The New Iraq?

Torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraqi custody

[1] The Iraqi authorities, in the form of the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC), began taking responsibility for detainees within the criminal justice system in September or October 2003, taking into their custody individuals accused of so-called "Iraqi-on-Iraqi" crimes.

[2] International Committee of the Red Cross, Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, February 2004, p. 16.This report, which has not been released by the ICRC, was reportedly leaked by a U.S. official to the media after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in May 2004.Several of the detention facilities cited in the ICRC report in connection with the abuse of inmates were among those from where Human Rights Watch also received similar allegations, including the Major Crimes Directorate and police stations in al-Dora, al-Bayya', al-Qanat and al-Salhiyya.

[3]Article 4 of the ICCPR is explicit: during a state of emergency, states parties may not derogate from the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, among other fundamental rights.It reads: "1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.2. No derogation from articles 6, 7 [torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment], 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision."Iraq ratified the ICCPR in 1971.

[4] Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), No. 23 of 1971, as amended, Article 92. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) amended the CCP at various times since April 2003.

[5] CCP, Article 123.

[6] The amounts that interrogators or other police officials allegedly demanded ranged from one hundred U.S. dollars to as much as several thousand dollars, well beyond the means of most Iraqis today.Some of those interviewed told Human Rights Watch that sometimes there followed a negotiating process, whereby the sums demanded were reduced and/or asked for in Iraqi dinar equivalents.Since sovereignty transfer in late June 2004, the exchange rate for one U.S. dollar has averaged between 1.40 to 1.46 Iraqi dinars.

[7] "Sacking of crusading judge fans concerns over Iraq rights record", Agence France Presse, October 18, 2004.

[8] In accordance with Article 26(A) of the Transitional Administration Law (TAL), "Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 shall remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law."Just prior to sovereignty transfer, the CPA Administrator transferred authority over the Iraqi prison system to the minister of justice (CPA/ORD/28 June 2004/100: Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority).Section 6(2) of CPA Order 100 stated that " the minister of justice shall remain in full control of the Iraqi prison system and shall report periodically to the Prime Minister regarding the status of the Iraqi prison system.... "To Human Rights Watch's knowledge, no further amendments to legislation introduced by the CPA relating to the management of prison and detention facilities have since been made.

[9] CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/10 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities).

[10] CPA/MEM/8 June 2003/02 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities).Under Section 14(5) of the Memorandum, ICRC delegates shall be granted access "whenever sought," giving them authority "to inspect health, sanitation and living arrangements and to interview all detainees in private," as well as to pass messages to and from the families of the detainees.

[11] CPA/ORD/02 June 2004/91 (Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias Within Iraq).Upon its establishment, Muqtada al-Sadr declared that the function of the Mahdi Army was to protect Shi'a religious authorities in al-Najaf.

[12] CPA/ORD/11 July 2003/13, as amended (The Central Criminal Court of Iraq).The felonies falling within the Central Criminal Court's jurisdiction are principally, but not exclusively: terrorism; organized crime; governmental corruption; acts intended to destabilize democratic institutions or processes; and violence based on race, nationality, ethnicity or religion.The court also hears cases where a determination is made that a criminal defendant may not be able to obtain a fair trial in a local court (Section 18 (2) of CPA Order 13 as amended on April 22, 2004).The CPA published its intent to establish the Central Criminal Court in a Public Notice (Regarding the Creation of a Central Criminal Court of Iraq and Adjustments to the Criminal Procedure Code), dated June 18, 2003.

[13]Order for Safeguarding National Security, No. 1 of 2004, of July 3, 2004.Article 7(1) reads: "The Central Criminal Court of Iraq shall assume the review of serious crimes committed during the period of the state of emergency, and which are referred by a judge of jurisdiction including crimes of murder, robbery, rape, kidnapping, destruction, bombing or burning or damaging of public or private property, and possession of military weapons and their ammunition, or the manufacturing, transportation, smuggling or trading of such weapons."

[14] The seven police stations are: al-Sa'doun, Balat al-Shuhada', al-Masbah, al-Za'faraniyya, al-Muthanna, Baghdad al-Jadida, and Jisr Diyala.

[15] Consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which Iraq is party, Human Rights Watch defines a child as any person below the age of 18 years.

[16] The Medico-Legal Institute is Iraq's principal center for forensic medicine.

[17] Douglas Jehl and Neil A. Lewis, "U.S. Said to Hold More Foreigners in Iraq Fighting," New York Times,Jan. 8, 2005.

[18] Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 8, 2004, Article 2(A).

[19] These and other rights, including the right to freedom of expression and association, religious beliefs, and freedom from discrimination on ethnic, religious or other grounds, are set out under Chapter Two of the TAL (Fundamental Rights: Articles 10-23).

[20] Annex to the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq in the Transitional Period, June 1, 2004 (Section Two: Institutions and Powers of the Iraqi Interim Government).

[21] The IGC was appointed by the CPA on July 13, 2003 (CPA/REG/13 July 2003/6 Governing Council of Iraq), and dissolved itself upon the appointment of the Iraqi Interim Government on June 1, 2004 (CPA/REG/9 June 2004/9 Governing Council's Dissolution).

[22] S/RES/1546 (2004).The annexes to the resolution, texts of letters from Iraqi Interim Government Prime Minister Ayad 'Allawi and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, both dated June 5, 2004, to the president of the Security Council, outline the role of the Multinational Force in achieving security and stability in Iraq.

[23]Ibid.

[24] The June 5, 2004 letter from Prime Minister Ayad 'Allawi to the president of the Security Council refers to the creation "with the MNF coordination bodies at national, regional, and local levels, that will include Iraqi security forces commanders and civilian leadership, to ensure that Iraqi security forces will coordinate with the MNF on all security policy and operations issues ," as well as the sharing of intelligence, with Iraqi security forces assuming "progressively greater responsibility as Iraqi capabilities improve."

[25] CPA/REG/9 June 2004/10 (Members of Designated Iraqi Interim Government).

[26] CPA/ORD/4 April 2004/68 (Ministerial Committee for National Security). The Order provided for the establishment of the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) "under the authority, direction and control of the Administrator of the CPA pending transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government."Currently headed by the prime minister, its permanent members are the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, justice and finance.The MCNS also has several permanent advisory members, with the multinational force commander invited to participate in its meetings as appropriate.With regard to its role, Order 68 only states that this is "to facilitate and coordinate national security policy among the Ministries and agencies of the Iraqi government tasked with national security issues" (Section 1(1)).

[27] CPA/ORD/1 April 2004/69 (Delegation of Authority to Establish the Iraqi National Intelligence Service).

[28]See "Text of the Prime Minister's statement at the press conference on the future of Iraq's defense and security", Al-Sabah Al-Jadeed, June 22, 2004.See also Jim Krane, "Iraq's interim leader plans security shake-up," Associated Press, June 21, 2004; Tom Lasseter and Hannah Allam, "Iraqi leader outlines security overhaul; Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced an ambitious plan for reestablishing an Iraqi military, including an air force, coast guard and special forces," Knight Ridder News Service, June 21, 2004; Sadeq Rahim and 'Ali Khalil, "'Allawi accuses external elements of involvement in carrying out terrorist operations and announces the establishment of a general directorate for national security," Azzaman, June 21, 2004.Further statements regarding the creation of a new security agency were made by the prime minister at another press conference on July 16, when he announced the arrest of alleged key figures from al-Qaeda,See "Creation of a new security apparatus to crack down on terrorism and its accomplices: renewed clashes in al-Falluja and the retrieval of a second decapitated body from the Tigris River", Al-Mada, July 17, 2004; and "'Allawi announces the creation of a new security apparatus and confirms the arrest of key figures from al-Qaeda," Baghdad, July 17, 2004.

[29] CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 (Dissolution of Entities).The new security adviser to the Ministry of Interior was named as Major General 'Adnan Thabet al-Samarra'i ("Reconstitution of the General Security Directorate," Al-Nahdhah, June 21, 2004).

[30] Under Article 1 of the Order, a state of emergency may be declared "upon the exposure of the people of Iraq to a danger of grave proportions, threatening the lives of individuals and emanating from an ongoing campaign of violence by any number of people, for the purpose of preventing the establishment of a broad based government in Iraq, or to hinder the peaceful participation of all Iraqis in the political process, or for any other purpose."

[31]See, for example, Betsy Pisik, "Human rights a priority in Iraq; Official tried to allay fears on security law, hits U.N.," The Washington Times, July 9, 2004.

[32] Order for Safeguarding National Security, Article 4.

[33]Ibid., Article 3 (First and Second).

[34]Ibid., Article 9 (Second).

[35] Article 15(B) of the TAL, for example, states that "[E]xtreme exigent circumstances, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, may justify a warrantless search, but such exigencies shall be narrowly construed.In the event that a warrantless search is carried out in the absence of an extreme exigent circumstance, the evidence so seized, and any other evidence found derivatively from such search, shall be inadmissible in connection with a criminal charge, unless the court determines that the person who carried out the warrantless search believed reasonably and in good faith that the search was in accordance with the law."

[36] Betsy Pisik, "Human rights a priority in Iraq," The Washington Times, July 9, 2004.See also Muhammad 'Abdul-Khaleq, "The government signs the Law for Safeguarding National Security," Al-Sabah Al-Jadeed, July 8, 2004.

[37] CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/7 (Penal Code).Section 3 (1) of the CPA Order states: "Capital punishment is suspended.In each case where the death penalty is the only available penalty prescribed for an offense, the court may substitute the lesser penalty of life imprisonment, or such other lesser penalty as provided for in the Penal Code."

[38] The death penalty was also reintroduced for two other crimes: the use of biological materials harmful to public health and resulting in deaths, and attacks on public means of transport and safety.

[39] Order for the Reintroduction of the Death Penalty, Number 3 of 2004, August 8, 2004.Order 3 of 2004 also provided for the commutation to life imprisonment of death sentences passed and upheld prior to the Order's effectiveness(Article 7).Human Rights Watch knows of several death sentences passed prior to August 2004, most if not all for premeditated murder.On October 24, 2004, Iraq's minister of justice said in a media interview that between 150 and 160 "Arab fighters" have been charged with carrying out acts of terrorism and may face the death penalty if convicted by the criminal courts.They were said to include Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, Moroccan, Syrian and Yemeni nationals as well as IraniansSee "About 150 Arab fighters face death penalty in Iraq: minister," Agence France Presse, October 24, 2004.

[40] Citing Iraq's minister of human rights, Bakhtiar Amin, at a press conference in Baghdad on August 8, 2004.See Fu'ad Jassem Hammudi, "Reintroduction of the death penalty," Al-Nahdhah, August 9, 2004, and "Safeguarding the security of Iraq, its people and human rights: reintroduction of the death penalty," Al-Sabah Al-Jadeed, August 9, 2004.

[41] Order for Amnesty, Number 2 of 2004, August 4, 2004. Order 2 of 2004 limited those benefiting from the terms of the amnesty to Iraqi nationals who committed the stipulated crimes between May 1, 2003 and the date of the law coming into force.Initially valid for a thirty-day period, the amnesty was extended for an additional month in mid-September 2004.It was not known how many people benefited.

[42] ICCPR, Article 9.To comply with Article 9, the state must specify in its legislation the grounds on which individuals may be deprived of their liberty and the procedures to be used in enforcing arrests and detentions. Only acts conducted in accordance with such rules are considered lawful, thus restricting the discretion of individual arresting officers. Moreover, the prohibition on arbitrariness means that the deprivation of liberty, even if provided for by law, must still be proportional to the reasons for arrest, as well as predictable. The arrests of persons for the exercise of their fundamental rights is considered arbitrary and in violation of international law.Article 9 also specifically requires that detainees be immediately informed of the reasons for their arrest and promptly be told of any charges against them, and that they be brought promptly before a judge empowered to rule upon the lawfulness of the detention.

[43] ICCPR's Article 9(3) states: "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release."

[44] ICCPR, Article 10(1).

[45] ICCPR, Article 7.

[46] ICCPR, Article 14.

[47] ICCPR, Article 14(3)(b) (preparation of the defense).Human Rights Committee (HRC) General Comment 13 states that under the ICCPR, "the accused must have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing. this subparagraph requires counsel to communicate with the accused in conditions giving full respect for the confidentiality of their communications.Lawyers should be able to counsel and to represent their clients in accordance with their established professional standards and judgment without any restrictions, influences, pressures or undue interference from any quarter." U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 135 (2003) para. 9.The U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers states that, "All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by and to communicate and consult with a lawyer, without delay, interception or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be within sight, but not within the hearing, of law enforcement officials."Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990), Article 8.

[48]Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 30 (1994), para. 2.

[49] Committee against Torture, Consideration of First Periodic Report of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, CAT/C/SR.91, November 15, 1991. The CAT reiterated its concern about incommunicado interrogation in the United Kingdom's second periodic report. See Committee against Torture, Consideration of Second Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, para. 29

[50]Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth session, 1992), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 30 (1994), paras. 11 & 12.

[51]Ibid. paras. 13 & 14.

[52] CCP, Article 92.

[53] CCP, Article 102(a).

[54] CCP, Article 123.

[55] CCP, Article 109 (a) and (c).

[56] CCP, Article 127.

[57] Article 213(c) of the CCP states that the court may rely solely on a confession "if it is satisfied with it and if there is no other evidence which proves it to be a lie."

[58] Article 333 of the Penal Code (No. 111 of 1969) states: "Any public official or agent who tortures or orders the torture of an accused, witness or informant in order to compel him to confess to the commission of an offense or to make a statement or provide information about such an offense or to withhold information or to give a particular opinion in respect of it is punishable by imprisonment or by detention. Torture shall include the use of force or threats."As defined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Code, "detention" is a period ranging from three months to five years, and "imprisonment" is a period ranging from five to fifteen years.

[59] CCP, Article 3(2).

[60] CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07 (Penal Code).Section 3(2) of the Order states: "Torture and cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment is prohibited."

[61] Prior to the amendment, Article 218 of the CCP read: "It is a condition of the acceptance of the confession that it is not given as a result of coercion, whether it be physical or moral, a promise or a threat.Nevertheless, if there is no causal link between the coercion and the confession or if the confession is corroborated by other evidence which convinces the court that it is true or which has led to uncovering a certain truth, then the court may accept it."The Article now reads: "It is a condition of the acceptance of the confession that it is not given as a result of coercion." (CPA/MEM/27 June 2004/03: Criminal Procedures, Section 3d (vii)).By virtue of the same Order, Article 213(c) of the CCP was also amended, allowing the court to accept confessions "if it is satisfied with it", deleting "and if there is no other evidence which proves it to be a lie." ( Section 3d(vi)).

[62] CPA/MEM/27 June 2994/03 (Criminal Procedures).Section 4 reads: "At the time an Iraqi law enforcement officer arrests any person, the officer shall inform that person of his or her right to remain silent and to consult an attorney."

[63]Ibid., Section 5(c), which reads: "A criminal detainee shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they [sic] understand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them by the authority serving an arrest warrant."

[64]Ibid., Section 3(b), which reads:"Before questioning the accused the examining magistrate must inform the accused that i) he or she has the right to remain silent and no adverse inference may be drawn from the accused's decision to exercise that right; ii) he or she has the right to be represented by an attorney, and if he or she is not able to afford representation, the Court will provide an attorney at no expense to the accused."

[65]Ibid., Section 3(c).

[66] TAL, March 8, 2004, Article 2(A).

[67] CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 (Dissolution of Entities).

[68] CPA/ORD/25 May 2003/05 (Establishment of the Iraqi De-Baathification Council).This Order was rescinded upon the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government at the end of June 2004 (CPA/ORD/28 June 2004/100 (Transition of Laws, Regulations, Orders, and Directives Issued by the Provisional Coalition Authority).

[69] The sole exception was a public notice regarding the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, set up under CPA Order Number 69 of April 1, 2004, and which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (See below).

[70] For the purposes of this report, all references are to the Major Crimes Directorate, even though some of the torture cases highlighted relate to periods in which the Directorate had not been officially established and was still either a Unit or an Office within the Ministry of Interior.

[71] Human Rights Watch understands that the new premises for the al-Rusafa branch of the Major Crimes Directorate are likely to be located in the al-A'dhamiyya district of Baghdad.

[72] These headquarters were established by the Major Crimes Directorate following the expulsion from Hakimiyyat al-Mukhabarat of the Hizbullah Movement in Iraq in mid-August 2004 (See Section VI).

[73]Madinat al-Sadr, a large neighborhood in north-eastern Baghdad, was so renamed following the fall of the Saddam Hussein government in April 2003.It was formerly known as Madinat al-Thawra [RevolutionCity] and subsequently as Madinat Saddam [SaddamCity].

[74]Order for Safeguarding National Security, No. 1 of 2004 (See Section IV).

[75] One investigative judge told Human Rights Watch that such cases included a defendant referred to the Central Criminal Court on charges relating to the illegal sale of antiquities.

[76] These are said to include the Important Crimes Directorate (Mudiriyyat al-Jara'im al-Muhimma), set up by the Iraqi Interim Government after July 2004 and headed by Major General Tareq al-Baldawi.It is headquartered at the Ministry of Interior and initially had two branches, one located in the al-Mansour district (al-Karkh sector) and the other in al-Karrada (al-Rusafa sector), but the latter is said to be no longer functioning.It is unclear what types of crimes fall within this directorate's jurisdiction, but the cases it has referred to the Central Criminal Court reportedly include persons accused of car theft.Occasionally, the Ministerof Interior's Office is said torefer directly individual cases to this Court, including a case involving an abduction, but Human Rights Watch was not able to independently verify this.

[77] Two floors within the main Ministry building are reportedly used to hold suspects incommunicado. Several detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch mentioned the seventh floor as being one of them.

[78] CPA/ORD/1 April 2004/69 (Delegation of Authority to Establish the Iraqi National Intelligence Service).The Charter of the INIS is annexed to CPA Order 69.

[79]Ibid., Section 1(3).

[80] Article 27(D) of the TAL also states that the Iraqi Intelligence Service "shall collect information, assess threats to national security, and advise the Iraqi government.This Service shall be under civilian control, shall be subject to legislative oversight, and shall operate pursuant to law and in accordance with recognized principles of human rights."

[81] Human Rights Watch interview with Murtadha Mahdi, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 3, 2004.

[82] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Ali Rashid 'Abbadi, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 3, 2004.

[83] Human Rights Watch interviews with Asil 'Abbas Hussain and Yusuf Shakir 'Ufi, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 3, 2004.

[84] "Falah al-Nakib Holds a News Conference on Najaf", Federal Document Clearing House, Political Transcripts, August 12, 2004.

[85] Human Rights Watch interviews with Jabbar, 'Ali, Sadiq and 'Adnan [full names withheld], Baghdad, August 12, 2004.

[86] In colloquial Iraqi dialect, a "paper" (waraq) commonly refers to a $100 bill in U.S. currency, while a "notebook" (daftar) denotes $10,000.

[87] Human Rights Watch interview with Dhia' Fawzi Shahid, Baghdad, September 5, 2004.

[88] The name of police station has been withheld at his request.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview with a former detainee from al-Najaf [name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch], Baghdad, September 21, 2004.

[90] Human Rights Watch interview with a businessman from al-Najaf [name and details withheld by Human Rights Watch], Baghdad, September 21, 2004.

[91]See, for example, Michael Howard, "Armed clashes claim 172 Iraqi lives", The Guardian, August 13, 2004 and "US bombing of Iraq city of Kut kills 75, wounds 148: official", Agence France Presse, August 12, 2004.Human Rights Watch was unable to verify how many people were killed during the aerial bombardment of al-Kut.One person from al-Najaf interviewed by the organization put the number of those killed at forty-five, and those wounded at 150.

[92] Human Rights Watch interview with Shaikh 'Ammar 'Ata al-Hamdani, Baghdad, September 20, 2004.

[93] Human Rights Watch did not know the date on which this article was first published inal-Shira', but it was reproduced by the Hizbullah Movement in Iraq in its weekly newspaper, al-Bayyina (Issue No. 99, last week of October 2004), under the title "What do you know about our new intelligence service?"

[94]Hizbullah party officials told Human Rights Watch that their occupation of the premises had been authorized by the CPA at the time, and showed the organization documents to that effect.

[95] Human Rights Watch discussion with Hassan al-Sari, Secretary General of Hizbullah, Baghdad, August 25, 2004.

[96] Human Rights Watch interview with Naji Mawla Ni'ma, Baghdad, October 3, 2004.

[97]Ibid.

[98] Human Rights Watch interview with Abu Mustafa al-Sa'idi, Baghdad, October 3, 2004.

[99] Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Muhammad al-Mas'udi, Baghdad, October 3, 2004.

[100] Detaining officials brought some of the defendants to court from the Transfer Prison in al-Rusafa. Others had come directly from police stations in the Baghdad area, and the rest from facilities under the authority of the Major Crimes Directorate or the Criminal Intelligence Directorate.Upon arrival in court, they initially kept the defendants in holding cells and then brought them up to what was known as the 'Major Crimes Room,' where they awaited their turn before the judge.Having obtained authorization from judicial officials to speak to the detainees, Human Rights Watch also had the full cooperation of police officials permanently assigned to the court to coordinate logistics for the hearings.They gave Human Rights Watch free access to all detainees, but there was no opportunity to talk confidentially to them.The detainees usually sat on the floor facing the wall and were told not to talk to anyone or to each other. Through early September 2004, most of the interviews or discussions with the detainees conducted by Human Rights Watch took place in the Major Crimes Room, within sight of police officials who had escorted them from their places of detention, but in most cases out of earshot.The president of the Central Criminal Court changed the system on September 7, ordering that all detainees be kept in the holding cells until the judges or judicial investigators were ready to receive them, and closing down the Major Crimes Room.Thereafter, Human Rights Watch conducted its interviews at the holding cells, which afforded more opportunity for confidential discussions with the detainees, without the presence of any detaining officials.

[101] In some cases, detainees gave Human Rights Watch the first names and ranks of police officials who they alleged had tortured them or ordered their torture under interrogation.

[102] Human Rights Watch interview with Haidar Ahmad Mirza Ahmad al-Nu'aimi, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, July 31, 2004.

[103] Human Rights Watch interview with Ra'ed 'Abdul-Salam Hamid, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, September 11, 2004.Hamid said he also had spent some two months at the Major Crimes Directorate, and has been subsequently transferred to the Iraqi Correctional Service section located in Abu Ghraib prison.He and his four co-defendants told Human Rights Watch that their trial had been postponed four times because of the failure of the police to bring a sixth defendant charged in the same case.On that day too, only five of them had been brought to court, and the trial was postponed again.

[104] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Amer Rahim Dhari, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 18, 2004.

[105] A police official present in the Major Crimes Room suggested to Human Rights Watch that the three were arrested because they may have been "loitering suspiciously" near the Ministry.

[106] Human Rights Watch discussion with an investigative judge, Central Criminal Court, October 24, 2004.

[107]See Ann Barnard, "Setting a tough tone in Baghdad roundup," Boston Globe, July 17, 2004.According to the article, Barnard was contacted by "a high-ranking official in Iraq's Interior Ministry," who told her, "We've arrested 500 criminals.Come to the ministry now.And bring your camera.You can take their pictures."

[108]See, for example, "Satellite images contribute to the arrest of 13 gangs," Al-Sabah, June 28, 2004.

[109]See Jamal Hashem 'Ali, "Breakup of fifteen criminal gangs on the eve of sovereignty transfer: the Interior raid al-Bataween dens," Azzaman, June 28, 2004.

[110] Some of these photographs can be viewed on http://tinyurl.com/4uze6.

[111] Accounts of the incident were first published by Mike Francis in, "Ordered to just walk away," The Oregonian August 11, 2004.

[112] Extracts from a statement written by Captain Jarrell Southall, 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry Division, Oregon Army National Guard.The statement is dated June 29, 2004.

[113] Mike Francis, "Abuse by Iraqis 'astonished' guardsman," The Oregonian, October 9, 2004.

[114] Mike Francis, "Ordered to just walk away," The Oregonian, August 11, 2004.

[115] Mike Francis, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman praises Oregon soldiers' action," The Oregonian, October 9, 2004.General Myers' comment was said to have been made in a letter to Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), in response to his call for an investigation into the incident.

[116]See, for example, "Failed American attempt to release members of the al-Bataween gangs," Al-Sabah, June 30, 2004.Other newspapers reported that U.S. forces had arrested Iraqi police officers.See, for example Jamal Hashem 'Ali, "American force detains police officers questioning the al-Bataween gangs," Azzaman, June 30, 2004.

[117] Under the penitentiary system established by the previous Iraqi government, detainees being referred to court or destined for transfer to another prison within cities or between different governorates would usually pass through a Detention and Transfer Prison or Tasfiratfor short(Sijn al-Mawqif wal-Tasfirat).In Baghdad, there were two such prisons, one in al-Karkh covering western Baghdad, and another in al-Rusafa, covering eastern Baghdad.At this writing, only the al-Rusafa Tasfirat was in use.The prison is located in the al-Sha'ab district, close to the football stadium and opposite the BaghdadPoliceAcademy.

[118] Human Rights Watch interview with the wife of one of the al-Bataween detainees [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 23, 2004.

[119] Human Rights Watch discussions with Zuhair al-Maliki, Salem Radwan al-Musawi and Haqqi Isma'il al-Shummari, investigative judges, Central Criminal Court, September 15, 2004.

[120] Human Rights Watch interview with Hassan Ghadhban Tu'ma, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 23, 2004.

[121] Human Rights Watch interview with Jaber Ghadhban Tu'ma, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 23, 2004.

[122] Human Rights Watch interview with Jassem Ghadhban Tu'ma, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 23, 2004.

[123] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Ubaid al-Sayyid Makki Muhammad, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 23, 2004.

[124] Jamal Hashem 'Ali, "Organized gangs' dens raided in al-Fadhl, al-Kifah and al-Sadriyya," Azzaman, July 14, 2004.

[125] Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Fateh Nameq, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 7, 2004.

[126] Human Rights Watch interview with Arkan Rahim Lafta, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 7, 2004.

[127] Human Rights Watch interview with Sa'ad Hassun Kadhim, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 21, 2004.

[128] Human Rights Watch interviews with Hussain 'Adel Karim Khan and Amjad Sa'di Muhammad, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 21, 2004.

[129] Human Rights Watch discussion with an investigative judge [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 21, 2004.

[130] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Ammar Rashid 'Amid, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 30, 2004.

[131] In some cases, police officials told Human Rights Watch that although they had not brought defendants to the Central Criminal Court in person within twenty-four hours as stipulated by the CCP, defendents' files had been referred to the investigative judges within a few days of arrest.In response to this, the judges told the organization that they did not regard this as compliant with the law, and that the defendants must appear before them in person.

[132] Human Rights Watch interview with Tahsin Khalil Ibrahim, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 10, 2004.

[133] Human Rights Watch interview with Khalid Muhammad 'Atiyya, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 25, 2004.

[134] Human Rights Watch interview with Muhammad Hassan al-Sayyid Mulla Hassan, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 28, 2004.

[135] Human Rights Watch interviews with Sawa Efraim and Shimon Musa Odisho, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 28, 2004.

[136] Human Rights Watch interview with Saif Sa'ad Ilyas, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, September 18, 2004.

[137] Human Rights Watch interview with Faruq Karim Muhyi Zamel, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, September 9, 2004.

[138] Human Rights Watch interview with Yasser 'Abdul-Hamid 'Abdul-Razzaq, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, September 9, 2004.

[139] ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(g).

[140]See HRC, Concluding Comments on Romania, UN doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 111 (1999).

[141] Human Rights Watch interviews with 'Adnan Talib Dayikh, Riad Muhammad Hamid, Fa'iz Fadhil 'Alwan al-Janabi, Ahmad Na'im 'Abbas al-Zaidi, Muhammad Hatem 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Tamimi, Haidar Ahmad Mirza al-Nu'aimi, and Shahrazad Dakhil Muhsin, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, July 31, 2004.

[142] Under Article 443 (2, 3 and 5) of the Penal Code.

[143] Under Articles 421 and 422 of the Penal Code, as amended.

[144] Human Rights Watch interview with Sabah 'Ali Hammadi, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 1, 2004.

[145] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Issa 'Abbud Sardar, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 1, 2004.

[146] Under Article 443 (1, 3 and 4) of the Penal Code.

[147]See Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted November 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (entered into force September 2, 1990), Article 37(c); and the ICCPR, adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976), Article 10(b).

[148] ICCPR, Article 10(3).

[149] Law No. 76 of 1983, as amended.Under Article 3(2) of this law, a juvenile is defined as someone above the age of nine and below the age of eighteen.Article 10 specifies the types of facilities where juveniles may be held, depending on their age.Article 48 stipulates that upon arrest, juveniles must be handed over immediately to the juveniles police force, responsible for referring them to an investigative judge or the juvenile courts.Article 52(2) stipulates that in areas where separate detention facilities are not available, measures must be taken to prevent juveniles from mixing with adult detainees.

[150] CPA/MEM/8 June 2003/02 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities), Section 30(5).Until the fall the former Iraqi government in April 2003, juveniles were held in prisons or detention facilities under the authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.Under CPA authority, the Directorate of Juvenile Prisons was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (CPA/ORD/8 June 2003/10: Management of Detention and Prison Facilities, Section 1).

[151] Article 63 of the Juveniles Welfare Law stipulates that the names of juvenile detainees, their addresses and the names of their schools may not be publicly divulged, or their photographs taken or other measures adopted that would result in their identities being revealed.Among the suspects rounded up in the al-Bataween raid of June 27, 2004, and who were photographed or filmed by journalists at the invitation of Ministry of Interior officials, there were reportedly four juveniles.

[152] Mike Francis, "Ordered to just walk away,"The Oregonian, August 11, 2004.

[153] Human Rights Watch interview with the sister-in-law of a juvenile from the al-Bataween group [name withheld by Human Rights Watch at her request], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 23, 2004.

[154] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Ubaid al-Sayyid Makki Muhammad, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 23, 2004.

[155] As provided for under Article 4 of the Juveniles Welfare Law No. 76 of 1983, as amended.

[156] At the Medico-Legal Institute, a forensic doctor told Human Rights Watch that the principal method used for estimating the age of persons to establish whether or not they are juveniles is through an examination of bone development, based on x-ray images taken of the joints such as the hips, elbows, wrists and knees.In some cases, an examination of dental development is also taken into account.The doctor added that "we have developed sufficient expertise whereby, based on the x-ray examination and our assessment of the person's general appearance, the margin of error in this regard is negligible," (Human Rights Watch discussion with a forensic doctor [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Medico-Legal Institute, Baghdad, September 14, 2004).

[157] Human Rights Watch interview with Faisal [full name withheld], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 18, 2004.

[158] His cousin Hassan, aged twenty, told Human Rights Watch that Criminal Intelligence personnel had also repeatedly beaten, boxed, slapped, and kicked him during interrogation, and made him sign a statement while blindfolded.Two weeks after his arrest, they transferred him to the same police station, where he said treatment was better, although he was not permitted family visits there either. (Human Rights Watch interview with Hassan [full name withheld], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 18, 2004).

[159] The hearing took place in the presence of a Criminal Intelligence official, who motioned Faisal to keep quiet when he began telling the judge that two other people arrested in the same case had already testified that he had nothing to do with the abduction.

[160] The three detainees declined to give their names when Human Rights Watch interviewed them at the Central Criminal Court on August 24, 2004.They said they were themselves accused of the illegal possession of weapons and had been arrested fifteen days earlier. They said they had received "the usual treatment" under interrogation, namely repeated beating with cables, hosepipes and other implements.

[161] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Ali [full name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 28, 2004.

[162] Human Rights Watch interview with Hassan Muhan 'Abbud, Baghdad, September 5, 2004.

[163] Human Rights Watch interview with Hussain 'Ali Kadhim, Baghdad, September 5, 2004.

[164] Authorization for access to these archives was obtained from judicial officials at the Central Criminal Court.

[165] Human Rights Watch discussion with Dr. Fa'iq Amin Baker, Medico-Legal Institute, Baghdad, August 10, 2004.

[166] The breakdown per month was as follows: June 11; July 4; August 1.There were no cases registered for the period September 1 through 14.

[167] The police stations from which the fourteen detainees were referred were the following: al-Bayya', al-Rashad, al-Dora, Bab al-Shaikh, Hay al-'Amel, Baghdad al-Jadida, Abu Ghraib, al-Sha'ab and al-Karkh Juveniles Police Directorate.One of the cases connected to the Major Crimes Directorate was a referral from the Money Laundering Unit, and the other was on the basis of an order from an investigative judge at the Central Criminal Court.

[168] For the remaining six cases, the medical reports concluded that in four of them, there was no evidence of external trauma, and in a fifth case, that the scarred tissue was "old."The sixth case involved a child referred for medical examination to verify allegations of sodomy, though it was unclear from the records whether the allegations related to a co-detainee or to a police official.In this case, the medical report concluded that sodomy could not be ruled out as having occurred, although there was no visible external evidence to that effect.The doctors estimated the boy's age to be between sixteen and seventeen.

[169] In the remaining five cases, the injuries were assessed as having occurred within a range of two weeks to two months (in one case the range given was two to four months) prior to the medical examination .

[170] There was one case in each of June, July, and August 2004.

[171] The second case was a referral from the Hay al-'Amel police station, in which medical examiners assessed the injuries as having occurred within two to four weeks prior to the medical examination.The third case, a referral from the al-A'dhamiyya police station, involved verification of allegations of sodomy and other sexual acts.It was unclear from the records whether the allegations involved a police official.

[172] The monthly breakdown was as follows: January 7: February 2; March 9.

[173] Three of the five cases emanating from the Major Crimes Directorate were connected to the Abduction and Murder Unit, the fourth to the Money Laundering Unit and the fifth to the Organized Crime Unit.The other referrals emanated from the following police stations: al-Jamila, Hay al-'Amel, al-Dora, al-Quds, al-Ma'mun and al-Karkh Juveniles Police Directorate.In the latter case, an assessment of the age of the detainee determined that he was between nineteen and twenty years old.

[174] Human Rights Watch did not have the opportunity to examine records involving female detainees for the same period.

[175] Human Rights Watch discussion with an investigative judge [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 22, 2004.

[176] Human Rights Watch discussion with Zuhair al-Maliki, then chief investigative judge, Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 30, 2004.

[177]Human Rights Watch discussion with a forensic doctor [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Medico-Legal Institute, Baghdad, September 14, 2004.

[178] One of the two cases involved the referral by a Central Criminal Court judge of a detainee held by the Major Crimes Directorate in al-Rusafa.His records at the Medico-Legal Institute showed that the judge referred him for a medical examination on July 8, 2004, but detaining officials did not implement the referral until July 17, ten days later.The medical examination was carried out on July 18, and in this instance the report stated that no evidence of external trauma could be found.

[179]Human Rights Watch discussion with a forensic doctor [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Medico-Legal Institute, Baghdad, September 14, 2004.

[180]Ibid.

[181] Investigative judges at the Central Criminal Court told Human Rights Watch that occasionally detainees alleging torture or ill-treatment are referred to a hospital rather than the Medico-Legal Institute for a preliminary medical examination, but the organization did not have the opportunity to check hospital records for details of such cases.The judges concurred, however, that they only regarded medical reports issued by the Medico-Legal Institute as ultimately reliable.At the institute, one of the doctors told Human Rights Watch that such preliminary examinations at hospitals are carried out by doctors on shift duty who were not specialists in the field of forensic medicine, and therefore unqualified to give a reliable assessment.Referring cases there would only cause "unnecessary delays."

[182] In the case of Firas 'Imad Sadeq al-Dulaimi (See Section VII, Case 2), Human Rights Watch verified that the investigative judge did refer him for medical examination, but found no records at the Medico-Legal Institute showing that detaining officials had implemented the referral order during the four subsequent weeks.

[183]The same reasons were cited by investigative judges at four other criminal courts (al-Bayya', al-Karrada, al-Rusafa and al-Thawra) with whom Human Rights Watch discussed inspection visits to police stations.

[184] In February 2004 the CPA authorized the establishment of an Office of Inspector General within each Iraqi Ministry, headed by an Inspector General appointed for a five-year term (CPA/ORD/5 February 2004/57: Iraqi Inspectors General).Section 5 of Order 57 sets out the functions of the Inspector General, which include receiving and assessing complaints of abuse of authority and forwarding these to the appropriate investigative authority; providing information and evidence regarding potentially criminal acts to appropriate law enforcement officials; referring matters for further civil, criminal and administrative action to appropriate administrative and prosecutorial agencies; and cooperating fully in assisting the work of law enforcement agencies, investigators and courts.Section 6 grants the Inspector General full and unrestricted access to the ministry's records, the power to subpoena witnesses, and the authority to require a Ministry's employees to report to the Office of Inspector General information regarding fraud, waste, abuse, corruption, and illegal acts.Section 9 requires the inspector general to "report the findings and recommendations of the Office's work to the respective minister, to appropriate elected and appointed leadership, and, except for law enforcement sensitive or confidential information, to the public."At this writing, the Ministry of Interior's inspector general was Major General Hassan al-Saray.

[185] Human Rights Watch discussion with a police official of the Major Crimes Directorate [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Baghdad, August 7, 2004.

[186] Article 329 of the Penal Code.The penalty for this offense is imprisonment for periods ranging from three months to five years, or a fine.

[187] Under Article 333 of the Penal Code, the crime of torture is punishable by up to fifteen years' imprisonment.

[188] Human Rights Watch discussion with an investigative judge [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 22, 2004.

[189] Under Article 3 of the CCP (Law 23 of 1971 as amended).

[190] Human Rights Watch discussion an investigative judge [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, September 15, 2004.

[191] CPA/ORD/27 June 2004/98 (Iraqi Ombudsman for Penal and Detention Matters).The detaining authority, according to the Order, included Iraqi, Multinational Force or contracted personnel.The ombudsman, appointed by the prime minister on the recommendation of the minister of justice, is authorized to investigate complaints received after the entry into force of the Order (Section 4(1); to enter and inspect detention facilities and documents at any time "subject only to the limitation that the Multinational Force Commander or his delegate may deny access for reasons of imperative military necessity as an exceptional and temporary measure, or prevent the inspection of operationally classified documents" (Section 11); and to submit appropriate recommendations to the prime minister, minister of justice, and the relevant head of the detaining authority (Section 14(4).In cases of "serious misconduct," such recommendations may include "dismissal, removal or punishment" of the detaining authority under investigation (Section 15).Additionally, Article 50 of the TAL, which provided for the establishment of a National Commission for Human Rights, stipulated that the Commission "shall include an Office of the Ombudsman to inquire into complaints.This office shall have the power to investigate, on its own initiative or on the basis of a complaint submitted to it, any allegation that the conduct of the governmental authorities is arbitrary or contrary to law."To Human Rights Watch's knowledge, no steps were taken following sovereignty transfer to set up the National Commission for Human Rights.

[192] Human Rights Watch discussion with an investigative judge [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, October 24, 2004.

[193] S/RES/1546 (2004).

[194] Since the transfer of sovereignty, Steven W. Casteel, a U.S. national and former Assistant Administrator for Intelligence with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, has held this post.

[195] Other topics covered in Block 1 include the right to life, trafficking of persons, rights of children and juveniles, and freedom of assembly and association.

[196] Other topics covered in Block 2 include the right to liberty and security, gender issues, community policing, and policing in a multi-ethnic society,

[197] Other topics covered in Block 3 include women in law enforcement, domestic violence, report writing and mine awareness.

[198] This part of the curriculum covers an overview of the Iraqi criminal justice system, laws of arrest, search and seizure laws, role of the courts, and human rights.

[199] The length of the course was augmented from a shorter version covering 108 hours.

[200] "Iraqi Police Transition Integration Program (REVISED)," provided to Human Rights Watch by Brigadier General Andrew Mackay, commander of CPATT, September 19, 2004.Brigadier General Mackay also made available documents pertaining to human rights issues used by trainers in some of lessons covered in the curriculum, and Human Rights Watch obtained similar documents on additional topics from other sources.

[201]See Gethin Chamberlaine, "Critics warn plan to sack 30,000 Iraqi police will create enemies", The Scotsman, August 23, 2004.

[202] Human Rights Watch discussion with Brigadier General Andrew Mackay, CPATT, Baghdad, September 19, 2004.

[203]Ibid.

[204] Human Rights Watch discussion with an investigative judge [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Central Criminal Court, Baghdad, August 22, 2004.

[205] Human Rights Watch discussion with Brigadier General Andrew Mackay, Baghdad, September 19, 2004.

[206]One reported incident where a Baghdad-based journalist said that he witnessed police abuse of criminal suspects exemplifies this attitude.See Patrice Claude, "Les droits de l'homme, on n'obtinent rien avec a!" Le Monde, August 10, 2004.In the article, one of the police officers on the scene is quoted as saying: "Les Amricains nous expliquent qu'il faut respecter les droits de l'homme maintenant.Mais on n'obtinent rienavec a.La bonne vieille mthode irakienne, a, a marche." [The Americans tell us that we must now respect human rights.But we don't achieve anything by that.The old and trusted Iraqi method, now that works].

[207] Human Rights Watch discussion with Brigadier General Andrew Mackay, Baghdad, September 19, 2004.

[208] Human Rights Watch discussion with advisers to the ICS [names withheld by Human Rights Watch], Baghdad, September 9, 2004.

[209]Ibid.

[210] Human Rights Watch discussion with David Hamilton, senior police adviser to the Ministry of Interior on planning and business management, Baghdad, September 7, 2004.Hamilton said that scene-of-crime officer training was already taking place at thirty-five locations nationwide, including training in methods for gathering physical evidence for scientific analysis.However, until such time as effective laboratory facilities become available, the usefulness of such training remains limited: "There are facilities available to police investigators for analysis of blood type but not subtype, and none for DNA analysis or fiber matching."An experiment was underway with a "model police station equipped to Western standards," but for the time being this was only within the Green Zone, he added.

[211]Ibid.

[212] Human Rights Watch discussion with an adviser to the Ministry of Interior [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Baghdad, September 21, 2004.

[213]Ibid.

[214] Human Rights Watch discussion with an adviser to the Ministry of Interior [name withheld by Human Rights Watch], Baghdad, September 21, 2004.

[215] One example given was the introduction of "data sheets" to account for each individual officer, following the discovery that salaries were being paid to some 120,000 police whereas the actual number was in the range of 88,000-90,000.

[216] Human Rights Watch did not know the outcome of these investigations at this writing.

[217] The interior minister at the time was Samir al-Sumaida'i, who is currently Iraq's representative at the United Nations in New York.

[218] Human Rights Watch discussion with an adviser to the Ministry of Interior, Baghdad, September 21, 2004.

[219]Ibid.

[220] Ann Barnard, "Iraqis to give security forces a freer hand, government stops short of martial law,"Boston Globe, July 4, 2004.

[221]Ibid.

[222]Ibid.

[223] Human Rights Watch interview with 'Ali Bargouth 'Alwan, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 12. 2004.

[224] The Badr Organization was formerly known as the Badr Brigades, the armed wing of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), a Shi'a political party.It was renamed in compliance with regulations introduced by the CPA in June 2004 banning party militias (CPA/ORD/02 June 2004/91: Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias Within Iraq).

[225] Human Rights Watch interview with Tahsin Dar'am Balasem, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, September 15, 2004.

[226] Human Rights Watch interview with Nasir Ghani Muhsin, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 10, 2004.

[227] A third brother, Khalid, was also implicated in the bank theft.Human Rights Watch independently had interviewed him upon his referral to the Central Criminal Court more than six weeks earlier (See Section VII, Case 3).

[228] Human Rights Watch interview with Ra'ed Muhammad 'Atiyya 'Abbas al-Budairi, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 11, 2004.

[229] Human Rights Watch interview with Hamid Farhan Salman, al-Karrada Criminal Court, Baghdad, October 13, 2004.

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