「血筋を絶やし、ルーツを絶やせ」

中国政府による ウイグル他テュルク系ムスリムを標的にした 人道に対する罪

A Chinese police officer guards the road near a “reeducation” camp in Yining, Xinjiang, September 4, 2018.  © 2018 Thomas Peter/Reuters

概要

血筋を絶やし、ルーツを絶やし、つながりを断ち、出自を壊せ。「両面人」のルーツを根こそぎにし、掘り出し、これら両面人たちと最後まで戦うことを誓え。


—中国宗教局高官のマイスムジャン・マイムエルによる発言。2017年8月10日、新華社のウェイボーのページ。

2014年5月、中国政府は新疆ウイグル自治区(「新疆」またはXUAR)でテュルク系ムスリムに対する「暴力的テロ猛撃キャンペーン(严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动)」を始めた。[1] スタンフォード・ロースクールの人権・紛争解決実習クリニックとヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチによる調査や、人権団体、メディア、活動家団体その他による報告、そして中国共産党(CCP)の内部文書によれば、中国政府はテュルク系ムスリム住民に対して人道に対する罪を犯しており、それは今も続いている。[2]

本報告書は新疆における中国政府の行為について入手できる情報を国際法の枠組みの中で検討評価し、この結論を導く根拠を事実に基づいて述べるものである。

国際刑事裁判所(ICC)ローマ規程によれば、人道に対する罪とは文民たる住民に対する広範または組織的な攻撃の一部として行われる一定の重大な行為である。「広範」とは行為の規模または犠牲者の数についてのことで、「組織的な」攻撃とは決まった型または秩序立った計画に沿うものを指す。人道に対する罪は平時か武力紛争中かを問わず、文民たる市民に対して犯されている限り成立する。

人道に対する罪は国際法上もっとも重大な人権侵害の一つと見なされている。本報告書に記録されている具体的な人道に対する罪には、国際法に違反する拘禁その他の自由の剥奪、特定の民族的または宗教的集団の迫害、強制失踪、拷問、殺人、そして身体または心身の健康に対して故意に重い苦痛を与えまたは重大な障害を加える非人道的な行為、とくに強制労働と性的暴力が含まれる。

中国の北西部にある新疆ウイグル自治区は中国で唯一ムスリムが人口の多数を占める地域である。自治区内のウイグル、カザフ、キルギスその他のコミュニティはテュルク系の民族である。中国で大多数を占める漢民族が主として中国語を話すのに対し、テュルク系住民は大部分がムスリムで、それぞれ独自の言語を持つ。2010年の国勢調査によれば、新疆の人口のうちウイグルが46パーセント、カザフが7パーセントを占めていた。

中国政府のテュルク系ムスリムに対する抑圧は新しい現象ではないが、近年で前例のないレベルにまで達している。100万人ものひとびとが300から400の施設に恣意的に拘禁された。[3] これらの施設には「政治教育」収容所、未決囚収容所、刑務所が含まれる。[4] 裁判所は適正手続き(デュープロセス)なしに厳しい刑を宣告し、イスラムの宗教に関する録音を家族に送ったりウイグル語の電子書籍をダウンロードしたりしただけでテュルク系ムスリムを何年も投獄してきた。被拘禁者や受刑者は拷問その他の虐待や文化的・政治的洗脳を受け、強制労働をさせられる。拘禁施設を出ても抑圧は続く。中国当局は大規模監視、移動の制限、恣意的逮捕と強制失踪、文化・宗教の抹殺、家族の引き離しという体制の下で暮らすことをテュルク系ムスリムに強いている。

米国国務省とベルギー・カナダ・オランダの議会は、中国政府の行為は国際法の下でジェノサイドにも該当すると判断している。ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチは現時点でジェノサイド認定に必要な意図の存在を証拠とともに示すことはできない。しかしながら本報告書の内容はジェノサイドの認定を妨げるものではない。また、そのような証拠が出てきた場合には、新疆のテュルク系ムスリム—1948年のジェノサイド条約によって保護されている集団—に対する行為がジェノサイドの認定の裏付けとなる可能性もある。

公式の統計によれば、新疆の人口は中国全体の人口の1.5パーセントに過ぎないにもかかわらず、2017年には新疆での逮捕数は中国全体での逮捕数の21パーセント近くを占めていた。2017年以降、中国政府当局は様々な名目で新疆のモスクの3分の2を毀損、または破壊した。そのうち約半数は完全に取り壊された。新疆全域でイスラム教の重要な聖地が破壊された。[5] 地域当局による干渉的な「家族になる」運動という監視・開発・洗脳キャンペーンの一環で当局関係者がテュルク系ムスリムの家に一方的に泊まりに来る。当局によればこのやり方は「民族の調和を推進する」。また別の、とりわけ恐ろしい手法として、両親が恣意的に拘束されたテュルク系ムスリムの子どもは寄宿制の保育園を含む孤児院や寄宿学校などの国営施設に入れられることがある。[6]

こうした侵害行為に対する国際社会の反応はますます批判的になっている。カナダ、欧州連合、英国、米国などの政府は人権侵害に加担した中国政府高官や政府機関や企業に対象限定型などを科している。国連人権理事会及び国連総会の人権部門である第三委員会における中国政府の政策を非難する声明に加わる政府が増えている。それにもかかわらず、イスラム協力機構(OIC)の加盟国数カ国を含めて多くの政府がいまだに中国政府の新疆での政策を称賛している。

2019年7月、22カ国の政府が人権理事会議長に書簡を出し、国連人権高等弁務官の新疆への「意味のあるアクセス」と、ムスリム住民に対して行われているとされる人権侵害の監視と報告を求めた。[7] これに対し中国政府は、自らは署名しなかったものの、人権状況が劣悪なイラン、北朝鮮、サウジアラビア 、ベネズエラなどを含む50カ国の政府による書簡をまとめた。[8] 7月の書簡に続き、同様の国々が2019年11月に国連第三委員会で同様の懸念を表明する声明を発表した。これに対して中国は54カ国が署名した書簡を出して応じた。[9]

2020年を通して新疆での人権侵害の報告は増え続け、各国政府が否定したり避けたりするのがますます困難になった。2020年6月、国連の50の特別手続き—特別報告者、作業部会、その他の人権専門家ら—が中国政府の新疆とチベットの宗教的および民族的マイノリティに対する「全体的な抑圧」を含む中国の人権状況を痛烈に非難する声明を出した。専門家たちは中国に関する国連人権理事会特別会期の開催、中国に特化した国連監視メカニズムの創設、そして国連機関や各国政府が中国に人権に関する義務を果たすよう迫ることを求めた。[10] 2020年10月、複数の地域にまたがる39カ国の政府が新疆、香港、チベットにおける広範な人権侵害について中国政府を公然と強く非難する声明を出した。この声明は国連特別手続き50人による呼びかけに概ね賛同するものだった。[11] 人権侵害の訴えを調査すると約束するのではなく、中国政府は二つの声明を出して応じた。そのうち一つはキューバが読み上げ、45カ国の署名があった。[12]

中国による人道に対する罪の捜査

重大な人権侵害について公正な裁きが行われるようにするのはそれらの犯罪が犯された地域の管轄権を有する国家の責任である。国家は、起きたとされる人権侵害を国内の刑事裁判メカニズムが公正な裁判に関する国際基準に従って公平に捜査し、関与した個人が特定され訴追されるようにする義務を負う。中国政府は新疆で政府関係者が人権侵害を行ったことを繰り返し否定しており、捜査をしようとせず、独立した国際監視機関による調査も受け入れていない。

歴史的に、重大な人権侵害の捜査をしない政府は国連機関や地域機構など他の組織が調査しようとすると国家主権を持ち出すことが多い。2002年に発効したICCローマ規程の下、人道に対する罪を含む重大な国際犯罪にもっとも深く関与しているとされる個人について第一に管轄権を有する国が捜査や訴追をする意思または能力がない場合には、ICCが代わって管轄を有する。さらに、容疑者がローマ規程締約国の国民である場合、申し立てのあった犯罪がローマ規程締約国の領域内で起きていた場合、または締約国でない国がその領土内で起きた犯罪を調査するようICCに求めた場合に、ICCは刑事捜査と訴追を行うことができる。中国政府はローマ規程の締約国ではない。ICCは国連安全保障理事会が新疆の状況をICCに付託すれば管轄権を行使することができるが、国連安保理の常任理事国である中国は拒否権を使ってそのような動きを妨げることができる。

テュルク系ムスリムに対する人権侵害の重大性を考えれば、関係各国政府が責任追及のために強力な協調行動を取る差し迫った必要がある。一つの方法として、国連調査委員会(COI)を設立し、新疆で起きたとされる人権侵害を調査させることがある。COIは事実関係を明らかにし、加害者を特定し、責任追及のための提言をする権限を与えられるべきである。COIは国際人権法、人道に対する罪、民族的および宗教的マイノリティ、ジェンダー問題の専門家を含む一流の専門家によって構成されるべきである。このCOIは国連人権理事会が採択する決議によって設立できるが、国連総会や国連安保理、国連事務総長もCOIを設立する権限を持つ。

本報告書には新疆での暴力的な政策を変えるよう中国政府への圧力を強めるための関係各国政府への提言も記されている。たとえば、これらの犯罪に対する個人の刑事責任と国家の責任の追及、対象限定型制裁、人種差別撤廃条約などの国連メカニズムの下での行動などである。

各国は「普遍的管轄権」の概念の下で刑事事件の訴追を行うことを検討するべきである。「普遍的管轄権」とは拷問など特定の重大な犯罪についてはその犯罪がその国の領域内で犯されていない場合でも国内司法制度によって捜査し訴追できることを指す。多くの国が、被害者がその国の国籍を有する場合にはそのような犯罪について訴追を認める法律を定めている。拷問禁止条約や強制失踪条約などの人権条約の下、各国はその国の管轄権が及ぶ容疑者を引き渡すまたは訴追する義務を負う。国際慣習法では、国家が人道に対する罪を犯した者を訴追できることが一般に認められている。

提言

中国政府へ

  • 新疆その他の地域のテュルク系ムスリムに対する人権侵害、特にいわゆる「再教育」収容所などでの恣意的拘禁と投獄、拷問その他の虐待、信教プライバシー移動の自由の制限、性暴力と強制不妊、強制労働を止めるために直ちに策を講じること。

  • テュルク系ムスリムに対して行われているとされる人道に対する罪を止めるために直ちに策を講じること。

  • 重大な人権侵害や人道に対する罪に関与した政府関係者を捜査し適切に訴追すること。

国連へ

  • 国連人権理事会は次の権限を持つ調査委員会(COI)を設立する決議を採択するべきである。

    • 新疆のテュルク系ムスリムに対して行われているとされる違法投獄その他の身体的自由の深刻な剥奪、政治・人種・国籍・民族・文化・信教を理由に行われる特定の集団の迫害、強制失踪、拷問、殺人、強制労働を含むその他の非人道的行為、信教の自由の制限、性暴力、生殖に関する権利の侵害を含む人道に対する罪その他の人権侵害を捜査する。

    • それらの人権侵害を止めるための提言を行う。

    • 関与した政府関係者を特定し、その責任追及に向けたロードマップを提示する。

    • 犠牲者やサバイバーのための適切な補償(reparations)を提起する。

    • 人権理事会その他の関係する国連機関に定期的に報告を行う。

  • 国連人権高等弁務官は独立したモニタリングと報告を行う権限を行使し、情報を収集し、調査結果について公の発言を行い、新疆の人権状況に関する報告書を作成し、国連人権理事会への定期的な報告を行うべきである。

  • 国連特別手続きは調査委員会または同様の調査メカニズムの設立を支持することを念頭にそれぞれの権限内で中国当局による新疆での人権侵害を記録し、公表する活動を続けるべきである。

  • 国連事務総長は、新疆での人権侵害に関する調査委員会(COI)の設立について公に支持を表明するとともに、新疆のテュルク系ムスリムに対する侵害行為を止めるよう中国政府当局に対し公開及び非公開の場双方で求めるべきである。国連事務総長は新疆での人道に対する罪を犯した者の責任追及を公に支持するべきである。

  • 国連総会は、新疆での人権侵害についての調査委員会(COI)が国連総会にも報告書を提出するとともに、すべての国連加盟国と関係する国連機関にも報告書が送られるよう求めるべきである。

  • 国連総会は、人道に対する罪を犯した者に対する対象限定型制裁を含む、責任追及のための具体的措置を明確に支持する決議を採択するべきである。

  • 国連安全保障理事会の理事国は、中国が常任理事国である中でも可能な限り行動を取るべきである。これにはアリア・フォーミュラ会合を通じた場合も含めて新疆での人権侵害に関する調査委員会(COI)に支持を表明することも含まれる。

関係各国政府へ

二国間または多国間の協調行動として

  • 米国のグローバル・マグニツキー法や同様の政府間または各国の法的手段に基づき、ビザ発禁措置、渡航禁止措置、個人に対する対象限定型制裁を科すこと。こうした制裁は協調して科されればより効果的になる。

  • 新疆での人権侵害を公けに非難する個別および共同の声明の中で、新疆のテュルク系ムスリムに対する広範または組織的な攻撃の一部として行われ人道に対する罪に相当する犯罪行為について、中国政府当局に責任があることを明確に述べること。

  • 普遍的管轄権を認める法に基づき、人道に対する罪に関与した中国政府関係者の訴追が行われるようにすること。

  • 自国の検察官に対し、ICCの予備捜査のような組織的な捜査を開始するよう促すこと。この捜査で検察は、起きたとされる重大な侵害行為についての情報を収集・分析し、将来の訴追の基礎を築くことが期待される。

  • 新疆における中国政府による大規模監視体制の一助となっているテクノロジー企業に段階的に制裁を科すこと。グローバル・マグニツキー法や同様の制裁を使ってもよい。

  • 人種差別撤廃条約の締約国は、テュルク系ムスリムに関する条約違反について個別または共同で中国に対する申し立てを行うべきである。

貿易、投資、商業活動について

  • 関係する政府機関は新疆でのすべての投資案件を見直し、必要があれば、強制労働など重大な人権侵害が起きているとされる信頼できる報告があるセクターで投資の撤収を含めた貿易制裁を科すこと。

  • カナダ政府が20211月に出したのと同様の企業への勧告を発表し、次の点に言及すること。

    • 強制労働を含む、新疆での人権侵害の重大性

    • 国際法及び国内法の下の企業の法的責任

    • 直接の商業活動やサプライチェーンを通じて重大な人権侵害に加担することになるリスク

    • 中国でいかなる商業取引を行う場合でも透明性があり綿密な人権デューディリジェンスを実施する責任

  • 欧州連合は、強制労働が行われているとの報告が独立した公正な国際的専門家によって調査され、侵害行為について適切な処置が取られ、犯人の責任が追及され、被害者に補償があるまではEU・中国投資協定を採択のため欧州議会に提出するべきではない。

  • 新疆で取引をしている相手の名前、住所、所有者、その他の関連情報を公開するよう企業に求めること。

  • 新疆で活動する企業に対し、法的拘束力のある人権デューディリジェンス要求を行うこと。

  • 国際金融機関は、新疆での弾圧に関与していないかどうかを確かめるためにポートフォリオを見直すこと。

テュルク系ムスリムのディアスポラのいる国へ

  • テュルク系ムスリムが庇護申請を審査する公正なシステムにアクセスできるようにすること。

  • テュルク系ムスリムの家族の合流を認めることで家族再統合を促進すること。

  • テュルク系ムスリムの中国へのルフールマンやその他の直接的・間接的強制送還をすべて止めること。

  • 他国にいるテュルク系ムスリムに対する嫌がらせの事例を追跡するメカニズムを設立し、場合によっては刑法を通じて犯人の責任追及をする措置を取ること。

  • テュルク系ムスリムが拷問や強かんその他の犯罪のサバイバーのための法的・医療的・心理的支援を提供するプログラムや文化・宗教の保護プログラムにアクセスできるようにすること。

企業や投資家へ

  • 国連のビジネスと人権に関する指導原則に定められている通りに人権デューディリジェンス実施の責任を果たすことは現在、新疆では政府の妨害により不可能であると認識すること。

  • テュルク系ムスリムの関わる強制労働を止めるための「行動の呼びかけ(Call to Action)」に加わる、または同様の策を講じること

 

[1] The region is home to several different communities of Turkic Muslims; the two biggest groups are 11 million Uyghurs and 1.6 million Kazakhs. There are also smaller communities of Kyrgyz and others. Human Rights Watch has documented abuses against members of each of these communities, including arbitrary detention in “political education” camps. For this report, we use the term Turkic Muslims to refer to all members of the community targeted by Chinese government policies.

[2] See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals For Mass Internment And Arrest By Algorithm,” International Consortium of Journalists, November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/; Steven Lee Myers, “China Defends Crackdown on Muslims, and Criticizes Times Article,” New York Times, November 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-leak.html; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: ‘We want to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?’” https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-%E2%80%9Cwe-want-be-respected-humans-it-too-much-ask%E2%80%9D.html.

[3] Alison Killing, Megha Rajagopalan, and Christo Buschek, “Blanked-Out Spots On China’s Maps Helped Us Uncover Xinjiang’s Camps,” Buzzfeed News, August 27, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/satellite-images-investigation-xinjiang-detention-camps; Kelsey Munro, “Xinjiang Data Project website launch,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/news/xinjiang-data-project-website-launch.

[4] Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Xinjiang’s Re-education Camps,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-xinjiangs-re-education-camps.

[5] Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, “Cultural Erasure,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 23, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.

[6] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.

[7] Joint letter to the Human Rights Council president on Xinjiang, July 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf.

[8] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China’s Retort Over Its Mass Detentions: Praise From Russia and Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, July 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/asia/china-human-rights-united-nations.html.

[9] “54 countries voice support for China's counter-terrorism measures in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, October 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/30/c_138514935.htm.

[10] “UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006.

[11] Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee General Debate, October 6, 2020, https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/201006-heusgen-china/2402648.

[12] Cuba Made a Joint Statement on Behalf of 45 Countries in Firm Support of China’s Counter-Terrorism and Deradicalization Measures in Xinjiang, October 6, 2020, http://chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/hyyfy/t1822121.htm.

[13] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf.

[14] Ibid., p. 13.

[15] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang,” July 9, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/09/behind-violence-xinjiang.

[16] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows, p. 10.

[20] Known as Yining in Chinese.

[21] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Rebiya Kadeer’s personal account of Gulja after the massacre on 5 February 1997,” 2007, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa170012007en.pdf; Amnesty International, “Remember the Gulja massacre? China’s crackdown on peaceful protesters,” 2007.

[22] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows.

[23] Ibid., p. 3-4; for a comprehensive overview and analysis of sources of ethnic tensions in the region in recent history, see 伊力哈木 (Ilham Tohti), 当前新疆民族问题的现状及建议 (Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang: Overview and Recommendations), https://chinachangedotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/e4bc8ae58a9be59388e69ca8efbc9ae5bd93e5898de696b0e79686e6b091e6978fe997aee9a298e79a84e78eb0e78ab6e58f8ae5bbbae8aeae1.pdf; translated at http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/pdf/ilham-tohti_present-day-ethnic-problems-in-xinjiang-uighur-autonomous-region-overview-and-recommendations_complete-translation1.pdf.

[24] Chris Buckley, “China calls Xinjiang riot a plot against rule,” Reuters, July 5, 2009.

[25] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled: An Assessment of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan, January 2011, https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/01/11/promises-unfulfilled/assessment-chinas-national-human-rights-action-plan, p. 49.

[26] Ibid., p. 33-36; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/asa170112011en.pdf.

[27] Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”: The July 2009 protests in Xinjiang, China, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/asa170272010en.pdf; Amnesty International, “China urged to release Uighur activist allegedly tortured in prison,” December 20, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/12/china-debe-liberar-activista-uigur-presuntamente-torturado-carcel/.

[28] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled; Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them”: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/xinjiang1009webwcover.pdf, p. 21-32; Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”; Amnesty International, “China must reveal whereabouts of Uighur children detained after deadly clash,” January 6, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/china-must-reveal-whereabouts-uighur-children-detained-after-deadly-clash.

[29] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 49; Dan Levin, “China Remodels and Ancient Silk Road City, and an Ethnic Rift Widens,” New York Times, March 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/asia/china-remodels-an-ancient-silk-road-city-and-an-ethnic-rift-widens.html.

[30] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 62-63; Human Rights Watch, “Letter from HRW to Grand Imam Ahmed el Tayeb Re: Forced Return of Ethnic Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/letter-hrw-grand-imam-ahmed-el-tayeb; Human Rights Watch, “Malaysia/China: Prevent Forced Return of Uighurs,” August 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/22/malaysia/china-prevent-forced-return-uighurs; Sara Colm, “Analysis: Inside Perspective on Uighurs,” Phnom Penh Post, December 20, 2010, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/analysis-inside-perspective-uighurs; Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers at Risk,” December 22, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/22/china-forcibly-returned-uighur-asylum-seekers-risk; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011; World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5 2(2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT_CAT_CSS_CHN_22111_E.pdf.

[31] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”

[32] “Xinjiang’s Party chief wages ‘people’s war’ against terrorism,” China Daily, May 26, 2014, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/26/content_17541318.htm.

[33] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses”: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims, September 2018, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web2.pdf, p. 11-25; Joanne Smith Finley, “Securitzation, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?” Central Asian Survey, 2019, p. 1-3; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,”ChinaFile, February 7, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims.

[34] Smith Finley, “Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey, p. 1, 3, 23, n.6.

[35] Ibid. Note that this economic development has nevertheless largely benefitted Han Chinese settlers.

[36] Chris Buckley, “The Leaders Who Unleashed China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times, October 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/china-muslim-detainment-xinjang-camps.html; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/; Edward Wong, “China Said to Detain Returning Tibetan Pilgrims,” New York Times, April 7, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/asia/china-said-to-detain-returning-tibetan-pilgrims.html.

[37] International Campaign for Tibet, “The origin of the ‘Xinjiang model’ in Tibet under Chen Quanguo: Securitizing ethnicity and accelerating assimilation,” December 19, 2018, https://savetibet.org/the-origin-of-the-xinjiang-model-in-tibet-under-chen-quanguo-securitizing-ethnicity-and-accelerating-assimilation/; Sui-Wee Lee, “China's top Tibet official orders tighter control of Internet,” Reuters, February 29, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet/chinas-top-tibet-official-orders-tighter-control-of-internet-idUSTRE8200BZ20120301; Human Rights Watch, “China: China Poised to Repeat Tibet Mistakes Abusive Policies Planned for Uyghur Region,” January 20, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/20/china-poised-repeat-tibet-mistakes.

[38] Deng Yuwen, “Reading the China Dream,” https://www.readingthechinadream.com/deng-yuwen-chinese-statism.html.

[39] “Full Transcript: Interview with Xinjiang Government Chief on Counterterrorism, Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” People’s Daily, October 16, 2018, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/1016/c90000-9508925.html.

[40] Human Rights Watch, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/07/26/genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/topical-digest-case-law.

[41] Ibid.

[42] The UN International Law Commission has prepared draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, which adopt the ICC Statute’s definition of the offense. The Draft Articles are under consideration in the UN General Assembly.

[43] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018; Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018.

[44] Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative, “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-education Programs,” August 3, 2018, https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs. This estimate was cited by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in its concluding observations to its review of China. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined fourteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China), CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, 2018, para. 40. Note that Zenz has recently revised his estimate to between 900,000 and 1.8 million. Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.

[45] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The China Challenge, Part 3: Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” December 4, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf; “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第14期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 14), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558505/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.pdf.

[46] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Testimony of Rushan Abbas, Director of Campaign for Uyghurs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “ARIA in Action, Part 1: Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law,” April 9, 2019, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040919_Abbas_Testimony.pdf; Sada Seytoff and Alim Seytoff, “Academic Freedom Watchdog Demands China Unconditionally Release Prominent Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-11022018134451.html.

[49] 吐鲁番市集中教育培训学校学员子女问答策略 (Tactics from Turpan City for answering questions asked by the children of concentrated education and training school students), translated in “Document: What Chinese Officials Told Children Whose Families Were Put in Camps,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-detention-directive.html (Tactics from Turpan City).

[50] Ben Dooley, “Inside China’s internment camps: tear gas, Tasers and textbooks,” Agence France-Presse, October 25, 2018, https://www.afp.com/en/inside-chinas-internment-camps-tear-gas-tasers-and-textbooks.

[51] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558509/China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.pdf, para. 14, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510/China-Cables-Telegram-English.pdf; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/.

[52] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf.

[53] These countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Alexandra Ma, “China is using flimsy excuses to lock up its Muslim minority on a huge scale — here are some of the bizarre reasons people are in jail,” Business Insider, September 16, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-gives-these-excuses-to-imprison-uighur-ethnic-minority-2018-9.

[54] Detention for this reason is especially unjust in that the government, during a brief period in 2015, encouraged Uyghurs to apply for passports, and that many of the Uyghurs detained on this basis appear to have applied for passports during this window. Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.

[55] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p. 11, 16.

[58] Ibid., p. 13.

[59] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 3, 24-25.

[60] Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur journalist’s unbreakable resolve to help her detained family,” March 16, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/uighur-journalists-unbreakable-resolve-to-help-detained-family/; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown.”

[61] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 4. This information appears to power what officials termed the “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), a method by which authorities analyze and evaluate detainees.

[62] Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, https://apnews.com/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b/China%E2%80%99s-massindoctrinationcamps-evoke-Cultural-Revolution.

[63] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 14.

[64] Ibid., para. 16.

[65] Ibid., para. 17; Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “New Leak Reveals Orders for China’s Internment Camps,” New York Times, November 24, 2019; Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.

[66] Tactics from Turpan City.

[67] Terence McCoy, “China scores 99.9 percent conviction rate last year,” Washington Post, March 11, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/11/china-scored-99-9-percent-conviction-rate-last-year/; Lily Kuo, “China’s criminal conviction rate is 99.9 percent,” Quartz, August 7, 2014, https://qz.com/246696/chinas-criminal-conviction-rate-is-99-9/; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017,” July 2018; Emily Feng, “‘Illegal Superstition’: China Jails Muslims For Practicing Islam, Relatives Say,” National Public Radio, October 8, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/764153179/china-has-begun-moving-xinjiang-muslim-detainees-to-formal-prisons-relatives-say; Chris Buckley, “China’s Prisons Swell After Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,” New York Times, August 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-uighurs-prisons.html.

[68] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[69] Gene A. Bunin, “The Elephant in the XUAR,” December 9, 2020, https://livingotherwise.com/2020/12/09/the-elephant-in-the-xuar-i-entire-families-sentenced/.

[70] Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-analysis-available-data/; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017.

[71] Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown,” March 20, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1700732019ENGLISH.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained,” November 14, 2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/uaa25117-3.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 20 Relatives of Uighur Journalist Detained,” March 1, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1779642018ENGLISH.pdf.

[72] Human Rights Watch, Submission to Universal Periodical Review of China, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/submission-universal-periodic-review-china; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[73] Ibid.

[74] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees.

[75] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[76] Entry 13409: Jin Dehuai, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=13409.

[77] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chaqiliq County People’s Court Criminal Verdict, 2018, Xinjiang 2824 Criminal-Case No. 121, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=35.

[78] Entry 915: Asqar Azatbek, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=915.

[79] Entry 5821: Nurlan Pioner, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=5821.

[80] Entry 11997: Nie Shigang, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=11997.

[81] Verdict against Serikzhan Adilhan, convicted of running an illegal business ( 塞力克江·阿德勒汗非法经营罪二审刑事裁定书 ), September 5, 2019, China Judgement Online, https://archive.vn/5mxOi.

[82] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court Criminal Judgment, 2017, Xinjiang 40 Criminal Final No. 78, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=36.

[83] “Siblings Get Lengthy Jail Terms in Xinjiang For Links to Turkey-Based Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, August 22, 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-siblings-08222020092753.html.

[84] Of the 177, 124 died in custody; of that number, 101 were Uyghurs, 20 were Kazkahs, and 1 each were Han, Tatar, and Uyghur-Kazakh. The numbers were generated using the database’s filter function; see https://shahit.biz/eng/#filter.

[85] “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” Radio Free Asia, October 29, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html;“Uyghur Father of Two Dies After Falling Ill in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/father-04122018153525.html; “Uyghur Man Buried Amid Strict Security After Latest Xinjiang Reeducation Camp Death,” Radio Free Asia, June 8, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/gulja-burial-06082018164250.html; “Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, March 14, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/teenager-03142018154926.html; “Elderly Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang ‘Political Re-Education Camp,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/woman-05242018164854.html.

[86] Helen Davidson, “China confirms death of Uighur man whose family says was held in Xinjiang camps,” Guardian, October 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uighur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps.

[87] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42.

[88] Harry Cockburn, “Muslim woman describes torture and beatings in China detention camp: ‘I begged them to kill me’,” The Independent, November 28, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/uighur-muslim-china-mihrigul-tursun-torture-reeducation-camps-a8656396.html.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview with Ismail (pseudonym), 40, whose father died in a political education camp and his brother is held in a camp, May 12, 2018.

[90] Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun; Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, recounting former detainee’s interrogation in a “tiger chair.”

[91] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018.

[92] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.

[93] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 2, 36, 41-42, 49-50, 54-55.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., p. 50.

[97] Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.

[98] “#MenmuUyghur” in Uyghur.

[99] Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” New York Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/asia/uighurs-china-internment-camps.html.

[100] Xinjiang Victims Database, shahit.biz.

[101] Patrick Poon, “Families of missing Uighurs terrified to search for their loved ones,” Amnesty International, March 31, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/03/uighurs-too-scared-to-search-for-missing-family/.

[102] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.

[103] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation.”

[104] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.

[105] “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/. See also, “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558501-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Chinese.html, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558502/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Enligsh.pdf, encouraging the use of 10-household units to monitor individuals in Xinjiang known to have obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or have obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.

[106] An acronym that stands for “Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (访民情、惠民生、聚民心). These teams, also known as “village-based work teams,” were first implemented in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2011—then extended indefinitely—by then-Tibet Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. See Human Rights Watch, “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance Program,” January 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/18/china-no-end-tibet-surveillance-program; “200,000 Communist Party members Dispatched to Stay in Grassroots Villages in Xinjiang to Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (新疆20万机关干部下基层住万村,访民情、惠民生、聚民心), People Online (人民网), http://xj.people.com.cn/GB/188750/361873/.

[107] Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” May 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region.

[108] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, May 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0519_web5.pdf, p. 15-16.

[109] Xinjiang: 2017 Nián Quánmín Jiànkāng Tǐjiǎn Gōngzuò Quánbù Wánchéng (新疆:2017年全民健康体检工作全部完成), Xīnjiāng Rìbào (新疆日报), November 2, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/02/content_5236389.htm; Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,” December 13, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions.

[110] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”

[111] Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”

[112] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; Isobel Cockerell, “Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,” Wired, May 9, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/.

[113] Human Rights Watch, “Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy,” May 15, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/china-police-dna-database-threatens-privacy.

[114] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region,” February 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf, p. 16-17.

[115] Steven Melendez, “In locked-down Xinjiang, China is tracking kitchen knvies with QR codes,” Fast Company, December 20, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/40510238/in-xinjiang-china-some-knives-branded-with-owners-qr-codes; “When CCTV cameras aren’t enough: Chinese police order drivers to install tracking devices on their cars,” Fast Company , February 21, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/4031016/when-cctv-cameras-arent-enough-chinese-police-order-drivers-to-install-tracking-devices-on-their-cars.

[116] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 1, 24; “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region.” IJOP collects information such as the individual’s name, ID type and number, ethnicity, address, license plate number, profession, education, passport, phone number, relationship with head of household, blood type, height, photo, political status, religion, “religious atmosphere” (fair or strong), reason for seeking asylum or education abroad, destination country, exit time, changed identity? (if yes, to what), and reason for leaving Xinjiang. See also, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 14-15; and “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), encouraging the detention of Xinjiang residents who IJOP identified as having obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or having obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.

[117] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang’s Muslims: Leaked List of Over 2,000 Detainees Demonstrates Automated Repression,” December 9, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/china-big-data-program-targets-xinjiangs-muslims.

[118] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 13.

[119] Ibid.

[120] For information on targeted digital surveillance against the Uyghur diaspora, see Stevens Le Blond, Adina Uritesc, Cédric Gilbert, Zheng Leong Chua, and Prateek Saxena, “A Look at Targeted Attacks Through the Lens of an NGO,” San Diego: USENIX Association, 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, August 20-22, 2014, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf.

[121] Paul Mozur and Nicole Perlroth, “China’s Software Stalked Uighurs Earlier and More Widely, Researchers Learn,” New York Times, July 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/china-uighurs-hackers-malware-hackers-smartphones.html.

[122] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.

[123] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent, March 22, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-education-camps-forbidden-beards-pray-pork-xinjiang-a8835861.html. See also, 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 8, describing how detainees should “adhere to the daily concentrated study of the national language (Chinese), law, and skills” and how camps should “make remedial Chinese studies the top priority.”

[124] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 9-10, 39-40. According to a former detainee, these rules included prohibitions on Islamic greetings, Uyghur and Kazakh writing on Uyghur restaurant signs, the use of Uyghur or Kazakh in public spaces, Uyghur- and Kazakh-language schools, and the establishment of minority-only chat groups on WeChat, QQ, and other social media websites; a ban on communications with any person in the 26 “sensitive” countries; and cash rewards for the intermarriage of Han Chinese and Kazakhs.

[125] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 38-39.

[126] Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.

[127] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 11.

[128] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent.

[129] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.

[130] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/17/she-survived-chinese-internment-camp-made-it-virginia-will-us-let-her-stay/?arc404=true.

[131] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 69.

[132] Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, April 24, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang.

[133] Dake Kang, “Correction: China-Xinjiang-Banished Textbooks story,” AP News, September 3, 2019, https://apnews.com/4f5f57213e3546ab9bd1be01dfb510d3; Qiao Long and Yang Fan, “China Bans Use of Uyghur, Kazakh Textbooks, Materials in Xinjiang Schools,” Radio Free Asia, October 13, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ethnic-textbooks-10132017135316.html; Darren Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina, January 2, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/01/02/the-patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 17.

[134] “Xinjiang’s ‘Open Letter’ Forces Uyghurs to Put Loyalty to China in Writing,” Radio Free Asia, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy3.html; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/.

[135] Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina.

[136] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4.

[137] The rationale is that such names “exaggerate religious fervor.” Although not “illegal” per se, children with banned names cannot obtain household registration, which is essential for accessing public school and other social services. The ban was also imposed retroactively, thereby requiring parents to change their children’s names. Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia.

[138] Ibid.; Amnesty International, “‘Forgive my children for not fasting’ – Ramadan in Xinjiang,” May 3, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/05/forgive-my-children-ramadan-in-xinjiang/.

[139] Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Handed 10-Year Prison Term Over Headscarf Claim,” Radio Free Asia, September 19, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/headscarf-09192017174307.html.

[140] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang’s Korla City Seizes Qurans, Prayer Mats From Uyghur Muslims,” Radio Free Asia, October 2, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/qurans-10022017152453.html.

[141] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, p. 37.

[142] Jon Sharman, “China ‘forcing Muslims to eat pork and drink alcohol’ for lunar new year festival,” The Independent, February 7, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslims-xinjiang-pork-alcohol-lunar-new-year-spring-festival-uighur-islam-a8767561.html.

[143] See “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558507/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-English.pdf.

[144] “Suppressing religious freedoms: Chinese imams forced to dance in Xinjiang region,” Express Tribune, April 18, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/871879/suppressing-religious-freedoms-chinese-imams-forced-to-dance-in-xinjiang-region/. See also, World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5, 2015, p. 2.

[145] Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs, 2014 (新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 2014), art. 40.

[146] CNES, Airbus DS, Earthrise, and AFP, “Then and now: China’s destruction of Uighur burial grounds,” Guardian, October 9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/chinas-destruction-of-uighur-burial-grounds-then-and-now; “Even in death, Uighurs feel long reach of Chinese state,” Agence France-Presse, October 9, 2019, https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/even-death-uighurs-feel-long-reach-chinese-state-doc-1ky71r1; Adam Withnall, “China ‘building cark parks and playgrounds’ over Uighur Muslim graveyards ‘to eradicate ethnic group’s identity,” The Independent, October 9, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslims-burial-grounds-satellite-xinjiang-a9148996.html.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Authorities Use ‘Burial Management Centers’ to Subvert Uyghur Funeral Traditions,” Radio Free Asia, April 19, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/burials-04192018141100.html.

[150] Cultural Erasure, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.

[151] Joanne Smith Finley, “‘Now We Don’t Talk Anymore’: Inside the ‘Cleansing’ of Xinjiang,” ChinaFile, December 28, 2018, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/now-we-dont-talk-anymore; Lily Kuo, “Revealed: new evidence of China’s mission to raze the mosques of Xinjiang,” Guardian, May 6, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang (“If one were to remove these … shrines, the Uighur people would lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual history. After a few years we would not have a memory of why we live here or where we belong.”) For a comparison of such demolitions to the demolitions of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries during Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany, see Fred Hiatt, “In China, every day is Kristallnacht,” Washington Post, November 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/03/china-every-day-is-kristallnacht/?arc404=true.

[152] Eva Xiao, “China pushes inter-ethnic marriage in Xinjiang assimilation drive,” Agence France-Presse, May 16, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/china-pushes-inter-ethnic-marriage-xinjiang-assimilation-drive-044619042.html; Darren Byler, “Uyghur Love in a time of Interethnic Marriage,” SupChina, August 7, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/08/07/uyghur-love-in-a-time-of-interethnic-marriage/; “Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese,” 2017, Radio Free Asia (2017), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.; Leigh Hartman, “China coerces Uighur women into unwanted marriages,” ShareAmerica, September 24, 2019, https://share.america.gov/china-coerces-uighur-women-into-unwanted-marriages/.

[155] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 11-25.

[156] Ibid., p. 4, 14-15.

[157] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[158] Known as Kuai Ya in Chinese.

[159] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20); Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One By One’ For Using A Mobile App, Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists,” November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/.

[160] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2).

[161] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 12.

[162] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 5, 83-86; Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Hearing before the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018.

[163] Ibid.; Amnesty International, China: Uyghurs living abroad tell of campaign of intimidation, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/china-uyghurs-living-abroad-tell-of-campaign-of-intimidation/.

[164] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.

[165] Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families; “China: Children Caught in Xinjiang Crackdown,” October 16, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/16/china-children-caught-xinjiang-crackdown.

[166] Ibid.

[167] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent, September 21, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighurs-human-rights-muslims-orphanages-xinjiang-province-reeducation-a8548341.html.

[168] Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.

[169] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.

[170] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent.

[171] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families.”

[172] Zenz, “Break Their Roots,” Journal of Political Risk.

[173] Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers At Risk,” December 22, 2009; “Thailand: More Uighurs Face Forced Return to China,” March 21, 2014; “Letter to Malaysian Prime Minister Concerning Forced Return of Uighurs,” February 1, 2013; “Saudi Arabia: Clarify Status of Uyghur Detainees,” November 23, 2020.

[174] Catherine Putz, “Thailand Deports 100 Uyghurs to China,” The Diplomat, July 11, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/thailand-deports-100-uyghurs-to-china/.

[175] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/egypt-dont-deport-uyghurs-china; Matt Rivers, Max Foster, and James Griffiths, “Disturbing video shows hundreds of blindfolded prisoners in Xinjiang,” CNN, October 7, 2019.

[176] Joëlle Garrus, “No place to hide: exiled Chinese Uighur Muslims feel state’s long reach,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 19, 2018, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/08/19/no-place-hide-exiled-chinese-uighur-muslims-feel-states-long-reach/; Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”

[177] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”

[178] Ibid.

[179] For a discussion about the history around these schemes, see Li Xiaoxia, “(新疆少数民族产业工人队伍发展及现状分析),” 北方民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2015.

[180] See, for example, 新疆的农村劳动力转移出现四个转变产生四大效应, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-06/18/content_652170.htm, mentioning that over 100,000 Xinjiang workers were exported to other provinces under the scheme in 2006.

[181] Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uighurs.html.

[182] Shohret Hoshur, “Internment Camp Assigned Uyghur Forced Laborers to Xinjiang Textile Factory: Official,” Radio Free Asia, November 14, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/laborers-11142019142325.html.

[183] Fair Labor Association, “Issue Brief: Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,” 2020, https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/fla-brief-xinjiang_forced_labor_risk_final.pdf; Citizen Power Initiatives for China, Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies, 2019.

[184] ASPI, “Uyghurs for Sale,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.

[185] John Sudworth, “‘If the others go I’ll go’: Inside China’s scheme to transfer Uighurs into work,” BBC News, March 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56250915.

[186] Ibid.; 中国财富经济研究院智库报告-1009新疆和田地区维族劳动力转移就业扶贫工作报告, Nankai University, http://web.archive.org/web/20200507161938/https:/ciwe.nankai.edu.cn/2019/1223/c18571a259225/page.htm.

[187] 我省出台措施进一步加大就业扶贫力度, http://www.jcgov.gov.cn/dtxx/sxyw/202003/t20200315_890057.shtml.

[188] Bernhard Zand and Adrian Zenz, “The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide,” Spiegel Online, November 28, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html.

[189] 孙瑞哲分享十大行业发展热点 (Sun Ruizhe Shares Top Ten Industry Development Hot Topics), March 4, 2018, transcript, http://www.ccta.org.cn/hyzx/201803/t20180305_3683861.html; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.

[190] Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their goal is to destroy everyone’: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape,” BBC News, February 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071.

[191] Ruth Ingram, “Confessions of a Xinjiang Camp Teacher,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/confessions-of-a-xinjiang-camp-teacher/.

[192] Forthcoming ChinaFile publication.

[193] Human Rights Watch interview with Aina Shormanbayeva via an electronic communication platform, August 20, 2020.

[194] Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation: Muslim women who fled China for Kazakhstan recount ordeals,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html; Amie Ferris-Rotman, Aigerim Toleukhan, Emily Rauhala, and Anna Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent, October 6, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html.

[195] Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation,” Washington Post.

[196] Ibid.; Ferris-Rotman, Toleukhan, Rauhala, and Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent; Rauhala and Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia,” Washington Post.

[197] Maya Wang, “Ending the One-Child Policy Does Not Equal Reproductive Freedom in China,” Human Rights Watch, October 29, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/29/dispatches-ending-one-child-policy-does-not-equal-reproductive-freedom-china.

[198] Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang,” China Brief, vol. 20, no. 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x19523.

[199] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[200] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[201] Ibid., p. 7-8.

[202] 闫国灿同志在地区卫生计生工作会议上的讲话 (Speech by Comrade Yan Guocan at the Regional Health and Family Conference), 和田政府网 (Hotan Government Net), May, 30, 2015, http://archive.is/fCkb3; Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief; Joyce Huang, “Rights Activists Denounce China’s Xinjiang White Paper,” VOA News, March 19, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/rights-activists-denounce-chinas-xinjiang-white-paper.

[203] Emphasis added. Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[204] Ibid.

[205] See Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[206] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[207] Ibid., p. 13.

[208] Ibid.

[209] Ibid., p. 15-16.

[210] Ibid.

[211] The acts are: “Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture; Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002.

[212] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a).

[213] The Rome Statute further defines a qualifying action as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [the enumerated acts] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).

[214] An “attack” is a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence. See Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 196. See also, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (ICC Elements of Crimes), ICC-ASP/1/3, September 9, 2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf, art. 7. “Attack directed against a civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the commission of enumerated acts in the Rome Statute. The acts do not need to be part of a military attack.

[215] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.

[216] ICC Elements of Crimes.

[217] See Darryl Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (1999). (“Explicit recognition of this policy element was essential to the compromise on crimes against humanity. It is the existence of a policy that unites otherwise unrelated inhumane acts, so that it may be said that in the aggregate they collectively form an ‘attack’. Delegations supporting the compromise explained that the policy element was intended as a flexible test.”)

[218] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.

[219] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.

[220] Ibid.; Austin Ramzy, “5 Takeaways From the Leaked Files on China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times November 16, 2019.

[221] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20).

[222] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.

[223] See, e.g., Enshen Li, “Fighting the ‘Three Evils’: A Structural Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China,” Emory International Law Review, vol. 33, no. 3, 2019; Kilic Kanat, “Repression in China and Its Consequences in Xinjiang,” Hudson Institute, July 28, 2014, https://www.hudson.org/research/10480-repression-in-china-and-its-consequences-in-xinjiang.

[224] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid. His confession and the investigation report were read aloud to officials throughout Xinjiang, and state media outlets portrayed him as corrupt.

[227] Ibid.

[228] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 25.

[229] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019.

[230] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(c).

[231] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), n.11. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held in the Kunarac case that exploitative conditions may rise to the level of enslavement when factors such as control of movement, control of environment, use or threat of force, psychological control, and other forms of coercion that would diminish a person’s free will are present. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement in the Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, February 22, 2001, §§ 543-543, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf.

[232] See, e.g., Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, discussing state propaganda extolling the benefits of the “job training” program.

[233] United States v. Pohl, Judgement, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, November 3, 1947, http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1947.11.03_United_States_v_Pohl.pdf.

[234] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(f), 7(2)(e).

[235] Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 519.

[236] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(g).

[237] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(h).

[238] See Elisa Novic, Beyond Words: From ‘Cultural Genocide’ to ‘Cultural Persecution,’ Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016.

[239] Ibid., p. 148-149, citing International Law Commission commentary on the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.

[240] See, for example, Tactics from Turpan City, instructing officials on how to respond to the economic concerns of detainees’ family members; Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” New York Times, November, 24, 2019, describing the economic fallout of these policies.

[241] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(i); Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(i).

[242] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-2.

[243] Ibid., art. 7(1)(g)-5.

[244] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d).

[245] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d), n.12.