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The Bonn process that provided for the convening of an emergency loya jirga (grand national assembly) and the selection of a transitional cabinet in Kabul in June 2002 was predicated on the premise of inclusion, that by offering regional authorities a stake in the central government and in the reconstruction of the country, political fragmentation could be overcome. But the prevailing insecurity in northern Afghanistan, and the reluctance thus far of regional warlords like General Dostum and Ismail Khan in Herat to assume the post of vice-president in the central government, put that in doubt. What instead appears to be a much more attractive proposition to them is a decentralized state, with regional authorities enjoying wide autonomy to levy taxes and raise and maintain private armies. Jamiat's attempt to exert its influence across a broader swathe of Afghanistan appears to be a reflection of the same impulse, rather than an effort to create a broadly representative central government.
Defusing tension in the north, securing space for humanitarian operations, and protecting civilians from the predations of armed parties requires a set of strategies aimed at ensuring security, demilitarization, promoting civic accountability, and allowing independent monitoring. Absent such measures, a political process that challenges the power bases of local authorities may pose risks for those who participate in it. One member of the loya jirga commission in Mazar spoke tellingly of this prospect:
All of the members of our office have been threatened, myself several times. "You're going too fast," I've been told. I will tell you about these things after democracy comes to this country. But right now, I don't feel secure.37
Recommendations
The government of Afghanistan and the northern provincial administrations should take the following measures:
- Investigate all reported cases of attacks on Afghan and international humanitarian NGOs and their employees. Persons identified as being responsible on the basis of these investigations should be promptly charged and prosecuted for the offenses in a manner consistent with international standards of due process and fair trials.
- Investigate reports of continued attacks against ethnic Pashtuns and other civilians in northern Afghanistan. Suspend from active duty and disarm any personnel who have been accused of attacks against civilians, pending the completion of those investigations.
- Respect the civilian nature of IDP camps. Issue clear instructions to all commanders to desist from forcing IDPs to perform military support functions. Investigate reports of rape and other acts of violence against IDPs by members of armed forces or groups and suspend from active duty any personnel implicated in those attacks, pending the completion of those investigations. Cooperate with United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to ensure that the return and resettlement of IDPs is carried out voluntarily and with the informed participation of IDPs.
- Prohibit ad hoc forcible recruitment by local commanders and ensure that conscription is carried out only where authorized by, and regulated in accordance with, domestic law. Extortion and intimidation of families seeking to avoid the conscription of their young men should be strictly prohibited and violators should be prosecuted.
- Reorganize the 600-person police force for Mazar along non-party lines, as provided for in the May 5 peace agreement negotiated by the U.N. Develop and enforce selection criteria for recruitment into the forces, including age, education level, and in the case of officers, professional experience. International assistance should be requested and provided for the training of the force in human rights and international policing standards, possibly in coordination with the German-led training program for the national police in Kabul. Screening should be rigorously conducted to exclude personnel implicated in human rights abuses or criminal activities. The mixed force should gradually be expanded to supplant the existing faction-controlled police department and police security department in Mazar.
- Urgently disarm both parties in Sholgara and demilitarize Sar-e Pul, as provided for in the May 5 peace agreement. UNAMA should commit additional resources to the commission charged with investigating the incidents of armed conflict in these districts and monitoring the processes of disarmament and demilitarization.
The United Nations Security Council should:
- Urgently expand the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to areas outside of Kabul, prioritizing deployment in Mazar-i Sharif. The extended mandate should, at a minimum, include rapid reaction capabilities for the Mazar-based force within Balkh and Sar-e Pul provinces.
37 Human Rights Watch interview with a member of the loya jirga commission, Mazar-i Sharif, June 2, 2002.
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