Key developments since March 1999: Both Angolan government troops and UNITA rebel forces have continued to use antipersonnel mines. Mine action funding in 2000 totals $17.4 million. Mine action programs have continued despite the ongoing conflict. As of May 2000, some 10 square kilometers of land and 5,000 kilometers of road have been cleared, and 15,000 mines destroyed. Funding for the government's mine action office, INAROEE, has dried up, and its operations are largely suspended. NGOs continue to operate, though at reduced levels due to reduced funding. The number of mine victims was up sharply in 1999 (from 103 in 1998 to 185 in 1999 in Luena alone).
Mine Ban Policy
After active participation in the Ottawa Process, Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. The government has said that because of the renewal of the war in November 1998, it has been unable to ratify the treaty. Both government troops and UNITA forces have been using antipersonnel landmines since the resumption of fighting. The ICBL has condemned both sides for use of AP mines, but is particularly appalled at the Angolan government's disregard for its international commitments.
Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Angola, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty...." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.
At the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique on 3-7 May 1999, the Angolan government delegation arrived only on the eve of the closing day and attempted to avoid discussing its new use of landmines in Angola. Vice Minister of External Relations Toko Serrão justified the government's use of landmines by saying, "We remain committed to the noble objectives of the treaty. But we are at war right now."253
Roberto de Almeida, the speaker of the national assembly, constitutionally number two in Angola, justified the government's position to Human Rights Watch in December 1999 saying, "It is war. We have the right to self defend ourselves. Landmines are part of that right. Once Savimbi [UNITA] is defeated we will stop using landmines."254
The country's national mine clearance organization Instituto Nacional de Remoção De Obstáculos E Engenhos Explosivos (INAROEE) also gives the government's position on its web site, which states: "The Government of Angola has said that they have documented their mine laying activities, and will be fully responsible for the clearance operations when appropriate, without any additional cost and negative impact on the international community funded demining projects, currently implemented through NGOs."255
Just as this Landmine Monitor Report 2000 was going to print, on 25 July 2000, Angola's parliament approved ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, with 147 votes in favour, one against and one abstention.0 Before the vote, Vice Minister Toko Serrão, addressed the parliament: "Formal adherence to a convention is not sufficient to guarantee the application of all the provisions referred to. The Ottawa Convention envisages different mechanisms destined for the implementation of the convention and resolution of possible disputes. Through these mechanisms, the states that are part of the convention are forced to elaborate and regularly present reports about the measures that they have taken relating to the obligations that result from the convention."1
Vice-Minister Serrão finished his address by stating that: "The entry into force of this convention is considered a historic achievement in the struggle to ban the use of antipersonnel mines. However given the provisions in Law 6/90 regarding international treaties it appears to us important that the Ministry of National Defense states its position on this issue."2 It is unclear precisely what additional steps are needed before Angola can formally submit its instrument of ratification to the United Nations, and thus be fully legally bound by the treaty. The incongruity of Angola apparently moving toward ratification at the same time that it admits to continued use of antipersonnel mines is cause for concern and requires close attention on the part of States Parties and others.
Angola attended three of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT, one each on Mine Clearance, Victim Assistance, and the General Status and Operation of the Convention. It sponsored and voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution on the implementation of the MBT, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.
Angola has not signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons or its Landmine Protocol II, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Inside Angola there has been little public discussion over the government's policy of continued use of landmines although an exhibition and video show on the extent of the damage landmines have caused Angola and its people was shown at the Portuguese Cultural Center in Luanda in March 2000. Entitled "Ottawa Yes, No More Landmines," the opening of the exhibition included a drama on mine awareness by the Julu theatre company.3
Production, Transfer and Stockpiles
Angola is not a known producer or exporter of landmines. Seventy-six different types of AP mines from twenty-two countries have been found or reported in Angola, eleven of which have not been confirmed by the UN.4 Little is known about the size or composition of Angola's current landmine stockpiles. Mine clearance NGOs claim there is no evidence of fresh imports of mines by the government. The mines government troops have are mostly from the USSR, East Germany, Cuba, China, Romania, and Hungary.5 According to the UK-based demining agency HALO Trust, "Even the most recently laid mines are old-fashioned and appear to have come from the `80s stock or dug out of the ground and reused. This is very promising."6
Little is known about UNITA's stocks. According to the Angolan military, they captured 15,000 tons of military equipment from UNITA in October 1999 including 2,450 antipersonnel mines and 8,742 antitank mines.7 In June 2000, the Angolan military announced they had discovered a UNITA bunker in Uige province full of weapons including "large numbers of antipersonnel mines."8 According to a document on a computer disk the government claims to have found at UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's command bunker in Andulo when they captured it in September 1999, UNITA had deemed procurement of antipersonnel mines a priority for its sanctions-busting weapons procurements in 1998 as the rebels prepared for renewed hostilities.9
New Use of Mines
A re-survey of eleven provinces by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and HALO Trust in 1999 indicated that both the government and UNITA have laid new mines. UNITA has tended to mine primary, secondary and tertiary roads to impede transportation. The government has been using mines for defensive purposes around strategic locations. Mine clearance operators believe the number of mines laid is significantly less than during previous conflicts. According to HALO and NPA the majority of reported mine accidents, an estimated 75 percent, involve old mines where Internally Displaced Persons traverse unfamiliar areas.
Although the Angolan government signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997 it has since been responsible for laying new antipersonnel and antitank mines and minefields. In 1999 Landmine Monitor published eyewitness accounts of this gross disrespect of the treaty.10 Human Rights Watch has continued to obtain credible information of continued landmine warfare and has interviewed a number of eyewitnesses to new use of mines in 2000. For example, two government soldiers admitted in June 2000 that they had laid landmines along paths to ambush UNITA patrols in Moxico province along the Zambian border;11 they also admitted to laying two AP mines across the border inside Zambia.12 Norwegian People's Aid reports that FAA (Angolan Armed Forces) Engineers in April 2000 admitted to laying new mines, but claim to have maps of the areas mined.13 Government troops also used mines in Luena in 1999, prompting Daniel Tessema, Program Director for Veterans International in Luena, to state that if the government "put signs up, the mines can be easily seen. (But) they don't even map the areas."14 Angolan troops appear to have also carried AP mines in an operation in northern Namibia,15 but UNITA has more widely used mines in these border areas.16
In a document produced for donors in March 2000, INAROEE admitted, "There is no doubt that limited new mines have been planted in Angola within the last six months. These mines are primarily planted as reinforcement in already mined areas around military installations and other strategic locations such as hydro-electrical power plants or access to provincial capitals."17 INAROEE officials have also stated that the only area in which the government has mined since December 1998 is Bie, when UNITA tried to take Kuito, and that only antitank mines were used. INAROEE also said that the FAA always demines where it mines,18 and that the mines in Bie had already been taken up. According to INAROEE the local provincial authorities monitor clearance.19
But, clearly antipersonnel mines have been used, and have been laid outside Bie, and are not always removed by government troops after use. Moreover, in June 2000, NPA found that an area in Luena declared clear of mines and safe by the army was still mined, casting doubts about the quality of the clearance by the Angolan military.20
There are also worrying reports that Angolans trained with international aid to do humanitarian demining have been used to plant fresh mines. Human Rights Watch interviewed a deminer from a folded NGO mine clearance operation who admitted that he had been conscripted into the Angolan armed forces and ordered to lay as well as clear mines.21
UNITA has continued to use landmines in its operations across the country. Save the Children reports that during a recent polio vaccination campaign, UNITA placed landmines on "previously cleared paths which mothers had to use to bring their children to vaccination posts. Unknown numbers of women and babies were killed and maimed in this way and many were dissuaded from vaccinating their children."22 UNITA has also used landmines to control and "effectively imprison populations" under its control by planting landmines around villages, according to Save the Children. In 1999 the rebels were reportedly paying infiltrators $300 to plant mines in Luena.23 UNITA has also increased use of antitank mines. For example, on 24 April 2000 thirty-eight people were killed on the Puri-Negage road (north Uige province) when the vehicle they were traveling in triggered an AT mine in all probability laid by UNITA.24
UNITA rebels have conducted military operations in northern Namibia, including laying antipersonnel and antivehicle mines,25 in response to Namibia granting permission in late 1999 for its territory to be used by Angolan government troops as a base for attacks on UNITA positions in southeastern Angola.26 (See Landmine Monitor report on Namibia for more details on UNITA use in Namibia.)
Re-Mining of Cleared Land
In June 1999, NPA reported that some re-mining had occurred in Luena, Malanje, Huambo and Kuito. About 25% of the minefields previously cleared in Huambo and Kuito showed signs of re-mining. But HALO has said, "We've checked every single minefield we've cleared in six years (between 100 and 150) and none have been re-mined. Cleared land has not been re-mined."27 This may be the case in UNITA areas, too. When the government's military reached Bailundo in late 1999 they found no new minefields. HALO had cleared Bailundo in 1998 and UNITA, it appears, never re-mined. On the other hand, Santa Barbara has reported that UNITA re-mined one of the bridges it had cleared in 1999 for the World Food Program.28
Long cited as one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, the early UN estimate of 10 to 15 million landmines contaminating Angolan soil is widely still cited. While no comprehensive landmine survey has been completed, estimates have been revised downward, with the 1998 U.S. State Department report stating, "The source of the original baseline data remains unknown and the actual number of landmines may never be determined, although six million appears to be a more reasonable figure."29
Through the end of May 2000, 2,610 mine or UXO fields had been identified, of which 517 had been cleared.30 According to INAROEE Cuando Cubango, Moxico, Bie and Malanje provinces have very high density of UXOs and landmines; Bengo, Benguela and Cuanza Sul and Huambo have a high density; Lunda Sul, Cabinda, Cunene, Huila, Zaire, Uige and Cuanza Norte have a moderate density and Luanda, Namibe and Lunda Norte have a low density.31 But these figures give little feel for the impact on communities.
Norwegian People's Aid has been contracted by the UN to conduct a nationwide survey of the landmine problem in the northern eleven provinces, the extent of damage, its consequences for local trade, and to map the existence of mines. By the end of 1998, NPA had completed an initial survey to identify mined or suspected mined areas in nine provinces, where about 80 percent of the population lives. By January 2000 fifteen provinces had been surveyed, thirteen by NPA and two by HALO. These surveys have not been fully comprehensive due to the war.
Mine Action Funding
Following the return to open conflict in November 1998, some donors became wary of continued funding of mine action in Angola, and some organizations carrying out mine action programs experienced reductions in funding.32 It appeared some donors were concerned because of a perception that there was large scale re-mining of previously cleared areas, making continued funding of mine clearance pointless, and because the Angola government was laying mines even though it had signed the Mine Ban Treaty. INAROEE has stated, "Donor concern about the renewed laying of landmines, as well as the Angolan government's reluctance to ratify the Ottawa Treaty, have made resource mobilization for mine action extremely difficult for all those who are trying to provide this assistance."33
Five major mine action organizations (Handicap International, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Mine Clearance Planning Agency, and Norwegian People's Aid) issued a statement at the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in March 2000 that in part said: "Donors must ensure that sanctions against governments that have violated the 1997 Landmine Convention do not affect the availability of funds for Humanitarian Mine Action.... We believe that funding for Humanitarian Mine Action should be based on the needs in affected areas, and not on the Landmines Convention status. Sanctions against the violators and encouragement of non state-parties must be designed in a way that does not further victimise the people and communities in mine and ordnance-affected areas."34
Because of this situation, in 1999 and 2000 many NGOs felt pressure to cut costs while trying to remain operational. HALO Trust roughly maintained its funding flows although gaps had to be covered by an individual donation. NPA had to cut expatriate staff and suspend contracts in early 2000. MAG suspended a program with more than 300 personnel and re-entered with a smaller operation. MgM had to temporarily halt its operations during the first six months of 1999 and in May 2000 required a loan from an individual to remain operational. Care International and HMD had to suspend their operations. INAROEE has had to halt its operations altogether and lay off most of its staff. INAROEE had received funds from seven sources, the Angolan government, the U.S., the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy, and the EU.
Support for mine action in Angola in 1999 and 2000 came from the European Union, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Italy became a major donor in 1999 for the first time.35 The EU, U.S., Norway and Sweden were the top donors to mine action in Angola in 1999; in 2000 it is the EU, the U.S. and Norway.
As noted in the chart below, support for mine action in 2000 has totaled $17.4 million.
ANGOLA MINE ACTION PROGRAM - Year 2000 -
Project & Implementing partners
Land Mine Survey & an assistance for secondment of National Database Capacity.
NORAD (Norwegian Agency Development)
Manual Demining Group 1
SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency )
Manual Demining Group 2
Manual Demining Group 3
US Dept. of State
Negotiations in course
Manual Demining Group 4
US Dept. of State
Mine Clearance Project implemented by: NPA
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Capacity Implemented by: NPA
Negotiations in course
Mine Dog Capacity-Free Run & EVD
AARDVARK Mechanically Assisted Demining Implemented by: NPA
HYDREMA Mechanically Assisted Demining
Danish Development Aid
Negotiations in course
Manual & Mechanical Mine Clearance
Humanitarian Mine Action
British Organization as " National Lotteries Charity Board and The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund"
Bengo ANG001/N18 Emergency Rehabilitation, Medical Support, Development Preparation in Support of Food Security and Road Access Programs
World Food Program
Kunene 00 03 EU
US Dept. of State
Training of a Demining Brigade and Mine Clearance Activities
CARE (CAMRI Project ) in Kuito Province
European Union/Com. Of EC CARE U.S.
Mine Clearance Operation
Santa Barbara's Funds
Road Rehabilitation and Mine Clearance Project
Santa Barbara's Funds
Project & Implementing partners
Mine Awareness and Clearance
To be defined
Future Mine Action Project to be Financed by European Union/Commission of the European Community ( Funds currently available )
European Union/Commis-sion of the European Community
US-funded Demining Equipment
US-funded Mine Awareness Activities (World Vision - Africare)
U.S. Dept of Sate
U.S. Dept of Sate
Mine Awareness in Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huambo, Bie. Implemented by HIF
Available for selected projects (Huila or Bengo )
UN agencies have also helped. World Food Program has supported mechanically-assisted demining of secondary and tertiary roads in Bengo province by MgM and bridge and road clearance in the south by Santa Barbara Foundation. WFP has also provided support to HALO Trust (supply of two mine protected vehicles) and NPA, as well as some food-for-work support for road clearing by INAROEE brigades.
Because of the tight nature of funding in 1999 and 2000, foundations and individual donations have played an important role in enabling mine clearance operations to continue. These include: Anti-Landmijn Stichting, Brot fur die Wit, Comic Relief, Christian Aid, Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, Misereor, National Lottery Charities Board, Johanniter International, Action Medeor, and the German Association of the Economy. A British book publisher, a German rock band, and a British journalist have also provided bridging funds to keep a number of clearance projects operational.
Through the end of May 2000, 2,610 mine or UXO fields had been identified, of which 517 were cleared (20 percent of the total). A total area of ten million square meters of land and some 5,000 kilometers of main roads had been cleared.36 Some 15,000 mines have been cleared and 300,000 UXOs have been cleared since 1995.37
In 1995, the Angolan government established its own mine action office, INAROEE. By1998, INAROEE was operating with seven demining brigades. INAROEE was supposed to do four things: logistics, the Escola Technico Angola Desminagem (ETAM) demining training school, quality assurance and coordination of mine action.
When the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) withdrew in January 1999, its support of INAROEE was terminated, and INAROEE and UNDP/UNOPS started developing a contingency plan. In March 1999, a further review of the UN Mine Action Program in Angola was conducted, with the participation of representatives of the Angolan government, INAROEE, UNDP and UNOPS, and donors.38 The main conclusions were that INAROEE should concentrate on its original mandate of coordination rather than direct involvement in clearance operations, and that its demining brigades should be handed over and managed by independent operators, such as NGOs.
INAROEE had its budget cut back in 1999 following renewed fighting.39 At its headquarters, the expatriate staff has been reduced from eighteen (twelve in the main program and six in the training school) to two (a UNDP/UNOPS-funded program manager and support for the data base funded by NPA).
INAROEE had demining brigades in the field in Bie, Huambo, Uige, Cuando Cubango, Huila and Moxico provinces. In January 1999 all the brigade operations were suspended because UN funding dried up40 although these forty-man brigades are theoretically still intact. Its regional offices also have only skeleton staff left and $6 million in demining assets remain idle at the ETAM logistics base in Viana.41 According to its director Helder Cruz many of the brigade members will find work with the NGOs.42
This has caused problems for the NGOs because the standards of many of the INAROEE deminers has been low, raising further concerns about what purpose the ETAM school will serve.
The general view is that INAROEE's brigades were not very productive at demining because of poor logistics and the quality of expatriate advisors contracted by the UN. However, it does have a future as a coordinating office for the operators in the field although coordination is currently weak, with no meeting of mine operators taking place since November 1999.43
NPA has taken one brigade and INTERSOS has raised funds to operate another. HALO offered to employ 20-25 ex-INAROEE deminers, but INAROEE refused saying HALO could take all or none of their fifty-seven staff. HALO could not do this and therefore recruited from outside of INAROEE.
UNDP has tried to fundraise for INAROEE. In November 1999, it urged donors to provide funding for INAROEE arguing that it was better to keep it operational than dismantle it and recreate it post-conflict. UNDP also argued that Angola needs a national planning and coordination entity such as INAROEE for mine action. It has also stated, "For better or worse, INAROEE remains the single most vocal and effective advocate for adherence to the Ottawa Convention within the Government of Angola. To dismantle it completely would be `throwing out the baby with the bathwater.'"44
UNDP has applied for continued funding of $1 million for INAROEE in 2000 and has submitted two separate but smaller applications for further development of the mine action data base and the refurbishment of INAROEE's vehicle fleet. INAROEE's Director Helder Cruz presented a demining plan for 2000, requesting $13 million from donors at a conference organized by the UNDP in Geneva on 20 March 2000.45
Helder Cruz hopes that although INAROEE will not be an operator, it will be a coordinator and trainer of deminers through the ETAM. Cruz hopes that plans to decentralize by setting up regional and national boards to coordinate and assess priorities for mine clearance will attract donor support.46 Some funds have been received by INAROEE, but have mainly gone to NPA for taking over a brigade.
INAROEE is waiting for $4.5 million to come through from the Angolan government. In March, it presented the Minister for Social Assistance Albino Malungo with a document covering its needs/funds. It is now Malungo's responsibility to present this document to the Council of Ministers. However, the Council has not put demining or INAROEE on its agenda since the document arrived in Malungo's hands. The money from the government is urgently needed to rehabilitate the training school, ETAM, which Helder Cruz describes as "the basis of all our work," and to create an independent brigade mechanism to demine areas such as the Benguela railway. INAROEE did receive $400,000 from the government, which has already been spent on payment of debts and hospital bills.47
The Angolan military is also active in demining operations in conflict zones or areas recently retaken from UNITA control. For example at UNITA's former strong hold of Jamba in Cuando Cubango province, military sappers have been clearing mines but with casualties. A number of these have been hospitalized in Namibia.48 INAROEE has also indicated its desire to also coordinate the Military Engineering Units of the Angolan Army to carry out humanitarian mine clearance.49 However, incidents such as at Sangondo, Luena where the Engineering Unit missed mines and declared the area safe, resulting in civilian casualties, raises a question at to whether the military has the skills to demine to humanitarian standards.
INAROEE-based GIS Landmine Database: The database continues to exist and is useful. Every minefield surveyed in Angola goes onto the database. Every time an operator completes a task or survey or discredits a task, a full report is sent to INAROEE. It also maintains information on the humanitarian priority of each minefield, coded between one and five in terms of importance/desperation. Priorities do change, for example in Kuito, when IDPs moved closer into land contaminated by mines laid in the 1980s or during the 1992-1994 war. The database can generate maps on a scale of 1:1,000,000 in digital form for all of Angola and also contains geo-referenced information on minefields, mine clearance, mine awareness programs, and mine accidents.
During 1999 and 2000 there has been little commercial demining activity in the country. The only commercial firm active is the South African firm BRZ International Ltd, which operates in Angola through Saracen Angola Lda. and in a joint venture with an Angolan commercial demining company, Mamboji Lda.50 BRZ International reports that in 1999 it conducted clearance and de-bushing work at Soyo for FINA Petroleos de Angola.51
NGO Mine Action Initiatives
The latest conflict resulted in mine action efforts being shifted and adjusted to directly support and integrate into the overall humanitarian emergency relief efforts. This was very evident in the major war zones around provincial capitals such as Malanje, Huambo and Kuito. The priority changed from area clearance to surveying for mines and UXO, awareness building among IDPs and resident populations, elimination of mines and UXO, and finally area clearance.
Norwegian People's Aid: NPA's demining operation remains the largest in Angola. Like HALO Trust, in January 1995, NPA obtained a government permit to clear mines. It suffered significant reduction in donor support in 1999 as it became difficult to convince donors to keep the funds flowing.52 In 1999, its funds from Norway dropped by ten percent, from Denmark by forty percent, from the Netherlands by half, and Australia pulled out completely. Overall support has dropped to about fifty percent of its 1998 funding level. NPA has tried to maintain its total workforce of some 700 Angolans and twenty expatriate staff and avoid lay-offs.
NPA's main role is to open up roads and bridges and to facilitate IDPs settling into agricultural areas and in camps. Between June 1999 and March 2000, it cleared 3,127,349 square meters of land. In this period, 219 AP mines, fifteen AT mines, and 101,179 UXO were found and destroyed. NPA sent a survey team into Malanje city on 4 May 1999 and established a presence until November 1999 when the deminers returned. The NPA team removed eighty-nine UXO resulting from five months (January to May 1999) of UNITA shelling.53
Highlights of NPA demining/mine action operations during 1999 are:
· doubling the area cleared in Angola through consolidation of resources in the South (Huila, Benguela and Cunene provinces);
· temporary shifting of demining programs from areas of conflict, most notably from Malanje to Ndalatando/Dondo in January 1999;
· stopping the systematic Level 1 Survey short of completing the three remaining provinces (Moxico, Lunda Norte and Cuando Cubango) and redeploying the teams nationwide to monitor and assess recent mine accidents and record information of newly reported minefields.
In 2000, its mine action program consists of six different projects. They are:
· The Manual Demining Project: Three manual groups, with a total of 300 manual deminers, deployed in the Malanje, Kwanza Norte54 and Huila provinces;
· The Mechanical Verification and Mine Clearance Project: Two Hydrema and three Aardvark mine clearance machines for verification, area reduction and mine clearance tasks, currently in Namibe province (on the border with Huila, doing road clearance for IDPs). In Cunene NPA is working on road clearance and on some small minefields;
· The Mine Detecting Dog Project: Explosive vapor detecting dogs utilized for verification of air samples collected in suspected mine contaminated areas by sampling teams, and free running and UXO detecting dogs;
· The EOD/BAC Project: EOD and battle area clearance teams deployed for the removal and disposal of UXO;
· The Landmine Survey Project and Database Collection: The collection, analysis, management and dissemination of mine and mine-related information for the effective coordination and organization of a coherent humanitarian mine action program; and
· The Mine Awareness Project: Mine awareness campaigns for the local population and communities about the danger of mines and UXOs.
NPA pulled out of Uige on 28 May 2000 because of security worries but may return. On 1 May 2000, NPA received funding to work in Moxico province,55 where it set up an office and opened a training center. It will take on an INAROEE brigade, some seventy people from INAROEE and MAG, who will be given a refresher course and the best people selected to work with NPA.
As noted above, NPA suffered significant reductions in donor support in 1999, but lay-offs were avoided by halving the number of expatriate advisors and putting the remainder in low-cost accommodation. Recent cash flow problems were dealt with by suspending contracts temporarily (January to March 2000).56
NPA's funders over the last two years include: Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) in 1999 and 2000 -- $2 million; the U.S. State Department from May 2000 to May 2001 -- approximately $2 million; USAID from October 1998 to January 2000 -- $2.2 million; Swedish National Development Agency from January to December 2000 -- $1.1 million; the Netherlands in 1999 --$592,000, and in 2000 -- $437,853; Italy in 2000 --$536,544; and Denmark, which in 1999 supported costs of running two mechanical mine clearance machines.
Mines Advisory Group (MAG): British-based MAG's presence dates back to mid-1992 with the start of a mine awareness poster campaign. It began mine clearance operations in April 1994 in Moxico province. MAG was forced to suspend operations in Moxico in mid-1998 and withdrew most staff from that province in August 1998. At the request of INAROEE, MAG established in January 1998 an operations base in Ondjiva, Cunene province in the south of the country following an assessment mission in November 1998. This mission confirmed the need for mine action in the province. MAG recruited and trained local personnel, with the help of its National Training Team (NTT) brought from the suspended Moxico operation. MAG's first two mine action teams were deployed in April 1999, followed by two more in September 1998.
MAG is working in close partnership with other NGOs and government bodies. It has established a "Sub-committee for Demining" involving local authorities, police, the provincial governmental humanitarian agency, MINARS (Ministry of Social Affairs and Rehabilitation), the Army and NGOs to coordinate mine action and development within the province. MAG has also been working closely with AICH, a Spanish NGO involved in the rehabilitation of water wells across the province. It has cleared well access, and existing and new well sites.
There is also a relationship with the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), which currently runs a mine awareness program in the province. IFRC staff pass all reports of mines and UXOs to MAG, which then deals with them and reports back to the IFRC the actions taken in response to the report. This positive action creates community confidence and leads to further information. During 1999 the program trained four mine action teams and has developed them to the point that they can deploy and manage themselves on a daily basis. In 2000 MAG will further upgrade the NTT's technical and managerial skills in preparation for handing over the ownership of the program. Due to the large number of mine and UXO tasks being reported and undertaken by the teams, MAG is reevaluating (upwards) the community need in the province in response to requests from INAROEE and from the local authorities in Luena, Moxico province. MAG is looking to re-start its suspended operations based in Luena initially. MAG is seeking funding to support the mine action element of an integrated post-conflict rehabilitation project underway in the town involving medico international, VVAF and the Trauma Care Foundation.
In 1999 MAG received $1.21 million from the Anti-Landmijn Stichting, Brot fur die Welt, Comic Relief, Christian Aid, the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, Misereor and the National Lottery Charities Board. In 2000 (Jan.-Dec.) support is less, $992,250 of which $549,000 is from the National Lotteries Charities Board, $54,000 from the Anti-Landmijn Stichting, $287,000 from Brot fur die WELT and Misereor, and $116,250 from the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund. No funds are yet secured for 2001 and MAG is very concerned, as are other agencies, that the level of funding support currently available from the international community is no way commensurate to the acute need of the affected populations.
HALO Trust: The British NGO HALO Trust began operating in Angola in late 1994. In January 1995, the government through the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Cooperation issued a permit to HALO for demining operations in Bie, Benguela and Huambo provinces.
HALO is currently operating in Huambo and Bie provinces, and in spite of the fluctuating security situation, it remained operational throughout 1999. Just prior to the onset of renewed fighting, HALO withdrew its expatriate monitoring staff, but the deminers continued working under local supervision and continued to report their progress by radio. This continued until government forces attacked Bailundo and the equipment was lost. HALO has shifted its demining efforts to support humanitarian organizations and their efforts to resettle IDPs. In the period January to November 1999, 414 AP mines, 96 AT mines, 1,254 items of UXO and 1,731 items of stray ammunition were destroyed. In 1999 HALO reduced the size of its demining teams in Kuito and Huambo and shifted that capacity to safer areas around Cubal. At the same time, it continued to demine, clearing mines around two bridges, a power transmission line and an agricultural area, all within the Huambo-Caala corridor.
At the request of the provincial government of Huambo, demining efforts were suspended between 3 March and August 1999; in November 1999, the provincial governor gave HALO his permission to operate anywhere in the province. On 18 November 1999, the government also handed over thirty-four AP mines to HALO to destroy and on 25 and 26 November sixty-seven AT mines they had cleared in the Vila Nova area.57 Since November 1999 HALO has started work on opening up some routes to survey villages further away from Huambo, working with MSF, ICRC and ADPP. In April 2000, it started demining in Caala, clearing 164 landmines that month in Muangunja suburb in an area of 935 square meters.58 However, it is unable to demine in any municipalities forty kilometers beyond Huambo because of poor security. Three of its staff were killed and three injured when three of its vehicles were ambushed on Quilengues-Vhongoroi road, Huila, on 24 January 2000.59 HALO asked to work in Andulo but government forces refused them permission on the grounds that they could not guarantee security.
In Kuito, HALO has been working close to Kuito and Kunje (within the perimeter) because of the security situation. Between January and November 1999, the HALO team removed nearly 1,000 UXO, seventeen AT mines and nineteen AP mines. Four teams are operational using manual and mechanical methods. At a request of the provincial government, demining activities were suspended from 3 March 1999 to 24 May 1999. In July HALO voiced its concern to the Angolan press about the increased number of mine accidents in the province.60 HALO also initiated mine awareness efforts during 1999, making appearances at 174 different localities and reaching a total of 40,000 people during this period.
HALO currently has 300 staff (three of which are expatriates), and its funding comes mainly from the U.S. government and the EU. From 1 June 1999 through 9 September 1999, the EU gave HALO approximately $400,000, followed by a $1.12 million funding contract from 1 January 2000. The EU has just asked HALO for another proposal for December 2000 to May 2001, and it has submitted one for $600,000. From 1 October 1999 to 31 December 1999, another $120,000 came from the Dutch Anti-Landmijn Stichting, which helped bridge a funding gap.
In May 2000, the U.S. Department of Defense provided HALO with $400,000 for six months work, permitting an expansion of fifty people, of which thirty were recruited in April. All operators in Angola have been asked by the U.S. to put in bids for funding which will total $3-4 million. HALO has submitted a proposal for $1.1 million. The Japanese government paid for two land rovers, with a one-time grant of $82,412 in July 1999.61
Care International: Care International funded Greenfield Consultants,62 a commercial firm based in the UK, to field two clearance teams in Cuando Cubango province, and carry out mine awareness programs in Bie, Cunene, Huila and Cuando Cubango provinces. These teams were deployed in December 1995. Care terminated its mine-related work in Bie province in mid-March 1999 because of the increased fighting between the government and UNITA and because it ran out of funds. Between February 1998 and June 1999, the project had been supported with a $1.1 million grant from the EU as well as $15,000 from the British-based Rowan Trust and $39,658 from TRAID. This Care Mine Related Interventions Project (CAMRI I) had a twenty-one person mine action team working to clear and dispose of mines and explosives. This project destroyed or clearly marked more than 100 mines.63
Care's teams have also trained almost 5,000 people in mine awareness and have assessed four campsites and surrounding agricultural land for temporary but safe resettlement of internally displaced persons. Care has requested funds in 2000 for a nine-month follow up CAMARI II project from the European Commission's DG Dev and a team from European Landmine Solutions visited Angola in June on an assessment mission.
Menschen gegn Minen (MgM): MgM, a German-based NGO, became operational in Angola in 1996 when it was awarded a contract from the World Food Program to clear roads for the internally displaced in Caxito, Bengo province. Since July 1999, it has cleared fifty-eight hectares of mined land in Libongo, Bengo province. The project for 1999 was called Bengo X and was dedicated to unfinished clearance from the Bengo VIII work and clearance of Dembos District and the village of return for people from Cambambe 2.
Due to the security situation in these areas, MgM relocated to the Libongo area and completed the clearance of a minefield that Save the Children Fund (USA) had started but had abandoned after a serious accident, which resulted in the closing of the program. Other mined areas were also cleared. During this operation MgM cleared sixty-one AP mines, nine AT mines and 900 pieces of unexploded ordnance. The bulk of the work was carried out along seventy kilometers of road, equal to fifty-six hectares; the remaining two hectares were mined fields. MgM estimates that it has opened up 3,000 hectares of farming land, which allowed some 56,000 internally displaced persons return home to Nambuangongo in early 2000.64
MgM also hopes to operate in Dembos, in the eastern Bengo province or Cuanza Sul (depending on which map you look at). They are waiting for the go-ahead from the military. The governor appears to support the program but the military is against it. Dembos is still an area of conflict and some 28,000 IDPs are waiting to go home, presently in IDP camps just outside Caxito. There are also plans for work in Ambriz, Nambuangongo and Caxito and long-term plans for work in Moxico, Uige, and Cuando Cubango provinces.
MgM is preparing to work in Cunene province and a base camp and workshop are ready.65 The job is to open feeder roads to Cuando Cubango and at a later stage, into Moxico province. MgM has roughly doubled its mechanical assets over the past year, employs eighty Angolans and operates seven dogs.
In 1999, it received $1,780,000 from donors and in 2000, $1,246,000. The funds have come from the Dutch, German, and U.S. governments; Johanniter International; Action Medeor; and from individuals.
Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara is also a German-based mine clearance organization. Like MgM, it became operational in Angola in late 1996. In 1999 it obtained a contract with SBF and the Swedish NGO Swed Relief to clear mines from twenty-five kilometers of roads and around four bridges in Huila province. It also cleared road sections and bridge areas in the rehabilitation of a major road between Matala (Huila province) and Menongue (Cuando Cubango province). Due to the changing security situation the work has shifted to Cunene province. This specific project was funded by $450,000. In 1999, it also received $1.21 million from the German Association of the Economy,_the German government and the Swedish government for clearance work that resulted in 10,000 square meters of farmland near Lubango being cleared during which twenty-five AP mines, thirteen AT mines and 123 UXO were cleared.
Santa Barbara continues to maintain an operational base in Xangongo and is working in Huila at Hoque, and Cunene near Xangongo on micro projects with $350,000 in funding from the Italian government and from the German Association of the Economy. By mid-June 2000, they had cleared seventeen AP mines and nine UXOs. It uses detectors, a vegetation cutter, and a Wolf demining vehicle in its clearance operations.66
Humanitarian Medical Development Response (HMD): HMD, an Irish/British organization, started operations in 1998 rehabilitating a hospital in Saurimo as part of a three-year $468,000 co-funded project, with $220,500 from an individual donor. HMD wanted to reduce the number of patients by branching into mine action (survey and mine awareness work). A second twelve-month mine clearance project by HMD ended in August 1999 after funding ran out. HMD had sent forty local deminers for training in mine clearance at the ETAM in October 1998 and then they cleared mines and UXO in the Saurimo area when they obtained reports from local people. This project was funded by a 200,000 Euro grant from the EU Food Security Program and $187,000 from an individual donation.67
INTERSOS: An Italian NGO, provided experts from its Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) who operated in 1997/98 as supervisors of a UNAVEM III/UNDP project clearing mined territory in Cuando Cubango with the 7th Demining Brigade of INAROEE. In November 1999 an eighteen-month demining project started in Lubango, Huila province, aimed at supporting IDPs. The project is funded by the EU and the Italian government. INTERSOS is taking over an INAROEE brigade to do this work.68
Demira: A German NGO that worked on the Cunene river bringing water in from Namibia but finished operating in Angola in August 1999. Demira never engaged in formal mine clearance although it cleared a few mines from roads that it operated on.
Since 1995, 1.8 million people in fifteen of the country's eighteen provinces have participated in mine awareness programs. There has been a significant increase in the need for mine awareness in 1999 and 2000 due to the resumption of the war and the large number of IDPs on the move within Angola. Moving populations are often exposed to unfamiliar areas and the marking of mine sites and mine awareness programs in IDP camps can reduce accidents in such areas.
UNICEF has used the Programa de Educação e Prevenção de Accidentes de Minas (PEPAM) as its mine awareness program. UNICEF/PEPAM has worked through INAROEE (capacity building and salary support), with INAROEE mine awareness NGO partners (World Vision, Handicap International, CARE, MAG, Medico International, and the IFRC in Cunene province) and various other NGOs.69 It also supports the Palanca Negra mine awareness theater group in Malanje. It has also been instrumental in developing a standardized mine accident registration system which has been integrated into INAROEE's landmine database.
A UNICEF-sponsored school mine awareness project runs in eleven provinces and has reached 224 schools and 1,900 teachers. It also worked with CIET International on "mine smartness" surveys with CIDA/DHA support. UNICEF has also subsidized INAROEE's remaining provincial coordinators (after INAROEE brigades were dissolved in April 1999) through salary support, who now have a coordination function to gather accident data and monitor local mine awareness projects.
World Vision in Malanje has been the principle provider of mine awareness services to both IDPs and resident populations. They continued through 1999 despite frequent UNITA shelling. However, their financial support dwindled in 1999, so that three of their six mine awareness instructors had to leave. In the period February to September 1999 (the period of heaviest fighting) they reached 11,379 persons.70 In September 1999, World Vision requested to expand their work outside Malanje city in order to pave the way for relocation of IDPs, but the government police did not approve the request for security reasons.71 World Vision, jointly with Africare, was awarded $1 million from the U.S. Department of State for mine awareness activities in 2000.
In Huambo and Kuito, GAC (Grupo de Apoio e Criança) is the largest mine awareness NGO. GAC mine awareness work continued throughout 1999 in Huambo, except for the days of heavy shelling. They have twelve instructors (two teams of six) in Huambo and an equal number in Kuito. In November 1999 they estimated that they reached a total of 3,521 people (1,843 children, 423 youths, 738 women and 517 men).72
Supported by UNICEF, INAROEE, GAC, and the Ministry of Education, Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo para Povo (ADPP) runs a teacher training program in Huambo, which in 1999 for the first time included a week-long module on mine awareness for all future teachers. The ICRC has also been active on the Planalto. Between January and September 1999, the ICRC conducted fifty-eight mine awareness sessions for 2,913 primary school pupils in the Planalto region.73 UNICEF mine awareness sessions also reached 2,212 students and 142 teachers in four schools, and 1,100 people in three churches in the same region.
The IFRC runs a mine awareness program based in Benguela. The program conducts training courses for volunteer instructors and a course for twenty-five teachers in support of the Ministry of Education initiative to introduce mine awareness into the school curriculum. It is anticipated that the teachers will train 1,125 students in 2000. IFRC also works with MAG and NPA.
In 1999, NPA has continued to carry out monitoring and supervising of the mine awareness programs carried out by Medico International in Moxico province, UNICEF and the Danish Refugee Council.74 Although NPA has reduced its operational role in mine awareness in Angola, the organization has the skills and capacity to train mine awareness instructors and design projects for other organizations. Therefore, NPA has through its partnership with other organizations played a key role in what has been by far the largest mine awareness initiative in Angola.75
INAROEE has been involved in nominal mine awareness work. It has also facilitated landmine committees in locations affected by minefields such as Huambo's three committees in Bairro Fatima, two in Cainhe, two in Santo Antonio.76 Handicap International (France) has also engaged in mine awareness work in six provinces with INAROEE, supporting radio programs and working directly in IDP camps.77
Angola has one of the highest rates of landmine injuries per capita in the world. Out of a population of about nine million, it has tens of thousands of amputees, the great majority of them injured by landmines. The government claims that there are 90,000 amputees in the country although the more widely used figure is 70,000. However, in general an estimated one in every 415 Angolans has a mine-related injury, and the proportion of child casualties ranged from 41 percent to 76 percent in the heavily mined provinces of Moxico, Huila, Bie and Huambo.
A total of 1,004 mine and UXO casualties are officially registered by INAROEE for the period mid-1998 to January 2000, but the real figure is much higher. 78 The number of AP landmine accidents registered by INAROEE went up sharply in 1999: in 1998, ninety-five mine accidents were registered; in 1999 there were 486 mine accidents; from January to March 2000 there were twenty-nine mine accidents.79
The situation in Luena is instructive. The number of victims in Luena was 83 in 1995, and dropped to 32 in 1996, but jumped to 103 in 1998 and rose to at least 185 in 1999 because of the renewed hostilities.80 According to the Jesuit Refugee Service, between January and October 1999 in Luena there were 105 mine victims from sixty-eight AP accidents.81 INAROEE reports that in October 1999 there were twenty-nine mine victims from eighteen mine accidents around Luena. In November 1999 there were twenty-nine victims from fourteen mine incidents.
The situation in Luena was not helped by the local representative of the Ministry of Social Assistance declaring that a field in Sangondo suburb was fit for settlement by IDPs. On 2 March 2000 a women lost her sight after touching a mine and two more mines and twenty-four pieces of UXOs were discovered and destroyed. A month later a women and man were killed by a reinforced antipersonnel mine.
For over a month, a number of NGOs operating in Luena had contacted the Ministry of Social Assistance to voice their concern about the dangers of resettlement on Sangondo but were ignored. Finally they sent an open letter complaining about this situation to the Provincial Governor and copied it to the Minister of Social Assistance Albino Malungo in Luanda.82 The crisis was only resolved when the Minister intervened and a meeting was held on 7 April at which it was agreed that the armed forces would need to clear the mines prior to continued settlement.83
Luena was not alone in seeing new mine victims. In and around the periphery of Malanje city, 184 mine accidents occurred in the period January-November 1999. While in Andulo, UNITA's former headquarters but under government control since October 1999, up to ten landmine incidents, mostly resulting in death or amputations, were reported every week.84 According to INAROEE, twenty people have died and fourteen others have been seriously injured in eastern Moxico province between January and May 2000.85
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Care and rehabilitation of FAA soldiers is the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Medica-Militar (SAMM) of FAA. Civilian victim assistance in Angola consists mostly of physical rehabilitation provided by several international NGOs, but the provision of rehabilitation services outside Luanda has also been significantly affected by the renewed war in Angola.
The ICRC runs an orthopedic center at Bombo Alto, near Huambo and a new center in Kuito. The Swedish Red Cross had run an orthopedic center at Neves Bendinha, but responsibility for this center was taken over in February 1999 by the ICRC and it became fully operational in August. The ICRC reports that its orthopedic activities have been reduced because of security problems. Similarly, the transportation of amputees from other provinces to the orthopedic centers had been suspended in 1999 although this program resumed in January 2000. In 1999 the ICRC treated 1,547 patients in its three centers. Of these, 1,237 were victims of antipersonnel mines.86 The ICRC also manufactures and supplies components for seven prosthetic centers throughout Angola for the production of 4,000 prostheses.87 The Dutch Red Cross has a center at Viana, Luanda Province.
Because of the renewed outbreak of fighting in the Planalto region in December 1998, the ICRC began a medical assistance program for civilian patients at Huambo hospital in which all patients arriving for surgical and orthopedic treatment were supported by the ICRC. In April 2000 the ICRC held a six-week seminar in war surgery in Huambo hospital.88
By late 1998, Handicap International (HI) operated two orthopedic clinics outside Luanda in Benguela, Lobito. A center in Negage in Uige province was turned over to the Ministry of Health in November 1998 and continues to function to some extent. The two centers in Benguela and Lobito have not been directly affected by the war, but have experienced a deficit in patients of some ten to twenty a month due to their inability to safely reach the workshops. HI plans to start general social reintegration projects related to both workshops, but limit its activities to the urban centers until the security situation improves in surrounding areas. HI continues to work at the Viana Center outside Luanda producing feet for all the physical rehabilitation programs in Angola. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, a U.S.-based NGO, provides physical and social rehabilitation to mine victims in Luena in Moxico province.89 Between September 1997 and 31 March 2000 the Center produced 738 prosthetic limbs, most of them for mine victims and funded by the War Victims Fund/USAID.90 In 2000, the Italian NGO INTERSOS obtained EU and Italian government funding for a two-phase project to rehabilitate and open a prosthetics clinic in Menongue in Cuando Cubango, aimed at servicing the whole province.91
Angola remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities are available for the physically disabled. Most amputees are reluctant to leave the relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their future will consist of being cared for by their families, or attempting to earn a living in one of the few occupations open to them, such as the street trading or--for those with education--secretarial work. The majority who come from farming backgrounds are likely to remain a burden on their families for the foreseeable future. Many have been reduced to begging; amputee beggars are already a common sight in Angolan towns. Angola will have to live with the human cost of the landmine wars for many years to come.
Key developments since March 1999: Based on information provided by the UNHCR and others, it appears likely that Burundi has been laying antipersonnel mines on its border with Tanzania.
Mine Ban Policy
Burundi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. In a March 2000 written response to Landmine Monitor's request for updated information, Burundi's Ambassador to Belgium, Hon. Jonas Niyungeko stated that the issue is currently being "studied" by the Parliament as a move towards ratification.92
Burundi participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by Ambassador S.E. Nicodeme Nduhirubusa of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cooperation. Burundi is not known to have made any official statements regarding a mine ban in 1999 or 2000. Burundi has not participated in any of intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Burundi sponsored UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B which urged rapid ratification and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, but it was absent during the vote in December 1999.
Burundi is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
There is no evidence that Burundi has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines and officials claim that the mines in Burundi have been brought in by rebels or foreign armies.93 Members of the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) allegedly escaped into Burundi with 40,000 antipersonnel mines and 2,000 antitank mines when they fled from the now ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front in April and May 1994.94
In July 1998, a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official then in charge of landmine policy, Ambassador Jaques Hakizimana, told an UNMAS assessment mission that implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty should not be a problem, since the government of Burundi has "never produced, imported, used or stockpiled" antipersonnel mines.95 But the Minister of Defense, Col. Alfred Nkurunziza, told UNMAS that "limited" stocks are kept for training purposes.96 New evidence that government forces have likely laid mines at the borders would indicate that Burundi has a significant operational stockpile of AP mines.
In July 1998, the Minister of Defense told the UNMAS assessment mission that no mines had ever been laid by the army.97 It now appears that Burundi's armed forces have been laying antipersonnel mines on the border with Tanzania at least since the beginning of 1999. This assessment is based on statements made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (responding to testimony of refugees), as well as on interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch with UN officials and humanitarian workers, and on press reports from the region. The Burundi military appears to be using mines both to prevent thousands of Burundi citizens from fleeing the civil war into Tanzania, as well as to control cross-border attacks and prevent infiltration by Hutu rebel forces based in Tanzania.
In January 1999, a UN Security Officer in Bujumbura told Human Rights Watch that new landmines had been planted along infiltration routes and that he believed the mines were planted by government soldiers.98 In May 1999, a local aid worker in the Musagara receiving station on the border told Human Rights Watch that most of the wounded refugees who came across the border were mine victims and that there had been an increase in victims since September 1998.99 A local aid worker interviewed in Kigoma reported the use of landmines near the Kibuye entry point into Tanzania and told Human Rights Watch that three refugees had died and three were injured by mines. He believed the mines were laid recently as he had not heard of any such injuries before January 1999.100 Another local aid worker in Kigoma stated that there were "a good number of landmine wounds among Burundian refugees" and indicated that refugees crossing the border had stepped on landmines.101 He also said that some Tanzanians had stepped on mines and were sent to the Kiberezi reception center for treatment.
In February 2000, a spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated, "The refugees have reported the presence of landmines as part of the reason why the numbers [of refugees] have dwindled."102
In March 2000, the UNHCR stated that it had protested to Burundi authorities about its mining of the border with Tanzania. UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said that "the main entry points to Tanzania have been heavily mined," preventing refugees from fleeing fighting between government forces and rebels. He also said that the government maintained the landmines were a necessary defense against the rebels.103 The mining of the border was reported by a number of newspapers.104
In April 2000, the UNHRC released a statement saying, "UNHCR is concerned at refugee accounts of use of mines as well as reports of civilians being caught between rebel forces and recent military reprisals in eastern Ruyigi and Makamba provinces." The UNHCR again noted the decline in the refugee flow, and said that refugees arriving in Tanzania from Burundi cited landmines, military activity near the border, and rising rivers as reasons for the drop-off.105
In May 2000, the UNHRC said that according to the latest arrivals, there is "mining by the governmental army of routes to Tanzania."106
It seems clear that mines have been used, and while Landmine Monitor does not have direct, incontrovertible evidence that Burundi armed forces are responsible, that is the conclusion drawn from the available evidence. There have been no allegations that other parties, such as the Hutu rebels or the Tanzanian government, might have laid the mines that are claiming new victims, and there is no evident reason why those parties would use mines in that fashion.
Landmine Monitor has asked Burundi for official comment on allegations of use of antipersonnel mines, but had not received an answer as of the end of July 2000.
Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Burundi, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty...." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.
According to the Minister of Defense, Col. Alfred Nkurunziza, the first mine accidents reported in Burundi occurred in 1993.107 Cibitoke was the first province to be affected by mine use, but the problem subsequently spread to Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, Bururi and Makamba.108 This last province is thought to be the worst affected, due to its proximity to rebel groups operating out of Tanzania.109 Landmines buried in Burundi are of Egyptian, Italian, South African, Russian and Chinese origin.110
There have been no in-depth assessments or surveys of Burundi's landmine problem since the 1998 assessment mission. Dr. Barendegere Venerand of the Kamenge Military Hospital told Landmine Monitor that "the location of mined areas is not yet well known in Burundi but epidemiologic surveillance is being conducted now in the Ministry of Health."111
The United Nations in Burundi conducts mine awareness for all UN staff in the country. In 1998, UNMAS reported that according to the Ministry of Defense, mine awareness training was being conducted for both the military and civilian populations in mine-affected areas.112 No updated information was available on any mine awareness education programs taking place in Burundi. There is currently no humanitarian mine clearance underway in Burundi.
In a detailed response to Landmine Monitor, Dr. Venerand indicated that the first cases of AP mine victims appeared in 1995. Ten amputations were carried at the hospital in 1996 and ninety-six in 1997. The number of recent landmine casualties is not known, but 316 incidents have been recorded since 1993 which, resulted in 791 deaths, mostly civilians. The majority of the victims have come from Cibitoke, Bubanza, rural Bujumbura, Bururi and Makamba.113 According to UN figures, between 1996 and 1998 there were 112 mine incidents, resulting in 364 casualties, about half of which were deaths. Seventy percent were antitank mine incidents.114
According to Dr. Venerand, victim assistance takes place in the nearest health centers, while Kamenge Military Hospital provides "specialised services in trauma." The hospital receives "lots of cases" of mine victims. About 70 percent of admissions in surgery are wounded out of which more than 80 percent are war wounded. The hospital is preparing a survey of the "geographic location of incidents, type of activities at the moment of incident, morbidity and mortality."115 On 25 March 2000 the Ministry of Reinstallation organized a day of reflection on the re-organization of medical assistance, with the aim to reduce cost of health care for victims of the conflict.116
Handicap International (HI) is providing training in physiotherapy and orthopedics. It is also supporting a number of income-generating projects for handicapped people. Its main activities are concentrated in Gitega where the national orthopedics center is located (which has a production capacity of five prostheses per month). HI also supports other small centers in Makamba, Kirundo, Muyinga, and Bujumbura which can produce only simple appliances.
Key developments since March 1999: Legislation to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty was passed in July 1999.
Mine Ban Policy
Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1999. In June 1999 the government submitted ratification legislation to the National Assembly and on 16 July 1999 the National Assembly passed Law 99/008 authorizing the President to ratify the treaty. The ratification document was forwarded to the Presidency of the Republic for signature. After Landmine Monitor requested an update, the Ministry of External Relations sent a reminder letter for quick ratification to the Presidency on 24 April 2000.117 Officials told Landmine Monitor that Cameroon will ratify the treaty before the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000 since there is no obstacle to it.118
Cameroon participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, represented by an official from Cameroon's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh.119 Cameroon has not participated in any intersessional meetings of the ban treaty. Cameroon is a member of the United Nations Consultative Committee on Peace and Security in Central Africa, a committee deeply concerned with small arms, including landmines.120 Cameroon voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
Cameroon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been vocal on the issue of possible negotiations on a mine export ban in the CD.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Cameroon has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. There has been some concern expressed about the possibility of Cameroon being used as a transit point for shipments of landmines involving the Central African Republic or Chad, but Landmine Monitor's investigations found no evidence of such transiting and officials denied this has occurred.121
According to officials, Cameroon possesses a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes, and these are tightly controlled.122 A figure of 500 mines for training was declared during the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and Dr. Elie Mvie Meka, a Technical Advisor in the Ministry of Defense confirmed this number.123
The country's defense strategy does not include the use of landmines. Military training courses include only basic information on landmine recognition and safety precautions.124 There is no evidence of use of AP mines by Cameroon in its border dispute with Nigeria or elsewhere.125
Cameroon is not mine-affected. There are centers in Cameroon that take care of disabled persons. The main rehabilitation centers include the Jamot Center, the Etoug Ebe Center in Yaounde and the Sajocah in Mezam Division-Bamenda. In Cameroon, a special law for disabled persons was passed on 21 July 1983 by the National Assembly.126
Cape Verde signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. According to Luis Dupret, Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ratification papers remain waiting for approval by the National Assembly and the delay is due to other pressing business.127 It attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It has not participated in the intersessional meetings in Geneva. Cape Verde voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. According to Dupret, Cape Verde maintains no stockpile of landmines.128
Key developments since March 1999: In the 1998-2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, it appears that tens of thousands of new mines were laid. Each government has alleged that the other laid mines and observers have expressed concern that both sides may have used mines. Casualties are now on the rise as a result of new use of landmines.
In May 1998, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war over a disputed border area. There have been many allegations that more than 100,000 landmines have been used in this war along the disputed frontier area. New use is compounding what was already a difficult landmine problem in Ethiopia and Eritrea. On 18 June 2000, the two countries signed an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Article 8 of the agreement obligates both parties to demine the conflict frontier zone to allow UN peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies safe access.129
Mine Ban Policy
Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a statement at the signing ceremony, the government reaffirmed its commitment to the treaty, and as a mine-affected nation, urged the international community to adhere to the articles of the treaty dealing with assistance for mine clearance and mine victims.130 In March 1999, and again in May 1999, the Ethiopian government stated that it had "already triggered" the procedure for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty,131 but to date Ethiopia has not ratified the treaty.
Ethiopia attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999 as an observer. Its delegation included officials of both the Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry. The head of delegation stated, "Ethiopia attaches paramount importance to the convention and would continue to work and cooperate with all states and groups for the implementation of the cardinal principles of the convention."132
The government has not attended any of the meetings in Geneva of the five Standing Committees of Experts of the Mine Ban Treaty, established to foster implementation of the treaty.
Ethiopia voted in favor of the December 1999 UNGA resolution supporting the treaty, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. While a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Ethiopia has not been noted as a supporter or opponent of efforts to negotiate a landmine export ban in that forum.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Ethiopia does not produce landmines. At the Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony, Ethiopia indicated that it had not imported any landmines since the overthrow of the regime of Mengistu Heilemariam in 1991.133 The size of Ethiopia's landmine stocks is not known.134
Soon after the start of the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of planting landmines in the conflict zone and areas of Ethiopia controlled by Eritrea. Ethiopia has alleged that Eritrea planted 110,000 mines.135 In late May 2000, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of planting mines in border towns before losing control of them to Ethiopian troops.136
The Eritrean government alleged to Landmine Monitor in early 2000 that Ethiopian forces have been using landmines in the disputed territories,137 and that the mines are to a large extent not mapped or marked.138 The Eritrean government in late May and early June 2000 accused Ethiopia of laying mines in the towns Ethiopian forces were occupying. In particular, when Eritrean forces recaptured the town of Barentu two weeks after it had been taken by Ethiopian troops, there were press accounts stating that the Ethiopians had looted and mined the town.139
In an aide-memoire dated 17 July 2000 to the OAU and UN, Eritrea said that "Ethiopia has and continues to plant new mines inside sovereign Eritrean territory, particularly in the areas which fall within the temporary security zone."140
Landmine Monitor has not been able to independently verify whether or not Ethiopia has used antipersonnel mines in the recent conflict. It is clear that mines were used by one or both parties to the conflict. In early June 2000, humanitarian sources told the UN Humanitarian Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) that there was much concern that both countries had mined border areas, and that "it would appear to take some time before people are confident enough to go back to their homes" in areas affected by the conflict.141 Landmine casualties among the civilian population are already reported to be on the rise.142
Additionally, South Mogadishu strongman Hussein Farah Aideed has claimed Ethiopian troops occupying some parts of southern Somalia have used landmines.143 In 1998 and 1999, the Ethiopian army made a number of incursions into Somalia, claiming that factions opposed to Ethiopia--Itihad and militia of the Oromo Liberation Front, aided by Eritrea--were launching attacks from bases in southern Somalia.144
The government of Ethiopia denies that it has used antipersonnel landmines in the conflict with Eritrea or anywhere else since signing the Mine Ban Treaty.145
Use by Non-State Actors
Insurgents opposed to the government of Ethiopia, particularly the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are believed to have used landmines-antivehicle and possibly antipersonnel--in Ethiopia recently. There were three incidents in 1999 of mine attacks on the Ethiopian-Djibouti Railway.146 According to press accounts, OLF took responsibility for at least one of the attacks,147 claiming that the train was transporting war material for Ethiopia and young Oromo men used by the Ethiopian army as "cannon fodder" and "mine sweepers."148 In southern Ethiopia, the Oromo Liberation Front claimed that it mined roads between Kenya and Ethiopia and some areas in northern Kenya.149 ONLF is also thought to have been behind a number of landmine incidents in the Somali National Region of Ethiopia, including an accident that seriously damaged the emergency medical ambulance in the region.150 Neither the OLF nor the ONLF have made statements about banning landmines.
The U.S. State Department reported in February 2000 that Eritrea has provided support for armed opposition groups attempting to overthrow the Ethiopian government. These groups, mostly based in Somalia and Kenya, used landmines inside Ethiopia in 1999, according to the U.S.151
Landmines have been used in Ethiopia during various conflicts for decades. For thirty years, Ethiopia fought with the Eritrean People's Liberation (EPLF) for the control of Eritrea. Until 1993, Eritrea was a province of Ethiopia, which had annexed the former UN Trusteeship of Eritrea in 1963. Landmines were used extensively both by Eritrean liberation movements and Ethiopia during that war, mainly along the border between the two countries.152
In 1977, Somalia invaded and occupied Somali-inhabited areas in eastern and northeastern Ethiopia until 1978. Both armies used mines extensively.153 As a result of that war, many minefields are found along the 1,626 km long border with Somalia, but also from the war between the former military regime of Siyad Barre in Somalia and Somali oppositions groups based inside Ethiopia.154 Other areas with known mine contamination are: Gondar and Dessie, the northern Shewar region, along the road between Djibouti and Awash, the Somali National Region, and the western area around Walega and West Arosa.155 Landmines have also been used along the border with Sudan, where insurgents opposed to the Government of Sudan have been active.156
While the Ethiopian government estimates the number of uncleared landmines in Ethiopia at more than 1.4 million, the U.S. Department of State puts the number of existing mines in Ethiopia at 500,000.157 Contaminated areas include Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Gamela, Oromiya, and Beni-Shangul.158 Even before the most recent border war, the border area between Eritrea and Ethiopia was heavily mined.159
Mine Action Funding and Mine Clearance
The Ethiopian Ministry of Defense operates the Ethiopian Demining Project (EDP). The EDP Headquarters in Addis Ababa is the sole mine action entity in the country, but the war of 1998-2000 has disrupted EDP mine action work. It has conducted historical research, mine awareness education, and demining. There have been no nationwide or systemic surveys in Ethiopia, but the EDP has so far identified over 100 minefields. The German NGO Santa Barbara Foundation has signed an agreement with Ethiopia for a Level I Survey, but has not yet conducted one due to lack of funds.160
The largest mine action donor for the country has been the United States. Between 1993-1999, EDP received $8.8 million from the U.S. for demining programs,161 including $335,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1999. The estimated U.S. contribution for FY 2000 is $2.3 million,162 which is to be spent on mine detecting dog capability, training in explosive ordnance disposal and mine clearance, and the purchase of equipment.163
In 1999 Ethiopia was certified by Germany as being eligible to receive military surplus equipment for demining operations.164
The U.S. Department of Defense indicates that the EDP mine clearance program has so far cleared 37,000 AT and AP mines and 364,000 pieces of UXO.165 In addition, the Ethiopian government claims that it has removed 30,375 landmines in 1999 and 40,000 landmines in 2000 in the northern conflict zone in areas that had been occupied by Eritrea since May 1998.166
Mine Awareness Education
The EDP as well as non-governmental organizations, primarily Handicap International, carry out mine awareness and education activities in Ethiopia. According to UN Mine Action Service 1998 mission report, the EDP runs radio and television programs, distributes flyers and runs newspaper ads to convey messages on the danger of landmines.167 There is little coordination, and a lack of community involvement in the EDP mine awareness activities.168
Since 1997, Handicap International has run mine risk awareness programs in the Somali refugee camps in northeastern Ethiopia. As of 1999, Handicap International had trained nine educators. Approximately 100,000 refugees have also benefited from these training programs. In 1999, the European Commission granted HI $257,000 for mine awareness education.169 At the end of 1999, an Ethiopian NGO RaDO started a mine risk education program in northern Ethiopia, with the technical assistance of UNICEF.
Landmine casualties are not recorded systematically. Before the 1998-2000 border war, there were an estimated 4,200-4,600 amputee mine victims.170 Although landmine incidents were beginning to subside and were thought to be relatively low in 1998,171 casualties are now on the rise as a result of new use of landmines in northern Ethiopia, with reports indicating a casualty rate of between five and seven per week. Civilians returning to the conflict zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia are now under considerable landmine threat.172 Ethiopian government sources claim that landmines in the northern Ethiopian conflict zone have caused the death of some 100 people in the 1998-1999 conflict period, and have forced 50,000 to abandon fertile agricultural land.173 Local government officials in the border town of Zala Anbesa claim that seventy-seven people were killed by landmines in the area.174
Landmine casualties continue to occur in the Somali National Region of Ethiopia, along the frontier with Kenya and along the Djibouti-Ethiopian rail line, where both cargo and passenger trains have been derailed by landmines on three occasions in 2000. These casualties are not systematically tallied. In the Somali National Region a landmine explosion destroyed one of the two functioning ambulances and seriously injuring the driver. A local doctor was also killed by a landmine accident at Qabridahari and another incident injured a nurse and a driver working on the National Polio Immunization Campaign.175
Landmine Survivor Assistance
All mine-affected regions of Ethiopia are extremely underdeveloped with poor infrastructure and poorly equipped health care facilities. Few hospitals are capable of performing emergency surgery and most local health posts are not competent to provide emergency care to mine victims.
The Department of Rehabilitation Affairs of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs runs three prosthetic/orthotic centers in Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, Mekele and Harar. The Addis Ababa prosthetic center was established in 1961 by the Ethiopian government, while the Mekele and Harar centers were established by the ICRC in 1992 and 1982 respectively. The Addis Ababa center is one of the premier such centers in all of Africa and its products, wheel chairs, mobility devices and components are used in many African countries. In addition, its serves as a reference center, providing training and counseling internationally to other centers in mine-affected countries.
The ICRC, through a Special Fund for Disabled (SFD), supports prosthetic/orthotic centers in Ethiopia. The Italian Red Cross, in collaboration with the ICRC, assigned two permanent staff to the center in Addis Ababa to help train prosthetists and orthotists and to develop their skill in the polypropylene technique. In 1999, fourteen ICRC prosthetists/orthotists on their first missions attended a two-week instruction course, and twenty-seven others from eight countries completed a one-month course. During these training courses, eighty-two amputees received new prostheses. Since July 1998, the U.S. has supported the SFD project in Addis Ababa with $1 million, through the ICRC, for this training.176
In addition, to the training courses, the SFD-supported expatriates carried out follow-up technical visits to SFD-supported projects every month. In 1999, technical visits lasting about two weeks were made to twenty-nine projects in seventeen countries. During these visits, the SFD staff gave further training in fitting techniques and reviewed the condition of equipment and polypropylene components. In SFD-supported projects, 4,788 polypropylene prostheses were produced in 1999. The Prosthetic/Orthotic Center in Addis Ababa supplied an increased number of ICRC projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda.177
Since 1997, HI and RaDO have conducted a joint project to implement rehabilitation services in the main hospitals of the country (Axum, Maychew, Bahir Dar, Debre Tabor, Woldia, Nekempte, Mettu, Sodo, Hossana, Dire Dawa). These services, established in coordination with the respective regional and local health bureaus, provide basic physiotherapy treatments and walking aids to in-patients and to disabled persons.
Gabon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, but has not yet ratified it. The ratification legislation that needs to be submitted to the National Assembly is still being prepared at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.178 A government official responded to a letter from Handicap International by stating, "I will relay your correspondence to our Government in Libreville and I have no doubt that it will be taken into consideration for a rapid ratification."179
Gabon attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a delegation led by its Ambassador to the Organization of African Unity. It has not participated in the intersessional meetings of the treaty. Gabon is an active member of the United Nations consultative committee on Peace and Security in Central Africa, a committee that has addressed small arms and landmines. It is also active in the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (COPAX). During the last COPAX meeting in October 1999 in Djamena, Chad, the participating governments reaffirmed their commitment to join and respect all the international conventions related to international humanitarian law including the Mine Ban Treaty.180 Gabon was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the treaty in December 1999. It has voted for similar resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Gabon is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Gabon told Landmine Monitor that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.181 According to government sources, Gabon has a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines intended for training purposes only.182 Information on the quantity and types of these mines is not available to the public.183
There are no humanitarian mine action programs in Gabon. The ICRC's Regional Bureau for Central Africa confirmed that there are no registered landmine victims in Gabon.184
The Gambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. The Gambia's National Assembly passed ratification legislation on 2 November 1999.185 On 20 July 2000, an official from the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor, "The President of the Republic of The Gambia has endorsed the Instrument of Ratification."186 All that remains is for the instrument of ratification to be officially deposited at the United Nations.187
The Gambia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, and it has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Gambia was absent from the December 1999 vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
The Ministry of Defense informed Landmine Monitor that it does not manufacture or "retain any stockpiles of landmines." It further stated, "There are no instances where our Armed Forces utilized landmines." With respect to trade in mines, the response was, "There [is] no evidence of antipersonnel landmines being transferred from The Gambia. However, this could be possible, but not to the knowledge of the Gambian Government."188
The Gambia's security situation has almost certainly been occasionally compromised by its proximity to Senegal's southern province of Casamance, where conflict between separatists and the Senegalese armed forces has involved use of landmines (see Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Senegal).189 Senegalese diplomats suspected that Gambian territory was being used as a rearbase by rebel elements in 1992, shortly before landmines made their appearance in Casamance. However, more recently, Gambian mediation efforts to end the Casamance conflict have been welcomed by Senegalese representatives.190
Key developments since March 1999: Mine clearance efforts have been delayed, though some limited clearance has taken place. UNICEF established a Mine Awareness Committee that has met bi-weekly since April 1999 to plan and coordinate all mine awareness activities. It was reported by the UN in July 1999 that Guinea-Bissau denied using landmines in its 1998 conflict and announced that efforts would be made to identify culpable parties and bring them to justice.
Mine Ban Policy
Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa on 3 December 1997, but has yet to ratify. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it attended any of the intersessional meetings in Geneva of the Standing Committees of Experts. Guinea-Bissau voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. In July 1999 an advisor to the Prime Minister called use of mines "a war crime."191
Guinea-Bissau is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Guinea-Bissau is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. It appears to have imported mines from a number of countries. On 7 February 1998, the government destroyed between 2,000 and 2,300 landmines from its stocks, in front of foreign diplomats, media and officials from the Senegalese army, but no further destruction has occurred.192 There is no estimate of the size of the landmine stockpile that the Bissau military currently retains.
The Landmine Monitor Report 1999 contained an account of the fighting in Guinea-Bissau that began in June 1998. Landmine Monitor concluded that the government forces, the Senegalese troops supporting the government, and the opposition forces (Military Junta) all used landmines. According to a 1998 UNMAS assessment, the use of mines by both sides in the battle for the capital of Bissau left an estimated 2,000-3,000 mines, "in any case, 8,000 mines seem to be a maximum."193 The UNMAS assessment noted that "it is reported that Junta and government forces as well as the Senegalese contingent have established records of the different minefields."194
In July 1999, a UN Development Program assessment said that "mines are reported to follow a pattern of single rows, with mines spaced one meter apart. A single strand of wire used to be in place marking the edge of the minefield. Experienced deminers indicated that they try to find this wire by prodding in one direction, and know that they are at the minefield when the wire is found." 195 According to UNDP mostly AP mines were found around and between former defensive positions. Some AT mines were found on possible approach routes and roads. Some POMZ mines were also found toward the eastern border but had not been used in the capital.
When the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 was released (September 1999), the Senegalese government denied using mines. The Guinea-Bissau government did not issue a denial at that time.196 However, in its July 1999 assessment, UNDP reported that "all forces flatly deny planting any mines. ECOMOG succeeded in having the various groups pointing out the areas they thought to be mined."197 UNDP also reported that some senior Guinea-Bissau officials "feel that some occupying forces recently planted mines in Bissau. During a press conference on 12 July 1999 the Prime Minister's advisor Iancuba N'Djai announced that efforts would be made to identify culpable parties and bring them to justice as using mines is `a war crime.'"198
Landmine Monitor stands by its report of use of mines by Guinea-Bissau troops in 1998.
The Bissau authorities estimate there could be as many as 20,000 mines in the Bissau area.199 The extent of the problem is known and the vast majority of the minefields are marked and mapped. However, a dispute between the authorities in Bissau and the Senegalese military has resulted in no handing over of maps for mine clearance, delaying efforts to clear the mines. Some limited clearance has taken place; 1,952 AP mines and 143 AT mines have been lifted and destroyed.200 The non-governmental organization Humaid Demining began a mine clearance program in April 1999.201
In 1999 it was apparent that there was no coordinated planning, prioritization and tasking of the clearance efforts. The UNDP has proposed that there should be a national mine action structure and has pledged $150,000 to initiate the coordination mechanism and core team.202 UNDP states that it will provide material support for national capacity-building and concrete demining operations.203 In 2000 the National Commission for Disarmament, Cantonement of Troops and Mine Clearance was given responsibility for mine clearance, with the participation of ECOMOG. The UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) is responsible for raising funds and is meant to run a mine action program, but it is scarcely operational.204 In June 2000 the UN noted that the government "has approved a project document on demining and set up a national institution for demining activities.... The prepatory assistance phase of the demining project is scheduled to begin in July."205
The Guinea-Bissau military states that it has 112 trained and experienced sappers (deminers).206 Most of these were associated with the Humaid Demining. The sappers reported that their Russian-made mine detectors were incapable of detecting C-3A, P-4B and PMN mines; they had therefore adopted prodding. Many of the newly laid mines were Spanish plastic mines impossible to detect with their current mine detectors.207 Humaid also reported 3,000 TM 46 antitank mines in the southeast and 1,900 in the south of the country but this claim cannot be substantiated.208 The UNDP noted in July 1999 that Humaid mine clearance efforts were not up to humanitarian clearance standards and that they needed training.209
A number of donors have come forward to support mine clearance in the country. Portugal pledged $50,000 in 1999 for training deminers.210 UNOGBIS has raised $165,000.211 Germany donated $25,000 in 1999,212 and the U.S. has allocated an estimated $365,000 in 2000, and $500,000 in 2001.213 Canada and individuals such as the former U.S. Ambassador to Bissau, John Blakin, have also been assisting in raising funds for mine clearance.214
UNICEF established a Mine Awareness Committee (COAM), which is made up of various organizations and NGOs and has met bi-weekly since April 1999 to plan and coordinate all mine awareness activities. There are three priority areas: information, training,and logistics. A variety of materials have been produced, such as marking rope, marking triangles, T-shirts, mine awareness posters and comic books, funded by Canada ($20,400). The local radio station has also provided free airtime for awareness messages and RDP (Portuguese radio) has also broadcast mine awareness programs to Bissau.
Andes, a local NGO, was supported by Rädda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) with a consultant in mid-1999 to train trainers for mine awareness, especially targeting teachers. During this period some forty individuals were trained.215 In July 1999, Andes organized a football tournament in Bissau with a mine awareness theme that attracted some 2,500 young people.
Landmine Casualties/Survivor Assistance
Though the number is uncertain, there continue to be mine casualties. Some of these accidents involved people who had returned to their houses in Bissau, or who had begun farming activities in rice and cashew fields. In Bissau, mine marking signs have not always been respected.216 One problem in particular is that red cloth is traditionally used to warn people not to enter an area because it is a private cashew orchard or a traditional ceremony is taking place in the area. A number of mine victims reported that they had believed the mine warning to have been these sort of signs.
Victims of mines, both military and civilian, are treated in hospital, but once discharged are the responsibility of their families. There are two prosthetic facilities in Bissau. One is run by the government, but is not functioning. The other is run by Andes, supported by Handicap International, which provides materials from Senegal. The UNDP reported that the ICRC plans to collect data regarding victims in the hospitals.217
Key developments since March 1999: The Oromo Liberation Front, a rebel group operating in southern Ethiopia, has been accused of planting antitank and possibly antipersonnel mines inside Kenyan territory.
Mine Ban Policy
Kenya signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 December 1997 but has not yet ratified. On 3 May 1999, Kenya's Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sheldon Muchilwa, told the First Meeting of States Parties that "we have almost completed the domestic requirements for ratification of the Convention and will deposit our instrument in the very near future."218 Three weeks later, at the regional launch of Landmine Monitor Report 1999 in Nairobi, a statement from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Bonaya Godana, was read to a public briefing, stating that Kenya's ratification was "at an advanced stage" and that the ratification instruments would be deposited with the United Nations "shortly."219 In October 1999, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told participants at a workshop on ratification hosted by the Attorney-General's office and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that Kenya was formalizing the ratification procedures.220 At the same time, Attorney General Amos Wako stated that the ratification "will be done upon conclusion of the preparatory committee on the elements of crime and rules of procedure, which will be finalized next year."221
In June 2000, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the ratification delay is due to "the long process of getting the concerned Ministries to conclude consultations before a Cabinet paper can be presented to the Cabinet for approval, paving way for appropriate legislation to commence."222 The official said he was "optimistic" this process would see ratification completed in time for the Second Meeting of States Parties.
Kenyan legislators have pledged their support for swift passage of ratification legislation, including Member of Parliament Raila Odinga, who leads the National Development Party and Member of Parliament George Anyona, who leads the Kenya Social Congress, and Member of Parliament, Josephine Odira Sinyo.223
At the First Meeting of States Parties, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Muchilwa stated, "We in Kenya are convinced that a successful implementation of the objectives of the Convention will constitute a significant contribution to international peace and security. We therefore appeal to all states to demonstrate their commitment to the ban by working together in solidarity."224
Kenya participated in the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in September 1999 and the meeting on Victim Assistance in September 1999. Kenya voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on key pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
Kenya is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been vocal on the issue of negotiating a mine export ban in that forum.
Many advocacy activities have been undertaken in the past year by various local and international non-governmental organizations, including by the Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, to advocate rapid ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, and domestic legislation.225 Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomed Landmine Monitor Report 1999 as "an initiative that aims at monitoring the implementation of one of the most important international treaties in the world today."226
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Kenya has not produced or exported landmines. The current size and composition of Kenya's stockpile of antipersonnel mines remains unknown. According to the Attorney General, the issues of transit and transfer and the interpretation of the treaty prohibition "will be adequately dealt with at the legislating stage."227
Ethiopia's Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a rebel group operating in southern Ethiopia, has been accused of planting antitank and possibly antipersonnel mines inside Kenyan territory, in the north of the country.228
In May 1999, two AT mine-related incidents were reported in Moyale district, a key transportation point along Kenya's northern border with Ethiopia.229 On 8 May, a senior Kenyan government official was killed and two of his colleagues seriously injured when their Land Rover hit a landmine near Moyale town.230 On 12 May 1999, a thirteen-ton lorry hit a landmine on the Moyale-Dabel road near Oda, injuring six passengers.231 The North Eastern Provincial Police Officer told Landmine Monitor that bandits suspected to be members of OLF had already planted two antivehicle mines, and were planting an antipersonnel mine, when they were disturbed by Kenyan security personnel.232 The Ethiopian Embassy in Nairobi denied involvement in the planting of the mines along the Marsabit-Moyale highway, saying that it "does not get involved in an internationally outlawed activity like planting mines targeting civilian population, institutions and infrastructure."233
In Bute village in Nana near Moyale where the landmine incidents occurred, the mine explosions caused a lot of anxiety to the local community.234 According to a resident:
This village was saved by donkeys otherwise we could have starved to death. The road to Moyale was closed for one month and even after it was declared safe, few vehicle owners were willing to put their vehicles at risk of being blown-up by landmines. Everything we eat here comes from Moyale. We are used to bandits, the government provides us with armed security escort, but these strange explosives are very deadly, even the escort cannot protect us from them. We are very scared.235
On 22 March 2000, fourteen Kenyan civilians were killed and four injured in two separate incidents when the vehicles they were travelling in were blown up in Dugo, in Ethiopia, two kilometers north of Moyale town. In the first incident, involving a Toyota Hilux pick-up truck, fourteen died and only one passenger survived - a pregnant woman who gave birth to still born twins at the scene.236 Four Kenyan occupants of a lorry heading for Moyale were seriously injured when it ran over a second mine at the same place. Kenya's Eastern Provincial Commissioner, Philomena Koech, told media that the victims were not Kenyan but Ethiopian and that they had already been buried in Ethiopia "where they died and belonged."237 Landmine Monitor has recorded the names and details of those involved in the incidents and confirms that the victims were Kenyan.238
Local police told media that the mines, believed to be detonated by remote control, were planted by militiamen of the Oromo Liberation Front, who infiltrate from Ethiopia.239
Kenya has a historic but limited problem with UXO dating back to World War I and WW II and also from the Mau Mau insurgency in the years running up to independence. More recently, Army maneuvers involving the Kenyan, U.S., and U.K. armed forces have led to a slight increase in the UXO problem in training ranges.240 In Samburu district, the local community reportedly wants to sue the British government over the UXO problems in the area, while a British Embassy spokesman in Nairobi told media that they will study the issue of accepting liability for some UXO fatalities.241
No in-depth assessment or survey has been made of the extent of the mine and UXO problem. In late 1999, KCAL commissioned a preliminary survey of landmines and UXOs in the northern part of Kenya.242
Mine clearance in Kenya is the task of combat engineers of the Kenya Armed Forces, who respond when a UXO or mine is reported.243 In October 1999, the Africa Demining Program (AFRIDEP), an initiative by retired Kenyan military personnel, was registered in Kenya as a commercial demining organization. According to the Programme Chairman, Dr. John M. Atunga, AFRIDEP has all the necessary equipment and technology to undertake demining activities to the highest standards.244
When the mine incidents occurred in Moyale, the Kenyan Army used armour-plated Army lorries to run over the suspected mined areas. Military experts told Landmine Monitor that it was "not necessary to take the more advanced mine clearance equipment to Moyale because of one simple mine. Moving the equipment to and from Moyale would have been expensive. Suffice to say that the military has the capability to demine."245
The military does not conduct mine awareness education. Mine awareness or risk education programmes in Kenya are so far confined to advocacy through the mass media and the workshops hosted by KCAL and other organizations. The Jesuit Refugee Service Eastern Africa (JRS) carries out landmine awareness education for refugees from neighboring countries when the need arises. When UNICEF was asked if it would engage in mine awareness for the communities in Moyale after the mine incidents, the regional representative said that UNICEF "cannot come in at the national level unless we are invited by our local partners. So far this has not happened."246
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Kenya borders with nations currently or recently engaged in conflict where landmines have been used (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and receives refugees, including landmine survivors, from these nations.
Victims from the recent mine incidents were treated at the Moyale District Hospital, the only government hospital in the district. The hospital has a bed capacity of 120 patients and serves people from Ethiopia as well.
There are general hospitals and dispensaries throughout the country and there are occupational therapists, counsellors and psychologists from the Ministry of Health in various hospitals. The Ministry of National Heritage, Culture and Sports sponsors the Kabete Orthopaedic Workshop, which manufactures some orthopaedic appliances and provides them at a subsidized cost. The Association of the Physically Disabled of Kenya hosts workshops on the manufacture of orthopaedic appliances. None of these organizations, however, deal specifically with landmine victims.
SÃO TOMÉ E PRINCIPE
São Tomé e Principe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 April 1998. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the Parliament approved ratification in early 1999, but the President has not yet signed it because of other pressing business.247 São Tomé did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, and did not participate in any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva. São Tomé was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It is believed that São Tomé has never produced or exported AP mines, and according to Luis Maria from the office of the Chief of Staff of the São Toméan Armed Forces, there are no stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the country.248 São Tomé is not mine-affected.
Key developments since March 1999: Despite continued fighting, Sierra Leone is not seriously mine-affected. A bill to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty is currently before the parliament. UNMAS conducted an assessment mission in February 2000 and concluded that there had been very limited use of mines in the past. It recommended establishment of a Mine Action Office, but not a nationwide program of mine and UXO awareness education.
In early May 2000, a fragile peace process in Sierra Leone collapsed after rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of Foday Sankoh took hundreds of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) soldiers hostage and for a short while threatened the capital, Freetown. Fighting between pro-government forces and the RUF has resumed, re-igniting the civil war that began in 1991 and was supposedly ended in July 1999 with the conclusion of a peace accord in Lomé, Togo. In February 1998 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces entered the country and ejected the military government and its allies, who had staged a coup in May 1997. Antipersonnel mines are believed to have been used in this conflict in very limited numbers and the impact of the mine and UXO problem has been described by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as "extremely limited" and consisting more of UXO and booby traps, than AP and AT mines.
Mine Ban Policy
Sierra Leone signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 June 1998. In March 2000, the Minister of Parliamentary and Political Affairs, Abu Aiah Koroma, submitted a bill to the Parliament on ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.249 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Sama Banya, told Landmine Monitor, "There is no doubt that the ratification process currently going through Parliament will soon be concluded. It is a package that will strengthen our implementation of the treaty in our country."250
Sierra Leone voted in support of pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999. It voted for similar UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Sierra Leone did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo and it has not attended the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva, but both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and government officials interviewed by Landmine Monitor stated the government's unflinching support for the treaty.251
Sierra Leone is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
A local NGO, SHARE (Save Heritage And Rehabilitate the Environment) has been active in campaigning for the government to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty and for no mine use in Sierra Leone.252
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Sierra Leone is not known to produce or export antipersonnel mines. It is believed to stockpile AP mines but no details are available on the size, composition, or countries of origin.253 The then-Chief of Defense Staff, Brigadier-General Khobe told the UNMAS assessment mission team that he abhorred the use of landmines and was committed to the destruction of remaining stockpiles.254 The UNMAS assessment mission team was shown a Romanian MAI 75 AP mine that ECOMOG forces claimed to have cleared.255
On 26 January 2000, Lt. Col. T.N. Momodu, a Staff Officer to the Chief of Defense Staff, said that the first Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) casualties due to landmines were in November 1992 when a mine he said was laid by the RUF destroyed a SLA tank in Wordu, Kono.0 He claimed that there were "twenty recorded landmines with the RUF supplied by Liberia." Momodu alleged that the AFRC-RUF junta "embarked on mine warfare in the wake of their rule in 1997 and employed anti-tank and anti-personnel mines as a means of deterring ECOMOG advance toward their position."
In February 2000 UNMAS conducted a seven-day technical assessment mission in Sierra Leone.1 The two-person UNMAS assessment team met with representatives of the government, the warring factions, UNAMSIL, UN agencies, the ICRC, and international and local NGOs and also travelled to Kabala in the north and Kenema and Daru in the east of the country. UNMAS concluded that the warring factions "had relatively little recourse to the use of landmines," both AP and AT.2 It noted, "Nuisance mining took place rather than the laying of protective or barrier mines per se."3 It also noted that while some weapons, such as unexploded mortar shells, hand grenades, and possibly RPGs had been handed in at disarmament sites, no landmines had been handed in.4
The Chief of Defense Staff "seemingly conceded" to UNMAS that a small number of landmines were used but claimed that they were all recorded and subsequently cleared between February and April 1998.5 ECOMOG told the UNMAS assessment mission that other parties to the conflict had used a small number of mines beginning in 1991, and that there had been further AP mine use in the 1997 invasion and retreat, particularly in the Waterloo area.6
The Civil Defense Forces (CDF) "denies having used landmines" but their representatives told UNMAS that CDF members had found 28 landmines in Tonkolili and Moyamba districts in central Sierra Leone, and that seven of these mines had been handed over to ECOMOG.7
The RUF also "denies having used landmines" and "claimed that there are no mines planted in areas under RUF control."8 The leader of the AFRC told UNMAS that "a small number of anti-tank mines were used on the road to Lungi in 1997/8," but claimed that these were subsequently cleared and that no antipersonnel mines had been laid by his forces.9
Since opening its office in Sierra Leone in 1999, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has attempted to verify whether Sierra Leona has a landmine problem. Its overall assessment is that most (if not all) the cases HRW has been able to investigate are a result of either booby traps or unexploded ordnance, not landmines.10 In late 1999 and early 2000, HRW interviewed two cases of combatants injured by "landmines," however eyewitnesses say both were injured by booby traps (a grenade tied between two trees) placed by member of the ex-SLA.11 Both the ICRC and Handicap International told HRW that while they have treated patients injured by booby traps, they don't recall ever having fitted a patient for a limb which was lost due to a landmine explosion.12
While access to all areas of the country was not possible when the UNMAS assessment mission visited, the team determined that Sierra Leone has a "limited" problem with landmines and UXO. While it said information received could not be confirmed, UNMAS listed the following areas as suspected to be mine- or UXO-affected:
Kono district, Kailahun district, the northern part of Moyamba district from Moyamba town, and the southern part of Tonkolili district from Maburaka town, and in Bafodia village.... In addition, a small area of land adjacent to a disused secondary school in Kabala has been identified as highly likely to be affected by either landmines or booby traps.13
UNMAS reports that landmines and UXO were not having any impact on peacekeeping operations, on agencies and organizations involved in aid distribution, on returning refugees and described any socio-economic impact as "extremely limited."14
In his public lecture Lt. Col. Momodu stated that the SLA "endeavoured to keep records and maps of all landmines laid - that included anti-tank and anti-personnel which were demined by joint SLA and ECOMOG engineers."15 The UNMAS Assessment Mission reported that a "limited capacity exists within the armed forces and warring factions to deal safely with uncleared landmines and items of UXO."16 Under the terms of the peace agreement signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Lomé, Togo in July 1999, all warring factions are expected to hand over maps of mined areas or areas containing explosive devises.17 However, at this writing no side had complied to this provision and the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR) process had all but halted after the RUF took hostage some 500 UN peacekeepers in May 2000 and the warring factions again resumed hostilities.
Nine AP landmines were handed over to DDR officials between November l999 and May 2000, when the DDR process broke down.18 These mines, all of which were destroyed in UNAMSIL supervised exercises during March and April 2000, were of Italian and Czech origin. Ten AP mines (believed to be of Chinese-origin) were captured along with hundreds of other arms and ammunition during a UNAMSIL operation to free 220 Indian peacekeepers and 11 unarmed UN military observers from their RUF captors on 15-16 July 2000 in the Kailahun District.19
UNMAS recommended that UNAMSIL prioritize the establishment of a Mine Action Office, which has since been set up, including the establishment of the IMSMA database.20 It recommended that this office coordinate mine action within Sierra Leone, "in particular with regard to mine and UXO survey, detection and clearance, and with respect to necessary mine awareness education for the UNAMSIL peacekeepers."21 As of 5 June 2000, there were 11,350 UNAMSIL troops in the country, including 254 military observers, under Indian command.22
The UNMAS Assessment Mission reported that "it does not appear that a nation-wide programme of mine and UXO awareness education is warranted."23
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
On 23 November 1999, Jariatu Gbla, aged fifteen, had her foot amputated at Connaught Hospital after an explosion in the village of Tonkolili in Mathibo.24 SHARE claims Gbla was the victim of a landmine while the UNMAS Assessment stated that "her injuries suggest that that the device may actually have been an unexploded hand grenade."25 In February 2000, a twelve-year-old boy lost an eye after an explosion at Yams Farm on the outskirts of Freetown. Media reported that "he stepped on a landmine."26 But subsequent investigations by Human Rights Watch indicated that the explosion was not due to a mine, and was more likely caused by "a bullet lodged in the tire."27
During the armed conflict, the health infrastructure of the country saw widespread destruction, including destruction of a reported 70% of the primary health care centers across the country.28 UNMAS noted that surgical care could be provided to landmine and UXO survivors at Kenema Hospital in the east of the country, Connaught Hospital in Freetown, and by the ICRC, MSF-Belgium, MSF-France, and MSF-Holland.29 Prostheses for amputees are manufactured and fitted by HI France and by the U.S.-based NGO Hope International, which also provides physical rehabilitation.30
Key developments since March 1999: Both the government of Sudan, a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty, and the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Army are believed to have used antipersonnel mines in this reporting period. On 27 March 2000, the SPLM/A officially committed to the "Geneva Call," thereby agreeing not to use antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances. Sudan's humanitarian mine action efforts continue to be seriously disrupted by the country's continuing civil war. In November 1999, the U.S. reported that Sudan manufactures landmines; Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this report.
Government Mine Ban Policy
Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified. According to a Ministry of External Relations official, a technical committee has been established to examine ratification.31 In May 1999, a senior government official stated that ratification was "under process."32
In a reply to Landmine Monitor dated 31 July 2000, Sudan stated its "signing of the Convention, despite its security concerns which are well known to all, stems from its deep conviction and its strong belief that humanity should get rid of such dangerous weapons which threaten the lives of innocent population.... The Government of Sudan is committed to the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Convention."33
Sudan attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, with a delegation led by Ambassador Awad M. Hassan, Director-General of the Department of Disarmament of the Ministry of External Relations. In a statement to the plenary, Ambassador Hassan described the problem of uncleared landmines in Sudan and stated that "technical and financial assistance is needed. The resources provided by the UN are obviously not sufficient. Therefore every direct assistance to my country is appreciated and valuable."34
Sudan has participated in the meetings of the Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance in September 1999 and March 2000, the meeting on Victim Assistance in September 1999, the meeting on Technologies for Mine Action in December 1999 and the meeting on General Status and Operation of the Convention in May 2000.
Sudan sponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It had supported similar UNGA resolutions on landmines in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
The Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines actively campaigns for ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty by Sudan, among other activities.35
Sudan is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and it is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
SPLM/A Mine Ban Policy
The main armed opposition group is the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), whose armed forces are known as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The SPLM/A controls a large area of southern and eastern Sudan. On 27 March 2000, at a press conference in Geneva, SPLM/A representative Edward Lino Abyei verbally committed the SPLM/A to the "Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action." The Geneva Call is a Swiss-registered non-governmental body. The deed is officially held by the President of the government of Geneva, who accepted this oral commitment from the SPLM/A. Under the deed, the SPLM/A committed itself not to use antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances. Two other non-state actors signed the deed on that date, which was the launch of the Geneva Call. On 24-25 March 2000, the SPLM/A participated in the International Conference on Non-State Actors, held in Geneva, hosted by the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with a number of other national ban campaigns.
Previously, in 1996, the SPLM/A "declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of landmines provided that there is a significant reciprocation on the side of GOS."36 The SPLM/A also created Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan) in part to address the issue of landmines and UXO in the areas under their control.37
In March 1999, the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A pledged not to use mines, although details on these pledges secured by Olara Otunnu, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, are not available.38
In November 1999, the U.S. Department of State reported that, "Sudan's Military Industry Corporation, which receives technical support from a variety of eastern European and Middle East countries, manufactures ammunition, landmines, and small arms."39 Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this report or to clarify if the alleged production includes antipersonnel mines. This is the first time known to Landmine Monitor that Sudan has been identified as a producer of either AP or AT mines. In its 31 July 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor, the government of Sudan states that "[i]t does not produce landmines." The SPLM/A has not been known to manufacture landmines. The armed forces of both the government of Sudan and SPLM/A have considerable experience in improvisation techniques and are capable of producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are also prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.40
Sudan shares borders with nine African countries, almost all beset by conflict. There have been past allegations that the government transferred AP and AT landmines to rebel groups in neighboring countries, including to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, which has used AT mines on civilian roads, and to the Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army.41 In December 1999, Sudan and Uganda signed a reconciliation agreement under the mediation of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. The two nations agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations and to stop all support to rebel groups based in their territories.42 Nevertheless it appears that both Sudan and Uganda continue to support rebel groups with arms.
Both the government's military and the SPLA are believed to have stockpiled AP mines, but details on the size, location or types of mines are unknown. AP mines from Belgium, China, Egypt, Israel, Italy, United States and former Soviet Union have been identified in Sudan.43 In July 1999, an assessment of Kassala in eastern Sudan and Malakal in the Upper Nile also found AP mines from Iran and Iraq.44 No AP mine destruction is known to have taken place by either the government of Sudan or the SPLA.
Over the past forty-four years since independence Sudan has witnessed relative peace for only the eleven years between 1972 and 1983. Nearly two million may have been killed, four million internally displaced and at least 350,000 people have fled to neighboring countries.45 The war in Sudan is primarily concentrated in the southern region, but in 1989 it reached the Nuba Mountains and in 1995 the civil war expanded to eastern Sudan. In contested areas of south Sudan, the government controls some towns while the surrounding countryside is dominated by insurgent forces and in some cases by government tribal militias. "In this type of warfare," an August 1997 UN report stated, "the government uses landmines to protect the garrison towns, and to interdict the movement of insurgent supplies and forces. The rebels also use landmines to fix government forces in the towns, and to interdict their supply lines. Both sides also reportedly continue to use landmines to terrorize local populations to diminish their support for the other side."46
The war in southern Sudan intensified in 1999, and it appears that both the government and the SPLA have continued to use antipersonnel mines. Human Rights Watch undertook a field mission to Sudan in mid-1999. Based on testimony from the local population, Human Rights Watch believes that the government has used antipersonnel mines, largely in its efforts to control the oil fields in southern Sudan.47 Witnesses to landmine explosions said that the government laid antipersonnel mines in and around Ler and Adok in Western Upper Nile, contested oil areas.48 In one witnessed incident, an antipersonnel mine triggered an attached antitank mine, killing three rebel combatants at once, outside a government barracks in Ler in early July 1999. Others have reported this government practice of attaching AT to AP land mines for greater lethality.
Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not been ratified by Sudan, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty...." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.
Government officials, including the State Minister of Foreign Relations, Mr. Ali Numeri, continue to state that the government of Sudan does not use AP mines.49 This was repeated in the 31 July 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor: "It does not produce landmines, nor use it. The statistics have shown that the rebel movement is the party which has used and continues to use landmines in the southern and eastern part of the country...."
In early 1999, the SPLA laid both antipersonnel and antitank mines in Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria, an area under SPLA control close to the Ugandan border. An SPLA officer and locals told Landmine Monitor researchers that 2,500 landmines were planted in Muleny, Natagumi and Lopitac triangle; 150 landmines were planted in the banana and orchard plantation in the valley behind Chukudum Catholic Mission up to Komiri Hill; and 1,000 were planted behind Chukudum Hospital to Nangoromitto and behind SPLA barracks. When presented with these figures, OSIL-Sudan Managing Director Aleu Ayiney Aleu stated that "only 160" landmines were planted in Chukudum by the SPLA.50
The area did not suffer from landmines until 1999 when area residents fell out with the town's SPLA commander. Chukudum town is now encircled with minefields, which observers state are aimed at preventing civilians from returning to the town. Civilians fled to the mountains to avoid SPLA shelling of the town and fighting between the Bor Dinka in SPLA units and armed local residents of the Didinga tribe. The Chukudum Landmines Project reports that through May 2000, thirty-seven people died and fourteen were injured by landmines.51
In February 2000, a shepherd was killed and nine others injured in a landmine blast when they were driving their herds in Bahr-el-Arab region, in south Darfur in southwest Sudan. According to people in the region, the SPLA was responsible for laying mines in the area in 1999. They claim some 160 mines were laid, which in 1999 killed eleven people and injured five others.52
On 16 January 2000, the Ugandan army and police reportedly captured two SPLA commanders in Arua town in northwestern Uganda in a raid that had been prompted by finding two antipersonnel mines in an Arua township villages two weeks earlier.53
In 1995, the armed opposition umbrella group, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) opened a new front in Eastern Sudan.54 Both AP and AT mines have been used on this front. In March 2000, NDA forces seized Sudan's Hamaskhorab district near the town of Kassala. The mayor of Kassala town, Ibrahim Mohamoud Hamid, claimed that the opposition based in Eritrea planted landmines.55 Between 1996 and the first half of 1999, 122 mine incidents were recorded around Kassala, involving 327 victims including forty-two fatalities.56 In May 1999 three persons were killed and eight injured by mines allegedly planted by the NDA north of Kassala town. The spokesperson for the government's armed forces in the region, Lt. General Muhammad Yasin, condemned the use of landmines and said his forces had cleared other mines with no losses.57 In May 2000 an Eritrean refugee fleeing the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war was reported killed by an AP mine on the Sudan side of the border.58
According to the Beja Relief Organization (the relief wing of the armed opposition Beja Congress, a member of the NDA), truckers on the border report that all roads inside Sudan to Eritrea are heavily mined except one road to Germaika, a village on the Eritrean side of the border. There are no warning signs on the mined roads, but the Sudanese military warn truckers and directs them onto this one road. The Beja Congress claims not to have or to use landmines.59
Landmine Problem/Survey and Assessment
The southern regions of Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal, and Upper Nile, the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan in central Sudan, and the eastern region, where there has been fighting since 1995, are all mine-affected. Most roads in the southern region are mined, and areas around towns such as Yei, Juba, Torit, Kapoeta and the Ugandan border town of Kaya, are reported mined.60
In the recent years, several assessment have been made of the mine problem in Sudan but no comprehensive assessment or survey is planned, similar to the Level One Impact Surveys currently underway in other countries. The former United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs Mine Clearance and Policy Unit made an assessment mission in 1997 at the request of the government of Sudan.61 Landmines were included in an August 1998 report by the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Conflict.62 Also in 1998, Rädda Barnen, UNICEF, Oxfam U.K. and the Sudanese Development Association made an assessment of the landmine problem in Kassala.63 In 1999, Dr. Hussein El-Obeid, of the government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) made an assessment of the mine problem in Kassala.64 In July 1999, Rae McGrath made a technical assessment of the landmine situation in Kassala and Malakal with photographer John Rodsted.65 Finally, in 1998 a fifth year medical student at the Medicine University of Khartoum conducted research into the socio-economic impact of mines in Sudan, which included case studies of seventy mine victims who are patients of the National Center for Prostheses and Orthoses (NAPCO).
Mine action efforts in government-controlled areas are carried out by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). The Sudanese Army is responsible for mine clearance. A mine action plan has been drawn up, but implementation is hindered by lack of resources and funding.66 The government of Sudan continues to call for assistance in mine clearance, both technical and financial.67
The International Partner's Forum of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IPF-IGAD) has planned a mine action component for post-war rehabilitation and development programs in the Sudan.68 The IPF is a group of donors that work closely with the Horn of Africa regional development organization, IGAD, which since 1994 has hosted peace negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M.
The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, SRRA, (the relief wing of the SPLA), created OSIL-Sudan in November 1996 to deal with the problems of landmines.69 OSIL-Sudan, supported by a consortium of international and non-governmental organizations, started a mine action program in September 1997. 70 In a March 2000 presentation, OSIL-Sudan's Managing Director, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, stated that OSIL now has four integrated mine action teams of 45 persons (one-third of whom are women) and expects to expand to 11 teams by April 2001.71 Between September 1997 and April 2000 OSIL reports that it has removed 1,815 antipersonnel mines, 196 antitank mines, 76,408 UXOs, and cleared 527 miles of road and 2.2 square kilometers of land.72 Aleu states that "we have destroyed every single mine we have found."73
The UK-based NGO Mines Advisory Group provided initial training, capacity building, and equipping of OSIL teams at the end of 1998. MAG conducted a further capacity and needs assessment in April 2000, and from mid-2000 MAG will provide additional training and capacity building to OSIL. This training will include mine clearance, mine awareness, community liaison and management techniques. Two existing and four new OSIL mine clearance teams and four mine awareness teams will be trained. This US$120,000 project is funded through Basel Mission with funds from the government of Switzerland.74
In government of Sudan-controlled areas, mine awareness programs are the responsibility of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC). Organizations in the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines are also active in mine awareness activities. These include the Sudanese Red Crescent Society and those grouped under the umbrella of the government-run agency, the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA). The government of Sudan has also established the Disaster Management and Refugee Studies Institute (DIMARSI) to train trainers on mine awareness in conflict zones in Sudan.
A pilot project has been funded by Rädda Barnen (Sweden), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), OXFAM, and UNICEF aimed at training trainers in child-to-child mine awareness education in the east of Kassala. With total funding of US$75,000, members of the Sudan Red Crescent Society provide child-to-child mine awareness training and promote ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty.75
In southern Sudan, OSIL-Sudan with assistance from UNICEF and other humanitarian organizations conducts mine risk education activities in conflict zones in the Sudan.76 The OSIL program focuses on children and returning refugees and targets approximately 300,000 residents in mine-risk areas.
Landmine victim statistics are not systematically collected. The Ministry of Foreign Affaits contends that 70,000 people have been killed or injured by landmines.77 This number has not been verified. The ICRC has reported 5,000 amputees registered in their hospitals.78 Sudan's large size and poor infrastructure place mine victims at extreme risk. Most victims die before reaching health care facilities, which may account for the relatively small number of amputees registered at the various centers.79
Landmine Survivor Assistance
Sudan is a huge country with poor infrastructure. Mine victims are most often from rural areas many hundreds of miles from the nearest treatment center. In addition, in southern Sudan, the most affected area, there are very few facilities that can take care of the victims.
The government of Sudan provides its military personnel with medical care. Civilian medical facilities and hospitals in government-controlled areas usually lack basic equipment, staff and resources. Satellite workshops in southern Sudan government-controlled towns of Juba and Wau assemble the prosthetic devices, fit them and provide physical therapy for civilians. In Khartoum, there is a national prosthetics and orthopedics center run by the Ministry of Social Planning and the Sudanese Armed Forces, with the support of the ICRC. The center provides assistance to civilian and military war victims, including landmine casualties. There is also a small prosthetics workshop in Kassala run by the Sudanese Disabled Care and Rehabilitation Society.
In August 1998, the government of Sudan provided 2 million Sudanese Dinars (around US$8,000) for mine victims, distributed by $200 to the family of a deceased, $120 to the family of a totally disabled person and $100 to the family of a partially disabled victim.80
Between January and September 1999, the ICRC manufactured 357 prostheses and 56 orthoses at the National Center for Prostheses and Orthoses in Khartoum and at the prosthetic/orthotic workshop in Lopiding hospital.81
Basic infrastructure and public services in southern Sudan are practically non-existent. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) operates four hospitals in SPLA-held southern Sudan. The hospital in Yei, which treats landmine victims, has been deliberately targeted by government planes, which bombed it twelve times in 1998, and five times in 1999, inflicting substantial damage to the operating theater and maternity ward and forced the hospital to close temporarily. NPA also runs emergency mobile units.
Medicins Sans Frontiers Holland operates a hospital in Kajo Keiji on the Sudan side of the border with Uganda that treats landmine victims. The ICRC maintains an important hospital to treat patients, including many mine victims, in Lopiding, Kenya. The facility serves those injured in southern Sudan, both combatants and civilians. It also serves Kenyans with grave medical conditions. The Sudan Evangelical Mission (SEM) has attempted to provide prosthetic support by bringing technicians from Nairobi-based Jaipur Foot Project to Southern Sudan to assess the needs of amputees.82
In 1999, the SPLM demanded that NGOs working in areas under SPLA control sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the SPLM. Eleven humanitarian organizations, including MSF refused to sign the SPLM document and were forced to withdraw from SPLA areas by 1 March 2000. Five of the non-signatories have since acceded to the MoU and begun the return process.
Psychological and social support facilities for mine victims are inadequate, if available, in southern Sudan. Some counseling and social support services are available at the ICRC-supported facilities at Lochichogio and at the UNHCR refugee camp at Kakuma, Kenya managed by the Lutheran World Federation and the International Rescue Committee. The Church Ecumenical Action in South Sudan assists in rehabilitation efforts in southern Sudan focusing on self-sufficiency to improve the livelihood of the most vulnerable people.83
Key developments since March 1999: On 17 July 2000 the National Assembly passed a bill to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. Among the tens of thousands of refugees arriving in Tanzania are an increasing number of mine victims.
Mine Ban Policy
The United Republic of Tanzania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. On 17 July 2000 the National Assembly passed a bill to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. The process and timetable for completing the ratification process and formally submitting the instrument of ratification to the UN is not known.
Tanzania participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by the High Commissioner to Mozambique, H.E. Lt. Gen. Martin N. Mwakalindile. Tanzania did not attend any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. The country has, however, been active in sub-regional meetings on small arms and light weapons, which have included landmines in their deliberations.84 In December 1999 Tanzania voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Tanzania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament. The Tanzania Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) actively lobbies for swift ratification of the ban treaty, urges mine action assistance, and monitors treaty implementation.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
Tanzania does not manufacture landmines and is not believed to transfer them. There are concerns about Tanzania being used as a transit point for arms shipments that could include landmines. Tanzania is one of just four signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty that have not publicly stated whether or not they have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has repeatedly asked for this information. Tanzanian Armed Forces used landmines in Uganda in 1979 and in Mozambique in 1986-1988.85
To date, Tanzania has not been considered heavily affected by antipersonnel landmines. However, the west of the country has seen a significant number of mine-affected refugees fleeing from DR Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. By the end of September 1999, Tanzania was sheltering some 276,000 Burundian, 100,000 Congolese, and 20,000 Rwandan refugees.86
Tanzania's main link to the landmine problem is the refugee population in the Kigoma area, where several camps host refugees from Rwanda and Burundi. Refugees arriving in Tanzania have been maimed or injured by mines. (See especially Landmine Monitor Report 2000-Burundi).
Data collected from Maweni hospital shows that thirty-eight refugees injured by explosions, including landmines, were treated at the hospital since 1997, including thirteen since March 1999.87 Landmine Monitor was also informed that there were ten cases of landmine explosions involving civilians in various areas of Kagera region in the northwest.88 In September 1999, a boy named Samuel Elikana was killed by a mine while grazing cattle on the border in Ngara district in the northwest. It is believed the landmine was planted by fighting parties in Burundi.89
No survey or assessment has been conducted on the mine/UXO problem in Tanzania and there are currently no mine clearance or mine awareness education programs underway. UNICEF and UNHCR are the main players in humanitarian mine action in the western part of the country. The International Committee of the Red Cross has donated basic medical and surgical materials to Kigoma Regional Hospital.90
No compensation is given to local people affected by landmines. Those injured are treated at Maweni hospital and provided with other assistance under the support of international bodies through the government. Some laws and policies exist in Tanzania to support people with disabilities, including those affected by landmines. Mine victims are normally taken to disabled centers.
Key developments since March 1999: Zambia has established an inter-ministerial National Task Force for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Zambia has told the UN that is has just a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for military training purposes only. A number of AP landmines appear to have been planted inside Zambia in 1999 and 2000 by Angolan government and UNITA rebel forces. In May-June 2000, the UN Mine Action Service conducted an assessment mission in Zambia.
Mine Ban Policy
Zambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 December 1997 but has not yet ratified it. The government is in the process of ratification. A memorandum has been drafted which must be presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cabinet for its approval. Foreign Minister Keli Walubita has apparently not made this a priority.91 The Canadian Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa David Kilgour met Zambia's Home Affairs Minister Peter Machungwa in Lusaka on 14 July 2000 and was told that Zambia had not ratified because of bureaucratic delays.92 The Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines has also obtained the same response.93
Zambia participated as a signatory state in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999. Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Valentine Kayope said the treaty "stands as a monument to all landmine victims and the millions who live each day in fear of these weapons.... For the Ottawa Convention to be fully effective, all countries must stop producing landmines and embrace the Convention. There is therefore an urgent need for the universalization of the Ottawa Convention.... For us in Africa...landmine use is prevalent for the simple reason that it is cheap and deadly.... The battle, therefore is to make the Ottawa Convention banning landmines fully effective not just in intention, but also in implementation."94
Zambia has attended all of the treaty intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts. At the March 2000 meeting on Mine Clearance in Geneva, Zambia issued a statement saying that "there is overwhelming political will to support" the treaty.95 Zambia in December 1999 voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The government of Zambia has established an inter-ministerial National Task Force for the implementation of the MBT. The Task Force is headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.96 It has been set up to among other things to conduct a preliminary survey of all the mine-affected areas around the country.97
Zambia is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Zambia is not a known producer or exporter of mines. Zambia has told the UN that is has just a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for military training purposes only.98
A number of AP landmines appear to have been planted inside Zambia in 1999 and 2000 by Angolan government and UNITA rebel forces. Landmine Monitor interviewed Angolan soldiers who admitted to laying AP mines on Zambian soil in 2000 in order to stop UNITA rebels from obtaining access to suspected rear bases.99 There have also been reports that UNITA rebels have laid some landmines in Cahvuma district to depopulate the border areas in order that their activities are not witnessed and to avoid being followed by the Zambian security forces.100
Landmines have been laid in Zambia since the 1970s and Zambia has a limited landmine problem in six of Zambia's nine provinces: Western, North-Western, Lusaka, Central, Eastern, and Southern. Deputy Foreign Minister Kayope, upon receiving a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Assessment Team, stated that more than 2,500 kilometers of countryside are mine-affected. He also said that the extent of the problem is not fully known because the "devices were planted randomly in what is termed as `a nuisance pattern' at various border areas."101 According to the Zambian government most of the landmines planted in Zambia are TM46 AT and M14 AP landmines.102 However, a U.S. military intelligence report states that 30 types of AP mine from ten nations have been found in Zambia.103
In May-June 2000, UNMAS visited Zambia for ten days to ascertain the extent of the landmine problem.104 The team had completed a draft report that concludes that although there is a mine problem in Zambia its humanitarian impact is limited and the immediate priority is to invest in mine awareness programs.105 UNMAS found that mines and UXO have hampered the progress of two development projects, the Power Rehabilitation Project in Southern Province and the Wetland/Grand Farm located north of Lusaka.106
The U.S. humanitarian demining program authorized an assessment visit to Zambia in March 2000.107
Fieldwork in Chiawa by the Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1998 established that landmines and UXO continued to be a problem. In the early 1980s AP mines claimed 125 civilians alone and a Japanese-sponsored water project had to be discontinued because of the mines. People in the area have lost their livestock and as the population grows, the safe land area to accommodate the population is getting smaller.108 This is not the only area where this is a problem. People in the border area between the Gwembe valley and Luangwa (several hundred kilometers) cannot do any large-scale farming for fear of landmines. Construction of schools and health centers has also been affected.109
In May 1999 an antitank mine destroyed a vehicle killing a World Bank consultant, Denis Berejena, and critically injured two people, including Sinazongwe District Council secretary Patson Chazebuka on Bottom Road in southern province; the other person injured was Walter Illi, a Kenyan national working for Interconsult. Berejena and his team were on an inspection tour of the World Bank-funded Gwembe Tonga Development Project aimed at alleviating the suffering of the people who were displaced when the Kariba dam was constructed. The road was known to have been mined during the 1970s.110 The week following this incident five more landmines were cleared in Sinazongwe. This incident drew media attention to Zambia's landmine problem and forced the government to send out bomb disposal experts to comb the area.111 The project was then suspended pending a comprehensive demining program of the area.112 By July 2000 no comprehensive survey and clearance work had commenced and the project remained suspended.
Zambian Army Engineers have been clearing mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on an ad hoc basis since the 1970s. Mine clearance has also been conducted by an eleven-person strong Bomb Disposal Unit under the Ministry of Home Affairs. This unit has received U.S. training.113 The local Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) offices have cleared over 800 landmines and UXO from 1970 to date.114 However, many more are still lying undetected due to financial constraints. A survey by Zambia Army personnel in Mufumbwe district in 1999 discovered eight landmines.115
The government has stated that although human resources are available, "there is no appropriate equipment to undertake effective mine clearance operations.... Zambia needs modern motorized landmine/UXO clearing equipment. In addition, specialised training is required for all those involved in landmine clearance."116
Several commercial demining firms such as Zimbabwe's Mine-Tech and South Africa's GRZ have sent teams to Zambia to assess the commercial viability of clearing landmines.117
Mine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
The Zambia Red Cross estimates that some 10,000 people in Zambia have fallen victim to mines and UXO.118 A preliminary survey by the National Task Force indicates a much more conservative estimate: since 1973 some 102 people have fallen victim to mines and UXO, including twenty-one in 1999 and three so far in 2000.119
Zambia has no elaborate victim support program. The government notes, "Very little assistance is available to most landmine victims since most accidents take place in remote areas where medical facilities are not available."120
There are three or four orthoprosthetic workshops in Zambia, chief of which is at the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka. All centers have all benefited from ICRC support. The UTH facility fitted 170 prosthetic devices in 1999. The workshop is very well equipped and stocked.
In addition, Zambia has a well-organised base of disabled people's organisations, under the umbrella of the Zambian Federation for Disability (ZAFOD) which has six member organisations. The Zambian National Association for the Physically Handicapped (ZNADPH) and the Zambian National Association for Disabled Women (ZNADWO) both cater for the needs of the mobility disabled, and both have branches throughout the country. The latter has 600 members, but ZNAPH has some 12,000 members. These are self-help organisations that give important support to disabled people.
Under the Persons with Disabilities Act (No 33 of 1996) the Zambian Agency for Persons with Disabilities (ZAPWD) was established. However, it only came into operation in September 1999. It has a wide-ranging role, with powers to gather statistics, register disabled people, plan and deliver services, raise awareness and act as an advocate for disabled people. There is much to be done before it fulfils these roles.
253 Inter Press Service, 19 May 1999.
254 Human Rights Watch interview, Luanda, 17 December 1999.
255 INAROEE website at: www.landmine.org/inaroee, date read 6 June 2000.
0 Manual da Conceicao, "Angola: Parliament ratifies Ottawa Convention on prohibition of landmines," Telivisáo Publica de Angola, Luanda, in Portuguese 1930 GMT 25 July 2000, BBC Monitoring, 26 July 2000.
1 Translation from Portuguese to English provided by the ICBL Coordinator. Statement by Vice Minister of External Relations, Toko Serrão, to the National Assembly, 25 July 2000.
2 Translation from Portuguese to English provided by the ICBL Coordinator. Statement by Vice Minister of External Relations, Toko Serrão, to the National Assembly, 25 July 2000.
3 Panafrican News Agency, 1 March 2000.
4 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), mine action NGO, on its website at: www.angola.npaid.org/minelist_complete_angola.htm, seen on 15 May 2000.
5 This is according to NPA. On its website, INAROEE lists the most commonly found AP mine types in Angola as from Italy, China, the former Soviet Union, Germany, and Romania. However, its director Gen. Eugénio da Silva Helder Cruz blamed the U.S., Russia, and South Africa as the countries responsible for mining Angola. "They are the ones who should give the most funds for demining. South Africa has a big responsibility." Interview, Luanda, 16 May 2000.
6 Interview with HALO Trust, Huambo, 18 May 2000.
7 Human Rights Watch interview with Angolan military official, Luanda, December 1999. Some of these mines were South African manufactured claymores.
8 Text of report on Angolan TV on 10 June, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 June 2000.
9 Document "Nota O8 DGM 0103," seen by Human Rights Watch.
10 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 113-114.
11 Human Rights Watch interview, June 2000.
12 UNITA has been blamed for the laying of these mines. The rebels have denied this and have called for an international inquiry. See, Post (Lusaka), 14 April, 2000.
13 NPA email to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000.
14 Reuters, 26 November 1999.
15 "Namibia: Angolans face terror charge," IRIN, 24 May 2000; journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes obtained similar accounts from local residents, interview, 6 June 2000; Publico (Lisbon), 10 May 2000.
16 Namibian Police, "Report on Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents: Kavango Region, January - April 2000," 10 April 2000.
17 "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolivmento Sócio Económico Angola," INAROEE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000.
18 In an incident on 12 May 2000, a HALO armored land rover drove over an antitank mine in Huambo province, at Liandambi, injuring three people. Local people said the mine had been laid by the FAA in December 1998. (Interview with HALO Trust, Huambo, 18 May 2000.) Either the current military forces did not know about the mines in the area, which would indicate that all mines are not mapped and lifted, or the military did know and failed to warn HALO. NPA has noted that there are instances of areas mined in the evening and demined the following morning. But this too can result in accidents if the soldiers forget where the mines are laid or oversleep. Such an incident occurred at a military position near Malanje in late June 2000. (NPA email to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000.)
19 Interview with Gen. Eugenio da Silva Helder Cruz, Director, INAROEE, Luanda, 16 May 2000.
20 E-mail communication from NPA, 7 July 2000.
21 Human Rights Watch interview, Angola, 16 December 1999; information also provided by an NGO involved in mine clearance in Angola.
22 Save the Children, War Brought Us Here: protecting children displaced within their own countries by conflict, (London: SCF-UK, May 2000) p. 37.
23 Reuters, 26 November 1999.
24 Angop, 24 April 2000. HALO Trust reports from its work in Huambo and Bie a dramatic increase in AT mines cleared from nineteen in 1998 to ninety-eight in 1999. By April 2000 they had cleared thirteen AT mines.
25 "Angola's UNITA Rebels Say They Will Go on Harassing Namibian Civilians," Republikein (Nambiain Newspaper), BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2000.
26 "Angola: New concerns as fighting rages along southern border," IRIN, 22 December 1999; "Sergeant killed in UNITA attack," The Namibian, 22 December 1999; "Civilian killings spark concern," The Namibian, 22 December 1999; "Unita 80 percent destroyed, says Angolan army chief," The Namibian, 21 December 1999; "Angolan fighting spread into Namibia," The Independent Online, 20 December 1999.
27 Information provided by HALO Trust, 18 May 2000.
28 Email from Santa Barbara Director Norbert Rossa, 7 June 2000.
29 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis, September 1998, p. 19. The report also notes that HALO Trust estimated the number to be 500,000 in 1997.
30 "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolivmento Sócio Económico. Angola," INAROEE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000. Updated figures provided by UNOPS Luanda, 21 June 2000.
31 INAROEE website at: www.landmine.org/inaroee.
32 The generally accepted notion that funding decreased significantly from 1998 to 1999 is incongruously not borne out by the reporting coming from donors. For the ten major donors reporting to the UNMAS Mine Action Investment Database, combined funding increased significantly from 1998 to 1999: from $9 million to $12.6 million. Two governments stopped contributing, Australia and Belgium (combined $890,000 in 1998), but two governments also made contributions for the first time, Denmark and Ireland (combined $1.516 million in 1999). The EU, U.S., Norway, and Canada all increased funding from 1998 to 1999; only Germany reported decreasing funds. The UK had not provided since 1995. Some donors to mine action in Angola have not reported to this database, including Sweden, Netherlands, Japan, and Italy. Mine Action Investment Database, accessed through UNMAS website on 28 July 2000. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/.
33 INAROEE website at: www.landmine.org/inaroee.
34 Handicap International et al, "Funding for Humanitarian Mine Action must not be dependent on Landmines Convention status of mine-affected countries," March 2000.
35 A number of operators have complained that Italy dictates what is cleared and does not provide funds for overhead.
36 "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolivmento Sócio Económico. Angola," INAROEE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000. Updated figures provided by UNOPS Luanda, 21 June 2000.
37 These UNOPS figures are contradicted by INAROEE's web site, which states that 2.4 square kilometers of high priority areas and 4,429 km of road had been cleared, removing 17,000 landmines, and that 6,000 minefields have been identified since 1995.
38 "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolivmento Sócio Económico. Angola," INAROEE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000.
39 In 1999 UNDP sought to raise $1.2 million for INAROREE.
40 Helder Cruz blamed UNOPS for this, saying that between 1997 and 1999 UNOPS took equipment back from the provinces, stopping his brigades from working. Interview, Luanda, 16 May 2000.
41 Helder Cruz, "Mine Clearance in Conflict Zones," paper presented at The Road Forward: Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Southern Africa conference, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 7-8 June 2000.
42 Ibid. The handing over of responsibility for humanitarian demining to the NGOs was announced by Gen. Cruz on 22 June 2000. See, Jornal de Angola, 23 June 2000.
43 Correct as of mid-June 2000.
44 UNDP, "Mine Action Update, Country and Global Programs," 17 November 1999.
45 Angola News, no.66, March 2000.
46 Helder Cruz, "Mine Clearance in Conflict Zones," 7-8 June 2000.
47 In the past the government has been worse, in 1997, 1998 and 1999 the government did not appear to support INAROEE.
48 South African Press Association (SAPA), 9 June 2000.
49 Helder Cruz, "Mine Clearance in Conflict Zones," 7-8 June 2000.
50 Saracen was originally linked to the private military company Executive Outcomes, which announced it had disbanded on 1 January 1999.
51 BRZ International, "Humanitarian Mine Clearance Profile," Document: BRZ 302; Doc Edition: B, p. 14.
52 Norwegian People's Aid website at: www.angola.npaid.org; interview with Harvad Hosknes, Luanda, 5 June 2000.
53 Up to twenty shells per day had been coming into Malanje, and some 10 percent of these did not explode on impact. In the period May to October, the NPA survey team deactivated 114 UXOs.
54 Kristian Berg Harpviken, "A community Study of Landmines and Humanitarian Demining: Cassua, Kwanza Norte, Angola," Landmine Memo no.7, International Peace Research Institute, March 2000.
55 Angop, 16 May 2000.
56 Interview with Harvad Hosknes, Luanda, 5 June 2000.
57 HALO was dealing with junior troops during this period and believes that this "good behavior" was a result of over-optimism that the war was over.
58 Angop, 16 May 2000.
59 WFP Report No. 04 of 2000, 27 January 2000.
60 Angop, 9 July 1999.
61 Jornal de Angola, 15 July 1999.
62 Greenfields was taken over by a German commercial firm in 1999 and renamed European Landmine Solutions. They claim that since 1995 they have released over 6,000 hectares of land and cleared more than 3,000 mines and 70,000 major items ordnance. When Human Rights Watch contacted ELS, Rody Skidmore on 15 May 2000 refused to even acknowledge that Care had been their client although this information is posted on the Care and INAROEE web sites.
63 Care website at: www.care/.../land_mines/lm_landmines0903.html, "Land Mines Continue to Threaten the Life and Limbs of the People of Angola," 3 September 1999. However, data provided by Care in a 30 June 2000 e-mail to the Landmine Monitor states that thirty-two mines were found and destroyed in this project and that 3,906.5 sq.m. of land was cleared.
64 MgM website at: www.MgM.org; interview with MgM project manager Kenneth O'Connell, Luanda, May 2000.
65 MgM on 30 May 2000 announced on the MgM Deming Network that it would distribute a Spanish version of the DC Comic "Superman" in Cunene to test its suitability as a mine awareness tool. Member organizations of the ICBL e-mailed MgM on 1 June 2000 questioning the cultural suitability of this comic.
66 Santa Barbara website at: www.stiftung-sankt-barbara.de; email from Santa Barbara manager Norbert Rossa, 6 June 2000.
67 HMD website at: www.hmdresponse.org/Programs/angola.html; interview with program manager Kate Stanley, London, 7 June 2000.
68 INTERSOS website at: www.intersos.org. The project has received funding for two phases, $936,000 from EU-DG Dev followed by a second phase of $655,000 funded jointly by EU-DG Dev and the Italian government.
69 GAC in Huambo and Kuito, Clube de Jovens in Huila province, Trindade Ninho de Infançia in Bengo province and Grupo Julo nationwide.
70 This included 2,016 men, 2,551 women, and 6,812 children, over fifty per cent during relative peace and proportionately more children.
71 Information provided by IDRC in May 2000. They are funding a survey of the humanitarian impact of mine action during conflict in Angola by the Angola-Instituto de Pesquisas (AIP). AIP will also produce a study, "A Preliminary Evaluation of Mine Clearance in Angola 1992 - 1999."
73 International Committee of the Red Cross, "Fact Sheet: ICRC in Angola," 26 January 2000.
74 Medico International on 24 March 2000 wrote to the provincial authorities it was closing its mine awareness program due to lack of funds. Medico hopes to raise funds for further work in a joint application with MAG. See, www.medico.de, and, Angola: Annaherungen. Das gemeiwesenorientierte Rehabilitationzentrum von Luena, (Frankfurt: Medico International, no date).
75 NPA website at: www.angola.npaid.org.
76 Information provided by ICRC, May 2000.
77 "Note Program Handicap International - section France Angola," 15 June 2000. This project is funded by the Italian government (see table above).
78 "Programa Nacional De Acção Humanitária Contra As Minas Em Apoio A Reabilitação E Desenvolivmento Sócio Económico, Angola," INAROEE & UNDP/UNOPS, March 2000.
79 Ibid. This is not only due to renewed war but also a reflection of better reporting systems at INAROEE.
80 Reuters, 26 November, 1999.
81 List of victims provided by the Jesuit Refugee Service, 14 April 2000.
82 "Assunto: Novo campo de Sangondo," Luena, 4 April 2000.
83 Governo da Provincia do Moxico, "Conclusoes Finais," Luena, 7 April 2000.
84 Africa Analysis, no.346, 5 May 2000.
85 Angop, 26 May 2000.
86 ICRC website at: www.icrc.org, "ICRC News 00/07," 2 March 2000.
87 ICRC Update No. 00/1, "Economic Security Programs in Angola," 26 January 2000.
88 "ICRC News 00/13," 13 April 2000.
89 Veterans International website at: www.vvaf.org.
90 Information provided by VVAF's program manager, Washington DC, 15 June 2000.
91 INTERSOS website at: www.intersos.org. The funding is $936,000 from the EU DG Dev for start up and a second sum of $280,000 split between the EU and the Italian government.
92 Letter from Jonas Niyungeko, Burundi Ambassador to Belgium, to Landmine Monitor, 2 March 2000.
93 Interview, Amb. Jonathas Niyungeko, Brussels, 12 February 1999.
94 Pierre Hublet, "Mission Report in Burundi from the 23rd January to the 1st February 1999," Handicap International Belgique, 1998, p. 3-4.
95 United Nations Mine Action Service, Joint Assessment Mission Report, 27 August 1998, p. 10.
96 Ibid., pp. 6, 10.
97 Ibid., p. 6.
98 Human Rights Watch interview with UN Security Officer, Bujumbura, 15 January 1999.
99 Human Rights Watch interview with local aid worker in Musagara, 15 May 1999.
100 Human Rights Watch interview with local aid worker in Kigoma, 15 May 1999.
101 Human Rights Watch interview with local aid worker in Kigoma, 14 May 1999.
102 "Burundi Refugee flow slows, landmines pose threat," Reuters, 17 February 2000, reported in Refugees Daily, 17 February 2000. The article is quoting Vincent Parker, UNHRC spokesperson, in Tanzania. The number of refugees crossing the border into Tanzania peaked in January 2000 at 23,000, but had dropped to 1,126 by May 2000. UNHCR Press Briefing Note, 4 May 2000; Refugees Daily, "Thousands Displaced but Few Leaving," 5 May 2000.
103 "UN says Mines Cause big drop in Refugees to Tanzania," Associated Press, 24 March 2000, reported in Refugees Daily, 24 March 2000. See also, UNHCR Press Briefing Note, "Burundi/Tanzania: Border Area Mined," 24 March 2000.
104 See for example, "Landmines In Use On Burundi-Tanzania Border?" Guardian (Dar es Salaam) 28 March 2000, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 28 March 2000; and Tanzania Heko Newspaper, 13-19 April 2000, interview with Leone Ndabagaye, Head of Foreign Unit.
105 UNHCR Press Briefing Note, "Tanzania: UNHCR concern at mine accounts," 28 April 2000. See also, "Mines, fighting, rivers reduce Burundian flight to Tanzania," Agence France Press, 4 May 2000; and "Number of Refugees to Tanzania Dwindling," IRIN-CEA Weekly Roundup, 5 May 2000.
106 UNHCR Country Updates, Africa Fact Sheet, May 2000, on UNHCR web site, http://www.unhcr.ch/news/cupdates/0005afri.htm
107 Pierre Hublet, "Mission Report in Burundi from the 23rd January to the 1st February 1999," Handicap International Belgique, 1998, p. 3-4.
108 UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report, 27 August 1998, p. 6.
111 Statement faxed to Landmine Monitor from Dr. Barendegere Venerand, Ministry of National Defense, Military Hospital of Kamenge, 3 May 2000.
112 UNMAS, Mission Report, p. 9.
113 Statement from Dr. Venerand, Ministry of National Defense, Military Hospital of Kamenge, 3 May 2000.
114 Cited in, Statement from Dr. Venerand, Ministry of National Defense, Military Hospital of Kamenge, 3 May 2000.
116 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Operations in Burundi Bulletin, 16-31 March 1999.
117 Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Assistant Director, United Nations Department, Ministry of External Relations for Cameroon, Yaounde, 24 April 2000.
118 Telephone interview with Ferdinand Hgoh Ngoh, Second Counselor, Cameroon Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, 14 April 2000.
119 Telephone interview with Ferdinand Hgoh Ngoh, Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 14 April 2000.
120 Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, 20 April 2000.
121 Interview with Dr. Elie Mvie Meka, Technical Advisor, Ministry of Defense, Yaounde, 20 March 2000.
122 Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, 20 April 2000.
123 Interview with Dr. Elie Mvie Meka, Ministry of Defense, Yaounde, 20 March 2000.
125 The ICRC notes that there have been no mine casualties reported. Interview with Daniel Augstburgger, Regional Delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross, Yaounde, 19 March 2000.
126 Law Number 83/013, 21 July 1983.
127 Interview with Luis Dupret, Secretary-General at the Cape Verde Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 27 May 2000.
129 Ethiopian and Eritrean foreign ministers signed the agreement in Algiers, Algeria on 18 June 2000. The President of Algeria, who holds the Presidency of the OAU for the 2000 cycle, brokered the agreement.
130 His Excellency, Dr. Fecadu Gadarmu, Ambassador to Canada, Statement to the Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997, p. 2.
131 Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fax to the Ethiopian Consulate in The Hague, 17 March 1999, p. 2. Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
132 Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the FMSP to the MBT, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
133 Dr. Gadamu, Ottawa, 3 December 1997, p. 3.
134 For information on mines found in Ethiopia, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 145-146.
135 Ethiopian Government Spokesperson, "Total Victory for Operation Sunset," Ethiopian News Service, Addis Ababa, www.telecom.net/~ena, 28 February 1999; Professor Addis Birhan, "Mine Eritrea's Minefields," Wata Information Service. www.telecom.net-et/~wata, 6 March 1999; Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 March 1999, p. 2; Statement of Dr. Waktasu Negeri to the FMSP to the MBT, Maputo, 3 May 1999; and Africa News, "30,375 Landmines Planted in Eritrea in Northern Ethiopia Demined," Embassy of Ethiopia, 25 May 1999.
136 "Ethiopia says Eritrea laid 7,000 mines in and around border town," AFP, 6 June 2000. In a February 2000 report regarding Eritrean human rights practices, the U.S. State Department said, "According to UN officials, [Eritrean] government forces laid approximately 50,000 to 60,000 landmines in the Badme area during their 8-month occupation of this disputed territory." U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -- Eritrea," 25 February 2000, p. 3. This is repeated in the State Department's Ethiopia country report. Use of mines by Ethiopia is not mentioned in either country report.
137 Interviews with Ato Abraham Yohannes, Embassy of Eritrea, Washington, DC, 28 January 2000 and 8 February 2000.
138 Interview with Eritrean National Demining Headquarters official, Asmara, January 2000.
139 Some of these reports were unclear as to who laid the mines, and some said both sides may have mined the town. IRIN-CEA, "Civilians returning slowly to Mined Town," 2 June 2000; "Eritreans Assess Damage in Barentu," BBC World (Africa), 2 June 2000; Ann M. Simmons, "Destruction, Danger Await Eritrean Returnees," The Times, 2 June 2000; Patrick Graham, "Eritreans Don't Think the War is Over," National Post, 4 June 2000; "Eritrean Town Looted by Retreating Ethiopian Army," Reuters, 2 June 2000; "Ethiopian Forces Reported Still in West Eritrea," IRIN News Briefs, 31 May 2000.
140 The aide-memoire was subsequently provided the UN Security Council and circulated as UN Security Council document S/2000/726, 21 July 2000. See also, "Eritrea Complains Ethiopia Violates Peace Pact," Reuters, United Nations, 24 July 2000.
141 United Nations, IRIN News Briefs, "Ethiopia: Landmine Deaths in Irob," 8 June 2000.
142 "Landmines Kill Two Children, Injure Three Others," Pan African News Agency, 8 June 2000.
143 "Adid Accuses Ethiopia of Annexing Somali Territory," AFP, 21 March 2000.
144 "Ethiopians Pull out of Somalia," BBC World, 4 January 1999, www.bbc.co.uk.
145 For a recent denial, see: "Ethiopia Responds to the Times' Special Report," Letter to the Editor from Fisseha Adugna, Charge d'affaires, Embassy of Ethiopia, Washington, DC, Washington Times, 3 June 1999. Though the Mine Ban Treaty has not entered into force for Ethiopia, the use of mines by a signatory can be judged a breach of its international obligations. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when...it has signed the treaty...." Clearly, new use of mines defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.
146 See, Landmine Monitor Report 2000, Djibouti chapter.
147 "Eritrea Warns against Changing OAU Peace Plan," Reuters, 31 May 2000.
149 "Landmines Kill 14, Injure Four others in Kenya," PANA (Nairobi), 23 March 2000.
150 Mohamoud Issa, "Landmines in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia," In Proceedings of the Workshop on the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa, The Institute for Practical Research and Training, Hargeisa, 23-24 November 1999.
151 U.S. State Department, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia, 25 February 2000, p. 4.
152 UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998, p. 5.
153 U.S. Department of State, Political Military Affairs Bureau, Office of International Security Operations, Pub No. 10098, July 1993, p.89; U.S. Department of State, "Background Notes: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," March 1998, Office of East African Affairs, www.state.gov.
154 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998.
155 UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998, p.2; U.S. Central Command, www.centcom.mil/demining/ethiopia.
156 Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan, (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1998), pp. 39-40.
157 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-1.
158 Ibid. Map-"The Three Most Mine-affected Areas in Ethiopia."
159 See, UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998.
160 Santa Barbara website at: www.stiftung-sankt-barbara.de.
161 "FY 00 NDAR Project Status," U.S. Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Program, 5 May 2000. Numbers reflect funding for Department of Defense, Department of State, and some Agency for International Development programs, as cited in Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," A Human Rights Watch Short Report Vol. 12, No. 3(G), July 2000, p. 26.
162 HRW, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," July 2000, p. 34.
163 U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 2, in HRW, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," July 2000, p. 34.
164 United Nations Assessment Mission to Ethiopia (UNMAS), 22 June 1998, p. 6.
165 USCENTCOM Demining Home Page, 11 June 2000.
166 Africa News, Embassy of Ethiopia, 25 May 1999; "Ethiopia: 40,000 landmines removed from central front," Ethiopian Television, Addis Ababa, in Amharic, BBC Monitoring, 20 June 2000.
167 UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998, p. 7.
168 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
169 "Multi-year Recipient Report: Ethiopia," Mine Action Investments Database, UN Mine Action Service, available at: http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/mai/Main.asp?sScreen= RECIPIENT, visited on 25 July 2000.
170 Handicap International, MAG, and Norwegian People's Aid, "Ethiopia, Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects," 1998.
171 UN Assessment Mission to Ethiopia, 22 June 1998.
172 "Demining Underway in Northern Ethiopia," AFP, 22 June 2000.
173 Landmines in Ethiopia and the War with Eritrea, Arabicnews.com: Ethiopian Politics, 6 June 2000.
175 Mohamoud Issa, "Landmines in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia," November 1999.
176 U.S. Agency for International Development, "Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, Portfolio Synopsis," Spring 2000, in "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," HRW, p. 28.
177 Interview with Maria Letizia Zamparelli, Studies and Planing Special Activities Service, Italian Red Cross, Rome, 24 April 2000.
178 Interview with Charles Essonghé, First Counselor, Permanent Mission of Gabon to the United Nations, New York, 24 April 2000.
179 Letter from Honorine Doussou-Naki, Ambassador of Gabon to France, to Sylvie Brigot, Handicap International, Paris, 17 February 2000.
180 Interview with Jacques Alfred Ndoumbe Eboule, Assistant Director, United Nations Department, Ministry of External Relations for Cameroon, Yaounde, 24 April 2000.
181 Interview with Charles Essonghé, UN Mission, New York, 24 April 2000.
184 Interview with Daniel Augstburger, Regional Delegate, International Red Cross Society, Yaounde, 19 March 2000.
185 Information provided by Mines Action Team in Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, June 2000.
186 Letter from Habib T. B. Jarra for the Permanent Secretary, Department of State for Defense, Office of the President, FA 174/02/(114), 20 July 2000.
187 On 28 July 2000, a government official said that the instrument of ratification "will soon be deposited." Letter from A. Drammeh for the Permanent Secretary, Department of State for Defense, Office of the President, to Elisabeth Bernstein, ICBL Coordinator, dated 28 July 2000.
188 Letter from Habib T.B. Jarra, 20 July 2000.
189 Alex Vines and Barbarcar Diagne, "Senegal: old mines, new wars," African Topics, no. 22, January-March 1998, p.13; Andrew Manley, "Guinea Bissau/Senegal: war, civil war and the Casamance question," Writenet/Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, pp. 14-16.
190 "Senegal: Gambia to mediate?," West Africa (London), no. 4180, 12-18 January 1999, p. 7.
191 From 23-31 May 1999, Leon Terblanche, Senior Mine Action Advisor, UNDP, undertook an assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau. United Nations Development Program, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 12.
192 Photographs of the stockpile destruction were printed in the Senegalese media; see Le Soleil, 9 February 1998.
193 Major Herve Petetin, UNMAS, "Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau," December 1998, p. 1.
194 UNMAS, "Mine Situation in Guinea-Bissau," December 1998, p. 1.
195 UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 7.
196 In a statement at the FMSP in Maputo where the report was released, Senegal said it was "astonished to come across allegations" of mine use by its troops in Guinea-Bissau and it "categorically rejects the allegations." "Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation Following some Allegations Contained in the 1999 Report of ICBL," First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on A.P. Land Mines, Maputo, 5 May 1999, (Non-official translation). Guinea-Bissau did not attend the FMSP.
197 UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, pp. 5-6.
198 UNDP recommended that "Instead of trying to place blame after the fact, [it] suggested the government convene a case study with the international community, ICBL, and involved parties to examine what mechanisms were not in place or failed to work to prevent the use of mines in Guinea-Bissau with the aim of strengthening the convention." UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 13.
199 UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 6.
200 Interview with a delegation from the Genie Militaire, Bissau, March 2000.
201 Humaid has a pool of demobilized staff consisting of three Chiefs of Operations (former officers), thirteen team leaders, seventy-seven deminers, and twenty-seven students. These deminers had cleared mines during the 1998-99 war and are organized into thirteen teams, each with six deminers, two nurses and two drivers.
202 UNDP estimates it will need $400,000 a year for running costs.
203 UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau," S/2000/632, 28 June 2000, p. 2.
204 Interview with Alioune Ibaba, UNOGBIS, Bissau, March 2000.
205 UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau," S/2000/632, 28 June 2000, pp. 2-3.
206 UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 8.
207 Ibid., p. 9.
209 Ibid., p. 10.
210 Ibid., p. 16.
211 Interview with Alioune Ibaba, UNOGBIS, Bissau, March 2000.
212 UNMAS Mine Action Investments Database.
213 Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," A Human Rights Watch Short Report Vol.12, No. 3, July 2000, p. 27.
214 Interview with a delegation of Genie Militaire, Bissau, March 2000.
215 Twenty in Suzana and twenty in Bissau from affected suburbs. UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 11.
216 UNDP, "Guinea-Bissau Technical Mission Report," 29 July 1999, p. 11.
217 Ibid., p. 18.
218 Statement by Hon. Sheldon Muchilwa, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
219 Speech by Dr Bonaya Godana, Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. William Morogo, to the regional launch of Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Nairobi, 27 May 1999.
220 Julius Bosire, "Kenya `to ratify landmine treaty,'" Daily Nation (Nairobi), 24 October 1999.
221 The statement by the Attorney General was delivered by the Deputy Solicitor General, Julius Kandie. The People, 24 October 1999, p. 3.
222 Interview with senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, 13 June 2000.
223 Statements by Raila Odinga and George Anyona to Seminar on Peace Building and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms with Special Reference to Mine Action, organized jointly by KCAL and the Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Foundation (JOOF). Notes recorded by Landmine Monitor researcher, who was a rapporteur at the workshop. Interview with Josephine Odira Sinyo, Nairobi, 20 December 1999.
224 Statement by Hon. Sheldon Muchilwa, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the FMSP, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
225 Workshop by KCAL/Greater Horn of Africa Mine Action Network (GHAMAN), Nairobi, 28-29 April 1999; Pre-Hap Landmine Workshop, Nairobi, 28 April-2 May 1999; Nairobi; KCAL/ Jaramogi Oginga Odinga Foundation (JOOF) Workshop on Peacebuilding and Conflict resolution with special reference to landmines, Nairobi, 3-4 August 1999; ICRC Kenya Workshop on ratification and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nyeri, 22 October 1999; Workshop by KCAL/GHAMAN, Nairobi, 12-13 November 1999.
226 Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered by the Deputy Minister, to the regional launch of Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Nairobi, 27 May 1999.
227 Letter from Attorney General Amos Wako to Landmine Monitor researcher, 23 December 1999.
228 Interview with senior government official, Nairobi, 6 January 2000.
229 IPPNW-Kenya, "Landmine Report from Kenya," May 1999.
230 "Landmine Kills Kenyan Official," PANA (Nairobi), 10 May 1999.
231 Landmine Monitor interviewed one survivor of this incident who said that another survivor, Maxwell Cheruitich, died weeks later from injuries related to the incident. Interview with George Mutisya Mulinge, Drilling Spares and Services Ltd., Nairobi, 7 January 2000.
232 Interview with Jeremiah Matagaro, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Provincial Police Officer, North Eastern Province, Nairobi, 28 October 1999.
233 Said Wabera, "Tension grips Moyale as soldiers move in," Daily Nation, 21 May 1999, p. 60.
234 Interview with senior government official, Nairobi, 16 December 1999.
235 Interview with Gure Mohammed, Bute, Moyale, 29 July 1999.
236 "14 killed, 5 injured as landmines blast truck," Daily Nation, (Nairobi), 23 March 2000.
237 Kenya Broadcasting Corporation TV, Nairobi, in English, 1800 GMT, 23 March 2000.
238 When there is a severe drought in Kenya, Kenyans from Gare community in Moyale and north Kenya often migrate with their livestock to southern Ethiopia in search of pasture. The lorry incident involved Kenyans from Gare community returning home. Interview with Said Wabera, Nairobi, 24 July 2000.
239 "Landmines Kill 14, Injure Four Others In Kenya," PANA (Nairobi), 23 March 2000.
240 Otsieno Namway, "Who Planted Mines in the Rift?" The East African (Nairobi), 24 February 2000.
241 Said Wabera, "British government admits claims," DN, 28 September 1999. However, spokesperson Rumbold, in his faxed letter to the Landmine Monitor Researcher, states that "The British Army is only one of a number of armed forces which carry out live firing exercises on training areas in Kenya. Afterwards, we routinely sweep any areas used for UXO. We have not seen any evidence that UXO from British Army Exercises has been responsible for any injuries."
242 John Kamau and Said Wabera, "Dangerous games: Preliminary Report on the state of landmines and other UXOs in Kenya," (KCAL: Nairobi), February 2000. See also John Kamau, "The Bomb Country: The Kenya we Hardly Know," Newsline, (Nairobi), Issue 5, 26 May-8 June 2000.
243 Interview, Major (rtd) M. Thairu, Nairobi, 16 December 1999.
244 Dr. John M. Atunga, AFRIDEP's Program Chair stated this in a workshop on landmines during the All Africa Peace Conference, Nairobi, 5 November 1999. The standards were not clearly defined. AFRIDEP lost the initial contract for mine clearance in Kosovo due to the delay in the registration of the organization. A new contract is being negotiated.
245 Interview with Lt Col (rtd) J.A.W. Kitiku, Deputy Director, Security Research and Information Centre, Nairobi, 4 January 2000.
246 Interview, Lissa Kurbiel, UNICEF Regional Office, during landmines workshop at the AAPC, Nairobi, 5 November 1999.
247 Telephone interview with Dr. Ana Paula Alvim, Department of Multilateral Issues in the Office of International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, São Tomé, 3 July 2000.
248 Telephone interview with Luis Maria, Office of the Chief of Staff, São Toméan Armed Forces, São Tomé, 26 March 1999.
249 SHARE interview with Cecil F. King, Senior Assistant Clerk of Parliament, Freetown, 18 March 2000.
250 Interview with Dr. Sama Banya, Foreign Minister, Accra, Ghana, 28 April 2000.
251 SHARE interview with Charles Tom Kamanda, Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Freetown, 19 March 2000.
252 SHARE press release, "Where are the Landmines used in the War," 20 November 1999; SHARE press release "Landmines to prolong suffering in Sierra Leone," 26 November 1999; SHARE public lecture on the topic of "Landmines, the Environment & Sustainable Peace in Sierra Leone," 26 January 2000.
253 In 1995, Jeremy Harding, an editor at the London Review of Books, was told by a diamond industry source that the British military equipment agent, J & S Franklin Limited, had procured landmines for the Sierra Leone government. Telephone interview with Jeremy Harding, London, 31 March 1999.
254 UNMAS, "Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report," 7 February 2000, p. 6.
0 He made these remarks at a public lecture organized by SHARE on the topic of "Landmines, the Environment & Sustainable Peace in Sierra Leone" to an audience of civil society organizations, government, armed forces and the international community at the British Council in Freetown. See, SHARE, Report of a Public Lecture on the topic: Landmines, the Environment and Sustainable Peace in Sierra Leone, 26 January 2000. Circulated on icblafrica egroup by ICBL Coordinator, 23 February 2000.
1 See UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000.
2 Ibid., p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 7.
5 Ibid., p. 6.
7 Ibid.; see also, Sulaiman Momodu, "Kamajors Discover 28 Rebel Planted Landmines," Freetown Concord Times (Internet Version-WWW) 26 January 2000.
8 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, p. 6.
10 Email from HRW Sierra Leone to Mary Wareham, HRW, 19 February 2000.
11 In May 1999 in Mile 91, a "kamajor" lost his leg and in November 1999 in Kabala, one ex-SLA was killed and another injured. Email from HRW Sierra Leone to Mary Wareham, HRW, 19 February 2000.
13 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, p. 7.
14 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
15 SHARE, Report of a Public Lecture, 26 January 2000.
16 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 9.
17 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Lomé, Togo, 7 July 1999.
18 One Czech AP mine was handed over in Freetown in Nov. 1999, three Italian AP mines in Hastings, one Czech AP mine in Kenema, and two Italian AP mines were handed over in Bo. HRW interview with UNAMSIL U.K. Major Mike Godard, Freetown, 26 July 2000.
19 HRW interview with UNAMSIL UK Major Mike Godard, Freetown, 26 July 2000.
20 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 9.
22 Human Rights Watch, "Memorandum on Sierra Leone: Priorities for the International Community," 20 June 2000.
23 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 10.
24 Elvis Gbanabom Hallowell, Executive Director, SHARE, in Report of a Public Lecture, 26 January 2000.
25 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 8.
26 "12-year-old Sierra Leonean loses eye in landmine explosion," Agence France Presse (Freetown), 3 February 2000.
27 Telephone interview with doctor who treated the boy. Email from HRW Sierra Leone to Mary Wareham, HRW, 19 February 2000.
28 UNMAS, Sierra Leone Assessment Mission Report, 7 February 2000, pp. 9.
31 Gabriel Rorech, State Minister of Foreign Relations, mentioned the committee in a meeting with Suzanne Askelof, Secretary General, Rädda Barnen (Save the Children-Sweden) on 5 February 2000.
32 Statement by Ambassador Awad M. Hassan, Director-General, Department of Disarmament, Ministry of External Relations to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.
33 Letter from Ambassador Mubarak H. Rahamtalla, Deputy Permanent Representative, Republic of Sudan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, Ref. SUGA/3-1/2, 31 July 2000.
35 The Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines was established in November 1997 and is composed of nongovernmental organizations including Sudanese Development Association, Sudanese Red Crescent, Disaster Management and Refugee Studies Institute, Relief Assistance for Southern Sudan, Rädda Barnen, Oxfam U.K., and Action Disabled Development. There is cooperation with the ICRC, UNICEF, and members from government departments including the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and the National Council for Child Welfare.
36 Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL-Sudan/Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), Nairobi-Kenya, "Landmine Information-Sudan," signed by Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Director, OSIL-Sudan, dated 8 January 1999, p. 2.
38 Otunnu was reported to have secured a ban on use of landmines in the south of the country by both parties to the conflict. See "Sudan's Warring Parties Agree to Stop Using Landmines," Reuters, Nairobi, 11 March 1999.
39 Emphasis added. "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes," Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, November 1999, www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_9911_armsflows.html.
40 OSIL, "Landmine Information-Sudan," 8 January 1999, p. 2.
41 Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan, (Human Rights Watch: New York, August 1998), p. 39, 40.
42 The Uganda-Sudan Agreement was signed in Nairobi on 8 December 1999. See also PANA, 9 December 1999.
43 For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 171-172.
44 The assessment was carried out by Rae MacGrath, founder of the Mines Advisory Group. No report has been made yet but Mr. McGrath made a presentation of his findings in Sharga Hall, University of Khartoum, 25 July 1999.
45 United States Council of Refugees Survey, 9 September 1999.
46 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Mine Clearance Policy Unit, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan: Assessment Mission Report," August 1997, p. 7.
47 Human Rights Watch interviews with witnesses to casualties caused by government-laid land mines, Kenya-Sudan border, August 1999.
49 Statement by Mr. Ali Numeri, State Minister of Foreign Relations, Khartoum, 1 March 1999.
50 David Nailo Mayo, Landmine Monitor interview with Aleu Ayiney Aleu, Managing Director, OSIL-Sudan at the Christian Aid Office, London, 4 April 2000. Data collected in Chudukum from eyewitness accounts, letters from residents of Chukudum, secondary sources and a standard questionnaire completed by field researchers between July 1999 and May 2000.
51 Data collected in Chudukum from eyewitness accounts, letters from residents of Chukudum, secondary sources and a standard questionnaire completed by field researchers between July 1999 and May 2000.
52 Agence France-Presse, 19 February 2000.
53 "Uganda: Northwest officials to send suspected Sudanese rebel commanders home," The Monitor (newspaper), as reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 January 2000.
54 The NDA, at its height, included the Beja Congress, the Democratic Unionist Party, the SPLA/M, the Sudan Alliance Forces, the Umma Party and the United Federal Defence forces.
55 Mohamed Osman, "Hundreds of thousands of Eritrean refugees expected in Sudan," Associated Press (el-Lafa Camp, Sudan), 22 May 2000.
56 Dr. Hussein El-Obeid, "Socio-econmic Impact of Landmines in Kassala State Assessment," September 1999. Eighty-eight percent of incidents occurred on rural roads indicating that they were caused by AT mine use and 93 percent of the victims were civilian. In April 1999, Dr. El-Obeid left the Government of Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission in and is now an independent consultant.
57 Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 10 April 2000.
58 Sudanese Red Crescent; Al-Ra'yal Alam (Arabic-Sudanese newspaper) 24 and 31 May 2000.
59 Human Rights Watch interview with Ali El Safi, Beja Relief Organization, Kampala, Uganda, 17 July 2000.
60 UNDHA, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan," Annex G: Areas and Roads reported mined, August 1997.
62 Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 1998).
63 Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Kassala Assessment Mission Report," August 1998.
64 Dr. Hussein El-Obeid, "Socio-econmic Impact of Lanmines in Kassala State Assessment," September 1999.
65 No report has been made yet but Rae McGrath made a presentation of his findings in Sharga Hall, University of Khartoum, 25 July 1999.
66 Annex I: HAC report, Sudan Mine Action Programme, July 1997, in UNDHA, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan," August 1997.
67 Annex A: Request for Assistance dated 25 January 1997, in UNDHA, "The Landmine Situation in Sudan," August 1997. See also Statement by Ambassador Awad M. Hassan, Director-General, Department of Disarmament, Ministry of External Relations to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.
68 IGAD Partners Forum-Sudan Committee, "Planing for Peace, an Action Plan," 13 March 2000.
69 Sudan Peoples [sic] Liberation Army (SPLM) [sic] General Headquarters, New Kush - Himan, "Resolution on problem posed by proliferation of anti-personnel mines in liberated parts of new Sudan," signed by CDR Salva Knr Mayardit, Deputy Chairman, NLC/NEC (SPLM) and SPLA Chief of General Staff, dated 1 November 1996.
70 OSIL lists the following international and non-governmental NGOs as sponsors of their mine action program: Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid EZE, Trocaire, UNICEF/OLS, Mine Advisory Group UK, Swiss Basler Mission, OXFAM Quebec, ICCO and CAMEO. OSIL, "Case Study: SPLA (NSA) and Landmines- Sudan," 1 March 2000, p.7.
71 OSIL, "Case Study: SPLA (NSA) and Landmines- Sudan," 1 March 2000, p. 7.
72 Ibid., p. 5; UK Working Group on Landmines, Special Update 15, July 2000.
73 Chege Mbitiru, "Mines endure as deadly reminder of Sudanese civil war," Associated Press (Yei, Sudan), 14 July 1999.
74 Information provided by MAG, email to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 28 July 2000.
75 Hajir Mussa Kheir, "Proceeings of the Workshop on the Menace of Landmines in the Horn of Africa," The Institute for Practical Research and Training, Hargeisa, 23-24 November, 1999.
76 This is according to OSIL-Sudan/SRRA, "Landmines Information-Sudan," p. 5.
77 Ali Numeri, State Minister of Foreign Relations, "Statement on the occasion of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, 1 March 1999."
78 www. icrc.org; OSIL, Case Study: SPLA (NSA) and Landmines-Sudan, 1 March, 2000.
79 Chege Mbitiru, "Mines endure as deadly reminder of Sudanese civil war," Associated Press (Yei, Sudan), 14 July 1999.
80 The funds come from the Zakat funds, an Islamic charity that collects money from the rich and redistributes to the needy. In Sudan this is done through the Zakat Chamber, under the umbvrella of the Ministry of Social Planning.
81 ICRC, "Fact Sheet: ICRC in Sudan," 26 January 2000, www.icrc.org.
82 Interview with Reverend Lexson Awad, Director, Sudan Evangelical Mission, Nairobi, 8 January 1999.
83 Church of Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) Annual Report, 1996.
84 Reports from "International Conference On Improvement of Human Security, Through the Control and Management of Small Arms," held in Arusha, Tanzania, 22-26 March 2000, and "The Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa Conference on the proliferation of small arms," Nairobi, 12-15 March 2000.
85 Human Rights Watch, Still Killing: Landmines in Southern Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997), pp. 71, 140.
86 ICRC Regional Delegation in Kenya, Fact Sheet, 28 January 2000, p. 3.
87 Information provided by Rev. Marco Badeleya, Maweni Regional Hospital, Kigoma, 14 April 2000.
88 Information provided by Sister Mary Kashaga, Ujirani Mwema, Bukoba, 8 April 2000. Data collected from 20 March-7 April, 2000.
89 John Ongeri, "Landmines Kills Herdboy in Ngara," The African Newspaper, 20 September 1999, p. 1.
90 ICRC Regional Delegation in Kenya, Fact Sheet, 28 January 2000, p. 3.
91 Foreign Minister Walubita in May 1998 - more than two years ago -- told the Landmine Monitor that his country would ratify the MBT "Soon. This is a priority for my government. I represent a constituency that suffers from landmines. I am therefore determined to see this enacted into Zambian law quickly." Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.182.
92 Zambia Daily Mail, 17 July 2000; interview with Canadian High Commissioner Dilys Buckley-Jones, Lusaka, 17 July 2000.
93 Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Lusaka, 17 July 2000.
94 Statement by the Zambian Delegation to the FMSP, delivered by Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister Valentine Kayope, Maputo, 3 May 1997.
95 "Statement by the Delegation of Zambia to Standing Committee of Experts on Mine Clearance," Geneva, 27-29 March 2000.
96 The Task Force is comprised of the ministries of Community Development and Social Services, General Education, Defense, Home Affairs, Information and Broadcasting Services, Lands, Environment and Natural Resources.
97 "Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance," 27-29 March 2000.
98 UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.
99 Interview with Angolan soldiers, May 2000.
100 AFP, 19 January 2000; AFP, 6 March 2000; Bivan Saluseki, "Chamuva Teachers Flee UNITA Attacks," Africa News Service, Lusaka, 4 February 2000. "Concern at Reported Border Raids," IRIN, Johannesburg, 19 January 2000. At least one person was injured by a suspected UNITA landmine.
101 Pan African News Agency, "Zambia grapples with Landmines in Six Regions," Lusaka, 30 May 2000; Post, 31 May 2000.
102 "Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance," 27-29 March 2000.
103 U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Intelligence Report, "Landmine warfare - mines and engineer munitions in southern Africa (U)," May 1993.
104 UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.
105 UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.
107 U.S. Department of State, "30 March 2000 Humanitarian Demining IWG Fact Sheet."
108 Muleya Mwanayanda, "Field notes," no date, on file at Afronet, Lusaka.
109 Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance," 27-29 March 2000.
110 Nebat Muenga, Charles Mangwato, and Andrew Lungu, "Landmine Kills Man," Times of Zambia, 1 June 1999; AFP, 2 June 1999.
111 Times of Zambia, 6 and 7 June 1999.
112 Times of Zambia, 15 March 2000.
113 UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.
114 Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.
115 Times of Zambia, 9 November 1999.
116 Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.
117 Landmine Monitor interviews with BRZ and Mine-Tech, Johannesburg, 6 June 2000.
118 Information provided by Zambian Red Cross Society, Lusaka, 18 July 2000.
119 UNMAS, "Mine Action Assessment Mission to the Republic of Zambia, May-June 2000," draft dated 6 June 2000.
120 Statement by Zambia to SCE on Mine Clearance, 27-29 March 2000.