Youth, Poverty and Blood:

I. Summary

II. Recommendations

To the Governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire

To All Governments donating funds to Liberia

To the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the African Union

To the United Nations Security Council

To the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI)

To the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

To the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

To the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank and others involved in the design, management and evaluation of disarmament exercises

To the Government of Nigeria

To the International Committee of the Red Cross

III. Context

The Regional Warrior

The Sub-Regional Dynamic of West African Conflicts

Economic and Social Factors

IV. The Recruiters, Their Promises, the Lure

Promises of Payment and the Opportunity to Loot

Recruitment in Refugee Camps

V.  Regional Warriors and Human Rights Abuses

High Level Orders to Commit Atrocities – the Liberian Security Forces and RUF in Guinea

Efforts to Respect the Laws of War Met With Limited Success – The LURD in Liberia

Looting on Massive Scale – Not Ordered but Sanctioned at the Highest Level

VI. Current Theaters: Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire

Guinea

Côte d'Ivoire

VII. Problems in the Disarmament Programs in Sierra Leone and Liberia [1998-2005]

Sierra Leonean Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program (1998-2003)

Liberian Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (2002-present)

Payment to Demobilized Children in Liberia and Increased Risk of Re-recruitment

Risks of Failure in the Disarmament Program in Liberia

Corruption by Commanders and DDR/DDRR Program Employees

Lack of Grievance Procedure

Inadequate job training options

VIII. Conclusion

IX. Acknowledgements

Annex