I. Introduction

Eight months after the collapse of the Taliban, northern Afghanistan remains on a dangerous precipice. Factional rivalries periodically erupt into open hostilities, jeopardizing civilian security, aid delivery, and the resettlement of displaced communities. The absence of a coherent, accountable administration in Balkh province-which includes Mazar-i Sharif ("Mazar"), the region's major city-has meant that robbery, rape, and other violent crimes are committed with impunity. Amid a recent spate of such attacks against international aid workers, a number of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have begun reevaluating their operations in northern Afghanistan. Forcible recruitment of young men, militia domination of camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and continued sexual violence have led to a general climate of insecurity, with members of ethnic minorities being especially vulnerable.

At the heart of the conflict are the competing ambitions of two ethnically-based armed parties, the predominantly Uzbek Junbish-e Milli ("Junbish"), led by General Abdul Rashid Dostum, and the predominantly Tajik Jamiat-e Islami ("Jamiat"), led in the north by General Atta Mohammad and backed by Defense Minister Mohammad Qasem Fahim. Dostum and Atta were uneasy allies in the coalition campaign to unseat the Taliban, and the capture of Mazar was delayed by disputes between the two commanders. Immediately after occupying Mazar, the two commanders, along with the leaders of three ethnic Hazara parties, effectively partitioned the city and established a patchwork of militia posts and patrols.

On February 3, 2002, all five parties operating in Mazar signed a United Nations-backed agreement establishing a 600-person mixed security force for the city drawn from each of the parties.¹ In practice, the mixed force has existed alongside two autonomous police forces: the police department, headed by a leader of the Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat party, and the police security department, which is headed by Atta's brother Fida Mohammad and is the most powerful of the three. Alongside these forces are unauthorized military posts maintained by each of the factions-over half reportedly belonging to Jamiat-which were to have been replaced by the mixed force.

Most of the territory west of Mazar, extending through Jowzjan and Faryab provinces, is held by Junbish. And with the exception of Samangan province, the territory to the east of Mazar is largely controlled by Jamiat commanders. The faultline between the two parties runs through the southern part of Balkh province and neighboring Sar-e Pul province, and these areas have seen repeated outbreaks of fighting during the past six months.

1 The force, headed by Junbish commander Majid Rouzi, was to include 240 officers from Jamiat, 180 from Junbish, and a further 180 from each of the three Hazara parties.