Geneva, Switzerland
Human Rights Watch has devoted an extraordinary amount of time and energy to the CCW for more than a dozen years. We consider it a very important international instrument, one that should be strengthened and built upon. We were more involved in bringing about Protocol IV on blinding lasers than any other NGO, and we were deeply involved in the conceptualization and development of Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.
But we find it a great leap of faith for anyone to believe that the CCW is going to deal with cluster munitions in an effective or timely manner.
There is already a process well underway that holds out great promise in addressing cluster munitions. It was launched in Oslo in February, with a second meeting in Lima last month. Draft treaty discussion text has been put forth, and there is already widespread agreement on the shape and essential elements of a new treaty: an integrated approach with a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, a requirement and deadline for stockpile destruction, a requirement and deadline for clearance of contaminated areas, and a requirement to provide assistance to victims.
The treaty will be further developed in meetings in Vienna in December and Wellington in February, with formal negotiations planned for Dublin in May and June 2008. This is indeed a fast track, but that is what the issue demands. And it is doable, with appropriate political will.
While CCW states parties largely avoided their responsibility to deal with cluster munitions in recent years, despite constant pleas from the NGO community, it is true that some useful work on clusters has been done in this forum, and that some future useful work is also possible.
But this is the forum that will only move along incrementally those who have little interest in dealing with cluster munitions in the near term, or in a comprehensive way. Those who are ready to undertake an effort that will make a real difference as soon as possible will put their diplomatic and other resources into the Oslo Process. An apt analogy is that Amended Protocol II is the best we can get on antipersonnel mines for about a dozen countries, but we have the Mine Ban Treaty for 153 states, and counting.
There are already about 75 states participating in the Oslo Process. This includes more than half of the states that have produced cluster munitions, and nearly half of those who stockpile the weapons. It also includes 20 states that are not party to the CCW-some of which are contaminated by cluster munitions. We expect these numbers to grow rapidly.
We hope that these CCW deliberations can contribute to a global solution to the dangers posed by cluster munitions. But it would be deplorable if the CCW discussions are used by some to drag down or delay or substitute for the Oslo Process, which clearly holds out the best chance for a strong international instrument with the most adherents.
