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The U.S. has more than 12 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile, including about 10 million self-destructing mines, more than one million non-self-destructing mines, and about one million Claymore mines. This constitutes the third or fourth largest antipersonnel mine stockpile in the world.73
More specifically, the U.S. stockpile is believed to consist of ten types of antipersonnel mines:74
ADAM |
9,516,744 |
Gator (USAF) |
237,556 |
Gator (USN) |
49,845 |
Volcano |
107,160 |
MOPMS |
9,184 |
PDM |
16,148 |
GEMSS |
76,071 |
M14 |
670,000 |
M16 |
553,537 |
M18/M18A1 Claymore |
973,932 |
TOTAL |
12,210,177 75 |
The U.S. announced a cap on its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on January 17, 1997. This cap, which includes antipersonnel mines contained in mixed systems, is still in effect even though the precise cap figure has never been publicly disclosed.76 The U.S. has declared possessing 11 million antipersonnel mines to the Organization of American States mine register, not including Claymore mines.77
After agreeing to CCW Amended Protocol II in May 1996, the U.S., in addition to destroying 3.3 million non-self-destructing mines (see below), modified approximately 670,000 M14 non-self-destructing mines to meet the detectability requirement in the amended protocol.78 This was accomplished by adding metal washers to the mines with adhesive bonding. These mines are to be used only in Korea, except a small number for training purposes.
The U.S. has never declared the exact number of M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines retained for training and research/development purposes, but this stockpile is thought to be approximately 2,000.79 These mines are used for proficiency training in Korea and for testing mine detection and mine clearance systems at military research and development laboratories.80 It is also possible that antipersonnel mines of foreign manufacture are retained for similar purposes.
The Air Force is planning to upgrade a number of its cluster munitions, including the Gator mixed mine systems, with an adaptation called the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD). With the WCMD, the Gator would still be prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Air Force plans the Gator upgrade in Fiscal Year 2005, just one year before the target date for ending all use of antipersonnel mines, including those in mixed systems such as Gator.81 This both seems wasteful, since the mines with the WCMD could only be used for one year and would have to be destroyed if the U.S. joins the treaty in 2006, and calls into question the Air Force's commitment to the 2006 target date.
Overseas Stocks
U.S. antipersonnel mines are, or have been, stockpiled in the following twelve countries: Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (at Diego Garcia, its Indian Ocean territory). This report is the first to identify Qatar, a ban treaty state party, as a location for stockpiled U.S. antipersonnel mines. It also appears that the U.S. is planning to stockpile antipersonnel mines in Bahrain and Oman, which have not signed the treaty, possibly for the first time (see below).
At a recent meeting of Mine Ban Treaty nations, officials from Italy and Spain said that all U.S. antipersonnel mines have been withdrawn.82 There is no publicly available official information regarding the current on-hand balances of antipersonnel mines outside the U.S. Officials from the National Security Council and Department of Defense, citing security concerns, refused to comment on the types, locations, and quantities of U.S. antipersonnel mines that are stored outside the continental United States.83
While the quantities and locations of munitions are routinely changed by the military, the ICBL's Landmine Monitor Report 1999 estimated that the U.S. had some 200,000 antipersonnel mines in mixed systems (Gator, Volcano, MOPMS) stored overseas, in addition to 1.2 million M14 and M16 dumb mines for Korea.84 There are also artillery-delivered ADAM self-destruct antipersonnel mines stored outside the continental U.S., perhaps numbering in the hundreds of thousands. For example, Human Rights Watch has learned that 7,776 ADAM antipersonnel mines are stored in Qatar (see below). It is likely that ADAM antipersonnel mines are also stockpiled in Germany and Japan.
U.S. antipersonnel mines are believed to be stored or have been stored in seven states parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Qatar, Spain, and the U.K. at Diego Garcia), as well as treaty signatory Greece.
The Mine Ban Treaty's article 4 requires destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines under a state party's "jurisdiction or control" within four years. Some states parties have apparently determined that U.S. mine stocks fall under their jurisdiction, not the U.S.'s, and thus have required removal of the U.S. mines. Italy and Spain have said that the U.S. has already removed its stocks. It is believed that Norway has reached an agreement for the U.S. to remove stocks by 2003 (within the treaty's four-year deadline).
Other states parties have apparently determined that U.S. mine stocks are under U.S. jurisdiction, and thus the states parties do not feel obligated to have the U.S. mines removed or destroyed. This seems to be the case with Germany, Japan, and the U.K. However, it would certainly be against the spirit of the treaty, aimed at no possession or use of antipersonnel mines, to allow a non-state party to store mines inside a state party. There is also a question about whether such stockpiling would violate the Mine Ban Treaty's provision which prohibits a state party under any circumstances to "assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."85
As noted, Human Rights Watch has learned that the U.S. is currently stockpiling antipersonnel mines in Qatar, a ban treaty state party. Two hundred sixteen ADAM projectiles containing 7,776 antipersonnel mines are currently stored at the Al Karana area in Doha, Qatar as part of U.S. Army Pre-Positioned Stocks Five (APS-5).86
Disturbingly, the U.S. apparently plans also to introduce and stockpile Gator and Claymore antipersonnel mines at the Al Udeid facility in Qatar. According to documents from a recently awarded contract, it appears that one hundred forty-two Air Force CBU-89 Gator mixed system units (a total of 3,124 antipersonnel mines) and one hundred forty-one M18/M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel mines will be stockpiled in war reserve ammunition stockpiles by the Air Force in Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman.87 The contract was awarded to DynCorp Technical Services (Fort Worth, Texas) on April 20, 2000. This would be the first publicly known instance of the U.S. stockpiling antipersonnel mines in Bahrain and Oman.
It is not known if the government of Qatar regards the U.S. equipment stored on its territory as being under its jurisdiction or control. It is also not known if Qatari nationals are employed in the operation or maintenance of the storage facilities as part of joint ventures formed with U.S. companies; if so, it could put Qatar at odds with the Mine Ban Treaty's prohibition on assisting anyone in any way with an activity prohibited by the treaty.88
Department of Defense Officials refused to comment on the issue of either the possible deployment of Air Force or the presence of Army antipersonnel mines in Qatar.89 Qatari diplomats stated that the "mine issue has not been discussed between Qatar and the USA."90
Indeed, U.S. officials have refused to discuss the status of any bilateral arrangements or any modifications to Status of Forces Agreements that may allow the continued storage of U.S. antipersonnel mines with countries who are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. One Department of Defense official stated that the U.S. has "not pressured or coerced" such countries.91 Just one state party, Norway, has declared the presence of U.S. stockpiles in the ban treaty's article 7 "transparency measure" reports submitted to the U.N.
The U.S. retains about 1.22 million non-self-destructing M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines for use on the Korea Peninsula.92 It is unclear if these are exclusively stored at facilities in the Republic of Korea. The U.S. maintains ammunition reserves that could be sent to Korea in Japan, Okinawa, Hawaii, and possibly other storage facilities in the continental U.S. The Department of Defense has stated that it does "not publicly reveal specific types of munitions inventories or where they are located."93
Stockpile Destruction
The U.S. reported that it completed destruction of 3.355 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines on June 30, 1998.94 The Department of Defense told Human Rights Watch that this action fulfilled the direction given by the president in May 1996 to destroy all non-self-destructing mines not needed for Korea or for training purposes.95 The Department of Defense also said that all non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines have been removed from maritime pre-positioning ships like those docked in Norway that contain equipment for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade and other similar pre-positioning ships stationed at Diego Garcia, a territory of the United Kingdom in the Indian Ocean.96 The destruction of the non-self-destructing mines was conducted by open detonation at military facilities, and was carried out by the U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command of the U.S. Army Materiel Command. The cost was approximately $3.3 million.97
PDM and GEMSS mines are apparently also slated for destruction, but the status of each is unknown.
One problem facing the U.S. when the 16,000 PDM and 9.5 million ADAM antipersonnel mines are destroyed (demilitarized) is the presence of trace amounts of depleted uranium in the housing of these mines.98 Apparently, during the development of ADAM, depleted uranium was used to improve their structural strength to withstand the physical forces of being expelled from an artillery tube. It is not known whether DoD has developed procedures to demilitarize these mines and if the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved such plans. The U.S. Army is responsible for demilitarizing antipersonnel mines and is spending $6.4 million in research and development funds between 1999 and 2001 to develop cryofracture methods--using extremely cold gas--for the disposal of antipersonnel mines.99 The Department of Defense has estimated the total cost of destruction of ADAM and PDM mines at $32 to 44 million.100
U.S. Mine Stocks and the Mine Ban Treaty
U.S. ADAM, Gator, MOPMS, Volcano, GEMSS, PDM, M14, and M16 antipersonnel mines are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty because they clearly meet the definition of antipersonnel mine in the treaty.101 The treaty permits Claymore mines used in command-detonated mode, but prohibits use with tripwires.
Certain U.S. mines designated as antivehicle or antitank mines may also be prohibited under the treaty. According to the provisions of the treaty, antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that explode from an unintentional act by a person are considered to be antipersonnel mines and therefore prohibited.102 The U.S. possesses a large number of antivehicle mines that may, as the result of intentional or unintentional design consequences, cause them to function as an antipersonnel mine. However, it is not possible to state with certainty which mines would be prohibited and which not, both because ban treaty states parties have not clarified what is meant by "an unintentional act" and because there is insufficient data to render judgment regarding the stimuli or forces necessary to activate the kill mechanism for these various antivehicle mines.
It would seem clear that U.S. M15 and M21 antitank mines with M624 fuzes and tilt rods would be prohibited; at least one ban treaty state party, Canada, has destroyed its antitank mines with tilt rods.103 It is unclear if M15 and M19 antitank mines that use M1, M1A1, M3, M5, and M142 firing devices as antihandling devices, as well as M21 antitank mines using M142 firing devices, would be considered compliant. Similarly, it is unclear if the 20 percent of RAAMS and M75 GEMSS antitank mines that are equipped with antihandling devices would be considered compliant.104
Even less clear is the case for U.S. antitank mines that have magnetic influence fuzes like RAAMS, Gator, Volcano, MOPMS, and GEMSS. These mines are "designed to detonate when straddled by a tank, which interrupts the mine's magnetic field. A person can walk on it and move it, but if picked up quickly or rotated, it will detonate."105 Additionally, while Volcano, Gator, and MOPMS do not have an internal antihandling device, the mine "may detonate when moved, because the mine may sense a significant change from its original orientation."106 The M2/M4 SLAM with an infrared sensor may also be in this category of mines that are questionable due to overly sensitive fuzes.
73 China, Russia, and perhaps Belarus have larger stockpiles. See ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 11-12.
74 For detailed descriptions of these mine types, see Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Exposing the Source," April 1997, pp. 43-46.
75 See ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 330. Please note that these are the number of individual antipersonnel mines, not the number of delivery systems like artillery projectiles or air-delivered munitions dispensers. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided these figures, except for the M14 and M18/M18A1 mines, as of 1997. The numbers today are likely to be similar. The M14 number is an approximation contained in the 1999 U.S. report required under the CCW amended Protocol II (and is 63,093 less than reported by ACDA). The Claymore number comes from a symposium paper presented by two DoD officials: Harry Hambric and William Schneck, "The Antipersonnel Mine Threat: A Historical Perspective," Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, November 12-18, 1996, p. 29.
76 DoD officials confirmed the inclusion of antipersonnel mines in mixed systems to Human Rights Watch. DoD interviews, May 10, 2000.
77 Organization of American States, "OAS Register of Anti-Personnel Land-Mines: Summary Table of Information Submitted by Member States for the Period 1997-1999," CP/CSH-168/99, rev. 1, May 21, 1999.
78 Amended Protocol II, Article 4 and paragraph 2 of the Technical Annex.
79 Department of Defense, "Landmines Information Paper," March 3, 1999, p. 4.
80 Letter to Human Rights Watch from Dr. George R. Schneiter, Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, March 21, 2000. Hereafter cited as "Schneiter Letter, March 21, 2000."
81 Air Force Materiel Command, Air Armament Center fact sheets, "Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser," and "Current Development Armament Roadmap," undated, but obtained in April 2000.
82 Oral remarks by Italian and Spanish delegations to the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, Switzerland, May 22-23, 2000. Confirmation from capitals has not yet been received.
83 DoD interviews, May 10, 2000.
84 ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 333-334. Based on Air Force and other U.S. government sources from 1997 and 1998, the report cited 50,000 Gator and Volcano mines in South Korea, 49,610 Gator mines in Saudi Arabia, 33,000 Gator mines in Italy, and smaller numbers for Germany, Diego Garcia (U.K.), Japan, Turkey, Greece, and Spain.
85 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Article 1, Paragraph 1 (c).
86 U.S. Army Operations Support Command, Solicitation DAAA09-99-R-0118: "Maintenance and Supply/Service for Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS-5) Equipment in Doha, Qatar," January 21, 2000. Exhibit N, Technical Exhibit no. 11 of this solicitation is titled "Ammunition in Qatar" and shows the presence of seventy-two M691 ADAM projectiles (forty-eight hour self-destruct time) and one hundred eighty-nine M731 ADAM projectiles (four hour self-destruct time). Each ADAM projectile contains thirty-six antipersonnel mines.
87 U.S. Air Force Air Combat Command, Solicitation F44650-99-R0007: "Operation, Maintenance, And Support of Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel in Southwest Asia" August 9, 1999. Section E, Appendix 1, Enclosure 5 shows the planned on-hand balances of munitions stored at facilities in each of these countries to include one hundred forty-two CBU-89 Gator units and one hundred forty-one M18/M18A1 Claymore mines.
88 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Article 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1 (c).
89 DoD interviews, May 10, 2000.
90 Interview with Minister Khalifa Ahmed Al-Sowaidi, Chargé d'Affaires and Brigadier General Hamad A. Hinzb Al-Marri, Military Attaché, Embassy of the State of Qatar to the USA, Washington, D.C., February 16, 2000.
91 DoD interviews, May 10, 2000.
92 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Report to the Secretary of Defense on the Status of DoD's Implementation of the U.S. Policy on Anti-Personnel Landmines," May 1997, p. 11.
93 Schneiter Letter, March 21, 2000.
94 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release: "Destruction of Last Non-Self-Destructing Anti-Personnel Landmines in U.S.-Based Stockpile," June 25, 1998.
95 Schneiter letter, March 21, 2000.
96 DoD Interviews, May 10, 2000.
97 DoD estimate given in March 1998. "Annual Report to Congress on Use by Armed Forces of Antipersonnel Landmines," March 1998, p. iii.
98 U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC, Energetics Systems Process Division, "Demilitarization Plan for Non Self-Destruct and Self-Destruct Antipersonnel Landmines," August 1998, p. 1.
99 Department of the Army, "RDDS, PE 0605805A: Munitions Standardization Effectiveness and Safety," February 2000, pp. 4-5.
100 Department of Defense, "Annual Report to Congress on Use by Armed Forces of Antipersonnel Landmines," March 1998, p. iii and p. 15.
101 Article 2.1. states " `Anti-personnel mine' means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons."
102 Antivehicle mines with antihandling devices are explicited allowed under the treaty, so long as the antihandling device only "activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine." (Article 2.3.) If it activates when unintentionally disturbed, it is prohibited. This was made clear during the treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997, and has been restated by many states parties during the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee of Experts meetings in Geneva, January 10-11, 2000 and May 29-30, 2000. See Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, "Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices," January 10, 2000.
103 Canada destroyed the mines because it concluded that, while called an antitank mine, when equipped with tilt rod fuzes, it met the treaty's definition of an antipersonnel mine.
104 Data extracted from Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, May 29, 1998, chapters 3, 4, and 5; ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 325-326.
105 ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 326.
106 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, May 29, 1998, chapter 3.