December 5, 2012

II. The Need for Justice

The people of Guinea have been repeatedly subjected to human rights violations during successive authoritarian and repressive regimes since the country became independent in 1958.[6] At the same time, the September 28 massacre, rapes, and other abuses were among the country’s worst episodes of abuse.[7]

International law mandates prosecution of those against whom there is evidence suggesting responsibility for serious crimes committed in violation of international law—namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.[8] The duty to prosecute lies primarily with the domestic authorities but can also lie with the countries where suspects are present and international courts.

But justice is also crucial from a more human perspective. Guinean victims have repeatedly called for perpetrators to be held to account.[9] Victims stress the need to secure the truth of what has happened, to see justice done, and to have prosecutions without delay; many of the victims suffer poor health due to injuries they suffered and are concerned they may not have the chance to see accountability done.[10]

Fair, credible prosecutions of the September 28 crimes can give these victims a measure of redress for the horrific harms they have suffered. Accountability for the gravest crimes also helps to strengthen respect for the rule of law, which in turn helps to promote long-term peace and stability. As the United Nations secretary-general’s 2004 seminal report on the rule of law indicates, justice can play an essential role in transitional societies:

[E]xperience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice.[11]

More recently, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, Conflict, Security, and Development stated as its “central message … that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizens security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence.” [12]

This is particularly the case in Guinea. Persistent impunity for human rights violations for decades has been a major problem that has emboldened perpetrators.[13] Victims and civil society repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that they view the lack of justice for previous human rights abuses as having fueled the intense level of brutality during the September 28 massacre.[14] As highlighted in the ICOI report,

The Guinean people have long been subject to coups d’états accompanied by grave and repeated violations of human rights. This situation is made possible by the existence of a very particular kind of army in Guinea and the repeated violations of human rights is a consequence of the impunity that is virtually institutionalized. These two phenomena—an atypical army and institutionalized impunity—are the real and profound weaknesses of the political system in Guinea.[15]

In October 2009 the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court indicated that the situation in Guinea was under preliminary examination.[16] Shortly thereafter, then-Guinean Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandre Cécé Loua indicated to the ICC that Guinea would ensure justice domestically.[17]

The primary obligation to provide accountability for the perpetrators of the September 2009 violence rests with national authorities in Guinea. Although Guinea is a party to the ICC, the latter has a mandate that limits it to prosecute the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity only when national authorities are unable or unwilling to bring justice for them, which is known as the “complementarity principle.”[18]

Complementarity respects the principal role of national courts and encourages the development of credible and independent domestic judicial systems. Moreover, national trials of serious crimes are most often best placed to ensure justice efforts have maximum resonance with local populations, and in turn to strengthen respect for rule of law in the relevant country. In addition, international tribunals will only ever be able to prosecute a limited number of individuals—usually at the greatest levels of alleged responsibility—while the fight against impunity requires a more far reaching response.

The value of domestic accountability does not negate its challenges. Cases involving serious crimes are often highly sensitive and necessitate resources in often-tight funding environments. But the alternative, impunity, threatens high costs too by risking fueling renewed abuses, with devastating consequences for the population and national development. Credible domestic efforts to ensure perpetrators are held to account not only provide communities directly affected by the crimes access to the proceedings and to redress, but also send a strong signal that human rights violations will not be tolerated.

[6] See Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness”: A Human Rights Agenda for Guinea’s New Government, May 2011, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/guinea0511webwcover_1.pdf, pp. 9-18.

[7] Human Rights Watch separate interviews with two Guinean civil society members, Conakry, June 20 and 22, 2012. See also Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness,” pp. 20-26; Bloody Monday, pp. 95-96.

[8] A review of the state of international law on justice for serious crimes is available in Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace, July 2009, http://www.hrw.org/node/84264, pp. 10-17.

[9] Human Rights Watch separate group interviews with two victims and four victims, Conakry, June 23 and 24, 2012. See also Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness,” pp. 19-30.

[10]Human Rights Watch group interview with four victims, Conakry, June 24, 2012.

[11] UN Security Council, “Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,” S/2004/616, August 23, 2004, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html (accessed September 17, 2012), para. 2.

[12] World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf (accessed October 19, 2012), p. 2.

[13] See Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness,” pp. 19-20, 49-50.

[14]Human Rights Watch group interview with four victims, Conakry, June 24, 2012. See also Human Rights Watch, “We Have Lived in Darkness,” pp. 19-30.

[15] ICOI Report, para. 259.

[16] “ICC Prosecutor confirms situation in Guinea under examination,” International Criminal Court (ICC) press release, ICC-OTP-20091014-PR464, October 14, 2009, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/guinea/icc%20prosecutor%20confirms%20situation%20in%20guinea%20under%20examination (accessed September 7, 2012).

[17] “Guinea Minister visits the ICC – Prosecutor Requests Information on National Investigation into 28 September violence,” ICC press release, October 21, 2009, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/guinea/guinea%20minister%20visits%20the%20icc%20_%20prosecutor%20requests%20information%20on%20national%20investigations%20into%2028 (accessed October 10, 2012).

[18] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002, arts. 5-7, 17-19.