OTHER

ABKHAZIA

Key developments since March 1999: HALO Trust and the Abkhazia Mine Action Center completed the nationwide minefield survey, and estimate 18,366,000 square meters of potentially mine threatened land in Abkhazia. As of May 2000, 460,077 square meters of land had been cleared, and 2,448 antipersonnel mines destroyed. Systematic mine awareness programs have been underway since early 1999 aimed at school children in mine affected communities. It appears that there is on-going use of mines in Abkhazia by Georgian armed groups. The Ministry of the Interior reported thirty-three landmine casualties between January 1999 and May 2000.

Background

After the disintegration of the USSR, the long-standing dispute over the political status of Abkhazia resulted in the outbreak of war between Abkhazia and Georgia, with significant use of mines, followed by a cease-fire agreement in May 1994. Peace negotiations are ongoing, but no progress has been made on agreement on the political status of Abkhazia. On 3 of November 1999 a national referendum took place, resulting in an Abkhazian declaration of independence. However, the international community did not recognize Abkhazian independence.⁵⁷ Skirmishes continue.

Mine Ban Policy

Abkhazia is not an internationally recognized state; it cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In early December 1999, in an interview with Landmine Monitor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the first time expressed his support for the treaty and readiness to address landmine issues in the context of the Abkhazia-Georgia peace process.⁵⁸ In May 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs clarified that Abkhazia would be ready to ban landmines and any other weapons as soon as they are not necessary for the defense of the national security of Abkhazia, depending on an appropriate commitment from Georgia.⁵⁹ Mines are still viewed as a legitimate and necessary weapon, and are used to protect Abkhazia from infiltration of armed groups from Georgia.

Landmine issues are addressed during the Abkhazian-Georgian talks at the governmental level mainly in the context of insurgent activities in the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia. Despite the importance of the landmine problem no formal negotiations have taken place specifically concerned with the issue of landmines.

The Abkhazian Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (AbCBL) was established in late 1999. In January 2000, AbCBL held a meeting with representatives of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), HALO Trust (British demining agency), Abkhazian Mine-Action Center (AMAC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia and local NGOs. During the meeting AbCBL expressed its determination to achieve a mine-free Abkhazia.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

It is not believed that Abkhazia has produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Abkhazia currently maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, though the size and composition are largely unknown. Most mines used in the conflict have been of Soviet manufacture, and it is likely that those types are now in the Abkhazian arsenal. These would include PMN-2, PMN, MON-50 and MON-100 mines.⁶⁰ (For information on transfer, see LM Report 1999, p. 837.)

Use

Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces used antipersonnel landmines extensively during the war of 1992-93. Mines have continued to be used in varying degree as the conflict heats up and cools down again since the May 1994 cease-fire. (For information about earlier use, see LM Report 1999, pp. 837-838.)

It appears that mines continue to be used in Abkhazia by armed groups that infiltrate from Georgian territory. Abkhazia's Ministry of the Interior states that from January 1999 through May 2000 there were twenty-four mine incidents on the territory of Abkhazia.⁶¹ UN sources have confirmed to Landmine Monitor that in this time period there were numerous mine attacks and ambushes targeting Abkhazian militia and civilians, killing and injuring a significant number of militia, civilians, and CIS peacekeeping troops.⁶² On some occasions the use of improvised explosive devices has also been reported.⁶³

The demining organization HALO Trust noted in March 2000 that "incidents of current mine laying...are increasingly rare."⁶⁴

There have been previous allegations of Abkhazian military groups or partisans laying mines in Georgia,⁶⁵ but Landmine Monitor is unaware of any allegations in 1999 or 2000.

The UN Security Council has repeatedly adopted resolutions in which it "condemns the activities by armed groups, including the continued laying of mines, which endanger the civilian population, impede the work of the humanitarian organizations and seriously delay the normalization of the situation in the Galii region, and deplores the lack of serious efforts made by the parties to bring an end to those activities..."⁶⁶

It has been reported that engineering units of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces use antipersonnel landmines in the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia in accordance with their mandate for protection of dislocation posts, strategic infrastructure sites and control posts.⁶⁷

Landmine Problem

After concluding their nationwide survey, HALO Trust, a British non-governmental demining organization, and the Abkhazia Mine Action Center in March 2000 estimated that there are 18,366,000 square meters of potentially mine-threatened land in Abkhazia.⁶⁸ About 7% of this land is considered Priority 1 (land next to human habitation, pressure for use of land is great), about 23% is Priority 2 (land close to human habitation, cleared land likely to be used), about 22% is Priority 3 (land not close to human habitation, cleared land may be used), and about 48% is Priority 4 (land not close to human habitation, cleared land is unlikely to be used).⁶⁹

In January 1999, the Government of Abkhazia estimated that there were between 30,000-35,000 landmines scattered in approximately 500 mined locations throughout Abkhazia.⁷⁰ HALO Trust had estimated in 1998 that there were close to 50,000 landmines in Abkhazia but further clearance work and extensive survey has now led them to conclude that the maximum number of mines in Abkhazia was never more than 15,000.⁷¹

The mine threat is restricted to four regions in Abkhazia: Sukhum, Gulripsh, Ochamchira and Gali. The worst affected areas are the banks of the Gumista and Ingur Rivers which formed the front lines at the beginning and end of the war, and along the M-27 highway between Gali and Sukhum where there were movements of troops and supplies and where the pre-war population was ethnically mixed. HALO survey teams found no evidence of mines northwest of the Gumista River.⁷² According to the UN, landmines are estimated to affect at least 2,000 hectares of arable farmland, as well as schools, hospitals, and administrative buildings in the Ochamchira region.⁷³

From its survey information, HALO has noted that in general: (1) Barrier minefields were used extensively on the banks of the Gumista and Ingur rivers to hamper full-scale military assaults. The Gumista River had over 5,000 mines laid on its banks. Mines are frequently washed downriver. HALO plans to clear this area by the end of the year 2000. (2) Defensive minefields were laid around military encampments, bridges and along access roads adjacent to M-27, to deny freedom of movement to opposition forces. Currently, HALO is only marking the positions of these minefields. (3) In the Ochamchira region, village people laid mines at the boundaries of their villages to protect against adjacent ethnically different communities.⁷⁴

Use of landmines has affected the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, as people are afraid of going to potentially mined areas.⁷⁵

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

In January 1999, in cooperation with Abkhazian authorities, HALO Trust established the Abkhazian Mine Action Center (AMAC) to supervise and coordinate mine action in the territory of Abkhazia. Recognized by the UN as a coordinating body for all mine action in Abkhazia, AMAC maintains a database of all information related to mines within Abkhazia, including the collation, translation and duplication of all wartime maps. These maps can be superimposed over existing ordnance survey maps to highlight danger areas; this information is all computerized. All mapping work is the responsibility of Abkhazian personnel.

AMAC is funded through HALO Trust by the governments of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Finland and the private foundations Pro Victimis and Anti-Landmyn Stichtung.⁷⁶

Survey and Assessment

Starting in 1999, survey and mine-marking teams were deployed to carry out an in depth survey of the extent of the mine/UXO problem in Abkhazia. In March 2000, HALO and AMAC reported the results of that survey.⁷⁷ HALO noted that "AMAC has proven in a remarkably short time to be an international model for a successful fully integrated Mine Action Center. One of the first specific tasks that AMAC set itself was to locate and map each and every minefield in the territory. This report is the fulfillment of that task. Researched, compiled and written by local staff with a minimum of expatriate involvement it represents the establishment of a truly indigenous capacity."⁷⁸

Mine Clearance

HALO Trust and the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CIS CPKF) are conducting demining operations in Abkhazia. HALO Trust started demining operations in 1997 with two demining platoons and now has five twenty-one man manual mine clearance teams working in Abkhazia; two teams are based in Gali and three in Sukhum. As of 1 May 2000, 460,077 square meters of land had been cleared, and 2,448 antipersonnel mines, 93 antitank mines, and 1,795 UXOs destroyed.⁷⁹

HALO has applied to the U.S. government for support for an additional three teams to operate in Ochamchira. HALO will employ 385 local staff and four expatriates in 2000. Manual teams concentrate on agricultural land and on sites where mechanical access is difficult. The manual mine clearance teams are all managed by local staff. HALO Trust has four Volvo vehicles, based in Sukhum, to support manual mine clearance.⁸⁰

The mine action priorities of HALO Trust and AMAC are as follows: 1. Return or resettlement of refugees and IDPs; 2. Agricultural land; 3. Infrastructure - schools, bridges, water, power and sewerage, road projects. There are some mountain areas where demining is not yet planned due to difficult mountain terrain, dense vegetation and lack of financial resources.

HALO, in cooperation with AMAC, maintains the reconstruction and development of cleared areas. The arable land that was cleared along the Gumista River is back in use by its previous private owners. Though this happens only in limited areas, the psychological effect is great. The industrial sites cleared by HALO Trust are not returning to production because of the lack of investment in small businesses and because supplies and equipment were looted during the war.

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS CPKF has been demining in Abkhazia. Roads, land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River have been surveyed and demined by the Russians. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, some 23,000 explosive devices have been cleared since 1994.⁸¹ HALO Trust states that Russian engineers "have undertaken limited clearance of items in Abkhazia," particularly in Gumista minefields. HALO notes that "some mines were missed and HALO had to re-clear some areas." HALO states that currently Russian engineers only deal with "increasingly rare" incidents of new use, and check the stretch of M27 between Gali town and Inguri bridge "several times each day."⁸²

Mine Awareness

Since its establishment at the beginning of 1999, the Abkhazia Mine Action Center has been running a mine awareness program in Abkhazia. The program is aimed at schoolchildren in mine-affected communities and is seen as an intrinsic part of survey and assessment.⁸³ The ICRC has supported AMAC and HALO in this effort. Mine awareness teams operate in Sukhum and Gali. The Sukhum-based team covers Ochamchira, Gulripsh, Gagra, and Gudauta; the Gali team also works in western Georgia. In addition to regular presentations to schools the teams also talk to NGOs, factory groups, ICRC, and to the various offices of the UN.

Mine Awareness presentations have been given to 3,078 recipients in Abkhazia and Western Georgia. The mine awareness teams have distributed 4,000 schoolbooks with a mine awareness message to schools. In 2000, plans call for providing every school child in Abkhazia with similar books. Posters with mine awareness messages have been printed and distributed nationally. Traffic billboards explaining the significance of minefield marking signs have been erected in the city of Sukhum. The mines awareness program is entirely Abkhazian managed.

Landmine Casualties

There is no systematic data collection on mine victims in Abkhazia; thus information is sketchy at best. The local NGO "Rehabilitation Center-AIS" is monitoring the problem and is creating a database of mine victims. At the end of April 2000, they had interviewed 153 amputees. The Center estimates that there are approximately 550-650 mine victims, with the number increasing each year. This NGO believes the information collected by the government misrepresents the actual number of victims.⁸⁴ The Ministry of the Interior reported twenty-four landmine and UXO incidents from January 1999 to May 2000, in which there were thirty-three casualties - fourteen people killed and nineteen wounded.⁸⁵

Survivor Assistance

The ICRC, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health Care of Abkhazia, runs an orthopedic workshop for the disabled, many of whom are landmine victims. According to the Abkhazian Social Security Foundation in 1998, there were some 490 amputees in Abkhazia⁸⁶ and by February 2000, some 450 of them had used the ICRC orthopedic workshop for free prostheses. There is little available in terms of rehabilitation services in Abkhazia. While medical personnel have the expertise to treat victims, at the Republican Hospital in Sukhum adequate resources and equipment to treat landmine injuries are generally not available.⁸⁷

CHECHNYA

Key developments since March 1999: The renewed conflict since September 1999 has seen extensive use of mines by Russian and Chechen forces. In April 2000, the Russian military revealed plans to deploy mines along the southern Chechen border with Georgia. In December 1999, mine clearance operations by HALO Trust were suspended. Mine awareness activities also ground to a halt, but by late spring 2000 had begun again. Many hundreds of new mine victims have already been identified.

Background

In September 1991, Chechnya proclaimed independence from Russia, and adopted the full name Chechen Republic Ichkeria. On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation sent troops into the Chechen Republic where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. In August 1996, the Khasav-Yurt peace agreements were signed; and a decision on the Chechen Republic Ichkeria's status was delayed till 1 January 2001.

Relations remained tense, however, and deteriorated to the point of Russia sending troops into Dagestan in August 1999 and then into Chechnya in September. Russian troops first secured the northern section of the country, occupied the Chechen capital of Grozny, then began pursuit of rebels in mountainous areas in southern Chechnya. The war, replete with massive violations of human rights and laws of war including widespread use of mines, continues as Landmine Monitor 2000 goes to print. (See also Landmine Monitor country report on Russia.)

Mine Ban Policy

Chechnya is not an internationally recognized sovereign state, and therefore cannot sign the Mine Ban Treaty. In 1998 then Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ilias Akhmadov expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty and said that the Chechen Republic Ichkeria would be ready to sign immediately.⁸⁸ With the resumption of the war in 1999, the Chechen position on a mine ban has reversed.

One Chechen parliamentarian noted that "any questions pertaining to the antipersonnel mine ban, which may be put by a sovereign state in peacetime to the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, are unacceptable at the present time."⁸⁹ Another government official said, "The question of banning the use of antipersonnel mines, which we put to some field commanders...caused unconcealed indignation. We considered it senseless to make further inquiries pertaining to this theme. The main conclusion made by our representatives is that mines will not be discarded from general military strategy by either the Russian Army or the Chechen detachments."⁹⁰

Production

It is unclear if, or how much, landmine production capability was located in Chechnya before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It is believed that there had been no domestic production of mines in Chechnya although some plants have produced military materiel.⁹¹ An engineer of the "Krasny Molot" plant said that Chechnya has never manufactured its own mines and does not produce them at the present time.⁹² He considered that making improvised explosive devises was not production, as they could not be made in large numbers.

Transfer

Chechnya has not made an official declaration regarding its position on the export or import of AP mines, but it is not known to have exported mines. The landmines in Chechnya were brought in during Soviet times. During the first war, it appears that Chechens obtained antipersonnel mines from Russian soldiers and officers, and mines also came from the Trans-Caucasus, delivered by groups on horseback across the mountains.

A Chechen military officer has said that all mines are remainders of stockpiles of the Armed Forces of the USSR or mines left by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation after the first war. He said the only method of receiving AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.⁹³

On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the U.S., Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, IliaS Akhmadov stated that Chechens were being provided "arms, ammunition, including explosives...by Russia." Earlier that month, Georgian intelligence services had captured a Russian military vehicle near the Russian military base in Vaziani, Georgia, attempting to transport weapons to Chechen militaries.⁹⁴ The SSM (State Security Ministry) of Georgia reported that the evidence of the trafficking would be submitted by Georgia's Procurator's Office to Russia's Procurator's Office. Vladimir Andreev, Commander of the Russian Military forces in Transcaucasus, responded that Georgia's SSM had forged a film depicting the illegal trafficking of weapons from Vaziani.⁹⁵

One Russian report stated that among other things Chechens used "serial landmines of Western manufacturing."⁹⁶

Chechen forces are known to have links with Islamist militant movements in the region and may also be obtaining military supplies, including landmines, from these support networks.⁹⁷

Stockpiling

It is not possible to get accurate information on the quantity of mines in Chechen stockpiles, but they consist mostly of Soviet-produced PMN and OZM mines. According to Mr. M. Arsaliev, the chief deminer of the Chechen Republic, the pre-war arsenal stored in the Chechen Republic consisted mainly of PMN, OMZ-72, MON-50, MON-90, and MON-100 antipersonnel mines, and TM-62 antitank mines.⁹⁸ During the fighting, stocks of AP mines, along with other weapons, were moved to secret camps and bases in mountain regions, especially in southern Chechnya.⁹⁹ A military official noted that the disproportion of fighting forces in Chechnya makes stockpile destruction impossible; mines will only be destroyed in the "natural" way.¹⁰⁰

Use

Both sides used mines in the 1994-96 Chechen conflict.¹⁰¹ (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for details). While some estimates of mines laid in the first war were over one million, surveys by the British demining organization HALO Trust found fewer mines than in other parts of the Caucasus. However, the perceived threat, based on accidents across the territory, resulted in large tracts of agricultural land not being used.¹⁰²

In the lull between the wars, there were allegations of continued use of landmines. In May 1997, HALO Trust said it had seen new minefields laid by Russian Interior Ministry forces along Chechnya's borders with Ingushetia and Dagestan.¹⁰³ Mines were also used by various armed groups and armed robbers.

With the renewed fighting, first in Dagestan in August 1999 and then moving into Chechnya, where it continues as this edition goes to print, mines have been used in significant numbers by all armed fighters. Chechens have made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke out.¹⁰⁴

Russian officials admit to the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations. A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote, "The use of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a `dire necessity.' In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not only to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first and foremost to protect the civilian population from international terrorists.... The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the purposes of defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers and other potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our territory."¹⁰⁵

Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and artillery-scattered mines, as well as remotely controlled devices. The main objectives of the initial stages of the operation were the creation of "security zones," and a "sanitary corridor." The military has said that at that point, only MVZ mines were used to protect check-points, outposts and temporary positions, and that the mines were removed whenever the units changed position.¹⁰⁶ They also said that the minefields were mapped and the "security zones" were marked.¹⁰⁷ As operations expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100 mines.¹⁰⁸

The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered mines.¹⁰⁹ The most commonly used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.¹¹⁰ Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.¹¹¹ Civilians returning to their homes have on occasion been injured by booby-traps left behind by Russian forces.

The Chechens have used mainly PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200, improvised explosive devices, grenades with trip-wires and to a wide extent booby traps.¹¹² A Russian military officer said that 90% of the mines were Russian-made, left over from the breakup of the USSR; he also stated that the Chechens used Italian-made mines.¹¹³ While Russian forces have used mostly AP mines, Chechens have used mainly antitank mines. According to one report, "The Chechen rebels use landmines of a wide range types and modifications, including serial landmines of Western manufacturing, as well as a wide spectrum of improvised explosives and even devices which to a great extent complicates mine clearance." Chechen fighters have used mines to retard the advance of Russian troops, as well as to complicate rebuilding of communication infrastructure, and along railroads, electrical supply lines and other such sites.¹¹⁴ By the summer of 2000, it was reported that, "Quite well equipped until recently, [the rebels] are now experiencing difficulties...in the supply of standard-issue munitions. Home-made explosive devices are therefore in use."¹¹⁵

In a radio interview, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov noted that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian force, and that the use of antipersonnel mines and antitank mines will only increase with the beginning of the partisan war.¹¹⁶ Another report indicates that for the Russians, in many cases, decisions to use mines were made at individual command and/or small reconnaissance team and patrol level.¹¹⁷

Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the fighting.¹¹⁸ Mines have been used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuating from Grozny traveled through a large minefield on the outskirts of the capitol suffering heavy casualties.¹¹⁹ Russians officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending to accept a bribe in exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. "Frankly, we did not expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the bait," said Gen. Vladimir Shamanov.¹²⁰

In one account of the incident, a Chechen fighter said, "I saw dreadful things during fighting in Grozny, but that massacre was beyond comparison. We had to walk on our dead comrades" to avoid stepping on unexploded mines."¹²¹ Several hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel commanders such as the Mayor of Grozny, Lecha Dudayev, who was killed by a mine. ¹²² One doctor in the nearby village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty-seven mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his right foot.¹²³

Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning civilians. On Russia's NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top Russian commander, said, "As long as the city isn't cleared of all mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are being banned from entering." He added, "Under civilian disguise, militants are trying to return to pick up their wounded."¹²⁴

On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been "completely cleared of mines." They did, however, note that the "city is still unsafe," charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.¹²⁵ In May 2000, Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power plants in Chechen's capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop "a plague of looting by their own [Russian] troops."¹²⁶

Since evacuating the capitol Grozny in early February, Chechen forces have resorted to guerilla tactics, mounting dozens of ambushes on Russian forces throughout Chechen territory. Usually, the ambushes are initiated by the use of concealed antitank mines that demobilize vehicles in the Russian convoy, followed by brief ground engagement by Chechen fighters. Such attacks have inflicted hundreds of Russian casualties and continue unabated.¹²⁷

In April 2000, it was reported that the "military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border" in order to stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not "disclose precisely" the type of mines to be used, noting only that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.¹²⁸ There has been speculation that the mining would be similar to that used in Afghanistan, where individual stretches of border were mined by sappers and in inaccessible areas, air-scattered by helicopter. The report also noted that when mines are air-scattered it is difficult to determine the exact location of the minefields, which endangers the movement of one's own troops.¹²⁹ The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is "considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border."¹³⁰

Landmine Problem

With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine clearance took place after the 1994-96 war, the current situation can only be worse - and the fighting continues. (For details of the mine problem as a result of the 1994-96 fighting, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 844.)

In addition to the mining of Grozny, air-scatterable mines have been used against guerrilla strongholds in the mountains. Forest ranges adjacent to villages and towns have also been mined, as have been the "administrative borders" of Chechnya, along the banks of the Terek River,¹³¹ the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.¹³²

During May 2000, the Chechen NGO, "Refugees Against Landmines," began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Panki Canyon of Akmeta district in Georgia about their knowledge of the landmine problem in Chechnya and mine victims. Responses about areas mined included the following:¹³³

· male from village on 1 May: fields near Samashky village and the nearby forests and roads;

· male from Urus-Martan on 6 May: arable land of Sovkhoz "Gorets" of Urus-Martan district by Russian forces;

· male from Urus-Martan on 6 May: arable land from Urus-Martan to Tangi-Chu; cattle pasture between Urus-Martan to Gekhi, near the highway to Baku - it was all mined in December 1999 and the minefields are not marked;

· 2 males from Urus-Martan on 6 & 7 May: sowing lands between Urus-Martan and Tangi-Chu are mined by Russian forces;

· male on 6 May: arable lands and fields in Naur district, and the bridge over the Terek river mined by Russian soldiers;

· male on 6 May: almost all civil and administrative buildings in Grozny.

Many refugees noted that minefields from the 1994-96 war had not been cleared. As one said, "After the first war, half of Chechnya was mined and still there are places not cleared yet... we shall see after the war."

In July 2000, a Russian television interview with a Russian sapper noted the following: "In innumerable areas in Chechnya, no man has set foot for several years now. It is dangerous to walk in woods, which have been mined by both our forces and the rebels. Since no minefields have been mapped, not even sappers take the risk. Civilians are blown up and farm animals killed by mines controlled by tripwires. The lofts and cellars of Grozny ruins are no less of a danger."¹³⁴

A Chechen doctor who operated on numerous mine victims said that no single town or district is without mines, and that even after the war, for ten or twenty years, mines will still be killing people. "There is no need to continue the war," he said, "even if troops leave now half the population will die." He believed that mine use in the second war was ten times greater than the first, and he said that neither side bothered with signs, marking or fencing.¹³⁵

Mine Action Funding

Even before the renewed war, international funding for demining had been almost nonexistent. There were no funds in the Chechen Republic budget for humanitarian demining. According to an agreement between Chechnya and the Russian Federation, financing of demining programs was to be carried out by Russia, but because of the financial crisis the program had not been implemented.

Mine Clearance

HALO Trust conducted a mine assessment mission in January 1997 and proposed a demining project in cooperation with the Chechen army.¹³⁶ For most of 1998 and 1999, HALO carried out programs in Chechnya. By the time of the 1999 Russian invasion, HALO had trained both manual and mechanical clearance teams. Operations were based in southwestern Chechnya. HALO was preparing to hand over management to Chechen personnel when the fighting began again. Operations were suspended in December 1999.¹³⁷

In February 2000, Russian military called upon the residents of Avtury to turn over arms and ammunition, and on behalf of the command of the Internal Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya promised "to clear the infested mined lands by the beginning of the planting season..."¹³⁸ In this vicinity about 1,500 hectares of land are infested with landmines and UXOs and have been unable to be farmed since the 1994-96 fighting.

On 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that "160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing in the Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district.".¹³⁹

Russian military stated, "During only the first week after gaining control over Grozny, the Russian sappers found in this half-destroyed city more than 3,000 landmines among other explosive devices, UXOs and ammunition - the result of surveying hardly one-third of the city. Due to this, the military command took the decision to suspend until special order entry to the city for civilians and journalists.¹⁴⁰ By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working in Grozny.¹⁴¹ On 24 April 2000, Russia declared the city "completely cleared of mines," stating that "[o]ver 177,000 explosive devices and rounds of ammunition were rendered harmless."¹⁴²

Mine Awareness

Prior to renewed fighting in 1999, the ICRC and Medical Emergency Relief International (MERLIN - a British NGO) had carried out mine awareness activities.¹⁴³ Just as the fighting has made clearance operations impossible, no mine awareness activities could be conducted. One Chechen NGO was formulating plans for mine awareness activities with refugees in Georgia, Ingushetya and Azerbaijan, but due to lack of resources and logistical constraints at that time, the project essentially remained a plan for the future. In early 2000, a very bleak picture of the situation was described:

The entire work carried out by our organization to inform the population of the danger of antipersonnel mines has been reduced since the beginning of the war. At the present time it is impossible to move about on the territory of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria and even if one reached any populated locality, having paid for this at every check-post, one would find out that it is a ghost town. It will be very difficult to work on problems of antipersonnel mines until the end of the military operations.... Our office in the city of Grozny, which contained video and photo materials, booklets, placards, warning boards and other things and equipment, has been completely destroyed.... Neither Russian nor Chechen military men inform the population about mined territories, moreover this information is kept secret.¹⁴⁴

Representatives from UNHCR reported that the agency plans to carry out mine awareness activities in Ingushetia/Chechnya and that the Danish Refugee Council also plans a project to target teachers and schools in Ingushetia.¹⁴⁵

By early summer 2000, mine awareness work in Chechnya is increasing. Movement around the territory is still dangerous and payment at Russian checkpoints still a necessity to reach communities; but it is possible to begin some work. A Chechen youth group, Laman Az (Voice of the Mountains), the Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development, the Chechen Human Rights Investigation Bureau, and the Danish Refugee Council are now actively involved in mine awareness activities. UNICEF now has funds to support such programs.¹⁴⁶

Landmine Casualties

With the end of the first war in 1996, there were an estimated 600 to 800 civilian landmine casualties in Chechnya, about half of whom are children.¹⁴⁷ Immediately after the war, the number of casualties from mines appeared to increase as people returned to their homes. Laman Az reported that during this time period, there were fifty-seven landmine casualties in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky region, forty-five landmine casualties in the Achoi-Martanovsky region, and thirty landmine casualties in the Urus-Martanovsky region.¹⁴⁸

By the outbreak of the war in 1999, there were approximately 3,500 people registered by the Ministry of Public Health in the Chechen Republic as needing artificial limbs. Of those, Chechen Health Ministry officials estimate up to 20 percent were mine victims.¹⁴⁹

One NGO had begun to compile information on mine victims, working through the Chechen Ministry of Health. In the spring and summer of 1999, it had compiled a list of names and addresses of 1,800 people injured by mines and were planning on cross-checking the information. When work had to stop with the outbreak of war, northern regions of Naursky, Shelkovsky, and Nadterochny had not yet been covered.¹⁵⁰

Officials indicated that the number of injured Chechen refugees in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the conflict in August 1999 is 347, including 88 children, 89 women and 210 men. The number of persons that need prostheses is 300, twenty-five of them critically.¹⁵¹

The "Kids of the Chechen War" program of the Children's Foundation reported on 250 injured children from Chechnya who applied for medical assistance; seventy of them are amputees requiring prosthetic aid.¹⁵² No Ministry of the Russian government or of the official temporary Chechen administration was able to provide any information on civilian victims of the current war.

During May 2000, the Chechen NGO "Refugees Against Landmines" began interviewing Chechen refugees in the Panki Canyon of Akmeta district in Georgia about their knowledge of the landmine problem in Chechnya and mine victims.¹⁵³ A female from Urus-Martan on 6 May reported that her brother Ibragin was killed on 14 April 2000 and her nephew, age 13, lost his eyes to a landmine. She also said, "A girl ran from some men and got killed in a nearby village on a landmine. These men laughed when they heard the explosion. She was 20-years-old." A woman, speaking about the casualties of the Chechen wars, said, "How can we name all of them? There were a lot who lost their legs and got killed due to these mines."

Landmine Survivor Assistance

Chechnya has historically been one of the poorest of the Soviet republics. The health care system was inadequate before the 1994-96 war and even then ill equipped to handle war victims. Two-thirds of hospitals and clinics were destroyed in that war and those that remained at the new outbreak of fighting were running at around 30% of their original capacity. If the medical system was in a crisis state with the first war, now it is impossible to assess what remains. Currently it is reported that the only place where a person who has been wounded by antipersonnel mines can receive assistance is Ingushetia.

KOSOVO

Key developments since March 1999: Both FRY and KLA forces used mines in the fighting that ended on 9 June 1999. NATO forces dropped cluster bombs in the March-June bombing campaign. Since June 1999, extensive mine action programs have been carried out. As of 1 July 2000, sixteen commercial and nongovernmental organizations are engaged in mine clearance. Approximately 8 million square meters of land have been cleared, including 4,173 AP mines, 4,175 AT mines, 4,591 cluster bomblets, and 9,412 other UXO. As of 31 May 2000, 463 villages in high and medium impact areas have been provided mine awareness education; eleven organizations are engaged in mine awareness programs. From June 1999 to 31 May 2000, there were a total of 492 mine/UXO victims identified in Kosovo.

Background

With the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, Kosovo became the southernmost province of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The FRY has been heavily dominated by its Serbian majority, while the majority population in Kosovo is ethnic Albanian. International pressure as a result of escalating conflict between the FRY armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and increasingly repressive measures against civilians in Kosovo led to negotiations in Rambouillet, France in February-March 1999. As these talks broke down, Serbian forces began "ethnic cleansing," forcing more than 800,000 Kosovars to flee to Albania and Macedonia.¹⁵⁴ With the stated objective of halting this process, on 24 March NATO launched a bombing campaign against the FRY and Serbian forces in Kosovo, which last lasted seventy-eight days. In the course of this conflict, large areas of Kosovo have been contaminated with mines and UXO.

In the agreement between the FRY and NATO on 9 June 1999, all FRY forces were withdrawn from the province and responsibility for the province's security was transferred to KFOR. As a province of FRY, Kosovo lacked the administrative apparatus of government. To provide an interim administration, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 created the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The ultimate status of the province remains undecided.

Mine Use by Yugoslav Forces

The FRY has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. (See report on Yugoslavia.) Historically the SFRY was a major producer of mines, and it is estimated that the FRY inherited stockpiles of several million mines in 1992. Many were used in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995, but it is likely that large stocks remained at the start of the conflict.

Several Yugoslav armed forces were operating in Kosovo before and during the NATO air campaign. The Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslovenska, or VJ) and Special Police forces operated in tandem with Serbian paramilitary forces under the control of the Serbian Interior Ministry known by the acronym MUP (Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova).

The Yugoslav Army laid extensive barrier minefields along its southern border. These minefields account for 75-80% of the mines laid in Kosovo. The majority are situated in remote border regions; many of them are marked.¹⁵⁵ The VJ also laid unmarked minefields around defensive positions in a wide variety of locations.¹⁵⁶ On occasion, Yugoslav forces also used booby-traps to target civilians.

The MUP Special Police and paramilitary forces laid many AP mines in and around civilian population centers. Evidence of such "nuisance mining" was found in Sicevo in Pec district, and most frequently in central Kosovo in Cabic, Donje Obrinje, Glogovac, Potart and Ujmir in Pristina district, and in Lubizba in Prizren district. "[M]any villages are afflicted with random mines laid with the sole aim of causing civilian casualties and thereby discouraging the return of refugees... are causing significant casualties and are denying access to farm land. This situation is most prevalent in villages formerly occupied by the MUP." ¹⁵⁷

Yugoslav forces are reported to have used PMA-1/1A, PMA-2, PMA-3, and PMR-2A mines. PMA-1/1A mines have been found in many places, such as around the village of Veliki Krystac in the Prizren district. The PMA-2 was discovered on the forested paths of Trstenik near Pristina and in the Djakova area, and the PMA-3 in Kotradic in Pec district. Many PMR-2A mines have been found on the outskirts of Donja Dubnica in the northern Mitrovica district.¹⁵⁸

Mine Use by the KLA

In June 1999, KLA leaders said that if the KLA were in a position to do so, it would sign the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁵⁹ KLA use of mines in the preceding months casts doubt on such a statement. It is unknown where the KLA obtained its mines, although there had been unsubstantiated allegations that they obtained weapons from Albania.¹⁶⁰

The KLA officially ceased to exist in September 1999 and stocks of weapons and ammunition, including mines, were handed over to KFOR before that date under the terms of an agreement for their demilitarization.¹⁶¹ The agreement provided a timetable for the KLA to disarm itself, and contained specific provisions concerning landmines and related weaponry in which the KLA agreed not to place any more mines (section 10b), to mark their minefields and booby traps by 25 June (section 14a), to establish secure weapons storage sites by 28 June to be registered with and verified by KFOR (section 23a), and to store in the registered weapons storage sites all prohibited weapons, including landmines within thirty days or before 20 September (section 23f1).

But it is very likely that mines of all types continue to be held by individuals and by unofficial Kosovar Albanian and Serbian groups. The number of mines handed over to KFOR is classified and it is not possible to make any accurate estimates of that number. In June 2000 two large caches of weapons and ammunition, including several hundred mines, were discovered in central Kosovo, in the village of Klecka near a former KLA headquarters. The KLA denied responsibility.¹⁶²

KLA officials including its chief mine clearance officer, Col. Bardhyl Tahiri, claimed that it never used AP mines during the conflict.¹⁶³ According to the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC), KLA forces did use AP mines sporadically during the war, mainly nuisance mining, particularly on routes travelled by VJ forces.¹⁶⁴ They also laid minefields around their defensive positions, but to a significantly lesser degree than the VJ, having smaller material resources, less freedom of movement and being engaged in a more fluid form of warfare. The HALO Trust found variations of PMR fragmentation mines around the perimeter of a KLA safe house in the village of Krajkovo in Pristina district.¹⁶⁵

The KLA predominantly used antitank mines.¹⁶⁶ Colonel Tahiri said that the KLA used antitank mines either captured or recovered from the VJ as well as AT mines improvised from components including explosive charges removed from Yugoslav AP mines. Most of the mines laid by the KLA were not properly recorded and the deaths of the combatants who laid them effectively erased any knowledge of their location.

According to UN sources, in the first weeks after KFOR entered Kosovo, the KLA systematically collected military ordnance for possible future use. In particular, the removal of stake mines from mixed stake and blast minefields resulted in the creation of some blast mine fields without any form of visible identification.

In the year since KFOR entered Kosovo in June 1999 there have continued to be reported and confirmed incidents of new mine use, particularly antitank mine use, by unknown persons, targeting the remaining Serbian population.¹⁶⁷ On 2 June 2000 near Preoce about seven kilometers west of Pristina, two people were killed and three injured in a mine explosion. On 15 June 2000 near Lepina two people were killed. KFOR now checks many roads and tracks each day.¹⁶⁸ On 22 March 2000 KFOR personnel discovered a device constructed from twenty-seven antitank mines on a road bridge north of Mitrovica, shortly after a railway bridge nearby had been destroyed by an explosion.¹⁶⁹

On 29 July 2000, NATO recovered a large cache of weapons, including 80 mines.¹⁷⁰

NATO Cluster Bomb Use

During the bombing campaign, the U.S. dropped 1,100 cluster bombs of the type CBU-87/B, each containing 202 BLU-97/B bomblets and the UK dropped 500 RBL/755 cluster bombs, each containing 147 BL-755 bomblets.¹⁷¹ Thus, a combined total of 295,700 bomblets were dropped by NATO. Estimates of the "dud rate" of cluster bombs, that is, the percentage that fail to explode on contact as intended and thus become de facto antipersonnel mines, run from a conservative 5% to as high as 30%. Human Rights Watch has criticized NATO for use of cluster bombs in populated areas and reported that NATO cluster bomb use can be confirmed in seven incidents resulting in civilian casualties (another five are possible but unconfirmed); some ninety to 150 civilians died during the conflict from use of these weapons.¹⁷²



Landmine Problem

Kosovo was littered with tens of thousands of antipersonnel landmines, mostly laid by FRY forces. Although it has been reported that some 500,000 mines were laid, KMACC has told Landmine Monitor that the actual number is likely to be around 50,000.¹⁷³ About eighty percent of the landmines are concentrated near the southern border, while nuisance mines are concentrated in the interior of the province. Additionally, it is estimated that 10-30,000 unexploded cluster bomblets and other UXO were to be found in the province at the end of the conflict.¹⁷⁴ Through its concerted efforts the international community quickly gained a remarkably full picture of the extent and variety of the mine/UXO problem in Kosovo, although data continues to be added. This initial information was gained from several sources.

On 13 June, the UK-based HALO Trust began a ten-week long minefield survey, in coordination with the KMACC in Pristina, which was completed in August 1999. The HALO report positively identified 252 areas with mines or unexploded ordnance (many areas containing multiple minefields), 684 villages which were found to be free of war debris, as well as 269 villages where it was uncertain (due to lack of information) whether or not they were affected.¹⁷⁵

A second source was the hundreds of maps of known minefields that the VJ began to provide to KFOR on 19 June 1999, as required under the agreement ending the war.¹⁷⁶ The first maps handed over identified 425 distinct minefields, but NATO engineers working under KFOR soon concluded that although at least eighty percent of the records coincided with their own ground observations, many of the maps and other information lacked sufficient detail to be useful. KFOR asked the VJ to revise the maps, and on 5 August, records marking 616 minefields were provided; one minefield was a duplicate, leaving the net total number of minefields identified by the VJ as 615. This has since been amended to 620.¹⁷⁷

This second set of more comprehensive records showed sixty of the original 425 minefields in different locations,¹⁷⁸ and KMACC found gaps in many areas especially in heavily mined areas in the south of the province near Macedonia and Albania; the quality of the maps was highly variable.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, this information suggested that the great majority of mines were concentrated in the south near the borders with Macedonia and Albania. An unknown number of mines were buried on the Albanian side of the border. (See Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Albania).¹⁸⁰

Another source of less complete and reliable information were KLA officers indicating locations where they had used landmines during the conflict. Colonel Tahiri reported that the KLA did not have maps of its mines, but had cleared all the mines that it had used.¹⁸¹ He also said the KLA has provided KMACC with complete information about its clearance activities, yet the KMACC program manager said that the KLA had reported only a few of their mine clearance activities to his office,¹⁸² and KFOR officials said that the KLA had registered relatively few mines with them.¹⁸³

A fourth source was the mapping coordinates for the areas attacked with cluster bombs by NATO during the conflict; although initially reluctant to provide "classified information," after international pressure the data was given to KMACC. The records indicated 333 separate targeted areas.¹⁸⁴ The final ongoing source of information has been reports being filed daily with KMACC by KFOR forces, nongovernmental organizations, commercial contractors and others operating under U.N. auspices in Kosovo.

Mine Action Funding

Funding for mine action in Kosovo has been a mixture of direct funding to NGOs and commercial companies and the establishment of a UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) for Kosovo. As of 31 May 2000, approximately $6.83 million had been contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo, and an additional $600,000 pledged. Contributions are outlined in the table below.¹⁸⁵

Table 1. Contributions to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Kosovo as of 31 May 2000

Date Funds Received	Donor	Amount (US$)
15-Nov-99	Australia	266,910
12-Apr-00	Australia	47,744
19-Aug-99	Belgium	79,321
20-Aug-99	Belgium	185,112
22-Sep-99	Canada	47,500.00
11-Feb-00	Canada	346,265
30-Jul-99	Denmark	211,996
01-Nov-99	European Union	2,525,520
24-Dec-99	European Union	1,015,500
24-Aug-99	France	325,2035
21-Jul-99	Luxembourg	126,186
10-Dec-99	Netherlands	798,375
30-Jun-99	Norway	199,980
25-Apr-00	San Marino	15,000
29-Feb-00	Spain	185,000
19-Jul-99	Switzerland	152,129
30-Jun-99	United Kingdom	300,000
Subtotal		6,827,745

Funds Pledged
12-Aug-99	European Union	600,000
Subtotal		600,000

Total Funds

7,427,745

In addition to these financial contributions, in-kind donations of personnel have been provided by Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Equipment donations have been provided by Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The following organizations carrying out mine action programs in Kosovo have been funded in 1999-2000:

Table 2. Funding of mine action organizations 1999-2000¹⁸⁶

Organization	Funding (governmental unless stated otherwise).
BACTEC International Ltd.	U.K. Department for International Development (DFID). Operating in MNB (N), MNB (C) and MNB (E). MNB = MultiNational Brigade area)
Danish Church Aid / Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)	Denmark. Operating in MNB (W).
Defence Systems Ltd.	U.K. DFID. Senior partner in MNB (S).
EMERCOM (Russia)	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
European Landmine Solutions Ltd. (ELS)	UK DFID. Operating in MNB (W) and MNB (S).
HALO Trust	U.K. DFID, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, International Trust Fund (ITF) using funds from United States, Germany and Czech Republic, bilateral agreements with AAR of Japan and Pro Victimis. Operating in MNB (W). Senior Partner in MNB (C).
Handicap International	Operating in MNB (W). Senior Partner for Djakove Municipality.
HELP (Germany)	Germany through the ITF (with matching US funds).
International Demining Alliance of Canada Inc.	Canada
INTERSOS	Italy and ECHO. Operating in MNB (W).
Mines Advisory Group	Manual teams funded by World Vision and ECHO. Flail funded by U.K. DFID. Senior Partner MNB (N).
MineTech	MACC core assets funded using EU contributions to VTF and donation by Belgium. Senior Partner MNB (E).
Mine Clear International Ltd	Funded using EU contributions to VTF. MACC core assets operating Province-wide.
Norwegian People's Aid	Norway. Flails donated by Finland. Senior Partner MNB (W).
RONCO	U.S. Operating in MNB (E).
Swiss Federation for Demining	Working in support of ICRC Safer Village Program.

Mine Action Coordination and Planning

UNMIK was mandated to "establish, as soon as possible, a Mine Action Center to deal with the threat posed to the returnees and internally displaced persons by landmines and unexploded ordnance."¹⁸⁷ Accordingly, the United Nations Mine Action Service established a Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC) in Pristina, which became operational on 17 June 1999, five days after the entry of KFOR into the province.¹⁸⁸

Mine action in Kosovo is based on lessons learned in other mine-affected areas, including Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to John Flanagan, the Program Manager of KMACC, "[W]e are not reinventing the wheel. The lessons have been hard learned over time and we cannot ignore them."¹⁸⁹

There are three fundamental aspects of the Mine Action Program (MAP) in Kosovo. From its inception, KMACC has concentrated on coordination and the setting and enforcement of standards, without attempting to engage directly in clearance operations. It has not opened regional offices but has appointed implementing agencies as "senior partners" in each of the MultiNational Brigade (MNB) areas. Second, there is a realistic and structured mine action plan for containing the landmine/UXO problem and then scaling down international assistance and handing the program over to the local implementing agency, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Whether or not this happens on time or without problems remains to be seen, but donors, the UN and international NGOs have a clear timetable on which to plan. Third, compared with previous mine action programs, KMACC activities are effectively integrated into the overall reconstruction plan for Kosovo.

Mine action planning for Kosovo is based on the premise that the problem can be brought under control through a three-year program. In order to achieve this, the program has been divided into three distinct phases, the first two of which have been completed:¹⁹⁰

· Preliminary Phase: key activities in Kosovo included mine awareness training to refugees in camps before they returned to the mine-affected area, rapid assessment of the mine/UXO threat, establishment of a Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina as the focal point for humanitarian mine action activities, and establishment of a victim surveillance system. This phase is now complete.

· Emergency Phase: key activities included mined area verification/survey; Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tasks; battle area clearance; mine/UXO clearance of houses, key installations, essential infrastructure and mined areas; building local capacity; ongoing mine awareness; and development of victim assistance capacities. This phase was completed on 31 December 1999.

· Consolidation Phase: the transition from Emergency to Consolidation Phase activities in Kosovo involved the development of an integrated plan for mine action. The plan builds upon the foundation created during the Emergency Phase, particularly with regard to the local capacity developed over this period by NGOs. The objectives of this third phase include the systematic clearance of mines, reduction in casualties through effective mine awareness, rehabilitation and reintegration assistance to mine victims, and development of institutional arrangements upon which the medium to long-term requirements for mine action will be based.

The plan will also integrate the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) into the Mine Action Program, as the indigenous organization tasked to assist with mine/UXO clearance. Reliance on international assistance will decrease in a controlled manner as part of a deliberate exit strategy, including reduction in the number of local deminers as mined areas become cleared. This is necessary to ensure that there is a phased reintegration of personnel into employment outside mine action.

In order to achieve the objective of clearing all high priority areas in 2000, emphasis is placed on the integration of manual teams, mechanical assets and Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) teams, which greatly increases the efficiency of clearance operations. This integrated approach will lead to a significant amount of land being returned to productive use without the necessity for full-scale manual clearance operations. Level 2 survey activities are being developed to pinpoint the exact location of the mined areas, prior to beginning clearance activities at a particular site. The MACC philosophy for Quality Control is to systematically inspect each clearance site at various stages of the process. The combination of these checks will constitute a comprehensive evaluation of the standards to which activities have been completed. KMACC has contracted the services of an independent QC capacity for this purpose.

Having entered the Consolidation Phase at the start of 2000, the mine action objectives for this year are the clearance of all high priority mined or dangerous areas, clearance of all cluster munition sites, the reduction of casualties through effective mine awareness and support to the existing prosthetic and rehabilitation capacities in addition to psychosocial and vocational training activities. For these aims to be attained, KMACC made several assumptions, that current levels of support would continue with additional assets as required, and that weather would permit a full work season. Two other assumptions were that there is no significant increase in reported dangerous/mined areas, and that all cluster strike areas can be rapidly surveyed and marked. KFOR units have been assigned responsibility for this latter task.

The success so far of the operation in Kosovo has brought within sight the broader humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty. The KMACC stated, "Finally, in Kosovo, there is the possibility of fulfilling the requirements of the Ottawa Treaty, even though the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not a signatory. By reinforcing the success that has been achieved to date, this situation could be realised in a period of three years. This would be a tremendous achievement both symbolically and physically, and the international community could be justifiably proud of this result. Conversely, any reduction in effort at this point could mean that this period is measured in decades, not years."¹⁹¹

Survey and Prioritization

As noted above, on 13 June 1999, the UK-based HALO Trust began a ten-week long minefield survey, in coordination with KMACC in Pristina, which was completed in August 1999. The HALO Trust level 1 survey was designed to locate battle debris that posed an immediate risk to the civilian population. Based on interviews with repatriated refugees and other residents, and assessments by HALO experts in vehicles and on foot, the survey focused on affected or potentially affected areas in and around populated villages and towns. Six teams covered every accessible village over a ten-week period beginning on 13 June, four days after the end of the war. They later provided 1,205 survey reports of specifically affected areas to KMACC. The HALO report positively identified 252 areas with mines or unexploded ordnance (many areas containing multiple minefields), 684 villages which were found to be free of war debris, as well as 269 villages where it was uncertain (due to lack of information) whether or not they were affected.¹⁹²

The core tool facilitating coordination and task prioritization is the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), a mine action management package developed for the UN by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in collaboration with UN Mine Action Service. The system has been used operationally for the first time in Kosovo. It is made up of a database that holds mine/UXO information and a Geographic Information System to display and map data, which can be produced on a scale of 1:50,000.

The survey information provided by the HALO Trust was the first data entered into IMSMA, and gave an initial indication of the location and scale of contamination. The Survey Action Center (SAC) was then contracted to tailor a specific software solution to combine data from a wide variety of sources¹⁹³ and the initial HALO assessment. A socio-economic impact index was created and information aggregated at the district level for the 320 districts of Kosovo. Classification of dangerous areas and district remains flexible enough to absorb reconstruction priorities as they are created.

The methodology has proven to be statistically highly accurate. According to KMACC, "As a result of the Survey, each district within the Province has been categorised as having a High, Moderate, Low or Nil impact as the result of mine/UXO contamination. Furthermore, each individual mined or dangerous area can be characterised in the same way, based on its effect on agricultural development, proximity to habitation or lines of communication, and impact on activities such as firewood collection. Based on these criteria, 760 out of a total 1,926 recorded dangerous areas have been classified as having a high impact. This degree of analysis enables a clear definition of priorities for clearance, as well as identifying where other activities such as mine awareness must be placed as a minimum activity...."¹⁹⁴

Mine/UXO Clearance

As of July 2000, there are sixteen international commercial and nongovernmental organizations engaged in mine and UXO clearance. Although KFOR has made some preparations for the return of the VJ to clear mines as required by the Military Technical Agreement, the decision to implement this rests with Commander KFOR based on his assessment of the security situation. The VJ has not returned as yet because of security risks.

Table 3. Organizations engaged in mine and UXO clearance in Kosovo, July 2000¹⁹⁵

Organization	Capacity
BACTEC International Ltd.	Four CBU clearance teams and two EOD teams.
Danish Church Aid / Action by Churches Together (DCA/ACT)	84 manual mine clearance personnel; access to Hydrema Flail (Danish Battalion KFOR)
Defence Systems Ltd.	Four manual clearance teams and two ready response teams.
EMERCOM (Russia)	Twenty deminers and two Explosive Detecting Dog (EDD) teams (four dogs total).
European Landmine Solutions Ltd. (ELS)	Six CBU clearance teams, and three EOD teams.
HALO Trust	Two hundred mine clearance personnel, three CBU clearance teams, four Case rollers and a crusher.
Handicap International	Two manual teams and one EDD team (two dogs).
HELP (Germany)	Two manual clearance teams.
International Demining Alliance of Canada Inc.	Two manual clearance teams. One mini-flail (Bozena). One EDD team (two dogs). One EOD team.
INTERSOS	One Manual Team and two EOD teams.
Mines Advisory Group	One mine action team, Minecat flail, one Minecat support team of 7 deminers.
Mine Tech	Two manual teams and four EDD teams (MACC core assets). Two manual teams and two EDD teams (UNHCR)
Mine Clear International Ltd	One Armtrac heavy flail and one Bozena mini-flail
Norwegian People's Aid	Four manual mine clearance teams. Two Sisu flails as MACC assets.
RONCO	Five CBU clearance teams
Swiss Federation for Demining	Three rapid response teams

In Kosovo, the use of dogs, machines and manual deminers as a system has been implemented from the start. Building on lessons learned in Bosnia, the requirement for deminers to be cross-trained as far as possible in demining, EOD and house clearance was also accepted. The integration of a Quality Control (QC) regime into every stage of the demining process is novel and the result of lessons from other operations. The QC process begins with the accreditation of organizations and covers all activities to the point where an area is declared cleared.

As of 1 July 2000, almost eight million square meters of land had been cleared and/or verified, including more than 16,000 houses and 776 schools. Some 4,173 AP mines were destroyed, along with 4,591 cluster bomb units, 9,412 other types of UXO, and 4,175 AT mines. ¹⁹⁶

Mine/UXO Awareness

As with mine survey and clearance, mine awareness is coordinated through KMACC. After a chaotic start with too many NGOs trying to implement mine awareness programs with no experience and no attempt at coordination, KMACC together with UNICEF have been able to coordinate and rationalise the system.

Mine awareness programs can be designed to target specific groups. As analysis of mine victim data shows that males between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five are the most at-risk group of the population, an awareness campaign targeting this group is currently being implemented. A child orientated awareness program is being implemented to cover the gap until mine awareness education becomes part of the school curriculum in November 2000. This activity will be launched in conjunction with the ongoing Safer Village projects and safe play area-marking schemes. The Safer Village concept examines the specific needs of a village and tries to provide alternatives to risk-taking behavior. This may mean the provision of firewood in winter until forests where wood has traditionally been collected are cleared on mines. The Child-to-Child program focuses on the child as a trainer of other children, and on parents in the home using traditional games and activities to reinforce mine awareness messages over a longer period of time. An additional benefit has been children using information gained in this program to report mines and UXO in the locality to village adults and KFOR personnel.

There are eleven organizations currently carrying out mine awareness programs in Kosovo, as outlined in the table below. Additional mine awareness capacity is expected from HMD Response using U.S. government funding through the International Trust Fund.

Table 4. Organizations currently implementing mine awareness programs¹⁹⁷

Organization	Capacity	Remarks
CARITAS		Senior Partner in MNB (S)
HALO Trust	Two mine awareness teams	Bilateral agreement with AAR Japan. Operating in MNB (W).
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Safer Village Community mine awareness teams.	Active in all but four of the twenty-nine municipalities
Islamic Relief Worldwide	Imam and Child to Child Programs	Funded using EU contribution to VTF.
KFOR	Teams from Sweden, Finland and France accredited by the MACC to conduct mine awareness.
Mines Advisory Group	Seven teams	4 Child to child training. 3 Community-based mine awareness. MNB (N, E, S)
Mines Awareness Trust	Two teams	Operating in MNB (W). Child to Child and Train the Trainer programs.
MineTech	Community-based mine awareness teams	Operating in support of MineTech Clearance operations.
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)	Two mine awareness teams	Operating in MNB (W) in support of NPA clearance operations. Funded using EU contribution to VTF.
Save the Children		School Curriculum development funded by UNICEF.
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF)	Youth Program	Funded by MACC using EU contribution to VTF.

Note: MNB refers to MultiNational Brigade

Some 1,973 villages have been classified as being in low, medium and high impact areas. As of 31 May 2000, 209 villages of the 425 in the high impact areas (49%) had been reached with mine awareness programs. Of the 537 villages in the medium impact areas, 47%, or 254, had been involved in mine awareness activities.¹⁹⁸ Mine awareness efforts by activity are described in the table below.

Table 5. Mine awareness by activity as of 31 May 2000¹⁹⁹

Activities	Child to Child	Community	Direct	Imam	Youth	Total Activities
Total	141	445	311	20	45	962
High impact	47	164	102	3	18	334
Medium impact	55	155	122	10	15	357

Note: This table describes the number of villages that are either in a Medium or High Impact area and does not include figures for villages located in Low Impact areas.

Mine/UXO Casualties

In the five months after the end of the war on 9 June 1999, 800,000 refugees returned to Kosovo.²⁰⁰ During this period there were many mine casualties, despite the fact that mine awareness programs had been carried out in refugee camps before their return. From 7-14 July 1999, the World Health Organization (WHO) conducted an assessment of the number of people injured or killed by mines and UXO in the four weeks following the end of the conflict, based on data from Kosovo's six hospitals and the KMACC database. It estimated that in the four weeks following 13 June 1999, 150 people were maimed or killed by mines and UXO: "[T]his corresponds to a monthly incidence rate of 10 per 100,00 population (an annualised rate of 120 per 100,000). Seventy-one per cent of the survivors are younger than twenty-four.... Nineteen per cent of the seventy-five patients interviewed were injured during demining efforts by the Kosovo Liberation Army. In some areas 35% and 42% of hospital beds in the surgical and orthopaedic wards are occupied by survivors of explosions of mines or unexploded ordnance."²⁰¹ WHO commented that this rate far exceeds that found in many other countries affected by mines.²⁰²

Between June 1999 and 31 May 2000, there have been more than 492 people involved in mine/UXO incidents. Of these, ninety-eight have died and the remainder have sustained injuries ranging from traumatic loss of limbs to minor wounds. Following the decline of casualties over winter, the rate of casualties has risen recently to approximately fifteen per month.²⁰³ The resources currently available to deal with the immediate and follow-up specialized treatment for mine victims are inadequate. Unexploded cluster munitions appear to pose the greatest threat, particularly to children. As of June 2000, about 80 children (0-18 years) had been killed or injured by these UXO compared to about 60 child victims from antipersonnel mines. ²⁰⁴

Since 1 June 1999, the overall victim rate is 15.4 per 100,000 population, and mortality rate is 4.9 per 100,000 population. Based on mortality data from 1994, mine/UXO injuries represent the fourteenth leading cause of death in Kosovo. There is one death for every five mine/UXO victims injured.²⁰⁵

There have been ten casualties among mine clearance personnel up to July 2000. Five incidents involved traumatic amputations of the lower leg through mine blast, two involved blast injuries to one foot (with minor, non-permanent damage to the foot), two involved blast injuries from close proximity to mine/UXO detonations (both non-permanent injuries) and one involved minor damage (non-permanent injury) to the hand.²⁰⁶ Numerous casualties to KFOR personnel have also been reported in the press.²⁰⁷

Survivor Assistance

In Kosovo, the lead agency for victim assistance is the World Health Organization which, with the ICRC and a number of NGO partners such as Handicap International and the Mother Theresa Society, are developing the means to provide comprehensive medical and rehabilitation care to mine victims. However, this will take some time, as much of the public health system and services had deteriorated in recent years and will require considerable effort to be upgraded. By February 2000 Handicap International had registered 482 amputees (of which, seventy-three percent were adult men, sixteen percent adult women, eleven percent children).²⁰⁸ Not all of these are mine victims. There is one prosthetics center in Kosovo, in Pristina. In addition, the International Trust Fund of Slovenia has provided rehabilitation assistance to a number of mine victims.²⁰⁹

Table 6. Organizations with current victim assistance programs²¹⁰

Organization	Capacity	Remarks
Handicap International	Prosthetic and rehabilitation support.
ICRC	Victim surveillance system	In conjunction with WHO and MACC
VVAF	Victim assistance outreach program	Funded by EU contribution to VTF.
WHO	Victim assistance point of contact

NAGORNY-KARABAKH

Key developments since March 1999: In March 2000, the Nagorny-Karabakh Minister of Agriculture said that thirty percent of the territory's most productive agricultural lands are not being used because of the danger of mines. HALO Trust, which had carried out mine clearance in Nagorny- Karabakh in 1995-96, resumed operations in January 2000.

Background

Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan, but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. In 1988, the region voted to secede and join Armenia, which led to armed conflict from 1988-1994 involving forces from all three armies. In the midst of the conflict, the region proclaimed itself the Nagorny-Karabakh Republic (NKR) on 2 September 1991, and declared independence on 6 January 1992. Armenian forces occupied 20% of Azerbaijan territory. The UN Security Council adopted four resolutions in 1993, calling for the withdrawal of Armenian occupying forces from Azeri territories and reiterating the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with Nagorny-Karabakh as an integral part.²¹¹ These resolutions have not been implemented. In May 1994 Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a cease-fire agreement; however, negotiations for a final peace agreement are still going on under the auspices of the OSCE.

Mine Ban Policy

There have been no public comments regarding landmines by officials of Nagorny-Karabakh. The Nagorny-Karabakh military has told the Landmine Monitor researcher that mines are viewed as useful weapons in numerous tactical military tasks and that as long as the war lasts, mines are necessary. The military recognizes that mines kill both enemy and friend.²¹²

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Nagorny-Karabakh is not known to have produced mines. Stocks now held are of former Soviet production, but types and numbers are unknown. The most commonly used mines during the conflict were Soviet PMN-2 and OZM-72, as well as Soviet MON mines and Italian TS-50.²¹³ During the armed conflict, the fighting parties used antipersonnel mines extensively, in areas claimed by Nagorny-Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Armenia, though the heaviest concentration of mines by far is in Nagorny-Karabakh.

Landmine Problem

The region of Nagorny-Karabakh is considered to be one of the most heavily mined regions of the former Soviet Union. The Nagorny-Karabakh Minister of Agriculture Mr. Armo Tsaturian, said that thirty percent of the territory's agricultural lands are not being used because of the danger of mines. He pointed out that these lands are the most productive areas in the valleys and foothills. The Minister also reported that eight hectares of vineyards are also inaccessible because of the mines.²¹⁴ Approximately 15,000 hectares of land, roads and forests must be surveyed for future mine action.²¹⁵ Nearly five thousand hectares of these territories are arable lands.

The United Nations and the U.S. had estimated the number of mines in Nagorny-Karabakh at 100,000, but after its 1998 assessment mission, the UN Mine Action Service concluded that the mine problem was not nearly as bad as original estimates portrayed.²¹⁶

Mine Action

In 1995-96, the British demining NGO HALO Trust carried out mine clearance in Nagorny-Karabakh and cleared more than 2,000 mines and 9,000 items of UXO from 883,000 square metres of land. In addition, HALO trained local specialists. In January 2000, HALO resumed operations in Nagorny-Karabakh and aims to support the existing mine clearance capacity, provide specialist training and to establish a mines action centre to coordinate the clearance work with the needs of the development community.

In 1993, Nagorny-Karabakh created a Working Group on Mine Problems (WGMP), under the Special Governmental Commission, whose task was to collect information on the landmine problem. In 1999-2000, headed by a special representative of the Prime Minister, its activities were expanded to include coordination among the various relevant ministries dealing with the various aspects of the mine problem, including mine clearance, minefield marking and mapping, mine awareness activities, and provision of basic medical aid courses.

Ministry of Defense engineer regiments deal with mine clearance while Emergency Services Department teams are responsible for the clearance of UXO. They inform the WGMP of their activities, except when the information is classified. With HALO support, the Emergency Services Department cleared over 1,000 UXO in the first three months of 2000, compared to 37 items of UXO destroyed in the whole of 1999.

Mine Awareness

The International Committee of the Red Cross office in Stepanakert initiated mine action programs in May 1994. The programs seek to educate the public, and in particular children, about the danger of mines. ICRC cooperates with the Ministry of Education and Science, as well as with the WGMP. The ICRC and the government created a map indicating the dangerous zones in the territory, which has been distributed among the village communities. Recently the WGMP and the ICRC prepared a notebook for schoolchildren which illustrates types of mines and UXO. Some 46,000 copies of this notebook will be distributed for free among schoolchildren. The WGMP has also prepared several mine awareness videos and posters, and special radio and television programs are continuously broadcast throughout Nagorny-Karabakh.

Landmine Casualties and Victim Assistance

The Nagorny-Karabakh Ministry of Health reports that between June 1993 and May 1999 the number of victims of explosions, including mines, was 687 of whom 180 died and 507 were injured.²¹⁷ Among the victims the children are gradually outnumbering the adults.

At a session of the WGMP in June 2000, the following statistics were presented: in 1995, there were eighty-two mine incidents; in 1996, sixty-four; in 1997, there were twenty-five incidents; in 1998, sixteen; and in 1999, thirty. According to the WGMP, twenty-eight of the victims in 1999 were male. As of June 2000, there have been twelve incidents, with five deaths and seven injuries.²¹⁸

An orthopedic hospital was established in 1994.

57 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1287, 31 January 2000, called the referendum "unacceptable and illegitimate."

58 Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia Sergei Shamba, Sukhum, Abkhazia, December 1999.

59 Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Shamba, Sukhum, Abkhazia, 5 May 2000.

60 Information provided to the AbCBL by HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine-Action Center, Sukhum, Abkhazia, May 2000; also, HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, pp. 40-46.

61 Report of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Abkhazia, April 2000. LM has information on specific incidents available upon request.

62 Information provided by UN sources to LM/HRW by email, July 2000. Also, information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia to the AbCBL.

63 Report of the Ministry of Interior, April 2000.

64 HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 26.

65 1999 Landmine Monitor interview with M. Rapava, Head of Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia.

66 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1225, 28 January 1999. See also, UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1187, 30 July 1998; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1150, 30 January 1998; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1124, 31 July 1997; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1096, 30 January 1997; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1065, 12 July 1996.

67 LM Monitor 1999 report on Russian Federation.

68 HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 22. Also, HALO Trust assessment report, dated 11 April 2000, provided to AbCBL in Sukhum, Abkhazia.

69 HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 22.

70 Statement on the Situation with Landmines in Abkhazia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Abkhazia, No. 11, 22 January 1999.

71 United Nations Development Program, "United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia," March 1998. Email from Richard Boulter, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

72 HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 24.

73 UNDP, Needs Assessment Mission, March 1998

74 HALO Trust assessment report, 11 April 2000; HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, pp. 24-26.

75 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1287, 31 January 2000 welcomed the establishment of a new mechanism between Georgia and Abkhazia on 18-19 January 2000 for joint investigation of violations of the cease-fire of 1994 and the preparation of a new protocol on return of refugees to the Galii region, which is one of the seriously mined areas of the region.

76 Information provided by HALO Trust to the AbCBL, 25 January 2000. Also, HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," p. 4.

77 HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 11.

78 Ibid., p. 2. Preface by Simon Conway, HALO Trust.

79 Information provided by HALO Trust to the AbCBL, May 2000. Locations, start and finish dates, and purpose of clearance are all available to the interested reader. The March survey report (p. 6) indicated 415,158 square meters of land cleared, and 2,310 AP mines, 83 AT mines, and 1,770 UXOs destroyed.

80 "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 32.

81 A.Nizhalovsky, Deputy-Commander of the Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the IPPNW-ICBL Landmine Conference. Moscow. 27 May 1998.

82 HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 26.

83 "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 14.

84 "Rehabilitation Center - AIS" database, May 2000.

85 Report of the Ministry of the Interior, April 2000. HALO however states that "almost all of those injured by mines in Abkhazia have been victims of anti-tank mines, many of them serving military, to the best of our knowledge there were only seven civilians injured by anti-personnel mines in Abkhazia in the period stated." Email from Richard Boulter, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

86 Interview with the head of the "Foundation for Medical Insurance," Center for Humanitarian Programs, August 1998.

87 UNDP, "Needs Assessment Mission," March 1998.

88 Interview with Ilias Akhmadov, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, 21 December 1998.

89 Interview with Mr. A. Idigov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Paris, December 1999.

90 Interviews with Kh. Israpilov, Commander-in Chief, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Grozny, 2-3 January 2000.

91 1999 interviews with former chief technologist of Electropribor plant Mr. A.Z. Satuev, laboratory assistant at Anisimov plant Mr. T. Larsaev, and former engineer at Krasny Molot plant Mr. T. Akhmetkhanov.

92 Interview with Mr. M. Isaev, engineer at "Krasny Molot" plant, Grozny, December 1999.

93 Interview with Col. M. Arsaliev, engineering service, Chechen military, May 1999.

94 Chechenskaya Pravda, (Chechen newspaper), 2 January 2000.

95 "Prime News," ORT (television daily news, ORT, RTR, NTV transmit to the entire territory of the former Soviet Union), Tbilisi, 10 February 2000.

96 "Segodnya" (news program), NTV Russian national television, 11pm, 6 March 2000.

97 There are clear links between Chechen fighters and Afghan war veterans, as well as Dagestani Islamists.

98 1999 interview with Mr. M. Arsaliev, chief deminer of the Chechen Republic.

99 M. Khambiev, Minister of Defense, Ichkeria television, October 1999.

100 Interview with Kh. Khachukaev, field commander, Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, Grozny, 24 December 1999.

101 Mines used by Russians have included OZM-72, MON-50, PMN-2 and PFM-1S, as well as remote-controlled VKPM-1, BKPM-2, remote controlled UMP-3. Interview with General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000; IPPNW-Russia, Materials of the First International Conference on AP Mines in Russia-CIS, 27-28 May 1998, Moscow, 1998, p. 30. Chechens mainly used PMN, PMN-2, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200 and often grenades with hand-made trip-wires. Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999; also various TV news interviews with Russian soldiers who participated in Combat in Chechnya, ORT, NTV, RTR.

102 Richard Boulter, "Knights in Armored Vehicles - the Halo Trust in the Caucasus," JMU Journal, #4.1, at website: http://www.hdic.jmu.edu/hdic/journal/4.1/halo.htm. Site visited 6 June 2000.

103 Carlotta Gall, "Land Mines, Chechnya's Hidden Killers," Moscow Times, 21 May 1997.

104 "Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines," Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000.

105 Letter to ICBL from Mr. Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, New York, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a meeting at the Russian Mission on 5 October 1999.

106 Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999.

107 Ibid.

108 ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December 1999.

109 Lieutenant-General Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, "Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines," Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

110 Ibid. Also, ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing ones.

111 Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.

112 Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia interim report, 1999; also various TV news reports by ORT, NTV, RTR among others, interviews with Russian soldiers and officers participating in combat actions in Chechnya, on the route between Rostov-Baku, 18 March 2000.

113 ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999.

114 "Railway Connection with Chechnya Will Soon Resume," Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (weekly) 26 November - 3 December 1999; "The Federal Center is Fully Determined," Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 10-16 December 1999; "What is Grozny like after the Thunder?" Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 February 2000.

115 "Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya," "Vesti" newscast, RTR Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000, in FBIS.

116 Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, interview to Radio Svoboda, March 2000.

117 "Night Patrol of `Fittermice,'" Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.

118 Daniel Williams, "Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny," Washington Post, 7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article reported that "Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia's top commanders, toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, `the city is ruined,' he said."

119 "Chechen Rebels Lured into Minefield," Segodnya (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000; Daniel Williams, "Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces' Grasp: Chechen Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital," Washington Post, 4 February 2000, p. A. 26.

120 Lyoma Turpalov, "Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap," Associated Press Newswires, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February 2000.

121 Ibid.

122 Ibid.

123 Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded, including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed. See also, Andrew Kramer, "Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both Russians and Chechens," AP, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, "Doctor Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon," AFP, 19 February 2000; Dave Montgomery, "Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops", The Dallas Morning News, 27 February 2000.

124 "Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny," (AP, Nazran, Russia), Washington Post, 15 February 2000, p. A.19.

125 Olga Allenova, "`Mine Warfare' Seen Continuing in Grozny," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p. 1.

126 Giles Whittel, "Grozny is Mined to Stop Troops Looting," London Times, 13 May 2000.

127 See for example, "Russian army column attacked near Grozny: reports," AFP (Moscow), 29 July 2000.

128 Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, "Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; "Federals to Mine 80Km of Chechnya-Georgia Border, AVN, 11 April 2000.

129 Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, "Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia," 12 April 2000.

130 Ibid.

131 Interviews with employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia in Chechnya, February 2000.

132 Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.

133 "Refugees Against Landmines" hope to complete interviews of 1,000 refugees. Interviewing was begun on 1 May and by mid-June, approximately 100 refugees had been interviewed. The NGO noted the difficult circumstances in attempting to interview about the ongoing war. Complete information from interviewees is available.

134 "Mine Clearance Experts Tell of Dangers in Chechnya," "Vesti" newscast, RTR Moscow Russian TV, 5 July 2000, in FBIS.

135 Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000.

136 "Landmines in the former Soviet Union," p. 10.

137 Richard Boulter, "Knights in Armored Vehicles."

138 "Spring in Avtury," Krashaya Zvezda (Ministry of Defence of RF's national daily), 7 February 2000.

139 "Ploughland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya," AVN (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.

140 Colonel-General Viktor Kazantsev, Commander of the United Groupment of Federal Forces in the North Caucasus, "Zdes I Seychas," ORT television program, 15 February 2000.

141 "When the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 February 2000.

142 Olga Allenova, "'Mine Warfare' Seen Continuing in Grozny," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.

143 NPA, "Fact Finding Mission Report, Chechnya," Annexes A-3 and A-15.

144 Maia Chovkhalova, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development (NGO based in Moscow that works in Chechnya), draft report for Landmine Monitor 2000.

145 Email memo to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch, from Jon Hoisaeter, Protection Officer, North-Caucasus, UNHCR, 4 April 2000.

146 Email from Chris Hunter, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development, 11 July 2000.

147 Roman Gashaev, Chairman of the "Laman Az," Voice of the Mountains Public Organization. Presented at New Steps for a Mine-Free Future, Report on the First International Conference on Landmines in Russia and the CIS, IPPNW-ICBL, Moscow, 27-28 May 1998.

148 Ibid.

149 1999 Landmine Monitor interview.

150 Chris Hunter, Centre for Peacemaking & Community Development, draft report for Landmine Monitor 2000.

151 Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minster of Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the republic of Ingushetia, February 2000. Data received from doctors in hospitals in Ingushetia indicate more than 220 people lost limbs from August 1999 to March 2000.

152 Lubov Krzhizhanovskaya, Director, Children Foundation Program "Kids of Chechen War." Research groups of the Foundation unofficially estimate the number of cases approaches 1,000.

153 "Refugees Against Landmines" hopes to complete interviews of 1,000 refugees. Interviewing was begun on 1 May and by mid-June, approximately 100 refugees had been interviewed. The NGO noted the difficult circumstances in attempting to interview about the ongoing war. Complete information from interviewees is available.

154 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 (Human Rights Watch: New York, December 1999), pp. 314-316.

155 Consolidated Minefield Survey Results: Kosovo, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August 1999.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 Ibid., p.8.

159 Meeting with representatives of the military and political sides of the KLA, and ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams and then-Canadian Landmine Ambassador Jill Sinclair, Pristina, Kosovo, 30 June 1999.

160 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 829.

161 The Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK [KLA] was signed on 21 June 1999 by KFOR Commander Lt. Gen. Mike Jackson and KLA Commander-in-Chief, Hashim Thaci.

162 "Peacekeepers Seize Kosovo Weapons Cache," Reuters and New York Times, 18 June 2000; "Kosovo Rebel Commander Denies Hiding Weapons," Baltimore Sun, 19 June 2000; "KFOR Finds Largest Weapons Cache Yet," European Stars and Stripes, 20 June 2000, p. 6.

163 Human Rights Watch interview with the Col. Tahiri, KLA headquarters, Pristina, 1 September 1999; Human Rights Watch interview with Col. Tahiri, Salihu Veseli, Chief of Demilitarization, and Commandant Remi, KLA headquarters, Pristina, 4 September 1999.

164 Report (untitled), Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center, UNMIK, August 1999.

165 Consolidated Minefield Survey, HALO Trust, 24 August 1999, p. 50.

166 KLA officers provided KMACC officials with some information about their use of antitank mines during the conflict and their clearance of antipersonnel mines after the war. The information was incomplete and made only a marginal contribution to the international community's knowledge about the extent of battle debris left behind from the war. Human Rights Watch interviews with Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, 1 September 1999, and with Col. Bardhyl Tahiri, KLA chief mine clearance officer with KMACC, 1 and 3 September 1999.

167 Email from KMACC, 30 June 2000; Danica Kirka, "Two Serbs Killed, 3 Injured in Land Mine Explosion," Associated Press, 2 June 2000; Threat Factsheet No. 5, KMACC, (undated).

168 Email to Landmine Monitor/Kosovo from KMACC, 30 June 2000; Danica Kirka, "Two Serbs Killed, 3 Injured in Land Mine Explosion", Associated Press, 2 June 2000.

169 Threat Factsheet No. 5, KMACC, (undated).

170 Eric B. Pilgrim, "KFOR Seizes Illegal Arsenal," European Stars and Stripes, 1 August 2000, p. 2.

171 See, Human Rights Watch, "Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign," February 2000. See also, HRW, "Cluster Bombs: Memorandum for CCW Delegates," 16 December 1999, and HRW, "Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia," May 1999.

172 HRW, "Civilian Deaths," p. 2.

173 Email from Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000. Landmine Monitor is grateful to John Flanagan for providing comments on the draft Landmine Monitor report.

174 KMACC has estimated that there are up to 30,000 unexploded bomblets in Kosovo. The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000. Human Rights Watch noted a conservative estimate of 5% would mean 15,000 unexploded bomblets from cluster munitions. See footnote 16. Others give failure rates of ten percent or more. See Rae McGrath, "Cluster Bombs: The Military Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster Munitions," UK Working Group on Landmines, August 2000. The HALO Trust estimated 10,000 UXO. Consolidated Minefield Survey Results, 14 August 1999, p. 3.

175 Consolidated Minefield Survey Results, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August 1999.

176 Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999, p. 4.

177 Email from Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.

178 Human Rights Watch interviews with KMACC and KFOR officials in Pristina, 23-27 August 1999.

179 Human Rights Watch interview with Chris Clark, Operations Officer, KMACC, 26 August 1999.

180 Human Rights Watch interviews with KMACC and KFOR officials in Pristina, 23-27 August 1999; HALO Trust Senior Survey Officer quoted in: "Profiles, Eastern Europe & the Caucasus: Kosovo," Journal of Mine Acton, 1, 4.1 (Spring issue), p. 80.

181 Human Rights Watch interview with Col. Tahiri, KLA, Pristina, 1 September 1999.

182 Human Rights Watch interview with the Lt. Col. Flanagan, KMACC, Pristina, 1 September 1999.

183 Human Rights Watch interview with KFOR officers, Pristina, from 24 August to 3 September 1999.

184 Al J. Venter, "The Prom 1: Waiting on the Ground for Deminers in Kosovo," Journal of Mine Action, 1.4.1 (Spring issue) 2000, pp. 12-16.

185 Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A.

186 Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. MNB is MultiNational Brigade area.

187 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary General pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Resolution 1244 (1999).

188 Report (untitled), Kosovo Mine Action Co-ordination Center, UNMIK, August 1999; responsibility for KMACC was assigned to the office of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, responsible for Humanitarian Affairs. This office forms the first pillar of the UNMIK structure, the other three being Civil Administration (UN), Institutional Building (OSCE) and Reconstruction (EU).

189 Email from KMACC, 30 June 2000.

190 UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Operational Plan for Consolidation Phase, Mine/UXO Clearance, KMACC, 13 December 1999.

191 The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, Public Information document, Kosovo Mine Action Co-ordination Center, 15 June 2000, p. 7.

192 Consolidated Minefield Survey Results: Kosovo, the HALO Trust, Pristina, 14 August 1999.

193 Sources of data include: UNMIK, UNHCR, FAO, WFP, IMG, WHO, ICRC.

194 The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 5.

195 Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. Amendments to MAG section provided in email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, MAG to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

196 The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 3.

197 Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A. Amendments to MAG section provided in email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, MAG to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

198 Ibid.

199 The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000 p., 4.

200 Kosovo: Emergency Bulletin 21, Save the Children, November 1999, p. 1; for details of casualties in Yugoslav minefields over the Albanian border see report on Albania in Landmine Monitor Report 2000.

201 E. G. Krug and A. Gjini, "Number of Land Mine Victims in Kosovo in High," British Medical Journal, 14 August 1999, p. 450.

202 WHO Finds Heavy Toll from Land Mines in Kosovo, Press Release, World Health Organization, 15 July 1999.

203 The Mine and UXO Situation in Kosovo, KMACC, 15 June 2000, p. 4.

204 UNMIK MACC, extrapolated from IMSMA database, June 2000; original data from the ICRC.

205 UNMIK MACC, extrapolated from IMSMA database by Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta, June 2000; original data from ICRC.

206 Email from Lt. Col. Flanagan, KMACC, 12 July 2000.

207 "German Soldiers Wounded in Kosovo Minefield," Reuters, 23 September 1999; "One Peacekeeper Killed, Five injured in Kosovo," Associated Press, 23 September 1999; "US Soldier Killed in Mine Explosion in Kosovo," FBIS, 16 December 1999; "Soldiers Injured in Kosovo Landmine Blast," Financial Times, 30 December 1999.

208 Activity Report on the Activities of the National Orthoprosthetic Workshop, August 1999-February 2000, Handicap International, Pristina, undated; Synthesis Report of Operation, Handicap International, Pristina, January 2000, p. 6.

209 Email from John Flanagan, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor, 1 August 2000.

210 Mine Action Capacity Operating in Kosovo over the Reporting Period, UNMIK KMACC quarterly report 1 March-31 May 2000, Annex A.

211 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/822, 30 April 1993; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/853, 29 July 1993; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/874, 14 October 1993; UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/884, 12 November 1993.

212 Discussions with soldiers and members of the special mine clearing regiment, including Lt.-Colonel Anatoly Galayan, Commander of the mine-clearing regiment, NKR Ministry of Defense, late 1999 and early 2000.

213 UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission," 5 November 1998, p. 8.

214 Azat Artsakh (Karabakh newspaper), 4 April 2000.

215 Program of the NKR Special Governmental Commission, presented at the 8 June 2000 meeting of the WGMP.

216 UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998.

217 Annual report of the NKR Ministry of Health, 1999.

218 Meeting of the Working Group on Mine Problems, 8 June 2000.