In the year since President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti, there has been marked, concrete improvement in respect for human rights and the government has launched institutional reforms that should bring lasting change. The reign of terror perpetuated by Haitian soldiers and their paramilitary counterparts was brought to a close with the September 19, 1994 multinational intervention led by the United States and authorized by the United Nations Security Council.
Haiti today is vastly different from the Haiti where a three-year military dictatorship claimed an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 lives and where arbitrary arrests, torture, rape, beatings, and extortion were the frequent tools of state repression. The extreme conditions under the military government ultimately forced some 100,000 Haitians to seek refuge abroad, while another 300,000 became internally displaced. One year after the restoration of Haiti's democratically elected president, the Haitian people have rediscovered their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly, and a free press has flourished. Heated discussions over the country's future and the government's practices can occur without fear of government reprisal. Grassroots organizations, formerly the primary targets of government repression, are flowering once again. While there are shortcomings in present human rights protections in Haiti and in government plans for institutional reforms, we applaud the vigorous efforts of the Haitian government to address human rights concerns.
In this report, we note several cases of improper use of force and other problems with the interim and new national police forces. Interim police have been involved in several shooting incidents where officers reported that criminals had fired at them, but witnesses disputed the officers' versions. Interim police responsible for unlawful acts have not been subject to any sanction other than removal from the force. The reported use of excessive force by some of the new police officers, together with the Haitian government's decision to appoint either lawyers or former military officers -- with no police training -- to command posts, may undermine the successful establishment of a lawful police institution. The failure to subject former Haitian army officers who are under consideration for leadership positions in the new police to particularly vigorous human rights screening is also cause for concern. Judicial authorities have ordered arrests in some cases where evidence was lacking and proper procedures were not followed. While press freedoms have improved significantly, some problems have emerged, including the slanting of election coverage by the state media in favor of the Aristide backed Lavalas platform.
The marked decrease in human rights violations in Haiti overall undoubtedly is due in large measure to the support given Haiti by the international community; first through the deployment of the multinational force (MNF), and then through the presence of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) peacekeepers and the U.N. Civilian Police monitors (CivPol). The U.N./OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti OEA/ONU, MICIVIH), an international human rights monitoring team that currently has 190 observers, was present in Haiti for two periods under the military government and returned to Haiti following the multinational intervention.
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned from three years and fifteen days of exile on October 15, 1994. Although some grave human rights abuses had persisted in the first weeks of the multinational intervention, by the time Aristide arrived the situation had improved significantly.1 The restored government's prompt dismantling of the military leadership and the gradual dissolution of the Haitian Armed Forces (Forces Armées d'Haïti, FAd'H) have greatly reduced state-sponsored violence. While there have been many cases of vigilante violence against suspected criminals, their occurrence is diminishing with reforms of the Haitian police and judiciary. Since January 1995, approximately twenty people have been slain "execution-style" in cases that are not clearly linked to economic motivations. The Aristide government has not been linked credibly to any of these cases. Further allegations, that the Haitian government is responsible for eighty political killings, are unfounded.
President Aristide has taken several measures in pursuit of accountability for crimes committed under military rule, including investigations into political assassinations of the military period, the creation of complaint bureaus, and the establishment of a National Commission for Truth and Justice. These initiatives have begun to address the issue of accountability for the crimes of the past, but much work remains. In many cases the willingness of judges, lawyers, and witnesses to prosecute human rights abuses is diminished by a fear of retaliation after the departure of peacekeeping troops. Nonetheless, there have been some arrests and convictions in cases of past human rights violations, including one conviction in the prominent case of Antoine Izméry (an Aristide supporter who was slain on September 11, 1993). At least seventeen people have been tried and condemned in absentia for murders committed under the military government.2
Haiti's political foundations and democratic institutions are fragile. The government has undertaken dramatic efforts to create successful new institutions, including the training and deployment of a new police force. The force, which will serve as an independent, civilian alternative to Haiti's repressive military, is expected to be at its full strength of 5,000 members by February 1996. Concurrently, the Aristide government virtually dismantled the entire Haitian military. Most of these former soldiers are now enrolled in a demobilization retraining program, but many are obviously dissatisfied with the loss of their former jobs (which has led to some threats of violence, and evidence of involvement in the shooting of a U.N. CivPol officer in August 1995). Meanwhile, some former soldiers remain on the streets as part of the interim police force, although they are being gradually replaced by officers of the new national police force.
Efforts to reform the justice system are underway but not at the same rapid pace as police reforms. In this report, we identify persistent problems requiring further attention and examine some weaknesses of the present judicial reform efforts. While the Haitian government has taken some prompt, concrete steps to improve the judicial system, for example raising the wages of all court officials, in many districts the courts barely function. The lack of basic materials and funds for travel continue to hinder their effectiveness. Judges remain generally ill-trained. The Haitian legal system's reliance on public denunciations (la clameur publique) still substitutes for criminal investigations or rigorous proof. The extremely limited calendar allocated to criminal trials virtually ensures lengthy pre-trial incarceration of any person charged with a violent crime. U.S.-sponsored plans for reforming the administration of justice (which include a major U.S.-Agency for International Development contract that was awarded to the Checchi company in August) appear to have been designed with little input from Haitian legal practitioners who are most familiar with the judiciary's weaknesses.
The Haitian government initiated prison reform with several concrete steps, such as creating a new civilian prison authority, and raising the salaries of prison guards. International assistance has played a dramatic role in prison reform, particularly in the treatment of detainees and the provision of material goods for physical repairs and to feed and house prisoners. While the participation of some minimally screened former soldiers in the new prison authority is troubling, prison conditions have improved significantly.
Since Aristide's return, the Haitian government created a new electoral law and named a Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Eléctoral Provisoire, CEP). The CEP was charged with preparing and running parliamentary and local elections that were held, after several delays, on June 25, 1995. Although there was wide participation in the election, with twenty-five political parties and over 10,000 candidates, the CEP's poor management led to widespread dissatisfaction with the election. The chaos that characterized election day resulted in a severely contested vote and prolonged the absence of a functioning parliament. Despite some political parties' claims of CEP-organized fraud, further evidence has not emerged to link the CEP or any other group with a systematic effort to influence the vote. The CEP's management failures did result in a lost opportunity to build a credible electoral body and create an environment in which lively and serious political debate could have occurred. Make-up and second-round elections held in August and Septemberproceeded smoothly, albeit with lower voter turnout. Protest against the CEP led to its president's removal, and with a new president in place, it now must organize presidential elections for late 1995. Following these elections, the Haitian government must follow constitutionally mandated procedures for establishing a permanent electoral council.