Over its decade of existence, the CNDH has gone through what can be roughly divided into three phases. The first began with the 1987 law and ended with the crackdown on democracy in 1991. The second lasted from 1992 to 1995. The first phase served to raise public awareness and put the CNDH onto the political landscape; during the second phase, the CNDH essentially disappeared from public view. In this third phase, the CNDH is seeking to reestablish itself, but primarily on the basis of non-conflictual promotional activities, quiet diplomacy and international networking.
Despite the links to the President and the party, the CNDH quickly defined an independent path in the first years of its existence, quickly gaining broad credibility both locally and internationally. In its first years, the CNDH played a pivotal role in promoting awareness about human rights in the country through seminars, conferences, and radio programs. Initially, the Commission gave broad interpretation to its mandate - initiating its own investigations and denouncing violations, neither of which was expressly permitted.25 International activists were impressed by the willingness of the CNDH to take on sensitive cases and to publish its results26 For example, the Commission determined in 1989 that, in order to issue "opinions on human rights issues" - which was a part of its mandate - it would have to investigate cases on its own authority.27 By 1990, the CNDH was publicly denouncing the human rights violations committed by the police and military, including some of those that were most politically sensitive.

In its first two years, the Commission received 391 complaints.28 It intervened in 1989 to obtain the release of citizens arrested after they publicly questioned why the anniversary of the Eyadema coup d'etat had replaced independence day as a national holiday.29 After criticism from the international human rights organization Article 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, the CNDH launched a series of actions aimed at freedom of speech.30 As the administrative secretary of the commission wrote at the time:

Some consider this enterprise a gamble in a single party system. Others believe it is a smokescreen to deceive the masses. Some in the administration consider this to be a subversive act, a source of disorder . . . . [But] . . . . The capacity to say no, the freedom to express one's opinion, the rights to contest are only subversive in a society that uses censorship as a method of government ... and that views its citizens as minors."31

It was probably in connection with the national conference of 1991, the effective end to single party rule, that the CNDH played its most significant role. As one Pro-Eyadema journalist said, the CNDH "demystified" the single party. 32 In late 1990, as in other countries on the continent, pressure was growing for free and fair elections. On October 5, students demonstrated following the conviction of four students for distributing "false and defamatory tracts about the President of the Republic." The CNDH denounced the brutality of the policy repressing the demonstration. This launched the process that eventually led the President to consent to the convening of a "sovereign" national conference.33 At the conference, itself, which took place from July 8 to August 28, 1991, human rights was the major theme of debate and the CNDH played a pivotal role.34

One of the primary tasks of the national conference was to draft a new constitution. The delegates incorporated the CNDH into the draft, which was eventually adopted by referendum in 1992 and entered into force October 14, 1992. The drafters were particularly concerned with establishing the independence of the commission and protecting its members.35

A few months after transitional institutions were put into place by the national conference, President Eyadema and his military determined to put an end to the experiment in democracy. In October 1991, security forces loyal to the president blocked the work of the transition government, seized the radio and assaulted the office of the prime minister. In May 1992, Gilchrist Olympio, the leader of the opposition, narrowly escaped an attempt on his life. Several hundred thousand people left the country in the violence that accompanied the crackdown.

The second phase that the CNDH went through began when the activist president of the CNDH, lawyer Robert Ahlonko Dovi - who had replaced Yao Agboyibor- went into exile with other pro-democracy activists. At that point the CNDH entered a dormant stage, headed by a comité de suivi or "oversight committee." Aboudou Assouma was named president and remained in the position until 1996.

This period was characterized by "profound lethargy" according to witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch. Even the current president, Komi Gnondoli, acknolwedges that the CNDH did not fulfill its mandate during this time.36 Aboudou Assouma blamed the political instability of the time.37 But one former staff member recalled bitterly the various measures taken to undermine the commission.38 The office was moved to a neighborhood associated with supporters of Eyadema.39 The number of complaints dropped to almost nothing and those presented were not acted on. According to the staffer, "All cases involving important figures in power were systematically blocked; publication of reports was stopped; the Commission restricted its investigations to cases of abusive termination of employment.40" There was, for example, no investigation of the assassination attempt against opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio.41 The only activity reported by the CNDH for this period was a conference of National Human Rights Commissions in Africa organized from May 29-31, 1995.

In November 1996, during a period of relative calm after many-though not all-of the exiles had returned, a new law was adopted to revive the CNDH and bring it in line with the constitution. In several respects the 1996 law was an improvement over the 1987 law. It extended the representation in the CNDH to nongovernmental organizations-which did not exist at the time of the 1987 law-and it made express the authority of the commission to act on its own initiative. Its major drawback was to subject selection of the members to a vote of the national assembly.

As in the 1987 law, the investigative procedures of the CNDH give significant authority to the commission and place heavy burdens on implicated government agency. Following a complaint, the executive bureau of the commission must meet within forty-eight hours-immediately if there is a grave and continuing violation-to assign an investigator (rapporteur) from among the members of the CNDH. The investigator has fifteen days to submit a report to the commission. The investigator is authorized to have access to the victim, the implicated authority and "any other person in a position to clarify [the claims]"42 She also has access to "all reports, registries, or other documents as well as to all objects and places connected to the investigation.43 Finally, she must be provided the cooperation of the implicated person's superiors. Article 27 of the law provides that "anyone who, by action, inaction, refusal to act or other means, interferes (entraver) or attempts to interfere with the accomplishment of the functions assigned to the commission" is subject to six months to five years of imprisonment and a substantial fine. The investigator makes recommendations to the commission which must immediately act to stop a continuing violation. If other means fail, the commission is invited to appeal to the president of the national assembly "and/or" the president of the republic.44

The CNDH is now entering its third phase. The new commission began to operate on October 15, 1997.45 Its first program of action stressed promotion as "an area to which the CNDH gives priority."46 In early 1998, the CNDH organized a seminar with the press and a tour to the provinces on the theme of "Respect for human rights; a factor in social peace."47 For the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the CNDH organized conferences in three schools.

Although there is no published report of activities, the CNDH did provide Human Rights Watch with a summary of activities for 1997-1998.48 According to the summary, the "CNDH registered 107 complaints from September 30 1997 to December 31, 1998," alleging human rights violations. That represents less than half the average number of complaints received per month during the heyday of the CNDH.49 Of those complaints, the commission rejected forty-seven complaints that were not within its mandate; sixty were investigated of which thirty-nine were resolved, fifteen are in progress and six were judged to be without foundation.

Those interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including human rights NGOs, victims and diplomats resident in Lomé, view the current commission with uniform skepticism. According to the leaders of the LTDH-the only NGO cited by the CNDH for bringing cases to its attention-the commission can obtain results in minor cases that do not directly implicate the government, security forces or those close to power. They cited two cases, one involving a public school teacher who was fired and the other, a woman who was beaten by police, in which the commission intervened on behalf of the victim.50

Several people cited cases to Human Rights Watch on which the CNDH had failed to act. Journalist Mewenemesse Appolinaire, editor of the pro-Eyadema, bimonthly La Depeche, was arrested and detained for three months in 1998 after publishing an article that criticized the army for playing a role in creating insecurity in the city. "The CNDH did nothing in my case," according to Mewenemesse.51 Lawyer Jonas Sokpoh, a former CNDH secretary general, told Human Rights Watch that he had petitioned the CNDH on a number of cases. One concerned the prolonged detention of the parents of an opposition leader, Djobo Boukari. They were arrested in November 1997 in Sokode, some 250 km from Lomé, while protesting the death of their son. According to Mr. Sokpoh, the CNDH hid behind the claim that "the case was before the courts," though it was in fact the courts that were allegedly committing the abuse by extending the detention.52

This is consistent with the very restrictive interpretation of its mandate that was provided by the commissioners who met with Human Rights Watch. The president, Mr. Gnondoli, confirmed that the commission would not take cases that were before courts. He also endorsed a very broad interpretation of the confidentiality constraints of the Commission. Article 23 of the 1996 law requires confidentiality "unless the commission decides otherwise, and without prejudice for it to report anonymously in its periodic reports." For Mr. Gnondoli, this means that "we are not required to publish the results of an investigation." But the same language interpreted by the CNDH during its first phase was interpreted to permit publication of reports including the names of petitioners, the authorities accused and the results obtained. In its discussions with Human Rights Watch, members of the commission also complained that NGOs did not understand its role and wanted the CNDH to behave like another NGO. Mr. Gnondoli explained, "our first role is to help the government to improve. The NGOs can be more vocal. We cannot be like them and speak out. We can be useful in other ways, like helping to keep the NGOs out of prison or being able to talk to any government official."53

In contrast to the CNDH's relative silence as to victims and violations, it has twice taken public positions to condemn international human rights NGOs for their reporting work on Togo. In January 1999, in a statement signed by the President of the Commission, the CNDH formally accused the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme [International Federation of Human Rights] (FIDH) of spreading "disinformation".54 The statement chastised the FIDH for failing to consult with the Commission during their investigation or to submit their conclusions in advance. "This method," the statement continues, "shows that the FIDH mission is not intended to serve the cause of human rights." Without specifically responding to any charges of the FIDH, the CNDH concludes that the FIDH is "spreading disinformation that does not reflect the reality on the ground."55

In May 1999, the CNDH took on Amnesty International. Amnesty International's report, "Togo: Rule of Terror,"56 led immediately to the arrest of several Togolese activists suspected of having collaborated with the organization. Amnesty's Secretary General, Pierre Sané and Togo researcher, Gaeten Mootoo, were expelled from the country when they came to meet with authorities regarding the cases in the report. In turn, the Togolese authorities threatened legal action against Amnesty International for defamation. A few days after the report was issued, the president of the CNDH held a press conference in support of the government's actions, where he attacked the report, saying that the facts were "imaginary" (relève de l'imaginaire) and that Amnesty must have been thinking about a different country ("Amnesty International a du se tromper de pays").57 He also attacked Amnesty International's methods which he characterized as "cavalier," particularly because the investigative team had failed to meet with the CNDH during its visit. This theme was also taken up in a letter to Amnesty's Secretary General. Sources close to the commission complained that President Gnondoli did not inform other members of the commission before his attack on Amnesty International. According to these sources, Mr. Gnondoli runs the commission "like a bureacracy." There is little room for discussion and none for dissent. For the time being, they have decided that it is essentially pointless to contest his authority.58