for Humanitarian Response in Ukraine: Speech by the Head of the National Centre for State Defense Control of the Russian Federation Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev (accessed March 7, 2023), Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/ briefings/humanitarian_response/more.htm?id=12412041@egNews (accessed August 15, 2023); Speech of Head of the National Centre for Control of the Russian Federation Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/special_operation/news/more.htm?id=12414738 (accessed August 15, 2023).

195 Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), September 14, 2022. He said the fleet of MAZ buses included fifteen 36-seater buses each with an evacuation capacity of 150 people, seventy 26-seaters each with an evacuation capacity of 100 people, and thirteen 23-seaters each with an evacuation capacity of 70 people.

196 Human Rights Watch interviews with Iryna Vereshchuk, Kyiv, March 1, 2023, and with official from Mariupol city council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Dnipro, May 7, 2022.

197 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a public transport official (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), September 14, 2022. The deputy administrator of the City Council also told Human Rights Watch that by mid-March only about 10 buses were left undamaged. Human Rights Watch interview with an official from Mariupol city council, Dnipro, May 7, 2022.

198 Human Rights Watch also reviewed other open-source images and footage of buses used as barricades. For example, an Associated Press video filmed on March 11 shows Russian tanks backing into buses used as barricades near Mytropolytska Street. “Video Shows Russian Tank Attacking Mariupol Apartments as Satellite Images Show Devastation,” ABC News, March 13, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-03-13/russian-tank-recorded-attacking-mariupol-apartments/100906290 (accessed August 15, 2023).

199 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 5, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8730 (accessed August 15, 2023).

200 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 5, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8731 (accessed August 15, 2023).

201 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 5, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8732 (accessed August 15, 2023).

202 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 5, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8733 (accessed August 15, 2023); Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), video post to Telegram channel, March 5, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8736 (accessed August 15, 2023).

203 Early on March 6, Donetsk Oblast Governor Pavlo Kyrylenko also announced that based on a new ceasefire agreement that was supposed to last from 10 a.m. until 9 p.m., there would be a second attempt to evacuate civilians from Mariupol, starting at midday. Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 6, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8739 (accessed August 15, 2023); Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire Negotiations: Chapter I, Parley Policy, https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/tracking-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-negotiations-chapter-i (accessed August 10, 2023).

204 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 6, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8741 (accessed August 15, 2023).

205 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 6, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8742 (accessed August 15, 2023).

206 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 8, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8761 (accessed August 15, 2023).

207 Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire Negotiations: Chapter I, Parley Policy, https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/tracking-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-negotiations-chapter-i (accessed August 10, 2023).

208 “Evacuation Route Offered to Fleeing Ukrainians Was Mined - Red Cross,” Newsweek, March 7, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220309083754/ https://www.newsweek.com/evacuation-route-offered-fleeing-ukrainians-mined-1685418 (accessed August 15, 2023).

209 The Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, letter to the President of the Security Council, March 11, 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3964768#record-files-collapse-header (accessed August 15, 2023).

210 “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 24 February – 15 May 2022,” The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), June 29, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/ documents/countries/ua/2022-06-29/2022-06-UkraineArmedAttack-EN.pdf (accessed July 13, 2023), para. 73. International media also reported that senior Ukrainian officials said on March 14 that a ceasefire arranged with Russian forces had held long enough for some cars to leave the city as soon as Russian forces opened “a checkpoint” at 1 p.m., and that although fighting in the city continued that day, the exit route was not affected. Pavel Polityuk, “Convoy of Civilians Leaves Ukraine’s Mariupol after Days of Failed Attempts,” Reuters, March 14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-2500-mariupol-residents-killed-so-far-war-ukrainian-presidential-advisor-2022-03-14/ (accessed August 15, 2023).

211 Pavlo Kyrylenko, Head of Donetsk Regional Military Administration (@pavlokyrylenkodonoda), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/pavlokyrylenkodonoda/2629 (accessed August 15, 2023); Kyrylo Tymoshenko, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine (@tymoshenko_kyrylo), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/tymoshenko_kyrylo/202 (accessed August 15, 2023).

212 Statistics received on April 27, 2023, from Yulius Berdianskyi, a volunteer worker in a Zaporizhzhia registration center. He said that of these, 326 fled on March 14; 38,289 fled between March 14 and March 22; and 20,452 fled between March 23 and March 31. He also confirmed that those registered came from both Mariupol city and from nearby towns and villages, and that the Council also registered 30 people who fled the city or nearby areas, and who arrived in Zaporizhzhia between March 10 and 13. Human Rights Watch telephone interview, August 22, 2023.

213 Human Rights Watch phone interview with Dmytro, volunteer working in Zaporizhzhia’s registration center, February 23, 2023.

214 “Із Маріуполя евакуювали 75 тисяч людей - Верещук,” UKRINFORM, March 31, 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3444972-iz-mariupola-evakuuvali-75-tisac-ludej-veresuk.html (accessed August 15, 2023).

215 “Ukraine: Ensure Safe Passage, Aid for Mariupol Civilians,” Human Rights Watch news release, March 21, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/21/ukraine-ensure-safe-passage-aid-mariupol-civilians.

216 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro, February 27, 2023; CNN, “Ukrainian family: 11-year-old girl shot in face by Russian soldier,” March 25, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tz7stTA_Bo (accessed August 15, 2023); Radio Svoboda Ukraine, “Знищення Маріуполя очима дівчини, яка звідти вирвалася,” March 24, 2022, video clip, Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=215&v=qoIzIMtSTr0&feature=youtu.be (accessed August 15, 2023).

217 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 14, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8854 (accessed August 15, 2023).

218 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8864 (accessed August 15, 2023).

219 Human Rights Watch interview with Zoreslav, April 21, 2022. Ukrainian officials later said that Kamianske village had been attacked by Grad rockets on March 15. Anatoly Kurtev. Secretary of the Zaporizhzhia City Council (@kurtievofficial), March 16, 2023, https://t.me/kurtievofficial/9392 (accessed November 22, 2023).

220 Pavlo Kyrylenko, Head of Donetsk Regional Military Administration (@pavlokyrylenkodonoda), post to Telegram Channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/pavlokyrylenkodonoda/2629 (accessed August 15, 2023); Kyrylo Tymoshenko, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine (@tymoshenko_kyrylo), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/tymoshenko_kyrylo/202 (accessed August 15, 2023).

221 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, April 13, 2023.

222 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8865 (accessed August 15, 2023).

223 “20 Days in Mariupol: The Team That Documented City’s Agony,” AP News, March 22, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-edf7240a9d990e7e3e32f82ca351dede (accessed August 15, 2023).

224 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

225 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro, February 23, 2023.

226 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Fedir, April 20, 2022.

227 Human Rights Watch interview with Ivan, Kryvyi Rih, April 6, 2022.

228 Human Rights Watch interview with Tamara, Dnipro, June 15, 2022.

229 “Ukraine: ‘Children’: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine,” Amnesty International, June 30, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ eur50/5713/2022/en/ (accessed August 15, 2023).

230 James Verini, “Witness to the Massacre in Mariupol,” The New York Times, September 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/01/magazine/ukraine-mariupol-theater.html (accessed August 10, 2023). See Chapter VII for more on the attack on the Drama Theater.

231 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Maksym Povnenkyi, June 23, 2023.

232 Human Rights Watch interview with Vladyslav, Lviv, May 2, 2022.

233 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yana, April 20, 2023.

234 Truth Hounds interview with Sofiia, Rzhyshchiv, September 29, 2022.

235 Human Rights Watch interviews with Aryna and Olena, Lviv, April 19, 2022.

236 Human Rights Watch interview with Milana, Dnipro, May 2, 2022.

237 Truth Hounds interview with Yehor, Kryvyi Rih, August 9, 2022.

238 One of the images from March 19 was published by CNN. Paul Murphy, “New Satellite images show significant destruction and long line of cars leaving Mariupol,” CNN, March 18, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-18-22#h_b5cd1831a40e7fe3a0884a878a7b7c0b (accessed August 15, 2023).

239 In April, at least 29,964 people who fled the greater Mariupol area travelled directly to Ukrainian-held Zaporizhzhia. Statistics received on April 27, 2023, from Ukrainian official.

240 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro, February 27, 2023.

241 Ukraine-Russia Ceasefire Negotiations: Chapter I, Parley Policy, https://www.parleypolicy.com/post/tracking-ukraine-russia-ceasefire-negotiations-chapter-i (accessed August 10, 2023).

242 “Turkiye Can Help Evacuate Civilians, Wounded in Ukraine’s Mariupol: Defense Minister,” Anadolu Agency, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/turkiye-can-help-evacuate-civilians-wounded-in-ukraines-mariupol-defense-minister/2553347 (accessed September 23, 2023).

243 “Ukraine War: Russia Blocks Buses Heading to Mariupol, Says Ukraine,” BBC News, March 31, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60938429 (accessed August 15, 2023).

244 Bel Trew and Shweta Sharma, “Russian Forces Accused of Blocking Mariupol Evacuation Buses and ‘Seizing Humanitarian Aid,’” Independent, April 1, 2022, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-soldiers-mariupol-evacuation-bus-latest-b2048742.html (accessed December 22, 2023).

245 Iryna Balachuk, “З Маріуполя вдалося евакуювати 4 автобуси людей,” Ukrainska Pravda, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/21/7341074/ (accessed September 23, 2023).

246 Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen Sosnovskyi, Kyiv, March 4, 2023.

247 The evacuation point was about 200 meters to the east of the Port City shopping mall.

248 “Ukraine Blames Russia After Mariupol Corridor Fails on Sunday,” Reuters, April 24, 2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2022-04-24/ukraine-blames-russia-after-mariupol-humanitarian-corridor-fails-on-sunday (accessed June 14, 2022).

249 “Ukraine: UN-Red Cross operation underway to evacuate civilians from stricken Mariupol plant,” UN news release, May 1, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1117342 (accessed June 14, 2023); Rachel Siegel, Andrew Jeong, and David L. Stern, “Evacuations begin from Mariupol plant as shelling in east continues,” Washington Post, April 30, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/04/30/ukraine-russia-azovstal/ (accessed June 29, 2023); Michael Schwitz, “A small group of women and children has made it out of Mariupol’s Azovstal steel plant,” New York Times, April 30, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/30/world/mariupol-evacuation-steel-plant-ukraine.html (accessed June 29, 2023).

250 Human Rights Watch interviews with Yevhen Sosnovskyi, Kyiv, March 4, 2023, and June 21, 2023.

251 “Third Humanitarian Convoy Under way [sic] to Evacuate Civilians from Besieged Ukraine City, Secretary-General Tells Security Council,” United Nations press release, SC/14882, May 5, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14882.doc.htm (accessed August 24, 2023).

252 Ibid.

253 “Statement Attributable to the Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine, Osnat Lubrani,” United Nations, May 3, 2022, https://ukraine.un.org/en/180300-statement-attributable-humanitarian-coordinator-ukraine-osnat-lubrani (accessed November 22, 2023).

254 “Third Humanitarian Convoy Under way [sic] to Evacuate Civilians from Besieged Ukraine City, Secretary-General Tells Security Council,” United Nations press release, SC/14882, May 5, 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14882.doc.htm (accessed August 24, 2023).

255 “Ukraine: More than 170 Civilians Evacuated from Azovstal and Mariupol Area in Third Safe Passage Operation,” International Committee of the Red Cross news release, May 8, 2022, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/more-150-civilians-evacuated-azovstal-and-mariupol-area-third-safe-passage-operation (accessed August 24, 2023).

256 Human Rights Watch, “We Had No Choice:” “Filtration” and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2022), https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forcibly-transferring-ukrainian-civilians.

257 A November 2022 Amnesty International report also documented how, after Russian forces had taken over control of parts of the city in March and April, they coerced fleeing Mariupol residents towards DNR-held territory or Russia, including on “evacuation buses.” “Ukraine: ‘Like A Prison Convoy’: Russia’s Unlawful Transfer and Abuse of Civilians in Ukraine During ‘Filtration,’” Amnesty International, November 10, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/6136/2022/en/ (accessed May 11, 2023).

258 “Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,” International Criminal Court news release, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and (accessed September 23, 2023).

259 The UN similarly estimated that 90 percent of the city’s multi-story residential buildings had been damaged, as well as up to 60 percent of “private houses.” “High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Mariupol, Ukraine,” OHCHR, June 16, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/high-commissioner-updates-human-rights-council-mariupol-ukraine (accessed August 24, 2023).

260 We defined an educational facility as any cluster of buildings listed on Open Street Map and Wikimapia as buildings used for educational purposes.

261 Boarding school 2 at Kosmichnyi Lane 1. Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 28, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8644 (accessed September 22, 2023); School 14 on the Left Bank at Pashkovs’koho Street 73-75. Мариуполь сейчас (Mariupol Now) (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, May 29, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolnow/12037 (accessed September 20, 2023); School 16 at Shevchenka Boulevard 121a. Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, March 2, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8691 (accessed September 22, 2023); School 48 on the Left Bank at Svobody Avenue 45. Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 28, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8644 (accessed September 22, 2022).

262 Human Rights Watch, “Tanks On The Playground:” Attacks on Schools and Military Use of Schools in Ukraine, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2023), https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/11/09/tanks-playground/attacks-schools-and-military-use-schools-ukraine.

263 We defined a hospital campus as any cluster of buildings listed on Open Street Map and Wikimapia as buildings used for medical purposes.

264 Satellite imagery shows damage to the following buildings on the hospital #1 campus: Adult Polyclinic; Children’s Polyclinic; Burns; Neurology; Ophthalmology; Pulmonology; Surgery; and Therapy. Satellite imagery shows damage to the following buildings on the hospital #4 campus: Infectious Diseases; Neurology; Polyclinic. Surgery; Therapy; and Tuberculosis.

265 Ministry of Health of Ukraine list dated March 30, 2023. On file with Human Rights Watch.

266 “How Russia Destroyed Healthcare in Mariupol,” Ukrainian Healthcare Center, January 4, 2023, https://uhc.org.ua/en/2023/01/04/healthcare-in-mariupol/ (accessed August 24, 2023).

267 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykola Halagan, Lviv, May 1, 2022.

268 Human Rights Watch interview with Marta, Vinnytsia, August 3, 2022.

269 Human Rights Watch interview with Tetiana Burak, Lviv, April 22, 2022.

270 “High Commissioner updates the Human Rights Council on Mariupol, Ukraine,” OHCHR, June 16, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/high-commissioner-updates-human-rights-council-mariupol-ukraine (accessed August 24, 2023).

271 Human Rights Watch interview with Yelizar Hrankov, Kyiv, May 5, 2023; Truth Hounds telephone interview with Maksym Povnenkyi, June 23, 2023; Human Rights Watch interview with Daryna, Dnipro, June 10, 2022; Human Rights Watch interview with Oleksandr, Dnipro, May 10, 2022; Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), May 5, 2023.

272 Human Rights Watch interview with Yelizar Hrankov, Kyiv, May 5, 2023.

273 Human Rights Watch interviews with Yelizar Hrankov, Kyiv, May 5, 2023. A man who was in the hospital on March 11 said that on that day, that the entire area to the south, west, and north of the hospital was full of Russian forces and that by the end of the day they had surrounded the hospital. He also said that he saw a few Russian tanks moving up and down Matrosova Street just to the south of the hospital and that he saw some of them firing at high-rise buildings on Mytropolytska Street, a little further to the south. Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), May 5, 2023.

274 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Maksym Povnenkyi, June 23, 2023.

275 Human Rights Watch interview with Daryna, Dnipro, June 10, 2022.

276 Human Rights Watch interview with Oleksandr, Dnipro, May 10, 2022.

277 Human Rights Watch interviews with Viktoriia, Dnipro, June 16, 2022; Rustam, Dnipro, June 17, 2022; Semen, Vinnytsia, July 22, 2022; and Oleksii, Narva, July 17, 2022; Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023.

278 Human Rights Watch interview with Semen, Vinnytsia, July 22, 2022.

279 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023.

280 Human Rights Watch interviews with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022, and Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022. The storage site was close to Naberezhna Street.

281 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Kohut, Kyiv, April 13, 2023.

282 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Oleksandr Tsarok, April 20, 2023.

283 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

284 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022.

285 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Oleksandr Tsarok, April 20, 2023.

286 Human Rights Watch interview with Stanislav, Lviv, May 3, 2022. The building is on the far eastern end of Myru Avenue, about 400 meters to the east of the Drama Theater.

287 Kpru (@kpru), post X (formerly known as Twitter), April 26, 2022, https://twitter.com/kpru/status/1518858713649586176 (accessed January 19, 2024). We also verified 22 photographs and videos of the building taken before and after the attack that were uploaded to various social media platforms, including images that show that a shop on the ground floor of the building that was struck. The building contains a number of apartments and is located on a corner, with addresses on two streets, Torhova Street 20 and Myru Avenue 10. One video uploaded to Telegram on April 7, 2022, records an explosion followed by the camera panning to show smoke rising from a point to the southeast, just behind Myru Avenue 10. Mariupol Now (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, April 7, 2022. https://t.me/mariupolnow/5563 (accessed September 20, 2023).

288 Ukrainian police and volunteers carry Iryna Kalinina, an injured pregnant woman, from a maternity hospital following an attack on March 9, 2022, AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, March 9, 2022, https://s.abcnews.com/images/International/02-twip-ukraine-refugees-ap-llr-220310_1646953966373_hpMain_1_4x5_608.jpg (accessed December 5, 2023).

289 Hospital #3 is about 700 meters west of the Drama Theater. In December 2021 or January 2022, when the hospital started renovating its maternity wing, maternity services were temporarily moved to the building at Osypenka Street 68, which operated as a maternity hospital and maternity outpatient center. An adjacent building, at Osypenka Street 70, performed some functions of a children’s hospital and had a diagnostic unit. Human Rights Watch interviews with Yaroslav Kildishov, Dnipro, May 8, 2022, and telephone interview with Demian, June 21, 2022. A “How Russia Destroyed Healthcare in Mariupol,” Ukrainian Healthcare Center , January 4, 2023, https://uhc.org.ua/en/2023/01/04/healthcare-in-mariupol/ (accessed August 24, 2023).

290 “Russia Scrubs Mariupol’s Ukraine Identity, Builds on Death,” AP News, December 23, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-erasing-mariupol-499dceae43ed77f2ebfe750ea99b9ad9 (accessed September 22, 2023); “In Occupied Mariupol, Russia’s Rebuild Is Erasing Ukrainian Identity,” Euronews, December 22, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/2022/12/22/in-occupied-mariupol-russias-rebuild-is-erasing-ukrainian-identity-and-any-evidence-of-war (accessed September 22, 2023); Oleg Zima Director of the Regional Intensive Care Hospital (@oleg.zima.5), post to Facebook, May 1, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=5057723410979096&set=pb.100002244609739.-2207520000 (accessed September 22, 2023); “Pregnant Woman, Baby Die after Russian Bombing in Mariupol,” AP News, March 15, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-maternity-hospital-pregnant-woman-dead-c0f2f859296f9f02be24fc9edfca1085 (accessed September 22, 2023).

291 “Pregnant Woman, Baby Die after Russian Bombing in Mariupol,” AP News, March 15, 2022.

292 “Ukraine War: Three Dead as Maternity Hospital Hit by Russian Air Strike,” BBC News, March 10, 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60675599 (accessed September 22, 2023).

293 “Marianna: ‘My Picture Was Used to Spread Lies about the War,’” BBC News, May 16, 2022, sec. BBC Trending, https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-61412773 (accessed September 22, 2023).

294 “‘Why? Why? Why?’ Ukraine’s Mariupol Descends into Despair,” AP News, March 16, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-descends-into-despair-708cb8f4a171ce3f1c1b0b8d090e38e3 (accessed August 11, 2023).

295 “The Labour of Truth,” Truth Hounds, March 2022, https://truth-hounds.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/the-labour-of-truth_eng.pdf (accessed September 22, 2023).

296 “Anatomy of the Mariupol hospital attack,” CNN, March 17, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/03/europe/mariupol-maternity-hospital-attack/index.html (accessed September 24, 2023).

297 Ibid.

298 “#ПрямойЭфир: Брифинг официального представителя МИД России М.В.Захаровой,” March 9, 2022, Live Stream, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/live/2-3BEk_B-xw?si=Y6c6QyZEGjy40Pmi&t=2260 (accessed September 22, 2023).

299 Human Rights Watch interview with Rustam, Dnipro, June 17, 2022. He said six Ukrainian territorial defense fighters in camouflage uniform were guarding the hospital’s underground shelter and about ten territorial defense fighters with assault rifles were in the Oncology Unit above the shelter.

300 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023. The Oncology Unit is at Myru Avenue 80.

301 Human Rights Watch interview with Yaroslav Kildishov, Dnipro, May 8, 2022. Their building at Kazantseva Street 16a, which belongs to Priazovskyi Technical State University, was about 500 meters southeast of the maternity unit.

302 Human Rights Watch interview with Vasyl, Vinnytsia, August 16, 2022. He lived in a house at Kazantseva Street 22a, about 400 meters east of the maternity unit.

303 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Demian, June 21, 2022.

304 Like the hospital’s Oncology Unit, the center was at Myru Avenue 80, about 100 meters to the east of the maternity unit.

305 Ukrainian emergency workers and volunteers carry Iryna Kalinina, an injured pregnant woman, from a maternity hospital following an attack on March 9, 2022, AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, March 9, 2022, https://s.abcnews.com/images/International/02-twip-ukraine-refugees-ap-llr-220310_1646953966373_hpMain_1_4x5_608.jpg (accessed December 5, 2023).

306 Human Rights Watch interview with Irina Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022.

307 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Demian, June 21, 2022.

308 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023.

309 Human Rights Watch interview with Viktoriia, Dnipro, June 16, 2022.

310 Neutral News (@neutralnews), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), May 17, 2014, https://twitter.com/neutralnews/status/467784288574771200 (accessed January 19, 2024).

311 Shadi Alkasim (@Shadi_Alkasim), post to X (formerly known as Twitter) May 9, 2022, https://twitter.com/Shadi_Alkasim/status/1501577975786971138 (accessed January 19, 2024). Human Rights Watch verified 10 videos and 13 photographs of the damaged hospital, as well as two photographs taken before the strike, all of which were uploaded to social media platforms and media archives.

312 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, July 16, 2023.

313 “The Labour of Truth,” Truth Hounds, March 2022, https://truth-hounds.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/the-labour-of-truth_eng.pdf (accessed September 22, 2023).

314 The Pryazovskyi State Technical University was founded almost 100 years ago as a professional training school for workers at the city’s Ilyich Iron and Steel Works factory and subsequently expanded to include institutes focusing on engineering, metallurgy, welding, transportation, economics, management, humanities, pedagogy, and information technology. Homepage, Pryazovskyi State Technical University, https://pstu.edu/en/ (accessed September 22, 2023).

315 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Puryshev, Kyiv, October 25, 2022.

316 Videos on file with Human Rights Watch.

317 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Puryshev, Kyiv, October 25, 2022.

318 Human Rights Watch interview with Yaroslav Kildishov, Dnipro, May 8, 2022. The building they were staying in was at Kazantseva Street 16a, about 50 meters west of the main University campus.

319 Human Rights Watch interview with Vasyl, Vinnytsia, August 16, 2022. He was staying in the basement of Kazantseva Street 22a, about 100 meters northwest of the University campus.

320 MariupolNow (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, April 28, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolnow/8360 (accessed December 7, 2023).

321 On file with Human Rights Watch. We verified 40 photographs and videos found on various social media platforms or sent directly to researchers that show damage to Universytets’ka Street 7.

322 The March 12 imagery is a little hazy, so it is possible that there was minor damage to other parts of the University campus by that date.

323 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Lev, April 22, 2022.

324 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Olga, April 23, 2022. The building is about 1.5 kilometers west of the Drama Theater and about 200 meters north of Myru Avenue.

325 Now deleted account, post to Telegram channel, May 30, 2022, https://t.me/zelinskogo/2215 (accessed January 19, 2024). In total, we verified one image from a social media platform that was taken before March 9 and that shows no damage to the buildings, and eight images and two videos taken after March 9 showing damage to the buildings.

326 A woman said that at some point on March 10, there was an attack on Ukrainian forces who were positioned in a tram building, next to Mykolayivska Street 96, about 150 meters east of Marinska Balka Street 67. Human Rights Watch interview with Nelia, Dnipro, June 10, 2022.

327 Human Rights Watch interview with Vladyslav, Lviv, May 2, 2022. The area is about 700 meters to the northwest of the Drama Theater.

328 Human Rights Watch interview with Solomiia, Dnirpo, May 6, 2022. She was staying in a house at Vidkryta Street 21, about 75 meters to the west of Marinska Balka Street 67 and next door to Vidkryta Street 23.

329 “Мариуполь. Казанцева, дома 43-75, частный сектор у ц.рынка. Трупы под завалами. Рассказы очевидцев,” August 3, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://youtu.be/uvYw85BmW_M?si=rngKBC4A5nfIRkCH (accessed January 19, 2024).

330 The building is about two kilometers to the west of the Drama Theater and about 600 meters north of Myru Avenue.

332 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Danylo, October 22, 2022.

333 Truth Hounds interview with Maryna, Kyiv, September 21, 2022.

334 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro Lastenko, October 29, 2022.

335 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Stefaniia, April 25, July 13, and August 28, 2023.

336 The group is called “Митрополитская, р-н ‘Жигули,’” with the name referring to Mytropolytska Street and the Zhiguli neighborhood, which takes its name from a shop there.

337 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Pavlo, March 28, August 31, and September 7, 2023.

338 Human Rights Watch showed the witness a photograph of Sergey Mishenko, whom the witness identified as the man he saw at the Metro shopping mall. Until July 7, 2023, he was the head of the Mariupol Fire and Rescue Squad in the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Management of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Контрагент ГБУ “ПСО Г. МАРИУПОЛЬ МЧС ДНР” досье №1229300128661 от 13.12.2023, Audit-it Ru, December 13, 2023, https://www.audit-it.ru/contragent/1229300128661_gbu-pso-g-mariupol-mchs-dnr (accessed December 13. 2023).

339 Ibid.

340 A fire burns in an apartment building after the shelling of a residential district in Mariupol, Ukraine, Friday, March 11, 2022, AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, March 12, 2022, https://newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=30fdb588efa047a58d0900907380c8b2&mediatype=photo (accessed December 5, 2023).

341 Митрополитская, р-н “Жигули” (@mitropolitskaya_giguli), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/mitropolitskaya_giguli/1409 (accessed September 20, 2023).

342 “DPR: Emergency services continue search and rescue operations in Mariupol *GRAPHIC*,” video clip, April 9, 2022, Ruptly, https://www.ruptly.tv/en/videos/20220409-019-dpr-emergency-services-continue-search-and-rescue-operations-in-mariupol-graphic-?search_key=f428cec7-f1e6-4058-88fc-0dddb48d9600 (accessed November 27, 2023). We received and analyzed eight videos from witnesses showing civilians in the basement before the attack and showing the aftermath. We also verified 14 photographs and videos posted online showing Mytropolytska Street 98 before and after the attack.

343 Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), May 5, 2023.

344 Единый реестр зданий и сооружений, подлежащих сносу, Ministry of Construction and Housing and Communal Services, https://minstroy-dnr.ru/snos-jilya (accessed January 23, 2024).

345 “Демонтаж дома. Магазин, Клён, Мариуполь 2023,” June 2, 2023, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uouJGLusNX8&ab_channel=дачныеидеи (accessed September 20, 2023).

346 The supermarket at Budivenykiv Avenue 86 is about one kilometer west of the Drama Theater and about 200 meters south of Myru Avenue. One person interviewed was inside the supermarket when it was attacked. Human Rights Watch interview with Sviatoslav, Vinnytsia, August 18, 2022. Two people interviewed were waiting outside. Human Rights Watch interviews with Nadiia, Dnipro, June 14, 2022, and with Ivan, Kryvyi Rih, April 6,2022. A fourth had just left it and was nearby when the attack happened. Human Rights Watch interview with Bohdan, Dnipro, June 20, 2022. The other two saw the damaged building shortly after the supermarket had been attacked. Human Rights Watch interviews with Davyd, Dnipro, June 12, 2022, and with Larysa, Kyiv, September 12, 2022. Three people saw body parts outside the supermarket and on Budivenykiv Avenue the same day as the attack. Human Rights Watch interviews with Bohdan, Dnipro, June 20, 2022; Davyd, Dnipro, June 12, 2022; and Sviatoslav, Vinnytsia, August 18, 2022.

347 One video uploaded to YouTube on April 5, 2022, and verified by Human Rights Watch, shows the damage inside the supermarket. “2022.03.14 - пр. Строителей 72а, Зеркальный, Мариуполь,” April 5, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbxWxcB6UDo&ab_channel=Azovec (accessed January 19, 2024).

348 Human Rights Watch interview Sviatoslav, Vinnytsia, August 18, 2022.

349 Human Rights Watch interview with Ivan, Kryvyi Rih, April 6, 2022.

350 Human Rights Watch interview with Bohdan, Dnipro, June 20, 2022. He was sheltering in a building about 200 meters west of the supermarket, at Zelinskoho Street 19, and said that he went there after he heard it was reopening.

351 Human Rights Watch interview with Davyd, Dnipro, June 12, 2022. He had moved on March 1 to a building about 250 meters northeast of the supermarket, at Bohdana Khmelnytskoho Boulevard 39.

352 Human Rights Watch interview with Larysa, Kyiv, September 12, 2022.

353 Human Rights Watch interview with Nazar, Vinnytsia, August 11, 2022.

354 “2022.03.14 - пр. Строителей 72а, Зеркальный, Мариуполь,” April 5, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbxWxcB6UDo&ab_channel=Azovec (accessed January 19, 2024). In total, we verified nine videos and two photographs of Dzerkalnyi supermarket that we found on social media platforms. One video, taken before February 24, shows no damage, and eight videos and two photographs showing damage were uploaded after April 18, 2022.

355 Human Rights Watch interview with Oleksii, Narva, July 17 and July 26, 2022.

356 Ibid.

357 Human Rights Watch interview with Yeva, Narva, July 16, 2022. She had moved from her home on March 2 to the basement of a building at Hromovoi Street 62, about 350 meters southeast of Myru Avenue 127.

358 Мариуполь сейчас (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, April 24, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolnow/7779 (accessed January 19, 2024).

359 TV-7 Маріуполь (@tv7mrpl), post to Telegram channel, edited February 1, 2023, https://t.me/tv7mrpl/14490 (accessed January 19, 2024).

360 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Tetiana Raizova, January 10, 2024; “On March 13, the world was split into before and after,” Monologues of the War, April 24, 2022, https://warmonolog.com.ua/tetyana-raizova-mariupol/ (accessed November 22, 2023).

361 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Pavlo, March 28, August 31, and September 7, 2023. He is the same person who Human Rights Watch interviewed in relation to the recovery of bodies at Mytropolytska Street 98.

362 Kyrylo’s photo was later posted on MariupolRIP Telegram channel. Погибшие, Память, Мариуполь (@MariupolRIP), post to Telegram channel, November 8, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolRIP/32996 (accessed November 22, 2023). He was also profiled by Victims Memorial. Victims_of_Russia (@victims_of_russia), post to Instagram, July 24, 2023, https://www.instagram.com/p/CvFcDeQNVO1/?img_index=9 (accessed November 22, 2023).

363 “Домовини не було, яму викопали в садочку - так і поховали сина». Історії чотирьох дітей, яких убила Росія,” Radio Svoboda, July 22, 2023, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/istoriyi-ditey-yakykh-ubyla-rosiya/32513704.html (accessed November 22, 2023).

364 Valerii Raizov’s obituary was later posted on MariupoRIP. Погибшие, Память, Мариуполь (@MariupolRIP), post to Telegram channel, March 13, 2023, https://t.me/mariupolRIP/36517 (accessed November 22, 2023).

365 Video on file with Human Rights Watch.

366 “Escapees from Mariupol tell of ‘hell on Earth,’” CNN, April 28, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/28/opinions/mariupol-escape-ukraine-war-hell-gorbunova/index.html (accessed November 22, 2023).

367 Human Rights Watch interview with Halyna Morokhovska, Lviv, April 21, 2022. The building is about 400 meters west of the Drama Theater and about 300 meters north of Myru Avenue.

368 Ibid. Her son-in-law confirmed that they were on the second floor at the moment of the attack, but said it was around 4 p.m.. Human Rights Watch interview with Andrii Tikhonok, Lviv, April 21, 2022.

369 Ibid.

370 Human Rights Watch interview with Nataliia Yukhmanova, Kyiv, April 21, 2022.

371 Human Rights Watch interview with Halyna Morokhovska, Lviv, April 21, 2022. The son-in-law confirmed that they were on the second floor. Human Rights Watch interview with Andrii Tikhonok, Lviv, April 21, 2022.

372 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023.

373 Human Rights Watch interview with Halyna Morokhovska, Lviv, April 21, 2022.

374 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Volodymyr Antonenko, December 10, 2022. The company’s headquarters at Soborna Street 7 was about 100 meters east of Kazantseva Street 20.

375 “Мариуполь, Казанцева,” April 9, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zPMBTl2Q7OU&ab_channel=Igor (accessed January 19, 2024). We verified three videos and two photographs of Kazantseva Street 20, including imagery of the intact building uploaded to social media platforms in August and September 2021, as well as imagery of the damaged building uploaded to social media platforms on and after March 26, 2022.

376 “Мариуполь, Казанцева,” April 9, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zPMBTl2Q7OU&ab_channel=Igor (accessed January 19, 2024).

377 Human Rights Watch interviews with Veronika, and Tymur, Dnipro, May 6, 2022; Human Rights Watch interviews with Bohdana, Lviv, May 3, 2022, and Raisa, Vinnytsia, August 2, 2022.

378 Braden Keith, “Mariupol’s Neptune Pool, Planned Paralympic Training Base, Destroyed by Bombing,” Swim Swam, March 16, 2022, https://swimswam.com/mariupols-neptune-pool-planned-paralympic-training-base-destroyed-by-bombing/ (accessed September 20, 2023).

379 Human Rights Watch interviews with Raisa, Vinnytsia, August 2, 2022; Bohdana, Lviv, May 3, 2022; Yevhen, Vinnytsia, August 5, 2022, and one of Mariupol’s deputy mayors (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, August 31, 2022.

380 Human Rights Watch interviews with Raisa, Vinnytsia, August 2, 2022; Karyna, Dnipro, May 10, 2022; Volodymyr, Dnipro, May 10, 2022; and Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022. Military hospital #555 is located at Akademika Amosova Street 54, about 150 meters north-east of the Neptune swimming pool.

381 Human Rights Watch interviews with Karyna, Dnipro, May 10, 2022, and Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

382 Human Rights Watch interview with Bohdana, Lviv, May 3, 2022.

383 Human Rights Watch interview with Karyna, Dnipro, May 10, 2022.

384 Human Rights Watch interviews with Bohdana, Lviv, May 3, 2022; Yevhen, Vinnytsia, August 5, 2022; Veronika and Tymur, Dnipro, May 6, 2022.

385 Human Rights Watch interview with Veronika, Dnipro, May 6, 2022. She lived on the fifth floor of Metalurhiv Avenue 195, about 150 meters southwest of the pool.

386 Human Rights Watch interview with Tymur, Dnipro, May 6, 2022. He lived on the first floor of a five-story building on Metalurhiv Avenue 197, about 150 meters southwest of the pool and describes events that occurred “not long after 11 a.m.,” when he said he was in his apartment with his wife.

387 mdk.mrpl (@mdkmrpl) post to Telegram channel, March 16, 2022, https://t.me/mdkmrpl/1240 (accessed January 19, 2024); Мариуполь сейчас (@mariupolnow) post to Telegram channel, June 11, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolnow/13262 (accessed January 19, 2024); Мариуполь Навсегда (@marik_life) post to Telegram channel, March 22, 2023, https://t.me/marik_life/8176 (accessed January 19, 2024). We verified one video of the undamaged Neptune pool uploaded before March 16, one video of the damaged pool uploaded on March 16, and three videos and four images found on various social media platforms of the damaged pool uploaded after March 16.

388 The witness indicated on a map how she walked through the square and through the gap between the two buildings about 50 meters to the north of the pool exit.

389 Human Rights Watch interview with Bohdana, Lviv, May 3, 2022. She lived at her apartment at Metalurhiv Avenue 219, about 200 meters northwest of the pool and about 150 meters west of the military hospital.

390 “Мариуполь Сейчас Мариуполь Сегодня Плавбассейн Нептун и рядом!,” June 18, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJMRdxEze1g&ab_channel=Liliya%26Alex (accessed September 20, 2023).

391 A surgeon working at the hospital between February 24 and March 16 also said that shelling on around March 14 or 15 killed at least one person and injured at least one person. Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Pasichnyi, Kyiv, March 25, 2023.

392 Human Rights Watch interview with Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

393 Human Rights Watch interview with Karyna, Dnipro, May 10, 2022.

394 Human Rights Watch interview with Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

396 Human Rights Watch interviewed a total of eight people about the moment of the attack and its aftermath. One person was inside the theater. A second was next to it. A third saw a plane dropping two bombs that landed in the vicinity of the theater. Another five said they were sheltering nearby and heard the attack. Of these five, one received an unspecified number of injured people in a nearby basement shortly afterwards, and another saw people covered in dust arriving moments later at another nearby shelter, in the city’s Philharmonic Hall. “Ukraine: ‘Children’: The attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol,” Amnesty International, June 30, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/ (accessed August 15, 2023); James Verini, “Witness to the Massacre in Mariupol,” The New York Times Magazine, September 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/01/magazine/ukraine-mariupol-theater.html (accessed August 10, 2023); Lori Hinnant, Mstyslav Chernov, and Vasilisa Stepanenko, “AP Evidence Points To 600 Dead In Mariupol Theater Airstrike,” AP News, May 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/Russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1 (accessed September 21, 2023).

397 Ukraine War: Russian Ambassador to UN Denies Putin’s Forces Bombed Mariupol Theatre as He Hits Out at ‘So Many Fakes,’” Sky News, March 18, 2022, https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-russian-ambassador-to-un-denies-putins-forces-bombed-mariupol-theatre-as-he-hits-out-at-so-many-fakes-12568882 (accessed September 20, 2023).

398 Маріупольська міська рада (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, February 27, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/8566 (accessed September 21, 2023).

399 “Ukraine: Ensure Safe Passage, Aid for Mariupol Civilians,” Human Rights Watch new release, March 21, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/21/ukraine-ensure-safe-passage-aid-mariupol-civilians.

400 James Verini, “Witness to the Massacre in Mariupol,” The New York Times Magazine, September 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/01/magazine/ukraine-mariupol-theater.html (accessed August 10, 2023); Lori Hinnant, Mstyslav Chernov, and Vasilisa Stepanenko, “AP Evidence Points To 600 Dead In Mariupol Theater Airstrike,” AP News, May 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/Russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1 (accessed September 21, 2023).

401 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Nataliia Tkachenko, June 16, 2022; “Ukraine: Mariupol Theater Hit by Russian Attack Sheltered Hundreds,” Human Rights Watch news release, March 16, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/16/ukraine-mariupol-theater-hit-russian-attack-sheltered-hundreds.

402 “Ukraine: ‘Children’: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol, Ukraine,” Amnesty International, June 30, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/ (accessed August 15, 2023).

403 Human Rights Watch interview with Maksym, Kyiv, September 12, 2022. He lived about 300 meters northeast at Mytropolytska Street 29.

404 “Ukraine: ‘Children’: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol,” Amnesty International, June 30, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/ (accessed August 15, 2023).

405 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Nataliia Tkachenko, June 16, 2022.

406 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Matvii, April 17, 2023.

407 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykola Halagan, Lviv, May 1, 2022. His daughter was Masha Halagan, and his mother was Lidiia Tarasova.

408 Human Rights Watch interview with Rostyslav, Dnipro, May 6, 2022.

409 Human Rights Watch interview with Sofiia, Rzhyshchiv, September 29, 2022.

410 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yaroslav, June 22, 2022. He lived at 48 Arkhip Kuindzhi Street.

411 “Ukraine: ‘Children’: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol,” Amnesty International, June 30, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/ (accessed August 15, 2023).

412 Shaun Walker, Isobel Koshiw, Pjotr Sauer, Morten Risberg, Liz Cookman, and Luke Harding, “Mariupol, the Ruin of a City,” The Guardian, February 23, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city (accessed September 21, 2023).

413 “Ukraine: ‘Children’: The Attack on the Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre in Mariupol,” Amnesty International, June 30, 2022, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur50/5713/2022/en/ (accessed August 15, 2023).

414 Ibid.

415 James Verini, “Witness to the Massacre in Mariupol,” The New York Times Magazine, September 1, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/01/magazine/ukraine-mariupol-theater.html (accessed August 10, 2023).

416 Lori Hinnant, Mstyslav Chernov, and Vasilisa Stepanenko, “AP Evidence Points To 600 Dead In Mariupol Theater Airstrike,” AP News, May 4, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/Russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-theater-c321a196fbd568899841b506afcac7a1 (accessed September 21, 2023).

417 “War in Ukraine: Estimated 300 Dead in Mariupol Theatre Strike,” BBC News, March 25, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60873435 (accessed September 21, 2023).

418 Hugo Bachega and Orysia Khimiak, “Mariupol theatre: ‘We knew something terrible would happen’,” BBC News, March 17, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60776929 (accessed September 21, 2023).

419The Real Goal Is to Hide The Traces of War’, Moscow’s Plan For Rebuilding Mariupol, A City ‘Wiped Off the Face of the Earth’ by Russian Troops,” Meduza, October 13, 2022, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/10/13/the-real-goal-is-to-hide-the-traces-of-war (accessed September 21, 2023); РИА Новости (@rian_ru), post to Telegram channel, July 19, 2022 https://t.me/rian_ru/171544 (accessed September 21, 2023).

420 “Маріупольський ДрамТеатр,” March 10, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lg3JYn2JukA&ab_channel=%D0%90%D0%97%D0%9E%D0%92 (accessed January 19, 2024).

421 “Video of the first minutes after the bombing of the drama theater in Mariupol (2022) Ukraine News,” April 27, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zcmI6TS5Aic&ab_channel=OdesaFilmStudio (accessed January 19, 2024).

422 ТрухаУкраїна (@truexanewsua), post to Telegram channel, March 25, 2022, https://t.me/truexanewsua/36447 (accessed January 19, 2024).

423 “Drone footage shows destroyed theatre in besieged Mariupol, Ukraine,” April 11, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6Lh8IXPjso&ab_channel=TheSun (accessed January 19, 2024).

424 “Inside Mariupol Drama Theatre [4k] / Внутри драмтеатра Мариуполя” April 23, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YVgoNQYQsUs&ab_channel=WarWalker (accessed January 19, 2024).

425 “War in Ukraine: Under the Rubble of the Mariupol Theater,” France Info, April 3, 2022, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/guerre-en-ukraine-sous-les-decombres-du-theatre-de-marioupol_5061052.html (accessed September 21, 2023).

426 Jay in Kyiv (@JayinKyiv) post to X (formerly known as Twitter), November 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/jayinkyiv/status/1592788440747474944?s=46&t=WOKv9hhxchwaA-IuFQFTewin (accessed September 21, 2023).

427 “Restoration of the Drama Theater in Mariupol,” Mariupol News, November 16, 2023, https://mariupol-news.ru/society/2023/11/16/64274.html (accessed December 18, 2023).

428 Human Rights Watch interview with Rostyslav, Dnipro, May 6, 2022. After the Drama Theater attack on March 16, he had moved from Artemaa Street 44 to a basement at Myru Avenue 42. The building is about 100 meters east of the Drama Theater.

429 “The Ministry of Construction plans to help restore Mariupol,” RIA Novosti, April 28, 2022, https://ria.ru/20220428/mariupol-1785856074.html (accessed January 19, 2024); “In Mariupol, everyone dreams that the fighting will end as soon as possible,” RGRU, April 8, 2022, https://rg.ru/amp/2022/04/08/v-mariupole-vse-mechtaiut-chtoby-poskorej-zakonchilis-boevye-dejstviia.html (accessed January 19, 2024).

430 “Мариуполь. пр. Ленина 42,” July 15, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLONNKODwe0&ab_channel=PresentPerfect (accessed January 19, 2024).

431 “Graves and destruction seen in Mariupol as fighting rages in city,” April 4, 2022, video clip, Reuters, https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/1667287 (accessed January 19, 2024). In total, we verified 29 photographs and videos of Myru Avenue 42 uploaded to various social media platforms and media archives.

432 Video on file with Human Rights Watch.

433 Мариуполь сейчас (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, April 23, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolnow/7660 (accessed January 19, 2024).

434 MariupolNow (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, March 9, 2023, https://t.me/mariupolnow/26526 (accessed November 7, 2023); Мариуполь сейчас (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, March 9, 2023, https://t.me/mariupolnow/26526 (accessed January 19, 2024).

435 Human Rights Watch interview with Zlata, Lviv, May 7, 2022.

436 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

437 The morgue was at Boika Aveue 60. Vaagn Mnatsakanian was also interviewed by international media about his role in burying the dead. Hilary Andersson, “The Agony of Not Knowing, As Mariupol Mass Burial Sites Grow,” BBC News, November 7, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63536564 (accessed September 25, 2023).

438 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Pavlo, March 28, 2023, August 31, 2023, and September 7, 2023. The building is about 600 meters west of the Drama Theater.

439 According to metadata embedded in the photos of the trenches Mnatsakanian said he took just after they had been dug at Primorsky Park, the three trenches there were completed at around 11:40 a.m. on March 14 and the four trenches in City Garden were completed at around 12:30 p.m. on March 14. Human Rights Watch reviewed satellite imagery taken at 11 a.m. on March 14, 2022, of Primorsky Park in which the three trenches do not appear. The next two sets of available imagery, taken on March 29 and April 3, 2022, shows three open trenches, 7, 12, and 13 meters long. The next available satellite imagery, taken on April 29, 2022, shows that the three trenches have been closed. Human Rights Watch also reviewed satellite imagery taken at 11 a.m. on March 14, 2022, of City Garden in which the four trenches do not appear. The next two sets of available imagery, taken on March 29 and April 3, 2022, show four open trenches, two that are 7 meters long and two that are 11 meters long. Due to tree cover, it is impossible to see on the next available satellite imagery, taken on April 29, 2022, whether the four trenches have been closed.

440 Human Rights Watch interview, Kyiv, March 3, 2023.

441 Truth Hounds interview with Oleksandr Yaroshenko, Kyiv, April 6, 2023.

442 “Amid Heavy Shelling, Ukraine’s Mariupol City Uses Mass Grave,” AP News, March 10, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-mass-graves-286b84d5d795ef91fb8c9ee48ed26612 (accessed November 7, 2023).

443 “‘Why? Why? Why?’ Ukraine’s Mariupol Descends into Despair,” AP News, March 16, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-mariupol-descends-into-despair-708cb8f4a171ce3f1c1b0b8d090e38e3 (accessed November 7, 2023).

444 “Guerre en Ukraine: 100 jours après le début du conflit, les deux visages de Marioupol désormais sous contrôle russe,” Franceinfo, June 3, 2022, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/guerre-en-ukraine-les-deux-visages-de-marioupol-sous-controle-russe_5174575.html (accessed November 7, 2023).

445 Truth Hounds interview with Yehor, Kryvyi Rih, August 9, 2022.

446 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykola, Narva, July 17, 2022.

447 Human Rights Watch interview with Roman, Kyiv, September 23, 2022.

448 Human Rights Watch telephone interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), November 3, 2022.

449 “Guerre en Ukraine: le cessez-le-feu à Marioupol n’est pas respecté,” Franceinfo, March 31, 2022, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/guerre-en-ukraine-le-cessez-le-feu-a-marioupol-n-est-pas-respecte_5056063.html (accessed November 7, 2023).

450 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

451 Human Rights Watch interview with Mark, Dnipro, June 10, 2022. Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen, Vinnytsia, August 5, 2022. One of the men said he saw photos of these graves on Telegram. Мариуполь | Super Marik (Mariupol I Super Marik) (@mariupol_super_marik), post to Telegram channel, June 9, 2022, https://t.me/mariupol_super_marik/10321 (accessed November 7, 2023); Мариуполь | Super Marik (@mariupol_super_marik) post to Telegram channel, June 9, 2022, https://t.me/mariupol_super_marik/10321 (accessed January 19, 2024).

452 Разрушения Мариуполя на карте (2000 домов), Могилы и места гибели жителей: Могилы. 26-й квартал, GoogleMaps, https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer? entry=yt&mid=1n0elDNzvK4vQYmWxCn2792ljSXNJK4x3& ll=47.13135920280282%2C37.55388756809411&z=19 (accessed January 24, 2024); Мариуполь | Super Marik (Mariupol I Super Marik) (@mariupol_super_marik), post to Telegram channel, June 9, 2022, https://t.me/mariupol_super_marik/10321 (accessed November 7, 2023).

453 Human Rights Watch interviews with Yulia and Polina, Dnipro, June 11, 2022.

454 Human Rights Watch interview with Anhelina, Vinnytsia, August 19, 2022.

455 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

456 Human Rights Watch interview with Dariia, Dnipro, June 9, 2022.

457 Murado (@msgazdiev) post to Telegram channel, April 7, 2022, https://t.me/msgazdiev/861 (accessed January 19, 2024); Мариуполь сейчас (@mariupolnow), post to Telegram channel, May 10, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolnow/9897 (accessed January 19, 2024).

458 Truth Hounds interview with Roman, Kyiv, September 23, 2022; Truth Hounds interview with Svitlana, Kyiv, September 27, 2022.

459 Human Rights Watch interview with Roman, Kyiv, September 23, 2022; Мариуполь Главный photo post to VK, April 13, 2022, https://vk.com/chp_d0netsk?z=photo-186819543_457241646%2Fwall-186819543_5586 (accessed January 19, 2024); “Маріуполь: «Земля відмерзла, змогли поховати» | Жінки викопують могили посеред спального району,” March 25, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=311Zp_qfyMk&ab_channel=РадіоСвободаУкраїна, (accessed January 19, 2024).

460 Human Rights Watch interview with Svitlana, Kyiv, September 27, 2022.

461 Ibid.

462 Olena Halushka (@OlenaHalushka), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), November 8, 2022, https://twitter.com/olenahalushka/status/1589891236668006400 (accessed November 7, 2023).

463 Human Rights Watch interview with a senior health official (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, March 3, 2023.

464 Human Rights Watch interview with a senior health official (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, March 3, 2023.

465 “Cholera Fears Prompt Quarantine in Ukraine’s Mariupol; Country Prepares for Disease Outbreaks,” The Washington Post, June 6, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/06/mariupol-cholera-quarantine/ (accessed November 15, 2023).

466 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

467 See above, Chapter VII, Case Studies: Attacks on Civilians.

468 “DPR: Emergency services continue search and rescue operations in Mariupol *GRAPHIC,*” video clip, April 9, 2022, Ruptly, https://www.ruptly.tv/en/videos/20220409-019-DNR-emergency-services-continue-search-and-rescue-operations-in-mariupol-graphic-?search_key=ed41f659-1472-41b3-a811-f4958b05748c (accessed November 27, 2023).

469 Human Rights Watch interview with Tetiana Burak, Lviv, April 22, 2022.

470 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023.

471 Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen Sosnovskyi, Kyiv, March 4, 2023.

472 Human Rights Watch interview with Zlata, Lviv, May 7, 2022.

473 Civil Voices Museum, “Яна Степанова ‘Если убираешь трупы, получаешь 30 тысяч рублей,’” video report, May 12, 2022, https://civilvoicesmuseum.org/ru/stories/%22esli-ubiraesh-trupy-poluchaesh-30-tysyach-rublej%22 (accessed November 7, 2023).

474 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykola, Narva, July 17, 2022.

475 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022.

476 The mall was about 300 meters from the westernmost end of Shevchenka Boulevard. The Guardian and France TV 2 also published information about this morgue, including images of piles of bodies in the morgue’s courtyard. Isobel Koshiw, “Makeshift Graves and Notes on Doors: The Struggle to Find and Bury Mariupol’s Dead,” The Guardian, June 1, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/01/makeshift-graves-and-notes-on-doors-the-struggle-to-find-and-bury-mariupol-dead-ukraine (accessed November 7, 2023); “Guerre en Ukraine: 100 jours après le début du conflit, les deux visages de Marioupol désormais sous contrôle russe,” Franceinfo, June 3, 2022, https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/guerre-en-ukraine-les-deux-visages-de-marioupol-sous-controle-russe_5174575.html (accessed November 7, 2023).

477 See above, Chapter VII, Case Studies: Attacks on Civilians.

478 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Stefaniia, April 25, 2023, July 13, 2023, and August 28, 2023. See above, Chapter VII, Case Studies: Attacks on Civilians.

479 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro Lastenko, October 29, 2022.

480 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with a man who visited the morgue in early June 2022, November 17, 2022.

481 Ожоговое отделение, Городская больница №1, Mariupol Medkontrol, https://mariupol.medkontrol.pro/gorbolnica-1/ozhogovoe-otdelenie (accessed November 7, 2023).

482 Human Rights Watch telephone interviews with Stefaniia, April 25, 2023, July 13, 2023, and August 28, 2023.

483 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

484 “At Least 22,000 Civilians Killed in Mariupol - Mayor’s Adviser,” Interfax-Ukraine, May 25, 2022, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/834794.html (accessed November 7, 2023).

485 Nick Cumming-Bruce, “The U.N. Says the Civilian Death Toll in Ukraine Is More than 8,000, and Probably Significantly Higher,” The New York Times, February 21, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/02/21/world/russia-biden-putin-ukraine-war (accessed November 7, 2023).

486 This November 16, 2022 image from a video shows some of the new graves dug since the Russian siege began, at the Starokrymske cemetery on the outskirts of Mariupol. Most are marked only by number. The Associated Press estimated at least 10,300 new graves in and around Mariupol - 8,500 in this cemetery - by analyzing satellite imagery from early March through December, noting sections where the earth had been disturbed. Lori Hinnant, Vasilisa Stepanenko, Sarah El Deeb and Elizaveta Tilna “Russia scrubs Mariupol’s Ukraine identity, builds on death,” AP News, December 22, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-erasing-mariupol-499dceae43ed77f2ebfe750ea99b9ad9 (accessed December 18, 2023).

487 Before February 2022, the cemetery only had individual graves.

488 Truth Hounds interview with Oleksandr Yaroshenko, Kyiv, April 6, 2023.

489 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, November 17, 2022.

490 Satellite imagery from March 17, 2022, shows no graves at the site. The first satellite imagery showing graves is from March 28, 2022.

491 Human Rights Watch confidential telephone interview, November 17, 2022.

492 Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen, Vinnytsia, August 5, 2022.

493 No new graves are visible in satellite imagery between October 12, 2022, and March 31, 2023.

494 Mariupol City Council (@mariupolrada), post to Telegram channel, April 21, 2022, https://t.me/mariupolrada/9324 (accessed November 7, 2023).

495 Human Rights Watch interview (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, August 31, 2022.

496 We could not undertake a historical satellite analysis for Pavlov Street cemetery because the cemetery’s graves are covered by tree canopy. The graves dug there after February 24, 2022, are located just to the east of the cemetery where there are no trees.

497 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with official from the Donetsk Regional Bureau of Forensic Medicine (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), May 4, 2023.

498 Human Rights Watch interview with Anastasiia Abramets, Victims.Memorial, Lviv, February 20, 2023.

499 Катерина Дяченко, Victims.Memorial, March 12, 2022, https://www.victims.memorial/people/katia_diachenko (accessed November 7, 2023).

500 Віктор Дєдов, Victims.Memorial, March 11, 2022, https://www.victims.memorial/people/viktor_diedov (accessed November 7, 2023).

501 Володимир Зеленський (Volodymyr Zelenskyy), post to Facebook, April 23, 2022 https://www.facebook.com/zelenskiy.official/posts/ pfbid0c8i24dwoLso3ir3hNxoAteGu7G5TFJHB HekVQ3xeRT4XxhRWbimDYHKFmSKVS6R2l (accessed November 7, 2023).

502 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Anna Murlykina, editor in chief, May 18, 2023.

503 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Anna Murlykina, editor in chief, May 18, 2023.

504 Ванда Об’єдкова, Victims.Memorial, April 3, 2022, https://www.victims.memorial/people/vanda-objedkova (accessed November 7, 2023).

505 Аліна Перегудова, Victims.Memorial, https://www.victims.memorial/people/alina_perehudova (accessed November 7, 2023).

506 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro Cherepanov, website administrator, August 15, 2022. For more on this website, see below in the section on the Missing.

507 Letter from Ukrainian Interior Ministry to Human Rights Watch, July 31, 2023.

508 These include a channel for Mytropolytska Street 98, and a next-door building, two groups for Prymorskyi district, a group for Azovstalska 15, a group for three buildings at the far western end of Myru Avenue, and a group for Myru Avenue 143.

509 Isobel Koshiw, “Makeshift Graves and Notes on Doors: The Struggle to Find and Bury Mariupol’s Dead,” The Guardian, June 1, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/01/makeshift-graves-and-notes-on-doors-the-struggle-to-find-and-bury-mariupol-dead-ukraine (accessed November 7, 2023).

510 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dmytro Cherepanov, website administrator, August 15, 2022.

511 Human Rights Watch written exchange with an administrator from MRPL.life, February 23, 2023.

512 Шукаємо маріупольців, MRPL Lost, https://lost.mrpl.life/looking (accessed December 6, 2023).

513 As of September 25, 2023, they included Smaller Telegram, including Мариуполь. Поиск пропавших людей (@mariupol_people_search), https://t.me/mariupol_people_search (accessed November 7, 2023), (324 members; 5551 photos); Мариуполь поисках своих родных!!!, (@mariypolpoisk), https://t.me/mariypolpoisk (accessed November 8, 2023), (281 members; 10,345 photos); Поиск близких, Мариуполь, (@searchforloved), https://t.me/searchforloved (accessed November 8, 2023), (6144 subscribers; 1543 photos); Поиск родных и близких Мариуполь 2022 Chat (@findmariupol), https://t.me/findmariupol (accessed November 8, 2023), (487 members; 12,302 photos); Mariupol City District-based Telegram groups, including https://t.me/findmar_kalmius (152 members; 3180 photos, Kalmiuskyi District); https://t.me/findmar_centr (159 members; 3659 photos, Central District); https://t.me/findmar_levberj (169 members; 3091 photos, Left Bank); and https://t.me/findmar_primorsk (208 members; 2533 photos, Prymorskyi District); A Viber group for missing persons: Поиск Пропавших Мариуполь / Эвакуация, Viber community, https://invite.viber.com/? g2=AQAnoEBJKLTsEU7dlc9cy%2FDD%2BzjaeQvgg ZTHFD%2BqHTI%2BxCf7x0485ZSuHTqA6csU (1,745 members); Viber Groups covering specific city districts and sub-districts, including information about the missing: Бахчиванджи 25; 27; 27а., Viber community, https://invite.viber.com/?g2=AQA0%2Bvpkc4AIRk7WPB9oGosRygpIquv Q6vWeKRbFt81i5yQUD3BhSmZzCffViTrk (299 members); Приморский-Мариуполь, Viber community, https://invite.viber.com/? g2=AQAAqULC6zqAlk7efAnyNoN6fU3CLUMaHfdnv 2HKlUG03j1nv4W%2BJTiEa3HxDRnE (1,101 members; Prymorskyi District); Пр.Металлургов 67-100, Viber community, https://invite.viber.com/? g2=AQB3soM%2BfmWC2U7ltXqYpDQUtq2Bw%2F5mq %2FCThLh4GWEJuGW8PRelkUVAv9RiuJMj&lang=en (468 members; Metalurhiv Avenue 67-100); and a website called “Search in Mariupol and in affected areas of Ukraine” Looking For You, Search in Mariupol and in affected areas of Ukraine, http://shukaty.com/ (accessed November 8, 2023).

514 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Natalia, March 11, 2023.

515 Human Rights Watch interview with Yelizar Hrankov, Kyiv, May 5, 2023. Human Rights Watch reviewed the first available clear satellite imagery, taken on March 13, which showed damage to the school.

516 Truth Hounds telephone interview with Dmytro Pasternak, May 17, 2023.

517 Truth Hounds interview with Oleksandr Yaroshenko, Kyiv, April 6, 2023.

518 Human Rights Watch interview with Yelizar Hrankov, Kyiv, May 5, 2023.

519 Human Rights Watch interview with Mykhailo Pasichnyi, Kyiv, March 25, 2023.

520 Human Rights Watch interview with a deputy head of Mariupol city council (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, May 5, 2023.

521 Human Rights Watch interview with Tetiana, Dnipro, May 10, 2022.

522 Human Rights Watch interview with Diana, Dnipro, June 21, 2022.

523 Human Rights Watch interview with Yevhen Sosnovskyi, Kyiv, March 4, 2023.

524 Human Rights Watch interview with Vaagn Mnatsakanian, Arles, October 12, 2022.

525 “Coercion and Control: Ukraine’s Health Care System under Russian Occupation,” Physicians for Human Rights, December 12, 2023, https://phr.org/our-work/resources/coercion-and-control-ukraines-health-care-system-under-russian-occupation/ (accessed December 13, 2023). Regarding Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, see TACC (@tass_agency), post to Telegram channel, October 6, 2023, https://t.me/tass_agency/213021 (accessed December 12, 2023).

526 Human Rights Watch interview with Iryna Korobka, Zaporizhzhia, September 2, 2022; Human Rights Watch interview with one of Mariupol’s deputy mayors (name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch), Kyiv, August 31, 2022.

527 Николай Осыченко (@NickolayOsychenko), post to Telegram channel, February 11, 2023, https://t.me/NickolayOsychenko/1313?fbclid=IwAR0NTF6t3qfgQmjrAj2xTS_dWTKtsZw2S5_QxstdAYrEFI8s-rnLdlwY2ZE (accessed November 7, 2023).

528 “Demolition of High-Rise Buildings Demolished in Mariupol Will Be Completed This Year,” RIA Novosti, February 13, 2023, https://ria.ru/20230213/mariupol-1851596718.html (accessed January 20, 2024).

529 Ibid.

531 Мариуполь, Official Website of Ministry of Construction of DNR, https://archive.is/dC9yk#selection-133.0-137.14 (accessed November 7, 2023).

532 “‘The Real Goal Is to Hide the Traces of War’: Moscow’s Plan for Rebuilding Mariupol, a City ‘Wiped off the Face of the Earth’ by Russian Troops,” Meduza, October 13, 2022, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/10/13/the-real-goal-is-to-hide-the-traces-of-war (accessed November 7, 2023).

533 Концепция мастер-плана развития города Мариуполь, Ministry of Construction, Housing and Utilities of the Russian Federation, 2022, https://meduza.io/static/pdf/minstroy-mariupol-ps-29-07-itogovaya.pdf (accessed November 8, 2023). In February 2023, the Guardian published a slide show in Russian summarizing the document. Shaun Walker, Isobal Koshiw, Pjotr Sauer, Morten Risberg, Liz Cookman, and Luke Harding, “Mariupol: The Ruin of a City,” The Guardian, February 23, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city (accessed November 7, 2023).

534 Joris Heijkant, Titus Knegtel, Hessel von Piekartz, and Erik Verwiel, “We are still alive. What is life like in Russian-occupied Mariupol?,” Volkskrant Kijk Verder, February 13, 2023, https://www.volkskrant.nl/kijkverder/v/2023/we-are-still-alive-what-is-life-like-in-russian-occupied-mariupol~v646390/ (accessed November 7, 2023).

535 Ibid; Shaun Walker, Isobal Koshiw, Pjotr Sauer, Morten Risberg, Liz Cookman, and Luke Harding, “Mariupol: The Ruin of a City,” The Guardian, February 23, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city (accessed November 7, 2023).

536 Kseniya Kvitka, “Russia Threatens Ukrainians Who Refuse Russian Citizenship,” commentary, Human Rights Watch Dispatch, May 16, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/16/russia-threatens-ukrainians-who-refuse-russian-citizenship.

537 Joris Heijkant, Titus Knegtel, Hessel von Piekartz, and Erik Verwiel, “We are still alive. What is life like in Russian-occupied Mariupol?,” Volkskrant Kijk Verder, February 13, 2023, https://www.volkskrant.nl/kijkverder/v/2023/we-are-still-alive-what-is-life-like-in-russian-occupied-mariupol~v646390/ (accessed November 7, 2023); Shaun Walker, Isobal Koshiw, Pjotr Sauer, Morten Risberg, Liz Cookman, and Luke Harding, “Mariupol: The Ruin of a City,” The Guardian, February 23, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city (accessed November 7, 2023). The new Russian curriculum for high school students includes a new history textbook that justifies the full-scale invasion and through misinformation and distortions seeks to portray Ukraine as a “neo-Nazi state.” Pjotr Sauer, “Russia Releases History Schoolbook Praising Ukraine Invasion,” The Guardian, August 8, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/08/russia-releases-history-schoolbook-praising-ukraine-invasion (accessed November 7, 2023).

538 Study materials “History of Russia, 11 Grade, Basic level.” В.Р. Мединский, А.В. Торкунов, 2023, https://www.codastory.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/История_России_11_класс_Базовый_уровень_Учебник.pdf (accessed December 11, 2023).

539 Katia Patin, “The Kremlin revises a textbook to dictate future understanding of Russian history,” Coda Story, August 14, 2023, https://www.codastory.com/rewriting-history/kremlin-texbook-ukraine/ (accessed December 6, 2023).

540 Human Rights Watch interview with Yaroslav, history teacher from Mariupol, Kyiv, November 1, 2022.

541 Human Rights Watch interview with Yaroslava Mozghova, director of Osvitoria Hub, Kyiv, November 1, 2022,

542 Human Rights Watch interview with Yaroslav, history teacher from Mariupol, Kyiv, November 2, 2022.

543 “Тетради с Путиным и Комиксы Об Убийцах: Как Детей в Мариуполе Травят Российской Пропагандой (Фото),” ТСН, August 30, 2023, https://tsn.ua/ru/ato/tetradi-s-putinym-i-komiksy-ob-ubiycah-kak-detey-v-mariupole-travyat-rossiyskoy-propagandoy-foto-2400406.html (accessed November 7, 2023).

544 Shaun Walker, Isobal Koshiw, Pjotr Sauer, Morten Risberg, Liz Cookman, and Luke Harding, “Mariupol: The Ruin of a City,” The Guardian, February 23, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city (accessed November 7, 2023).

545 Human Rights Watch, “We Had No Choice:” “Filtration” and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2022), https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forcibly-transferring-ukrainian-civilians.

546 Human Rights Watch, “We Had No Choice:” “Filtration” and the Crime of Forcibly Transferring Ukrainian Civilians to Russia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2022), https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/09/01/we-had-no-choice/filtration-and-crime-forcibly-transferring-ukrainian-civilians.

547 Joris Heijkant, Titus Knegtel, Hessel von Piekartz, and Erik Verwiel, “We are still alive. What is life like in Russian-occupied Mariupol?,” Volkskrant Kijk Verder, February 13, 2023, https://www.volkskrant.nl/kijkverder/v/2023/we-are-still-alive-what-is-life-like-in-russian-occupied-mariupol~v646390/ (accessed November 7, 2023).

548 Vladimir Putin: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/leader.htm (accessed May 6, 2023); “The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” Constitution of the Russian Federation adopted December 12, 1993, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm (accessed January 24, 2024), art. 87.

549 Sergei Shoigu has been serving in this role since November 6, 2012. Sergei Shoigu: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/minister.htm (accessed May 6, 2023). His extensive powers and responsibilities include the exercise of control over the deployment and use of the armed forces, based on the president’s decision. Полномочия Министра обороны Российской Федерации, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://doc.mil.ru/documents/extended_search/more.htm?id=10912180@egNPA (accessed May 6, 2023).

550 Valery Gerasimov has been serving in this role since November 9, 2012. Valery Gerasimov: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/deputy/more.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee (accessed May 6, 2023).

551 Alexis A Blanc et al., “The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a ‘Besieged Fortress,’” RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-7.html (accessed November 7, 2023); Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 23, 2013, No. 631, as amended on January 17, 2022, “Issues of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (together with the “Regulations on the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”), https://legalacts.ru/doc/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-ot-23072013-n-631/ (accessed November 13, 2023), point 26.

552 Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9710@egOrganization (accessed June 26, 2023).

553 Ibid.

554 Blanc et al., “The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a ‘Besieged Fortress,’” RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-7.html (accessed November 7, 2023), pp. 24-26.

555 Mikhail Evgenievich Mizintsev: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://web.archive.org/web/20230324145320/ https://structure.mil.ru/management/details.htm?id=12000953@SD_Employee (accessed June 28, 2023).

556 “Северный флот России получил статус военного округа,” Interfax.ru, January 1, 2021, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/743819 (accessed November 7, 2023).

557 Michael Kofman et al., “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts,” Center for Naval Analysis, 2021, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/10/russian-military-strategy-core-tenets-and-concepts (accessed December 11, 2023); “Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts,” Center for Naval Analysis, 2021, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/10/russian-military-strategy-core-tenets-and-concepts (accessed December 11, 2023); Lester W Grau and Charles K Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 29. At the time of the full-scale invasion and throughout the period this report covers, the Russian government did not officially classify the conflict in Ukraine as a war.

558 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 19, 2017, No. 177, as amended on November 5, 2020, https://lawnotes.ru/president-rf/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-ot-19.04.2017-n-177 (accessed January 12, 2023).

559 Mark Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015).

560 Galeotti, Spetsnaz; Christopher Marsh, “Developments in Russian Special Operations: Russia’s Spetsnaz, SOF and Special Operations Command,” CANSOFCOM Education and Research Center, 2017, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D4-10-21-2017-eng.pdf (accessed July 12, 2023), p. 18; Grau and Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 283.

561 Blanc et al., “The Russian General Staff: Understanding the Military’s Decisionmaking Role in a ‘Besieged Fortress,’” RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1233-7.html (accessed November 7, 2023), pp. 22-23.

562 Grau and Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 283.

563 Galeotti, Spetsnaz.

564 Both the Military Transport Aviation Command and the Long-Range Aviation Command are described by the Russian Ministry of Defense as a “[resource] of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.” Air Force Aviation, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/air/structure/aircraft.htm (accessed November 7, 2023).

565 Russian Frontal Aviation Arms Order of Battle, Eastern Order of Battle, February 6, 2022, http://www.easternorbat.com/html/russian_air_force_eng.html (accessed November 7, 2023).

566 Air Force Aviation, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/air/structure/aircraft.htm (accessed November 7, 2023).

567 Grau and Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 387.

568 “Federal Law of July 3, 2016 No. 226-FZ,” Official website of the President of Russia, https://web.archive.org/web/20230323043540/ http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40960 (accessed January 15, 2024).

569 Viktor Zolotov was awarded the rank of General of the Army on November 10, 2015. On April 5, 2016, he was appointed to the position of the Director of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops-Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian federation. Zolotov Viktor Vasilievich, Rosguard, https://web.archive.org/web/20221028082527/ https://rosguard.gov.ru/ru/page/AjaxPartial/zolotov-viktor-vasilevich (accessed October 28, 2022). As recently as February 2023, Zolotov also visited national guard troops in Kherson and Crimea, where he gave awards to his forces for their role in the invasion. Директор Росгвардии посетил подразделения ведомства в Республике Крым и в Херсонской области, Rosguard, February 3, 2023, https://rosguard.gov.ru/News/Article/direktor-rosgvardii-posetil-podrazdeleniya-vedomstva-v-respublike-krym-i-v-xersonskoj-oblasti (accessed March 30, 2023); Structure of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, Rosguard, https://web.archive.org/web/20230226115903/ https://rosguard.gov.ru/page/index/structure (accessed November 27, 2023).

570 Ibid.

571 Ibid.

572 Anecdotal evidence indicates that Kadyrov may have played a direct role in planning or directing some of the national guard forces deployed in Mariupol that were dispatched from Chechnya. In a post to his personal Telegram account, Kadyrov shows a meeting involving Adam Delimkhanov and the commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army, Andrey Mordvichev, in which Kadyrov made “proposals to the action plan” in Mariupol. Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, April 8, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1822 (accessed July 12, 2023).

573 «Владимир Путин присвоил Рамзану Кадырову звание генерал-майора», Радио Свобода, July 23, 2020, https://www.svoboda.org/a/30743775.html (accessed December 11, 2023).

574 On March 21, 2022, Ramzan Kadyrov asserted on his Telegram channel that he was commanding Chechen fighters through Adam Delimkhanov, who was in command of Chechen fighters in Mariupol, and was in constant contact with Delimkhanov while the fighters were “eliminating firing positions” and supporting the Russian military. Ramzan Kadyrov (Kadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 15, 2023).

575 “Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic,” dnronline.su, https://web.archive.org/web/20220222063919/ https://dnronline.su/en/head-of-the-dpr/ (accessed December 18, 2023).

576 Ibid; “State structure of the Donetsk People’s Republic,” Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, https://web.archive.org/web/20220605125230/ https://denis-pushilin.ru/gosudarstvennoe-ustrojstvo-donetskoj-narodnoj-respubliki/ (accessed December 18, 2023).

577 Russian state media reported that commander of the DNR 1st Army Corps, Major General Roman Kutuzov, was killed in action on June 5, 2022. “Battle for Donbass: How Major General Roman Kutuzov Died,” Tsargrad, June 5, 2022, https://tsargrad.tv/news/boj-za-donbass-kak-pogib-general-major-roman-kutuzov_560811 (accessed November 9, 2023); ANNA NEWS (@anna_news), post to Telegram channel, October 29, 2022, https://t.me/anna_news/42020 (accessed November 9, 2023); РИА ФАН (@riafan), post to Telegram channel, July 16, 2022, https://t.me/riafan/103883 (accessed November 9, 2023). Russian war correspondents memorialized Kutuzov’s death. Сладков+ (@Sladkov_plus), post to Telegram channel, June 5, 2022, https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5614 (accessed November 9, 2023); Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны, post to Telegram channel, (@RVvoenkor), January 2, 2023, https://t.me/RVvoenkor/35096 (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post Telegram channel, November 1, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/8988 (accessed November 9, 2023). Ukrainian sources citing the Ukrainian military confirmed Kutuzov’s death on June 5, 2022. “Ukrainian Military Eliminates Russia’s Major General Kutuzov: Who Was He?,” The New Voice of Ukraine, June 6, 2022, https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukrainian-military-eliminates-russian-major-general-kutuzov-50247918.html (accessed November 9, 2023). Prior to commanding the 1st Army Corps, Kutuzov served as Chief of Staff of the 29th Combined Arms Army, following a career in the Russian armed forces. Эшелон с легендарными танками Т-34 сделал остановку в Чите, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, January 13, 2019, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12211888@egNews (accessed November 9, 2023); Кутузов Роман Владимирович, Warheroes, https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=32769 (accessed November 9, 2023).

578 Ратифицированы договоры и приняты законы о вхождении в состав России ДНР, ЛНР, Запорожской и Херсонской областей, Official Website of The State of Duma, October 3, 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/news/55407/ (accessed November 9, 2023). In at least one case, a Russian media outlet reported that the unit leader of the DNR’s Somalia battalion was awarded the “Order of Courage” by President Putin for actions in Mariupol. “Донбасскому комбату «Сомали» Тимуру Курилкину присвоили звание Героя ДНР и передали Орден Мужества от Путина,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Donetsk, April 3, 2022, https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/daily/27374.5/4567430 (accessed November 9, 2023). In December 2022, Russia’s Ministry of Defense published a post on its Telegram page that shows Putin presenting “Battle Colors” to the first Donetsk and Second Guards Luhansk-Severodonetsk army corps and presenting awards to soldiers the ministry says are from DNR and LNR forces. Official Channel of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (@mod_russia), post to Telegram channel, December 31, 2022, https://t.me/mod_russia/23079 (accessed November 9, 2023).

579 Ibid.

580 In July 2020, Lt. Gen. Leonid Holopatiuk, chief of the Main Department of Military Cooperation and Verification of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, presented a report to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in which he stated that both DNR and LNR forces had command positions staffed in part by Russian servicemen. “Presentation by Lieutenant-General Leonid Holopatiuk Chief of Main Department of Military Cooperation and Verification of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” 950th Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, 1 July 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/0/457468.pdf (accessed November 9, 2023).

581 In July 2020, Lt. Gen. Holopatiuk stated that Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army was the parent unit of DNR and LNR’s 1st and 2nd Army Corps. “Presentation by Lieutenant-General Leonid Holopatiuk,” 950th Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, 1 July 2020, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/0/457468.pdf (accessed November 9, 2023); Andrew Bowen, “Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border,“ Congressional Research Service, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11806 (accessed November 9, 2023), p.2; “‘Армии ЛДНР’ передают в подчинение 8-й армии Южного военного округа ВС РФ - Тымчук,” Ostro, https://www.ostro.org/ru/news/armyy-ldnr-peredayut-v-podchynenye-8-j-armyy-yuzhnogo-voennogo-okruga-vs-rf-tymchuk-i246746 (accessed November 9, 2023).

582 Ратифицированы договоры и приняты законы о вхождении в состав России ДНР, ЛНР, Запорожской и Херсонской областей, Official Website of The State of Duma, October 3, 2022, http://duma.gov.ru/news/55407/ (accessed November 9, 2023).

583 US intelligence suggests that by April 10, 2022, Dvornikov was the overall commander of operations in Ukraine. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment April 11,” Institute for the Study of War, April 11, 2022, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-11 (accessed November 9, 2023).

584 Шойгу впервые назначил командующего войсками на спецоперации, RBC, October 8, 2022, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/10/2022/63416a959a7947a652f10e55 (accessed November 9, 2023On January 11, Valery Gerasimov was appointed as head of the group of integrated forces, making Sergei Surovikin one of his deputy commanders. “Gerasimov Appointed Commander of Russian Group of Forces in Ukraine Operation,” TASS, January 11, 2023, https://tass.com/politics/1561153 (accessed November 9, 2023).

585 «Встреча с Министром обороны Сергеем Шойгу Official Website of President of Russia official, July 4, 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68815 (accessed November 9, 2023).

586 Human Rights Watch was not able to identify specific air force units involved in conducting air strikes in Mariupol.

587 Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February - July 2022,” RUSI, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 (accessed November 9, 2023), p. 9.

588 At time of writing, Dvornikov’s official biography still said he held this position. Dvornikov Alexander Vladimirovich, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://structure.mil.ru/management/info.htm?id=12088926@SD_Employee (accessed November 9, 2023). He was promoted to the rank of General of the Army on June 23, 2020. Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated June 23, 2020, No. 413, “On conferring a military rank on A.V. Dvornikov,” http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202006230049 (accessed November 9, 2023). On February 17, 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense published the names of new commanders for each of the four military districts and included an announcement of the appointment of Col. Gen. Sergey Kuzovlev to the position of commander of the Southern Military District in January 2023. Defense Ministry Officially Announces Commanders of Four Russian Military Districts,” TASS, February 17, 2023, https://tass.com/defense/1577923 (accessed November 9, 2023).

589 The Southern Military District order of battle was drawn from unpublished data shared with Human Rights Watch by the Institute for the Study of War.

590 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (@GeneralStaff.ua), post to Facebook, March 1, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/262194402760312 (accessed November 13, 2023); General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (@GeneralStaff.ua), post to Facebook, March 2, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/263000569346362 (accessed November 13, 2023); General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (@GeneralStaff.ua), post to Facebook, March 4, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/264313929215026 (accessed November 13, 2023); “Росармія наступатиме в напрямку Сєвєродонецька, Слов’янська та Волновахи, аби створити умови для оточення,” ArmyInform. April 15, 2022, https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/04/15/rosarmiya-nastupatyme-v-napryamku-syevyerodoneczka-slovyanska-ta-volnovahy-aby-stvoryty-umovy-dlya-otochennya/ (accessed November 13, 2023).

591 War criminals of the Russian Federation: MORDVYCHEV Andrey Nikolaevich, Defense Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, https://gur.gov.ua/content/mordvychev-andrei-nykolaevych.html (accessed November 13, 2023).

592 Оперативные сводки (@opersvodki), post to Telegram channel, March 28, 2022, https://t.me/opersvodki/2478 (accessed November 13, 2023).

593 Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et al., “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022,” RUSI, November 30, 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-conventional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine-february-july-2022 (accessed November 9, 2023); Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 4,” Institute for the Study of War, March 4, 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4 (accessed November 13, 2023).

594 Ibid.

595 Clark, Barros, and Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16,” Institute for the Study of War, March 16, 2022, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16 (accessed November 13, 2023).

596 Приватний канал (@polkazov), post to Telegram channel, https://t.me/polkazov/4178 (accessed November 13, 2023); ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS (@Tsaplienko), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/Tsaplienko/3248 (accessed November 13, 2023).

597 Rob Lee (@RALee85), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 15, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1503927379240099842 (accessed November 2, 2023); “Ukraine reported the death of the fourth Russian general since the start of the war,” Meduza, March 16, 2022, https://meduza.io/news/2022/03/16/v-ukraine-soobschili-o-gibeli-chetvertogo-s-nachala-voyny-rossiyskogo-generala (accessed November 2, 2023); WorldOnAlert (@worldonalert) post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 15, 2022, https://twitter.com/worldonalert/status/1503854809237139462 (accessed November 2, 2023); Pravda Gerashchenko, (@PravdaGerashchenko_robot), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/Pravda_Gerashchenko/4889 (accessed November 2, 2023); Zelenskiy / Official (@V_Zelenskiy_official), post to Telegram channel, March 15, 2022, https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/831 (accessed November 2, 2023).

598 Russian magazine battime.ru reported that a Russian serviceman identified as 22-year-old Ruslan Fidusovich Aitov was killed in action in Mariupol on March 12. “На Украине погиб 22-летний танкист из Новочеркасска,” Battime.ru, April 14, 2022, https://battime.ru/na-ukraine-pogib-22-letnij-tankist-iz-novocherkasska.html (accessed January 24, 2023). Vechnaya Pamyat, a Russian site dedicated to memorializing Russian personnel killed during the invasion of Ukraine, identified Aitov as serving in the 68th Tank Regiment. Vechnaya Pamyat, August 19, 2022, https://vechnayapamyat.net/аитов-руслан-фидусович/ (accessed December 11, 2023). Vechnaya Pamyat reported that Sergeant Dmitry Alexandrovich Danchenko, a tank gunner with the 68th Tank Regiment of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, was killed in action in Mariupol on March 12. Label: Military unit 91714, Архивы В/Ч 91714 - Vechnaya Pamyat, accessed on Internet archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20230509053323/ https:/vechnayapamyat.net/tag/%D0%B2-%D1%87-91714/ (accessed January 24, 2024). Shakhty-media.ru, a Russian government information portal for the city of Shakhty in the Rostov region, said an Order of Courage medal was awarded posthumously to Sgt. Georgy Semyonovich Khangulyan, who was killed in action on March 12 near Mariupol. Vechnaya Pamyat identified Khangulyan as serving in the 68th Tank Regiment. “The Order of Courage was presented to the family of the deceased sergeant, Shakhty resident Georgy Khangulyan,” Shakhty Media, June 10, 2022, https://shakhty-media.ru/orden-muzhestva-vruchen-seme-pogibshego-serzhanta-shahtintsa-georgiya-hangulyana/ (accessed November 2, 2023). Vechnaya Pamyat reported Captain Alexander Andreyevich Khokhlov of the 68th Tank Regiment of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division was killed in action in Mariupol on March 12. Label: Military unit 91714, Архивы В/Ч 91714 - Vechnaya Pamyat, accessed on Internet archive, https://web.archive.org/web/20230509053323/ https:/vechnayapamyat.net/tag/%D0%B2-%D1%87-91714/ (accessed January 24, 2024). Russian news website Yuga reported that Timur Mashukov was killed in action in Mariupol on April 10. Vechnaya Pamyat identified Mashukov as serving in the 68th Tank Regiment. “A soldier from the Krasnodar region died in Mariupol,” Yuga.ru, April 14, 2022, https://www.yuga.ru/news/462629-vo-vremya-voennoj-specoperacii-v-ukraine-pogib-voennyj-iz-krasnodarskogo-kraya-ego-ubili-v-mariupole/ (accessed November 2, 2023). Tatar-language news site, Intertat, reported that Artyom Nagorkin of the 68th Tank Regiment, 150th Motorized Rifle Division was killed in action on April 17 near Mariupol. “«Июньдә өйләнешергә җыенганнар иде, җитешмәде» - Кайбычта тагын бер солдатны җирләделәр Бу хакта тулырак,” Intertat,tatar, April 29, 2022, https://intertat.tatar/news/iyunda-oilaneserga-yengannar-ide-itesmade-kaibycta-tagyn-ber-soldatny-irladelar-5852839 (accessed November 2, 2023).

599 Ilya Pitalev, “Tankers of the People’s Militia of the DPR equip a T-72 tank with ammunition on one of the streets of Mariupol,” RIA Novosti, April 5, 2022, https://riamediabank.ru/media/8158828.html?context=list&list_sid=list_263627700 (accessed November 2, 2023).

600 The emblem visible in this image in Ilya Pitalev, “Tankers of the People’s Militia of the DPR equip a T-72 tank with ammunition on one of the streets of Mariupol,” #8158828 RIA Novosti, April 5, 2022, https://riamediabank.ru/media/8158828.html?context=list&list_sid=list_263627700 (accessed November 2, 2023), was compared to emblems found on these websites: Chevron Patriot, https://shevronpatriot.ru/voennye-shevrony/suhoputnye-shevrony/shevron-68-tankovyj-polk-150-divizii.html (accessed December 11, 2023); Tank Forces, Sammler.Ru. November 4, 2020, http://www.sammler.ru/index.php?showtopic=8271&page=8#entry2075850/ (accessed November 6, 2023); Def Mon (@DefMon3), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 7, 2022, https://t.co/ylhyrz1G81 (accessed November 2, 2023); Военный Осведомитель (@milinfolive), post to Telegram channel, April 7, 2022, https://t.me/milinfolive/80629 (accessed November 6, 2023).

601 “Since beginning of war, defenders of Mariupol have destroyed about 6,000 Rashists and more than 100 vehicles of Russian Federation - Deputy Commander of ‘Azov’ Regiment Palamar,” Censor.net, May 13, 2022, https://censor.net/en/news/3341181/ since_beginning_of_war_defenders_of_mariupol_have_destroyed_ about_6000_rashists_and_more_than_100_vehicles (accessed November 8, 2023). (“Rashist” is a word blended from the Ukrainian pronunciation of the English words “Russia” and “fascist” used by some Ukrainians to describe Russians and Russian forces). “Defenders of Mariupol reported huge losses of Russians during their storm of the city,” Open Ukraine, May 13, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t30FXdRLJpA&ab_channel=OpenUkraine (accessed December 21, 2023); VIDEO. Defenders of Mariupol reported huge losses of Russians during the assault on the city - News - Kyiv Security Forum (openukraine.org); Serhii Zgurets, “Grief is beyond reason: before the battle for Donbas, the enemy is changing the organization of its units (analysis),” Defense Express, April 12, 2022, https://defenceua.com/army_and_war/ gore_bez_rozumu_pered_ bitvoju_za_donbas_vorog_ zminjuje_ organizatsiju_svojih_pidrozdiliv_ analiz-6908.html (accessed November 8, 2023).

602 Russian news site Donday reported that Aslan Magomedov of the 102ndnd Motorized Rifle Regiment was killed in action in Mariupol on an unspecified day in March 2022. “Еще двое военных из Ростовской области погибли во время спецоперации,” Donday, May, 12, 2022, https://archive.ph/3dD0f#selection-583.0-583.68 (accessed November 8, 2023); “The authorities of the cities and districts of Dagestan reported the death of six soldiers in Ukraine,” Caucasian Knot, March 29, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220329123354/ https:/kavkaz-uzel.global.ssl.fastly.net/articles/374684/ (accessed November 8, 2023). The Derbent district administration in Dagestan reported on March 11 that Gadzhiev Mailk Gadzhiibragimovich of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was killed in action in Mariupol. Necro Mancer (@666_mancer), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 13, 2022,https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1502923940351651845 (accessed November 2, 2023). Мавсум Рагимов выразил соболезнования родителям Малика Гаджиева, Official website of the Derbent District Administration, https://derbrayon.ru/news/novosti/mavsum-ragimov-vyrazil-soboleznovaniya-roditelyam-malika-gadzhieva (accessed on The Internet Archive, January 23, 2024). A VK post from March 17, 2022, stated that Yegor Alexandrovich Kanatnikov of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment was killed in action. Irina Samarina’s VK page, https://vk.com/wall73219135_2892 (accessed January 23, 2024). The Orel city administration site reported that Kanatnikov’s unit was in Mariupol. “In Orel, a Memorial Plaque to Honor Yegor Kanatnikov was unveiled,” Orel City Administration Website, November 11, 2022, https://www.orel-adm.ru/ru/about/news/novosti/v-orle-otkryli-pamyatnuyu-dosku-egoru-kanatnikovu/ (accessed December 21, 2023).

603 Viktor Maksimchuk, Top Cargo 200, March 6, 2022, https://topcargo200.com/106/ (accessed November 8, 2023). “The major who died near Mariupol will be buried under Goryachiy Klyuch,” 93.RU, March 15, 2022, https://93.ru/text/incidents/2022/03/15/70508669/ (accessed November 8, 2023). “Major Viktor Maksimchuk, 44, was commander of a motorized rifle regiment, who also died in fighting near Mariupol. Mikhail Belyakov, a 30-year-old sergeant from Penza region, was killed in Ukraine on 27 February. He was a father of two.” Jack Hutton (@jackhutton), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 18, 2022, https://twitter.com/jackhutton/status/1504723354560851968 (accessed November 8, 2023). “Дополнение: похоронен в станице Бакинская Краснодарского края,” Necro Mancer (@666_mancer) post to X (formerly known as Twitter), June 18, 2022, https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1538242643653697537?lang=en (accessed November 8, 2023); “Погиб в боевых действиях в Украине майор Виктор Максимчук из Краснодарского края…”, Necro Mancer (@666_mancer) post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 11, 2022, https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1502342842315943940?lang=en (accessed November 8, 2023); Православная община, post to VK, March 11, 2022, https://vk.com/wall-186179224_730 (accessed November 8, 2023); Kieren Williams and Will Stewart, “Russian general killed with 7 soldiers from feared unit under Putin’s direct control,” Mirror Online, March 16, 2022, https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/russian-general-killed-trying-storm-26478770 (accessed November 8, 2023); Титушки в Краснодаре 693 (@majdankrd), post to Telegram channel, June 18, 2022, https://t.me/majdankrd/11478 (accessed November 8, 2023).

604 BMP-3 ∙ #1771 documenting material losses in Russo-Ukrainian war, WarSpotting, November 25, 2022, https://ukr.warspotting.net/view/14581/58660/ (accessed November 8, 2023).

605 “Since beginning of war, defenders of Mariupol have destroyed about 6,000 Rashists and more than 100 vehicles of Russian Federation - Deputy Commander of ‘Azov’ Regiment Palamar,” Censor.net, May 13, 2022, https://censor.net/en/n3341181 (accessed November 8, 2023); “Defenders of Mariupol reported huge losses of Russians during their storm of the city,” Open Ukraine, May 13, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t30FXdRLJpA&ab_channel=OpenUkraine (accessed December 21, 2023); VIDEO. Defenders of Mariupol reported huge losses of Russians during the assault on the city - News - Kyiv Security Forum (openukraine.org); Serhii Zgurets, “Grief is beyond reason: before the battle for Donbas, the enemy is changing the organization of its units (analysis),” Defense Express, April 12, 2022, https://defence-ua.com/army_and_war/ gore_bez_rozumu_pered_bitvoju_za_donbas_vorog_ zminjuje_organizatsiju_svojih_pidrozdiliv_analiz-6908.html (accessed November 8, 2023).

606 Kotsnews (@sashakots), post to Telegram channel, March 20, 2022, https://t.me/sashakots/30159 (accessed November 8, 2023); Yuri Gavrilov, “Served and died like a real officer,” RG.RU, March 21, 2022, https://rg.ru/2022/03/21/sluzhil-i-pogib-kak-nastoiashchij-oficer.html (accessed November 8, 2023); “Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Andrei Paliy has died,” TASS News Agency, March 20, 2022, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14128091 (accessed November 8, 2023); Замкомандующего Черноморским флотом Андрей Палий погиб на Украине, MK.RU, March 20, 2022, https://www.mk.ru/politics/2022/03/20/zamkomanduyushhego-chernomorskogo-flota-andrey-paliy-pogib-na-ukraine.html (accessed November 23, 2023); Alexey Belyanin, “Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Andrei Paliy, died in Ukraine,” Kommersant.ru, March 20, 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5269657 (accessed November 9, 2023).

607 Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev reported on April 16 that Corporal Sergei Sergeyevich Bondarenko, of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, was killed in action in Mariupol. “Старший матрос Бондаренко Сергей Сергеевич,” Vechnaya Pamyat, May 5, 2022, https://www.vechnayapamyat.net/старший-мат ергей/ (accessed May 24, 2023). Vechnaya Pamyat, a Russian site dedicated to memorializing Russian personnel killed during the invasion of Ukraine, reported that Mikhail Andreyevich Geraskin of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was killed in action in Mariupol on March 11. РаZVожаев (@razvozhaev), post to Telegram channel, April 16, 2022, https://t.me/razvozhaev/216 (accessed November 9, 2023); Rosgvardia_Russia, post to VK, March 9, 2022, https://vk.com/wall133897279_662? z=photo-172867724_457244225%2Fwall133897279_662 (accessed November 9, 2023). A September 20 post by Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev said that Igor Gennadiyevich Konovalenko of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade who was in Mariupol in the early days of the war was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland. РаZVожаев (@razvozhaev), post to Telegram Channel, September 20, 2023, https://t.me/razvozhaev/1074 (accessed November 9, 2023). Kavkaz.Reallii, a Russian-language outlet of US-funded Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, reported that Yaroslav Petrovich Krimenenko who was serving in the 810th Naval Infantry brigade was killed in action on March 28 in Mariupol. “Могилы предположительно убитых в Украине военных обнаружены в Ейске и соседних станицах,” Kavkaz.Reallii, October 23, 2022, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/mogily-predpolozhiteljno-ubityh-v-ukraine-voennyh-obnaruzheny-v-eyske/32097047.html (accessed November 11, 2023). In a Telegram post, Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev said that Sergeant Vladimir Nikolayevich Krivopalov, of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, had been killed in action in Mariupol. РаZVожаев (@razvozhaev), post to Telegram channel, March 26, 2022, https://t.me/razvozhaev/148 (accessed November 9, 2023). Anna-News, a pro-Kremlin Russian news agency, reported that Ivan Borisovich Lukin of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 15. “In memory of Ivan Borisovich Lukin,” Anna-News, April 14, 2022, https://anna-news.info/pamyati-ivana-borisovicha-lukina/?ysclid=lar2cmvg1c921615886 (accessed November 9, 2023). A Telegram post by Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev said that senior sailor Dmitry Petrovich Savitsky of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was killed in action in Mariupol on an unspecified date. РаZVожаев (@razvozhaev), post to Telegram channel, March 29, 2022, https://t.me/razvozhaev/162 (accessed November 9, 2023). Necro Mancer, an open-source intelligence Twitter account tracking killed Russian forces in Ukraine, reported that Vazhenin Kirill Igorevich of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was killed in action in Mariupol on March 19. Necro Mancer (@666_mancer), post to X (formerly Twitter), March 21, 2023, https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505801356787032069 (accessed November 9, 2023).

608 Военная хроника (@milchronicles), post to Telegram channel, April 19, 2022, https://t.me/milchronicles/302 (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel, May 4, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/6858 (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel, May 6, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/6868 (accessed November 9, 2023); “Осада Азовстали: Обстановка от морпехов на 06.05.22,” 2022, video clip by WarGonzo, Dzen, https://dzen.ru/video/watch/62741fd21a923165e622e3e0 (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel May 11, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/6924 (accessed November 9, 2023); РаZVожаев (@razvozhaev), post to Telegram channel May 13, 2022, https://t.me/razvozhaev/413 (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel May 14, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/6952 (accessed November 9, 2023); Репортер Filatov (@FilatovCorr), post to Telegram channel, August 20, 2022, https://t.me/FilatovCorr/343 (accessed November 9, 2023); Военная хроника (@milchronicles), post to Telegram channel, October 21, 2022, https://t.me/milchronicles/1234 (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel, November 14, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/9261 (accessed November 9, 2023); “Мариупольские флэшбэки. Из морпехов - в военкоры,” 2022, video clip by WarGonzo, Dzen, https://dzen.ru/video/watch/63722423a97d3060edd504db (accessed November 23, 2023); “Mariupol flashbacks. From marines to military corks, November 2022, video clip by WarGonzo, Dzen, https://dzen.ru/video/watch/63722423a97d3060edd504db (accessed November 9, 2023); “‘Marines are strong in spirit’: a film was released about the legends of the Northern Military District - Struna, Rokot, Boyka,” Vestiprim, December 13, 2022, https://vestiprim.ru/news/ptrnews/130439-morpehi-silnye-duhom-vyshel-film-o-legendah-svo-strune-rokote-bojke.html (accessed November 9, 2023); WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel, April 15, 2023, https://t.me/wargonzo/6597 (accessed November 9, 2023).

609 Канал специального назначения (@ok_spn), post to Telegram channel, April 5, 2022, https://t.me/ok_spn/18182 (accessed November 9, 2023).

610 “Mariupol flashbacks. From marines to military corks, November 2022, video clip by WarGonzo, Dzen, https://dzen.ru/video/watch/63722423a97d3060edd504db (accessed November 9, 2023).

611 БРАТЧУК (@Bratchuk_Sergey), post to Telegram channel, March 22, 2022, https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/7463 (accessed November 9, 2023).

612 “Deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet Andrey Paliy died in a special operation near Mariupol,” Sevastopol, March 20, 2022, https://sevastopol.su/news/v-specoperacii-pod-mariupolem-pogib-zamkomanduyushchego-chf-andrey-paliy (accessed November 9, 2023).

613 Oleksandr Bevza, “The Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed another Russian colonel,” 24TV, March 23, 2022, https://24tv.ua/zsu-znishhili-shhe-odnogo-rosiyskogo-polkovnika_n1916240 (accessed November 9, 2023); БРАТЧУК (@Bratchuk_Sergey), post to Telegram channel, March 22, 2022, https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/7463 (accessed November 9, 2023); “В боях под Мариуполем погиб командир 810-й бригады ЧФ полковник Алексей Шаров,” ForPost, March 23, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220323105959/ https:/sevastopol.su/news/v-boyah-pod-mariupolem-pogib-komandir-810-y-brigady-chf-polkovnik-aleksey-sharov (accessed November 27, 2023); РаZVожаев (@razvozhaev), post to Telegram channel, March 24, 2022, https://t.me/razvozhaev/134 (accessed November 9, 2023).

614 Генеральний штаб ЗСУ / General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, post to Facebook, March 15, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/273253274987758 (accessed November 9, 2023).

615 “Since beginning of war, defenders of Mariupol have destroyed about 6,000 Rashists and more than 100 vehicles of Russian Federation - Deputy Commander of ‘Azov’ Regiment Palamar,” Censor.net, May 13, 2022, https://censor.net/en/n3341181 (accessed November 9, 2023); “Defenders of Mariupol reported huge losses of Russians during their storm of the city,” Open Ukraine, May 13, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t30FXdRLJpA&ab_channel=OpenUkraine (accessed December 21, 2023); Serhii Zgurets, “Grief is beyond reason: before the battle for Donbas, the enemy is changing the organization of its units,” Defense Express, April 12, 2022, https://defence-ua.com/army_and_war/ gore_bez_rozumu_pered_bitvoju_za_donbas_vorog_ zminjuje_organizatsiju_svojih_pidrozdiliv_analiz-6908.html (accessed November 9, 2023).

616 Kavkaz.Reallii, a Russian-language outlet of US-funded Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, reported that Nikita Sergeyevich Ogonkov of the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade was killed in action on March 15 in Mariupol. “Graves of soldiers allegedly killed in Ukraine were discovered in Yeisk and neighboring villages,” Kavkaz.Reallii, October 23, 2022, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/mogily-predpolozhiteljno-ubityh-v-ukraine-voennyh-obnaruzheny-v-eyske/32097047.html (accessed November 9, 2023). Kavkaz.Reallii reported that Yaroslav Petrovich Krimenenko of the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion was killed in action in Mariupol on March 28. “Graves of soldiers allegedly killed in Ukraine were discovered in Yeisk and neighboring villages,” Kavkaz.Reallii, October 23, 2022, https://www.kavkazr.com/a/mogily-predpolozhiteljno-ubityh-v-ukraine-voennyh-obnaruzheny-v-eyske/32097047.html (accessed November 9, 2023). НЕ ЖДИ меня из Украины (@poisk_in_ua), post to Telegram channel, July 24, 2022, https://t.me/poisk_in_ua/3243 (accessed November 9, 2023). Maxim Starovoitov of the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion was killed in action in Mariupol on an unspecified date before April 29. Mandolin Rain (@on4U3TI7ylCbSD3), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 29, 2022, https://twitter.com/on4U3TI7ylCbSD3/status/1519966680662818818 (accessed November 9, 2023). Ivan Kononov of the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 14. “A professional soldier, paratrooper Ivan Kononov died during the battles near Mariupol,” Battime, March 24, 2022, https://battime.ru/v-rostovskoj-oblasti-prostilis-s-esche-odnim-pogibshim-na-ukraine-voennym.html (accessed November 9, 2023); Anastasia Batishcheva, “A graduate of the Ryazan Airborne Forces School Ivan Kononov died in Ukraine,” MK in Ryazan, March 20, 2022, https://t.co/Obifiqz1Qt (accessed November 9, 2023); Anton Troianovski, Ivan Nechepurenko, and Valeriya Safronova, “More Russians Consider Costs of War in Ukraine as Casualties Mount,” The New York Times, April 6, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-casualties.html?referringSource=articleShare (accessed November 9, 2023).

617 “‘Marines are strong in spirit:’ a film was released about the legends of the Northern Military District - Struna, Rokot, Boyka,” News Primorye, December 13, 2023, https://vestiprim.ru/news/ptrnews/130439-morpehi-silnye-duhom-vyshel-film-o-legendah-svo-strune-rokote-bojke.html (accessed November 9, 2023).

618 Военная хроника, (@milchronicles) post to Telegram channel, October 21, 2022, https://t.me/milchronicles/1234 (accessed November 9, 2023); “‘Marines are strong in spirit:’ a film was released about the legends of the Northern Military District - Struna, Rokot, Boyka,” News Primorye, December 13, 2023, https://vestiprim.ru/news/ptrnews/130439-morpehi-silnye-duhom-vyshel-film-o-legendah-svo-strune-rokote-bojke.html (accessed November 9, 2023).

619 Russian Marine Corps, post to VK, June 7, 2022, https://vk.com/morskaya_pehota_russia?w=wall-93188324_121723 (accessed November 9, 2023).

620 Alexei Glushak of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 8, 2022. Nasha Gazeta, “Gru Special Forces Officer Buried In Tyumen,” NG72.RU, March 14, 2022, https://ng72.ru/news/69826 (accessed November 9, 2023). Sergei Olegovich Medvedev of the 22nd Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on May 27, 2022. Live Journal, January 26, 2016, https://saito-section-9.livejournal.com/1462593.html (accessed November 13, 2023). Starshina Boris Borisovich Zhuravlyov of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 8, 2022. “Герой РФ старшина Журавлев Борис Борисович, May 27, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08UVpFMpvAU (accessed November 13, 2023); Канал специального назначения (@ok_spn), post to Telegram channel, June 10, 2022, https://t.me/ok_spn/19540 (accessed November 13, 2023). Sergey Petrovich Korgon of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 8, 2022. Vyacheslav Pushkarev, post to VK, March 11, 2022, https://vk.com/wall-3859758_1444 (accessed November 13, 2023); Necro Mancer (@666_mancer), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), May 27, 2022, https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1530180987514236931 (accessed January 24, 2023). Praporshchik Nikolai Naumov of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 21, 2022. Rob Lee (@RALee85), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1508922041927409667 (accessed November 13, 2023); “A military man who died in Ukraine will be buried in the Rostov region. He is survived by his wife and daughter,” 161 RU, March 29, 2022, https://161.ru/text/world/2022/03/29/70725830/ (accessed November 13, 2023); “A special forces soldier who died during a military special operation in Ukraine will be buried in the Rostov region,” 1RndRu, March 29, 2022, https://t.co/Mcxf8BA7HQ (accessed November 13, 2023); “Guard ensign from the Volgograd region died in Ukraine,” V1Ru, March 24, 2022, https://t.co/VGPl1tF74X (accessed November 13, 2023); “Это Ростов! - новости Ростова-на-Дону 161,” VK, March 29, 2022, https://t.co/cBmFIlL8AU (accessed November 13, 2023); Rob Lee (@RALee85), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), https://t.co/KvWpRH66SR (accessed November 13, 2023); “A 35-year-old contract soldier who died in Ukraine will be buried in the Rostov region,” Panorama, March 29, 2022, https://t.co/yvnjtj7VkP (accessed November 13, 2023); Это Ростов! - новости Ростова-на-Дону 161, post to VK, March 29, 2022, https://vk.com/wall-104083518_2479352?lang=en (accessed November 13, 2023). A video on the Russian Odnoklassniki social network site dated March 20, 2022, lists 18 men said to be part of the 22nd Special Purpose Brigade who were reportedly killed in action in Mariupol. ГРУ22бригады 200Мариуполь, video clip, OK, March 20, 2022, https://ok.ru/video/4710895454864 (accessed November 13, 2023).

621 “Генеральний штаб ЗСУ / General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” post to Facebook, March 15, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/273095601670192 (accessed November 13, 2023).

622 Roman Tsymbaliuk, post to Facebook, March 20, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/RomanTsymbaliuk/ posts/5246227442077151 (accessed November 13, 2023).

623 Военный Осведомитель, (@milinfolive), post to Telegram channel, June 5, 2022, https://t.me/milinfolive/85183 (accessed November 13, 2023).

624 Vladimir Kobyshev of the 346th Independent Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 16, 2022. “A 28-year-old special forces soldier from the Tatsinsky district died in Ukraine,” 1Rnd, April 17, 2022, https://www.1rnd.ru/news/3372488/na-ukraine-pogib-28-letnij-specnazovec-iz-tacinskogo-rajona (accessed November 13, 2023). Andrey Kunakov of the 346th Independent Special Purpose Brigade was reportedly killed in action in Mariupol on March 19, 2022. “In Memory of the Defender of the Fatherland Major Andrey Kunakov,” Veterans of Russia, May 2, 2022, https://veteransrussian.ru/novosti/novosti-ood/pamyati-zashchitnika-otechestva-mayora-andreya-kunakova/ (accessed November 13, 2023); Rob Lee (@RALee85), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), May 4, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1521766275147603968 (accessed November 13, 2023); “On May 3rd there is a memorial day - Radonitsa,” Vesti Kalmykia, May 3, 2022, https://t.co/6SJAmvAtMJ (accessed November 13, 2023);
Братство Героев Спецназа, post to VK, May 3, 2022, https://t.co/r6m1KjT1cC (accessed November 13, 2023); Kotsnews (@sashakots), post to Telegram channel, May 2, 2022, https://t.co/amOwvvvA4M (accessed November 13, 2023); Badma Byurchiev, “The head of Kalmykia announced the death of a military man in Ukraine,” Caucasian Knot, May 2, 2022, https://t.co/K76Ohen1in (accessed November 13, 2023).

625 Генеральний штаб ЗСУ / General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, post to Facebook, March 20, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008 (accessed November 13, 2023).

626 Roman Tsymbaliuk, post to Facebook, March 20, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/RomanTsymbaliuk/ posts/5246227442077151 (accessed November 13, 2023).

627 Kadyrov appears to have been in control of national guard forces deployed from the Republic of Chechnya and to have appointed Adam Delimkhanov as the responsible commander in Mariupol. Kadyrov reportedly visited Delimkhanov and the commanders of both Russian and DNR forces in Mariupol on March 28, 2022, as offensive operations in Mariupol were ongoing. Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov listens to commander of Russia’s 8th combined army of the Southern Military District, Lieutenant General Andrei Mordvichev, during a meeting at an operations centre in the course of Ukraine-Russia conflict in Mariupol. © 2022 Chingis Kondarov / Reuters Pictures, https://pictures.reuters.com/CS.aspx? VP3=SearchResult&ITEMID=RC2DBT9XBJ6H& POPUPPN=1&POPUPIID=2C0FQEZ7PA6 (accessed November 13, 2023); Kadyrov_95 (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 13, 2023).

628 Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 13, 2023); Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95) post to Telegram channel, March 24, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1601 (accessed November 13, 2023); Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 13, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1445 (accessed November 13, 2023).

629 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 26, 2022 No. 238 ‘On awarding the title of Hero of the Russian Federation to A.S. Delimkhanov,’” April 26, 2022, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202204260002 (accessed November 13, 2023); “Why Ramzan Kadyrov’s Friend Was Awarded the Title of Hero of Russia,” Important Stories, May 5, 2022, https://istories.media/en/investigations/2022/05/05/why-ramzan-kadyrovs-friend-was-awarded-the-title-of-hero-of-russia/ (accessed November 13, 2023).

630 Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95) posted a video on March 23, 2022, reportedly showing Kadyrovites in Mariupol, Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95) post to Telegram channel, March 23, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1584%20/ (accessed November 13, 2023). X user markito0171 posted a video on March 30, 2022, reportedly showing Kadyrovites in Mariupol; C4H10FO2P (@markito0171), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 30, 2022, https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1509276619202043906 (accessed November 13, 2023). An open-source intelligence account on X, Heuvelrug Intelligence, geolocated a video of Kadyrovites fighting in Mariupol on March 24, 2022. Heuvelrug Intelligence (@HillridgeOSINT), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 24, 2022, https://twitter.com/HillridgeOSINT/status/1507041533928906752 (accessed November 27, 2023). A video posted to X on March 25, 2022, shows Kadyrovites near Mariupol. Southern African Eye (@eye_southern) post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 25, 2022, https://twitter.com/eye_southern/status/1507258961480798214 (accessed November 13, 2023). A video posted to X on March 30, 2022, shows Kadyrovites in Mariupol. Masno (@NovichokRossiya) post to X (formerly known as Twitter), March 30, 2022, https://twitter.com/NovichokRossiya/status/1509144166130982912 (accessed November 13, 2023). Ramzan Kadyrov posted a video of the 141st Special Motorized Regiment in Mariupol on March 18, 2022. Kadyrov_95 (@RKadyrov_95) post to Telegram channel, March 18, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1507 (accessed November 13, 2023). An open-source intelligence account on X, Neonhandrail, geolocated videos of Kadyrovties leaving Mariupol on May 17, 2022, Neonhandrail (@neonhandrail), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), May 23, 2022, https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/1528587876862423041 (accessed November 13, 2023).

631 Дмитрий СТЕШИН, “Александр Ходаковский: Мы в Мариуполь две недели вгрызаемся. А тут приехали чеченцы - красивые, бородатые - чуть колонной на город не пошли,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 15, 2022, https://www.kp.ru/daily/27377/4558736/ (accessed November 13, 2023).

632 Kadyrov_95 (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 13, 2023).

633 Ben Farmer, “Chechen special forces tighten grip on Mariupol as house-to-house fighting erupts,” The Telegraph, March 18, 2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/18/1300-still-trapped-rubble-mariupol-theatre/ (accessed November 13, 2023).

634 Kateryna Tyshchenko, “Invaders begin loading rolled metal products in port of Mariupol - mayor’s adviser,” Ukrainska Pravda, May 28, 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/05/28/7349130/ (accessed November 13, 2023); Андрющенко Time (@andriyshTime), post to Telegram channel, May 28, 2022, https://t.me/andriyshTime/1125 (accessed November 13, 2023).

635 Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 19, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1538 (accessed November 13, 2023).

636 “As noticed by many Ukrainians, Kadyrov made the #Moscow4 blunder to publish a video showing SOBR Spetsnaz delivering what he said was Russian humanitarian aid to Mariupol residents. The video in fact showed Kadyrovites give people obviously looted Ukrainian products.” Christo Grozev (@christogrozev), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 3, 2022, https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1510556252019073027 (accessed November 13, 2023).

637 Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 13, 2023); Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 24, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1601 (accessed November 13, 2023); Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 13, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1445 (accessed November 13, 2023).

638 Дмитрий СТЕШИН, “Александр Ходаковский: Мы в Мариуполь две недели вгрызаемся. А тут приехали чеченцы - красивые, бородатые - чуть колонной на город не пошли,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 15, 2022, https://www.kp.ru/daily/27377/4558736/ (accessed November 13, 2023).

639 “The main battles in the central part of Mariupol have ended,” RIA Novosti, April 7, 2022, https://ria.ru/20220407/mariupol-1782217714.html (accessed November 13, 2023).

640 “Khodakovsky reported details of the surrender of militants from Azovstal,” Regnum News Agency, May 16, 2022, https://regnum.ru/news/3592246 (accessed November 13, 2023).

641 Russian Ministry of Defense (@mod_russia) post to Telegram channel, May 17, 2022, https://t.me/mod_russia/15813 (accessed November 13, 2023); “Footage of the surrender of militants from the Azovstal plant has been published,” RusNext, May 7, 2022, https://rusnext.ru/news/1652793808510928 (accessed November 13, 2023); “Зачистка Мариуполя: батальон «Восток» прочесал частный сектор у «Азовстали»,” April 8, 2022 video clip posted to YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V5jaBscF56s (accessed November 13, 2023).

642 Ibid.

643 “Донбасскому комбату «Сомали» Тимуру Курилкину присвоили звание Героя ДНР и передали Орден Мужества от Путина,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Donetsk, April 3, 2022, https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/daily/27374.5/4567430 (accessed November 9, 2023).

644 Intel Slava Z (@intelslava), post to Telegram channel, March 23, 2022, https://t.me/intelslava/23261 (accessed November 15, 2023).

645 GeoConfirmed (@GeoConfirmed), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1515316200150114317 (accessed November 15, 2023); Семён Пегов (@wargonzoo), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/wargonzoo/status/1515269158560309250 (accessed November 15, 2023).

646 MilitaryLand.net (@Militarylandnet), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 16, 2022, https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1515308610133311489 (accessed November 15, 2023).

647 Military Advisor (@miladvisor), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 17, 2022, https://twitter.com/miladvisor/status/1515703739147038727 (accessed November 15, 2023).

648 Military Advisor (@miladvisor), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 17, 2022, https://twitter.com/miladvisor/status/1515704678763347974 (accessed November 15, 2023).

649 Intel Slava Z (@intelslava), post to Telegram channel, March 23, 2022, https://t.me/intelslava/23221 (accessed November 15, 2023); Intel Slava Z (@intelslava), post to Telegram channel, March 23, 2022, https://t.me/intelslava/23261 (accessed November 15, 2023).

650 Семён Пегов (@wargonzoo), post to X (formerly known as Twitter), April 23, 2022, https://twitter.com/wargonzoo/status/1506695408352903178 (accessed November 15, 2023).

651 Andrey Kots, “Их называют ‘стальные каски’ Кто первым заходил в Мариуполь,” RIA Novosti, May 26, 2022, https://ria.ru/20220526/boytsy-1790593377.html (accessed November 15, 2023).

652 Anatoly Vasiliev, “‘You are focused on areas that will allow the liberation of the DPR:’ Denis Pushilin awarded military personnel of the 105th and 107th Infantry Regiments of the Mobilization Reserve,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Donetsk, July 16, 2022, https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/daily/27419.5/4618788 (accessed November 15, 2023); ‘Не дали врагу перечеркнуть русское’: Денис Пушилин - военнослужащим, Russian Federation Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, July 16, 2022, https://denis-pushilin.ru/news/ne-dali-vragu-perecherknut-russkoe-budushhee-denis-pushilin-voennosluzhashhim/ ( November 15, 2023).

653 Media Puls (@mediapuls), post to Telegram channel, March 9, 2022, https://t.me/mediapuls/14464 (accessed November 15, 2023).

654 “RT Exclusive | The 9th Regiment of the DPR is sweeping the area from Ukrainian Army,” March 14, 2022, video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qvSbT_dOpPM (accessed November 15, 2023).

655 Russian military blogger Alexander Sladkov reported on March 16, 2022, that the Vostok Battalion and the 9th Separate Marine Regiment participated in the assault on Mariupol. Сладков+ (@Sladkov_plus), post to Telegram channel, March 16, 2022, https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5100 (accessed November 15, 2023). State-controlled media network RT reported on March 19, 2022, that the 9th Separate Marine Regiment was in Mariupol. RT Russian (@rt_russian), post to Telegram channel, https://t.me/rt_russian/100800 (accessed November 15, 2023). Telegram channel Intel Slava Z reported on March 23, 2022, that the Russian forces in Mariupol were supported by the 9th Separate Marine Regiment. Intel Slava Z (@intelslava), post to Telegram channel, March 23, 2022, https://t.me/intelslava/23261 (accessed November 15, 2023). Semyon Pegov, a correspondent for the Russian military project WarGonzo reported on March 23, 2022, that Russian forces with support from the 9th Separate Marine Regiment, 1st Separate Tank Battalion, and the 107th Rifle Regiment had surrounded the Azovstal steel plant. WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel March 23, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/6327 (accessed December 11, 2023).

656 🇷🇺 Сводки ополчения Новороссии Z.O.V. (ДНР, ЛНР, Украина, Война) (@swodki), post to Telegram channel, April 9, 2022, https://t.me/swodki/64691 (accessed November 15, 2023).

657 BTR-70 #6915, Russo-Ukrainian Warspotting, August 6, 2022, https://ukr.warspotting.net/view/6915/16077/ (accessed November 23, 2023); BTR-70 #2124, Russo-Ukrainian Warspotting, July 18, 2022, https://ukr.warspotting.net/view/6915/16077/ (accessed November 23, 2023); Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, November 10, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/8737 (accessed November 15, 2023); Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, October 31, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/8578 (accessed November 15, 2023).

658 Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, October 31, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/8578 (accessed December 14, 2023).

659 Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, October 5, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/7932 (accessed November 15, 2023).

660 The Telegram channel of Kaskad posted a video on October 26, 2022, showing strikes it said it had conducted in Mariupol during the offensive on Mariupol. ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, October 26, 2023, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/336 (accessed November 15, 2023). The Telegram channel of Kaskad posted photos and videos of soldiers of the battalion in Mariupol on an unspecified date. ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, October 18, 2023, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/218 (accessed November 15, 2023); ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, October 10, 2022, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/88 (accessed November 15, 2023); ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, October 8, 2022, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/57 (accessed November 15, 2023); ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, October 5, 2022, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/17 (accessed November 15, 2023). The Telegram channel of Kaskad posted a video on October 6, 2022, with a caption stating that soldiers of the battalion provided assistance to Mariupol residents during the “liberation of Mariupol.” ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, November 6, 2022, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/29 (accessed November 15, 2023). A video posted by Kaskad on August 25, 2022, states that the battalion took an active part in the “liberation of Mariupol,” and the capture of the Azovstal steel plant. Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, August 25, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/6943 (accessed November 15, 2023). The Telegram channel of Kaskad posted a video on December 2, 2022, from what it called “the liberation of Mariupol” showing the battalion destroying a Ukrainian drone. ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, December 2, 2022, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/800 (accessed November 15, 2023). A photo published on Telegram by Kaskad shows soldiers of the battalion in Mariupol in May 2022. ОБТФ “Каскад” (@obtf_kaskad), post to Telegram channel, October 30, 2022, https://t.me/obtf_kaskad/372 (accessed November 15, 2023); Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, October 31, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/7932 (accessed November 15, 2023).

661 In a November 11, 2022, Telegram post, the Russian war project WarGonzo stated that Kaskad participated in the assault on Mariupol. WarGonzo (@wargonzo), post to Telegram channel, November 11, 2022, https://t.me/wargonzo/9195 (accessed November 15, 2023). Russian Telegram account WarDonbass posted a video on October 31, 2022, reportedly showing soldiers of Kaskad in Mariupol. The caption states that the battalion “went to storm Mariupol.” WarDonbass (@WarDonbass), post to Telegram channel, October 31, 2022, https://t.me/WarDonbass/84807 (accessed November 15, 2023). Alexander Semenov of Kaskad claimed in an August 21, 2022, Telegram post that an officer of the battalion captured eight soldiers in Mariupol. Александр Семенов (@Alexandr_Semenov), post to Telegram channel, August 21, 2022, https://t.me/Alexandr_Semenov/6895 (accessed November 15, 2023). A video posted by the DNR Ministry of Internal Affairs on July 20, 2022, reportedly shows Kaskad storming Mariupol and Azovstal on an unspecified date. МВД ДНР (@news_mvddnr), post to Telegram channel, July 20, 2022, https://t.me/news_mvddnr/4527 (accessed November 15, 2023).

662 Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordination Headquarters for Humanitarian Response in Ukraine, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, March 5, 2022, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/organizations/more.htm?id=12411711@egNews (accessed November 15, 2023).

663 About Security Council, Official website of President of Russia, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/security-council (accessed November 15, 2023).

664 Meeting with permanent members of the Security Council, Official website of President of Russia, March 11, 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/security-council/67960 (accessed November 15, 2023).

665 Telephone conversation with French President, Emmanuel Macron, Official website of President of Russia, March 29, 2022, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68084 (accessed November 15, 2023).

666 Meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Official website of President of Russia, April 21, 2022, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/UA/events/68254 (accessed November 15, 2023).

667 Meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Official website of President of Russia, April 21, 2022, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/UA/events/68254 (accessed November 15, 2023).

668 For example, “Mr President, as you instructed, humanitarian corridors have been created daily since March 21 to evacuate civilians and foreign nationals,” and “Despite the resistance of the fighters and all others, we were able to evacuate 142,711 civilians from Mariupol after you issued instructions to this effect.” Meeting with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Official website of President of Russia, April 21, 2022, http://www.en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/UA/events/68254 (accessed November 15, 2023).

669 Ibid.

670 Путин Владимир Владимирович, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://structure.mil.ru/management/leader.htm (accessed April 11, 2023). President Putin was sanctioned by the European Union on February 25, 2022, for “actively supporting actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine.” Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0269-20230315&from=EN (accessed April 11, 2023).

671 He has served in this role since November 6, 2012. Sergei Shoigu: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/minister.htm (accessed April 11, 2023). His extensive powers and responsibilities include the exercise of control over the deployment and use of the armed forces, on the basis of the decision of the president. Полномочия Министра обороны Российской Федерации, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://doc.mil.ru/documents/extended_search/more.htm?id=10912180@egNPA (accessed May 6, 2023). Shoigu was sanctioned by the European Union on February 22, 2022, for “actively supporting actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as stability and security in Ukraine.” Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0269-20230315&from=EN (accessed April 11, 2023).

672 He has served in this role since November 9, 2012. Valery Gerasimov: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/deputy/more.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee (accessed April 11, 2023). Gerasimov was sanctioned by the European Union on April 29, 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and remains listed for “the massive deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine and Russia’s military attack against Ukraine in February 2022.” Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0269-20230315&from=EN (accessed April 11, 2023).

673 Главное оперативное управление Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации: Рудской Сергей Федорович, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ministry_of_defence/details.htm?id=9710@egOrganization (accessed April 11, 2023).

674 He has served in this role since September 2016. Aleksandr Dvornikov: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/deputy/more.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee (accessed November 1, 2023). Dvornikov was sanctioned by multiple governments in 2019, including the United Kingdom and the European Union, and remains sanctioned for his role as commander of the Southern Military district in contributing to the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets in The UK, Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury, November 12, 2023, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ media/657041690f12ef07a53e02c2/Russia.pdf (accessed December 12, 2023); Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2022/408 of 10 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2022:084:FULL&from=EN (accessed December 12, 2023).

675 Composition of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Security Council of the Russian Federation, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/council/composition/ (accessed March 27, 2023). Viktor Zolotov was awarded the rank of General of the Army on November 10, 2015. On April 5, 2016, he was appointed to the position of the Director of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops - Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian federation, Zolotov Viktor Vasilievich, Rosguard, https://web.archive.org/web/20221028082527/ https://rosguard.gov.ru/ru/page/AjaxPartial/zolotov-viktor-vasilevich (accessed October 28, 2022). Zolotov has been sanctioned by the European Union since December 16, 2022, for his role as a Member of the Coordination Council” who is “responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02014R0269-20230315&from=EN (accessed April 11, 2023).

676 War criminals of the Russian Federation, Mordvychev Andrey Nikolaevich, The Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, https://gur.gov.ua/content/mordvychev-andrei-nykolaevych.html (accessed November 15, 2023). Russian state media TASS reported in February 2023 that Mordichev was appointed to command the Central Military District following his time as the commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army. “Lieutenant General Mordvichev to command Russia’s Central Military District troops,” TASS, February 17, 2023, https://tass.com/defense/1577719 (accessed November 15, 2023).

677 On March 21, 2022, Ramzan Kadyrov asserted on his Telegram channel that he was commanding Chechen fighters through Adam Delimkhanov who was in command of Chechen fighters in Mariupol and was in constant contact with Delimkhanov while the fighters were “eliminating firing positions” and supporting the Russian military. Ramzan Kadyrov (Kadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 15, 2023). In addition to being the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov is a general officer in the Russian National Guard. Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he was a Major General and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in April 2022 before being promoted again in October 2022 to the rank of Colonel General. Kadyrov announces promotion to Colonel General,” TASS, October 5, 2023, https://tass.com/politics/1518239 (accessed December 6, 2023).

678 Ramzan Kadyrov (Kadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 21, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556 (accessed November 15, 2023). On April 26, 2022, Delimkhanov was awarded by presidential decree the title of “Hero of Russia,” Russia’s highest award, for “courage and heroism shown during a special operation on the territories of the Donetsk People’s Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) and Ukraine.” Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 26, 2022, No. 238, “On awarding the title of Hero of the Russian Federation to A.S. Delimkhanov.” April 26, 2022, https://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202204260002 (accessed on The Internet Archive, January 23, 2024). On July 21, 2022, the European Union sanctioned Delimkhanov for establishing Chechen forces in the Donbas and for “leading the siege on the city of Mariupol in March 2022,” adding that he was responsible “for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.” Council Regulation (Eu) 2022/1269 of 21 July 2022 Amending Regulation (Eu) No 833/2014 Concerning Restrictive Measures In View Of Russia’s Actions Destabilising The Situation In Ukraine, Volume 65, July 21, 2022, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L:2022:193:FULL&from=EN (accessed on The Internet Archive, November 15, 2023); “Chechen Senior Military Commander Said To Be ‘Alive And Well,’” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 14, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-delimkhanov-wounded-ukraine/32459016.html (accessed November 15, 2023).

679 On September 7, 2018, Interfax, a Russian news agency, reported that Pushilin was appointed head of the Donetsk People’s Republic. “The DPR parliament appointed Pushilin as acting head of the republic,” Interfax, September 7, 2018, https://www.interfax.ru/world/628307 (accessed November 15, 2023); “Head Of The Donetsk People’s Republic, Donetsk People’s Republic Official Site, https://dnronline.su/en/head-of-the-dpr/ (accessed on The Internet Archive, December 18, 2023); “State structure of the Donetsk People’s Republic,” Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic Official Site, https://denis-pushilin.ru/gosudarstvennoe-ustrojstvo-donetskoj-narodnoj-respubliki/ (accessed December 18, 2023). On July 16, 2022, Komsomolskaya Pravda, a Russian news agency, reported that Denis Pushilin, Head of the DPR, awarded serviceman of the 107th Rifle Regiment for their role in the assault on Mariupol. Anatoly Vasiliev, “‘You are focused on areas that will allow the liberation of the DPR:’ Denis Pushilin awarded military personnel of the 105th and 107th Infantry Regiments of the Mobilization Reserve,” Komsomolskaya Pravda Donetsk, July 16, 2022, https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/daily/27419.5/4618788 (accessed November 15, 2023).

680 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Klavdiia, March 17, 2023.

681 United Nations Security Council, “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,” Resolution 49/1, RES/49/1 (2022) https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iicihr-ukraine/index (accessed December 20, 2023).

682 “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: Receipt of Referrals from 39 States Parties and the Opening of an Investigation,” International Criminal Court news release, March 2, 2022, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-qc-situation-ukraine-receipt-referrals-39-states (accessed December 18, 2023).

683 “Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,” International Criminal Court news release, March 17, 2023, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and#:~:text=Today, 17 March 2023, Pre,Ms Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova. (accessed December 18, 2023).

684 “Joint Statement from the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom on the establishment of the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group (ACA) for Ukraine,” US Department of State news release, May 25, 2022, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-from-the-european-union-the-united-states-and-the-united-kingdom-on-the-establishment-of-the-atrocity-crimes-advisory-group-aca-for-ukraine/ (accessed December 18, 2023); About Us , European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), https://www.euam-ukraine.eu/our-mission/about-us/ (accessed December 18, 2023); “Lord Ahmad announces UK support package for war crimes investigations,” United Kingdom Government Official site press release, July 14, 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/lord-ahmad-announces-uk-support-package-for-war-crimes-investigations (accessed December 18, 2023); “Promoting Accountability for War Crimes and Other Atrocities in Ukraine,” US Department of State news release, May 17, 2022, https://www.state.gov/promoting-accountability-for-war-crimes-and-other-atrocities-in-ukraine/ (accessed December 18, 2023).

685 “Eurojust supports joint investigation team into alleged core international crimes in Ukraine,” Eurojust press release, March 28, 2022, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/eurojust-supports-joint-investigation-team-alleged-core-international-crimes-ukraine (accessed December 18, 2023).

686 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Dzvinka, March 14, 2023.

687 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ilona, March 14, 2023.

688 Ibid.

689 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Klavdiia, March 17, 2023.

690 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Ilona, March 14, 2023.

691 Human Rights Watch interview with Zoriana, Kyiv, March 22, 2023.