「斷代斷根」

中國對維吾爾人及其他突裔厥穆斯林的危害人類罪行

A Chinese police officer guards the road near a “reeducation” camp in Yining, Xinjiang, September 4, 2018.  © 2018 Thomas Peter/Reuters

摘要

「斷代、斷根、斷聯、斷源一個不漏,徹底把『兩面人』的根子鏟乾淨、挖乾淨,誓與『兩面人』鬥爭到底。」

——買蘇木江買木爾(Maisumujiang Maimuer),宗教事務官員,2017810日,新華社微博

2014年5月,中國政府在新疆維吾爾自治區針對突厥裔穆斯林發動「嚴厲打擊暴力恐怖活動專項行動」。[1] 史丹福大學法律學院人權與衝突解決診所和人權觀察的研究,以及各人權組織、媒體、維權團體等各方面的報導,顯示中國政府對當地突厥裔穆斯林人口已經實施——且仍在持續實施——危害人類罪行。[2]

本報告為前述結論提出事實基礎,並基於國際法框架對中國政府在新疆作為的可得資訊進行評估。

根據《國際刑事法院羅馬規約》,危害人類罪是指在明知對任何平民人口進行廣泛或有系統攻擊下,作為攻擊的一部分而實施的重大特定罪行。「普遍」意指行為的規模或受害者的人數。「有系統」攻擊是指形成模式或按部就班的計劃。危害人類罪可以在和平時期或者武裝衝突期間實施,只要它是針對平民人口。

危害人類罪被視為國際法上最嚴重的人權侵犯之一。本報告紀錄的具體危害人類罪行包括:違反國際法的監禁或以其他形式剥奪自由;迫害一個可識別的族群或宗教群體;強迫失蹤;酷刑;謀殺;以及疑似故意造成極大痛苦或對身心健康造成嚴重傷害的不人道行為,特別是強迫勞動和性暴力。

新疆維吾爾自治區位於中國西北部,是中國唯一以穆斯林人口佔多數的地區。該地區包括維吾爾族、哈薩克族、柯爾克孜族及其他多個民族均屬突厥裔族群。和中國多數民族即主要說中文的漢族不同,突厥裔人口多為穆斯林並有自己的母語。根據2010年人口普查,維吾爾族約佔新疆人口的百分之46,哈薩克族約佔百分之7。

中國政府對突厥裔穆斯林的鎮壓並不是新的現象,但在最近幾年達到前所未見的程度。高達一百萬人被任意拘禁在300到400間設施[3] ),包括「政治教育」營、看守所和監獄。[4] 法院未經正當程序即判下重刑,突厥裔穆斯林僅因向家屬寄送伊斯蘭宗教影音或下載維吾爾文電子書就被判處數年監禁。在押人員和囚犯受到酷刑和其他虐待、文化和政治思想灌輸以及強迫勞動。這些鎮壓直到離開拘禁設施仍在持續:中國當局對突厥裔穆斯林施加廣泛的大規模監控系統、限制遷徙、任意逮捕和強迫失蹤、抹殺其文化與宗教、以及拆散家庭。

美國國務院和比利時、加拿大及荷蘭國會皆已認定中國的行為亦構成國際法上的種族滅絕。人權觀察目前尚未紀錄到種族滅絕蓄意要件的存在。不過,本報告內容並不排除這種結論,而且,若有相關證據出現,目前針對新疆突厥裔穆斯林——作為受到1948年種族滅絕罪公約保護的一個群體——所實施的各種行為也可能支持種族滅絕的結論。

2017年,根據官方統計,新疆逮捕人數幾乎佔到全中國逮捕人數近百分之21,儘管新疆居民僅佔全國人口的百分之1.5。從2017年起,中國當局利用各種不同理由損壞或摧毀了新疆三分之二的清真寺;其中近半遭徹底推平。全區主要的伊斯蘭教聖地都被剷除。[5] 自治區當局以「結親」名義實施侵入性的監控、發展與思想灌輸計劃,派遣官員幹部到突厥裔穆斯林的家中留宿,美其名為「促進民族團結」。另一種駭人措施是,有些突厥裔穆斯林兒童因父母遭任意拘禁而被安置到孤兒院或寄宿學校、寄宿幼兒園等官方設施。[6]

這種種侵犯人權的舉措已日益招致全球質疑。有些政府,如加拿大、歐盟、英國和美國,已經對中國政府官員與涉及侵犯人權的企業實施針對性或其他類型的制裁。越來越多國家加入在聯合國人權理事會和聯合國大會第三委員會(負責人權事務)發表的聲明,譴責中國政府相關政策。然而,仍有許多國家對中國政府的新疆政策表示讚揚,包括伊斯蘭合作組織的部分成員。

2019年7月,24個國家聯名致函人權理事會主席,要求讓聯合國人權事務高級專員對新疆人權進行「有效視察」,監測並報告當地疑似侵犯穆斯林人口的行為。[7] 中國政府的反應是組織其他50個國家(不包括中國本身)發表聯名信,簽署者包括伊朗、北韓、沙特阿拉伯、委內瑞拉等人權紀錄惡劣的國家。[8] 2019年11月,同一群國家又向聯大第三委員會遞交一份譴責聲明。中國政府再次以54國聯名信回應。[9]

2020全年,有關新疆人權侵犯的報導持續增加,使各國政府更難否認或忽視。2020年6月,50個聯合國特別程序——包括特別報告員、工作組和其他人權專家——對中國人權紀錄發出強烈指控,包括中國政府對新疆、西藏的宗教和少數民族進行「集體鎮壓」。專家們呼籲人權理事會就中國問題召開特別會議,成立專責監測中國的聯合國機制,並要求聯合國機構與各國政府施壓中國履行人權義務。[10] 2020年10月,跨區域集團的39個國家發表公開聲明,尖銳抨擊中國政府在新疆、香港和西藏的普遍人權侵害。該聲明大體上支持前述聯合國50個特別程序的呼籲。[11] 中國政府沒有對相關指控進行調查,僅以兩份聲明回應,其中一份關於新疆的聲明由古巴宣讀,並有45國聯署。[12]

調查中國危害人類罪

在發生嚴重人權侵害區域享有管轄權的國家,有義務確保相關罪行受到司法追究。該等國家有義務確保國內刑事司法機制就疑似人權侵害實施公正調查,並依據國際公正審判標準查明並起訴責任人。中國政府一再否認有官員在新疆涉及侵犯人權,既不願自行調查也不允許獨立的國際監察員實地調查。

歷史上,未對嚴重人權侵犯進行調查的政府往往援引國家主權,拒絕其他有關當局如聯合國機構或區域性國際組織前往調查。根據2002年生效的《國際刑事法院羅馬規約》,若享有主要管轄權的國家缺乏意願或能力,該法院即有權對疑涉危害人類罪及其他重大國際罪行的主要責任人進行調查和起訴。若涉嫌加害人是國際刑事法院締約國的公民,若相關罪行發生在國際刑事法院成員國的領土,或若有非成員國請求國際刑事法院審查在其領土內發生的罪行,國際刑事法院便可實施調查與起訴。中國並非國際刑事法院成員國。雖然國際刑事法院可以在聯合國安全理事會將新疆情勢移交該法院時取得管轄權,但中國作為安理會常任理事國可以動用否決權阻止移交。

鑒於突厥裔穆斯林所受的迫害如此嚴重,有關各國迫切需要採取強硬、一致的問責行動。辦法之一是由聯合國成立調查委員會,對新疆人權侵犯的指控進行調查。調查委員會職權應包括認定事實、查明加害人和提出問責建議。委員會應由知名人士組成,包括國際人權法、危害人類罪、少數族群與宗敎權利以及性別議題等專家。委員會可以通過聯合國人權理事會的決議成立,但聯合國大會、聯合國安理會和聯合國秘書長也都有權採取相關行動。

本報告也對各有關國家提出其他建議,以便加強施壓中國政府,改變其侵犯人權的新疆政策,包括追究相關罪行的個人刑責與國家責任、針對性制裁、以及根據其他聯合國機制如《消除一切形式種族歧視國際公約》採取行動。

個別國家應當考慮刑事追訴——根據「普遍管轄權」(universal jurisdiction)概念,各國可以利用國內司法系統調查和起訴諸如酷刑等特定重大犯罪,即使犯罪地點不屬該國領土。許多國家都已立法允許對被害人為本國國民的這類罪行加以起訴。各種人權條約,例如《反酷刑公約》和《反強迫失蹤國際公約》,都要求締約國引渡或起訴在其境內的嫌疑犯。根據國際習慣法,各國基本上可以對危害人類罪的嫌犯進行起訴。

 

建議

對中國政府

  • 立即採取措施,終止對新疆和其他地區突厥裔穆斯林的人權侵害,特別是:任意拘押和監禁,包括所謂的「再教育」營;酷刑和其他虐待;限制宗教自由、隱私與遷徙;性暴力和強迫絕育;以及強迫勞動。

  • 立即採取措施,終止對突厥裔穆斯林的疑涉危害人類罪行。

  • 調查並適當起訴涉嫌嚴重侵犯人權和危害人類罪的政府官員。

對聯合國

  • 聯合國人權理事會應通過決議成立調查委員會,並授予下列權限:

    • 調查以新疆突厥裔穆斯林為目標的疑涉危害人類罪和其他人權侵害行為,包括:非法監禁或其他形式嚴重剥奪人身自由;基於政治、種族、民族、族群、文化或宗教理由迫害某個可識別團體;強迫失蹤;酷刑;謀殺;其他不人道行為,包括強迫勞動;限制宗教自由;性暴力;以及侵犯生育權利;

    • 作出終止相關侵犯行為的建議;

    • 指出負責官員並提出將其繩之以法的具體途徑;

    • 呼籲給予受害者和倖存者適當賠償;以及

    • 定期向理事會和聯合國其他相關機構提交報告。

  • 聯合國人權事務高級專員應履行其獨立監察和報告的職權,收集相關資訊,就其結論發表公開抗議,為新疆人權情勢撰寫報告,並定期向人權理事會提供更新資訊。

  • 聯合國各種特別程序應就其職權對中國當局在新疆侵犯人權進行持續紀錄和公開報導,據以支持設立調查委員會或類似的調查機制。

  • 聯合國秘書長應公開支持對新疆人權侵犯成立調查委員會,並在公開和私下敦促中國當局終止對新疆突厥裔穆斯林的迫害。秘書長應公開支持對發生在新疆的危害人類罪行追究責任。

  • 聯合國大會應要求負責調查新疆人權侵犯的委員會也向大會提交報告,並將相關報告轉交給所有聯合國成員國和聯合國有關機構。

  • 大會應通過決議,公開支持具體問責措施,包括對危害人類罪的責任人實施針對性制裁。

  • 聯合國安全理事會成員國應在中國作為常任理事國的條件下採取最大可能的行動,包括通過阿里亞辦法(Arria Formula)會議或其他途徑,對於成立委員會調查新疆人權侵害表達支持。

對有關各國政府

協調一致的雙邊或多邊行動

  • 依據美國《全球馬格尼茨基法》和類似的政府間或國內法律工具,實施簽證禁令、旅遊禁令和針對性個別制裁;這種制裁若以集體方式實施將更有成效。

  • 在所有譴責新疆人權侵犯的個別或聯合聲明中,指出中國當局應為犯罪行為負責,這些行為是針對新疆突厥裔穆斯林的普遍且有系統攻擊的一部分,構成危害人類罪。

  • 基於普遍管轄權的法律基礎,協助起訴涉及危害人類罪的中國官員。

  • 鼓勵本國檢察官發動框架性調查,即類似國際刑事法院的初步審查,由檢察機關針對疑涉嚴重違法行為收集並分析有關資訊,為將來起訴奠定基礎。

  • 對既經證實協助中國在新疆執行大規模監控的科技業者實施更強硬行動,包括引用《全球馬格尼茨基法》和類似的制裁措施。

  • 《消除一切形式種族歧視國際公約》締約各國應就中國對突厥裔穆斯林的違反公約行為提出個別或聯合控訴。

關於貿易、投資和商業活動

  • 有關政府機構應審查所有對新疆的投資,並在必要時針對據可靠指控涉及嚴重侵害(例如強迫勞動)的產業部門實施貿易制裁,包括撤資。

  • 向企業發出類似加拿大於20211月針對下列議題所做的公開建議:

    • 新疆人權侵害的嚴重性,包括強迫勞動;

    • 企業依據國際法和國內法應負的法律責任;

    • 因直接商業活動和供應鏈成為人權侵害共犯的風險;以及

    • 對於在中國一切商業交易應進行透明及徹底人權盡職調查的責任。

  • 在有關強迫勞動的舉報得到獨立且公正的國際專家調查、侵害得到解決、加害者受到追究且受害者得到賠償之前,歐盟不應將《歐中投資協定》送交歐洲議會通過。

  • 呼籲工商業者公開發布在新疆開展業務對象的名稱、地址、所有權及其他相關詳情。

  • 立法規定在新疆運營企業必須執行人權盡職調查。

  • 檢討國際金融機構的投資組合,確保其不致參與該地區的迫害行為。

對境內有突厥裔流亡社群的各國

  • 確保突厥裔穆斯林申請庇護能夠得到公正制度的裁決。

  • 允許突厥裔穆斯林的家屬入境團聚,以協助家庭團聚。

  • 終止一切遣返措施及其他形式直接或間接強迫突厥裔穆斯林返回中國。

  • 建立機制以追踪發生在其他國家的騷擾突厥裔穆斯林案件,並採取包括刑事司法在內的措施以追究加害者責任。

  • 確保突厥裔穆斯林能夠獲得為酷刑、強暴和其他犯罪被害人提供的法律、醫療和心理援助,以及文化與宗教保存方案。

對企業和投資者

  • 認識到目前在新疆因為政府干預已不可能履行聯合國《工商企業與人權指導原則》要求承擔的人權盡職調查責任。

  • 加入為終止涉及突厥裔穆斯林強迫勞動做法的「行動呼籲」,或採取類似措施。
 

[1] The region is home to several different communities of Turkic Muslims; the two biggest groups are 11 million Uyghurs and 1.6 million Kazakhs. There are also smaller communities of Kyrgyz and others. Human Rights Watch has documented abuses against members of each of these communities, including arbitrary detention in “political education” camps. For this report, we use the term Turkic Muslims to refer to all members of the community targeted by Chinese government policies.

[2] See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals For Mass Internment And Arrest By Algorithm,” International Consortium of Journalists, November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/; Steven Lee Myers, “China Defends Crackdown on Muslims, and Criticizes Times Article,” New York Times, November 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-leak.html; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: ‘We want to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?’” https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-%E2%80%9Cwe-want-be-respected-humans-it-too-much-ask%E2%80%9D.html.

[3] Alison Killing, Megha Rajagopalan, and Christo Buschek, “Blanked-Out Spots On China’s Maps Helped Us Uncover Xinjiang’s Camps,” Buzzfeed News, August 27, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/satellite-images-investigation-xinjiang-detention-camps; Kelsey Munro, “Xinjiang Data Project website launch,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/news/xinjiang-data-project-website-launch.

[4] Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Xinjiang’s Re-education Camps,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-xinjiangs-re-education-camps.

[5] Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, “Cultural Erasure,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 23, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.

[6] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.

[7] Joint letter to the Human Rights Council president on Xinjiang, July 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf.

[8] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China’s Retort Over Its Mass Detentions: Praise From Russia and Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, July 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/asia/china-human-rights-united-nations.html.

[9] “54 countries voice support for China's counter-terrorism measures in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, October 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/30/c_138514935.htm.

[10] “UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006.

[11] Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee General Debate, October 6, 2020, https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/201006-heusgen-china/2402648.

[12] Cuba Made a Joint Statement on Behalf of 45 Countries in Firm Support of China’s Counter-Terrorism and Deradicalization Measures in Xinjiang, October 6, 2020, http://chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/hyyfy/t1822121.htm.

[13] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf.

[14] Ibid., p. 13.

[15] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang,” July 9, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/09/behind-violence-xinjiang.

[16] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows, p. 10.

[20] Known as Yining in Chinese.

[21] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Rebiya Kadeer’s personal account of Gulja after the massacre on 5 February 1997,” 2007, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa170012007en.pdf; Amnesty International, “Remember the Gulja massacre? China’s crackdown on peaceful protesters,” 2007.

[22] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows.

[23] Ibid., p. 3-4; for a comprehensive overview and analysis of sources of ethnic tensions in the region in recent history, see 伊力哈木 (Ilham Tohti), 当前新疆民族问题的现状及建议 (Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang: Overview and Recommendations), https://chinachangedotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/e4bc8ae58a9be59388e69ca8efbc9ae5bd93e5898de696b0e79686e6b091e6978fe997aee9a298e79a84e78eb0e78ab6e58f8ae5bbbae8aeae1.pdf; translated at http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/pdf/ilham-tohti_present-day-ethnic-problems-in-xinjiang-uighur-autonomous-region-overview-and-recommendations_complete-translation1.pdf.

[24] Chris Buckley, “China calls Xinjiang riot a plot against rule,” Reuters, July 5, 2009.

[25] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled: An Assessment of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan, January 2011, https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/01/11/promises-unfulfilled/assessment-chinas-national-human-rights-action-plan, p. 49.

[26] Ibid., p. 33-36; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/asa170112011en.pdf.

[27] Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”: The July 2009 protests in Xinjiang, China, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/asa170272010en.pdf; Amnesty International, “China urged to release Uighur activist allegedly tortured in prison,” December 20, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/12/china-debe-liberar-activista-uigur-presuntamente-torturado-carcel/.

[28] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled; Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them”: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/xinjiang1009webwcover.pdf, p. 21-32; Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”; Amnesty International, “China must reveal whereabouts of Uighur children detained after deadly clash,” January 6, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/china-must-reveal-whereabouts-uighur-children-detained-after-deadly-clash.

[29] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 49; Dan Levin, “China Remodels and Ancient Silk Road City, and an Ethnic Rift Widens,” New York Times, March 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/asia/china-remodels-an-ancient-silk-road-city-and-an-ethnic-rift-widens.html.

[30] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 62-63; Human Rights Watch, “Letter from HRW to Grand Imam Ahmed el Tayeb Re: Forced Return of Ethnic Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/letter-hrw-grand-imam-ahmed-el-tayeb; Human Rights Watch, “Malaysia/China: Prevent Forced Return of Uighurs,” August 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/22/malaysia/china-prevent-forced-return-uighurs; Sara Colm, “Analysis: Inside Perspective on Uighurs,” Phnom Penh Post, December 20, 2010, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/analysis-inside-perspective-uighurs; Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers at Risk,” December 22, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/22/china-forcibly-returned-uighur-asylum-seekers-risk; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011; World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5 2(2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT_CAT_CSS_CHN_22111_E.pdf.

[31] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”

[32] “Xinjiang’s Party chief wages ‘people’s war’ against terrorism,” China Daily, May 26, 2014, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/26/content_17541318.htm.

[33] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses”: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims, September 2018, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web2.pdf, p. 11-25; Joanne Smith Finley, “Securitzation, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?” Central Asian Survey, 2019, p. 1-3; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,”ChinaFile, February 7, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims.

[34] Smith Finley, “Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey, p. 1, 3, 23, n.6.

[35] Ibid. Note that this economic development has nevertheless largely benefitted Han Chinese settlers.

[36] Chris Buckley, “The Leaders Who Unleashed China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times, October 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/china-muslim-detainment-xinjang-camps.html; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/; Edward Wong, “China Said to Detain Returning Tibetan Pilgrims,” New York Times, April 7, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/asia/china-said-to-detain-returning-tibetan-pilgrims.html.

[37] International Campaign for Tibet, “The origin of the ‘Xinjiang model’ in Tibet under Chen Quanguo: Securitizing ethnicity and accelerating assimilation,” December 19, 2018, https://savetibet.org/the-origin-of-the-xinjiang-model-in-tibet-under-chen-quanguo-securitizing-ethnicity-and-accelerating-assimilation/; Sui-Wee Lee, “China's top Tibet official orders tighter control of Internet,” Reuters, February 29, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet/chinas-top-tibet-official-orders-tighter-control-of-internet-idUSTRE8200BZ20120301; Human Rights Watch, “China: China Poised to Repeat Tibet Mistakes Abusive Policies Planned for Uyghur Region,” January 20, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/20/china-poised-repeat-tibet-mistakes.

[38] Deng Yuwen, “Reading the China Dream,” https://www.readingthechinadream.com/deng-yuwen-chinese-statism.html.

[39] “Full Transcript: Interview with Xinjiang Government Chief on Counterterrorism, Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” People’s Daily, October 16, 2018, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/1016/c90000-9508925.html.

[40] Human Rights Watch, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/07/26/genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/topical-digest-case-law.

[41] Ibid.

[42] The UN International Law Commission has prepared draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, which adopt the ICC Statute’s definition of the offense. The Draft Articles are under consideration in the UN General Assembly.

[43] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018; Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018.

[44] Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative, “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-education Programs,” August 3, 2018, https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs. This estimate was cited by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in its concluding observations to its review of China. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined fourteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China), CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, 2018, para. 40. Note that Zenz has recently revised his estimate to between 900,000 and 1.8 million. Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.

[45] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The China Challenge, Part 3: Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” December 4, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf; “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第14期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 14), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558505/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.pdf.

[46] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Testimony of Rushan Abbas, Director of Campaign for Uyghurs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “ARIA in Action, Part 1: Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law,” April 9, 2019, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040919_Abbas_Testimony.pdf; Sada Seytoff and Alim Seytoff, “Academic Freedom Watchdog Demands China Unconditionally Release Prominent Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-11022018134451.html.

[49] 吐鲁番市集中教育培训学校学员子女问答策略 (Tactics from Turpan City for answering questions asked by the children of concentrated education and training school students), translated in “Document: What Chinese Officials Told Children Whose Families Were Put in Camps,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-detention-directive.html (Tactics from Turpan City).

[50] Ben Dooley, “Inside China’s internment camps: tear gas, Tasers and textbooks,” Agence France-Presse, October 25, 2018, https://www.afp.com/en/inside-chinas-internment-camps-tear-gas-tasers-and-textbooks.

[51] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558509/China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.pdf, para. 14, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510/China-Cables-Telegram-English.pdf; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/.

[52] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf.

[53] These countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Alexandra Ma, “China is using flimsy excuses to lock up its Muslim minority on a huge scale — here are some of the bizarre reasons people are in jail,” Business Insider, September 16, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-gives-these-excuses-to-imprison-uighur-ethnic-minority-2018-9.

[54] Detention for this reason is especially unjust in that the government, during a brief period in 2015, encouraged Uyghurs to apply for passports, and that many of the Uyghurs detained on this basis appear to have applied for passports during this window. Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.

[55] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p. 11, 16.

[58] Ibid., p. 13.

[59] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 3, 24-25.

[60] Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur journalist’s unbreakable resolve to help her detained family,” March 16, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/uighur-journalists-unbreakable-resolve-to-help-detained-family/; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown.”

[61] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 4. This information appears to power what officials termed the “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), a method by which authorities analyze and evaluate detainees.

[62] Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, https://apnews.com/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b/China%E2%80%99s-massindoctrinationcamps-evoke-Cultural-Revolution.

[63] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 14.

[64] Ibid., para. 16.

[65] Ibid., para. 17; Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “New Leak Reveals Orders for China’s Internment Camps,” New York Times, November 24, 2019; Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.

[66] Tactics from Turpan City.

[67] Terence McCoy, “China scores 99.9 percent conviction rate last year,” Washington Post, March 11, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/11/china-scored-99-9-percent-conviction-rate-last-year/; Lily Kuo, “China’s criminal conviction rate is 99.9 percent,” Quartz, August 7, 2014, https://qz.com/246696/chinas-criminal-conviction-rate-is-99-9/; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017,” July 2018; Emily Feng, “‘Illegal Superstition’: China Jails Muslims For Practicing Islam, Relatives Say,” National Public Radio, October 8, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/764153179/china-has-begun-moving-xinjiang-muslim-detainees-to-formal-prisons-relatives-say; Chris Buckley, “China’s Prisons Swell After Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,” New York Times, August 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-uighurs-prisons.html.

[68] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[69] Gene A. Bunin, “The Elephant in the XUAR,” December 9, 2020, https://livingotherwise.com/2020/12/09/the-elephant-in-the-xuar-i-entire-families-sentenced/.

[70] Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-analysis-available-data/; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017.

[71] Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown,” March 20, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1700732019ENGLISH.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained,” November 14, 2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/uaa25117-3.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 20 Relatives of Uighur Journalist Detained,” March 1, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1779642018ENGLISH.pdf.

[72] Human Rights Watch, Submission to Universal Periodical Review of China, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/submission-universal-periodic-review-china; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[73] Ibid.

[74] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees.

[75] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”

[76] Entry 13409: Jin Dehuai, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=13409.

[77] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chaqiliq County People’s Court Criminal Verdict, 2018, Xinjiang 2824 Criminal-Case No. 121, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=35.

[78] Entry 915: Asqar Azatbek, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=915.

[79] Entry 5821: Nurlan Pioner, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=5821.

[80] Entry 11997: Nie Shigang, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=11997.

[81] Verdict against Serikzhan Adilhan, convicted of running an illegal business ( 塞力克江·阿德勒汗非法经营罪二审刑事裁定书 ), September 5, 2019, China Judgement Online, https://archive.vn/5mxOi.

[82] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court Criminal Judgment, 2017, Xinjiang 40 Criminal Final No. 78, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=36.

[83] “Siblings Get Lengthy Jail Terms in Xinjiang For Links to Turkey-Based Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, August 22, 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-siblings-08222020092753.html.

[84] Of the 177, 124 died in custody; of that number, 101 were Uyghurs, 20 were Kazkahs, and 1 each were Han, Tatar, and Uyghur-Kazakh. The numbers were generated using the database’s filter function; see https://shahit.biz/eng/#filter.

[85] “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” Radio Free Asia, October 29, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html;“Uyghur Father of Two Dies After Falling Ill in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/father-04122018153525.html; “Uyghur Man Buried Amid Strict Security After Latest Xinjiang Reeducation Camp Death,” Radio Free Asia, June 8, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/gulja-burial-06082018164250.html; “Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, March 14, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/teenager-03142018154926.html; “Elderly Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang ‘Political Re-Education Camp,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/woman-05242018164854.html.

[86] Helen Davidson, “China confirms death of Uighur man whose family says was held in Xinjiang camps,” Guardian, October 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uighur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps.

[87] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42.

[88] Harry Cockburn, “Muslim woman describes torture and beatings in China detention camp: ‘I begged them to kill me’,” The Independent, November 28, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/uighur-muslim-china-mihrigul-tursun-torture-reeducation-camps-a8656396.html.

[89] Human Rights Watch interview with Ismail (pseudonym), 40, whose father died in a political education camp and his brother is held in a camp, May 12, 2018.

[90] Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun; Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, recounting former detainee’s interrogation in a “tiger chair.”

[91] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018.

[92] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.

[93] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 2, 36, 41-42, 49-50, 54-55.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid., p. 50.

[97] Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.

[98] “#MenmuUyghur” in Uyghur.

[99] Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” New York Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/asia/uighurs-china-internment-camps.html.

[100] Xinjiang Victims Database, shahit.biz.

[101] Patrick Poon, “Families of missing Uighurs terrified to search for their loved ones,” Amnesty International, March 31, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/03/uighurs-too-scared-to-search-for-missing-family/.

[102] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.

[103] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation.”

[104] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.

[105] “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/. See also, “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558501-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Chinese.html, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558502/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Enligsh.pdf, encouraging the use of 10-household units to monitor individuals in Xinjiang known to have obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or have obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.

[106] An acronym that stands for “Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (访民情、惠民生、聚民心). These teams, also known as “village-based work teams,” were first implemented in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2011—then extended indefinitely—by then-Tibet Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. See Human Rights Watch, “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance Program,” January 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/18/china-no-end-tibet-surveillance-program; “200,000 Communist Party members Dispatched to Stay in Grassroots Villages in Xinjiang to Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (新疆20万机关干部下基层住万村,访民情、惠民生、聚民心), People Online (人民网), http://xj.people.com.cn/GB/188750/361873/.

[107] Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” May 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region.

[108] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, May 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0519_web5.pdf, p. 15-16.

[109] Xinjiang: 2017 Nián Quánmín Jiànkāng Tǐjiǎn Gōngzuò Quánbù Wánchéng (新疆:2017年全民健康体检工作全部完成), Xīnjiāng Rìbào (新疆日报), November 2, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/02/content_5236389.htm; Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,” December 13, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions.

[110] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”

[111] Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”

[112] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; Isobel Cockerell, “Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,” Wired, May 9, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/.

[113] Human Rights Watch, “Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy,” May 15, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/china-police-dna-database-threatens-privacy.

[114] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region,” February 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf, p. 16-17.

[115] Steven Melendez, “In locked-down Xinjiang, China is tracking kitchen knvies with QR codes,” Fast Company, December 20, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/40510238/in-xinjiang-china-some-knives-branded-with-owners-qr-codes; “When CCTV cameras aren’t enough: Chinese police order drivers to install tracking devices on their cars,” Fast Company , February 21, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/4031016/when-cctv-cameras-arent-enough-chinese-police-order-drivers-to-install-tracking-devices-on-their-cars.

[116] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 1, 24; “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region.” IJOP collects information such as the individual’s name, ID type and number, ethnicity, address, license plate number, profession, education, passport, phone number, relationship with head of household, blood type, height, photo, political status, religion, “religious atmosphere” (fair or strong), reason for seeking asylum or education abroad, destination country, exit time, changed identity? (if yes, to what), and reason for leaving Xinjiang. See also, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 14-15; and “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), encouraging the detention of Xinjiang residents who IJOP identified as having obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or having obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.

[117] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang’s Muslims: Leaked List of Over 2,000 Detainees Demonstrates Automated Repression,” December 9, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/china-big-data-program-targets-xinjiangs-muslims.

[118] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 13.

[119] Ibid.

[120] For information on targeted digital surveillance against the Uyghur diaspora, see Stevens Le Blond, Adina Uritesc, Cédric Gilbert, Zheng Leong Chua, and Prateek Saxena, “A Look at Targeted Attacks Through the Lens of an NGO,” San Diego: USENIX Association, 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, August 20-22, 2014, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf.

[121] Paul Mozur and Nicole Perlroth, “China’s Software Stalked Uighurs Earlier and More Widely, Researchers Learn,” New York Times, July 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/china-uighurs-hackers-malware-hackers-smartphones.html.

[122] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.

[123] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent, March 22, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-education-camps-forbidden-beards-pray-pork-xinjiang-a8835861.html. See also, 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 8, describing how detainees should “adhere to the daily concentrated study of the national language (Chinese), law, and skills” and how camps should “make remedial Chinese studies the top priority.”

[124] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 9-10, 39-40. According to a former detainee, these rules included prohibitions on Islamic greetings, Uyghur and Kazakh writing on Uyghur restaurant signs, the use of Uyghur or Kazakh in public spaces, Uyghur- and Kazakh-language schools, and the establishment of minority-only chat groups on WeChat, QQ, and other social media websites; a ban on communications with any person in the 26 “sensitive” countries; and cash rewards for the intermarriage of Han Chinese and Kazakhs.

[125] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 38-39.

[126] Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.

[127] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 11.

[128] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent.

[129] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.

[130] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/17/she-survived-chinese-internment-camp-made-it-virginia-will-us-let-her-stay/?arc404=true.

[131] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 69.

[132] Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, April 24, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang.

[133] Dake Kang, “Correction: China-Xinjiang-Banished Textbooks story,” AP News, September 3, 2019, https://apnews.com/4f5f57213e3546ab9bd1be01dfb510d3; Qiao Long and Yang Fan, “China Bans Use of Uyghur, Kazakh Textbooks, Materials in Xinjiang Schools,” Radio Free Asia, October 13, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ethnic-textbooks-10132017135316.html; Darren Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina, January 2, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/01/02/the-patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 17.

[134] “Xinjiang’s ‘Open Letter’ Forces Uyghurs to Put Loyalty to China in Writing,” Radio Free Asia, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy3.html; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/.

[135] Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina.

[136] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4.

[137] The rationale is that such names “exaggerate religious fervor.” Although not “illegal” per se, children with banned names cannot obtain household registration, which is essential for accessing public school and other social services. The ban was also imposed retroactively, thereby requiring parents to change their children’s names. Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia.

[138] Ibid.; Amnesty International, “‘Forgive my children for not fasting’ – Ramadan in Xinjiang,” May 3, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/05/forgive-my-children-ramadan-in-xinjiang/.

[139] Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Handed 10-Year Prison Term Over Headscarf Claim,” Radio Free Asia, September 19, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/headscarf-09192017174307.html.

[140] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang’s Korla City Seizes Qurans, Prayer Mats From Uyghur Muslims,” Radio Free Asia, October 2, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/qurans-10022017152453.html.

[141] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, p. 37.

[142] Jon Sharman, “China ‘forcing Muslims to eat pork and drink alcohol’ for lunar new year festival,” The Independent, February 7, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslims-xinjiang-pork-alcohol-lunar-new-year-spring-festival-uighur-islam-a8767561.html.

[143] See “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558507/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-English.pdf.

[144] “Suppressing religious freedoms: Chinese imams forced to dance in Xinjiang region,” Express Tribune, April 18, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/871879/suppressing-religious-freedoms-chinese-imams-forced-to-dance-in-xinjiang-region/. See also, World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5, 2015, p. 2.

[145] Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs, 2014 (新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 2014), art. 40.

[146] CNES, Airbus DS, Earthrise, and AFP, “Then and now: China’s destruction of Uighur burial grounds,” Guardian, October 9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/chinas-destruction-of-uighur-burial-grounds-then-and-now; “Even in death, Uighurs feel long reach of Chinese state,” Agence France-Presse, October 9, 2019, https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/even-death-uighurs-feel-long-reach-chinese-state-doc-1ky71r1; Adam Withnall, “China ‘building cark parks and playgrounds’ over Uighur Muslim graveyards ‘to eradicate ethnic group’s identity,” The Independent, October 9, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslims-burial-grounds-satellite-xinjiang-a9148996.html.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Authorities Use ‘Burial Management Centers’ to Subvert Uyghur Funeral Traditions,” Radio Free Asia, April 19, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/burials-04192018141100.html.

[150] Cultural Erasure, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.

[151] Joanne Smith Finley, “‘Now We Don’t Talk Anymore’: Inside the ‘Cleansing’ of Xinjiang,” ChinaFile, December 28, 2018, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/now-we-dont-talk-anymore; Lily Kuo, “Revealed: new evidence of China’s mission to raze the mosques of Xinjiang,” Guardian, May 6, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang (“If one were to remove these … shrines, the Uighur people would lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual history. After a few years we would not have a memory of why we live here or where we belong.”) For a comparison of such demolitions to the demolitions of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries during Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany, see Fred Hiatt, “In China, every day is Kristallnacht,” Washington Post, November 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/03/china-every-day-is-kristallnacht/?arc404=true.

[152] Eva Xiao, “China pushes inter-ethnic marriage in Xinjiang assimilation drive,” Agence France-Presse, May 16, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/china-pushes-inter-ethnic-marriage-xinjiang-assimilation-drive-044619042.html; Darren Byler, “Uyghur Love in a time of Interethnic Marriage,” SupChina, August 7, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/08/07/uyghur-love-in-a-time-of-interethnic-marriage/; “Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese,” 2017, Radio Free Asia (2017), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html.

[153] Ibid.

[154] Ibid.; Leigh Hartman, “China coerces Uighur women into unwanted marriages,” ShareAmerica, September 24, 2019, https://share.america.gov/china-coerces-uighur-women-into-unwanted-marriages/.

[155] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 11-25.

[156] Ibid., p. 4, 14-15.

[157] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[158] Known as Kuai Ya in Chinese.

[159] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20); Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One By One’ For Using A Mobile App, Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists,” November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/.

[160] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2).

[161] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 12.

[162] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 5, 83-86; Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Hearing before the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018.

[163] Ibid.; Amnesty International, China: Uyghurs living abroad tell of campaign of intimidation, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/china-uyghurs-living-abroad-tell-of-campaign-of-intimidation/.

[164] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.

[165] Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families; “China: Children Caught in Xinjiang Crackdown,” October 16, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/16/china-children-caught-xinjiang-crackdown.

[166] Ibid.

[167] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent, September 21, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighurs-human-rights-muslims-orphanages-xinjiang-province-reeducation-a8548341.html.

[168] Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.

[169] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.

[170] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent.

[171] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families.”

[172] Zenz, “Break Their Roots,” Journal of Political Risk.

[173] Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers At Risk,” December 22, 2009; “Thailand: More Uighurs Face Forced Return to China,” March 21, 2014; “Letter to Malaysian Prime Minister Concerning Forced Return of Uighurs,” February 1, 2013; “Saudi Arabia: Clarify Status of Uyghur Detainees,” November 23, 2020.

[174] Catherine Putz, “Thailand Deports 100 Uyghurs to China,” The Diplomat, July 11, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/thailand-deports-100-uyghurs-to-china/.

[175] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/egypt-dont-deport-uyghurs-china; Matt Rivers, Max Foster, and James Griffiths, “Disturbing video shows hundreds of blindfolded prisoners in Xinjiang,” CNN, October 7, 2019.

[176] Joëlle Garrus, “No place to hide: exiled Chinese Uighur Muslims feel state’s long reach,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 19, 2018, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/08/19/no-place-hide-exiled-chinese-uighur-muslims-feel-states-long-reach/; Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”

[177] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”

[178] Ibid.

[179] For a discussion about the history around these schemes, see Li Xiaoxia, “(新疆少数民族产业工人队伍发展及现状分析),” 北方民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2015.

[180] See, for example, 新疆的农村劳动力转移出现四个转变产生四大效应, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-06/18/content_652170.htm, mentioning that over 100,000 Xinjiang workers were exported to other provinces under the scheme in 2006.

[181] Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uighurs.html.

[182] Shohret Hoshur, “Internment Camp Assigned Uyghur Forced Laborers to Xinjiang Textile Factory: Official,” Radio Free Asia, November 14, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/laborers-11142019142325.html.

[183] Fair Labor Association, “Issue Brief: Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,” 2020, https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/fla-brief-xinjiang_forced_labor_risk_final.pdf; Citizen Power Initiatives for China, Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies, 2019.

[184] ASPI, “Uyghurs for Sale,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.

[185] John Sudworth, “‘If the others go I’ll go’: Inside China’s scheme to transfer Uighurs into work,” BBC News, March 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56250915.

[186] Ibid.; 中国财富经济研究院智库报告-1009新疆和田地区维族劳动力转移就业扶贫工作报告, Nankai University, http://web.archive.org/web/20200507161938/https:/ciwe.nankai.edu.cn/2019/1223/c18571a259225/page.htm.

[187] 我省出台措施进一步加大就业扶贫力度, http://www.jcgov.gov.cn/dtxx/sxyw/202003/t20200315_890057.shtml.

[188] Bernhard Zand and Adrian Zenz, “The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide,” Spiegel Online, November 28, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html.

[189] 孙瑞哲分享十大行业发展热点 (Sun Ruizhe Shares Top Ten Industry Development Hot Topics), March 4, 2018, transcript, http://www.ccta.org.cn/hyzx/201803/t20180305_3683861.html; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.

[190] Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their goal is to destroy everyone’: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape,” BBC News, February 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071.

[191] Ruth Ingram, “Confessions of a Xinjiang Camp Teacher,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/confessions-of-a-xinjiang-camp-teacher/.

[192] Forthcoming ChinaFile publication.

[193] Human Rights Watch interview with Aina Shormanbayeva via an electronic communication platform, August 20, 2020.

[194] Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation: Muslim women who fled China for Kazakhstan recount ordeals,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html; Amie Ferris-Rotman, Aigerim Toleukhan, Emily Rauhala, and Anna Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent, October 6, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html.

[195] Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation,” Washington Post.

[196] Ibid.; Ferris-Rotman, Toleukhan, Rauhala, and Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent; Rauhala and Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia,” Washington Post.

[197] Maya Wang, “Ending the One-Child Policy Does Not Equal Reproductive Freedom in China,” Human Rights Watch, October 29, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/29/dispatches-ending-one-child-policy-does-not-equal-reproductive-freedom-china.

[198] Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang,” China Brief, vol. 20, no. 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x19523.

[199] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[200] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[201] Ibid., p. 7-8.

[202] 闫国灿同志在地区卫生计生工作会议上的讲话 (Speech by Comrade Yan Guocan at the Regional Health and Family Conference), 和田政府网 (Hotan Government Net), May, 30, 2015, http://archive.is/fCkb3; Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief; Joyce Huang, “Rights Activists Denounce China’s Xinjiang White Paper,” VOA News, March 19, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/rights-activists-denounce-chinas-xinjiang-white-paper.

[203] Emphasis added. Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[204] Ibid.

[205] See Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.

[206] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.

[207] Ibid., p. 13.

[208] Ibid.

[209] Ibid., p. 15-16.

[210] Ibid.

[211] The acts are: “Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture; Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002.

[212] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a).

[213] The Rome Statute further defines a qualifying action as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [the enumerated acts] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).

[214] An “attack” is a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence. See Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 196. See also, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (ICC Elements of Crimes), ICC-ASP/1/3, September 9, 2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf, art. 7. “Attack directed against a civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the commission of enumerated acts in the Rome Statute. The acts do not need to be part of a military attack.

[215] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.

[216] ICC Elements of Crimes.

[217] See Darryl Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (1999). (“Explicit recognition of this policy element was essential to the compromise on crimes against humanity. It is the existence of a policy that unites otherwise unrelated inhumane acts, so that it may be said that in the aggregate they collectively form an ‘attack’. Delegations supporting the compromise explained that the policy element was intended as a flexible test.”)

[218] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.

[219] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.

[220] Ibid.; Austin Ramzy, “5 Takeaways From the Leaked Files on China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times November 16, 2019.

[221] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20).

[222] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.

[223] See, e.g., Enshen Li, “Fighting the ‘Three Evils’: A Structural Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China,” Emory International Law Review, vol. 33, no. 3, 2019; Kilic Kanat, “Repression in China and Its Consequences in Xinjiang,” Hudson Institute, July 28, 2014, https://www.hudson.org/research/10480-repression-in-china-and-its-consequences-in-xinjiang.

[224] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Ibid. His confession and the investigation report were read aloud to officials throughout Xinjiang, and state media outlets portrayed him as corrupt.

[227] Ibid.

[228] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 25.

[229] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019.

[230] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(c).

[231] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), n.11. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held in the Kunarac case that exploitative conditions may rise to the level of enslavement when factors such as control of movement, control of environment, use or threat of force, psychological control, and other forms of coercion that would diminish a person’s free will are present. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement in the Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, February 22, 2001, §§ 543-543, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf.

[232] See, e.g., Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, discussing state propaganda extolling the benefits of the “job training” program.

[233] United States v. Pohl, Judgement, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, November 3, 1947, http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1947.11.03_United_States_v_Pohl.pdf.

[234] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(f), 7(2)(e).

[235] Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 519.

[236] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(g).

[237] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(h).

[238] See Elisa Novic, Beyond Words: From ‘Cultural Genocide’ to ‘Cultural Persecution,’ Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016.

[239] Ibid., p. 148-149, citing International Law Commission commentary on the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.

[240] See, for example, Tactics from Turpan City, instructing officials on how to respond to the economic concerns of detainees’ family members; Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” New York Times, November, 24, 2019, describing the economic fallout of these policies.

[241] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(i); Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(i).

[242] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-2.

[243] Ibid., art. 7(1)(g)-5.

[244] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d).

[245] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d), n.12.

區域/國家