NON-SIGNATORIES

ARMENIA

Background

Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in conflict over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan, but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. Mines were used by all sides in the conflict. A cease-fire agreement was signed in May 1994, but negotiations for a final peace settlement are on-going under the auspices of the OSCE. Landmines and demining are reportedly on the agenda of the peace negotiations.¹⁹⁸ (See also reports on Azerbaijan and Nagorny-Karabakh.)

Mine Ban Policy

Armenia has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Armenia has made it clear that it will not join the treaty unless Azerbaijan agrees to do so.¹⁹⁹

In welcoming the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized the "Ottawa Convention as an important step forward in the total elimination of an entire category of excessively injurious weapons.... Armenia's accession to the Convention is contingent on a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to adhere to the Convention and comply with its regime. We are concerned with Azerbaijan's rigid position not to accede to the Convention, which has remained unchanged from the first steps of the Ottawa process."²⁰⁰ Subsequently, at a landmine seminar organized by the Armenian National Committee of the ICBL and IPPNW-Russia in April 2000, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated the willingness of the government to sign the treaty, but stressed that it had to be done simultaneously by all neighboring countries.²⁰¹

In commenting on the seminar a few days later, Vardan Oskanian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, noted that at this stage Armenia cannot unilaterally accede to the ban treaty. He said that the landmine issue is being dealt with in conjunction with other issues within the framework of the negotiations on settlement of the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.²⁰²

Officials at the Ministry of Defense stated that landmines on the dividing line are an important defense element and mine clearance in those areas in the foreseeable future is problematic for Armenia and, if unilateral, unacceptable. At the same time the readiness was expressed for bilateral talks with Azerbaijan to "design symmetrical measures to that effect."²⁰³

In December 1999, Armenia voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has with the other pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Armenia has not participated in the ban treaty intersessional meetings.

Armenia is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, the government is considering the possibility of acceding to the Amended Protocol II on landmines. In light of this, Armenia told Landmine Monitor that it has decided, on a voluntary basis, to submit the annual report required under Article 13, and to contribute to improving the coordination and effectiveness of mine action.²⁰⁴

The government has expressed its belief that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is the central forum for negotiating a global ban on mines, even though it is not a member of the CD.²⁰⁵

Armenian nongovernmental organizations established the Armenian National Committee of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in January 1999 and have been very active in raising the issue of a mine ban and other mine-related issues to military and government representatives and with the public at large. Representatives have participated in international and regional conferences and organized a wide range of activities in Armenia, including a seminal meeting with military, government, media and NGO representatives in April 2000, to raise the profile of the mine issue and develop constructive dialogue with all key players in reaching a ban, and to press for mine action and victim assistance.

In a major activity since its establishment the National Committee conducted a poll of 400 individuals in five regions and in the city of Yerevan to gauge the awareness of the population on a number of mine-related issues.²⁰⁶ One part of the questions related to the government position on the Mine Ban Treaty.

Evaluating the position of the government on non-accession of Armenia to the treaty, 35% of those polled supported the government's position, 23% were against it and 42% did not offer an opinion. Those respondents who disagree with the position taken by the authorities point out a serious danger posed by mines to civilians as their major argument. Only one of the respondents voiced the opinion that Armenia should accede to the treaty immediately, even unilaterally.

Most respondents believe that the main reason why Armenia does not accede to the treaty is that the Karabakh problem is not resolved yet and that all the neighboring states--Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran--have not acceded. Replying to the question of the possibility of Armenia's acceding to the treaty, almost 80% of respondents believe that Armenia can accede only if the regional security guarantees are given (final solution of the Karabakh problem, durable peace in the region, and accession of the neighboring states).

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Armenia is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines, though it has no formal restrictions on production or trade in place. In April 2000, the Minister of Defense said that Armenia has not imported landmines since its independence. He said the only landmines in the country were those that had been left at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Specific information about current stockpiles of AP mines is unavailable, but the Minister said that the stock was "negligible."²⁰⁷

Use

Landmines were used by all sides throughout the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.²⁰⁸ In an interview, Armenian Defense Minister Harutiunian acknowledged that landmines had been used on a large scale and in a chaotic fashion and that mixed mining (i.e. planting of antitank and antipersonnel mines) was a common occurrence. Individuals who did not have special engineer training often laid those mines, and the minefields were not recorded. That is why mine clearance in those areas may pose a serious problem in the future.²⁰⁹

The Armenian forces used Soviet-made mines, primarily PMN, MON and PMD. OZM-type mines were also used, but the Head of the Engineer Troops Colonel V. Adoyan asserted that by now most of them would no longer be operational.²¹⁰

In 1998 the United Nations indicated that mines continued to be used.²¹¹ While an Azerbaijan military official alleged in April 2000 that "Armenian sabotage and reconnaissance squads" enter Azeri territory and mine roads and shepherd's paths,²¹² Landmine Monitor has not found concrete evidence of such use. Defense Minister Harutiunian has stated that since his appointment to the position in June 1999 not a single order to lay new landmines had been issued. He further stated that it is not planned to issue such orders in the future provided the military-political situation in the region remains stable.²¹³

Although it has been reported that landmines are laid on the Armenian-Turkish border, the Head of the Armenian Engineer Troops stated this is incorrect. He said this segment is guarded by the joint forces of Russian and Armenian border guards and no landmines are used. However, he acknowledged there is a reserve stock of landmines in ammunition depots in the rear for "threat-posing emergencies." Moreover, he stated that mines are not used around strategic installations, including nuclear power plants.²¹⁴

Landmine Problem

According to the Ministry of Defense, the 900 kilometer-long line that divides the warring sides is replete with landmines. In a statement to the OSCE, the government noted an estimated 50-80,000 mines along the border.²¹⁵ The Ministry of Defense has said that minefields and mined areas on the dividing line are, as a rule, beyond the forward posts of the stationed troops and border guards, enclosed with barbwire and the local population is well-informed.²¹⁶

Territories bordering on the dividing line are regarded as mine-contaminated. These are agricultural and woodlands where warfare was conducted and/or which came under fire. At least 1,700 hectares in regions bordering on Azerbaijan are in need of engineer reconnaissance, demining and/or clearance of unexploded ammunition. The Armenian Defense Ministry has been conducting such activities on its own and has expressed its interest in cooperation and in technical and financial assistance of international organizations. ²¹⁷

According to information obtained by Landmine Monitor during its investigations along the border in ten rural communities of the Syunik region (David-Bek, Kaghnut, Uzhanis, Yeghvard, Agarak, Nerkin Gand, Shirakhog, Srashen, Chekaten, Nerkin Khendzoresk) the regional government indicated that of a total area of 183,000 hectares of agricultural land, some 1,699 hectares had been mined. Within the mined areas, 251 hectares is land that had been privatized and given to peasants, including 236 hectares of arable land and 15 hectares of vineyards. Some 1,448 hectares of non-privatized land, including 393 hectares of arable land and 1,055 hectares of pasturelands had also been mined.²¹⁸ From 1994-1999, in Syunik region, landmines were the cause of thirty deaths, forty-four injuries, and also killed 197 cattle (including cows, sheep and horses) and destroyed 27 vehicles.²¹⁹

In the Tavush region, bordering with Georgia and Azerbaijan, with a total area of 27,150 square kilometers, the regional government reported some 9,409 hectares of privatized land had been mined, including 4,777 hectares of areas under crops, 1,198 hectares of vineyards, 1082 hectares of orchards, 678 hectares of hayfields and 1,674 hecatres of pasture land.²²⁰

Forty-two villages in the Tavush region are located very close to the border with Azerbaijan, including fourteen villages that are located not more than one kilometer from the border. Close proximity to the border and mined land are a serious hindrance for the villagers to enage in farming.²²¹

Mine Action

Armenia is not known to have contributed to international mine action programs. Armenia inherited Soviet equipment that could be used for mine clearance.²²² To date, no humanitarian mine clearance projects have been implemented in Armenia, nor has the government been allocating money for mine action.

But local governments have started to estimate the damage sustained during the years of conflict as a result of hostilities in general and of mines in particular. They identify the damaged infrastructure (schools, hospitals, houses of culture, residential houses, consumer services facilities, etc.) in order to assess the need in reconstruction activities in the border-areas and to use the assessment as a basis for calculating the required funding and for designing the programs of stage-by-stage mine clearance.

Since the beginning of 2000, there have been some positive changes related to progress in humanitarian demining. Armenia has been taking measures to train combat engineers and has been making conscious efforts to acquire equipment and protective gear for combat engineers.

During a March 2000 visit of Admiral Charles Abbot, an agreement was reached for cooperation between Armenian and US combat engineers in humanitarian demining. A US inter-departmental group on demining was scheduled to visit Armenia in May and conduct special seminars for Armenian combat engineers, and in October 2000, South Caucasus-wide joint exercises will be held in Georgia.²²³

Mine Awareness

Mine awareness programs are not underway in Armenia. At the same time, in the limited context of the Armenian National Committee's poll previously discussed, the information gathered indicates that the overwhelming majority of respondents (88%) are aware of the danger posed by mined areas, especially for civilians. Some 44% of the respondents in the border areas are aware that there are mined areas in their regions and 10% of the respondents replied that they live in close proximity to mined areas. They believe that the greatest danger is posed by agricultural lands and forests near the border as well as transportation lines and roads with adjacent territories.

Some 33% of respondents did not have information as to whether mine clearance operations had been undertaken in their region and 25% replied that such endeavors had been made primarily in agricultural lands and in roads with adjacent territories. Another 33% held that mine clearance operations had not been undertaken in their district.

The poll indicated that local governments do not take the measures to ensure safety for civilians: 36% noted the absence of warning signs to notify the population about mines and 49% had difficulty answering that question. As to the question of whether mine awareness education programs had been conducted for civilians, only 12% of the respondents replied in the positive. Some 13% of the respondents believed that such programs are offered at schools. Nevertheless, the respondents tend to believe that mine awareness education programs should be offered both to adults (88%) and to secondary school students (93%). The respondents assigned key role to mass media (59%), especially to TV (45%) in raising mine awareness of the population.

The results of the poll indicate that there is a perceived need of mine awareness education programs. Just over 65% of respondents held that they are not sufficiently informed about mine danger and less than 9% believed that they possess sufficient knowledge. Breaking down the answers by the respondents' gender we could see that men have a clearer idea of actions and behavior than women in case of coming across a landmine. That can be accounted for by the fact that during military service men receive some training about landmines. Thus, mine awareness education is especially important for women.

Landmine Casualties

Reliable data on landmine casualties is not available; it is not considered public information. The Ministry of Health & Social Welfare does not keep track of information on mine victims, nor have NGOs or international organizations made concerted efforts to collect such data. In 1994, the U.S. State Department indicated that there were approximately five to ten casualties per year in Armenia due to landmines.²²⁴ Armenia received a total of $1.15 million in 1993 and 1994 through the U.S. Leahy War Victims Fund for the provision of prosthetics to amputees.²²⁵ A prosthetic workshop had already been put in place in Armenia after the 1989 earthquake. It is estimated that between 300-500 people per year since 1989 received a prosthetic, about half of whom had suffered war related injuries.²²⁶

There is a difference in medical assistance for military personnel and that available to civilian mine victims. Servicemen wounded by mines receive immediate care at the Central Clinical Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defense for specialized medical assistance. The Hospital keeps track of those wounded (this information is classified) and conducts research on some aspects of landmine-related wounds.

Civilian victims usually get treatment in local hospitals where highly qualified medical assistance is not always available and where records are not kept of mine victims. Information about civilians with wounds of the extremities is relatively more accessible because they are brought to Yerevan to the Center of Traumatology, Orthopedics & Rehabilitation for treatment.

In the course of this research, 108 cases (covering victims from 1992 to the present) provided by the Center of Traumatology were studied. The average age of the victims was from 18 to 40; four were boys under 16 and one was a woman. The extremities of seventy-four of them were amputated. The wounded civilians are primarily residents of the border districts of the country.

Amputees, both military and civilian, get their prosthetic devices from the Yerevan prosthetic and orthopedic plant, which indicated in March 2000, about 1,250 landmine victims have so far received prosthetic devices.²²⁷

Survivor Assistance

Armenia has a total of 179 hospitals with beds for 25,300 patients. There are also six military hospitals in the country. The largest specialized medical institutions are concentrated in the country's capital. It is noteworthy that the medical potential of the country for rendering post-traumatic surgical, orthopedic and rehabilitation aid was significantly broadened and strengthened after the devastating Spitak Earthquake of 1988.

Thus, the Center for prosthetics and personnel training was established where the prosthetic appliances, including bio-prosthetic devices, are made which meet the highest standards. The Bavarian Red Cross set up the department of technical orthopedics and rehabilitation affiliated with the Center of traumatology, which produces orthopedic prosthetic devices for children. The International Center for Post-Traumatic rehabilitation was built with the support of the International Federation of Red Cross. Experts employed by these institutions received special training and professional development abroad.

Thus, the country has adequate material-technical base and qualified personnel for rendering specialized medical assistance, producing prosthetic devices and for rehabilitation of landmine victims. At the same time the lack of adequate funding for these institutions poses a serious problem for the country, since the existing facilities and personnel cannot be used efficiently and are not adequately accessible for landmine victims.

A number of NGOs focus on the issues of the disabled and some collaborate with the Ministry to provide humanitarian assistance to the disabled and to ensure their psycho-social reintegration into the community.

Individuals disabled by landmines are to a varying degree taken care of by these NGOs. However, until recently there were no NGOs that would specifically deal with the issues of landmines. Since the establishment of the National Committee of ICBL in January of 1999 one of the coordinators of the Committee, together with a group of orthopedic physicians, initiated some activities targeting the landmine victims, set up a database and a rehabilitation center for those disabled by landmines and for their reintegration into society.

Disability Policy

The issues and rights of the disabled persons are regulated by the "Law about the social protection of the disabled in the Republic of Armenia" adopted by the National Assembly and signed by the President on 24 May 1993. The Law stipulates certain privileges for the disabled, such as free medical treatment and medication, free prosthetic devices and other appliances, free use of public transportation as well as provision of pensions. There are no laws specific to the rights and privileges of civilian mine victims.

Military personnel who are landmine victims and their family members are entitled to privileges and benefits under the law "On social security system for military personnel and their family members" adopted by the National Assembly on 27 October 1998 and signed by the President on 25 November 1998. The Law made provisions for many more privileges and for larger pensions. However if a serviceman is affected by the landmine not at the time of discharging his duties he will be issued a certificate about the wound and he will be given a civilian, not military pension.

The country's grave economic crisis and scarcity of the State budget result in regular delays in disbursements for health care. The delays have been becoming progressively more protracted and at present they exceed eight months. As of 1 January 2000, the debts of the State to the sector were over 7 billion AMD. Provision of medical services to the disabled for free within the framework of the existing laws is problematic when in reality the State's funding is unavailable.

At the national level the coordination of the disabled-related issues are overseen by the department of the Ministry of Health & Social Welfare and by the sector for social security of the Ministry of Defense.

AZERBAIJAN

Key developments since March 1999: As of March 2000, the civilian Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action had developed a National Mine Action Plan, initiated a National Mine Database, prepared for training of deminers, and begun to purchase equipment. Training of national deminers started in March 2000 and demining operations start in July 2000.

Background

Azerbaijan and Armenia engaged in conflict over the Nagorny-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Nagorny-Karabakh is an autonomous region of western Azerbaijan, but the majority of the inhabitants are Armenian. Mines were used by all sides in the conflict. A cease-fire agreement was signed in May 1994, but negotiations for a final peace settlement are on-going under the auspices of the OSCE. Landmines and demining are reportedly on the agenda of the peace negotiations.²²⁸ (See also reports on Armenia and Nagorny-Karabakh.)

Mine Ban Policy

Azerbaijan has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Azerbaijan voted in favor of the 1996 pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution, but abstained on the three subsequent resolutions in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, most recently in December 1999.

In its February 2000 response to an OSCE questionnaire on landmines, the government said, "Azerbaijan believes that a total ban and elimination of antipersonnel landmines is a necessary humanitarian goal with which the world community is faced in the 21^st century. However, under the conditions of the continuing occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan territories by Armenian troops and threats of renewed military operations with extensive use of land mines by the enemy on Azerbaijan territory, Azerbaijan is forced to use appropriate measures as a deterrence.... Azerbaijan cannot become a party to the Convention at this stage, since it would be unable to fulfill the obligations that result from it."²²⁹

In April 1999, Vice Prime Minister Abid Sharifoff said that Azerbaijan intends to sign the Mine Ban Treaty and Amended Protocol II (1996) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons as soon as a peaceful settlement of the conflict is achieved.²³⁰ Azerbaijan is not a signatory to the CCW or its original Protocol II on landmines. Although it is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Azerbaijan stated in February 2000 that it considered the CD "to be the proper forum for discussion of the question regarding anti-personnel land mines."²³¹

The government did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999, nor any of the ban treaty intersessional meetings, nor the first Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva in December 1999. It did, however, attend the NGO-sponsored regional landmine meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia in December 1999. This participation was largely the result of the work of the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) and its ongoing work to raise public awareness in support of a ban.

The ACBL organized a landmine conference in February 2000 in Baku. Government representatives took part and were pressed to demine border areas and join the Mine Ban Treaty. At that conference, Colonel Isa Sadikhov, the former deputy of the Minister of Defense, said that the experience of recent conflicts showed that mines are very efficient weapons. He stated that as long as there is a threat of renewed hostilities and Azeri territory is occupied, it would be impossible to conduct demining operations or join the treaty.²³²

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Azerbaijan is not believed to be a landmine producer or exporter. When the Soviet army left Azerbaijan in 1992, it left landmines behind and this is likely the source of Azerbaijan's stockpile of antipersonnel mines. The number and types of mines in Azerbaijan's stockpiles are unknown.

Use

Landmines were used by all sides throughout the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict.²³³ In 1998 the United Nations indicated that mines continued to be used.²³⁴ While Azerbaijan clearly insists on its right and need to use antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor is not aware of allegations of Azeri forces laying new mines in 1999 or 2000.

In April 2000, an Azerbaijan military official alleged that "Armenian sabotage and reconnaissance squads" continue to enter Azeri territory and mine roads and shepherd's paths.²³⁵ A border area resident also alleged this, saying that people and cattle are killed and injured on roads on which they used to walk safely.²³⁶ However, Landmine Monitor has not found concrete corroborating evidence of such use, and Armenian officials deny such charges.²³⁷

Landmine Problem and Survey

The conflict resulted in twenty percent of Azerbaijan's territory being occupied by Armenia and fifteen percent of the population becoming internally displaced.²³⁸ UNMAS noted in June 2000, "More than five years after the cessation of hostilities, the biggest impediment to reconstruction and rehabilitation remains the problem of landmine contamination."²³⁹ A complete, nationwide survey has not been undertaken because of the political situation.²⁴⁰ UNMAS has estimated that 19,500 square kilometers of land is mine-affected.²⁴¹ UNMAS has also stated that approximately twenty-four of the sixty-five Azerbaijan regions are believed to be contaminated, that seven Azeri regions controlled by Armenians are suspected of having mines, and that fourteen other regions "contain defensive minefields laid by the Azerbaijan Defense Forces."²⁴²

According to information from the Ministry of Defense the front line of military contact covers 1,039 kilometers and much of this territory is mined. Mines can also be found in and around villages, agricultural regions, pastures, roads, bridges, schools, water sources and forest regions. The Ministry of Defense states that it marks minefields and informs the population about them. The Ministry of Defense also says that it has records and maps of all its minefields. The information is classified.

Mine Clearance and Funding

On 18 July 1998 the civilian Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was established to assume responsibility for mine clearance. As of March 2000, it had developed a National Mine Action Plan, initiated a National Mine Database, constructed several administrative buildings, selected places for training of deminers, and begun to purchase equipment.²⁴³ It is planned to conduct 24 demining training courses for 115 individuals.²⁴⁴ In 2000 it is planned to demine more than 5 million square meters of territory. Demining operations were expected to start in June 2000 in Fizulu.

British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) stated training of deminers in March 2000.²⁴⁵ Several teams of deminers are now operational under MAG technical supervision. The deminers are employed by the local NGO Relief Azerbaijan, coordinated by ANAMA. Funding is from UNDP through contract with UNOPS.

The National Mine Action Plan delineates a four-phased approach to the mine problem. UNDP is assisting ANAMA with the first phase, the aim of which is to establish the capacity to deal with the mine problem in government-controlled territory (and secondarily to build capacity to eventually deal with the mine problem in territory currently occupied). The estimated cost for establishing the program and the first year of operation is almost $3.53 million.²⁴⁶

The breakdown of the budget includes: international training and supervision agency ($120,000), national demining NGO ($340,000), international dog support and training contractor ($550,000), national quality assurance and dog support NGO ($240,000), mine awareness ($150,000), victim assistance ($150,000), general survey (Level One) ($120,000), facility development ($200,000), and equipment and material procurement ($1,658,900).²⁴⁷

On 10 March 2000, АNАМА met with donors of the Azerbaijan Mine Action Program. It announced that $2.265 million of the $3.53 million budget had been raised. Of this sum the Azeri government contributed $600,000, UNDP $500,000, the World Bank $600,000, the Japanese government $500,000, and Canada $65,000.²⁴⁸

The ultimate beneficiaries of clearance efforts in Azerbaijan will be the 350,000 inhabitants, including refugees, IDPs living in tent camps and people who never left their place of residence in the conflict ridden and contaminated areas. These groups are among the poorest of Azerbaijan's population and include a large percentage of women and children. The project will also provide some income generation activities for people who will be eventually involved in the mine action program.

Apparently, discussions are underway between officials of Azerbaijan and Turkey regarding an agreement to demine the border and prohibit future use on the border, similar to an agreement Turkey has made with Bulgaria.²⁴⁹

Mine Awareness

The National Mine Action Plan calls for mine awareness instruction to be given to people living next to the mined territories, as well as to refugees and IDPs. According to preliminary estimates the number of people who will be reached by the mine awareness programs will be some 110,000 individuals.²⁵⁰

Beginning in 1996, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations Development Program and HALO Trust carried out mine awareness programs in Nagorny-Karabakh. The ICRC's mine awareness program works in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education, UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).²⁵¹ ICRC field officers have trained 5,400 schoolteachers in mine awareness, who then teach their students. Some 81,000 children have had instruction in mine awareness. In addition these teachers pass on the information to parents in the IDP camps. The ICRC program is community-based and uses locally produced materials, such as videos, leaflets, brochures, and posters. These programs were conducted throughout 1999 in refugee and IDP camps in Barda, Sabirabad and Saatli.²⁵²

UNICEF, in partnership with the Ministries of Education, Health, Labor and Social Welfare, the national Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Areas, ANAMA, other UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs, requested $300,000 for mine awareness in Azerbaijan between February-December 2000. The objective of the project is to "sensitize the IDPs of the danger of mines and reduce/eliminate the potential incidence of mine fatalities and injuries among children in Azerbaijan."²⁵³

ACBL and Institute of Peace and Democracy, with financial support from the Landmines Project of the Open Society Institute Development Foundation, are implementing two projects for humanitarian mine action during August 1999- July 2000.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Based on official data provided by the government, 5,561 people injured in the Karabakh conflict have been registered in the country; of these, 78% are military and 22% civilian. Many of them are mine victims.²⁵⁴ Data from the Society of the Invalids of the Karabakh conflict indicate there are more than 7,000 invalids from the conflict and that more than 70% of them are mine victims.²⁵⁵

The ICRC runs an orthopedic/prosthetic center in Baku, as does the government. Since April of 1997, Azerbaijan has had a law for the protection and rehabilitation of disabled. (For more on casualties and mine survivor assistance, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 768-769.)

BELARUS

Key developments since March 1999: Belarus destroyed nearly 7,000 antipersonnel mines from 1997-1999. Belarus hosted an "International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination" in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000. Belarus is actively seeking assistance for stockpile destruction. Mine clearance by the military continues.

Mine Ban Policy

Belarus has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. It has, however, voted for the 1997, 1998 and December 1999 UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Government officials have stated that Belarus "fully supports" the ban treaty.⁰ In December 1999, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said, "We completely share its humane purposes, but taking our international obligations seriously, we cannot become a party to the Convention today without having adequate resources for its implementation. We shall constantly keep in mind the scope of commitments under the Ottawa Convention though it is not legally bound by them."¹

Belarus has stated that it hopes to become a party to the treaty in the future, and toward that end, welcomes international financial and technical assistance for clearance and the destruction of millions of antipersonnel mines stockpiled in the country.²

Belarus hosted an "International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination" in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000.³ Discussions were aimed at accurately defining the scope of the landmine problem in Belarus, developing possible solutions and identifying international resources that could be made available to assist the Republic of Belarus in its demining and stockpile elimination activities. A regional approach to the problem was discussed, based on possible cooperation between Belarus, Canada and Ukraine, as the most effective and efficient strategy for Belarus to be able to join the Mine Ban Treaty.

In March 2000, Belarus legislators reconfirmed their commitment to support the total ban on landmines as soon as the assistance necessary to destroy existing stockpiles is provided.⁴ The government is wary of premature commitment, given its negative experience when it had to destroy ten percent of its weapons under European arms reduction agreements almost without international assistance. The military is also concerned that Belarus' neighbors, Latvia and Russia, have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵

Belarus has indicated that it was not able to participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique because of lack of funding. The representative of the Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines (BCBL) did attend the meeting and subsequently was able to brief Belarus authorities on the meeting, which was viewed positively by the government. Belarus attended the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction meetings in Geneva in December 1999 and May 2000.

The Belarus authorities welcomed the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 and the need for further collaboration with the ICBL and BCBL was indicated. As stated by Major General I. Misuragin, Chief of the Corps of Engineers, the government is "trying to be as open as possible in mine-related issues. This is proved by our close co-operation with various public organizations, in particular, the SCAF Center [Support Center for Associations and Foundations], which renders assistance to the Defense Ministry in dealing with mine-related issues. For the past two years the Ministry of Defense has been answering questions of the non-governmental organization International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) for its research activities."⁶

On 7 October 1996, the government ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. However, its instrument of ratification has not been submitted to the depository "due to financial constraints on its implementation."⁷ The Armed Forces have studied the provisions of Amended Protocol II, and have started their implementation.⁸ Material on the basic provisions of the Mine Protocol has been developed and distributed to the Army. Special attention is given to studying the Protocol in curricula for cadets and students at the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus. Belarus participated in the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva in December 1999.

Belarus supports negotiation of a ban on mine transfers at the Conference on Disarmament, of which it is a member.⁹

Production and Transfer

According to officials in the Ministry of Defense, Belarus has never produced and will not produce or modernize antipersonnel landmines, or their components, including Claymore-type mines or any other mines, in the future.¹⁰ They also stated that Belarus is not producing or conducting research on any munitions which might function like antipersonnel mines and pose dangers to civilians (such as antitank mines with anti-handling devices, submunitions, cluster bombs), and that Belarus is not engaging in research on alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.¹¹

Government officials say that Belarus is not exporting AP mines nor has it exported them in the past.¹² In 1995 President Alexandr Lukashenka announced a moratorium on the export of all types of landmines from 1 September 1995 until the end of 1997.¹³ In late 1997 the president extended the export moratorium to the end of 1999.¹⁴ On February 4, 2000 the moratorium was extended again until the end of 2002.¹⁵ A decree at the beginning of 1998 banned the transit of AP mines and certain other goods through the territory of the Republic of Belarus.¹⁶

Stockpiling

Belarus has very significant stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. It estimates that it would need U.S.$10-50 million, depending on the method of destruction used, to develop technologies necessary for and to carry out the destruction of its stocks. Belarus does not have either the scientific capabilities or the facilities to destroy landmines.¹⁷

Government officials have declined to divulge the total number of mines in stockpile, and have spoken only of "millions" of stockpiled mines.¹⁸ The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus have in stock MON-50, -90, and -100 fixed directional mines, PMN and PMN-2 blast mines, OZM-72 circular area fragmentation mines, PFM and POM-2 cluster mines, and MS-3 booby-trap.¹⁹ Most of the landmines at the Armed Forces storage facilities are believed to be the cluster types that cannot be brought in compliance with the requirements of Protocol II.

Although the CCW Protocol II does not require destruction or dismantling of mines that do not meet the requirements of the Protocol's Technical Annex, in 1997 the Armed Forces began a step-by-step process of destroying these landmines.²⁰ About 7,000 mines of different types have been destroyed by explosion since that time. The first types to be destroyed were mines with an expired shelf life. Belarus has completely destroyed the most treacherous explosive devices - MB-2 booby-traps made to look like pens and used by the Special Forces.²¹

Number and type of AP mines and booby-traps destroyed in 1997-99²²

Type	Model	Number
Circular area	POMZ-2m	3908
	OZM-4	210
Blast	PMN	551
Directional	MON-50	66
	MON-90	1088
Booby-trap	MC-3	965
Booby-trap	MB-2	151
Total		6939

Belarus indicates that it has not been able to undertake larger-scale destruction of landmines because their destruction by explosion is viewed as environmentally unsound. Some 3.5 million landmines could be destroyed by explosion or incineration. However two-thirds of the KSF clusters with PFM mines have liquid explosive content and cannot be destroyed this way, as it would generate hydrocyanic acid and lead, creating danger for the environment.²³

In 1999 the shelf life of 1.5 million PFM-1 antipersonnel cluster mines expired. This type of mine has a liquid explosive, and their continued storage may cause an irreversible chemical reaction and result in an explosion. The number of mines with expired shelf life increases by 5-10% annually.²⁴ The Belarus Ministry of Defense has identified the destruction of PFM-1 landmine stockpiles as a priority.²⁵ There is no plant specialized in destruction of landmines.

When assessing environmental consequences of landmines destruction, Belarus used the methodology of ecological threat assessment, worked out by experts of the Russian Federation in the course of destruction of permanently packed KSF-1 clusters with PFM-1 mines by incineration in the open air.²⁶ The preliminary assessment of this method has determined that: (1) Aluminium oxide, lead compounds, liquid explosive (unburned remains), hydrogen cyanide (hydrocyanic acid) are the main pollutants of the environment; (2) The scale of general pollution with harmful substances will come to: with incineration of one box with clusters - 0.29-6.8 km, and ten boxes - 0.92-21.6 km. (3) Incineration of cluster boxes on the one-by-one basis in the center of the working zone with the radius of 50m exceeds the admissible pollution level on most types of harmful substances by 1800 to 2000 times. (4) The radius of a long-time pollution zone (due to fallout of lead compounds to the surface) will come to: with incineration of 1 box - 46m, and one dispatching automobile lot (252 boxes) - 730 m.

Possible ways to solve the problem were discussed at the First International Workshop on Humanitarian De-mining and Mines Stockpile Elimination in Minsk on 6-7 March 2000. A regional approach was proposed by SCAF. The most effective and efficient way to eliminate PFM-1 mines could be their destruction at the specialized plant constructed by western donors in one of the countries that has similar type of mines to be destroyed (Russian, Ukraine, Bulgaria). However only part of the PFM-1 stockpiles could be safely transported to another country while at least some 1.5 million of these mines need to be destroyed on the spot.

It is expected that technical, financial and legal assessments of Belarus' exact needs in humanitarian demining and stockpile elimination will be completed by October 2000.

Use

The Belarus Ministry of Defense states that AP mines are not used on its territory, for border defense or otherwise.²⁷ Officials state that antipersonnel mine use is not part of the military's doctrine or training, and that the stocks of mines are an "unwanted heritage from the former Soviet Union."²⁸ The Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also said, "Belarus does not use any other munitions which might function like an antipersonnel mine and pose dangers to civilians such as antitank mines with anti-handling devices, improvised explosive devices, certain submunitions/cluster bombs."²⁹

Landmine Problem

There is an unknown number of World War II vintage German and Soviet mines scattered about old battlefields, in particular in the Vitebsk, Gomel and Minsk regions where the major battles of WWII were fought. ³⁰ Most of this mined land is agricultural fields and forests. The requests for mine clearance of these territories come from the local authorities and it is the local population that benefits from the humanitarian mine action.³¹

Few records or maps exist of the mined areas and no research has been conducted yet in this respect.³² Most of the mined land is not marked. The most dangerous parts of the mined areas are those where trench battles took place.³³ Mined areas are marked as soon as they are located. Recently most of the UXO have been found in the Brest, Gomel, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk regions. The Vitebsk region is the most affected, where the area of 191 square kilometers should be checked, and is of special concern.³⁴

Mine Clearance

The Ministry of Defense has cleared some 26 million explosive devices from Belarus' territory since the end of World War II. Over the past 10 years, from 5-80,000 explosive items were detected and defused annually.³⁵ Of that number, about 1,500 were AP mines. The clearance of the mined area is carried out by specially trained detachments of the Belarus Military Forces.

Belarus lacks funding needed for mine action. It has never received any international assistance in this respect.³⁶ Belarus has asked the UN Mine Action Service to provide assistance in assessing the extent of the mine and UXO problem in the country. The government will host a UN experts' mission in July-September 2000 to examine the situation and to estimate the costs of demining.³⁷ Belarus actively participates and fully supports the activities of the special group to support Global Humanitarian Mine Action within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

No national program on humanitarian mine action currently exists in Belarus. The organization and coordination of mine clearance is carried out by the Department of Engineer Forces in the Main Headquarters of the Belarus Military Forces and by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There are 200 deminers in fourty-four mobile military groups that belong to Army engineer detachments that undertake mine clearance and training operations in Belarus. For example, five districts in the Brest region and two districts in the Grodno region are served by two mobile military groups of six deminers. Manual, dogs and mechanical modes of operations are used. Recently no deminers have been killed. One officer was severely injured in a demining operation in 1998.

Almost everyday the groups are called to clear UXO. Two specially equipped automobiles are used to transport the teams to the location of detected UXO. In November 1999 the team cleared over 3,439 UXO, including AP mines in the industrial area of the city of Grodno.³⁸ The operation was videotaped and shown on national TV. UXO were destroyed by explosion.

The total area cleared in Belarus from 1991 until 1999 is 350 hectares, most of which could not be used for agricultural or production purposes before clearance. The location of areas recently cleared includes Krupsky district in the Minsk region, Dubrovensky district in the Vitebsk region, and Baranovichi district in the Brest region. The records of areas cleared are maintained and these records are publicly accessible.³⁹ The cost of mine clearance is approximately $12,000 per square kilometer depending upon complexity of engineer works. The funding is spent primarily on calling-out of reserves and resources for demining efforts. To this end, 1,000 combat engineers were called out from reserve in 1992-99. The major obstacle to a more effective mine clearance program is lack of funding.

Mine Awareness Education

The demining teams use mine clearance operations for education aimed at victim prevention. However there is no systematic mine awareness program being carried out.

The NGO SCAF collaborates with the Ministries of Education and Defense to develop mine awareness programs for Belarus' schools. The Ministry of Education has recently incorporated mine awareness issues in the national secondary education curriculum.

Mine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

For the period from 1944-99, there were 5,997 mine and UXO casualties, including 3,375 maimed and 2,622 killed.⁴⁰ In the past ten years, sixty-two children were injured, including thirty-seven wounded and twenty-five killed. All of these people were civilians and the accidents happened in uncultivated fields. (See also Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 774-775.)

Medical, surgical, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in facilities coordinated by the Ministry of Health. Most prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities are available in Belarus. The Belarus Prosthetic-Rehabilitation Center (BPRC) is the main producer and supplier of prosthetics. This network has the capacity to produce 259 wheelchairs and 1,220 prosthetic devices monthly.

A national disability law exists in Belarus: "Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus."⁴¹ The National Council on the Problems of Disabled and Handicapped, which is chaired by the First Deputy of the Prime Minister, coordinates the implementation of the law.⁴² A Law on Psychiatric Counseling has recently been adopted by the parliament and hopefully will result in better services to be provided to AP mines victims/survivors. (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 776-777.)

ESTONIA

Key developments since March 1999: Existing law was amended on 17 July 1999 to prohibit the export and transit of antipersonnel mines. In March 2000, the Foreign Ministry said that Estonia has less than 1,000 AP mines in its stockpile, which are used for training purposes. Estonia acceded to CCW Amended Protocol II on 20 April 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Estonia has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), despite making statements in favor of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines, and voting in favor of all pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions. ⁴³ According to an official at the Foreign Ministry, Estonia is concerned that there may be problems with verification of other countries' compliance with provisions of the MBT. Estonia does not exclude the possibility of joining the MBT, although not in the near future.⁴⁴

Because of its occupation under the Soviet Union, there remains a perceived need for secure defenses, but limited defense budgets preclude acquiring the expensive defense systems thought necessary to substitute for AP mines. At present, there are poor diplomatic relations with Russia, with attacks on the Estonian embassy in Moscow. In this situation, traditional arguments by the military that antipersonnel mines can be an inexpensive and efficient method of slowing massive land invasion are persuasive, despite the small size of actual AP mine stocks in Estonia and the lack of recent production capacity. Although responsible officials recognize that in practice the long-term humanitarian costs of AP mines greatly outweigh their short-term military value, this has yet to be translated into acceptance of the ban.⁴⁵

There are periodic security consultations between Estonia and Finland, and Estonia closely follows Finnish policy on the landmine issue,⁴⁶ although the Ministry of Defense insists that there is no need to link the Estonian position on the AP mine issue to that of any other country.⁴⁷

Estonia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties of the MBT in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. It has not sent representatives to any of the MBT's intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts.

Estonia acceded to Amended Protocol II (Landmines) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 20 April 2000.⁴⁸ Estonia would prefer that a ban evolve through the Conference on Disarmament (CD). This remains the government position, as stated in its report to the OSCE:

The Conference on Disarmament has a clear mandate to address conventional disarmament issues. As part of this mandate, the Government of Estonia believes the CD has a role to play in strengthening the existing international regime against anti-personnel landmines. The Conference counts all key countries as its members and also provides for the possibility of active participation by non-members. An APL transfer ban negotiated by the CD would only enhance the task of implementing a global regime against land-mines. Estonia welcomes the initiative of those countries who promote the Conference on Disarmament action on an APL transfer ban and regrets that during its 1999 session the Conference was not able to establish an appropriate mechanism to deal with this issue. The Government of Estonia hopes that a Special Co-ordinator is re-appointed and consultations start during the early party of the Conference's next session.⁴⁹

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

According to the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Estonia is not now producing AP mines and has not produced them in the past.⁵⁰ The "Weapons Act" of 1 January 1996 was amended on 17 July 1999 to prohibit the export and transit of AP mines, related technologies and materials. ⁵¹

In March 2000, the Foreign Ministry said that Estonia has less than 1,000 AP mines in its stockpile, which are used for training purposes.⁵²

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

Landmines and other explosives left from military operations during World War II and from the Soviet occupation have been cleared from Estonian islands in the Baltic Sea, notably from Pakri and Naissaar, which were used as military test sites by the Soviet army. After these clearance operations there are no more "closed areas" in Estonia. Mines and UXO found occasionally in various parts of Estonia are destroyed by the Rescue Board, a division of the Ministry of Interior that employs about twenty people to perform clearance operations, and which has received British, Swedish and U.S. assistance. There is also a group of well-trained demining specialists in the Estonian Defense Forces, which the government has proposed could be involved in conflict zones elsewhere in the world.⁵³

Mine Action and Victim Assistance

In 1999 Estonia contributed US$2,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.⁵⁴ Officials of the Foreign Ministry said that Estonia is willing to contribute one platoon-sized unit for mine clearance in mine-affected countries. Estonian officers serving in SFOR missions have successfully participated in clearance of minefields in Bosnia. The preferred framework for such assistance would be the Demining 2010 Initiative.⁵⁵

During recent years there have been no mine accidents, but accidents with UXOs still occur. In 1999, several schoolchildren were injured on an island near Tallinn when they attempted to burn a mortar shell. It is possible that there are landmine victims among Afghanistan war veterans. There are legal benefits for disabled people, including any mine/UXO victims, and hospitals in Tallinn and other towns can provide high quality treatment.⁵⁶

FINLAND

Key developments since March 1999: Finland contributed US$5 million to mine action programs in 1999 and deployed mine clearance teams to Kosovo and Mozambique. It contributed about $1.9 million to mine action January-April 2000. Finland has carried out destruction of some non-detectable mines, in accordance with Amended Protocol II. Finland reiterated its goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006.

Mine Ban Policy

Finland is the only country in the European Union that has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). In part to mitigate its isolation in the EU in particular, and the wider international community, it has become Finnish policy to voice support for the total banning of antipersonnel mines and indicate "readiness" to join the MBT in the future.⁵⁷

The government formed a working group comprised of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to consider the AP mine issue. In its report of December 1997, it declared that Finland was in the process of moving toward a total ban on AP mines and would be prepared to replace them with other methods of independent and reliable defense. But the working group insisted that Finland needed additional money - several million U.S. dollars - for alternatives to AP mines; even if alternatives and the funds to acquire them were available the transitional period would take at least ten years.⁵⁸ In December 1999, the goal of being able to join the MBT by 2006 and replace its mines before the end of 2010 was reiterated in its report on AP mine policy to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁵⁹ The working group continues its deliberations.

In March 2000, officials of the Foreign Ministry said that it was not an easy decision to remain outside the MBT: "The step to take was difficult. We are not usually outsiders in international politics and disarmament." ⁶⁰ The government felt it had to stay out of the Ottawa Process because it was "not capable of influencing the end result. We could not join the Ottawa Treaty because of the requirement to destroy stockpiles in such a short time. We could not do it in four years. We could, of course, have signed the treaty, but we could not ratify. So we decided not to sign. We think that it is better that if we are going to sign we would also be capable to ratify. We decided that we will not take part in the process. After that Finland found its position easier."⁶¹

Officials consistently point to Finland's geographical and geopolitical position, as a large country with a small population bordering on Russia, with whom it has fought two wars in the last sixty years as a fundamental reason for staying outside the MBT. Finland wants to have, and to give the signal that it has, a "strong, credible, independent defense." In March 2000, an official from the Ministry of Defense explained: "Antipersonnel landmines are part of the Finnish defense system. Finland is a country fragmented by the lake system, full of different areas around the waterways. To defend these kind of areas Finland needs landmines which fit well and are essential."⁶² He repeated the claim often made that the military would need a budget increase of 3-5 Miljard Finnish marks (US$500-800 million) to cover the expenses of replacing AP mines.⁶³

While government and military officials always refer to Russia when discussing AP mine issues, they deny that Finland is afraid of its neighbor, saying that a possible attack from Russia is already out of question and history.⁶⁴ This claim seems to contradict the explanations about the need for strong border defenses. One military official noted, "Even though Russia is not the threat, it is an uncertain factor. I think, nobody can really estimate how time and the situation will change. We have a long border with Russia."⁶⁵ Defense officials deny that Finland looked upon any other states as an example not to sign the MBT, and say that the Ministry of Defense is unanimous in this decision, which has been taken from a national point of view. They note that "many Finnish people think that landmines are a very important part of the defense policy."⁶⁶ In Finland, war veterans and most of Finnish society defend and support the priorities and needs of the Defense Forces.

What no government or military official has explained is the real practicality of relying on AP mines as border-defense against invasion when the mines are in stockpiles rather than already deployed.⁶⁷ Finland has no mass-delivery systems,⁶⁸ and would have to rely on hand-emplacement of hundreds of thousands of mines in a country where the lake systems make travel difficult and slow. It is the view of the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland that, if the military were to admit that AP mines are an out-dated form of defense, they would risk discussion of the relevance of current defense doctrine and planning; this is a discussion the Finnish defense establishment is not ready to take up.

A member of the Finnish Parliament says that Finnish policy is double-sided. "Finland is in a way the `superpower of disarmament' but this is when it is about the strategic weapons of other countries. When the disarmament concerns the weapons strategically important to Finland we are not as positive about it. It is embarrassing that we are in the same group with the United States of America, China and Russia. We have to remember that while planning to plant antipersonnel landmines around strategic places, these are also where civilians are in danger."⁶⁹

Finland held the presidency of the European Union in the last half of 1999. Despite being the only European Union member not to have signed the MBT, it was put in the position at the United Nations of delivering the EU statement in favor of the implementation of the MBT:

The EU emphasizes the importance of full and speedy implementation of the Ottawa Convention, including the reporting obligations and the deadlines laid down in the Convention as to the destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas and in stockpiles as well as assistance to the mine victims. Moreover, the EU calls upon all States to combine their efforts in order to achieve the total elimination of antipersonnel mines worldwide. In this context, the importance of the possibility the Convention offers for States Signatories to provisionally apply its provisions pending its entry into force should be stressed. The EU and its Member States will actively participate in the program of intersessional work adopted at the First Meeting of State Parties.⁷⁰

At the time of this statement, the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland pointed out the irony of a country that has not even signed the MBT being able to give a pro-treaty statement on behalf of EU countries that are signatories, many of whom have taken key leadership roles in the Ottawa Process which produced the MBT. Despite the strength of the EU statement, it has been difficult for the EU to act cohesively in encouraging the signing, ratification and implementation of the MBT when one of its member countries has not signed the treaty.

A Finnish member of the European Parliament (MEP) said that in the EU, Finland does not come under great pressure to join the MBT because its borders are seen as an independent problem.⁷¹

Regionally, the Finnish position has also had a negative influence. An NGO dealing with issues in the Baltics and based in Riga, Latvia, believes that Estonia and Latvia are following Finland's lead on the MBT.⁷²

In the United Nations, Finland has voted for all key resolutions in favor of banning AP mines, including Resolution 54/54B in December 1999 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Finland also attended as an observer the First Meeting of State Parties in May 1999; the delegation was led by the Head of the Unit for Humanitarian Assistance at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Finland has also followed the intersessional work of the MBT, attending meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts.

Finland has been a core supporter of negotiating landmine issues in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It would be happy to see a transfer ban negotiated in the CD but has been careful to not take any steps or voice its support for initiatives seen as hostile by countries that support the Ottawa Process and MBT. Finland sees the different approaches as complementary to each other.⁷³

Finland is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Finland participated in the First Conference of States Parties on Protocol II in December 1999, and submitted its Article 13 report at that meeting.

Production

Almost all AP mines in stock are Finnish-made mines, said to be produced between 1945 and 1981. No mines have been produced since then.⁷⁴ From this, the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland concludes: "This means that the majority of the mines in stocks are quite old, some of the oldest have been given new fuses, or renewed in some other ways, but mainly the stock should probably be anyway, for military technical reasons, modernized and replaced with new mines or now after this ban process with something else."⁷⁵ Finland has the capability and the know-how to produce AP mines and it is, in principle, possible to do so as long as there is no legislation that prohibits production. (For more detail, see Landmine MonitorReport 1999, pp. 786-787.)

Until 1981 several Finnish companies produced components for simple, "basic" mines that the army assembled as blast-mines, fragmentation-mines, and some Claymores; however, most of the Claymores in stock were imported from Austria.⁷⁶

Finland has no mine delivery systems. "APMs are mainly meant to be delivered by hand, but there are some future delivery development plans for the new military readiness groups. Using helicopters as a delivery system has been researched only in a theoretical way. At the moment Finland does not have technical equipment for delivering APMs."⁷⁷

On the question of replacing and finding alternatives for AP mines, the Defense Ministry said that it "evaluate[s] possibilities in different kinds of research and follows with the development in other countries."⁷⁸

Transfer

The Defense Ministry stated in 1998 and again in 1999 that Finland does not export AP mines.⁷⁹ However, in another interview a Defense Ministry official said that "Finland has exported components of mines (antitank) but never whole APMs."⁸⁰ Following regulations in the CCW Amended Protocol II, which came into force in Finland in December 1998, Finland does not transfer any AP mine production technology to any other country.⁸¹ All exports and transfers of know-how or production licenses of military goods and components are regulated under arms trade law (which now incorporates the CCW restrictions) and must be licensed by the Ministry of Defense.⁸²

Finland has imported Claymore-type mines (model VM88) from Austria.

Stockpiling

Finland's tradition of transparency does not include military issues, especially if it means disclosing information on stockpiles and other information that has to do with war plans. But at the CCW Protocol II meeting in December 1999, Finnish delegates told the ICBL that in the near future Finland may give information on the number of mines in stockpiles.⁸³ At present, public knowledge of AP mine stockpiles remains as described in the Landmine Monitor Report 1999: officially numbering hundreds of thousands but less than a million.⁸⁴

But the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland continues to believe that "the stated amount is in clear contradiction with statements that APMs are an essential part of Finland's defense, and especially in consideration of Finland's long land border and with the statement that it would be very expensive to consider alternatives and destroy the stocks because Finland has more landmines on average than other European countries."⁸⁵ Also, a government officer, who wishes to remain unnamed, commented that the size of the stockpile is probably bigger than reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 1999.

Finland will not destroy its mine stockpiles before it finds alternatives to AP mines for its defense and signs the MBT. However, ratification of the CCW Amended Protocol II has resulted in destruction of some stocks to be compliant with the Protocol. It is not known what impact Protocol II has had on the absolute numbers of mines, but the changes to the composition of the stockpiles resulting from ratification are clearer. It has been necessary to destroy some of the older AP mines (types Sakaramiina SM57 and SM61), and adapt others (Sakaramiina SM65). The SM65 blast-mines do not meet the Amended Protocol II requirements in terms of being detectable; Finland has decided not to add metal to the stockpiled mines except when they are used in training, maintaining the capacity to add the metal if the mines should be taken out from stocks for use. When this change is made these mines will be called Sakaramiina 65-98.⁸⁶ One official said that they "started to destroy old blast mines already before the end of last year (1998) and they are already all destroyed."⁸⁷ Some antitank mines (Pohjamiina PM76) have also been destroyed. The old mines have been destroyed in Lapland or they have been recycled; for example, all the copper has been collected for reuse.⁸⁸

As in other countries, the Finnish Ministry of Defense has renamed its Claymore mines as directional fragmentation "charges" or "explosives" as of 3 December 1998. But the Defense Staff has also stated it will not use the weapon by tripwire-activation: "Finland has changed and classified all Claymore mines as weapons and they are command-detonated only."⁸⁹ The name has changed and the policy is to use them only in command-detonated mode, but no modifications of the weapon have been made: "[I]t is still possible to trigger them by tripwires."⁹⁰

Use

Antipersonnel landmines remain an essential part of Finnish defense doctrine, and Finland reserves the right to use them and other weapons that might function as AP mines. But the mines are in stocks and there are no minefields in peacetime in Finland.⁹¹

Finland has reported that it also reserves the right to use explosive booby traps in population centers under certain conditions. In its Article 13 report for Amended Protocol II, Finland states: "Use of booby traps is forbidden in population centers where civilians are still present and fighting has not yet escalated or it is not expected immediately, except situations where the center is connected to a military installation or in close proximity. Booby traps may be used in population centers if dangerous areas are guarded, fenced and properly signed."⁹²

Mine Action Funding

Since the early 1990s Finland has supported mine action programs with FIM 103 million (US$16.7 million) in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Laos and Mozambique.⁹³ The Finnish contribution includes cash contributions, personnel and in-kind assistance.

For the period 1998-2001 Finland has allocated FIM 120 million (US$19.5 million) for mine action as detailed below.⁹⁴ In connection with this decision Finland established in June 1998 a Stand-by Unit for Humanitarian Demining, which consists of twenty to thirty people to be deployed according to operational needs in assisting demining programs. The Unit has the capacity to train local deminers and carry out mine awareness training, and includes a mechanical mine clearance capacity. One expert of the Stand-by Unit participates in the Western European Demining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM), which was deployed in May 1999 to train mine clearance specialists and instructors in Croatia.

In 1998 a mechanical mine clearance project was also started, in Cambodia, which involved a six-man team (Finn Flail Team), two Finnish RA-140 DS mine clearance vehicles and one XA-180 command and control vehicle. These projects are provided with full support and service packages (vehicles, maintenance, spare parts, personnel costs). In 1999 mechanical mine clearance teams were also deployed in Mozambique and Kosovo. The mechanical mine clearance project in Kosovo is the newest project funded from Finland's humanitarian aid budget, at a cost of FIM 18 million (US$3 million) for the first two years. There are two RA-140 DS (Raisu) clearance vehicles and six persons in the area of Pejen (Pec) and Deqanin in west Kosovo, clearing or investigating suspected mined rural fields. This project is carried out in cooperation with Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).⁹⁵ Finland also supports mine action programs of Finnish nongovernmental organizations, including the Finnish Red Cross and Finn Church Aid. Finland and South Africa started cooperating on mine action by signing a Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki on 15 March 1999 during the visit of President Nelson Mandela. Within this framework Finland and South Africa will cooperate on mine clearance, mine awareness, mine information and victim assistance in southern Africa.

In 1999, the following mine action projects were funded by Finland:⁹⁶

Country	FIM	Program	Organization97
Afghanistan	3 million (US$541,000)	mine clearance	UNOCHA
Angola	3 million (US$541,000)	victim assistance, mine awareness	ICRC
Bosnia	3 million (US$541,000)	local prostheses production	Finnish Red Cross
Cambodia	3,569,190 (US$650,000)	Finnish mechanical mine clearance
Cambodia	592,000 (US$107,000)	mine incident database project	HI
Croatia	360,000 (US$65,000)	planning/project officer	WEUDAM
Kosovo	9,846,000 (US$1.8 million)	Finnish mechanical mine clearance	UNDP/NPA in kind/personnel assistance
Mozambique	7.7 million (US$1.4 million)	Finnish mechanical mine clearance	UNDP in kind/personnel assistance
UNMAS	540,000 (US$100,000)	contribution to core functions
TOTAL	28.7 million (US$5 million)

In the year 2000 as at 1 May, the following mine action projects were funded:⁹⁸

Country	FIM	Program	Organization
Afghanistan	3 million (US$ 488,000)	mine clearance	UNOCHA
Cambodia	3,510,000 (US$ 570,600)	mine clearance	Halo Trust
Cambodia	1.2 million (US$ 195,000)	mine clearance, 3rd phase	Finn Church Aid/MAG
Cambodia	900,000 (US$ 147,000)	mine incident database, 2nd phase	HI
Cambodia	565,000 (US$ 92,000)	mine awareness	Finnish/Cambodian Red Cross
Mozambique	1.2 million (US$ 195,000)	Finnish mechanical demining	UNDP/ADP
UNMAS	615,000 (US$ 100,000)	Support for coordination functions
UNMAS/UNDP	615,000 (US$ 100,000)	Support for Level 1 survey

GEORGIA

Key developments since March 1999: It appears that Georgian groups continue to lay antipersonnel mines inside Abkhazia. The Georgian government acknowledges that it is considering mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border. Russian aircraft dropped mines inside Georgia in what Russia called an accident.

Mine Ban Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, even though as early as September 1996, President Shevardnadze said: "I, as the President of Georgia, declare that Georgia takes the obligation never to produce, use or import antipersonnel mines."⁹⁹

At the treaty signing conference, in December 1997, the representative of Georgia stated that the country could not sign the Mine Ban Treaty for two reasons: first, antipersonnel mines have been used in the region of Abkhazia and Georgia cannot fulfill its treaty obligations to conduct mine clearance until Abkhazia is reintegrated with Georgia; second, Georgia lacks funds, proper equipment, and trained deminers to conduct the mine clearance operations.¹⁰⁰

In February 1999 President Shevardnadze stated his intention to sign the ban treaty,¹⁰¹ but the Ministry of Defense remained opposed, insisting on the right of the military to use antipersonnel mines.¹⁰² In March 2000, in a letter to the ICBL Georgian Committee, the Ministry of Defense cited additional reasons for not joining the treaty: (1) Russian military forces located on Georgian territory have "great amounts of landmines;" (2) "none of the states of our region" have signed; and (3) "Russia continues mining of Georgian territories...."¹⁰³

Georgia was one of twelve observer delegations at the May 1999 Maputo First Meeting of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty. It voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty United Nations General Assembly resolution in December 1999, as it had in 1997 and 1998. In a July 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "I would like to underline that Georgia has been a supporter of the `Ottawa Process' and shares its ultimate goal of complete elimination of the landmines. I would also like to reiterate our support to the International Campaign for Banning Landmines and express our will to reach one of the most important goals of mankind - world free of landmines."¹⁰⁴

An NGO-sponsored regional conference on landmines was held in Tbilisi in early December 1999 and was attended by military and governmental representatives from the region as well as NGOs.

Georgia is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II on landmines, but has not ratified 1996 Amended Protocol II. It did not participate in the December 1999 first annual conference on Amended Protocol II. Georgia is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, officials state that Georgia is not a producer or exporter of antipersonnel landmines, and has not imported AP mines since independence.¹⁰⁵ Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, though the exact size and composition is not known. It has not destroyed any of its landmine stockpiles.¹⁰⁶ In addition, there are antipersonnel mines stockpiled at military bases under Russian control. The most commonly found types of mines in Georgia and Abkhazia are MON-50, MON-100, MON-200, MON-90, OZM-72, PMN, PMN-2 (former Soviet Union); and the TS-50 (Italy).¹⁰⁷

Use

The resumption of fighting in Chechnya has had an impact in Georgia. On 9 August 1999, two Russian Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was involved in fighting against Dagestani rebels, and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one severely.¹⁰⁸ Georgian military identified the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.¹⁰⁹ On 17 August, it was reported that Air Force headquarters would "[o]n behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry...officially apologize to Georgia in the near future for mistakenly dropping mines on Georgian territory 9 August 2000." The incident had been confirmed by a special commission set up to investigate the incident.¹¹⁰

In April 2000, it was reported that the "military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border" in order to stop the flow of men and material between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen said that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.¹¹¹ The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is "considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border." That possibility was said to be a direct response to the decision of the Russians to mine the area.¹¹²

Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces laid tens of thousands of mines during the intense fighting in 1992-93.¹¹³ In 1999 and 2000, there continued to be numerous reports of groups from Georgia, allegedly linked to the Georgian government,¹¹⁴ infiltrating into Abkhazia and laying antipersonnel mines. (See report on Abkhazia). At the Regional Conference in Tbilisi in December 1999, an official from the Georgian Ministry of Defense noted, "Those mines and ammunition we use at present are military secrets. Landmines have their importance and let us leave it in secret."¹¹⁵ Areas of Lower Gali Region in Abkhazia are subject to ongoing limited conflict.¹¹⁶

In a response to Landmine Monitor regarding potential use during this reporting period (March 1999-May 2000), the Georgian Foreign Ministry stated that Georgian armed forces have been "strictly abstaining of laying landmines since long before March 1999. Unfortunately, as you are aware, certain parts of Georgia are not under the control of the Government of Georgia, therefore we are not able to control any kind of military or paramilitary activities there. Neither the Government of Georgia is supporting or controlling the paramilitary units functioning on the above mentioned territories."¹¹⁷

There have in the past been allegations of Abkhazian military groups or partisans laying mines in Georgia,¹¹⁸ but Landmine Monitor is not aware of allegations in the March 1999-May 2000 time period. A January 1999 UN Security Council resolution "condemns the activities by armed groups, including the continued laying of mines, which endanger the civilian population, impede the work of the humanitarian organizations and seriously delay the normalization of the situation in the Gali region, and deplores the lack of serious efforts made by the parties to bring an end to those activities...."¹¹⁹

Landmine Problem

According to the United Nations, there are approximately 150,000 landmines in Georgia and Abkhazia, the majority of which are near the Inguri River separating Georgia and Abkhazia.¹²⁰ The U.N. Development program has estimated that there are 15,000 mines just in two heavily mined areas along the Inguri River and the Gali canal.¹²¹ Outside of Abkhazia, mines pose dangers to civilians in Georgia mainly in areas near the border with Abkhazia and near military bases, which have been mined. (See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 for more details). There are also mines on the border with Turkey.

Mine Clearance

Georgia has no national programs for humanitarian clearance, mine awareness, or survivor assistance. Responsibility for mine clearance is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense for the zone of military actions and territory of military bases, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for populated areas, roads, and railroads, and to the State Department for frontier areas. Since 1994, CIS peacekeepers have conducted demining operations in the security zone along the Inguri River. The non-governmental organization HALO Trust has been conducting humanitarian mine clearance in Abkhazia.¹²² (See Landmine Monitor report on Abkhazia).

In 1999, the government of Georgia requested U.S. assistance to "clear protective minefields surrounding two ex-Soviet military bases in Georgia so that the areas may be returned to civilian use."¹²³ The U.S. has budgeted $1,062,000 for mine action assistance for Georgia and Abkhazia in U.S. fiscal year 2000.¹²⁴ Georgia will host a unique U.S.-sponsored joint humanitarian demining training exercise with personnel from Armenia and Azerbaijan from September-November 2000.¹²⁵

Apparently, discussions are underway between officials of Georgia and Turkey regarding an agreement to demine the border and prohibit future use on the border, similar to an agreement Turkey has made with Bulgaria.¹²⁶

Mine Awareness

The ICBL Georgian Committee has begun a mine awareness campaign, including mapping mined areas, organizing lectures and seminars for teachers in high-risk regions, and publication of a mine awareness brochure for people in Georgia and Abkhazia. The ICBL Georgian Committee is cooperating with Abkhazian NGOs on these issues. During the Tbilisi Regional Conference in December 1999, ten teachers and 300 school children were involved in mine awareness activities with the Georgian Committee.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

The ICBL Georgian Committee believes that there has recently been a reduction in the number of people killed or injured by antipersonnel landmines in Georgia, primarily because a large number of people have left the mined territories. However, after displaced persons return to their homes, it is anticipated that there will be an increased number of mine casualties.

According to information from the Head of Science and Technical Research Department of Georgian Army General Staff, Colonel Tavadze, about 70% of casualties during the war were landmine victims.¹²⁷

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) runs orthopedic projects for the war disabled, many of whom are landmine victims. It has centers in Tbilisi and Gagra (Abkhazia) where an average of thirty-one patients in Tbilisi and six patients in Gagra are fitted with prostheses or orthoses per month.¹²⁸ In 1997, the ICRC manufactured 669 prostheses in the Tbilisi and Gagra workshops, 184 of which were for mine victims.¹²⁹

Hospitals throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia, routinely run into shortages of basic medical supplies. Lack of surgical equipment and the facilities to store blood prevent adequate care for landmine survivors. No special rehabilitation assistance is provided to landmine victims in Georgia. There are medical rehabilitation centers, but expensive surgical and rehabilitation measures are inaccessible to most people. There are no national programs to provide psychological counseling for landmine victims. Although a general law for the "Social Protection of Disabled" exists in Georgia, necessary legislation for its implementation has not been developed. The aforementioned law makes no mention of mine victims.

KAZAKHSTAN

Mine Ban Policy

Kazakhstan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The government has said that it supports the ideas of the Ottawa process and its humanitarian aspects, but "joining the treaty in the close future is problematic, primarily because the treaty obliges complete and immediate destruction of landmines which are used in Kazakhstan for defensive purposes only, to protect considerable parts of its long border. Clearing these landmines away and their substitution with the most modern types of landmines will require considerable financial resources."¹³⁰

Kazakhstan abstained on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had in 1997 and 1998. (It voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution in 1996). Kazakhstan did not participate in any of the diplomatic meetings on landmines in 1999 or 2000.

Kazakhstan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). In response to the OSCE questionnaire about antipersonnel mines, the government noted, with respect to the CCW and Protocol II on landmines, that:

The fulfillment of obligations under the provisions of this Convention...may require high financial expenditures. The extent of the financial outlay and other assistance on the part of the states party to the Convention have not been specified, and the possibility that such assistance can be provided evokes doubt. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan, if our state were to join this Convention, would be deprived of one of the most inexpensive and effective types of defensive weapons which, at the present time, we would find impossible to replace with alternative systems.¹³¹

The government concluded, therefore, that it was "inexpedient...to join the Convention...at this stage."¹³² Nevertheless, an official has indicated that Kazakhstan bases its policies on landmine issues on the provisions of the CCW and its Protocol II.¹³³

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

In April 2000, government officials said that the country does not produce AP mines, does not have industrial facilities for their production and does not plan to construct such facilities.¹³⁴ Kazakhstan is not known to have exported mines. It inherited a stockpile of mines from the Soviet Union.

The United Nations and Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the government declared a comprehensive moratorium on production in December 1996 and a ban on the export of antipersonnel landmines in August 1997.¹³⁵

It is not known if Kazakstan has imported AP mines in the past. But, the government has stated, "It is possible for Kazakhstan to import landmines only from countries that are not party to the Convention [CCW] from now on. This means it is necessary to preserve the available stores of APMs in case they have to be used in the interests of state security."¹³⁶

Landmine Problem

The U.S. State Department in 1993 reported that an unknown number of German and Russian landmines from World War II were scattered about Kazakhstan.¹³⁷ However, Kazakhstan declared to the United Nations in 1995 that it was not mine affected¹³⁸ and has repeated the assertion in April 2000: "There are no mine-affected territories in Kazakhstan, thus there are no necessity of demining, no danger of mine-incidents with civilians and mine-victim assistance."¹³⁹ There have been no recent reports of casualties due to uncleared mines.

Kazakhstan acknowledges that its long borders are mined.¹⁴⁰ It can be assumed that Kazakh mines are deployed along its border with China.

Kazakhstan is not known to have made any contributions to international mine action programs. The Kazakhstan armed forces reportedly have sophisticated mine removal and mine destruction capabilities.¹⁴¹

KYRGYZSTAN

Key developments since March 1999: Six Kyrgyz soldiers were reported to have been killed by landmines during border conflict in mid-1999. Uzbekistan is reported to have laid new mines on its border with Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan voted for the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions from 1996-1998, but was absent from the vote on the 1999 resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyzstan is not known to have made any statements on landmines, or attended any diplomatic meetings on landmines, in 1999 or 2000. Kyrgyzstan is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

According to a Russian diplomat, Kyrgyzstan has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but did inherit a stockpile from the Soviet Union. He said that the stocks are very old, storage dates have expired, and many of the mines are "of special menace" because they have liquid explosive, which cannot be destroyed cheaply.¹⁴²

In June-September 1999 an armed conflict took place near Botkem, close to the border with Uzbekistan. An armed group from Tajikistan intruded into Kyrgyz territory and was repelled during combat actions in which Kyrgyz armed forces and Uzbeki air forces took part.¹⁴³ In the fighting, twenty-seven Kyrgyz servicemen were reported to have been killed, six by landmines.¹⁴⁴ It is unknown who laid the landmines.

As a result of the conflict Uzbekistan is reported to have reinforced its unmarked border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.¹⁴⁵ One of the reported cases is the mining by Uzbeki military of territory near the Kyrgyz settlement of Boz Adyr, which is a disputed area of the Kyrgyz-Uzbeki border. Initially the area was marked with warning signs, which later disappeared.¹⁴⁶

There are landmines on the Kyrgyz-China border, laid during the time of the Soviet Union. How much of the Kyrgyz-China border is mined or how many mines are laid is unknown. However, in early 1999, Kyrgyzstan began discussions with China on how to clear the border minefields between the two countries.¹⁴⁷ Also Kyrgyzstan has sought help from the United States in the demarcation of its border with Uzbekistan. The U.S. government plans to donate $3 million to help resolve the border problems. After the Russian Border Service troops withdrawal from Kyrgyzstan in 1999, the Kyrgyz leadership has been faced with the problem of the protection of their borders with China and Uzbekistan.

The number of landmine victims in Kyrgyzstan is not known. Kyrgyzstan is not thought to have made any contributions to international mine action programs.

LATVIA

Key developments since March 1999: Latvia has announced that it has 4,500 antipersonnel mines in stockpile. During 1999 the Ministry of Defense decided to shift primarily to command-detonated AP mines or antitank mines. Mines and UXO remain a substantial problem, but there are few resources for clearance.

Mine Ban Policy

Although Latvia has not signed the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), officials attended many meetings of the "Ottawa Process" leading to the MBT. The Foreign Ministry confirmed in January 2000 that Latvia welcomes the efforts of the international community to stop the use of antipersonnel mines and, eventually, to eliminate all deployed and stockpiled AP mines. The government considers that the MBT is the most decisive political step ever taken in this respect.¹⁴⁸

The Foreign Ministry insists that Latvia meets the MBT requirements, although it has not signed the treaty: AP mines are not produced in Latvia, and there are no minefields on the borders or elsewhere. The existing small number of AP mines is estimated to be sufficient for training purposes for no longer than the next several years.¹⁴⁹

Latvia did not send observers to the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999, but the Foreign Ministry states that it closely followed developments there and studied the related documents,¹⁵⁰ including the Landmine Monitor Report 1999, which is considered a valuable resource.¹⁵¹ Latvia has voted in favor of all the pro-ban resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly.

The National Armed Forces have held that AP mines are useful to protect strategic objects, and that combined with antitank mines they are considered an efficient tool in the case of massive land invasion. The Baltic countries' shared history of invasion and occupation probably influences these perceptions, as well as present-day uncertainties in the region. More recently, military sources stated that while a direct military threat seems unlikely now, until it joins NATO Latvia would be isolated in the event of a conflict, and therefore AP mines provide "psychological security."¹⁵² But it is accepted now in military circles that AP mines do more harm to the civilian population than the aggressor, particularly if they are not the newer self-destruct type, and pose little of an obstacle to a modern army.¹⁵³ The Foreign Ministry confirmed that Latvia's position on the MBT prohibition of AP mines is highly influenced by the regional context, especially the policies of neighboring countries such as Finland, Russia and Belarus.¹⁵⁴

Latvia signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II in 1993, but it has never ratified the Convention or its Amended Protocol II (1996) on landmines. Latvia is not a member of the Conference of Disarmament, but would support negotiations there on the issue of AP mines.¹⁵⁵

Production, Stockpile and Transfer

Officials state that Latvia is not producing and has not previously produced antipersonnel mines; all mines of the Latvian armed forces are Soviet in origin.¹⁵⁶ Early in 1999, the National Armed Forces said it held approximately 20,000 mines in stockpiles.¹⁵⁷ But in January 2000, the Foreign Ministry stated that remaining stocks total 4,500.¹⁵⁸ This difference has been explained in terms of the larger figure including antitank mines while the smaller figure represents those AP mines that cannot be adapted to command-detonation and would have to be destroyed under the MBT prohibition.¹⁵⁹ During 1999 the Ministry of Defense changed its policy away from non-command detonated AP mines and put the emphasis on antitank mines; the plan (approved at the end of 1999) is for each engineering platoon to have "controllable" (that is, command-detonated) mines or antitank mines. It has been concluded that most of the AP mines can be converted to command-detonation mode.¹⁶⁰

In September 1995 an indefinite export moratorium on AP mines was imposed, which the Foreign Ministry says will be confirmed in a new law by the end of 2000. Transfer of AP mines requires approval by the Latvian Strategic Goods Control Committee. Existing regulations require several licenses for the transit of strategic, military and dual-use goods. A transit license through Latvian territory is issued only if the authorities are in possession of a corresponding export license of the exporting country and import license of the importing country. It is said to be doubtful that such transit would be authorized in the case of AP mines.¹⁶¹

Use

There is no evidence of new use of AP mines by Latvian Armed Forces. But in Latvia, as in other Baltic countries, explosives sometimes including antipersonnel mines are used by criminal elements. According to the Latvian State and Riga City Police,¹⁶² the number of such incidents is decreasing, from a total of 67 in 1995, to 35 by 1999. Most of these incidents caused death, injury and serious damage to vehicles or buildings. Most were targeted on other criminal elements involved in "business disputes."

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left from World Wars I and II and from the Soviet occupation remain a substantial problem today in Latvia; the absence of assistance by Germany or Russia in clearing these "remnants of war" is sometimes put forward as a reason for reluctance to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Large areas of agricultural land still are closed to civilian use. To determine locations polluted by explosives, Latvia has used a methodology elaborated in 1998 by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development. The classification includes nine levels of pollution; according to Ministry of Defense data there are about 60,000 polluted areas¹⁶³ covering approximately 100,000 hectares.¹⁶⁴ Areas intensively contaminated by mines and UXO are marked by signs and partially guarded. Every year EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) teams of the Armed Forces neutralize or dispose of more than 3,000 explosive items, as detailed in Landmine Monitor Report 1999.¹⁶⁵ Destruction of such explosives continues and between January-September 1999, Homeguard Units (a voluntary defense organization under the National Armed Forces) destroyed 2,847 such devices.¹⁶⁶

Eight army officers and instructors were honored for their work in destroying 4,500 explosive items during 1999. Among them was Zane Silina, the only woman deminer, who destroyed more than 1,000 explosives in 1999. She says that the most active time of year is spring, but even in winter there is much disposal work to be done due to increased construction; many explosives are found on construction sites in Latvian towns.¹⁶⁷

In the Zvarde region which was heavily contaminated in World War II and later used as a Soviet military test site, there are about 580 peasant families who still cannot return to their homes. According to one Homeguard deminer, Andris Rieksts, during the first two months of 2000 there were six calls from returning peasants for clearance. Zigurds Firers, Head of the District Council of Saldus, said construction of roads is necessary for this region of rich arable land. Gaidis Zeibots (of the National Armed Forces at that time) says that Zvarde region could be used as a real-life training ground for NATO deminers.¹⁶⁸

According to an official of the Armed Forces, the concentration and depth of explosives in Cekule (Riga district) is such that complete clearance would require resources comparable to several annual defense budgets. In Cekule about 4.3 million cubic meters of soil will have to be moved in the clearance operation, and there is the question of whether this makes sense.¹⁶⁹

Since 1995 there has been little state funding for demining and EOD operations. Local government funding for equipment has decreased from approximately US$4,000 to US$3,000 annually. State funding exceeded US$16,000 in 1999. For seriously affected regions there are very scarce government subsidies; for example, state financing for Zvarde region totals only about US$5,000 per year. Due to insufficient financing local governments are able to cover the costs only partially. One consequence is that there are no commercial demining companies in Latvia. Assistance has been provided in recent years by the United States, Norway and Denmark.¹⁷⁰

Latvian Armed Forces are training EOD personnel from the Latvian Homeguard Units, Navy and Ministry of the Interior personnel. About 200 Homeguard and ten professional deminers are able to participate in operations (except at sea). There have been problems with equipment, but this situation improved in 1999 when German equipment was purchased by the State. Generally there has been no international assistance for EOD and demining activities in Latvia. In 1999 talks started on a longterm Norwegian-Latvian project to set up EOD Training Centers in the Adazi district of Riga and in Liepaja, with significant financing by Norway; this project is included in Latvia's NATO Membership Action Plan. The Centers should open in 2002, and as a result it is expected that within a few years Latvia will employ only professional deminers and EOD personnel. There is language training for Latvian military specialists under the Latvian - Canadian Agreement on Military Cooperation, and there has been other assistance in demining/EOD operations by Denmark and the United States. The Ministries of Defense and of the Interior have also decided to establish a joint training course to neutralize improvised explosive devices, with three centers in Latvia.¹⁷¹

There are few mine awareness programs in Latvia. One Latvian nongovernmental organization, the Baltic International Center of Human Education, previously carried out a mine awareness project financed by Open Society Institute and local organizations.¹⁷² Latvia has laws and social guarantees for disabled persons, including the victims of mine and UXO accidents. Disabled people are treated primarily at the Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics (which was famous for its surgeons during the Afghanistan war), the Center of Microsurgery, and the National Centre of Rehabilitation in Vaivari, Jurmala (a former rehabilitation centre for Soviet astronauts).

RUSSIA

Key developments since March 1999: Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines extensively in Chechnya and Dagestan from August 1999 to the present day. In April 2000, Russia announced plans to mine its border with Georgia. CCW Amended Protocol II was submitted to the State Duma for ratification in May 2000. Destruction of significant numbers of obsolete and non-Protocol II compliant AP mines has continued.

Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Although government officials and, perhaps most notably, then-President Boris Yeltsin have stated Russia's willingness to sign at some point in the future,¹⁷³ it is clear that the military still considers antipersonnel mines a necessary weapon, as evidenced by its extensive use of the weapon in operations first in Dagestan in August 1999 and then in Chechnya from September 1999 to the present day.

In addition to stating concerns about costs related to implementing the treaty, the military insists that alternatives to antipersonnel mines must be in place before Russia can ban the weapon. In its December 1999 response to an OSCE questionnaire on antipersonnel mines, the government stated: "The Russian Federation believes that what is important to solve the `mines' problem is a realistic approach taking into account the interests of all the members of the international community and, first of all, of the states which historically or due to their geostrategic location are compelled to rely on this defensive weapon to ensure their security. The Russian Federation advocates the search for mutually acceptable solutions for anti-personnel mines and opposes the division of the international community into supporters of a hasty ban on anti-personnel mines and those states that are still unable to take this step and propose other ways to meet this goal."¹⁷⁴

Although President Vladimir Putin has not made any public statements regarding a mine ban since his election, a government press release in March 2000 spoke of the policy "aimed at banning of landmines," declared by the president. It noted that the pending ratification of Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), would "enable the Russian Federation to carry out a more active role in landmine-related issues in the international political arena." ¹⁷⁵

Russia attended, as an observer, all of the treaty preparatory meetings of the Ottawa Process, as well as the First Meeting of State Parties in Mozambique in May 1999. It has also participated in many of the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. However, Russia has continuously stated its strong preference for dealing with controls on AP mines through the CCW and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), rather than the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁷⁶ Russia abstained on the vote on the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has every pro-ban resolution since 1996.

At the same time, Russian officials are always quick to point out some of the positive steps Russia has taken toward a ban: a moratorium on export of non-detectable and "dumb" antipersonnel mines, a ban on the production of blast mines, and the destruction of more than half a million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.¹⁷⁷

Conference on Disarmament and Convention on Conventional Weapons

Russia has consistently favored the CD "as the main forum for the mine action issue."¹⁷⁸ It called for the appointment of a Special Coordinator on AP mines, and the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an export ban.¹⁷⁹ Again in December 1999, it stated that it "reiterates its proposal to establish a special committee in the framework of the CD that could deal with the problem of the universal ban on APM transfer."¹⁸⁰

Russia is a party to the 1980 CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines. Putin submitted Amended Protocol II (1996) to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000.¹⁸¹ Hearings will presumably take place in late June 2000 with fairly good chances for its approval.¹⁸²

A government press release on preparations for the submission for ratification noted that it "complies with the interests of the Russian Federation" because it allows for the destruction of "huge stocks of outdated APMs with expired life-time," with minimal financial burden, coupled with relative ease in military-technical terms, and for the development of alternatives. It also noted that ratification would not affect Russian defense capacity or security. ¹⁸³

For several years the Russian military has stated that steps were already being taken to fulfill requirements of the Amended Protocol: "Necessary recommendations on the combat use of APMs in compliance with the new requirements have been prepared and released to the related staffs and commanders of military units."¹⁸⁴ At the December 1999 Tbilisi Conference, Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Nagorny stated that "the Russian Engineers are fulfilling all requirements of the CCW to a full extent."¹⁸⁵

The costs associated with implementing Amended Protocol II are officially budgeted at 3,066,805 rubles (approximately U.S.$109.53 million) over the eight-year period 1998-2005.¹⁸⁶ According to information from the Ministry of Defense obtained by International Physicians to Prevent Nuclear War-Russia, full costs to implement Amended Protocol II are estimated at about U.S.$374.6 million, which includes costs for making some mines compliant with the Protocol, development and production of some alternatives, and destruction of some stocks. A similar estimate of the cost of joining the Mine Ban Treaty is about U.S.$576 million, which includes costs for development and production of alternatives as well as destruction of all stockpiles. Below are two charts illustrating the total estimated cost projections: ¹⁸⁷

Cost estimate of Russia's joining the MBT prepared by the RF Ministry of Defense for the RF government in 1998:

Actions	AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in mln Russian R (as of 1998)
	Total	Year by year
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Development of engineer munitions - alternatives to LM	210	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
2. Production & accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of engineer munitions - alternatives to LM	3000	5	10	50	250	300	450	550	650	735
3. LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)	390	50	180	80	80
Total:	3600	85	220	160	360	330	480	580	650	735

Cost estimate of Russia's meeting the requirements of the CCW and its amended Protocol II:

Actions	AMOUNT OF FINANCES NEEDED, in billions Russian Rubles (as of 1998)
	Total	Year by year
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Modernization of the existing munitions (LMs) and development of new ones (alternatives to LMs), including the preparation of their production	200 80	33 -	44 3	56 28	38 22	27 27
2. Production and accumulation of a minimally necessary quantities of new munitions	1891.25		7	12	141.75	265.5	375.5	367	362	360.5
3. Outdated LM stockpiles destruction (reprocessing)	245	11	11	13	40	40	34	32	32	32
Total:	2341.25	46	64	82	219.75	332.25	409.5	399	394	392.5

Production

Russia has been one of the world's largest producers and exporters of AP mines. It is believed that since 1992, it has been producing at least ten types of antipersonnel mines.¹⁸⁸ In May 1998, representatives of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation stopped producing blast AP mines.¹⁸⁹ Russian military reconfirmed this at the Tbilisi landmine conference in December 1999.¹⁹⁰ (For more detail on mines types, production sites, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806.)

In the former USSR there were more than 20 enterprises that either assembled landmines or produced their components. According to the public statements of the Command of the Russian Engineer Forces, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ninety percent of Russia's ammunition and armament production facilities were left outside the territory of Russia, namely in Ukraine, Belarus and in the Baltic republics of the former USSR.¹⁹¹ But, within the last three to five years, the military has managed to begin the production of different modern types of ammunition, including mines and fuses, which were previously produced outside its territory.¹⁹² Some plants that have assembled AP mines are now involved in destruction technology.

According to official sources, it should not be assumed that Russia has increased its production of AP mines as a result of the on-going conflict in Chechnya. They state current stocks of mines compliant with CCW Protocol II are significant -- and will be for quite some time.¹⁹³ Instead Russia is increasingly focusing more efforts on research and development of landmine alternatives.¹⁹⁴ In the above charts estimating costs of implementing the MBT, points one and two show costs of development and production, respectively, of alternatives. (For more on alternatives see Landmine Monitor 1999, pp. 807-808.)

Transfer

The Soviet Union was one of the world's largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. However, on 1 December 1994 it announced a three-year moratorium on the export of AP mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This was extended for another five years on 1 December 1997.¹⁹⁵ Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny of the Russian Engineer Forces stated, "Since 1991 Russia entirely stopped the export of APMs in any countries of the world. The only exception is APMs left behind in the CIS countries according to governmental agreements with the countries in question. Since 1991 no planned transfers of APMs have taken place."¹⁹⁶ (For more details on transfer, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 808.)

But apparently a black market operates. On 13 January 2000, on a trip to the US, Chechen Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilia Akhmadov stated that Chechens were being provided "arms, ammunition, including explosives...by Russia." Chechen military have said that the only method of receiving and replenishing their AP mines is through contacts with representatives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.¹⁹⁷

Stockpiling

There is no official public number of antipersonnel landmines stockpiled in Russia. One published report states that Russia has approximately 60 million landmines that fall under the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁹⁸ ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock. (For information on types and locations of stocks, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.) Both military officials and representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admit that through governmental agreements huge stocks have been left in CIS states, in particular in Belarus and Ukraine, and that certain stockpiles remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents presently located in CIS countries.

Destruction

Russia carries out systematic destruction of its obsolete AP mines as well as mines with an expired shelf life, primarily PMN and PMN-1s. Some mines are recycled, extracting explosives and reprocessing them for civilian use. Mines currently slated for destruction also include those not in compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II. In 1998, more than 500,000 such mines were destroyed.¹⁹⁹ According to Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, of the Engineer Forces, the number of mines destroyed will reach 800,000 by the end of 2000.²⁰⁰ However, General Kuznetsov (ret.), who was the commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, stated that in 1998-1999 alone, 850,000 mines were destroyed.²⁰¹ Plans call for destroying non-CCW compliant mines by 2005,²⁰² but Nagorny said that destruction would not be completed until 2010-2012.²⁰³ The Ministry of Defense has calculated that it will cost about U.S.$6.4 million annually to destroy all of its non-CCW compliant mines.²⁰⁴

Use

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in 1993 during the conflict in Tajikistan, during large-scale combat operations in Chechnya from December 1994 until June 1996, in military operations against Dagestan in August 1999, and then again on a wide-scale basis in Chechnya since September 1999. Russian forces in CIS peacekeeping operations in Georgia/Abkhazia and perhaps elsewhere have also used mines.

A government official, describing their use in Dagestan wrote, "The use of antipersonnel landmines there was nothing less but a `dire necessity.' In Dagestan we had to do everything possible not only to safeguard the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, but first and foremost to protect the civilian population from international terrorists.... The Russian Federation uses antipersonnel landmines only for the purposes of defense and in the first place to deter terrorists, drug smugglers and other potential illegal trespassers who wish to penetrate into our territory."²⁰⁵

In the renewed fighting in Chechnya, which continues as Landmine Monitor goes to print, mines have been used in significant numbers by all armed fighters, but particularly by Russian forces. Chechens have made unverifiable claims that Russia has used between 200,000-300,000 mines since the fighting broke out.²⁰⁶ Questions have been raised if the types of mines and methods of mine use have been consistent with CCW Protocol II, as well as its requirements for mapping, marking, and protecting minefields.

Russian officials themselves, including at the highest military levels in the operation in Chechnya, admit the large-scale use of mines throughout the operations. Russian troops have used hand-laid mines, air- and artillery-scattered mines, as well as remotely controlled devices. The main objectives of the initial stages of the operation were the creation of "security zones," and a "sanitary corridor." The military has said that at that point, only MVZ mines were used to protect check-points, outposts and temporary positions, and that the mines were removed whenever the units changed position.²⁰⁷ They also said that the minefields were mapped and the "security zones" were marked.²⁰⁸ As operations expanded, so did the use of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Hand-laid mines included OZM-72, and MON-50/90/100 mines.²⁰⁹ It is likely that, in many cases, decisions to use mines were made at individual command and/or small reconnaissance team and patrol level.²¹⁰

The Russians also have widely used scatterable mines, mostly dropped from aircraft, to cut off potential withdrawal routes from Dagestan, against guerrillas in the mountainous areas of Chechnya, and to cut off both weapons supply and guerrilla reinforcement along the Russian-Georgian border. In December 1999, a Georgian officer noted that such operations had been going on for two months, and he stated that on one day alone, Russian aircraft scattered mines along a 20 kilometer stretch in the Chechen border area. He noted that it is very difficult to precisely locate air-scattered mines.²¹¹ The most commonly used mine has been the PFM-1S, which is equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.²¹² Artillery-delivered mines have also been used, notably in the mining of the estuary of the River Sunzha and in fields running from Grozny to Alkhan-Kalu.²¹³

Much of the Chechen capital of Grozny has been laid to waste in the fighting.²¹⁴ Mines have been used extensively in the city and have taken their toll on combatants and civilians alike. In one of the most notorious incidents in the fighting for Grozny, on 31 January 2000, a column of some 2-3,000 rebels evacuated the city through a minefield, suffering heavy casualties.²¹⁵ Russians officials claimed they lured the guerrillas into a trap by pretending to accept a bribe in exchange for safe passage out of Grozny. "Frankly, we did not expect bandits, especially the key figures, to swallow the bait," said Gen. Vladimir Shamanov.²¹⁶ Several hundred fighters were killed or wounded, including rebel commanders. ²¹⁷ One doctor in the nearby village of Alkhan-Kala said that in two days, he amputated limbs on sixty-seven mine victims, including rebel commander Shamil Basayev, who lost his right foot.²¹⁸

Shortly after the incident, the Russian military closed Grozny to returning civilians. On Russia's NTV television, Col. Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, a top Russian commander, said, "As long as the city isn't cleared of all mines and shells, and there is a threat of buildings collapsing, civilians are being banned from entering." He added, "Under civilian disguise, militants are trying to return to pick up their wounded."²¹⁹

On 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been "completely cleared of mines." They did, however, note that the "city is still unsafe," charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.²²⁰ In May 2000, Russian authorities began using mines again to protect factories and power plants in Chechen's capital, Grozny. The Russian-appointed mayor of the city, Supyan Mokchayev reported that such mining was necessary to stop "a plague of looting by their own [Russian] troops."²²¹

Russia has also "accidentally" dropped mines on Georgian territory. On 9 August 1999, two Su-25 aircraft entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan, where Russia was fighting against rebels and bombed in and around the village of Zemo Omalo; three people were wounded, one severely.²²² Georgian military were able to identify the weapons used as KSS-1S cluster bombs, containing PFM-1S antipersonnel mines.²²³ On 17 August, it was reported that Air Force headquarters would "[o]n behalf of the Russian Defense Ministry...officially apologize to Georgia in the near future for mistakenly dropping mines on Georgian territory 9 August." The incident had been confirmed by a special commission set up to investigate the incident.²²⁴

In April 2000, it was reported that the "military leadership and border services of Russia and Georgia have adopted the decision to mine several stretches of the border" in order to stop the flow of men and materiel between Georgia and Chechnya. Russian military spokesmen would not "disclose precisely" the type of mines to be used, noting only that over twenty mountain passes and dozens of pathways would be mined along an 80 kilometer-long stretch of the border near the southern Chechen Argun Gorge.²²⁵ Russian officials stated that mining would be carried out in compliance with CCW Protocol II, and that the majority of the minefields would be remote controlled which will eliminate the indiscriminate effect of their use.²²⁶ The Georgian Department for the Protection of the State Border, for its part, has stated officially it is "considering the possibility of mining the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border."²²⁷

Mine Clearance

The USSR was heavily infested with mines and UXOs after World War II and they are still a problem in some areas. Today there are requests for mine/UXO-clearance from 10 territories in Russia where World War II battles took place. (For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 811-812.)

In the post-World War II period, demining operations were carried out by the Engineer Forces of the Defense Ministry. Today demining operations are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense's Engineer Forces; the Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Resources' Russian National Corps of Emergent Humanitarian Operations; and the Ministry of Internal Affairs' demining brigades.²²⁸ Demining is also conducted by non-governmental enterprises like the company "Fort" (Moscow), which is carrying out demining in Tver, Moscow and Vladimir regions, and the company "Iskatel" (St.-Petersburg). Employees of these companies are mainly retired officers of engineer forces.²²⁹

Russian engineers perform extensive demining in the CIS/FSU countries and regions, as well as taking part in demining operations in more than twenty countries, e.g., Algeria, Bosnia, Libya and Syria. The Russian Ministry of Defense's participation in humanitarian demining operations is carried out within the framework of military-technical co-operation with foreign governments.

In August 1999 the temporary press service of the Russian "joint grouping" in Dagestan reported finding two depots with mines and other weapons "during an operation to liberate villages in the Botlikh district." It also reported that Russian troops would carry out demining operations in the villages of Ansalta, Rakhata, and Shodroda, and clear mines from roads...."²³⁰ Demining has also been carried out by Russian soldiers and the Police of Dagestan in Boltlikh and Tsumadinskom.²³¹ In October-November 1999 a platoon of the Russian Engineer Forces conducted a survey and began clearance of landmines and UXOs in Novolaks district of Dagestan, in the areas where combat actions had taken place. The platoon cleared more than 100 hectares of agricultural land, but had to suspend work due to the beginning of frost.²³²

In Chechnya, on 3 April 2000, the Russian Military News Agency reported that "160 hectares of land has been cleared of mines and prepared for ploughing in the Pravoberezhny district. Sappers have surveyed 653 hectares of land in the Urus-Martan district."²³³ After gaining control of Grozny at the beginning of February, clearance operations began in the city. By late February there were reportedly 500 sappers working in Grozny alone.²³⁴ Shortly thereafter, as noted above, on 24 April 2000, Russian forces announced that the city had been "completely cleared of mines," noting, however, that the "city is still unsafe," charging continued mine use by Chechen fighters.²³⁵ (See report on Chechnya.)

From 6 August to 15 November 1999, a demining team of twenty sappers and four mine dogs from the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes conducted a special operation in Kosovo within the framework of a Swiss-Russian humanitarian program. Under the order of the UN Mine Action Coordinating Committee (UNMACC), Russian deminers conducted a mine survey and humanitarian demining of the most dangerous areas, in particular in the vicinity of the town of Glogovac, where the most fierce combat clashes took place and resulted in a large number of mine victims. As a result, 85,309 square meters was surveyed and ten minefields detected. Thirty-name AP mines were cleared, along with other explosive devices and UXOs. Between 23 August and 20 September 20, 1999, the Russians also demined the Yugopetrol oil depot in Pristina.

Since 1994, the special engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense as a part of the CIS CPKF has been demining in Abkhazia. Roads, land and infrastructure in Abkhazia and the south bank of the Ingur River have been surveyed and demined by the Russians. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, some 23,000 explosive devices have been cleared since 1994.²³⁶ The British demining organization HALO Trust states that Russian engineers "have undertaken limited clearance of items in Abkhazia," particularly in Gumista minefields. HALO notes that "some mines were missed and HALO had to re-clear some areas." HALO states that currently Russian engineers only deal with "increasingly rare" incidents of new use, and check the stretch of M27 between Gali town and Inguri bridge "several times each day."²³⁷

Currently the Ministry of Emergent Situations and Catastrophes is negotiating the participation of its demining units in humanitarian demining operations in Chad. Similar consultations are under way with Egypt, Libya, Angola, and Peru among other countries.

Russia has not made any donations to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, nor has it received any funds for mine action programs within Russia.

Mine Awareness

During the Soviet era, dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas was carried out by district military recruiting offices.²³⁸ Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities ground to a halt, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.²³⁹

With the increase of mine danger in a number of areas of the Russian Federation, the lack of mine awareness programs becomes increasingly serious. Currently there are no federal mine awareness activities in the areas of on-going conflict. No mine awareness programs are under way either in Dagestan or Ingushetia.

IPPNW-Russia is launching the broadcast of a series of TV-clips on mine awareness.

Landmine Casualties

There have been a significant number of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999. (For casualties post-WWII, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.)

There is no complete official data on mine casualties/incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians, available at the moment. Such is not likely to ever be made available. The Russian Armed Forces Command and the governmental officials are objectively not interested in collection of this data, let alone making it public. However, judging by highly fragmentary information coming from the conflict zone, one can estimate a rather high level of mine-caused losses. For example, for the period from the beginning of the combat operation in Chechnya into May 2000, just one hospital of the Ural Military District located in Ekaterinburg has treated 126 mine-wounded soldiers.²⁴⁰ Another indicator of the scope of the problem is the fact that the MOD's Military Medical Department ordered seventy-eight prostheses for soldiers, injured in Chechnya for the period 1 August 1999- 1 February 2000, from the RKK "Energiya" only.²⁴¹ (See Chechnya report for civilian casualties).

The number of mine-injured in the republic of Ingushetia since the beginning of the last Chechen conflict in August 1999 is 347,²⁴² including: forty-eight children, eighty-nine women and 210 men. The number of persons that need prosthetics is 300, twenty-five of them critically.²⁴³ There are no prosthetic shops in the republic, but one is to be built in the near future; the project has been approved and funds have already been allocated. The total number of hospitals/medical centers in Ingushetia is 12, including: 1 of Republican-level, 2 of city-level, 4 of territorial/regional level, 1 rural, 2 local and 2 dispensers (1 TB and 1 Dermato-venerologic).

There is the only rehabilitation center, a pediatric center in Troitskaya stanitsa. There are no mine awareness programs, either provided by the republic authorities or NGOs.

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in treatment of blast injuries, predominantly during World War II. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia. According to the 1995 Federal law "On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped" an individual rehabilitation and reintegration program is developed and offered for each handicapped person. Under the existing 1997-2000 Federal program "Social Insurance for Military Handicapped" (1997-2000), a total of 22 million rubles was allocated for 1999.

There are seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. The total annual need for prosthetic devices is said to be 200,000 pieces, including 120,000 lower limb prostheses and 32,000 upper limb prostheses. In December 1994, "Energiya," the Russian Space Corporation, began to produce prostheses. At present, it produces more than 200 types of prosthetic modules, reaching 40,000 components per year, which are up to international standards.²⁴⁴ "Energiya" has developed standardized prosthetic workshops, including mobile ones. Eight experimental mobile workshops vehicles (based on the PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in the remote areas. Unfortunately, due to constraints of the federal budget, not all elements of its plans have been carried out. It is now planned to consolidate its achievements within the framework of the new 2000-2005 federal program, "On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped," developed in the fall of 1999 and approved in January 2000.

Over the past two years, through the International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, mine victims have been treated by bringing U.S. manufactured prosthetic technology to the Institute where their physicians supply the surgical and rehabilitative component for the most cost-effective delivery of the services. The cost of the procedure in Russia is about $3,500 per person; in the U.S., the same treatment has been estimated at $25,000. In 1998, the program treated four children and three adults.²⁴⁵The IPRLS has proposed a St. Petersburg Center for children which, if fully funded, could provide treatment and rehabilitation for up to 500 children who require surgery. The proposal has been accepted by UNICEF and is under consideration by the World Bank.²⁴⁶

TURKEY

Key developments since March 1999: In December 1999, Turkey reported that a military directive banning the use of AP mines on Turkish territory has been in place since January 1998. In May and December 1999 Turkey stated its intention to join the Mine Ban Treaty in the near future. In March 1999 Turkey signed an agreement with Bulgaria to demine and prohibit future use of mines on their common border. Turkey reported on similar negotiations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and a similar proposal to Greece. Through the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe Turkey is proposing a region-wide agreement to clear common borders. The PKK rebel forces apparently continue to use AP mines in Turkey and Northern Iraq.

Mine Ban Policy

Turkey has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), but did attend the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in May 1999 as an observer. The Turkish delegate stated that "the security situation around Turkey so far preclude[s] my country from signing the Ottawa Convention." Upon closing his speech, however, he announced the government's intention "to sign the Ottawa Convention at the beginning of the next decade if present conditions would not change adversely."²⁴⁷

In its report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Turkey noted on 15 January 1999 that "a comprehensive study is underway to reassess the country's security requirements and to develop alternative strategies to the use of anti-personnel landmines." ²⁴⁸ In its 14 December 1999 OSCE report Turkey reaffirmed its intention to join the MBT at the beginning of the next decade if the situation does not "change adversely."²⁴⁹

In a meeting with ICBL members in Geneva in December 1999, Turkish officials noted that landmine policy had changed dramatically in the past two years. They stated Turkey hoped to be in a position to join the treaty in two or three years, assuming the security situation did not deteriorate.²⁵⁰

Turkey has attended nearly all of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT. Turkey has taken part in regional landmine conferences in Zagreb, Croatia, in June 1999 and in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June 2000. After abstaining from voting on the 1996 and 1997 UN General Assembly resolutions in support of a landmine ban, Turkey voted in favor of the 1998 and December 1999 pro-ban resolutions.

Turkey's delay in signing the MBT can be attributed to ongoing armed conflict with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), long-standing concern about the security of its borders in the context of regional rivalries, and the situation in Cyprus where a heavily mined buffer zone divides the Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces. In recent years the conflict with the PKK and some regional rivalries appear to have lessened.

The Turkish government has undertaken bilateral negotiations with some neighboring countries regarding demining of common borders. The first agreement was concluded with Bulgaria on 22 March 1999, prohibiting the use and mandating the removal and destruction of landmines in common border areas. This agreement has been approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and was ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament on 15 March 2000, where the hope was expressed that the bilateral agreement was paving the way for Turkey to join the MBT.²⁵¹ There have been numerous reports of Turkey's desire to conclude similar agreements with its other neighbors. According to the Turkish delegation's statement at the Ljubljana Regional Conference on Landmines on 21 June 2000, negotiations are underway with Georgia and Azerbaijan, while a response to Turkey's proposal is awaited from Greece.²⁵²

Turkey has also pursued this idea within the framework of the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, where its submission to Working Table III (Security Issues) is entitled "Regional Agreement for Common State Borders to be Kept Free from Mines." The objective of this proposal is "a legally binding agreement between the states in the SEE region to eliminate all anti-personnel mines placed and/or stored along common border areas."²⁵³ The importance of these initiatives is increased by the fact that, of the nations bordering Turkey, only Bulgaria is a party to the MBT and only Greece is a signatory.

Turkey is a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and announced in June 2000 that ratification of the CCW and its Amended Protocol II was underway.²⁵⁴ It also participated, as an observer, in the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 1999.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), it continues to support the CD as an appropriate forum for addressing the landmine issue, stating that "a global regime against antipersonnel mines would be enhanced if a transfer ban in the CD is pursued."²⁵⁵

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines but has produced and imported them.⁰ In June 2000, Turkish officials told a representative of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines that Turkey no longer produces AP mines, but there has been no formal confirmation of this information.¹ Its 1996 moratorium on the sale and transfer of AP mines was extended on 15 October 1998 for a further three years from its expiry on January 1999.² Turkey will not reveal details about its current stockpile of AP mines, but past production and import of AP mines suggests that stockpiles are substantial.

The United States is believed to maintain a stockpile in Turkey of 1,100 U.S. Air Force Gator antipersonnel mines.³

Use

From the recent initiatives with Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Greece, it can be concluded that these borders have been mined, although the extent and exact locations of minefields have not been made known. The borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq are also mined, and it is in this southeast region where there has been the most widespread use of mines by both sides in the conflict between Turkey and the PKK (For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 821-823). Confirmation of mine use by either side in the PKK conflict is difficult, as access to the southeastern region is often severely restricted.

During the First Meeting of States Parties to the MBT in May 1999 the Turkish delegation disputed information in the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 about mine use, stating that "the report contains incorrect, inaccurate and misleading information with regard to my country.... [N]ew antipersonnel mines were not laid by my government, more precisely by the Turkish Army, between December 1997 to early 1999 as alleged in the report."⁴ In a January 2000 letter to the ICBL, Turkey's Permanent Mission to the UN stated that "not even a single mine had been planted in Turkey since January 1998."⁵ In December 1999, Turkey reported to the OSCE that "with humanitarian considerations in mind, a directive has been issued by the Chief of Turkish General Staff in January 1998, banning the use of APMs on Turkish territory. A phased demining initiative in Turkey is also intended by this directive."⁶

Landmine Monitor has no evidence and has received no allegations of new use of AP mines by Turkish forces in the current reporting period of March 1999 to May 2000.

PKK

Landmine Monitor Report 1999 also reported use of AP mines by PKK forces, and it appears that use has continued. There are frequent accusations of landmine use by the PKK. Turkish officials maintain that "APM's are being indiscriminately used by the PKK terrorist organization."⁷ On 17 July 1999, the Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan radio claimed that the PKK emplaced landmines in July along roads in the Chaman border area. A local man was reported injured by one of these mines.⁸ A United Nations report in June 2000 noted that the UN Office for Project Services "remains concerned about the incidences of freshly laid mines being found in previously cleared minefields" in Northern Iraq.⁹ The report does not identify the user of mines.

Turkey states that during operations against the PKK the security forces "regularly recover AP mines."¹⁰ According to an Italian press report, since 1994, a total of 14,025 devices have been seized, 11,339 of them across the Turkish border with Iraq where the PKK has bases. This total includes over 12,000 Italian AP mines, alleged to have been supplied by Saddam Hussein from Italian exports to Iraq in the 1980s.¹¹ This press report is based in part on material supplied the Turkish military, and also a dossier prepared by the municipal authority in Florence, Italy.¹² Another report apparently based on the same data stated that Turkish security forces captured 15,000 landmines from the PKK, of which 3,250 were seized in Turkey's South Anatolia region and the remainder found in Northern Iraq. Of the 3,250 mines, 2,866 were reported to be AP mines and 384 were antitank mines.¹³

Representatives of the PKK attended a conference on non-state actors and banning landmines in Geneva on 24-25 March 2000. While several non-state actors attending the conference declared they will not use landmines, the PKK was not one of them. At the conference the PKK representatives spoke only of how Kurdish civilians have suffered from mines.¹⁴

There has also been one report of a cache of landmines seized during a series of raids against the militant Islamic group Hezbollah in February 2000; the number and types of mines seized were not reported.¹⁵

Mine Clearance

Turkey has engaged in mine clearance operations, ostensibly along the Bulgarian border and perhaps elsewhere. Details of the "phased demining initiative" noted above have not been reported. At the FMSP Turkey spoke of unspecified demining operations, and these were described as "ongoing" in January 2000.¹⁶ In a report submitted to Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the Southeast Industrialist and Businessmen's Association called for the demining of the border with Northern Iraq to allow for trade across the border.¹⁷

Turkish Parliamentarians reported in 1996 that mined areas have not been properly mapped and marked.¹⁸

Landmine Casualties

There are reports of landmine casualties in Turkey, concentrated in the southeast and east where conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK has been most intense, as well as in border areas. The casualties involve both military personnel and civilians. In August 1999, Prof. Serdar Necmioglu, chairman of the Medical Faculty Orthopedic and Traumatology Section of Dicle Hospital, stated that the number of patients admitted to that hospital for landmine-related injuries had reached 1,000 for the period between 1990 and 1999. He reported that the rate had increased during 1992-93, but slowed again following 1995. The injuries listed included chest trauma, abdomen, blood vessel and eye injuries in addition to orthopedic damage.¹⁹

Following the discovery of Italian-made mines in PKK stockpiles, legal action ensued, in the names of those killed or wounded as a result. It was estimated that between 1984 and 1999, 368 people died and 1,560 were injured due to these mines in particular.²⁰ The Sovereignty of Law Association charged that "the Italian government should therefore be held responsible for the consequences of selling them to an illegal organization."²¹ Migrants are frequent casualties of Greek minefields having crossed the Turkish/Greek border illegally.²²

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

Turkey has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Turkey reports a donation of $50,000 to mine-clearance activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also that Turkish military units take part in mine clearance there.²³ During the regional conference in Ljubljana the delegation indicated Turkey has participated in mine clearance, contributing funding and personnel, in Kosovo and other countries. The statement also noted that it had organized mine clearance training through NATO Partnership for Peace and various bilateral agreements.²⁴

UZBEKISTAN

Key development since March 1999: Uzbekistan is reported to have reinforced its border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.

Mine Ban Policy

Uzbekistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. According to a Russian Foreign Ministry official in May 2000, at high political levels the Uzbekistan government shares the goals and aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, but cannot immediately join because of financial constraints.²⁵ Uzbekistan is not known to have made any statements on landmines, or attended any diplomatic meetings on landmines, in 1999 or 2000.

In December 1999, Uzbekistan abstained on the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. This contrasted with its vote in favor of similar resolutions in 1996 and 1997 (it was absent from the 1998 vote). The change comes in the wake of reports of Uzbekistan use of mines in 1999.

Uzbekistan is a state party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not ratified the original or the amended Protocol II on landmines. Uzbekistan is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Uzbekistan is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It inherited stockpiles of AP mines from the Soviet Union. One official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that many of the mines have an expired shelf-life (ten to twelve years of storage). He said, "More than half of the stored mines are in fact the items of special menace, because they are equipped with the liquid type of explosive. These types of mines are difficult to destroy by the cheapest possible way - by burning - because it could lead to contamination of the air, which is harmful to the environment."²⁶

Use

In June-September 1999 a conflict took place when an armed group from Tajikistan intruded into Kyrgyz territory near the Uzbekistan border. The intruders were repelled during combat actions in which Kyrgyz armed forces and Uzbeki air forces took part.²⁷

As a result of the conflict Uzbekistan is reported to have reinforced its unmarked border with Kyrgyzstan with landmines.²⁸ One of the reported cases is the mining by Uzbeki military of territory near the Kyrgyz settlement of Boz Adyr, which is a disputed area of the Kyrgyz-Uzbeki border. Initially the area was marked with warning signs, which later disappeared.²⁹ It has been reported that animals have been killed by detonating mines in the area. Local papers reported that the area had "been mined only recently."³⁰

Mine Action

Uzbekistan is not considered to have a mine problem.³¹ Uzbekistan is not known to have contributed to any international mine action programs.

YUGOSLAVIA

Key developments since March 1999: In the conflict in Kosovo, Yugoslav forces laid at least 620 minefields and an estimated 50,000 mines, with the great majority concentrated in the south near the Albanian and Macedonian borders. The KLA also used mines in the conflict.

Background

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consists of two Republics, Serbia and Montenegro. The Republic of Serbia has two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbia has a mixed ethnic population of which a small percentage is Albanian, while in Kosovo most of the population is ethnic Albanian. The FRY has been involved in armed conflicts almost continuously since the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia.

Early in 1999 the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Union demanded that the FRY cease repressive measures against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, withdraw its Army and police units from Kosovo, and enable UN peacekeeping forces and international civilian missions to enter and operate in the province. The Yugoslav authorities responded to these demands by increasing repressive measures and starting and accelerating the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.

On 24 March 1999 NATO started an air campaign against FRY that lasted until 9 June 1999. During this time the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) conducted military operations against Serbian forces in Kosovo. Under UN Resolution 1244, the province was placed under the administrative control of the United Nations. Throughout this most recent conflict, mines were used by both the Yugoslav army and the KLA (See Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Kosovo).

Mine Ban Policy

The FR of Yugoslavia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). On 11 January 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that "in spite of the expressed interest of the FR of Yugoslavia to take part in the preparatory stage for the Convention [MBT], it has not been given the opportunity to do so from the very outset. Having joined the negotiations at a later stage, it was not possible for the FR of Yugoslavia to make all necessary preparations related to its possible accession to the Convention before the Ottawa Conference, held in December 1997."³² The Foreign Ministry also stated: "The NATO aggression against the FRY of Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 has raised completely new questions about the use of inhumane weapons, among which anti-personnel landmines represent but only one category.... The population of Kosovo and Metohija was also a victim of anti-personnel landmines planted by the terrorist organization of the so-called KLA.... I wish to assure you that we stand ready to continue to participate actively in the efforts towards the elimination of all types of weapons, inhumane weapons in particular, and will make our concrete contribution to this as soon as appropriate conditions have been created to this effect."³³

Clearly the key reason Yugoslavia has not signed the MBT is that its military still sees the weapon as useful. In 1996, Col. Dusan Stanizan, chief of engineering on the Yugoslav Military's General Staff said, "Considering the fact that Yugoslav military doctrine is primarily defensive, antipersonnel and antitank landmines have a very important place in our defensive system."³⁴ In January 2000, he commented on their utility in the conflict in Kosovo when he wrote that the Yugoslav Army's mining of some routes from Albania into Kosovo had prevented KLA soldiers from breaking through.³⁵

There has been no perceptible change in official attitudes toward AP mines, despite continuing efforts to open dialogue on the issue by international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including the Yugoslav Campaign to Ban Landmines (YUCBL) and the Red Cross. With the aim of raising public awareness about AP mines and involving more NGOs in the effort, the YUCBL organized roundtables in Novi Sad, Podgorica and Pristine during 1999 and 2000, to which the Army and Ministry of Defense were invited but refused to attend.³⁶ On 21 February 2000 the YUCBL wrote to the General Staff and Ministry of Defense requesting information for this report; there has been no reply. Efforts to arrange interviews also failed, and open letters published in newspapers received no response.³⁷

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had signed and ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1981 and 1983 respectively. Because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia asserts itself to be the legal successor of the SFRY, it claims that the CCW has become part of Yugoslav national legislation. The FRY has not ratified Amended Protocol II (Landmines).

Production, Transfer and Stockpile

The SFRY was one of the largest producers of AP mines in the world, and a major exporter, primarily to the lesser developed countries.³⁸ There have been official and unofficial claims that the FRY has stopped producing and exporting antipersonnel mines, but it is not possible for Landmine Monitor to affirm or disprove these statements.³⁹ It is likely that current stockpiles remain substantial.

Recent Use

The Yugoslav Army used mines extensively in Kosovo. Maps and other information handed over to the UN Mine Action Coordination Center by Yugoslav authorities in the second half of 1999 indicate that 620 minefields were laid by Yugoslav forces. Although it has been reported that some 500,000 mines were laid, the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center (KMACC) has told Landmine Monitor that the actual number is likely to be around 50,000.⁴⁰ About eighty percent of the landmines are concentrated near the southern border, while nuisance mines are concentrated in the interior of the province.⁴¹ Yugoslav and KLA use of mines in this province is described in more detail in the separate report on Kosovo.

During 1998 and 1999 the Army also mined areas on the Croatian border, especially bridges and their environs, in anticipation of a possible NATO invasion from the west and north. During this period, minefields were laid near the community of Sid, some of which have been cleared according to a military source.⁴² However, the forested left bank of the Bosut River remains very dangerous for civilians. Peasants collecting wood have activated mines with their tractors and now no longer enter this area.⁴³

Landmine Problem

In November 1999 the Serbian Ministry of the Interior reported that there are one hundred locations on FRY territory (excluding Kosovo) contaminated with UXO.⁴⁴

During the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, especially in the periods of the Serbian-Croatian war (1991-1992, 1994-1995), mine barriers were deployed on a sixty-six kilometer-long section of the Hungarian-Yugoslavian border, starting at the junction of the river Dráva and the Danube. These minefields were created on the Yugoslavian side of the border by Serbian military corps (Yugoslav People's Army) and para-military troops (Krajinian Serb Republic). The border section, located west of the current Yugoslavia-Croatia-Hungary triple border as far as Drávaszabolcs, is full of AP mines: PMR-2 (concrete Yugoslavian-made), PMR-2A (tripwire, metal, Yugoslavian-made), OMSZ-2 (tripwire) and antitank mines: TMM-1 (metal, Yugoslavian made), TMPR-6 (plastic, Yugoslavian made).⁴⁵ Presumably in 1995, Serbian soldiers replaced detonators in the minefields deployed from 1991. It is likely that mines were deployed in the order of ten thousands to form contiguous mine blockade.⁴⁶ There are no detailed maps of those minefields.

There have also been successive minings and (partial or complete) deminings of Yugoslavia's western border with Croatia since approximately 1991, about which there is fragmentary information. An unofficial source reported that the left bank of the Danube has been mined and remined, especially around bridges (for example, bridges near Batina village in Sombors community, near Bogojevo village in Apatin community, and near Backa Palanka).⁴⁷ When armed conflict with Croatia ceased, the Yugoslav Army undertook clearance operations in these areas, but an army officer involved in the original mining operations said that many mines were placed in the sand around bridges, that would have been shifted by the river.⁴⁸

Zoran Begovic from the Montenegrin Ministry of Interior claims that after the peace agreement between Yugoslavia and Croatia, the Yugoslav Army cleared all minefields on the border with Croatia in the Debeli Brijeg region.⁴⁹ However, in 1997 Yugoslavia refused a proposal to demilitarize the border with Croatia.

Near the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Sjeverin village in Priboj community from 1992 to 1998 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees built eight houses for returning refugees. On 13 January 1998 the first returnees found AP mines in the yards of their new homes, and the return of other refugees was stopped.⁵⁰ The Prevlaka peninsula in the FRY Republic of Montenegro was heavily mined but may have since been cleared.

Mine Action

At the conclusion of NATO hostilities on 9 June 1999, the FRY also agreed to mark and clear its minefields from Kosovo, and UN Resolution 1244 permitted Yugoslav personnel to return to Kosovo for this purpose; it is not clear what progress has been made as Kosovars did not want them in the province. The FRY also organized teams for clearance of UXO in most communities where NATO dropped cluster bombs, but some areas remain uncleared.⁵¹

In the SFRY, mine awareness was been regarded as an important element of Yugoslav military doctrine, in the historical context of preparedness of the population in the event of attack, and it had a well-developed program for the general population. However according to one source, the FRY has never organized mine awareness programs for the general population.⁵²

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

From the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s, 1,250 mine victims were treated in the Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics in Belgrade.⁵³ There are many patients from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia who need new prostheses, and the Institute has had difficulty producing these. The Institute in 1999 and early 2000 received forty-five new patients. It has received no international support for several years, and lacks the financial resources to import materials for fabrication of prostheses, which was an expensive process even before the war. One prosthesis costs approximately $2,000. There are a few Yugoslav companies trying to produce the necessary materials and components, but these are not fully tested. Some patients (mostly young people from Croatia and Bosnia) subject to psychological and social problems have prolonged their stay at the Institute.⁵⁴

There is little information regarding casualties from mines following the fighting in 1999. The impact on civilians has likely been greater from cluster bombs.⁵⁵

The FRY had well developed surgical and rehabilitation services for mine victims, as well as reintegration services for them.⁵⁶ In general, the worsening economic situation in Yugoslavia means that disability laws and programs for skills training continue to be poorly implemented if at all, and most landmine survivors are left to the care of their families. Most mine survivors receive disability pensions but all pensions in the FRY are very low.

198 United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 13.

199 Felix Corley, "Landmine Use Now Set to Continue," Jane's Intelligence Review - Pointer, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1 January 1998, p. 2. See also: "Armenia Reluctant to Ban Landmines," RFE/RL Newsline, 18 November 1997.

200 "Armenia's Views on the Issues of Antipersonnel Landmines," Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Republic of Armenia, March 1999.

201 Mr. Ruben Shugarian, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at landmine seminar, "The issue of antipersonnel mines and its media coverage," Armenian National Committee of ICBL and IPPNW-Russia, Yerevan, Armenia, 19-21 April 2000. See also, Reply of the Republic of Armenia to the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC.DEL/92/00, 29 March 2000.

202 Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan Oskanian, interview with Artak Alexanian, of the "Lraber/News" program of "Prometevs," TV channel, 22 April 2000.

203 Interview with officials at Defense Ministry of the Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 The poll was conducted in Syunik, Tavush, Ararat, Gegharkunik and Yerevan. Of the people interviewed, 83% were between the ages of 21-50, the remainder over 50; 60% were men and the remainder, women. Seventy-four percent have children, 71% a college degree, 41% employed in the education sector, 22% government officials and 14% employed in the health care system. The poll did not pretend to be scientific, but was intended to give an idea about the issues in question.

207 Interview with Lt.-Gen. Vagharshak Harutiunian, Minister of Defense, Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.

208 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 762-765.

209 Interview with Lt.-General Harutiunian, 19 April 2000.

210 Interview with Colonel V. Adoyan, 19 April 2000.

211 United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 14.

212 Interview by Azeri researcher with Col. Isa Sadikhov, former deputy of the Minister of Defense, Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines Office, 17 April 2000.

213 Interview with Lt.-Gen. Vagharshak Harutiunian, 19 April 2000.

214 Interview with Col. V. Adoyan, Head of the Engineer Troops, Defense Ministry, 19 April 2000.

215 Reply to the OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 29 March 2000.

216 Information provided by the Ministry of Defense of Armenia, April 2000.

217 Ibid.

218 According to the data provided by the Department of Agricultural and Environment, Syunik regional Governor's Office, December 1999. Information checked by Landmine Monitor researcher in investigations in the rural communities noted above.

219 Interview with Mr. A. Torozian, Head of Department of Agriculture and Environment, Syunik Regional Governor's office, 13 July 2000.

220 According to data provided by Tavush regional Governor's Office, February 2000. Also, checked against information gathered by Landmine Monitor researcher.

221 Ibid.

222 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p. 48.

223 "Armenia will take part in the humanitarian mine action program," Arka News Agency, Noratert, 23 March 2000. This information was confirmed by Vostanik Adoyan, Head of the Engineer Troops Department in the Defense Ministry of Armenia on 20 April 2000.

224 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 24.

225 Portfolio Synopsis: Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, United States Agency for International Development, October 1997.

226 Telephone interview with Allen Randlov, former Director of the War Victims Fund, 15 March 1999.

227 According to the data of Yerevan prosthetic and orthopedic enterprise, March, 2000.

228 United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 13.

229 Response to Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC.DEL/28/00, Vienna, 2 February 2000.

230 "Azerbaijan Mine Action Program," a joint project of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and United Nations Development Program, April 1999, page 2.

231 Response to OSCE Questionnaire, 2 February 2000.

232 ACBL Landmine Conference, Baku, Azerbaijan, 19 February 2000.

233 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 762-765.

234 United Nations Mine Action Service, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," 5 November 1998, p. 14.

235 Interview with Col. Isa Sadikhov, former deputy of the Minister of Defense, Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines Office, 17 April 2000.

236 Interview with Vagif Hanbabayev Hasan, Kazakh District, Azerbaijan, 10 September 1999.

237 Armenian Defense Minister Harutiunian has stated that since his appointment to the position in June 1999 not a single order to lay new landmines has been issued. Landmine Monitor/Armenia interview with Lt.-Gen. Vagharshak Harutiunian, Minister of Defense, Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.

238 UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, "Country Programs: Azerbaijan," June 2000, p. 37, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/Portfolio.pdf.

239 UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, June 2000, p. 34.

240 A partial Level 1 survey of 260 of the 700 square kilometers potentially mined in the Fizuli region was carried out in 1998 by BACTEC International. UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," p. 9

241 UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, p. 34.

242 Ibid., p. 37.

243 Interview with ANAMA Director Ilyas Badalov, Zerkalo, 10 March 2000; Zerkalo (newspaper), 11 March 2000, available at: http://www.zerkalo-daily.com; UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, p. 35.

244 Interview with ANAMA Director Ilyas Badalov, Zerkalo, 10 March 2000.

245 Email from Tim Carstairs, Communications Manager, Mines Advisory Group to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 28 July 2000.

246 Ibid, pp. 35-36.

247 Ibid, p. 36.

248 Zerkalo (newspaper), 11 March 2000, available at: http://www.zerkalo-daily.com.

249 Statement by the Turkish Delegation to the Ljubljana, Slovenia Regional Conference on Landmines, 21-22 June 2000.

250 Interview with ANAMA Director Ilyas Badalov, Zerkalo, 10 March 2000.

251 UNMAS, "Joint Assessment Mission Report: Azerbaijan," p. 12.

252 Statement of Musa Jalalov, Mine Awareness Program of International Committee of the Red Cross, delivered at the Landmine Seminar "Mine Free Caucasus," Baku, 17 November 1999.

253 UNMAS, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects, p. 37.

254 Yeni Musavat, 13-19 August 1998.

255 Azadliq (Independent,), Baku, 12 August 1998 (in Azeri).

0 Presentation, Republic of Belarus, Colonel S. Luchina, Deputy Chief of Staff, Corps of Engineers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, on the occasion of the International Seminar on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

1 Statement by H.E. Mr. Sergei Martynov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus to the First Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

2 Statement of Mr. Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

3 Participants included representatives from Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, U.S, ICRC, Geneva Humanitarian Demining Center and the Secretariat of the United Nations, among others.

4 Presentation by Piotr Zhushma, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs and Relations with CIS, House of Representatives, National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus at the International Workshop on Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

5 Statement by Major General I. Misuragin, Chief of the Corps of Engineers, at the International Workshop in Humanitarian Demining and Mine Stockpile Elimination, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

6 Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

7 Statement by Colonel Luchina, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

8 Nikolai Kuts, "Mines with delayed action," Vo slavu Rodini (newspaper), 27 July 1999.

9 Statement of Sergei Martynov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva, 11 February 1999.

10 Statement by Sergei Martynov, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

11 Interviews with Colonel Ignaty Misuragin, Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense and Colonel Sergei Luchina, Deputy Head of Department of Engineer Forces, Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 21 January 1999. Also Letter # 17/1043 from the Belarus Ministry of Defense to the Support Center for Associations and Foundations (SCAF), "About Information on Landmine Issues," 24 November 1998.

12 Statement of Ivan Grinevic, Third Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Belarus at the Regional Conference on Landmines, Budapest, 26-28 March 1998.

13 Decree # 335 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "Introduction in the Republic of Belarus Moratorium on Export of Landmines," 22 August 1995.

14 Decree # 628 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "About the Prolongation of the Moratorium on Export of Landmines Till the End of 1999," 4 December 1997.

15 Decree # 42 of the President of the Republic of Belarus, "About the Prolongation of the Moratorium on Export of Landmines Till the End of 2002," 4 February 2000.

16 Decree #27 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, "About State Control Over Transit Through the Territory of the Republic of Belarus of Specific Goods," 10 January 1998.

17 Statement by Colonel Luchina, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

18 Statement by H.E.Mikhail Khvstov, Ottawa, 3 December 1997.

19 Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

20 Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

21 Letter #17/1096 , Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

22 Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

23 Nikolai Kuts, "Mines with delayed action," 27 July 1999.

24 Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

25 Letter #1274/18, Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 February 1999 and Letter #17/70, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 26 January 1999.

26 Statement by Major General Misuragin, Minsk, 6 March 2000.

27 Letter #17/1043, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 24 November 1998.

28 Statement by Mr. Sergei Martynov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 17 December 1999. Also, ICBL meeting with Mr. Martynov, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

29 Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

30 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, (Washington, D.C., 1993).

31 Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

32 Mr. Rudi Wildheim, a member of Hildenbrandt-Electronic Company's Board of Directors and who fought in World War II, made available for Belarus experts Bundeswehr's maps of minefields the German Army had laid in Belarus during World War II. These materials were very helpful in demining the territory of the Dubrovensky district in the Vitebsk region.

33 Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

34 Nikolai Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes," Respublica, (newspaper), 13 March 1997.

35 Presentation by the representative of the Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

36 Letter #17/1096, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 29 November 1999.

37 Nikolai Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes."

38 Zhuchko, "Deminers Make Mistakes."

39 Letter #17/1043, Belarus Ministry of Defense, 24 November 1998.

40 Presentation by the representative of the Belarus Ministry of Defense, Minsk, 6-7 March 2000.

41 Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus, 25 November 1991.

42 Law on Social Protection of People With Disabilities in the Republic of Belarus, Article 6, p. 36.

43 For details of Estonia's previous statements on ban policy, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 778.

44 Interview with Malle Talvet, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 10 March 2000.

45 Analysis formed from interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January-March 2000.

46 Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2000.

47 Interviews with Erik Männik, Head of Defense Policy Planning, and Hestrid Tedder, Defense Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Defense, Tallinn, 10 March 2000.

48 E-mail messages from Hestrid Tedder, Ministry of Defense, 3 May 2000, and from Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2000.

49 Report of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 9 December 1999, p.2.

50 Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 20 January 1999; fax message from Erik Männik, Ministry of Defense, 10 March 1999.

51 Report to the OSCE, 9 December 1999. It notes the following additional recently adopted or amended legislation that regulates primarily the transfer, but also the use, production and storage or destruction of AP mines in the Republic of Estonia: Strategic Goods Export and Transit Act (17 July 1999), Regulation on Procedure for Export and Transit of Strategic Goods (9 October 1999), Customs Act (19 January 1998, amended 31 October 1999), and Minister of Defence Regulation on Procedure for Procurement, Storage, Conveyance and Carrying of Weapons and Munitions in the Area of Government and of the Ministry of Defence (2 December 1997).

52 Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2000.

53 Interview with Erik Männik and Hestrid Tedder, Ministry of Defense, 10 March 2000.

54 Report to the OSCE, 9 December 1999, p. 2.

55 Interview with Tiit Aleksejev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 20 January 1999; e-mail message, 20 February 1999.

56 Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2000.

57 Council of State, Report to the Parliament, 17 March 1997.

58 Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 352, 16 December 1997; Jalkaväkimiina -työryhmän raportti (report of the APM-working group), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 December 1997.

59 Report of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2 December 1999, p. 2.

60 Interview with Counselor Timo Kantola, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2000.

61 Ibid.

62 Interview with Col. Yrjö Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 2 March 2000.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Telephone interview with Commander GS Henrik Nysten, Ministry of Defense, 4 May 2000.

66 Interview with Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 2 March 2000.

67 Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3.

68 Telephone interview with Commander GS Henrik Nysten, Ministry of Defense, 4 May 2000.

69 Interview with Parliamentarian Kimmo Kiljunen, Social Democratic Party, 6 April 2000.

70

71 Interview with MEP Heidi Hautala, President of the Green Group in the European Parliament, 31 March 2000.

72 Statement by Dr. Igors Tipans, Baltic International Center for Human Education, at ICBL seminar in Brussels, 31 January 2000.

73 Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 2.

74 Interview with Lt. Col. Jaakko Martikainen, Defence Staff, 5 February 1999; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3.

75 Laura Lodenius, Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, 31 January 1999.

76 Telephone interview with Col. Arto Mikkonen, Defense Staff, 18 February 1999.

77 Telephone interview with Commander Nysten, 4 May 2000.

78 Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 12 February 1999.

79 Telephone interview with Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999; Press Release, Defense Force, No. 200, 2 December 1998.

80 Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 12 February 1999.

81 Telephone interview with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.

82 Telephone interview with Senior Governmental Secretary Jari Takanen, Ministry of Defense, 5 February 1999.

83 Laura Lodenius, Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, reported after the CCW First Conference of States Parties, Geneva, December 1999.

84 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 789-790.

85 Laura Lodenius, Coordinator, Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland, 31 January 1999.

86 Press Release, Defense Staff, 3 December 1998. See also, Finland's National Report required by CCW Amended Protocol II, Article 13, dated 11 November 1999.

87 Telephone interview with L. Col. Heikki Backstrom, Ministry of Defense, 22 February 1999.

88 Ibid.

89 Telephone interviews with Lt. Col. Kukko, Ministry of Defense and Lt. Col. Martikainen, Defense Staff, 5 February 1999; and Press Release, Defense Force, Press Release 200, 2 December 1998.

90 Telephone interview with Col. Mikkonen, Defense Staff, 18 February 1999.

91 Statement of Brigadier General Kari Rimpi, Defense Staff, Press Release, 2 December 1998.

92 Finland's Article 13 Report, Amended Protocol II, dated 11 November 1999.

93 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 790-791; further details are available from the Campaign to Ban Landmines in Finland.

94 Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Similä, First Secretary, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Department for International Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2000; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3.

95 Press release, Department for International Development Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 17 April 2000.

96 Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Similä, First Secretary, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Department for International Cooperation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 19 April 2000; Report to the OSCE, 2 December 1999, p. 3; the country totals do not tally with the total for each funding year due to fluctuation in the exchange rate during this period.

97 Abbreviations: UNOCHA - UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, WEUDAM - Western Union Demining Assistance Mission; UNDP - UN Development Program; NPA - Norwegian People's Aid; UNMAS - UN Mine Action Service; HI - Handicap International; MAG - Mines Advisory Group; ADP - Accelerated Demining Program; ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross.

98 Memorandum of Ilkka-Pekka Simila, 19 April 2000.

99 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, "Georgia and Problem of Anti-Personnel Mines," June 1998.

100 Address of H.E. Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador of Georgia at the Signing Ceremony of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ottawa, 3-4 December 1997.

101 "Georgian Leader Supports Joining Convention on Banning Landmines," Kavkasia-Press news agency, Tbilisi, 9 February 1999, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.

102 Jody Williams, report to ICBL on visit to Georgia, email dated 22 February 1999.

103 Letter to Georgian Landmine Campaign from the Public Relations Department, Georgian Ministry of Defense, 14 March 2000.

104 Letter from Georgi Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2000.

105 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.793.

106 Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Mine Action Database.

107 United Nations, Country Report: Georgia, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/georgia.htm.

108 "Prime-News," (television), Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999.

109 "Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established," Moscow RIA News Agency, 11 August 1999.

110 "Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia," Moscow Interfax, 17 August 1999. A U.S. government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside Georgia. ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December 1999.

111 Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, "Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000.

112 Ibid.

113 United Nations Development Program, United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia (United Nations, March 1998), available at: http://www.abkhazia.org. Russian soldiers and peacekeepers based in Georgia have also used mines in the past. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 793-4.

114 Two main Georgian groups have claimed responsibility for mine attacks, the "White Legion" and the "Forest Brothers." See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 838, for more details on mining and links to government. In April 2000, the Abkhaz Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that members of the White Legion and Forest Brothers patrol the Georgian side of the Ingur River.

115 Vacho Jgrenaya, Sapper Administration, Georgian Ministry of Defense, "Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines," Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

116 HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 11.

117 Letter from Georgi Burduli, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2000.

118 1999 Landmine Monitor interview with M. Rapava, Head of Criminal Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia.

119 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1225, 28 January 1999.

120 United Nations, Country Report: Georgia, available at: www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/georgia.htm. The UNDP estimates 50,000 mines throughout Abkhazia, which makes the UN estimate of 150,000 for all of Georgia seem high.

121 UNDP, Needs Assessment Mission, March 1998.

122 HALO Trust and Abkhazia Mine Action Center, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000.

123 U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining," 2 September 1999. The U.S. is considering the request.

124 Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," July 2000, pp. 27, 34.

125 Ibid., pp. 24, 34. The exercise will involve a total of sixty deminers from the three countries.

126 Statement by the Turkish Delegation to the Ljubljana, Slovenia Regional Conference on Landmines, 21-22 June 2000. Also, in a letter to Georgian Campaign from K. Imnadze, Deputy to the Secretary of the National Security Council, No. 342, 10 March 2000, he states representatives of the governments of Georgia and Turkey met in December 1998 to begin these discussions.

127 Landmine Monitor 1999 interview with Colonel G. Tavadze, head of the Main Department of the Strategic Planning and Science-Technical Research.

128 International Committee of the Red Cross, Update No. 98/01 on ICRC Activities in Georgia, 4 June 1998, available at: http://www.icrc.org.

129 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 1997, Georgia, 1 June 1998.

130 Letter from E. Kazykhanov, Director of the Department of Multilateral Cooperation, Embassy of Kazakhstan in Moscow, Russian Federation, in response to IPPNW-Russia inquiry. Letter No.20/178, 19 April 2000.

131 Response to Questionnaire on Antipersonnel Landmines, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), FSC.DEL/32/00, Vienna, 3 February 2000.

132 Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

133 Letter from E. Kazykhanov, 19 April 2000; Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

134 Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

135 United Nations, Country Report: Kazakhstan, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/country/kazakhst.htm.

136 Response to OSCE, 3 February 2000.

137 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines, July 1993, p. 111.

138 United Nations, Country Report: Kazakhstan.

139 Letter from E. Kazykhanov, 19 April 2000.

140 Ibid.

141 Hidden Killers, p. 111.

142 Analytical Note by Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

143 Interview with Asel Otorbaeva, correspondent of Vecherny Bishkek daily, and Marat Bozgunchiev, Director of the WHO Information Center for republics of Central Asia, 17 May 2000.

144 Ibid.

145 Email communication with Nick Megoran of Eurasia Insight, Central Eurasia Project, regarding the situation on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, 22 June 2000 and 1 July 2000; Daniyal Karimov, article in Delo newspaper, 3 May 2000.

146 Daniyal Karimov, article in Delo newspaper, 3 May 2000.

147 Correspondence from International Committee of the Red Cross official, Tashkent, 13 January 1999.

148 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

149 Interview with Ivars Apinis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 20 January 2000; Report of Latvia to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 21 January 2000, p. 3.

150 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

151 Interview with Ivars Apinis, Riga, 20 January 2000.

152 Interviews with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, December 1998 and 1 March 2000.

153 Ibid.

154 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000; Report to the OSCE, 21 January 2000, p. 3.

155 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

156 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000; Report to the OSCE, 21 January 2000, p. 3.

157 Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, January 1999.

158 Interview with Ivars Apinis, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 20 January 2000.

159 Telephone interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, 6 June 2000.

160 Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 1 March 2000.

161 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 January 2000.

162 Interview with Ieva Zvidre, Press Center of the Riga City Police Department, Riga, February 1999, updated in telephone interview with Krists Lei_kalns, Latvian State Police Press Center, 5 May 2000.

163 Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 1 March 2000.

164 Report to the OSCE, 21 January 2000, p. 3.

165 Landmine Monitor 1999, pp. 800-802.

166

167 Airis Rikvelis, "Best Army Deminers Honoured," Neatkariga rita avize (daily newspaper), 25 November 1999.

168 Latvian Radio report, 1 March 2000.

169 Interview with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 15 February 2000.

170 Interviews with Guntis Aizporietis, National Armed Forces, Riga, 20 January and 15 February 2000.

171 Ibid; Interviews with Guntis Aizporietis and Egils Lescinsikis, National Armed Forces, Riga, January 1999; visit to the National Armed Forces Headquarters, Riga, 1 March 2000.

172 Baltic International Center for Human Education, webpage www.bc-cfp.lv.

173 For examples of statements by Yeltsin and other officials see New York Times, 11 October 1997; New York Times, 11 October 1997; Statement by Mr. B.A. Schiborin, Representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry at the Budapest Regional Seminar on Landmines, 26-28 March 1998.

174 Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-personnel Landmines, Delegation of the Russian Federation on Military Security and Arms Control, FSC. DEL/425/99, 15 December 1999.

175 Press release, AP RF Division of Governmental Information/Information Analytical Materials, No. 177, 9 March 2000.

176 For elaboration of these issues, see Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, "Russia and Antipersonnel Mines," position paper prepared for IPPNW-Russia, 26 February 1999. See also Col. Vladimir P. Kuznetsov, "Ottawa Process and Russia's Position," Krasnaya Zvezda (daily newspaper), 27 November 1997.

177 Boris Schiborin and Andrei Malov, "Russia and Antipersonnel Mines," 26 February 1999.

178 Schiborin and Malov, "Russia and Antipersonnel Mines," 26 February 1999.

179 Statement by Bulgarian Ambassador Petko Draganov to the Conference on Disarmament, undated but February 1999 when twenty-two CD members called for a Special Coordinator and an Ad Hoc Committee.

180 Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-personnel Landmines.

181 "Putin Urges Ratification of Protocol Limiting Mines," Itar-Tass, Moscow, 7 May 2000.

182 Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

183 Press release, No.177, 9 March 2000.

184 Press release of the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of RF at the opening of the 1998 Moscow conference "New Steps To a Mine-Free Future," IPPNW-ICBL, 27-28 May 1998.

185 Working Materials, Second International Conference on Landmines in Russia and FSU, IPPNW-Russia, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

186 Press Release, No. 177, 9 March 2000. This is the approved interdepartmental/governmental budget that still requires approval of the State Duma.

187 Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia, report for the Second International Conference in Russia and FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999, p. 63.

188 Russia's Arms Catalogue, Army 1996-1997, published by "Military Parade," JSC, under general supervision of Anatolyi Sitnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces, Ordnance, Moscow, 1996, Vol. 1, p. 276-83. See also, Landmines: Outlook from Russia, report prepared by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces of the RF Ministry of Defense for IPPNW-Russia, 25 February 1999.

189 Presentations by B. Schiborin, chief counselor of the Disarmament Department, Russian Foreign Ministry, and A. Nizhalovsky, deputy-commander of Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, at the Moscow Landmine Conference, 27 May 1998.

190 Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, senior officer, Division of Engineer Forces, 2^nd International Conference on Landmines in Russia/FSU, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999. At the CCW Protocol II conference in Geneva on 16 December 1999, Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Ministry of Defense, also confirmed this, noting that PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines are no longer produced.

191 Interview with Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 16, 1999; Vladimir Kuznetsov, "S Uchetom Boevogo opyta zivut I uchatsya ingenernie voiska," Krasnaya Zvezda (The Red Star), 21 January 1998; A. Raylyan, "Like a Phoenix From Its Ashes," Armeysky Sbornik Magazine, No. 1, 1998, pp. 64-65.

192 Vladimir Kuznetsov, "Novyi Oblik Ingenernych Voisk," (New outlook of the Engineer Troops), Armeysky Sbornik (Army's journal) No.1, 1998, p. 11.

193 Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affair, 13 May 2000.

194 Ibid.

195 Presidential Decrees No. 2094 of 1 December 1994, and No.1271 of 1 December 1997.

196 Lt. Col. Mikhail Nagorny, 2^nd International Conference on Landmines, Tblisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

197

198 Andrei Korbut, "Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could have Undermined its Defense). Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 39, p. 6.

199 Landmines: Outlook from Russia, IPPNW-Russia, interim report, 1999.

200 Statement at Tbilisi Landmine Conference, December 1999.

201 Interview with General Kuznetsov (ret.), Commander of the Russian Engineer troops from 1986-1999, by General Mehov (ret.), Russian Humanitarian Mine Action Center/RAVUNPM, Moscow, April 2000.

202 Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999; N. Antonenko, "Second Wind," Armeysky Sbornik, No. 1, 1998, pp. 62-63.

203 Statement at Tbilisi Landmine Conference.

204 Interview with Colonel-General V.P. Kuznetsov, 25 February 1999. The estimate was 40 million rubles, prior to the devaluation of the currency.

205 Letter to Jody Williams and Stephen Goose from Mr. Alexander V. Zmeevski, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 22 October 1999, as a follow up to a meeting at the Russian Mission on 5 October 1999.

206 "Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines," Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency (Internet), 5 June 2000.

207 Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serdtsev, December 1999.

208 Ibid.

209 ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Adviser, Russian Ministry of Defense, Geneva, 16 December 1999.

210 "Night Patrol of `Fittermice,'" Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000. In a radio interview, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov noted that the decision to use mines is taken by junior commanders, in both Chechen and Russian forces. Radio Svoboda, March 2000.

211 Lieutenant-General Nickolaishvili Guram Georgevich, "Peaceful Caucasus: Toward a Future Without Landmines," Regional Landmine Conference, Tbilisi, Georgia, 5-7 December 1999.

212 Ibid. Also, ICBL meeting with Col. Vladimir Bobkov, Ministry of Defense, 16 December 1999. Col Bobkov said only self-destructing PFMs were used, not older non-self-destructing ones.

213 Interview with a colonel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, RTR television, March 2000. In the interview, he said that more than 40,000 mines had been laid by artillery.

214 Daniel Williams, "Russians Declare Victory, Raise Flag Over Grozny," Washington Post, 7 February 2000. Regarding the level of destruction in the city, the article reported that "Gen. Gennady Troshev, one of Russia's top commanders, toured the city today and said he had trouble finding intact buildings to use as command posts. After more than five months of bombing and shelling, `the city is ruined,' he said."

215 "Chechen Rebels Lured into Minefield," Segodnya (newscast), Moscow NTV, 3 February 2000; Daniel Williams, "Grozny Nearly in Russian Forces' Grasp: Chechen Rebels Head South After Taking Heavy Losses in Escape from Capital," Washington Post, 4 February 2000, p. A.26.

216 Lyoma Turpalov, "Minefield massacre bleeds rebels; Russia says it was a trap," Associated Press, (Alkhan-Kala, Russia), 4 February 2000.

217 Ibid.

218 Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Hasan Baiev, Washington, DC, 1 May 2000. He estimated 300 wounded, including 50 civilians who fled Grozny with the fighters, plus many killed. See also, Andrew Kramer, "Doctor becomes enemy of all after treating both Russians and Chechens," AP, 18 February 2000; Alvi Zakriyev, "Doctor Hassan Baiyev: life-saving Chechen surgeon," AFP, 19 February 2000; Dave Montgomery, "Brutal attacks reported in Chechnya: Accounts surfacing about executions, other atrocities by Russian troops," The Dallas Morning News, 27 February 2000.

219 "Russia Blocks Civilians From Returning Home to Grozny," (AP, Nazran, Russia), Washington Post, 15 February 2000, p. A.19.

220 Olga Allenova, "`Mine Warfare' Seen Continuing in Grozny," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.

221 Giles Whittel, "Grozny is Mined to Stop Troops Looting," London Times, 13 May 2000.

222 Prime-News, (television), Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 August 1999.

223 "Georgian Deputy Says Type of Russian Bomb Established," Moscow RIA News Agency, 11 August 1999.

224 "Sources Say Russian Air Force to Apologize to Georgia," Moscow Interfax, 17 August 1999. A U.S. government official told the ICBL that there was a second incident in which a Russian helicopter dropped mines inside Georgia. ICBL meeting with U.S. delegation to CCW Protocol II meeting, Geneva, 13 December 1999.

225 Aleksandr Igorev and Georgiy Dvali, "Minefields Will Separate Russia from Georgia," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 12 April 2000; "Federals to Mine 80Km of Chechnya-Georgia Border, AVN, 11 April 2000.

226 Interview with Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor of the Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 4 May 2000.

227 Ibid.

228 Presidential Decree #1010 of November 13, 1995, "On Russian National Corps for Emergent Humanitarian Operations."

229 A. Kostiukov, demining commercial enterprise "Fort": verbal statement at the working group meeting, 10 November 1998.

230 "Ministry Confirms Bombing of Chechnya," Moscow Interfax, 26 August 1999.

231 Report from Press Center, Police of Russia in Dagestan and Infoart Agency, September 1999, http://www1.infoart.ru/.

232 Lieutenant-Colonel Mikhail Nagorny, Working materials of the Second International Conference on Landmines.

233 "Ploughland Cleared of Mines, Rebels Detained in Chechnya," AVN (Russian Military News Agency), 3 April 2000.

234 "When the Thunderstorm Passed Grozny," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 25 February 2000.

235 Olga Allenova, "`Mine Warfare' Seen Continuing in Grozny," Moscow Kommersant (daily newspaper), 25 April 2000, p.1.

236 A.Nizhalovsky, Deputy-Commander of the Engineering Forces, Russian Ministry of Defense: presentation at the IPPNW-ICBL Landmine Conference. Moscow. 27 May 1998.

237 HALO/AMAC, "Abkhazia Minefield Survey Report," March 2000, p. 26.

238 The so-called "District Military Committee" - "raivoenkomat."

239 Interview with V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.

240 "When Soldier Is Wounded We All Feel Pain," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (national daily), 5 February 2000.

241 Military Medical Department, RKK "Energuia" (Russian Space Corporation), 15 March 2000.

242 Interviews with Minister of Public Health Kambulat Uzhakhov, Deputy-Minster of Labor and Social Security Khalifa Zaurova and Ministry of Education via Suleiman Arselgov, Chair of the Council of Eldest and Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the Republic of Ingushetia, February 2000.

243 Ibid.

244 Landmines: Outlook from Russia, interim report, 1999.

245 "International Meeting Highlights Aid to Amputee Landmine Survivors," (Stoughton, MA), 13 July 1999.

246 Ibid.

247 Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, Head of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999.

248 Reports of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 15 January 1999.

249 Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999, p. 3. This report also noted that a seminar had been organized on 23-24 December 1998 by the General Staff to brief the Turkish Armed Forces on the provisions of the MBT and "other international efforts aimed at the total elimination" of AP mines.

250 ICBL meeting with members of delegation of Turkey to the First Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999. Notes taken by Stephen Goose.

251 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, Arms Control and Disarmament section, available at: www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/01.htm; "Bulgarian assembly ratifies landmine removal agreement with Turkey," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, BTA (news agency) 15 March 2000.; also "Assembly Ratifies Bulgarian-Turkish Landmine Agreement," World News Connection, 15 March 2000.

252 Statement by the Turkish Delegation, Regional Conference on Landmines, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

253 "Humanitarian De-mining," Summaries of Working Table III Projects, The Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe, available at: http://www.stabilitypact.org.

254 Statement by the Turkish Delegation at the First Panel of the Regional Conference on Landmines, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

255 Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, at the FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

0 For details see, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 820-821.

1 Discussion between Susan Walker, ICBL Government Liaison, and two members of the delegation of Turkey to the regional conference on landmines in Slovenia, 21 June 2000.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, Arms Control and Disarmament, Statement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, document CD/1559, 21 October 1998.

3 Data as of 1997. Provided to Human Rights Watch by U.S. government sources, March 1999.

4 Additional Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.

5 Erdogan Iscan, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, Geneva, letter to Susan Walker, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 17 January 2000.

6 Report to the OSCE, 14 December 1999, p. 3. Also in December 1999, Turkish officials told the ICBL that mines had not been laid in 4-5 years. ICBL meeting with members of delegation of Turkey to the First Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 17 December 1999.

7 Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, FMSP, Maputo, May 1999.

8 News Archive, Stratford-Iraq, 17 July 1999, http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/news/an990717.htm.

9 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1281 (1999), S/2000/520, 1 June 2000, p. 13. The report addresses distribution of humanitarian supplies throughout Iraq.

10 Erdogan Iscan, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to UN in Geneva, letter to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch, 12 January 2000.

11 Fausto Biloslavo, "Almost All the Land Mines Used by the PKK Are Italian," Il Giornale (newspaper), 1 July 1999, p. 10.

12 Ibid. According to the latter, in the late 1980s these Italian mines also reached the PKK via a triangular arrangement involving the Swedish firm Bofors, Chartered Industries in Singapore, and Iraq. It was also reported that Italian-licensed mines manufactured in Egypt may have reached the PKK and that Yevgeniy Primakov when head of the Russian KGB secret service facilitated this trade.

13 "Over 12,000 Land Mines Seized From PKK Italian Made," World News Connection, 8 October 1999.

14 "Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban," Conference hosted by Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, UK Working Group on Landmines, and Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines, Geneva, 24-25 March 2000.

15 "Turkey to Continue Fighting Terrorism: Interior Minister," Xinhua (news agency), 20 February 2000.

16 Additional Statement by Mr. V. Vural Altay, at FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999; also Erdogan Iscan, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, Geneva, letter to Susan Walker, ICBL, 17 January 2000.

17 "People in the Southeast React Favorably to Ecevit's Comments on Border Trade," Turkish Daily News, 13 June 2000.

18 "Turkey Hindered by own Landmines on Syrian Border," Reuters News Service, 6 December 1996.

19 "Turkey, Number of Wounded in Mine Explosions Detailed," Istanbul Hurriyet, Ankara edition from FBIS, 9 August 1999.

20 "Over 12,000 Land Mines Seized from PKK Italian Made," World News Connection, 8 October 1999.

21 "Lawsuit Against Italian Government," Turkish Daily News, 14 October 1999.

22 See report on Greece in this edition of the Landmine Monitor Report 2000.

23 Reports to the OSCE, 15 January 1999 and 14 December 1999.

24 Statement by the Turkish Delegation, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 21-22 June 2000.

25 Analytical Note by Andrei Malov, Senior Counselor, Department of International Security, Disarmament and Arms Control, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2000.

26 Ibid.

27 Interview with Asel Otorbaeva, correspondent of Vecherny Bishkek daily, and Marat Bozgunchiev, Director of the WHO Information Center for republics of Central Asia, 17 May 2000.

28 Email communication with Nick Megoran of Eurasia Insight, Central Eurasia Project, regarding the situation on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, 22 June 2000 and 1 July 2000; Daniyal Karimov, article in Delo newspaper, 3 May 2000.

29 Daniyal Karimov, article in Delo newspaper, 3 May 2000.

30 Email communication with Nick Megoran of Eurasia Insight, Central Eurasia Project, 22 June 2000 and 1 July 2000.

31 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, December 1994, p. 24.

32 Letter to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) from Assistant Federal Minister Miroslav Milosevic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 11 January 2000.

33 Ibid.

34 Col. Dusan Stanizan, "Mines: Weapon Without Aim," Novi glasnik (military magazine), March/April 1996.

35 Dusan Stanizan, "Bridges of Spite and Hope," Vojska (military magazine), 20 January 2000, p. 6.

36 Eighteen panelists and approximately seventy participants took part in these roundtables, in Novi Sad (Vojvodina) on 29 September 1999, Podgorica (Montenegro) on 25 November 1999, and Pristine (Kosovo) on 1 March 2000; it was planned to publish material from the roundtables in June 2000.

37 Danas, 2 October 1999; Pobjeda, 26 November 1999.

38 For details of mines produced and therefore likely to be in FRY stockpiles, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 827-829.

39 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 828-829.

40 Email from Lt. Col. John Flanagan, Program Manager, KMACC, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.

41 Human Rights Watch interviews with UNMACC and KFOR officials, Pristina, 23-27 August 1999.

42 Interview with Petar Skokandic, ex-officer of Yugoslav Army, member of Vojvodina Reform Democratic Party, Novi Sad, 14 March 2000.

43 Interview with Dusan Radosavljevic, member of Vojvodina Reform Democratic Party, Sid, 15 March 2000.

44 Interview with Col. Vladimir Aleksic, Ministry of the Interior, Politika, 27-30 November 1999.

45 Telephone interview with Captain Posta, MH HTAZ, Budapest, 7 April 2000;

L. K., "Botlózsinóros aknák magyar területen," Magyar Hírlap, 23 January 1996, p. 1; Németh A. Endre - Erdei Éva, "Új feladatok a déli határon," Magyar Hírlap, 22 January 1996, p. 8.

46 E. É., "Akna magyar területen," Magyar Hírlap, 10 April 1997, p. 21.

47 Interview with officer of Yugoslav Army (who requested anonymity) who took part in mining bridges in Backa Palanka during 1991 and 1999, Backa Palanka, 16 March 2000.

48 Ibid.

49 Interview with Zoran Begovic Minister of the Interior, Republic of Montenegro, Podgorica, 25 November 1999; this was also stated by Mr. Begovic at the YUCBL roundtable in Podgorica, 25 November 1999.

50 Interview with Sefko Alomerovic, President of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Podgorica, 25 November 1999; this was also stated by Mr. Alomerovic at the YUCBL roundtable in Podgorica, 25 November 1999.

51 Col. Rajko Stevanovic, "Bombs Remain at One Hundred Locations," Vojska,16 June 1999.

52 Interview with Dr. Nikola Bogunovic, vice manager of Yugoslav Health Institution, Belgrade, 15 January 1999.

53 Interview with Ljubisa Jovanovic, prosthetics ward chief, and chief technician Branko Savic, Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics, Belgrade, 29 January 1999; Interview with Ljubisa Jovanovic, Belgrade, 4 March 2000; this figure was previously reported as 600 mine victims. They were from Krajina, which is part of Croatian territory then under the control of the ethnic Serb majority. For details of rehabilitation services in the FRY, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 834-836.

54 Statement by Ljubisa Jovanovic, Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics, Belgrade, at the YUCBL roundtable, Novi Sad, 29 September 1999.

55 "Report from Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Politika,18 May 1999, says that during the NATO campaign in 1999, 200 people were reported killed, and more than 450 wounded from cluster bombs.

56 For more information on survivor assistance, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 834-836.