I. Background

Just as South Sudan was set to become an independent nation in July 2011 under the terms of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),[1] tensions were rising in Sudan between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and remaining forces of the former southern rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Army (SPLA) still present in Sudan, over political and security arrangements in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

Fighting broke out in Southern Korfodan on June 5, 2011, triggered in part by disputed state elections in which the incumbent candidate for governor, Ahmed Haroun, claimed a narrow victory. Haroun, like Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, is subject to an arrest warrant by the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur. The fighting spread to Blue Nile on September 1, 2011.

President al-Bashir declared a state of emergency and dismissed Malik Agar, the SPLM governor of Blue Nile, replacing him with a military commander.  In the following weeks, Sudanese authorities banned SPLM-North, seized their offices, arrested scores of party leaders and members across the country, and imposed new media restrictions and banned other parties for their alleged links to South Sudan.[2]

Both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, bordering the now-independent South Sudan, have populations with longstanding ties to the former southern rebel SPLA during Sudan’s long civil war. In view of the political and ethnic diversity in the two states, the CPA provided they would have popular consultations whereby residents could evaluate the government arrangements in their state and make amendments to accommodate their needs, while remaining part of a federal Sudan.[3] 

Instead, renewed conflict interrupted the consultations. In the 18 months prior to the publication of this report, Sudan was engaged in a conflict with SPLA-North forces in the two states, as well as fighting rebel groups in Darfur for the past nine years. Sudan’s tactics in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile – like those used in Darfur and during the civil war in Southern Sudan -- include aerial bombing using cheap, unguided bombs, and ground attacks on communities presumed to support SPLA by virtue of living in rebel held areas or shared ethnic ties. 

These tactics suggest a deliberate strategy of the Sudan government to treat all populations in rebel held areas as enemies and legitimate targets, without distinguishing between civilian and combatant. This goes to the heart of the serious violations of international humanitarian law documented in this report. Failing to distinguish between civilian and military is strictly prohibited by international humanitarian law. Also prohibited by international humanitarian law is treating a whole town, village, or other area as a single military target, when there are separate and distinct military objects along with a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.[4] Violations of these prohibitions may amount to war crimes.

The Sudan government has also deployed large numbers of Popular Defense Forces (PDF), auxiliary forces drawn from local communities, capitalizing on pre-existing local tensions to fight ground wars expediently. 

Hundreds of thousands of people have fled their homes, lost their livelihoods, separated from family members and are living without sufficient food, water, shelter, or hygiene. Conflict is expected to intensify throughout the dry season which starts annually in October, and to result in more hunger, deprivation, and refugee flows into teeming refugee camps in South Sudan that already host more than 175,000 Sudanese.