The United States-dominated multinational force entered Haiti on September 19, 1994, with a mandate to "use all necessary means...to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment...." The force's presence permitted the reinstatement of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and a reduction in the severe human rights abuses that plagued Haiti during the three year military regime. Yet as the multinational force prepares to turn over operations to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) on March 31, 1995, political tensions are increasing and far from having brought stability, the U.S.-led force can point only to a fragile security that impending parliamentary and presidential elections may rupture. Since the UNMIH mandate is designed solely to maintain a secure environment and will prohibit law enforcement, increasing responsibilities will soon fall onto Haiti's only functioning security force, an interim police force composed entirely of former members of the same military whose brutal human rights record initially galvanized the international effort to restore democracy to Haiti.
Neither the Haitian nor the U.S. governments enacted adequate screening procedures to purge the army of human rights violators prior to establishing the interim force. By the end of January 1995, U.S. officials of the State, Defense, and Justice departments, aided by the Haitian military high command, had selected nearly 3,400 soldiers through the rank of major, given them six days of training, and returned them to their units to serve under the observation of international police monitors of the multinational occupation force. Yet a U.S. Embassy source admitted that in truth only the Haitian officer corps had been individually scrutinized. Not surprisingly, there are serious allegations of involvement in human rights violations against members of the interim force and against senior military officials who supervised the creation of the force.
The decision to create an interim force of former soldiers, together with the failure to create effective mechanisms for screening out human rights violators or to investigate civilian complaints against members of the force, resulted in an interim police force that lacks the authority to enforce the law effectively. Many of the interim police are afraid to patrol alone, have been rejected outright by the population, and in some cases, attacked when there were allegations of abuse they committed while members of the military. Other interim police have returned to their intimidatory practices of the past. The widespread lack of credibility of the interim police force, engendered in part by a hasty selection process that failed to identify and remove human rights violators, could compromise the relative security achieved in Haiti by the multinational force.
The failures of the interim police to provide security in the face of a vacuum left by the concurrent dissolution of the army, and more recently, an emerging crime wave, have led to sporadic efforts to involve civilians in public security. So far these efforts have had decidedly mixed results. The Guantánamo refugee recruits who now work alongside the interim police in some areas have not contributed significantly to enhanced stability, largely due to their limited responsibilities and their subordinate role vis à vis the interim police. Community policing options and the emergence of neighborhood watch associations, both of which have received the endorsement of U.S. forces, represent potentially effective supplements to the interim security forces. Unfortunately, they already have led to several violent confrontations, as some participants have taken the law into their own hands.
The dissolution of the Haitian army and the time consuming formation of a new, permanent police force in Haiti leave the country with only the interim police as a security force during the parliamentary elections in June and presidential elections in December. Late in 1994, the Haitian government officially disbanded the Haitian army, retaining approximately 3,400 former military in the interim police force. By mid-February 1995, the Haitian government had dismissed all Haitian officers above the rank of major, leaving Maj. Dany Toussaint, the commanderof the interim police, as the most senior officer. While some Haitian soldiers remain on Defense Ministry payrolls, the future of the Haitian army is uncertain. Earlier plans called for it to reemerge with a force of 1,500, but the dramatic dismantling of the institution may prevent its reconstitution as a viable force.
A new national police academy was inaugurated in early February and has begun four month training sessions for the first two classes of 375 recruits each. At the present rate, the academy will not graduate the full complement of police cadets to form the national police force of 6,000 to 7,000 officers until November 1996 at the earliest. Until then, the Haitian and U.S. governments intend for the interim police to serve alongside members of the new permanent national police. As the interim police will be removed incrementally once the total number of combined interim and permanent police reaches 6,000 to 7,000, all of the interim force will remain on the streets until at least March 1996. In addition, some of the interim police will be permitted to apply for the permanent police force, although the Haitian and U.S. governments do not plan for more than 9 percent of the new force to be composed of former soldiers. Nevertheless, neither the U.S. nor the Haitian government has incorporated thorough and transparent human rights screening procedures into the selection process for the academy.
The foreign troop presence in Haiti has curbed the widespread violations of human rights that marked the coup d'etat regime, but abuses have continued. The present security vacuum and concurrent crime wave are heightening tensions. The challenge now for the Haitian government, with the international community providing support, is to transform this externally enforced calm into a durable environment of security that breaks the cycle of violence and impunity that has plagued the country for decades. This requires the creation of civilian institutions capable of promoting the law and establishing accountability for the egregious crimes of the recent past.