VI. Attempts to defuse factional tensions in the north
Tensions between Jamiat and Junbish reached a new peak in late April, with a rapid buildup of troops and heavy artillery in Mazar by both parties and renewed fighting in Sar-e Pul town and in Sholgara district, in the southern part of Balkh province. The immediate catalyst may have been the movement of tanks and troops from the Jamiat-controlled Defense Ministry in Kabul to participate in the National Day celebrations alongside local Jamiat forces in Mazar on April 28, a date commemorating the defeat of the Najibullah government by mujahideen forces in 1992. But there was also simmering discontent among Junbish commanders with Jamiat's gradual extension of its authority westwards.
Both parties began a rapid buildup of troops and military hardware in Mazar. By early May up to 3000 troops from each faction were estimated to be in the city, with large numbers having entered on the pretext of taking part in the National Day celebrations. Others continued to enter Mazar over the course of the week, often in civilian dress and traveling on public buses. They were given arms when they reported to their factions' bases inside the city. International observers estimated that there were about ninety to one hundred armored vehicles in the city.
Concurrently with the buildup in Mazar, heavy fighting broke out between the two parties on April 29 in Sholgara and Sar-e Pul town. Jamiat reportedly attacked Junbish positions in Sholgara, while in Sar-e Pul, Junbish seized full control of the town and took fifteen Jamiat commanders prisoner. The conflict led to at least twenty deaths before the U.N. negotiated a ceasefire on May 2.31
A second agreement brokered on May 5 by U.N. negotiators committed both factions to move their armored personnel carriers and artillery to their respective bases west and east of the city within twenty-four hours, and to dismantle unauthorized posts and bases concurrently with the reorganization of the 600-person police force. The agreement also provided for an investigation by a U.N. commission into the fighting in Sholgara and Sar-e Pul, and authorized such a commission to disarm both factions in Sholgara and to demilitarize Sar-e Pul.32
Enforcement of the May 5 agreement has been spotty, and reflects the limited capacity of the U.N. to police agreements between rival commanders in the absence of international security forces. By far the most successful aspect of the agreement has been the withdrawal of armored personnel carriers and heavy artillery from Mazar. Jamiat's tanks and artillery have been withdrawn to Marmul, east of the city, while Junbish, after an initial period of non-compliance, had by late May relocated its equipment to its main base in Shibergan.33
The May 5 agreement, based on earlier discussions, also provided for the reorganization of the 600-person police force on district rather than party lines. But as of late June that process had yet to commence.34 According to one international observer, a more specific set of selection criteria for recruitment was also needed; the observer had received complaints from Mazar residents that many of the existing recruits to the force were sixteen years of age or less, contravening international standards and suggesting a lack of good faith by local commanders. In addition, many unauthorized militia posts remain in Mazar. The establishment of such posts in hotels and private residences has prevented United Nations officials from identifying their precise number and location.35
United Nations officials concede that there has been no progress in the demilitarization of Sar-e Pul and Sholgara.36 Sar-e Pul town, as of this writing, remains in Junbish hands, while Jamiat-dominated Sholgara has been the site of continued instability; last week, fighting was again reported to have broken out in the district. Humanitarian aid operations in Sar-e Pul, suspended at the time of the clashes in late April and early May, had resumed by late May, but ultimately remain hostage to the degree of restraint shown by the two parties.
31 Human Rights Watch communications with international humanitarian officials, Mazar-i Sharif, May 1-7, 2002. See also Human Rights Watch, "Rise in Factional Fighting Threatens Fragile Peace: International Community Urged to Improve Security for Civilians," May 7, 2002.
32 Text of agreement dated May 5, 2002, on file at Human Rights Watch.
33 Human Rights Watch interview with an international humanitarian official, Mazar-i Sharif, June 5, 2002.
34 Human Rights Watch communication with a United Nations official, Kabul, June 25, 2002.
35 Human Rights Watch interview with an international humanitarian official, Mazar-i Sharif, June 5, 2002.
36 Human Rights Watch communication with a United Nations official, Kabul, June 25, 2002.
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