III. Steps toward Justice
Since 2010 Guinea has made important strides in investigating the September 28 massacre, rapes, and other abuses. While much of the detail of the investigation is secret, consistent with Guinean criminal procedure,[19] available information on its progress is discussed below.
Establishment and Offices
In early 2010 a Guinean prosecutor assigned a three-judge panel to investigate crimes committed around September 28, 2009, consistent with Guinean law.[20]
Several months after beginning work, the upper floor of the small building in which the judges had received office space was allocated to the Special Force for a Safe Electoral Process (Force spéciale de sécurisation du processus électoral, FOSSEPEL), a unit comprised of gendarmes and police with a mandate to ensure security around the 2010 presidential election. This created significant security risks for the judges and their visitors, including victims, as sensitive activities became visible and vulnerable to monitoring by individuals with possible ties to security service members implicated in the crimes.[21]
For about a year, the judges remained in the same premises as FOSSEPEL—and without any personnel dedicated to their security. Civil society and international partners pressed for these security concerns to be addressed.[22] The judges’ offices were ultimately moved to the premises of the Court of Appeal in Conakry in September 2011, and a team of gendarmes was assigned to provide dedicated security for the judges during business hours.[23] As discussed in Section V, security challenges remain, however.
Victims
Practitioners working with the investigation indicate that since the panel was established, more than 200 victims have appeared before the judges to give statements concerning crimes committed during the September 28, 2009 violence.[24]
Some victims have appeared without counsel. Others have been accompanied by lawyers who are representing them in connection with a partie civile[25] action to the September 28 investigation, which the International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme, FIDH) and the Guinean Organization for Human Rights (Organisation guinéene de défense des droits de l’homme et du citoyen,OGDH) has initiated with victims’ associations and individual victims.[26] Some victims who initially appeared without counsel have since returned to give additional statements with the assistance of counsel.[27]
Estimates of the time victims spend with the judges range from approximately thirty minutes to four hours, and statements tend to be substantially longer and more thorough when a lawyer is present.[28] Victims have described giving statements as a positive experience in which the judges listen to them, although practitioners also have noted that the questions posed by the judges are few in number and not detailed.[29] After the victim concludes, the judges dictate a summary of the statement to a court official, known as the greffier, and all statements are kept in an investigation dossier.[30] Consistent with standard Guinean law and practice, lawyers for both victims and suspects can access the dossier.[31]
Suspects
Information available to Human Rights Watch indicates that to date at least seven individuals have been charged, questioned, or detained in relation to their alleged involvement in the September 28 crimes; one was later released on the basis that he was not present during the September 28 violence.[32] Given that crimes against humanity and a specific crime of torture are not incorporated into Guinea’s domestic law, suspects are charged with ordinary crimes, such as murder, rape, or organized crime.[33]
Second Lieutenant Marcel Kuvugi, a member of the red berets, was first taken into custody in June 2010.[34] Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Inquiry both identified Kuvugi as someone who should be investigated for his role in the crimes.[35] Kuvugi’s detention documents identify him as being suspected of murders, assassinations, rapes, and torture committed during the events of September 28, 2009.[36]
According to a defense lawyer, Kuvugi was questioned by the judges several weeks after he was first detained, during which he indicated that he was not present at the stadium on September 28, 2009, as he was recovering from oral surgery. [37] Kuvugi was offered the opportunity to secure a lawyer to represent him during questioning but declined citing lack of resources. [38] This is contrary to international fair trial standards that require that defendants should be afforded a lawyer free of charge should they lack means to pay for one. [39]
In February 2011 Kuvugi obtained legal representation, and in March 2011 Kuvugi’s lawyer requested that Kuvugi be released subject to conditions by the judges based on poor health.[40] The request was denied and his detention renewed.[41] In December 2011 the judges renewed his detention for six months.[42] As of September 2012 he remained in custody without a legal basis for his continued detention.[43]
Three other individuals whose identities are unknown to Human Rights Watch have also been taken into custody for their role in the crimes; one was later released on the basis that he was not present during the September 28 violence.[44]
Lieutenant Aboubakar “Toumba” Diakité, former President Camara’s aide-de-camp and head of his personal security in September 2009, also faces charges, but his whereabouts are unknown. Human Rights Watch and the ICOI identified Toumba as someone whose role in the September 28 crimes should be investigated.[45]
Toumba fled Guinea after the former president was shot in December 2009, and Toumba told the media he shot him because Camara sought to place primary responsibility for the September 28 crimes on Toumba.[46] On January 19, 2011, Interpol issued an international notice for Toumba’s arrest and extradition, listing crimes against humanity and sex crimes among the offenses for which he is sought.[47]
In February 2012 the investigation took a meaningful step forward when Moussa Tiégboro Camara became the highest-level suspect to face charges and questioning.[48] Tiégboro Camara is Guinea’s minister in charge of fighting drug trafficking and organized crime (ministre à la présidence chargé de la lutte anti-drogue et du grand banditisme), a position he held during the September 28 violence and its aftermath and has retained to the present. In this role, he has a visible and influential role in Guinea’s security forces. Human Rights Watch and the ICOI both identified Tiégboro Camara as an individual whose role should be investigated.[49]
On February 8, 2012, Tiégboro Camara appeared before the judges. He was questioned for several hours, during which he denied involvement in the crimes.[50]
The Guinean judiciary has never brought such a high level official in for questioning in association with a criminal case where the victims are civilians, according to information available to Human Rights Watch.[51] Some civil society members and legal practitioners noted that Tiégboro Camara’s charging and questioning was a significant move that increased both their confidence in the Guinean judiciary and their expectations that justice for the September 28 crimes might be possible in Guinea.[52] Others were less optimistic about the implications of these developments, however, as Tiégboro Camara was not removed from his government post after being charged and had previously indicated his interest in giving a statement to the judges.[53]
More recently, in September 2012, the judges brought charges against Colonel Abdoulaye Cherif Diaby, who was Guinea’s health minister on September 28, 2009. The ICOI identified Diaby as someone whose role in the September 28 crimes should be investigated. [54]
The judges have also asked to interview former Guinean President Moussa Dadis Camara. Human Rights Watch and the ICOI identified Dadis Camara as someone who should be investigated. [55]
In addition to being president, Dadis Camara held the positions of commander-in-chief of the Guinean armed forces and leader of the National Council for Democracy and Development (Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement, CNDD) in September 2009. The CNDD represents a group of military officers that had effectuated the bloodless coup in Guinea after President Lansana Conté died in December 2008.
Dadis Camara stepped down as president in December 2009, as he was largely incapacitated after being shot. He went into exile in Burkina Faso, where he has since apparently substantially recovered.[56] According to those close to the investigation, in 2011 the Guinean government transmitted an international request for legal assistance, known as a rogatory commission, to Burkina Faso’s Foreign Ministry for the judges to question Dadis Camara, which remains outstanding.[57]
Investigating Possible Mass Graves
In 2010 the judges submitted a request to the director of judicial police to access a potential mass grave site and to interview individuals in the surrounding area, although there has been no response to the request.[58] The judges learned of additional possible mass grave sites in 2011, but did not request access to them or to interview those in the surrounding areas due to what an interlocutor described as a “lack of resources.”[59]
[19]Code de procédure pénale (“CPP”), République de Guinée,1998, http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1504_1217429951_loi-n-037-du-31-decembre-1998-portant-code-de-procedure-penale.pdf, art. 10.
[20]Practitioners offered different information as to which prosecuting official—the procureur de la république or procureur général, to whom the procureur de la république reports—opened the investigation. Human Rights Watch separate telephone interviews with two legal practitioners, Conakry, October 11, 2012, and interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 19, 2012. See also International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the Guinean Organization for Human Rights (OGDH), “Commemoration Of 28 September Massacre Overshadowed By Political Tension” (“Commemoration Note”), September 2011, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/note_guinee_28092011_en.pdf (accessed August 14, 2012).
[21] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean Justice Ministry official, Conakry, June 20, 2012. See also Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness,” pp. 27-28; FIDH-OGDH, Commemoration Note, pp. 6-7.
[22] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean civil society member, Conakry, June 24, 2012. See also Letter from Human Rights Watch to Guinea’s Justice Minister on security for judges, July 6, 2011, on file with Human Rights Watch; FIDH-OGDH, Commemoration Note, p. 6.
[23] Human Rights Watch group interview with legal practitioners, Conakry, June 22, 2012. See also UN General Assembly (UNGA), “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Guinea,” A/HRC/19/49, January 17, 2012, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-49_en.pdf (accessed August 10, 2012); “28 septembre 2009: des actes de guerre commis dans un pays qui n’est pas en conflit,” Guinee libre, October 6, 2011, http://www.guineelibre.com/article-28-septembre-2009-des-actes-de-guerre-commis-dans-un-pays-qui-n-est-pas-en-conflit-86015181.html (accessed August 14, 2012); FIDH-OGDH, Commemoration Note, pp. 6-7.
[24] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean civil society member, Conakry, June 24, 2012, and legal practitioner, Conakry, June 26, 2012.
[25]Partie civile is a feature of civil law systems that allows victims to act as formal parties in criminal cases and participate in proceedings more fully than if they serve as witnesses, such as by having the opportunity to inspect documents related to the proceedings. See FIDH, “Victims’ Rights Before the ICC,” http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/4-CH-I_Background.pdf (accessed September 6, 2012); See also FIDH-OGDH, Commemoration Note.
[26]Human Rights Watch interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 26, 2012, and telephone interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, October 5, 2012.
[27] Human Rights Watch separate interviews with two legal practitioners, Conakry, June 22 and June 26, 2012.
[28] Human Rights Watch separate interviews with four legal practitioners, Conakry, June 19, 21, 22, and 26, 2012.
[29] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean civil society member, Conakry, June 24, 2012, and separate telephone interviews with two legal practitioners, Conakry, September 11 and October 5, 2012.
[30] Human Rights Watch separate interviews with two legal practitioners, Conakry, June 19 and 21, 2012.
[31] Human Rights Watch interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 19, 2012.
[32] Some sources suggested some suspects were initially taken into custody for another case, but others disagreed with this assessment. Human Rights Watch telephone interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, October 5, 2012, and separate interviews with Guinean civil society member, Conakry, June 26, 2012 and three legal practitioners, Conakry, June 21, 22, and 26, 2012, and group interview with legal practitioners, Conakry, June 22, 2012. See also UNGA, “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Guinea,” A/HRC/19/49, January 17, 2012, para 28.
[33]Human Rights Watch review of detention documents, Conakry, June 23, 2012. See also Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness,” p. 28.
[34] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean defense lawyer, Conakry, June 24, 2012.
[35] Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday, p. 99; ICOI Report, paras. 64, 231.
[36] Human Rights Watch review of detention document, Conakry, June 24, 2012.
[37] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean defense lawyer, Conakry, June 24, 2012.
[38] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean defense lawyer, Conakry, June 24, 2012.
[39] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted December 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, art. 14.
[40] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean defense lawyer, Conakry, June 24, 2012.
[41] Human Rights Watch review of detention documents, Conakry, June 23, 2012. See also CPP, art. 142.
[42] The basis for multiple renewals of Kuvugi’s detention was unclear as this would appear to be inconsistent with Guinean law on pre-trial detention. Human Rights Watch review of detention documents, June 23, 2012, and interview with Guinean civil society member, Conakry, June 26, 2012. See also CPP, art. 142.
[43] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, September 6, 2012. See also FIDH-OGDH, “The Fight Against Impunity in Guinea: Progress Observed, Actions Awaited,” September 2012, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapguinee596ang.pdf (accessed October 17, 2012).
[44] Human Rights Watch separate interviews with two legal practitioners, Conakry, June 21 and 22, 2012, and group interview with legal practitioners, Conakry, June 22, 2012.
[45] Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday, p. 41; ICOI report, para. 229.
[46] See “Guinea aide admits shooting junta leader Camara,” BBC News Online, December 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8415659.stm (accessed September 6, 2012); “Soldier who shot ex-junta chief wants to return to Guinea,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, January 12, 2011, http://www.rnw.nl/africa/bulletin/soldier-who-shot-ex-junta-chief-wants-return-guinea (accessed September 7, 2012).
[47] Interpol, Red Notice for Aboubacar Sidiki Diakite, http://www.interpol.int/Wanted-Persons/(wanted_id)/2011-205 (accessed July 14, 2012); “Guinea: Progress in Massacre Probe,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 9, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/09/guinea-progress-massacre-probe.
[48] The French term for the charges brought against Tiégboro and the other suspects is inculpation. Some sources translate this term as indictment. However, such a translation may be misleading as the charges will need to withstand a second level of investigation and confirmation before a trial may go forward. For further discussion of the process, see Section IV of this report.
[49] Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday, pp. 99-100; ICOI Report, para. 236.
[50] Human Rights Watch interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 21, 2012. See also Ahmed Tounkara, “Inculpation du Lieutenant Colonel Tiegboro: Cellou Dalein est sceptique,” Africaguinée.com, http://www.africaguinee.com/index.php?monAction=detailNews&id=11716 (accessed August 9, 2012); “Guinea: Progress in Massacre Probe,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 9, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/09/guinea-progress-massacre-probe; Ursula Soares, “Guinée: un haut responsable de l’armée inculpé pour le massacre au stade de Conakry,” Radio France Internationale (RFI), February 9, 2012, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120209-guinee-haut-responsable-armee-inculpe-le-massacre-stade-conakry (accessed August 16, 2012).
[51] Human Rights Watch interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 20, 2012, and Guinean civil society member, Conakry, June 20, 2012, and telephone interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, September 11, 2012. See also FIDH, “Guinea: Major breakthrough in the case of the 28 September 2009,” February 24, 2012.
[52] Human Rights Watch separate interviews with two civil society members, Conakry, June 26 and 28, 2012, and legal practitioner, Conakry, June 22, 2012.
[53] Human Rights Watch interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 21, 2012, group interview with UN officials, Conakry, June 22, 2012, and group interview with four victims, Conakry, June 24, 2012.
[54] ICOI Report, para. 243. See also Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday, pp. 76-79.
[55] Human Rights Watch, Bloody Monday, pp. 97-98; ICOI Report, para. 216.
[56] “Guinea junta blames Toumba Diakite for massacre,” BBC News, February 2, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8493875.stm (accessed August 14, 2012); “Guinea leader Camara breaks exile silence,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8464712.stm (accessed August 14, 2012).
[57] Human Rights Watch interview with Guinean Justice Ministry official, Conakry, June 20, 2012, and legal practitioner, June 24, 2012, and group interview with legal practitioners, Conakry, June 22, 2012.
[58] Human Rights Watch interview with legal practitioner, Conakry, June 24, 2012, and telephone interview with legal practitioner, August 10, 2012.
[59] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with legal practitioner, August 10, 2012.













