Who’s Responsible
To identify the Russian commanders and military units that may have been responsible for laws-of-war violations in Mariupol that could amount to war crimes, we conducted an extensive review and analysis of Russian social media posts, obituaries of Russian personnel, Russian government and military statements, and photos and videos posted by or showing specific units present in Mariupol. We identified a total of 17 units of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces that were operating in the city in March and April 2022.
It appears that the highest levels of the Russian military command had deep knowledge of the situation in Mariupol and were closely involved in the planning, execution, and coordination of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces. We identified ten senior officials who may be responsible for war crimes in Mariupol as a matter of command responsibility. This includes President Vladimir Putin-the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Russia and head of Russia’s National Guard, who was involved in issuing direct orders on a number of occasions-as well as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the first deputy minister of defense and chief of the general staff of the Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov.
These individuals, and potentially other commanders of the 17 units identified in Mariupol, should be investigated and appropriately prosecuted for their alleged role in serious violations committed during the Russian forces’ assault. Concerted international efforts towards accountability are crucial to demonstrate that unlawful attacks carry consequences, to deter future atrocities, and to reinforce the principle that accountability for grave crimes cannot be eluded because of rank or position.
Units on the Ground
The attack on Mariupol was carried out by a combination of military forces. Human Rights Watch identified a total of 17 units of Russian and Russia-affiliated forces that we conclude were operating in and around the city in March and April 2022. The total number may be higher. Claims that other units were operating there at that time could not be verified.
Forces involved in the battle include Russian armed forces’ units, including five from the Southern Military District; two special forces units; two units from Chechnya, including one from Russia’s national guard; seven units from the “DNR” forces’ 1st Army Corps; and Russian air forces.1
Further research is needed to link specific violations of the laws of war to specific units or commanders.
The Southern Military District
Human Rights Watch identified elements of two major combat formations from the Southern Military District in Mariupol that are permanently part of its organization of battle: the 8th Combined Arms Army and ground force units from the Black Sea Fleet.
The 8th Combined Arms Army
Units from the 8th Combined Arms Army (8th CAA) were in Mariupol as early as March 4, 2022. Human Rights Watch identified elements of both the 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s 68th Tank Regiment and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.
The 150th Motorized Rifle Division
Human Rights Watch reviewed media and verified photographs and videos that confirm the presence of regiments of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division in Mariupol.
The 68th Tank Regiment
Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment were in Mariupol as early as March 12, 2022.
The 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment
Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment were in Mariupol as early as March 6, 2022.
The Black Sea Fleet
Units from the Black Sea Fleet’s ground forces include elements of the 810th Marine Brigade’s 382nd Marine Battalion.
The 810th Naval Infantry Brigade
Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were in Mariupol as early as March 11, 2022. The 382nd Marine Battalion, a unit subordinated to the 810th Marine Brigade, was present in Mariupol between March and May 2022.
The 382nd Marine Battalion
The 382nd Marine Battalion was in Mariupol as early as March 14, 2022.
The “DNR’s” 1st Army Corps
Human Rights Watch also identified multiple units from the “DNR’s” 1st Army Corps, which at the time had a close operational and possibly subordinate relationship to the 8th Combined Arms Army. Units identified as belonging to the “DNR’s” 1st Army Corps include the Vostok Battalion; the 1st Separate Tank “Somalia” Battalion; the 9th Separate Marine Regiment; the 1st Separate Motor Rifle Slovyansk Brigade; the 107th Rifle Regiment; and the OBTF Kaskad.
Vostok Battalion
The Vostok Battalion was likely engaged in fighting in Mariupol as of early March 2022.
The 1st Separate Tank “Somalia” Battalion
The 1st Separate Tank “Somalia” Battalion was in Mariupol as early as March 3, 2022.
The 107th Rifle Regiment
Elements of the 107th Rifle Regiment participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 23, 2022.
The 9th Separate Marine Regiment
Elements of the 9th Separate Marine Regiment participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 9, 2022.
Operational-Combat Tactical Formation (OBTF) “Kaskad”
The OBTF Kaskad participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as February 24, 2022.
Special Operations Units
Human Rights Watch identified elements of two special operations units that report to the Main Directorate of Intelligence (GRU), including the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade.
22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade
Elements of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 8, 2022.
346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade
Human Rights Watch identified elements of the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade, a special operations unit that reports to the Special Operations Command under the General Staff.
Elements of the 346th Separate Special Purpose Brigade participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 16, 2022.
Forces from Chechnya
The 141st Special Motorized Regiment
The 141st Special Motorized Regiment participated in the battle for Mariupol in early March 2022. Ukrainian and Russian sources, and photos and videos posted online of the 141st Special Motorized Regiment, place the unit in Mariupol.2
Special Purpose Police Regiment
Special Purpose Police Regiment participated in the battle for Mariupol as early as March 19, 2022.
Military Command Structure
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Ministry of Defense
The Russian military is officially headed by President Vladimir Putin.3 His second in command is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.4
The General Staff
The General Staff is the primary organization in the overall command and control structure of Russia’s armed forces. Valery Gerasimov is the First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, and reports to Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.5
The General Staff has many sub-departments. One of them, the Main Operations Directorate, is responsible for directing the operations of the military forces and for organizing the interaction between armed forces and other federal bodies.6 Its head, the first deputy chief of the general staff, Sergei Rudskoy, reports directly to the chief of the general staff.7
A number of forces are below the general staff level, including military districts and the Northern Fleet, and Special Forces (Spetsnaz).
Military District Commands
Russian forces below the general staff level are largely organized into military districts-the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western-as well as the “Northern Fleet,” which has the status of a military district.8 Commanders of each military district command an array of forces, including air and naval forces within their respective districts. These commanders are appointed by Russia’s president on the recommendation of the minister of defense.9
Special Forces
Within the Russian armed forces, there are multiple formations of so-called special forces, or Spetsnaz units. Two main branches of special forces units are not associated with the organic structure of the VDV (Vozdushno-desantnye voyska) or military districts. One branch includes units that fall under the control of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (still commonly referred to as the GRU); and the other includes units that fall under the control of the Special Operations Forces Command (KSSO), which also reports to the General Staff.10
The GRU falls under the Ministry of Defense and its general staff.11 The KSSO reportedly operates independently of the GRU.12 According to a Russian military analyst, special operations or Spetsnaz units are subordinate to operational commanders when deployed.13
National Guard
Distinct from its regular armed forces, Russia has a separate force, the National Guard, commonly referred to as Rosgvardiya. The overall head of the National Guard is President Putin who appoints the commander-in-chief of the National Guard forces.14 The commander-in-chief of the National Guard forces is Gen. Viktor Zolotov.15
National Guard District Commands
The National Guard command structure flows from Zolotov down to eight districts, each with their own commanders, and each district is further broken down into regions, which all have their own commanders.16 It is unclear what role district and regional commanders play in individual decisions made by the units that report to them.
Due to the outsized influence that the head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, has over the political and security structure in the Republic of Chechnya, the extent to which Chechen national guard forces are practically incorporated into the formal command structure set out in law is unclear.17
Call to Action
Take a Stand for Human Rights in Ukraine:
Research, United, Advocate!
Join us to make a difference in Ukraine’s war-torn landscape. Research, collaborate, and engage with human rights organizations. Together, we can protect and promote human rights.
1 Further research is needed identify specific air force units involved in conducting airstrikes in Mariupol.
2 Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov posted a video on March 23, 2022, reportedly showing Kadyrovites in Mariupol Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 23, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1584 (accessed July 12, 2023); Video posted on X (formerly Twitter) on reportedly shows Kadyrovites in Mariupol, (@Markito0171), post to X (formerly Twitter), March 30, 2022, www.twitter.com/markito0171 /status/1509276619202043906 (accessed July 12, 2023); X (formerly Twitter) OSINT account Heuvelrug Intelligence geolocated a video of Kadyrovites fighting in Mariupol on March 24, 2022, Heuvelrug Intelligence (@Hillridge OSINT), post to X (formerly Twitter), March 24, 2022, https://web.archive.org/web/20220324170805/ https:/twitter.com/HillridgeOSINT /status/1507041533928906752 (accessed July 12, 2023); Video posted on X (formerly Twitter) shows Kadyrovites near Mariupol, South African Eye (@eye_southern), post to X (formerly Twitter), March 25, 2022, https://twitter.com/eye_southern /status/1507258961480798214 (accessed July 12, 2023); Video posted on X (formerly Twitter) shows Kadyrovites in Mauripol, Masno (@NovichokRossiya), post to X (formerly Twitter), March 30, 2022, https:/twitter.com/NovichokRossiya /status/1509144166130982912 (accessed July 12, 2023); Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov posted a video of the 141st Special Motorized Regiment in Mariupol, Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, March 18, 2023, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1507 (accessed July 12, 2023); X (formerly Twitter) OSINT account Neonhandrail geolocated videos of Kadyrovites leaving Mariupol, Neonhandrail (@Neonhandrail), post to X (formerly Twitter), May 17, 2022, https://twitter.com/neonhandrail /status/1528587876862423041 (accessed July 12, 2023).
3 Vladimir Putin: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/leader.htm (accessed May 6, 2023); Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted December 12, 1993, http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm, art. 87.”The President of the Russian Federation shall be the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.”
4 Sergei Shoigu has been serving as Minister of Defense since November 6, 2012. See Sergei Shoigu: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/minister.htm (accessed May 6, 2023); Sergei Shoigu’s powers and responsibilities are extensive and include the exercise of control over the deployment and use of the armed forces, based on the President’s decision. See Полномочия Министра обороны Российской Федерации, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://doc.mil.ru/documents/extended_search/more.htm?id=10912180@egNPA (accessed May 6, 2023).
5 Valery Gerasimov has been serving in this role since November 9, 2012. See Valery Gerasimov: Biography, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://eng.mil.ru/en/management/deputy/more.htm?id=11113936@SD_Employee (accessed May 6, 2023).
6 Главное оперативное управление Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации, Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, https://structure.mil.ru/structure/ ministry_of_defence/details.htm? id=9710@egOrganization (accessed June 26, 2020).
7 Ibid.
8 “Северный флот России получил статус военного округа,” Interfax, January 1, 2021, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/743819 (accessed July 12, 2023).
9 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 19, 2017, No. 177, as amended on November 5, 2020, https://lawnotes.ru/president-rf/ukaz-prezidenta-rf-ot-19.04.2017-n-177 (accessed January 12, 2023).
10 Mark Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015); Christopher Marsh, “Developments in Russian Special Operations: Russia’s Spetznaz, SOF and Special Operations Command,” CANSOFCOM Education and Research Center, 2017, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D4-10-21-2017-eng.pdf (accessed July 12, 2023), p. 18; Lester W Grau and Charles K Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 283.
11 Lester W Grau and Charles K Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 283.
12 Lester W Grau and Charles K Bartles, The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces, (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2016), p. 283.
13 Mark Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015).
14 “Federal Law of July 3, 2016 No. 226-FZ,” Official website of the President of Russia, https://web.archive.org/web/20230323043540/ http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40960 (accessed January 15, 2024).
15 Viktor Zolotov was awarded the rank of General of the Army on November 10, 2015. On April 5, 2016, he was appointed to the position of the Director of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops-Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation. See Zolotov Viktor Vasilievich, National Guard of the Russian Federation, https://web.archive.org/web/20221028082527/ https://rosguard.gov.ru/ru/page/AjaxPartial/zolotov-viktor-vasilevich (accessed October 28, 2022). Zolotov has also visited national guard troops in Kherson and Crimea as recently as February 2023 where he gave awards to his forces for their role in the invasion. Директор Росгвардии посетил подразделения ведомства в Республике Крым и в Херсонской области Rosguard, February 3, 2023, https://rosguard.gov.ru/News/Article/direktor-rosgvardii-posetil-podrazdeleniya-vedomstva-v-respublike-krym-i-v-xersonskoj-oblasti (accessed March 30, 2023); Structure of The Federal Service of The National Guard Troops of The Russian Federation, Rosguard, https://web.archive.org/web/20230226115903/ https://rosguard.gov.ru/page/index/structure (accessed November 27, 2023).
16 Structure of the Federal Service of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, Rosguard, https://web.archive.org/web/20230226115903/ https://rosguard.gov.ru/page/index/structure (accessed November 27, 2023).
17 Anecdotal evidence indicates that Kadyrov may have played a direct role in planning or directing some of the National Guard forces deployed in Mariupol that were dispatched from Chechnya. In a post to his personal Telegram account, Kadyrov shows a meeting among Adam Delimkhanov and commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army Andrey Mordvichev where Kadyrov made “proposals to the action plan" in Mariupol. See Ramzan Kadyrov (@RKadyrov_95), post to Telegram channel, April 8, 2022, https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1822 (accessed July 12, 2023).