II. Lead-Up to Military Operations

Crisis Point

In August 2008, the Congolese army launched a military offensive against the CNDP. Despite their superior numbers, the government forces quickly lost ground. In September 2008, Nkunda held a conference with CNDP members to review the group’s political position. The CNDP decided to demand direct bilateral talks with the government and to broaden their demands to include the removal of President Kabila from power.[47] On October 8, 2008, the rebels unexpectedly attacked and captured Rumangabo military camp, one of the most important military bases in eastern Congo, and seized a large stock of weapons and ammunition. Then, on October 26, the CNDP launched a major military offensive, rapidly overrunning Congolese army positions in quick succession. Military support from UN peacekeepers to the Congolese army was not enough to halt the advance and on October 29, 2008, Nkunda’s rebels approached Goma, causing widespread panic. The Congolese army disintegrated, its soldiers looting, raping, and killing as they fled.[48] UN peacekeepers remained as the only credible military force to protect Goma and its 500,000 inhabitants.

A diplomatic flurry ensued. US, European and other governments quickly urged Rwandan President Kagame to intervene and use his influence with Nkunda to halt the CNDP advance. Kagame protested that Nkunda’s rebels were acting of their own accord and not on Rwanda’s orders, but he nevertheless intervened. Nkunda called a halt to the advance and demanded face-to-face peace talks with Kabila’s government.

To resolve the crisis, diplomats called an emergency summit. International and regional leaders, including Presidents Kagame and Kabila, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met in Nairobi on November 7, 2008. The UN and African Union (AU) agreed to appoint special envoys to help mediate a solution: the UN appointed former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and the AU appointed former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa. The two former presidents immediately began their shuttle diplomacy and in the weeks that followed met separately with both President Kabila and Laurent Nkunda. In early December both sides agreed to send negotiating teams to Nairobi to begin direct talks. Nkunda’s CNDP brought an extensive list of demands to the table.

Meanwhile, Kabila attempted to shore up his defeated army. He sought military support from his former allies in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), but no member state was willing to send troops. The UN Security Council on November 20, 2008, authorized 3,000 additional troops for MONUC,[49] but it soon became clear that the new troops would take months to arrive. Fearful that Nkunda’s CNDP rebels would march on Goma should talks fail once again, and aware that the Congolese army was in tatters, Secretary-General Ban on December 4, 2009, requested the EU to urgently deploy a short-term bridging force to Goma to help fill the gap until UN troops could arrive.But the EU declined to help.[50]

Unable to find military support to back up his beleaguered army, faced with a superior CNDP force, and engaged in talks in which the Congolese government was in a weak position, Kabila turned to Rwanda for help. As one diplomat told Human Rights Watch, Kabila’s “back was up against the wall.”[51] 

Rwanda-Congo Deal

Rwanda too faced difficulties following the CNDP’s advance on Goma. Rwandan President Paul Kagame had started to feel the political costs associated with his support for Nkunda’s CNDP. The December 12, 2008 publication of the UN Group of Experts report, which had been made available to governments a month earlier, detailed evidence of Rwanda’s support for the CNDP and led Sweden and the Netherlands to withdraw nearly US$20 million in aid to Rwanda in protest.[52] In addition, officials in Rwanda had found it difficult to control the increasingly headstrong Nkunda. The CNDP’s announcement that its goals were national and included the removal of Kabila was not well received in Kigali.[53]

On December 5, 2008, the Congolese minister of foreign affairs, Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, and his Rwandan counterpart, Rosemary Museminali, announced the upcoming joint military operation against the FDLR, named Umoja Wetu.[54] For several weeks, bilateral talks continued in secret. Like previous negotiation attempts, the key players included Rwandan General James Kabarebe and Congolese General John Numbi.

In January 2009 the plan was put into operation. On January 5, Bosco Ntaganda, Nkunda’s military chief of staff, announced he was removing Nkunda as leader of the CNDP for hindering peace in eastern Congo.[55] Ntaganda was being sought on an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for war crimes committed in Ituri, northeastern Congo, between 2002 and 2004. According to CNDP insiders interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Ntaganda had had many rifts with Nkunda since he joined the CNDP movement in 2006, which may, in part, explain his decision to head the “putsch” against Nkunda.[56] He was also likely urged on by Rwandan officials who knew Ntaganda well (he had served in the Rwandan army) and who sought to exploit the divisions between the two men for their own purposes.

Shortly after announcing Nkunda’s removal, Ntaganda’s spokesperson announced that the CNDP delegation in Nairobi no longer had the authority to negotiate at the peace talks on behalf of the CNDP.[57] Ten senior CNDP officers, under immense pressure from General Kabarebe, joined Ntaganda’s putsch and signed a declaration of the cessation of hostilities on January 16, which stated that the CNDP would integrate into the Congolese army to disarm the FDLR through joint Rwandan and Congolese military operations.[58] The declaration was read aloud by Ntaganda, flanked by Generals Kabarebe and Numbi, and the Congolese minister of the interior, Célestin Mbuyu, at a hastily organized press conference in Goma the same day. Seeing support ebbing away, Nkunda responded to a request from General Kabarebe to come to Gisenyi, Rwanda, for consultations. On his arrival the next day, Rwandan authorities promptly detained Nkunda and placed him under house arrest. Ntaganda was made a general in the Congolese army.

Later on March 23, a new CNDP negotiating delegation signed a political agreement with the Congolese government, which provided its troops with amnesty for acts of war and insurgency (but not for war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide), release of political prisoners, and political participation in Congo’s government.[59]

Joint Military Operations

Umoja Wetu

On January 20, at least 4,000 Rwandan troops, and possibly many more, crossed the border into eastern Congo to fight the FDLR in a joint Rwandan-Congolese offensive named operation Umoja Wetu (“Our Unity” in Swahili).[60] Although a joint offensive in name, many Congolese troops were distracted by the complicated integration of former combatants from the CNDP, and other armed groups into their ranks and were largely absent from the operation. Concerned about negative public opinion from having concluded a deal in which Rwandan troops were invited into Congo, Kabila’s government at first maintained that the Rwandan soldiers present in Congo were only military advisors[61] to the joint operations and would not stay long. Then in a televised statement on January 31, President Kabila extended the invitation declaring that the joint operation would be finished by the end of February 2009, without making any mention of the extent of Rwanda’s military involvement.[62]

Rwandan troops quickly forged ahead, sometimes together with former CNDP troops, attacking one of the main FDLR bases at Kibua, in Masisi territory (North Kivu), and other FDLR positions around Nyamilima, Nyabiondo, Pinga and Ntoto (North Kivu). While there were some military confrontations, mostly notably in the area around Nyabiondo and Pinga, FDLR combatants often retreated into the surrounding hills and forests in advance of the attacks.

After 35 days of military operations in North Kivu, and in what was likely an agreed timeframe between Presidents Kabila and Kagame, the Rwandan army withdrew from Congo on February 25. A goodbye ceremony and military parade in Goma were attended by the Rwandan and Congolese foreign and defense ministers, the head of MONUC, Alan Doss, and diplomats from Kinshasa and Kigali. General Numbi, one of the key architects of the deal, announced that the operation had been a success.[63]

Kimia II

Government representatives from both Rwanda and Congo emphasized that the mission was not complete and pressed MONUC to join forces with the Congolese army to finish off the FDLR problem in North and South Kivu. In meetings following the Rwandan army’s departure, government officials from both countries raised similar expectations in private.[64] MONUC, which had deliberately been kept out of the planning and execution of Umoja Wetu,

was put in a difficult position. While some diplomats and UN officials recognized the serious limitations of the Congolese army’s capacity to conduct these operations effectively and the potentially catastrophic consequences for the civilian population in the Kivus, they believed they had no choice but to go ahead. Some UN officials believed they could do more to protect civilians by being part of the operations, rather than being on the outside.

On March 2, the Congolese army jointly with MONUC peacekeepers launched the second phase of military operations against the FDLR, known as operation Kimia II (“quiet” in Swahili). On April 7, President Kabila appointed Maj. Gen. Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa as the Congolese army commander of the operation.[65] Former CNDP officers received important command positions. Bosco Ntaganda, a newly made general in the Congolese army, was in effect deputy commander of operation Kimia II. Aware that Ntaganda was wanted on an arrest warrant from the ICC, and that the Congolese government, as a state party to the ICC, had a legal obligation to arrest him, Congolese government officials kept Ntaganda’s name out of the official organizational structure of operation Kimia II. On May 29, the Congolese minister of defense wrote to Alan Doss, the head of MONUC, to say that Ntaganda was not playing a role in Kimia II.[66] The assurances, however, were false. According to at least five Congolese army officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, and internal Congolese army documents, Ntaganda was the de facto deputy commander of operations for Kimia II and was in charge of integrating CNDP soldiers into the Congolese army. His regular presence in Goma and his repeated visits to troops on the frontlines all demonstrated he played an important role.

Outcome of Military Operations since January 2009

As a result of the Congolese army’s military operations, a significant number of FDLR combatants have given up their weapons and returned to Rwanda. Since the start of military operations in January 2009, more FDLR combatants have voluntarily decided to give up their arms and return to Rwanda than in previous years. Between January and September 2009, the UN’s Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) program, tasked with facilitating the return of foreign combatants, repatriated 1,087 FDLR combatants to Rwanda. They have been joined by 1,798 family members and 12,387 Rwandan refugees.[67]

The return of such a large number of combatants and civilians to Rwanda is significant. In combination with the destruction of a number of FDLR bases, their exclusion from mining zones and other areas of economic activity, where they previously reaped financial benefits, has, according to some analysts, weakened the FDLR militarily.[68]

However, the FDLR still retains capacity to carry out attacks against villages and towns. Human Rights Watch has received reports that the FDLR is recruiting new combatants and that the movement continues to raise funds and collect weapons and ammunition through numerous international networks, including through Tanzania, Burundi, Zambia, and Uganda.[69] The UN Group of Experts in their November 2009 final report concluded that military operations against the FDLR had failed to dismantle the group’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern Congo. The report added that the FDLR had regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, is recruiting new combatants, continues to benefit from support from some senior commanders in the Congolese army, and has formed alliances with other armed groups in both North and South Kivu.[70] While the FDLR have been pushed out of some mining areas and they no longer have access to certain markets they previously depended on, the militia group continues to control many important gold and cassiterite (tin) mining areas in North and South Kivu providing it with crucial financial income.[71]

The military operations may have also fanned the flames of underlying issues in eastern Congo that have often led to conflict in the past, namely land and control over natural resources. Many of the offensive operations of Kimia II have been led by former CNDP commanders, who according to some sources, have also sought to use the operations to gain control over mineral-rich areas and to clear the land for returning Congolese Tutsi refugees and cattle being brought in from Rwanda. The perceived leadership roles and preferential treatment given to former CNDP commanders has also led a number of former Mai Mai combatants, along with other disgruntled Congolese army soldiers, to abandon the Congolese army, or refuse to join the integration process. Some have joined forces with the FDLR, strengthening their ranks.[72]

The human cost of the military operations can only be described as devastating. Human Rights Watch researchers have collected interview testimony indicating that between January and September 2009, over 1,400 civilians were deliberately killed by the FDLR, the Congolese army, and their allies. This figure does not include civilians who may have been killed by crossfire during the fighting and, furthermore, Human Rights Watch has credible reports of 476 civilians killed by the Congolese army and its allies in a remote area that Human Rights Watch has not been able to access in order to establish the circumstances of the deaths.

In the same period, over 7,500 women and girls were raped and over 900,000 people forced to flee their homes in North and South Kivu. Thousands of civilians have been pressed into forced labor and hundreds have been abducted or arbitrarily arrested. In most locations where the FDLR or the Congolese army has attacked, houses have been looted, with over 9,000 homes and other structures destroyed, leaving already poor and destitute people with nothing.

A comparison of the impact of military operations on the FDLR and the harm to civilians starkly conveys the suffering endured by the population. For every FDLR combatant that has been removed from combat through being repatriated, one civilian has been killed, seven women and girls have been raped, eight homes have been destroyed, and nearly 900 people have been forced to flee for their lives. This human cost shows the need in the event of continuing military operations for the Congolese armed forces and UN peacekeepers to undertake comprehensive measures to ensure that civilians at risk are better protected.

Rape as a weapon of war

The widespread use of sexual violence as a weapon of war is a dramatic and appalling aspect of the military operations. Its continued impact on the women and girls of eastern Congo is evident in the statistics. Since the start of Congolese army operations in January, rape cases in many conflict areas have doubled or even tripled compared to 2008. While the exact number of victims is unknown, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN agency responsible for coordinating efforts on tackling sexual violence in Congo, recorded that 7,540 women and girls were raped in North and South Kivu provinces between January and September 2009, and possibly many more. UNFPA recorded 3,207 new cases of rape in North Kivu and 4,333 in South Kivu for rapes by all perpetrators between January and September 2009, nearly surpassing the figures recorded during all of last year.[73]

Since many victims are unable or unwilling to seek assistance at health centers, these figures are likely to represent only a fraction of the total. During the course of its research, Human Rights Watch has interviewed numerous rape victims who had no access to healthcare or other assistance, largely because humanitarian actors were not present due to the insecurity caused by ongoing military operations. Cases such as these are therefore not included in UNFPA’s statistics. Figures are also incomplete because some actors providing assistance to victims of sexual violence do not report their statistics to UNFPA.

Individual health centers and small rape counseling centers near the zones of conflict visited by Human Rights Watch reported sharp increases in sexual violence. For one assistance provider in North Kivu, for example, monthly cases of sexual violence tripled between late 2008, when the average was less than 15 cases per month, and September 2009, when the average was over 40 cases per month.[74] In Kaniola health zone, Walungu territory, 33 rape cases were reported for the first six months of 2009, all by the FDLR, up from 16 cases reported in all of 2008.[75] There was a similar spike in rape cases along the Kigulube-Luyuyu axis in northeastern Shabunda territory where FDLR combatants arrived in May 2009 and Congolese army troops were preparing an offensive. Approximately 164 cases were reported in this area in the month of May alone, up dramatically from previous months.[76]

The vast majority of the victims were raped by Congolese army soldiers or FDLR combatants. In South Kivu, nearly 90 percent of cases of sexual violence recorded by UNFPA in 2009 were perpetrated by armed men.[77] The breakdown of cases perpetrated by Congolese army soldiers and other armed groups is unknown. One assistance provider for victims of sexual violence in North Kivu recorded 3,106 cases of sexual violence between January and July 2009 perpetrated by armed men. Half of these cases were perpetrated by Congolese army soldiers.[78] Human Rights Watch’s own research also found that the over half of the rapes in North Kivu were perpetrated by soldiers of the Congolese army.[79]