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There has been no reported use of antipersonnel mines by U.S. armed forces since 1991 in the Gulf War. The U.S. has banned the use of non-self-destruct antipersonnel mines since May 1996, except for the defense of Korea until 2006 (or beyond if alternatives are not available). Under current policy, the government will prohibit the use of "pure" self-destructing antipersonnel mines (ADAM and PDM) globally in 2003, again except for Korea until 2006. Under current policy, the use of antipersonnel mines in mixed systems is not geographically or time restricted, but could be ended in 2006 if suitable alternatives are identified and fielded.107
Antipersonnel mines were not employed by U.S. air or ground forces in Yugoslavia during Operation Allied Force from March 24 to June 10, 1999. However, the U.S. reserved the right to use antipersonnel mines if it deemed it necessary.108 Had the U.S. done so, it could have put NATO allies, all but one of whom are ban treaty states parties, at legal risk given the treaty's prohibition on assisting in any way the use of antipersonnel mines by another entity (see below "Operational Issues").
The U.S. states that it has made the necessary amendments to its doctrine and training to comply with the requirements regarding mine use contained in the CCW's Amended Protocol II.109 The U.S. Army field manual governing mine warfare was revised in June 1998 to incorporate policy and treaty-mandated changes since its last publication in 1992. Minor technical changes to it were made in June 1999.
The U.S. no longer classifies Claymores as antipersonnel mines, thus they are not part of the U.S. policy to find alternatives and ban antipersonnel mines. The Mine Ban Treaty allows use of Claymore mines in command-detonated mode, but not with tripwires. According to Department of Defense officials, U.S. forces are "not trained in the use of tripwires and Claymore mines."110 However, a U.S. Army field manual indicates that tripwire fuzing for Claymore mines is authorized for and applicable in Korea.111 Claymore mines with M57 command detonating devices are routinely deployed in the basic combat ammunition load of U.S. forces and are likely present during operations and deployments to places such as Kosovo, Colombia, and the Persian Gulf.
The use of antipersonnel mines in minefields at the U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ended in 1999. According to the Pentagon, all of the antipersonnel mines and antitank mines have been removed from the minefields and destroyed. A commercial contractor using mine-detecting dogs to insure that total clearance has been achieved is checking the former minefields.112 Beginning in 1961, the U.S. used approximately 50,000 antipersonnel and antitank mines along the perimeter of its facilities at Guantanamo Bay.113
The mines that are already in the ground in South Korea in the DMZ are considered to be the property of South Korea, not of the United States. Thus, those mines would have to be removed when South Korea joins the ban treaty, but not when the U.S. does. U.S. war plans call for laying more than one million new non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines all across the northern part of South Korea (not in the DMZ) in the event of renewed war, as well as air- and artillery-delivered self-destructing mines.
The United States relinquished control of its military facilities in the Panama Canal Zone in December 1999. One of the most publicized aspects of this event was the responsibility for clearing unexploded ordnance (UXO) at several firing ranges and munitions testing ranges used by the U.S. According to a former Army official, the UXO does not include any antipersonnel mines. The U.S. Army tested mines at the Tropic Test Center and the Empire, Piña, and Balboa West ranges. The test program consisted of component and system tests but this source said there was no high explosive in the mines. The only detonable material used was for fuze function testing. All of the mine components were reportedly recovered for forensic examination.114
Operational Issues
There are a number of issues regarding interoperability, rules of engagement, command and control, and logistics between the United States and its alliance and coalition partners who are party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The major areas where U.S. operations may be limited:
· Europe: All NATO partners except Turkey and the U.S. are party to the treaty;
· Southwest Asia: Qatar is party to the treaty, and the U.S. often uses facilities in Europe to stage equipment to
this region; and
· Korea: Japan is party to the treaty.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines has expressed concern that participation by states parties in joint operations with the U.S. in which U.S. forces use antipersonnel mines could put the states at legal risk, and certainly is contrary to the spirit of a treaty aimed at no possession of antipersonnel mines.115 Such participation does not appear consistent with the treaty's article 1 obligation for a state party "never under any circumstance...[t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."
As noted above, there are also serious concerns related to U.S. desires to transit antipersonnel mines across the territories of states parties, and U.S. stockpiling of antipersonnel mines in states parties.116
The U.S. has tended to address these issues with each state individually. The status of discussions within NATO political and military structures is not publicly available. An official from the Department of Defense stated that the U.S. has "not pressured or coerced" other NATO countries or allies to violate their obligations under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.117 To date, no alliance-wide precedents have been publicly released regarding these issues.
U.S. Mine Casualties
Mines have caused nearly 100,000 U.S. Army casualties since 1942.118 One-third of all U.S. Army casualties in Vietnam were the result of mine incidents.119 Thirty-three percent of U.S. personnel killed in action and fourteen percent of the wounded in action during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf war were the result of mine incidents.120 Peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo have all resulted in U.S. mine casualties.
107 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: "U.S. Efforts to Address the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines," September 17, 1997.
108 Air Force officials told Human Rights Watch in early April 1999 that war plans included possible use of antipersonnel mines. A State Department official told Human Rights Watch on April 13, 1999 that antipersonnel mines remained "an arrow in the quiver" of the United States. A number of diplomats from other NATO countries also told Human Rights Watch that the U.S. insisted on the right to use antipersonnel mines. See also, Edith Lederer, "Land Mine Coalition Demands NATO Ban Use of Mines in Yugoslavia," Associated Press, United Nations, May 21, 1999.
109 United States of America, National Annual Report CCW/AP.II/CONF.1/NAR.13, November 5, 1999, p. 3. Chief among these requirements would be that all antipersonnel mines must be kept within marked and monitored minefields, or be equipped with both self-destruction and self-deactivation features if used elsewhere; also, use of non-detectable antipersonnel mines is prohibited.
110 DoD Interviews, May 10, 2000.
111 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, May 29, 1998, Chapter 4.
112 Schneiter Letter, March 21, 2000; the fact that antitank mines were also to be removed was disclosed at a DoD News Briefing on January 20, 1998.
113 DoD News Briefing, January 20, 1998.
114 Telephone interview with former munitions test official, March 2000.
115 ICBL, "Landmine Monitor Executive Summary 1999," p. 10.
116 See page 14 on transit and pages 16-18 on stockpiling.
117 DoD Interviews, May 10, 2000.
118 Harry Hambric and William Schneck, "The Antipersonnel Mine Threat," paper presented to the Technology and the Mine Problem Symposium, Monterey, California, November 18-21, 1996, p. 3-11.
119 Human Rights Watch and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Press Release, "Retired Generals Call for Total Antipersonnel Mine Ban, Pentagon Documents Reveal Devastating Effect of U.S. Landmines in Korea and Vietnam," Washington, D.C., July 29, 1997.
120 Hambric and Schneck, p. 3-28 and 3-33. The authors note that UXO incidents are included in this total because Joint Publication 1-02 includes UXO in the definition of mine.