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Protectors or Pretenders? - Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, HRW Report 2001

Sierra Leone








Overview

Summary

International Standards: The Paris Principles

Important Factors

Examining the Record in Africa

Innovative and Positive Contributions by Commissions

Regional Iniatives

The Role Of The International Community

Conclusion

Recommendations

Abbreviations

Acknowledgements




Assessment

    The broad mandate of the NCDHR in the promotion of both democracy and human rights, and the orientation and background of the chairperson and commissioners as educationalists, represent both the NCDHR's greatest strength and weakness. The commission's human rights mandate has largely been interpreted in terms of human rights education programs. The population is now more aware of human rights issues as a result of the sensitization programs conducted by the NCDHR. Sierra Leonean human rights activists interviewed by Human Rights Watch unanimously praised the benefits of the educational aspects of the NCDHR mandate. Michael O'Flaherty, the (then) head of the human rights section of UNAMSIL noted that the NCDHR "have developed considerable skills, methodology and knowledge in the areas of dissemination and sensitization which can be utilized in many ways."211

    While the efforts of the NCDHR have clearly facilitated in the population a better understanding of what their basic human rights are, there has not been as much effort made to be more of a force in monitoring and documenting abuses in order to better advocate for redress on behalf of the victims of what is arguably one of the most devastating human rights situations in the world. The NCDHR has no dedicated program to systematically monitor, document, and advocate for redress for the thousands of war victims. The combination of insufficient government support and the reliance on short term and/or task specific funds undermines the continuity has frustrated some of the NCDHR's project ideas. However, the professional orientation of the commissioners as educators and not human rights activists may also have dictated the program priorities for which they solicit and utilize funds.

    Several human rights activists referred to the NCDHR's lack of human rights advocacy on issues both related to and independent of the civil war as a major shortcoming. Since its inception, and although mandated do so by the decree, the NCDHR have yet to issue a report about the human rights situation in the country. Human rights activist, Frank Kargbo noted:

    In terms of mass education, the NCDHR has a very good base and has made a significant contribution, particularly in the areas of democracy and good governance. However, the human rights protection side of the mandate has never been seriously addressed. Part of the problem is that none of the commissioners are well grounded in human rights ideology. The other problem is they don't have enough manpower; what employees they have are dedicated to the education campaign.212

Isaac Lappia, the Sierra Leonean representative of Amnesty International said:

    We simply haven't seen the NCDHR adequately address essential human rights issues related to the judicial system like arbitrary arrests, prison overcrowding, brutality within prisons, high prisoner mortality, corruption within the courts and the death penalty. Take the l998 treason trials for example, some of the defendants were convicted on very shaky and unsubstantiated evidence. The NCDHR didn't say anything. And then on October 19, l998 when twenty-four were publicly executed they made no statement condemning it. It was a highly political issue but as human rights activists they should have at least issued a statement condemning the use of the death penalty.213

Joseph Rahall, the chair of the Human Rights Forum, an umbrella organization of over twenty human rights groups, noted:

    They should have been the first group to come up with a report on the January 1999 offensive, or on the effects of [rebel] operations `No Living Thing' or `Pay Yourself.' After the January offensive they could have sent people to the streets to take testimonies and then compiled those testimonies to come up with a report. They do not have any statistics on the numbers of amputees, wounded or people killed during these rebel offensives. The country has been left without a database of human rights abuses.214

    Some see the lack of human rights documentation and advocacy as indicative of the NCDHR's unwillingness to openly criticize abuses by members of the government or their surrogates, such as the civil defense forces (pro-government militia groups such as the Kamajors) or the regional ECOMOG peacekeepers. Examples cited by human rights activists were the NCDHR's silence on the lynching of suspected rebel collaborators following the restoration of democracy in February l998, the public execution of twenty-four junta members accused of treason in October l998, the systematic use of child soldiers by the government-supported Kamajor militias, hundreds of executions of rebels and suspected rebel collaborators by the ECOMOG peace-keeping force during the January l999 rebel offensive, and the inclusion of the blanket amnesty in the July 7, l999 Lomé Peace Accord. Sierra Leonean journalists have also have complained that the NCDHR failed to denounce two controversial bills to control the media.

    Some human rights activists go as far as to posit that the government uses the NCDHR as a mouthpiece to push through its political agenda and that the NCDHR has lost credibility as an independent human rights commission able to equally represent all sectors of society. The NCDHR's offices within a building housing only government ministries further adds to the perception of being closely associated with the government. Several human rights activists cite the inclusion of (former) NCDHR head Dr. Kadi Sesay in the government's negotiating team during the Lomé Peace talks as damaging to the credibility of the NCDHR as a truly autonomous commission. Dr. Sesay defends her decision, taken after much serious debate within the NCDHR, to join the government's negotiating team instead remaining outside the talks as follows:

    I went specifically to represent the human rights perspective. We were afraid the truth and reconciliation commission, among other things would have been looked over. I fought hard against the blanket amnesty and to get issues of women and children included in the agreement. I went there specifically to make sure issues of human rights were not pushed to the side.215

While Dr. Sesay denies that she has ever received threats or come under pressure from the government to represent their position, a former NCDHR employee who drafted a public statement condemning the court martial and death penalties during the l998 treason trials, said he was told `I was not in line with government thinking,' and that the statement would not be used. He also received indirect warnings to avoid controversy after discussing the death penalty and atrocities committed by members of the civil defense forces (pro-government militia groups) during a weekly NCDHR-sponsored radio program.216

    Despite its limitations, the NCDHR has developed a constructive and cooperative relationship with local human rights NGOs. For example, recently when the local NGO's set up a working group to begin formulating ideas for the truth and reconciliation commission, as mandated by the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, a member of the NCDHR was asked to attend. Likewise when the NCDHR set up a one-day workshop to explore the same issue, a member of the Human Rights Forum was invited to participate. As previously mentioned, several members of the local human rights community are members of the four monitoring committees and referrals to the NCDHR legal aid clinic are often made by local NGO's.

    The human rights section of UNAMSIL has also contributed towards unity and solidarity of purpose among the governmental and non-governmental Sierra Leonean human rights community. This was formalized through the formation of the Human Rights Committee in January l999 which brings local human rights groups, international NGO's, the NCDHR and UN agencies together for information sharing and advocacy. UNAMSIL has also conducted several intensive training workshops for members of both the NCDHR and the monitoring committees. UNAMSIL has also provided technical assistance to the NCDHR to prepare a report to the Office of the President for submission to the U.N. Human Rights Commission on the government's compliance with the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.

    The future of the NCDHR was unclear at the start of 2000. Article xxv of the July 1999 Lomé Peace Accord calls for the "creation, as a matter of urgency and not later than 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement, of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission." By early 2000, debate was still continuing within governmental and non governmental sectors around the interpretation of this article; as to whether the human rights component of the NCDHR should be expanded and given new powers or, if a new commission should be created. Much of the debate centers around many of the problems with the NCDHR's completion of the human rights mandate as outlined in this chapter.

    Shortly after the signing of the accord, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights sent special adviser Brian Burdekin to provide technical assistance. By year's end, he had prepared a report which was not made public. However, during his visit he continually stressed the importance of the future commission being independent, pluralistic and have expanded powers.

    Local human rights activists interviewed by Human Rights Watch felt that a new commission, unattached to the NCDHR, was required to ensure greater autonomy, credibility and independence than has been afforded by the current commission. They also stressed the importance of the commission being headed by someone from a legal and/or human rights background. One human rights activist explained this choice, saying:

    The mandate is simply too wide. Within the democracy building part of the mandate there is still so much to do; the constitution needs review, and there's still much to do in the way of educating people on how a proper democracy should function. And Human Rights, there's so much yet to be done on documentation, monitoring and reporting. Human Rights is in itself a very wide issue taking into account the level of atrocities in Sierra Leone. The commission should stand on it's own.217

    In early 2000, international and national pressure appeared to be mounting for a dedicated human rights body separate from democracy activities. Regardless of whether the NCDHR remains a single body or divides its democracy and human rights responsibilities into two institutions, it must enjoy greater autonomy from government than has been the case to date in order for all sides of the conflict to have confidence in it. Its powers will need to be expanded to include the right of subpoena, and to compel documentation and evidence. It will need to be staffed by human rights professionals, expand its capabilities in the areas of monitoring, documentation, and advocacy, and receive adequate funding and commitment by the government. There have to be offices countrywide and it will have to enjoy the confidence of all Sierra Leoneans. A data base of human rights violations throughout the war needs to be established, and compliance with the peace accord needs to be monitored.

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