VIII. MONUC and Civilian Protection

Subject to horrific abuses from both the FDLR and the government armed forces, civilians in  Congo looked to the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, to bring them desperately needed protection. MONUC was first established in 1999. With nearly 20,000 peacekeepers, MONUC is currently the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world,[398] with a strong mandate from the UN Security Council to protect civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence” and to use force to do so.[399] In December 2008, the Security Council specifically requested MONUC to attach “the highest priority to addressing the crisis in the Kivus, in particular the protection of civilians.”[400]

Since 2004, MONUC’s mandate also authorized the mission to participate in and support military operations led by and jointly planned with Congolese army integrated brigades against foreign and national armed groups, including the FDLR.[401]The Security Council emphasized that such operations must be “in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and should include appropriate measures to protect civilians.”[402] 

MONUC has faced significant challenges in fulfilling this mandate. In March 2009 it joined forces with the Congolese armed forces to carry out the Kimia II military operations against the FDLR. But preparations for the operation were hurried, permitting little time for full reflection on how an international peacekeeping force could appropriately provide protection to civilians while backing a national army with a terrible human rights record. Well into Kimia II, the conditions around MONUC’s involvement were not yet properly clarified and no concrete plan to provide protection to civilians at risk was in place. To make matters worse, MONUC lacked the necessary logistical resources and rapid response capabilities to effectively carry out its mandate to protect civilians, and it had trouble grappling with the fragmented and catastrophic conflict on the ground.

In spite of these and other obstacles, MONUC to its credit made some notable and important efforts in 2009 to improve civilian protection, which undoubtedly saved lives. However, in many other instances peacekeepers arrived too late or not at all, leaving local populations exposed with nowhere else to turn for their basic security.

Origin of Operation Kimia II

During 2007 and 2008, MONUC had already supported Congolese army military operations in North Kivu, but the focus then was countering the CNDP rebels, whom the government viewed as the most important threat to its authority in the east. MONUC repeatedly urged the Congolese government to increase its military pressure on the FDLR as well, and had been training Congolese army units to carry out military strikes against FDLR positions with support from MONUC peacekeepers in what was known as Kimia I. But throughout 2008, the Congolese government had no real interest in such operations and as soon as peacekeepers finished training Congolese army units to be deployed in an offensive against the FDLR, army officials diverted the new units to attack the CNDP instead.[403]

In January 2009 the political landscape changed dramatically. After Rwandan forces intervened in Congo, the CNDP ousted their leader, Laurent Nkunda, ended their rebellion, and agreed to integrate into the Congolese army if the Congolese government agreed to launch joint military operations with the Rwandan army against the FDLR (see background above). Congo agreed, and when Rwandan forces crossed the border later in the same month for the launch of operation Umoja Wetu jointly with the Congolese army, MONUC officials were caught off-guard. Not only had they not been informed of the impending operation against the FDLR by either government, but MONUC officials were excluded from the operational planning and the execution.[404] After protests and pressure from diplomats, six MONUC military officers were eventually permitted to join the Congolese and Rwandan army planning and command center in Goma with the objective of ensuring that civilian protection was part of military operations. But the officers had minimal access to information and limited influence.[405] MONUC continued some of its logistical support to the Congolese army and quickly established a number of bases in strategic locations in North Kivu. But as one frustrated MONUC military official told Human Rights Watch, “We were kept in the dark.”[406]

MONUC officials publicly hailed the improved relations between Congo and Rwanda that brought about the joint operations against the FDLR, but privately many MONUC officials were troubled at the turn of events that saw Rwandan soldiers return to eastern Congo. Some were worried that the international peacekeeping mission appeared out 0f the loop.  When Rwandan troops in late February 2009 began their withdrawal from Congo, as had been agreed with the Congolese government, bothRwandan and Congolese government representatives emphasized that the operation against the FDLR was not yet completed, which raised expectations that MONUC would have to support continued military operations to finish the job.[407]Worried about again being excluded from the planning and execution of future military operations, and the possibility of a return of Rwandan forces if MONUC did not step in, MONUC officials agreed to support further military operations by the Congolese army. “We were left with no choice, either we were in or we were out,” one UN official later told Human Rights Watch. “We believed that being on the inside would give us a better chance to help protect civilians.”[408]

Some UN officials also believed that the dramatic political shift by the Congolese government to launch operations against the FDLR was an opportunity that could not be missed, and the momentum launched by operation Umoja Wetu had to continue.[409] “Finally Kinshasa agreed to fight the FDLR, something we have been urging them to do for years,” one UN official told Human Rights Watch. “Politically we had to support the continuation of military operations.”[410]

In March 2009, MONUC force commander, Gen. Babacar Gaye and the Congolese army chief of staff, Gen. Didier Etumba signed a Joint Operations Directive to engage in military operations against the FDLR to be known as Kimia II.[411] The agreement thrust MONUC into a crucial role in the next phase of military operations.

Concerns about Operation Kimia II

On March 2, the Congolese army with direct MONUC participation launched operation Kimia II. MONUC’s role included logistical and operations support such as intelligence and operations planning, fire support, air strikes, transportation, joint patrolling, and medical evacuations.[412] MONUC also agreed to supply daily rations for 16,000 soldiers, plus fuel for FARDC vehicles and other transport support worth over $6 million for the first six months of the operation.[413]

The preparations had been rushed and gave no time for adequate planning. One senior MONUC military official told Human Rights Watch that MONUC was trying to get operations started as quickly as possible in order to “harness the fighting spirit of the CNDP,”[414] a reference to the opportunity presented by the newfound allegiance of this rebel group with the Congolese army. CNDP combatants were perceived as being more experienced and better motivated fighters, especially against the FDLR. While some MONUC officials were keen to progress quickly, others expressed concern. A number of diplomats and MONUC officials recognized the potentially catastrophic human cost of the planned operations and were aware of the serious limitations in the Congolese army’s capacity to conduct the operations effectively and in compliance with international humanitarian law.[415] Civilian staff members in MONUC told Human Rights Watch there was little to no consultation between MONUC military and civilian staff before plans went forward with Kimia II, giving those wary about MONUC’s support for the operation little opportunity to voice their concerns or to develop advance plans to enhance civilian protection.[416]

One Western diplomat told Human Rights Watch that MONUC was feeling “false pressure” to keep up the momentum on military operations and questioned what results the military operations would achieve. “Reprisal killings are what the FDLR do, and we should expect more of [such attacks]. But are we ready to deal with this?” the diplomat asked.[417] 

A senior MONUC military commander also voiced skepticism. In an interview with Human Rights Watch on April 28, he said, “The United Nations is saying we need a purely military solution.... It’s clear that the Congolese army is not capable of succeeding in this operation, but at this junction, how can we tell the FARDC to stop?” He then added, “You’re living in a fool’s paradise if you think that we can solve [the FDLR problem] purely militarily.”[418]

There is no evidence that MONUC officials pressed the Congolese government to address serious shortcomings before the launch of Kimia II, including completing integration of the CNDP and other armed groups in the Congolese army, resolving salary and logistical problems for the armed forces involved in the operation, and putting into place a strategy for adequate civilian protection. In an internal document in November 2009, MONUC said that conducting military operations against the FDLR was a sovereign decision by the Congolese government and insisted that if MONUC had not supported the military operations, it risked a “chain reaction” that could have unraveled the integration process, seen a re-emergence of armed groups, and a deterioration of relations between Congo and Rwanda. The document further said that the mission had to face “hard choices” in managing “competing priorities of immediate protection with [seeking] longer-term change.”[419] MONUC officials took the decision to provide substantial military support to operation Kimia II with the apparent hope that in the short term, the presence of peacekeepers in support to Congolese army soldiers would significantly lower the risk to civilians, and that in the longer term, it would lead to improved security for civilians. They were sadly mistaken on both counts.

Debates on conditionality

MONUC officials emphasized both publicly and privately that the Kimia II operations should respect international humanitarian and human rights law, but no formal conditions were put in place defining MONUC’s role in the operations. It was not clear how respect for international humanitarian law would be ensured—especially by Congolese army forces with a record of war crimes—or under what circumstances MONUC would withdraw its support if violations occurred. The dilemma led to intense discussions within MONUC and also at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. As some saw it, MONUC had entered into an agreement to support military operations with one of Africa’s most abusive armies without clear pre-conditions or clarity on how human rights violations would be avoided.[420]  

On January 13, March 6, and April 2, the UN Office of Legal Affairs provided formal legal advice to MONUC. According to the confidential legal note in April, MONUC “cannot participate in any form of joint operations with FARDC units, or support an operation by those units, if there are substantial grounds for believing there to be a real risk of them violating international humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law in the course of the operation.”[421] The legal advice added that should such violations occur, “MONUC must immediately intercede with the FARDC at the command and operations levels, with a view to dissuading the unit concerned from continuing such violations.”[422] If such action did not bring results and the violations were widespread and serious, MONUC was advised “to cease its participation in the operations as a whole.”[423]

On June 2, the UN Policy Committee, which includes the heads of all UN agencies, held a meeting in New York chaired by Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro to discuss the situation in eastern Congo. At issue were the difficulties of trying to balance MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians with its support to the Congolese army to disarm Congolese and foreign armed groups. Some participants voiced concerns that MONUC could be considered complicit in the crimes committed by the Congolese army. The Policy Committee endorsed advice from the Office of Legal Affairs and decided that MONUC should not participate in any form of joint operations with FARDC units if there were substantial grounds for believing there to be a real risk of human rights violations.[424]

Following this decision and the earlier legal advice, MONUC officials belatedly began to develop a policy on conditionality. According to MONUC officials, it was found difficult to implement the policy when military operations were already well underway and human rights violations were being regularly reported. The FARDC’s confusing chain of command and the lack of information about which Congolese army troops were in which locations made the task even harder. MONUC officials said that they did not have enough information even to know whether the rations and fuel it was providing to Congolese army soldiers were actually reaching individual units and, if they did, whether those units knew that support was coming from the United Nations.[425] 

In September 2009, several months into its joint operations with the Congolese army, MONUC developed a draft policy note on conditionality, which it presented to the Congolese government for comment. It sought to present the proposed new conditions as helping the government implement its own policy of “zero tolerance.” The draft policy stated that MONUC would “seek to suspend its support to battalions who committed grave violations of human rights and who, after notification from MONUC, took no action and continued to commit such violations.” The policy note added, however, that “such targeted measures would have no effect on the global envelope of support from MONUC to the FARDC” and that the support taken from the abusive battalion would be “redirected” toward another battalion whose behavior was more exemplary.[426] 

The UN Office of Legal Affairs advised that if MONUC had reason to believe that such violations continued after intervention to stop them, the mission “must cease its participation in [the operations] completely.” In reviewing the draft policy note, the legal affairs office said that MONUC’s continued support for the entire operation, even if only certain units were repeatedly violating human rights, was in conflict with MONUC’s mandate.[427] 

MONUC officials worked to change the draft policy note on conditionality to incorporate the legal advice. In an internal document from November 2009, MONUC said that it was doing its best to incorporate the legal advice in very challenging circumstances. “The mission has not had the luxury of devising an airtight policy and then implementing it under controlled conditions,” the internal document said. MONUC has had “to take action to deal with a rapidly evolving situation on the ground.”[428] At the time of writing the draft policy note had not yet been finalized or implemented.

MONUC and accountability for FARDC abuses

While internal discussions continued on the legal questions, MONUC did seek to act on the abuses committed by Congolese soldiers in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga. On November 1, after eight months of support to operation Kimia II, Alain Le Roy, the head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations announced during a visit to Congo that MONUC would suspend its support to the Congolese army’s 213th Brigade. MONUC’s own preliminary investigations had revealed Congolese army soldiers had killed at least 62 civilians in the Lukweti area, just north of Nyabiondo.[429] MONUC support, however, was not suspended to any other army units despite credible information that gross human rights violations were occurring elsewhere. Following strong protests from Congolese government officials about the suspension, MONUC quickly responded that its overall support to Kimia II operations would continue.

MONUC’s withdrawal of support to the 213th Brigade consisted of halting all supplies of food rations for the soldiers for the month of November. But since there is no system in place to track whether the rations MONUC provides to Congolese army units participating in operation Kimia II actually make it to the troops on the ground, it is unclear what, if any, impact this suspension of support will bring. None of the commanders responsible for the abuses in the Nyabiondo or Shalio areas, nor other commanders known for previous serious human rights violations, had been removed from involvement in Kimia II operations at the time of writing.

MONUC officials privately raised some concerns with Congolese army commanders about the behavior of their troops and in an internal document of November 2009, describing its support to the Congolese army, MONUC said it had acted and would continue to act “on many fronts” to prevent violations of human rights and bring perpetrators to justice. MONUC said that where it “had reliable information, it is presented to military and government authorities for them to take necessary action.”[430] But action by the government was not forthcoming and MONUC’s interventions were not systematic, nor were they followed up by MONUC officials. In mid-2009, for example, the MONUC human rights section drew up a list of 15 individuals believed to be involved in operation Kimia II who had records of gross violations of human rights documented by MONUC over a number of years. The continued presence of such commanders dramatically increased the risk that human rights violations would continue and that civilians would be put at risk in areas where these commanders conducted operations. The list included Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and Col. Innocent Zimurinda, among others, and was presented to the MONUC leadership for action. It is not clear what action, if any, the MONUC leadership took on the basis of this list. By December, nine months into the military operations, the abusive commanders were still in operational command.

MONUC’s failure to use its leverage with the government to prevent and punish abuses by these and other high-ranking army officials increased the risk to civilians and contributed to rampant atrocities and continuing impunity in eastern Congo.

Sexual violence

The UN Security Council in its various resolutions on MONUC has specifically and repeatedly requested MONUC to pay particular attention to the issue of sexual violence. This request has been reinforced by other UN resolutions, including Resolution 1820, adopted in June 2008, which condemns the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence during wartime, and announces targeted measures against responsible parties to the conflict.[431] In September 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1888, which urges all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence committed by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice. This resolution requested that the secretary-general appoint a special representative to provide coherent and strategic leadership to address sexual violence in armed conflict.[432]

In response to the Security Council’s various resolutions, MONUC in April 2009 launched a comprehensive strategy to combat sexual violence. It was swiftly adopted by all UN agencies as a joint platform, and the Congolese government also welcomed it.[433] One of the strategy’s key pillars is an action plan on civilian protection and the prevention of sexual violence. It sets out actions that should be taken, including profiling patterns of sexual violence, introducing a risk model, reviewing and possibly adjusting the MONUC force commander’s directive to put special attention on sexual violence, and adjusting the rules of engagement if necessary, among others. The strategy also underscores the importance of prosecuting civilian and military high-ranking officials implicated in sexual violence.[434] The strategy was developed before the launch of operation Kimia II, but not adopted until a month after the operation began.

During operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II, sexual violence cases increased dramatically in the areas of conflict. Yet MONUC gave little or no specific attention in advance as to how operation Kimia II might affect this already vulnerable section of society, nor were specific actions taken to help prevent such attacks. By October 2009 a senior staff member due to lead the implementation of MONUC’s comprehensive strategy on sexual violence had still not arrived in Congo.

MONUC human rights officials have made some efforts to support the Congolese military justice system in prosecuting crimes of sexual violence by providing information on violations and assisting during investigations. This has helped bring some perpetrators to justice. Yet in the vast majority of cases, sexual violence crimes are never prosecuted, or, as with Colonel Kipanga in Rutshuru (see above), those implicated appear to have little difficulty evading punishment.[435]

The deeply troubling reality is that sexual violence cases in Congo are increasing rather than decreasing despite the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to combat sexual violence and increased attention by the Security Council and other actors.

Insufficient resources

The lack of sufficient resources has hampered MONUC’s ability to protect civilians. The UN Security Council provided MONUC a strong mandate to protect civilians, but UN member states did not back up this commitment with adequate resources to ensure the full implementation of the mandate. The 3,000 additional peacekeepers authorized by the Security Council in November 2008 had still not arrived in eastern Congo by October 2009, despite promises from council members that they would urge a rapid deployment. Alan Doss, the head of MONUC, repeatedly warned that, without such assets, MONUC’s “capacity to respond quickly to emerging threats and protect civilians would be curtailed.”[436] 

On August 26, an advance team from Bangladesh arrived in Congo. Egypt, Jordan, Tanzania and Uruguay had pledged more troops but they were not yet operational as of October 2009.[437] The Belgian government contributed one out of the two C-130 cargo planes requested by MONUC, but as of October 2009 MONUC was still looking for the contribution of 16 military helicopters to give troops greater mobility and allow them to react quickly to events on the ground.

While these resources are still urgently needed, they are unlikely to solve the structural problems within MONUC that constrain the mission’s flexibility and ability to respond promptly to changing situations. One important constraint on MONUC has been the limitations of the agreements, known as memoranda of understanding (MOUs), which troop-contributing countries sign with the UN in advance of deployment. Often these agreements spell out the number of bases a troop-contributing country will establish, their rough locations, and the minimum conditions required such as electricity and water needs. Usually an MOU limits each troop-contributing country to one permanent base and four satellite locations, which might not match MONUC’s needs on the ground.[438]

The constraints imposed on MONUC by the MOUs sometimes result in bizarre yet very real problems. For example, MONUC troops require generators to deploy to new areas where there is no electricity, a problem encountered in most locations in eastern Congo, but the cost of generators is only covered by some troop-contributing countries and usually only to a certain limit. If the limit is exceeded, the UN should provide the generators, but there are no budget allocations within MONUC for this type of expense.[439] As a result, for want of generators MONUC troops may be seriously delayed in deploying to remote regions where they are desperately needed to protect civilians.

There are also serious staffing problems within MONUC. Key posts are often left vacant for many months. Staff also frequently are constrained by UN security guidelines or do not wish to be deployed for adequate lengths of time in remote locations where civilian protection needs are most urgent. In September 2009, for example, MONUC had 109 unfilled interpreter positions, including 40 in the Kivus.[440] According to a former senior UN official, the DDRRR unit, crucial to helping FDLR combatants to return to Rwanda, was more than 50 percent understaffed in June 2009.[441]

Problems for demobilization

The Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) program is an essential component of the UN’s mission, with an objective to encourage and facilitate foreign combatants, particularly the FDLR, to voluntarily return to Rwanda. Between January and October 2009, in part due to the military pressure from Kimia II operations, the DDRRR program repatriated 1,274 FDLR combatants to Rwanda, representing a significant increase compared to previous years.[442] They have been joined by 1,798 family members and 12,387 Rwandan refugees. FDLR combatants were also removed from many of their bases, although often only temporarily.

Despite these developments, the UN Group of Experts concluded in their final report in November 2009 that “operations against the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and military structures on the ground in eastern DRC” and that the FDLR militia “has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters.”[443] The Group also found that the FDLR continues to benefit from support from certain senior commanders in the FARDC, particularly officers in the 10th military region in South Kivu, and has formed alliances with other Congolese armed groups in both North and South Kivu.[444] While the FDLR have been pushed out of some mining areas and they no longer have access to some markets they previously depended on, they continue to control important gold and cassiterite (tin) mining areas in North and South Kivu, providing them with crucial financial revenues.[445]

The UN Group of Experts also found strong evidence of the ongoing support from the FDLR diaspora leadership based in Europe, North America and Africa, provided through “fundraising and propaganda exercises and money laundering activities”[446] and said that significant weapons and ammunitions deliveries to the FDLR came from Tanzania, smuggled across Lake Tanganyika to South Kivu.[447]  It further reported that Burundi is being used as a rear base for FDLR recruitment and support networks.[448] It is unknown how many new combatants have joined the FDLR’s ranks since the start of military operations in January.

The UN’s DDRRR program has also been deliberately blocked from carrying out its work by former CNDP commanders newly integrated into the Congolese army. The problem is not linked to FDLR combatants who wish to return to Rwanda, but rather concerns those former CNDP combatants who are Rwandan citizens and wish to return home. Throughout 2007 and 2008, the CNDP actively recruited in Rwanda, including among former demobilized Rwandan army soldiers, Rwandan army soldiers temporarily on leave from the army, Congolese Tutsi refugees living in camps in Rwanda, and other Rwandan citizens, some of whom were duped into joining by false promises of jobs in eastern Congo. Many of those recruited were children.[449] Since then, a significant number of these recruits have presented themselves at DDRRR centers requesting to be repatriated to Rwanda, and as foreign combatants in Congo they are eligible to enter the program. From January 2007 through October 2008, the DDRRR program repatriated over 150 former CNDP combatants to Rwanda, including 29 children.[450] From January to October 2009, the figure jumped to 448 former CNDP combatants repatriated to Rwanda, including 83 children.[451]

Fearful of losing these combatants, some of whom have extensive military experience, and perhaps also concerned at the evidence this presents of the extent the CNDP was linked to Rwanda, former CNDP commanders have deliberately tried to block attempts to demobilize these combatants. As of June 7, 2009, the DDRRR program had counted 10 hostile attempts by former CNDP elements to interfere in their demobilization efforts, mostly in Walikale territory.[452] The former CNDP commanders maintained that these soldiers were deserting and were falsely claiming to be Rwandan citizens.[453] On June 17, the Congolese army commander in charge of operation Kimia II, General Amuli, made an agreement with the DDRRR program that all soldiers who wished to surrender and claimed to be foreigners would be jointly screened by DDRRR officers and Congolese military intelligence officers. Despite this agreement, former CNDP officers continued to disrupt DDRRR’s work.

For example, in early July, Lt. Col. Antoine Manzi, a former CNDP officer deployed to Walikale territory, repeatedly attempted to block DDRRR officials from transferring to Goma seven soldiers who claimed to be Rwandan citizens and wished to return home. DDRRR officials insisted and were eventually successful in transferring the combatants, but their staff were later threatened, and some beaten, by former CNDP soldiers forcing the DDRRR program to temporarily close its base in Walikale.[454] Also in Walikale territory, troops under Colonel Manzi’s command in Musenge threatened to use force if MONUC did not hand back three former CNDP soldiers, likely children, after they sought to voluntarily disarm. The peacekeepers had to threaten the use of force before safely transferring the combatants to the DDRRR program.[455] 

As a result of these incidents and the threats to its staff, the DDRRR program adopted a provisional measure on July 17 to no longer accept any Congolese army soldiers into the program, regardless of their nationality.[456]This decision undermines the very essence of the DDRRR program to voluntarily disarm and repatriate foreign combatants to their country of origin. It also violates the rights of Rwandan citizens, including children, who may have been forced to join the CNDP or who joined under false pretenses, to safely return home. By early September 2009, there was still no clear strategy on how MONUC would resolve this problem; however, some MONUC military commanders and DDRRR officials did continue to accept former CNDP Rwandan combatants who fled to their bases for repatriation.[457]

New Initiatives for Civilian Protection

Despite the lack of a concrete protection plan, the disregard of UN legal advice, and insufficient resources, MONUC took some important steps in 2009 to improve the protection of civilians. It increased the number of field bases, placing peacekeepers throughout North and South Kivu in locations where they were better able to protect civilians and respond to incidents. By August 2009, MONUC had 40 bases in North Kivu province, up from 25 bases in September 2008, and had decreased the amount of time required to establish a temporary base to a minimum of 14 days, though it still often took longer.

During operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II, MONUC peacekeepers tried to deploy to high-risk areas before offensives began.[458]In some cases, they were able to escort civilians out of conflict zones to safe areas before operations were launched. This was the case, for example, in Pinga and Kashebere during operation Umoja Wetu.[459]MONUC peacekeepers have also launched foot patrols on high-risk paths that civilians, and women in particular, frequently used to access their farms, go to markets,[460] and collect firewood.[461] During national examinations in June, peacekeepers in some areas provided escorts to students as they walked from their villages to the towns where exams were being administered.[462] These important initiatives undoubtedly helped to save and protect civilian lives.

Some MONUC field base commanders, such as the commander in Kiwanja (North Kivu), have made exemplary efforts in 2009 to communicate with local authorities, civil society representatives, school directors, and traditional chiefs in their areas of responsibility, and ensured that they had information on how to contact the MONUC base in case of an emergency. But this was not the case everywhere. In the majority of MONUC field bases visited by Human Rights Watch researchers in North and South Kivu in 2009, commanders were rarely in communication with members of the local population.

Joint Protection Teams

In an effort to overcome some of these challenges and bridge the divide between MONUC peacekeepers and the civilian population, MONUC established Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) in early 2009. These teams, made up of members of MONUC’s civil affairs, human rights, political affairs, and child protection divisions, are deployed to MONUC field bases for up to five days at a time. Their mandate is to develop a greater understanding of local dynamics in the area, create links between MONUC and the local population, and act as an early warning mechanism by seeking to predict threats and suggest courses of action to MONUC leadership.[463] In some cases, JPTs also work to mediate disputes between non-integrated armed groups and the Congolese army or the local population, separate children from armed groups and the Congolese army, provide protection advice for MONUC military officers at their bases, and discuss possible protection responses in the event of an attack.[464] By November 2009, MONUC had organized more than 50 JPTs.

JPTs have been limited in their effectiveness because of their short stays in the field. Because of staffing limitations, MONUC civilian staff members normally cannot be in the field for longer than five days.[465] As the North Kivu Brigade commander told Human Rights Watch, “Confidence building can’t happen in five days. I would like for them to go to places for two months at a time, instead of five days.”[466] There is also a shortage of civilian staff members who can be deployed on JPTs, and even fewer qualified protection specialists. At any given time, only one JPT can be deployed in all of North Kivu.[467] Because of these constraints, JPTs have acted more as fact-finding missions that deploy to areas after major incidents, rather than early-warning mechanisms to predict threats and quickly plan a protection strategy.

“Must protect” areas

MONUC military and civilian officials have instigated regular meetings with the DRC Protection Cluster, an official grouping of UN agencies and other humanitarian and human rights actors who seek to coordinate action on the protection of civilians. These monthly meetings, known as “priority protection planning meetings,” are used to decide where MONUC peacekeepers are most urgently needed and what action is possible, given the often competing demands for MONUC’s limited resources. The participants at these meetings analyze information they have received on threats to civilians and categorize the threats into three protection categories: (i) “Must protect”areas where MONUC troops should be physically present with a base deployed to the area; (ii) “Should protect” areas where MONUC should be physically present if the resources are available, and if not, MONUC troops should at least do regular patrols to the area; and (iii) “Could protect” areas where MONUC troops should carry out patrols, especially on market days.[468]

This methodology and the action that has resulted from it have contributed to enhanced protection for civilians, especially through the increase in bases and patrols in areas where civilians are at risk. But in a number of cases, the system has been ineffective, often because it took too long to establish a base in a “must protect” area. While sometimes the delays were due to logistical constraints, in other cases it was due to inefficient decision-making and internal bureaucracy that should have been overcome.

Remeka and Kibua, both in the Ufumandu area of Masisi territory where significant human rights abuses were being committed (see above), were designated as “must protect” areas in February 2009. A MONUC temporary base was briefly established in Kibua for one week in February, but it was later removed because of the difficulties in supplying the base, leaving civilians in the area without protection. Despite two visits to Remeka by the JPTs in March and their strong recommendation that a MONUC base be established, no action was taken, again due largely to logistical difficulties and an apparent lack of adequate water supplies. By the time the logistical challenges were overcome, Remeka was no longer deemed a “must protect” area because most of the population had fled.[469]

Also in February, Itebero town in the Waloaluanda area of Walikale territory, was designated a “must protect” area because of the widespread atrocities being committed by FDLR combatants against civilians there (see above). Yet no MONUC base was established in the area until July 9, five months later, and after two massacres in Mianga and Busurungi by the FDLR and one in the Shalio area by Congolese army soldiers, leaving scores of civilians dead.

This remote area in North Kivu, close to the South Kivu border, fell under the Indian Brigade’s area of responsibility, but it was physically impossible to access due to a number of destroyed bridges. The area was, however, accessible from South Kivu, where Pakistani peacekeepers had a base close to the North and South Kivu border at Hombo, some five kilometers away. The Pakistanis argued, however, that it was not their area of responsibility.[470] Debates over which peacekeepers had responsibility for patrolling and protecting the civilians in the area persisted for months and created a perception that this area was a “no man’s land” for MONUC troops.

In May 2009 a MONUC joint assessment mission[471] highlighted the lack of protection in this area due to the “jurisdictional” confusion and said it would urgently refer the problem to MONUC senior management. The assessment mission lamented the “peacekeeping vacuum,” concluding that the civilians had not seen any MONUC presence “in the last 2 months in spite of the area being a place of displacement with a high incidence of violence.”[472] The assessment mission also again raised the lack of advance planning for the humanitarian consequences of operation Kimia II which, if it had been done, it said, would “have dictated the importance of having peacekeepers and JPTs operating in [this] area.”[473]  

Despite these recommendations, as well as other urgent warnings from within and outside of MONUC,[474] no base was established and there were no further MONUC patrols in the Waloaluanda area until July 9, when Indian peacekeepers established a base in Musenge, although they were still unable to reach the worst-affected areas because of a broken bridge.[475] On July 20 the FDLR again attacked civilians in the area, killing some 30 people at Manje. It took six days for MONUC peacekeepers to respond. On July 26, peacekeepers from the Pakistani South Kivu Brigade carried out a one-day patrol to assess the damage after the population had already fled.

Finally, on September 5, nearly seven months after the area had been designated as “must protect,” the MONUC Indian Brigade established a base at Otobora, a village south of Musenge, from which peacekeepers could now reach some of the worst-affected areas.

The seven-month delay in establishing a base that could reach civilians in need of urgent protection in the Waloaluanda area seriously undercut MONUC’s claims that civilian protection was its highest priority. One MONUC civilian official, frustrated at the slow response and the lack of concrete protection plans explained to Human Rights Watch some of the challenges in the system,

[The UN] needs to figure out how to institutionalize some of these procedures so that “must protect” recommendations... are then actually implemented.The force commander’s directives are only directives. The military ultimately follow standard operating procedures and their rules of engagement. But there is no one telling them they need to follow our recommendations. That would require an entire re-shaping of peacemaking. We would have to change the culture altogether...There is no guiding document on protection of civilians in field missions anywhere in Goma. We all talk about it, but no one knows how to actually implement it.[476]

In June 2009, MONUC and the DRC Protection Cluster developed a “Protection Handbook” for MONUC peacekeepers. While an important initiative, there is no formal training on the guidelines, no mechanism for monitoring and evaluation on whether and how these guidelines are followed, and nothing in the MOUs, rules of engagement, or force directives instructing troops to follow these guidelines.[477]By September 2009, there was still no clear document that spelled out MONUC’s protection plan.[478]

Challenges for Human Rights Monitoring

As an integrated mission, MONUC’s human rights section is joined together with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Human rights section staff members have two reporting lines: one to MONUC leadership in Kinshasa and another to the OHCHR in Geneva. MONUC’s participation in operation Kimia II effectively makes the mission a party to the armed conflict, creating a conflict of interest for MONUC human rights staff, undermining their impartiality and thus their credibility when reporting on human rights abuses, despite their reporting being done with utmost integrity. Furthermore, because reporting on such abuses risks upsetting MONUC’s military relationship with the Congolese army, publicly reporting on them has become much more difficult. Since military operations began in January 2009, the MONUC human rights section has not published a single report on the abuses committed, although its staff members have worked hard to raise human rights concerns internally.

Following an October 2009 mission to Congo, Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, raised concerns about the problem of having a human rights monitoring section under the authority of a peacekeeping mission which he said could delay, dilute, or discourage human rights reporting if it was considered, as it often is, as a hindrance or obstacle to securing political reform. He also raised concerns about the perceived lack of independence of MONUC’s human rights reporting due to its role in Kimia II and urged that “consideration be given to the creation of a new mechanism to ensure that the necessary monitoring and reporting roles are carried out independently, effectively, and credibly.”[479]

The MONUC leadership has in some cases inaccurately portrayed the humanitarian and human rights realities in eastern Congo and disregarded information reported by MONUC’s own human rights division or other UN agencies. In a letter to Alan Doss, the head of MONUC, on October 28, 2009, the DRC Protection Cluster expressed their concern about the “inaccurate picture of the humanitarian situation” described in the UN secretary-general’s report on MONUC in September 2009. In the letter, the protection cluster said the report presented to the UN Security Council was in contradiction with their own findings during the same period and “present[ed] a picture far removed from the realities our members have witnessed and reported on over the same period.”[480] 

International Response

Encouraged by the historic rapprochement between Congo and Rwanda in late 2008 and early 2009, governments with interests in the region were reluctant to raise any concerns that might upset the new relationship between the former foes. Questions of accountability and respect for human rights in particular were considered too troublesome to mention for fear of upsetting the peace process. Only by September 2009, did some governments and regional intergovernmental bodies, notably the US and EU, raise concerns about the promotion of Bosco Ntaganda to the rank of general in the Congolese army, despite an arrest warrant from the ICC. Many governments also chose to remain silent when it was clear he would play an important role in the UN-backed operation Kimia II.[481]

Instead, in March the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking before Congo’s parliament, hailed the “courageous decision” by President Joseph Kabila to invite his former Rwandan enemies into the country for joint military operations.[482] Western governments applauded the launch of operation Umoja Wetu, which they said marked an important policy shift on the part of Kabila’s government to finally break all ties with the FDLR. When operation Umoja Wetu ended after five weeks, the UK and US governments, among others, pressed for continued action against the FDLR. They supported MONUC’s decision to push ahead quickly with operation Kimia II.[483] 

These governments proved unwilling to call into question the potentially catastrophic humanitarian and human right consequences of the operations. “We believed we had to support the improved relations between Congo and Rwanda which we saw as crucial to peace in the region,” one diplomat later told Human Rights Watch. “This consideration took precedence over everything else. In hindsight we should have given much more attention to the horrible consequences military operations could bring.”[484]

A number of high-level foreign delegations visited Congo, and Goma, in particular, during 2009. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ambassadors from the UN Security Council, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and a number of other African and EU ministers all highlighted their concerns about the humanitarian and human rights situation in eastern Congo and some, such as Clinton and Ban, specifically highlighted the issue of sexual violence. But they all fell short of putting real pressure on the Congolese government or MONUC to rethink their strategy and ensure that civilians were protected and abusive commanders were removed.

By mid-2009, some diplomats, especially those from EU countries, began to privately question the direction of operation Kimia II and the Congolese army’s effectiveness, and the dire consequences for civilians.[485]  The private concerns were rarely raised publicly, and few hard questions were asked during UN Security Council discussions. In November 2009, US Special Envoy for the Africa Great Lakes Region, Howard Wolpe, publicly raised concerns about the human cost of the military operations.[486]

The most vocal and detailed criticism of the lack of accountability and the pervasive human rights abuses resulting from military operations came from UN human rights officials. On September 9, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, following publication of a report into the killings in the town of Kiwanja that had occurred nearly a year earlier, declared, “I am deeply concerned that members of the CNDP who may be implicated in these crimes—especially Bosco Ntaganda, against whom there was already an International Criminal Court arrest warrant—are either still at large, or have even been absorbed into the FARDC.”[487]

The UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Philip Alston, was the most severe in his analysis of operation Kimia II. Following a 10-day mission to Congo in October 2009, Alston was the first UN official to publicly acknowledge that MONUC’s mandate and role in operation Kimia II had transformed the peacekeeping mission into “a party to the conflict in the Kivus.” He condemned “the lack of planning, coordination and cooperation in Kimia II,” which he said had led to “predictable and repeated killings.”[488] In a stark warning, he said, “alarm bells are ringing loudly in the DRC.” From a human rights perspective, Alston concluded, operation Kimia II had “produced catastrophic results.”[489]