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Bénin signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 25 September 1998. It submitted its Article 7 transparency report on 15 October 1999. This report is in French and covers the period from 1 August to 31 December 1999.52 The report states that there are currently no legal measures in place to implement the treaty.53 An interdepartmental commission comprised of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry for Industry has been set up to propose a text for national legislation to be adopted relating to antipersonnel mines.54
Bénin attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a representative from the Ministry of Defense. Benin has not attended any of the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. In September 1999, President Mathieu Kérékou stated that he will do everything in his capacity to further the ban on antipersonnel mines.55 In December 1999, Bénin voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. A conference organized by the ICRC in Cotonou on 9 August 1999 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions included the ban treaty in its discussions.56
Bénin is a state party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not to the original or amended Protocol II. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
There is no production of AP mines in Bénin and transfer of AP mines is not allowed.57 According to its Article 7 report, Bénin does not possess any stockpiled AP mines, including any for training. This was confirmed in an interview with the Ministry of Defense.58 While Benin has the national capacity and resources for mine clearance, no further information was available on Bénin's contributions to humanitarian mine action.59
Key developments since March 1999: Botswana ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2000, the first anniversary of global entry into force. The Botswana Defense Force acknowledged that it retains a small stockpile of AP mines for training.
Botswana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 1 March 2000. The treaty will enter into force for Botswana on 1 September 2000. The process of incorporating the provisions of the treaty into domestic law has not started. According to a government official, efforts to abide by the requirements of the treaty have started and they are in the process of preparing the necessary information to be sent to the Attorney General's chambers for implementation.60
Botswana did not attend the Maputo First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999. It did not attend any meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts in 1999 or 2000. Botswana voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
Botswana is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use
Botswana has not produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Botswana Defense Force (BDF) officials say that the military has never laid any landmines in Botswana nor in any other country.61 On allegations that Botswana maintained a stockpile, the official said the term stockpile did not give the right picture as it implied a large quantity. He said that that the force maintains only a small quantity of AP mines for training purposes, explaining that in the past BDF soldiers have been deployed to mine-infested Mozambique. Therefore there was a need for the soldiers to know about the mines.62
Botswana is not known to be mine-affected. A military official refuted the statement in Landmine Monitor Report 1999 that landmines were laid in northern Botswana during the Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) war.63 According to an official of the Botswana Council for the Disabled (BCD), the council has never handled any cases of disability caused by injuries from landmines in Botswana.64
A military trade publication indicates that at some point, Botswana procured the Rapid Antipersonnel Minefield Breaching System Mark 3 (RAMBS 3) produced by the UK company Pains Wessex Ltd.65
The Botswana Red Cross (BRC) society has been conducting regular training of the BDF on landmines. This activity has been done in conjunction with the regional office of the ICRC based in Harare, Zimbabwe.66 The BRC has also involved itself in landmine awareness education of the society. In 1998, BRC produced a fifteen-minute radio program on landmines, which was in vernacular on Radio Botswana for one month. Among the topics covered were: what are landmines, what do they look like, what are their effects on people, animals and land. At the end of the program people were allowed to phone in and ask questions and also give their opinions on the issue of landmines. The program was reportedly a success and many people said it was the first time that they had heard anything about landmines.67
Key developments since March 1999: Burkina Faso has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999.
Burkina Faso signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and on 16 September 1998 the instruments of ratification were deposited at the United Nations, making Burkina Faso the 40th country to ratify the treaty and thus allowing the treaty to enter into force on 1 March 1999. According to one source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, domestic implementation legislation is not viewed as necessary because Burkina Faso has never produced, stockpiled, or used landmines.68 Some deputies in the National Assembly are prepared to propose legislation.69 Burkina Faso has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. An official in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs blamed the late report on the current socio-political crisis that has focused government priorities elsewhere. But he stated that there is absolutely no question of Burkina Faso's transparency or willingness to promote the treaty.70 When asked for an update following a letter from the ICBL Coordinator encouraging timely submission of Article 7 reports, the same official replied that the report was in preparation.71
Burkina Faso attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. It did not attend any intersessional meetings of the MBT. Burkina Faso voted in support of the pro-treaty UN General Assembly resolution 54/54B in December 1999. Burkina Faso is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but attended the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II. Burkina Faso is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Burkina Faso neither produces nor exports AP mines. There have been allegations of illicit weapons passing through Burkina for rebels in Angola and Sierra Leone. Harouna Ouédraogo, Chief of the Cabinet at the Ministry of Defense, told Landmine Monitor that Burkina Faso has never used AP mines.72 In July 1998, Defense Minister Albert Millogo told the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Defense Commission that Burkina Faso's armed forces possess only inactive mines for military training purposes.73
Burkina Faso is not mine-affected. It is not involved in mine clearance or awareness programs and has not made any financial contribution to mine action programs.
Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Chad on 1 November 1999. A Level One Impact Survey is currently underway and mine clearance is due to begin this year. At least 127 mine and UXO-related casualties are reported to have occurred from September 1998 to October 1999. Chad has not submitted its Article 7 report which was due by 29 April 2000.
Chad signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 6 July 1998 and ratified it on 6 May 1999. Thus, the treaty entered into force for Chad on 1 November 1999. Chad has not enacted domestic implementation legislation for the treaty.
Chad attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, the head of delegation Adoum Hassan Bakhit stated, "Chad, in spite of all its limited resources, will do everything in its power to address the source of the problem posed by the presence of mines in its territory. The probability of success of this program is strongly reinforced by the visible adhesion of the Government of Chad to the program, by a stable political environment, the absence of conflict, and long-term engagements to several international partners. Chad will not succeed alone. This will not occur without the aid of the international community, which is capable of constructing an efficient, national demining program."74
Chad did not participate in any of the treaty intersessional meetings of Standing Committees of Experts. Chad has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 29 April 2000. Chad voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
Chad is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Chad is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. It is believed that Chad has a sizable stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no details are available.75 There have been reports of rebels, particularly in the mountainous north, using mines, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify these reports. There is no evidence of government armed forces using antipersonnel landmines.
Decades of conflict and the 1973 Libyan invasion have left Chad with a landmine and UXO problem. Minefield records are close to non-existent, and there is not yet a comprehensive mine database.76 In 1999, the UN Development Program and Chad's mine action center, the Haut Commissariat National au Déminage (HCND) identified the following types of mines:
|
|
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| Antipersonnel | Antitank |
| NR409 | PRB M3 (NR441) |
| NR413 | PRB M3 A1(NR201) |
| NR442 | TC6 |
| PRB M 35 | M 19 |
| NR 109 | M 7 A2 |
| M14 | TM 46 |
| M18A1 | TM 57 |
| PMD6 | TM DB |
| PMN | PT MI Ba 2 |
| PMA 3 | TMA 4 |
| PPM 2 | TMA 5 |
Mine-affected areas in Chad are mostly located in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) mountain and desert area in the north of the country. Salamat, Guera and Moyen Chari regions are also reported mine-affected but to a lesser degree than the BET. The Aozou-Bardaï-Wour-Zouar zone in the north is mine-affected as a result of internal conflict and also from the Libyan incursion into the Aozou strip. Faya Largeau is also mined due to its position as the staging point for a military advance upon the capital Ndjamena. In the east, the Iriba and Guereda areas along the Sudanese border are mined, as are certain key points inwards towards Ndjamena.78 Mined areas generally include both antipersonnel and antitank mines, but unexploded ordnance is also a problem, especially in the north and east.
Several meetings have been held to attract donor support for mine action in Chad, including a July 1998 donor conference in New York, a round table in Geneva, and another donor conference in New York on 29 October 1999. At the donor conference in New York, the UNDP and HCND indicated a funding shortfall of $2.425 million for mine action in Chad.79
Contributions for mine action programs have been received from the UNDP ($2 million) Italy ($500,000), Japan ($400,000), Chad ($245,000) and Canada ($66,000).80 Germany has also donated forty-two Ebinger mine detectors to Chad. A total of $1.4 million in funding for the Level One Impact survey has been secured from the U.S. Department of State and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action.81
Through its fiscal year 1999, the U.S. had provided $1.9 million in assistance to Chad to support and sustain the training of military engineers as deminers. In 1999 and 2000, the U.S. was planning to provide $3.5 million in in-kind and financial assistance for mine action.82 This includes for the rehabilitation of a demining training school in the capital, the establishment of a regional demining office in the northern part of country, training in mine awareness education, and the collection of historical data. The allocation of U.S. funding in 2000 includes $210,000 for the purchase of vehicles, $11,000 to purchase radios, a $196,000 grant to UNDP to contract aerial medical evacuation services, $12,000 for repairs to the deminer's building in Faya in the north of the country, and $108,000 for the purchase of spare parts for C-130 aircraft supporting demining operations.83
The UN Development Program has set up a national mine action center under the Haut Commissariat National au Déminage.84 The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) serves as implementer of the program.85 The demining program is described as "one of the few programs, if not the first, which has not resulted from a United Nations Peacekeeping mission," meaning that the program "started with nothing."86
In October 1999, at the donors conference, the UNDP and HCND presented a national mine action plan, but it has not been implemented and a new national plan for mine action for 2000-2001 was due for release in July 2000.87
A Level One Impact Survey started in Chad in November 1999, following pre-testing of survey instruments and training of local staff. Handicap International is the implementing partner for the survey. An assessment mission from the Survey Action Center visited Chad in July 1999. In June 2000, a UNICEF consultant visited Chad to undertake a needs assessment for mine awareness.
Clearance activities in Chad have been sporadic, mostly due to resource constraints. Some 100-200 Chadian military have been trained in mine clearance. One priority set by the HCND is mine clearance in a 100-kilometer radius around Faya Largeau, scheduled to begin in March 2000.88 In May 2000, the German demining organization HELP, which won a tender to carry out the demining, was due to begin operations with additional German government funding. Clearance will be conducted in conjunction with a wider Islamic Development Bank-sponsored rural development program in the same areas.89
Reliable and comprehensive information on victims is hard to come by in Chad. Accidents that take place at great distances from a medical facility are unlikely to be officially recorded.90 But in October 1999, the HCND reported 127 mine and UXO-related casualties since September 1998.91 Of these casualties, approximately one-third resulted in death and another one-third in amputation.92
There have been fifteen reported incidents involving children. Particularly at risk are adolescent goat and sheep herders who pick up UXO they find in the fields.93 UNICEF and HCND report that in Iriba region, eleven of twenty-five reported mine and UXO casualties were children.94 It is not known how many nomads have been killed or injured by mines or UXO; Chad has a considerable nomadic population. In addition, forty-seven vehicles were reported destroyed and a large number of domestic animals upon which local economies depend.95
Medical care and rehabilitative services for mine victims in Chad are generally rudimentary. Lack of medical infrastructure and evacuation leads to an average of four to five days for a mine or UXO victim to reach hospital care.96 The capital boasts a well-run prosthetics clinic managed by SECADEV, a Catholic development organization, and supported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC plans to locate and transport an estimated 300 mine and UXO victims from the north of the country in a program beginning in July 2000. This initiative will later spread to the rest of the country.
Key developments since March 1999: Despite a military coup in December 1999, Côte d'Ivoire ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 June 2000.
Côte d'Ivoire signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. Ratification legislation was submitted to the National Assembly in June 1999 and one month later, the assembly voted in support of it, authorizing the President of the Republic to ratify.97 While a military coup on 24 December 1999 delayed the ratification process, on 24 March 2000, the ratification document was forwarded for signature to the President.98 The new head of state, General Robert Guéi, signed the ratification document on 5 June 2000 and it was deposited with the United Nations on 30 June 2000.
Côte d'Ivoire attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 in a delegation led by its Ambassador to South Africa, H.E. Kanga Ballou. It did not participate in any of the treaty's intersessional meetings in Geneva in 1999 or 2000. Côte d'Ivoire voted for the December 1999 UNGA resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty. Côte d'Ivoire is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but it attended the December 1999 First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II. Côte d'Ivoire is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Côte d'Ivoire has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Government officials describe the country as completely mine-free with no stockpiles of antipersonnel or antitank mines.99 There were no allegations of mine use during the period of the coup. Military training includes only basic information on landmine recognition and safety precautions.100 In an interview, General Bendji Joseph Mockey told the Landmine Monitor that some soldiers "don't even know what a mine is."101 Côte d'Ivoire provides training for African military officials every year on landmines (such as safety precautions, landmine recognition and demining) at the Zambakro military school, which is sponsored by the French government.102
The French military on 28 September 1999 destroyed the 120 antipersonnel mines that it had stockpiled in Côte d'Ivoire. (See LM report on France).
During the early 1990s there were fears that the west of the country might be contaminated with landmines used in the conflict with Liberia, but the ICRC has not recorded any landmine incidents in Côte d'Ivoire. The recently established Handicap International office in Abidjan also confirmed that there are no registered landmine victims in Côte d'Ivoire.103
Key developments since March 1999: In 1999, the government appointed a Mine Action Taskforce to formulate an action plan that includes surveys of mine-affected zones, mine awareness, and victim assistance. The U.S. is funding mine action in Djibouti. Djibouti has not submitted its Article 7 report due by 27 August 1999. Rebel forces used antitank mines in 1999 and early 2000, resulting in 69 new mine victims. In November 1999 the French military stationed in Djibouti destroyed its stockpile of 2,444 antipersonnel landmines.
Djibouti signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 May 1998. Djibouti has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. It has not submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 27 August 1999. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials told Landmine Monitor in February 2000 that they were waiting for a progress report from the Ministry of Defense.104
Djibouti did not participate in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it participated in any meetings of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts. Djibouti voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on similar UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
In 1999, the local NGO Association de Soutien aux Victimes des Mines (ASOVIM) launched the first organized campaign against landmines in Djibouti. ASOVIM has started a letter writing campaign to government agencies and the parliament urging the swift adoption of domestic implementation legislation.
Djibouti has not ratified Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Djibouti has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears to have received landmines from France and Italy. The possible transit of mines through Djibouti territory is a concern. Djibouti is the most important seaport on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and is the major port for all materials to Ethiopia, which has signed but not ratified the MBT. Neighboring Eritrea has not signed the MBT and neighboring Somaliland is not in a position to sign at this time. In 1998, Djibouti opposition groups claimed that at least one shipment of landmines was imported by Ethiopia through the port of Djibouti.105 There have been no new allegations of landmines transferred through the ports of Djibouti in 1999 or 2000.
Djibouti has not begun stockpile destruction, or apparently even developed a plan. In 1998 French Foreign Legion technicians assisted Djibouti's military with the destruction of 350 kilograms of landmines and unexploded ordnance.106 Djibouti, which obtained independence from France on 27 June 1977, is home to the largest overseas French military base. On 2-4 November 1999, the French military in Djibouti destroyed their stockpile of 2,444 antipersonnel landmines at the Grand Bara, southwest of the city of Djibouti.107
There is no evidence that Djibouti's army has used landmines in counterinsurgency operations since signing the MBT. Although a peace agreement was signed between the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) rebels and the government of Djibouti, a splinter FRUD faction, lead by former Prime Minister Ahmed Dini, maintained an armed insurrection in 1998 and 1999. The government of Djibouti and independent observers claim that FRUD forces employed antitank mines in this renewed conflict. At least ten accidents involving 69 individuals and 22 fatalities due to new landmines were recorded in 1999 and in the first two months of 2000. The latest incident occurred on 7 February 2000. All new use of mines during 1999 and 2000 appear to involve antitank mines planted on civilian access roads.
The government concluded a reconciliation agreement with the opposition FRUD on 7 February 2000 under which the two sides freed all prisoners and agreed to cease hostilities.108 There have been no new mine incidents since then.
During 1999, Eritrea accused Djibouti of siding with Ethiopia in the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As a result Djibouti broke diplomatic relations with Eritrea. On various occasions, Djibouti claimed that Eritrea was emboldening the northern Afar militia and that the Afar militia planted mines in the border area between Eritrea and Djibouti. Landmine Monitor cannot verify these allegations. On 13 March 2000, Djibouti and Eritrea normalized diplomatic relations.109
Djibouti has a small landmine problem, which is the legacy of a three-year internal war during 1991-1994. Landmines were used in this war by both the rebel forces of the FRUD and by government Army troops.110 Djibouti military used French and Italian mines, while FRUD forces employed Italian and Russian mines.111 There is no indication of any large-scale use of landmines against the civilian population by either party.
No systematic mine surveys have been carried out in Djibouti and no reliable data are available on the extent of mine contamination. Certain zones in the northern Afar highlands are considered to face a higher risk than other areas. 112 Representatives of ASOVIM toured suspected sites in the Afar Plateau and reported that many public facilities, such as schools, have been abandoned because of the threat of landmines.113 In Obock town, mines have been found in palm groves, which are now left untended. Rural roads north of Tadjourah may also be mined. The southern district of Dikhil may also contain mines.
As part of the reconciliation agreement the two sides are said to have agreed to reveal all mined areas.
In 1999, the government appointed a Mine Action Taskforce composed of representatives from the military, Ministry of Health, the ICRC and WHO. The taskforce is formulating an action plan that includes surveys of mine-affected zones, mine awareness, and victim assistance.
Djibouti has not allocated any internal funds for mine action. However, the U.S. plans to contribute approximately $1.1 million in 2000 and 2001 to fund a mine action program in Djibouti. The U.S. approved Djibouti's request for humanitarian demining assistance on December 12, 1999. U.S. military trainers and contractors will apparently be used to establish a complete demining program including training, equipment, and facilities for demining training. A survey of requirements was conducted in 2000.114
The French army trained of a contingent of thirty Djibouti military deminers and in November 1998, the newly trained deminers started a limited demining exercise in the district of Obock.115
A list of recorded mine incidents during 1999 follows, complied by Landmine Monitor from news accounts and interviews. All incidents were caused by antitank mines. Landmine victim statistics are not systematically compiled in Djibouti.
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|
|
| 7 Feb. at Mulhole Alayou Dada | 2 military victims (1 killed and 1 injured) |
| Mar. at Day: | 5 military victims (1 killed and 4 injured) |
| 4 Apr. at Ripta | 7 civilian victims (2 killed and 5 injured) |
| 14 Apr. near Ripta | 2 civilian victims (1 killed and 1 injured) |
| 15 Apr. at Boli | 2 military victims (6 killed and 6 injured) |
| 26 Apr. at Mdeho | 13 military victims (4 killed and 9 injured) |
| 6 May at Adaylou | 8 civilian victims (2 killed and 6 injured) |
| 20 July at Near Obock | 10 civilian victims (1 killed and 9 injured) |
| 12 Sep. at Alaili Dada | 6 civilian victims (3 killed and 3 injured) |
| 24 Sep. at Adaylou | 6 civilian victims (3 killed and 3 injured) |
| TOTAL | 69 victims (22 killed and 47 injured) |
Djibouti's northern plateau, the area most heavily contested during the civil war, and which contains most of the suspected minefields and mined routes, is mostly rough mountainous terrain that contains few easily accessible roads. Civilian victims face major difficulties in calling for or reaching help. Military mine victims are almost always evacuated by helicopter.
The District hospital of Obock, closest to areas with the greatest landmine threat, was completely destroyed during the 1991-1994 civil war. There are now only two hospitals in Djibouti capable of assisting victims of landmines. Both are in Djibouti City. Civilian victims are treated at the public Peltier Group Hospital. Although capable of major surgery, Peltier Hospital had gone through a number of years of deterioration. All military victims of landmines are treated at the French Military hospital of Bouffard, which has adequate, but small, surgery and intensive care facilities. Civilians are not normally treated at this hospital.
Post-operative care is not available for mine victims in Djibouti. Peltier Hospital has a small rehabilitation center for amputees and other handicapped persons. It is not equipped to provide prosthetics. No job training or psychological rehabilitation facilities exist in Djibouti.
The local office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been active in providing some assistance to mine victims. The ICRC, which has a rehabilitation facility in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, imports prosthetics for landmine amputees or sends patients to Addis Ababa to be fitted with artificial limbs. During 1999, the ICRC in Djibouti assisted twenty-four military mine victims. The majority of the soldiers were injured during the 1992-94 war, but eight were injured between 1997 and 1999. ICRC provided seventeen prostheses, five wheel chairs and two orthopedic shoes. Also in 1999, following the resurgence of mine explosions, the ICRC, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health of Djibouti, started a program of assistance for civilian mine victims. Six civilians injured during 1999 have so far been treated at the government Peltier Hospital.116
Equatorial Guinea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 September 1998. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 28 August 1999. A government official in Malabo justified the delay, telling Landmine Monitor that "landmines are not an issue for us."117 Equatorial Guinea did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor any of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts meetings in Geneva. It voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. Equatorial Guinea has not produced or exported landmines. It is not believed to possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It is not a party to the CCW, nor a member of the CD. Diplomatic and U.N. sources in Malabo are unaware of any mine action activities or injuries resulting from landmines. 118
Ghana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 30 June 2000, the ninety-ninth country to do so.
Ghana participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a delegation of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. It participated in the first meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in January 2000 and also in the second meeting of the SCE on Mine Clearance in March 2000. Ghana voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
Ghana has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. There is no evidence that it has aided in the transshipment of landmines. In February 1999, Landmine Monitor was told that the Ghanaian Armed Forces do not stockpile AP mines.119 There is no public record of the military using landmines, even for training purposes. Ghana is not mine-affected.
Guinea signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 8 October 1998. The treaty entered into force for Guinea on 1 April 1999. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 28 September 1999. A government official claimed that a "resource shortage" is responsible for the delay.120 Guinea attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It has not participated in any meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Guinea voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It is not a party to the CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Guinea is not thought to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is not known if Guinea has a stockpile of AP mines. Mines have not been used in Guinea, although there may be some mines and UXO in border areas from the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia.121 There are currently no mine action operations in Guinea and there is no existing data on mine victims in Guinea.
Key developments since March 1999: The treaty entered into force for Lesotho on 1 June 1999. Lesotho has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 November 1999. Officials confirmed that the LDF does not even keep landmines for training purposes.
The Kingdom of Lesotho signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 2 December 1998. The treaty entered into force for Lesotho on 1 June 1999. It is not known to have passed any domestic implementing legislation. While Lesotho has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 November 1999, it is aware of this obligation and intends to submit the report prior to the Second Meeting of State Parties.122
Lesotho attended the First Meeting of State Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thomas Thabane. In a statement to the plenary, Minister Thabane referred to continued use of antipersonnel mines in the region and said, "Let us therefore use this occasion not only to celebrate, but to rededicate ourselves to the commitments and objectives of the Ottawa Process. For us in Southern Africa, let us commit ourselves to the goal of making our region a mine free zone. This is an achievable goal, but it requires sustained efforts from everyone."123 He went on to call on "all those governments which have publicly stated their support for an immediate and total ban, to match their words with actions by ratifying the Convention."124
Lesotho has not participated in any intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva. Lesotho was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for universalization of the treaty. Previously Lesotho supported pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996 and 1998. Lesotho is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
The Lesotho Red Cross is an active member of a network of anti-landmine campaigns in southern Africa.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use
At the FMSP, Minister Thabane stated that "Lesotho does not use, buy or manufacture landmines, neither do we have any stockpiles of mines."125
During the chaos that resulted in the South African-led SADC intervention in September 1998, rebel soldiers of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) claimed that they held landmines.126 A journalist, Sechaba Ka'Nkosi, viewed three of the reported rebel hideouts in the mountains but was not allowed to see the weapons. While he could not confirm the claim, he told Landmine Monitor that at the time he found it convincing.127 An LDF representative told Landmine Monitor that the Lesotho government was investigating the veracity of these allegations, hence the delay in delivering the Article 7 report.128 But in a written response to Landmine Monitor, Lesotho stated that:
Incidences [sic] referred to regarding the disturbances in 1998 as described by a purported LDF member have no basis. The Lesotho Defence Force does not, and has never at anytime kept stock of landmines. What may have been stolen at the time were mere hand-grenades. LDF does not even keep any landmines for training purposes.129Mine Action
A number of antitank mine incidents resulted in four deaths and eleven injuries in the early 1980s when the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) was active with the support of the (then) South African government.130 Lesotho told Landmine Monitor, "Indeed there were victims of limpet mines in the 1980s, but they were as a result of LLA operations launched outside Lesotho. Such weapons belonged to the LLA."131
Today there are no reports of uncleared mines in Lesotho.132 Lesotho's Foreign Minister told the FMSP that they are "keenly aware that this scourge does not respect borders and it may not be long before it catches up with us."133 The government has not adopted national legislation for persons with disabilities.
Liberia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 December 1999. In a written response to Landmine Monitor's question on the reason for the accession, Liberia's Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism, Joe Mulbah, stated:
Liberia believes that landmines pose a perpetual threat to civil society. Its use is pernicious to the people. The gruesome use of landmines has today left the world with millions of amputees and maimed children. Coming out of a seven-year civil war in which landmines were used on a minimal scale, we saw the horrendous impact it had on our people. We pray that such devastation should never come our way as a people who have resolved never to experience war in our existence. We therefore support the global programme to eliminate landmines.134
Liberia is due to submit its Article 7 transparency measures report by 28 November 2000. Liberia did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, nor has it participated in any intersessional meetings of the treaty. Liberia sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, but was not present for the vote on 1 December 1999. It is not a party to CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Liberia is not known to have produced or exported AP mines. There is concern that Liberia may serve as a transit point for weapons shipments to rebel groups in Sierra Leone, particularly to the Revolutionary United Front.135
It is assumed that Liberia maintains a stock of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm this. In 1999 Liberia conducted a weapons destruction program.136 The exercise, which began on 25 July, involved the destruction of over 19,000 small and heavy caliber weapons, more than three million rounds of ammunition and some landmines collected by the UN and ECOMOG during the disarmament exercise in 1996-1997. A symbolic arms-burning act took place in Monrovia but the real weapons destruction occurred at an abandoned iron ore mine about forty miles northwest of the capital.137
There is no credible evidence of new use of AP mines in Liberia. However, it is not possible to assess if non-state actors in the north of the country possess or use landmines. Landmines were used in the nine-year civil war from 1989 to 1997. Rebel forces mined roads and ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces planted minefields around their installations. Areas such as the currently unstable province of Lofta County were affected.138 Mines were also used in Monrovia (in the Paynesville area), Capemount and Bong Mines. Prior to the 1997 multiparty elections, mines were found in the private residences of various warlords.139
While the U.S. Department of State had previously listed Liberia as mine-affected, in 1998 it revised its assessment and declared the country mine-free.140 The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, an NGO concerned with human rights and humanitarian issues, has expressed its concern about the possibility of a remaining landmine problem and has been unable to verify that Liberia is now landmine-free.141
Some hospitals and clinics are up and running again in several parts of the country and the two prosthesis workshops in Ganta and Monrovia have been reactivated.142 The main JFK hospital in Monrovia has a small outpatient clinic. In general the facilities are limited due to the destruction and looting during the civil war.
Madagascar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 16 September 1999. The treaty entered into force for Madagascar on 1 March 2000. Madagascar's Article 7 transparency report is due by 28 August 2000. Madagascar has supported key pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions, including Resolution 54/54 B in December 1999. Madagascar did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo and has not participated in any meeting of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Madagascar is not a party to CCW nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Madagascar's Minister of the Armed Forces confirmed in a letter to the UN that it had not imported any landmines since 1970.143 The size and composition of Madagascar's current stockpile of AP mines is not known. According to the U.S. Department of State, the only use of landmines in Madagascar was in 1991 as a deterrent to opposition marches in the immediate vicinity of the Presidential Palace.144 Otherwise, Madagascar is not considered mine-affected.
Key developments since March 1999: The Malawi Army told Landmine Monitor that it has no AP mine stockpile, only inert dummy mines for training purposes. Malawi has not submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. There were no reported landmine incidents in Malawi.
Malawi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 August 1998. It has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. Landmine Monitor was told this is due to a shortage of personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare the report;145 but Malawi is aware of its obligation under the treaty.146 The same reason was given for the current lack of domestic implementation legislation.147
Malawi was absent during the vote on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution in December 1999, but had voted for pro-ban resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. It attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in a delegation led by Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Ziddy Kingi Medi. In a statement to the plenary Medi called on all states that have not yet signed and ratified the treaty to do so and stated, "Malawi will also cooperate with other states in the region to ensure that the region and indeed the continent of Africa and the world at large is free of landmines."148 Malawi has not participated in intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva due to a lack of funds.149
Malawi has appealed to states to join the treaty and has discouraged continued manufacture, use, and stockpiling of landmines, as well as encouraged other countries to assist in demining.150 Malawi has participated in various meetings examining the need to establish an effective information management computer network system.151
NGOs in the Malawi Campaign to Ban Landmines (MCBL) have remained active in the monitoring of implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty by holding meetings with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence, including the Malawi Army.
Malawi is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
In May 1999, Malawi's Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that Malawi "does not manufacture, own or stock" antipersonnel mines.152 The Malawi Army told Landmine Monitor that it does not have an AP mine stockpile, only inert dummy mines for training purposes.153 Malawi denies having acquired landmines from the U.S. as reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999 and states that it acquired mine detection equipment from the U.S. to facilitate continued use of the rail traffic in the Nacala Corridor during the Mozambique civil war.154 Information on the presence of mines and any demining along the Nacala Corridor was unavailable to Landmine Monitor as the Malawi Army regards this as classified information from a foreign country, which should be handled by Mozambique.155
Malawi officials still insist that Malawi does not have a mine problem despite some incidents along the border with Mozambique. The Nacala Corridor is economically important to Malawi and while it was heavily mined during the civil war in Mozambique, it is now said to be cleared.156 Officials state that the country is ready to assist in demining along its border with Mozambique, as long as resources can be made available from donors.157 The Malawi Army has expertise and equipment to detect mines, but requires financial and logistical support.158 In the past year, there have been no reported landmine incidents in Malawi.
Key developments since March 1999: In May 1999 Mali announced that it had destroyed 5,127 antipersonnel mines, while retaining 2,000 for training purposes. Mali has not submitted its Article 7 report, due by 27 August 1999. Mali agreed to co-chair the SCE on Stockpile Destruction, but did not attend the two SCE meetings.
Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 2 June 1998. It has not undertaken any national implementation measures. Mali has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999. In November 1999, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that report was delayed because the counselor in charge of it had been given other responsibilities.159
Mali attended the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) in Maputo in May 1999. In a statement to the plenary, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Farouk Camara, said that Mali has never engaged in the production or transfer of antipersonnel mines, nor have any been deployed on its territory.160 At the FMSP, Mali agreed to co-chair the Standing Committee of Experts on Stockpile Destruction, along with Hungary. Mali did not, however, attend the two meetings of the SCE in December 1999 and May 2000 in Geneva.
Mali voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999. Mali is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
In November 1998 the Association Malienne des droits de l'Homme (AMDH) established an NGO coalition, the National Commission To Ban Landmines. AMDH told Landmine Monitor that to their knowledge there is no indication of any use of AP mines by Mali's Armed Forces in 1999 or 2000.
On 25 May 1998 Mali initiated destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile and completed the process in October 1998. At the FMSP, Mali announced that 5,127 AP mines and 4,131 antitank mines without anti-handling devices mines were destroyed at a cost of CFA Fr 49,918,402 (US$72,233).161 None of its 6,400 antitank mines with anti-handling devices were destroyed. Mali has chosen to retain 2,000 antipersonnel mines for training.162
At the FSMP Mali noted that it has made some modest contributions to mine clearance activities and has established an expert demining force, which has been deployed abroad. In 1997 the National Center for Orthopaedic Devices (CNAOM) was established when the Center for Re-education of the Physically Handicapped (CRHP) and the National Institute for the Re-Adaptation and Professional Training of the Physically Handicapped (INRFP-HP) merged. At the FSMP, Mali stated that it seeks to share its experience and expertise in the area of prosthetics and orthapaedics and the special reintegration of victims.163
Key developments since March 1999: On 21 July 2000 Mauritania became the 100th country to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. Mauritania is now receiving demining training and assistance from the United States.
Mauritania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In February 1999, the National Assembly and the Senate passed a law authorizing the President to ratify the treaty.164 Just as Landmine Monitor Report 2000 went to print, on 21 July 2000, Mauritania deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations, thus becoming the 100th country to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty. On the occasion, Mauritania's Ambassador to Canada, Adberrahim Ould Hadrami said, "Mauritania is located in the most mine-affected region in the world. Mauritania's ratification of the Ottawa Convention demonstrates our commitment to join the international community in addressing the landmine problem in Africa and elsewhere."165
Mauritania participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, represented by Ambassador Abderrahim Ould Hadrami, the Director of International Organizations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has not attended any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva. Mauritania was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, but had voted in favor of pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1997 and 1998. Mauritania is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Mauritania has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It is believed to have imported mines from France, Britain, Italy, Egypt, former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, and Argentina.166 Details on its stockpile of AP mines are currently unknown.
Mauritania is mine-affected from World War II and from the war in Western Sahara. Mines are found in the Adrar region, the Tiris Zemour region and the Dakhalt Nouadibou region, as well as around the military bases of F'Derik, Bir-Mogrein, and Tour Bleue in Nouadhibou.167
Mauritania was accepted into the U.S. humanitarian demining program on 10 December 1998. It will receive approximately $3.185 million in bilateral demining assistance from the U.S. in 1999 and 2000.168 In March 2000, at Z'Reida Base, near Nouakchott, a Mauritanian army company participated in a demining training session by U.S. military personnel.169
There is no mine awareness program underway at present and there is no reliable assessment of the number of landmine casualties. The U.S. Department of State estimated nineteen mine casualties in 1998.170 In December 1999 two people were reported killed and two injured in a mine incident at Laguera, in the Nouadhibou area.
Mauritius was the first African country to sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. In a written response to Landmine Monitor's request for updated information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that "the Government is working on a Bill with a view to enforcing" the ban treaty.172 While Mauritius has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 August 1999, Landmine Monitor was told in April 2000 that it was "in the process of sending its report."173 An earlier article in Le Mauricien suggested that this omission was due mainly to administrative constraints and personnel shortage.174
Mauritius participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 with a delegation led by Hon. Rajkeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The Minister called for universalization of the treaty and paid tribute to the ICBL, urging the meeting to "set up a suitable framework that encourages Civil Society's further engagement."175
Mauritius has not participated in any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva. Mauritius voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had done on key pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997 and 1998.
Public awareness and sympathy on the landmines issue was heightened following media reports of new dangers posed by mines that had shifted after the flooding in neighboring Mozambique in February-March 2000.
The situation in the country remains the same, in that Mauritius has never produced, exported, or used any antipersonnel mines. A number of AP mines have been retained for training purposes in accordance with Article 3 of the treaty and are in the custody of the Mauritius Police Force, in a classified location.176 Details on the number and type of mines retained were not disclosed.
Mauritius is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, but it has not ratified Amended Protocol II.
In May 1999, Mauritius pledged a contribution of US$50,000 over a period of five years to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance.177 As a developing country, which is not affected by a mine problem, Mauritius made such a gesture as a mark of solidarity toward those territories that are mine-infested, and toward victims of these indiscriminate weapons.178
Key developments since March 1999: Mozambique hosted the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999. It served as co-chair of the SCE on Mine Clearance. Mozambique introduced UNGA Resolution 54/54B, which was adopted in December 1999. In April 2000, work began on a national Level One Impact Survey. About five square kilometers of land was cleared in 1999, bringing the overall total to 194 square kilometers. Despite fears that the February and March 2000 floods would result in an increase in mine casualties, the number of mine casualties continued to decline, falling from 133 casualties in 1998 to 60 casualties in 1999.
Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1999 and ratified on 25 August 1998. Mozambique is not known to have enacted domestic implementation legislation. Mozambique has yet to submit its Article 7 transparency measures report, which was due by 27 August 1999.179
Mozambique hosted the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP), which took place in Maputo from 3-7 May 1999 and was attended by 108 governments in addition to international and non-governmental organizations.180 The FMSP was opened by Mozambican President Joaquim Alberto Chissano who stated, "The choice of Mozambique bears testimony to our country's commitment to fulfill the goals of the Convention-a commitment dating back to the process that culminated in the signing of the Convention in Ottawa."181 Foreign Minister Leonardo Simão was elected President of the FMSP and Carlos dos Santos, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations in New York, was Secretary-General of the meeting. Nobel Peace Laureate and ICBL Ambassador Jody Williams addressed the opening plenary and formally presented the Landmine Monitor Report 1999 to the President and assembled delegates. Farida Gulamo of the Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines also addressed the opening plenary. From 8-9 May 1999 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines held its Second General Meeting in Maputo directly after the FMSP.182
Mozambique has been very active in the intersessional program of work conducted by the Standing Committees of Experts. It co-chairs the committee on mine clearance and representatives have participated in all standing committee of experts meetings in 1999 and 2000.
Mozambique introduced and secured 109 co-sponsors on the 1999 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B calling for the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The resolution was adopted by the UNGA on 1 December 1999 by a vote of 139 to 1, with 20 abstentions. In a statement at the UN, the Mozambican Permanent Representative "hoped that growing awareness and action on the issue of anti-personnel mines at various levels would result in concrete actions and would relieve the suffering of innocent children, women and the elderly around the world."183
Mozambique is not a party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Destruction
Mozambique is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It has imported AP mines from a number of sources.184
Details regarding mine stockpiles in Mozambique have not yet been made public. This information will become available with Mozambique's Article 7 report. It is unknown if Mozambique requires assistance in the destruction of its stocks. In a joint operation in May 2000, South African and Mozambican police destroyed an arms cache in Mozambique, which included twenty-three mines.185 A Christian Council of Mozambique initiative in Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, and Zambezia provinces had destroyed 60,000 weapons including landmines by July 2000.186
Minefields have been located in all provinces of Mozambique, but the most heavily mined regions are found along the border with Zimbabwe in the west of Manica province, in the center of the country in Zambezia and Tete provinces, and in the south in Maputo and Inhambane provinces. Few maps and records were kept of the mines laid during Mozambique's decades-long civil war, which ended in 1992. Mines were used by both the Frelimo government and the Renamo rebels around areas including military headquarters, towns and villages, sources of water and power, pylon lines and dams, as well as on roads, tracks and paths and alongside bridges and railway lines.187 Many of the mines in Mozambique were laid around bridges and culverts, to protect bridges from being attacked by people intent on blowing them up.188 Since the war, many of these, including the bridges on N1, the main road up the country, have simply been demarcated as mined areas, and/or cleared when the roads were repaired. On smaller upcountry grade roads, the culverts and bridges were similarly mined and even fewer of these have been cleared.
The National Demining Institute (IND) has recorded a nationwide total of 1,759 mined areas.189
Impact of Flooding
The floods that inundated the coastal lagoons and floodplains of Gaza, Maputo, and Inhambane provinces in February and March 2000 caused major international concern. The major area of flooding in Gaza and Maputo provinces fell in the Accelerated Demining Program's (ADP) core area of operation, while the flooding in the Save River (between Inhambane and Sofala/Manica) is in the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Handicap International (HI) working area. By mid-March, ADP had used satellite images (taken on 28 February and 1-4 March) to produce hardcopy maps at 1:400,000 scale.190 These maps show the extent of the flooding as an overlay on existing National Demining Institute and ADP data. The maps were distributed to relief agencies via the Emergency Mine Action Committee (EMAC) and UN Development Program (UNDP) to use in operations in and around the flooded area.
The flooded areas largely comprised low-lying agricultural land previously under formal irrigation. The area is highly populated, with market towns such as Macarretane, Chokwe, Chibuto, and Xia-Xai.
The maps show that less than a dozen recorded mined or potentially mined sites were inundated. This is a small figure in proportion to the national figure of 1,759 mined sites, or 380 in Maputo and Gaza combined.191 However some significant minefields were flooded.
The major problem was not mines in the flooded area, but the movement of internally displaced people (IDPs) away from the floods and into areas to the southeast just inside Maputo province and over the Mazimechopes river. The flooding quickly displaced up to 200,000 people, mostly farmers.192 By comparison to the floodplains in Gaza, Maputo Province contains a relatively high concentration of small minefields, and in the rural north of the province few of these are formally marked.
The main aim of the EMAC was to provide data and coordinate mine awareness activities for all the agencies working with IDPs. In the first week of April 2000 there was one mine accident involving an ADP deminer working in the emergency zone.193 But as of 12 April 2000, no other injuries or deaths were recorded by IND in or around the flood zone. The flooding claimed between 640 and 700 lives.194
Concern remains that some mines placed on or around riverbanks and bridges may have been moved by the floodwaters or buried in silt. On the basis of mapped information there appears to be little likelihood of this, and the problem remains small compared to the risks run by IDPs now trying to re-establish lives in proximity to minefields. The mines did not impact on the relief efforts but since some relief centers were in the proximity of minefields, the floods changed priorities for mine clearance.195
In response to the flooding, the Rome meeting allocated $7.5 million for mine action over a period of 18 months. As part of the Rome package, the government requested $806,200 for IND. This broke down as: $450,000 for Administration and costs in IND, $50,000 for mapping and imaging, $200,000 for training, $6,200 for removal/ EOD equipment, and $100,00 for aerial support services.196
The Canadian International Demining Centre (CIDC) is in the process of executing a National Level One Impact Survey funded by the government of Canada, through its development wing CIDA. The total budget is around $1.8 million.197 This survey is being executed in a manner generally compliant with international standards and based upon the protocols and procedures as developed by the Survey Action Center (SAC).198 The implementation of this effort has gone slowly due to uncertainty surrounding the operation of the CND, adaption of Impact survey protocols and supporting database to the context of Mozambique, contract and operational management issues and the April floods.
In order to ensure that the survey is conducted in a manner compliant with international initiatives and standards related to Impact Surveys, the CIDC has based much of its working procedures on field protocols developed by the Survey Action Center. Additionally, the Survey Action Center provides a part-time Quality Assurance Monitor to the project, who assesses progress in accordance with UNMAS standards for Certification and reports this progress back through the SAC to UNMAS. This monitoring and reporting process creates a link between CIDC and the other ongoing Impact Surveys, giving the team in Mozambique expanded access to subject matter expertise and lessons learned in the field of Impact Surveys.
Throughout 1999 the CIDC tried to recruit the survey teams in Mozambique but had little success. The available pool of skilled staff in Maputo was small and CIDC did not want to "poach" skilled staff from other existent and active demining units.199 In the end they recruited twenty-five researchers with high school education or above and ability in at least two languages and ran a thirty-five-day training course at the ADP facility at Moamba near Maputo.200 In March 2000, CIDC hired a manager on a twelve-month contract. CIDC had experienced problems with importation taxes and customs, helping to create a six-month hold-up. Then throughout March and April the CIDC survey reviewed the toponomy of Mozambique, creating a revised register of over 10,000 place names, and identified around 2000 villages to be surveyed.
The survey did not start work in March in the south due to the flooding and finally in April 2000 two survey teams were deployed (by ferry) to Nampula to begin work in the northern four provinces. By mid-May 2000 Nampula was finished and Cabo Delgado was fifty percent completed but a quarter of the two teams were sick with malaria and some key members of the survey teams had left due to the difficult conditions.201
In Maputo, the survey moved from its temporary offices to the IND offices in late April, and began cross-referencing data from IND data and HALO Trust, a process that will also include data from ADP, Handicap International (HI), World Vision, and NPA. At the beginning of June the survey received plotting and IT equipment, four months after the equipment was ordered.
The survey was originally funded for one year, but the Canadian donors have extended the contract by one year. The project manager intends to produce a report in late 2000, which outlines the history of the survey and provides lessons learned.202
By March 1999 the donor community had seemingly lost faith in the National Demining Commission (CND) under Osorio Severiano.203 The new National Demining Institute (IND) and its new director from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Artur Verissimo, replaced the CND in mid-1999. IND has pushed for investment in two provincial offices, one in Nampula and one in Chimoio, to coordinate with HALO and NPA, to act as conduit between Provincial government and mine action in the provinces, and to collect information for IND in Maputo.204
In early March 2000, the UNDP, ADP and IND organized an Emergency Mine Action Committee (EMAC) which met with relief agencies and coordinated mine action related to the flooding. IND took a lead role in convening and chairing meetings and coordination of activities. Formal meetings were held at least twice a week to inform relief agencies and coordinate mine awareness activities for internally displaced people.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, between 1993 and the end of 1998, funding for demining in Mozambique exceeded $116 million.
The U.S. has been the largest single donor, having provided over $20 million to mine action in Mozambique since 1993. The U.S. has provided assistance to HALO Trust, NPA, POWER, and ADP. It is the sole donor working to support the military to establish a long-term Mozambican capacity based within the military. In 1999 the U.S. provided a total of $3 million for mine action programs, and the U.S. contribution in 2000 is expected to total $4 million. The U.S. intends to provide dogs for the military via RONCO, make an equipment grant to IND ($140,000), provide funding for HALO Trust, and explore the potential of funding the clearance of power lines in Sofala (Malovusi to Hatunda).205
Japan is considering funding for clearance of railways and strategic infrastructure. The outcome of the clearance of Massingir in 1998 ($1 million from Japan and $1 million from the U.S.) was largely successful: seventeen formal defensive minefields were cleared (89,634 square meters) of 192 AP mines and 157 UXO were destroyed. Japan is interested to repeat the initiative on a different site again using Mechem as contractor. HALO Trust received a small grant of $83,333 for equipment.
Denmark provided $400,000 via UNDP, which in part went to cover a Chief Technical Advisor for ADP who arrived in February 2000.206
Funding for mine action207
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| Donor | Program | Implementor |
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| Australia | Demining in Sofala | ? |
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| Australian Army Technical Assistance to ADP | ADP |
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| Austria | Demining Sofala Marromeu, Chibabava and Buzi | Local Co. |
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| Canada | National Level 1 Survey (upgrading) | CND/ADP/CIDC |
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| Production of GIS maps at 1:50,000 (by air survey) | CND/ADP/CIDC |
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| 3 TCOs to support database in CND / ADP | CND/ADP/CIDC |
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| HI demining in Inhambane | HI |
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| Support for Mine Awareness in the flood zone | Various |
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| Denmark | ADP Demining | ADP |
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| IND institutional support | IND |
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| EU | ADP Demining | ADP |
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| Finland | ADP Demining | ADP |
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| Provision of 2 Sisu-Patria RA140DS flails & 6 TCOs | ADP |
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| HI mine awareness campaign | HI |
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| Germany | GTZ Integrated Humanitarian Demining for Development IHDD) survey and demining in Manica and Sofala Provinces. | GTZ Mine-Tech |
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| Ireland | ADP demining in Inhambane | ADP |
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| Italy | UNOPS project Gorogosa and Manica | ? |
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| Japan | ADP demining via UN VTF | ADP |
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| Mozambique | Annual budget of CND | CND |
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| Netherlands | HALO Trust demining in Nampula | HALO |
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| HI level 2 survey in Inhambane | HI |
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| NPA Phase III demining and reconstruction | NPA |
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| New Zealand | 2 TCOs to ADP | ADP |
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| Norway | NPA demining | NPA |
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| IND administrational grant | IND |
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| HI mine awareness support to IND | HI |
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| Sweden | HI demining in Inhambane | HI |
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| HI mine awareness support to IND | HI |
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| Switzerland | HALO demining in Cabo Delgardo | HALO |
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| HI mine awareness support to IND | HI |
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| Mine awareness post-floods | HI |
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| Demining in Matalane and Gorongosa | Afrovita |
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| UK | HALO demining in Zambezia | HALO |
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| UNICEF | Mine awareness post-floods | HI |
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| USA | Mine Dogs for ADP | Ronco |
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| Equipment for 1st Bat. Deminers. 200 sets of kit | FADM |
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| Demining Equipment (response to flooding) |
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The United Nations also contributes, as does the UN Association-USA's "Adopt-a-Minefield" initiative.208
By 1998, some 189 square kilometers of land had been cleared in Mozambique.209 Data from five of the major mine clearance organizations indicates that a total of five square kilometers was cleared in 1999. This is far more than the reported IND figure of two square kilometers. Statistical collection and analysis for mine clearance operations in 1999 were badly disrupted by the changeover from CND to IND and departure of the UNDP and UNV support staff. Although ADP, HALO Trust, and NPA have reported consistently, it is apparent that many commercial companies have not. The database has not been proactively maintained, and the following incomplete statistics illustrate the point.
Mine Clearance Figures210
| Source | CND
4th Qtr 1999 |
Noticias211
17 January 2000 |
Estimated Total for 1999 |
| AP Mines | 53,624 | 56,176 | 2,552 |
| AT Mines | 302 | 456 | 154 |
| UXO | 23,977 | 30,432 | 6,455 |
| Small Arms Ammunition | 424,396 | ||
| Roads (kilometers) | 7,400.14 | 7,733.2 | 333.06 |
| Roads (square meters) | 62,276,987 | ||
| Power lines (kilometers) | 385.54 | 1,829.45 | 1,444 |
| Power lines (square meters) | 72,413,455 | ||
| Railroads (kilometers) | 90.4 | ||
| Railroads (square meters) | 22,600,000 | ||
| Areas (square meters) | 38,573,125 | ||
| Total (square meters) | 175,523,567 | 177,000,000 | 2,000,000 |
| Total (hectares) | 17,552.36 | 17,700 | 200 |
Details on individual organizations involved in mine clearance follows.
1) Accelerated Demining Program (ADP):212 ADP reports that it is fully funded for FY2000, which includes approximately $2 million in new capital equipment, vehicles, radios, detectors, tools, and protection equipment.213 ADP receives funding from: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.S (in kind). A major problem for ADP is finding funding for core costs, notably Mozambican salaries. A notable exception to this is Japan, a major contributor to ADP via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. Japan has earmarked funds specifically for local salaries. Finland contributed two Sisu Patria RA 140DS flails and six technical cooperation officers for a four-year program that began in September 1999. The technical cooperation officers all have experience in UN Peacekeeping operations. In 1999, ADP cleared 1,200,000 square meters of land with a staff of 500 people and a budget of around $4.5 million.
2) Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).214 This Norwegian-based NGO employs approximately 500 staff in seven demining teams of between fifty-five and 107 persons. Thirteen mine detection dogs work in a mine dog section, and there is also a monitoring team and a medical team. NPA hopes to build up to an operational capacity of approximately 560 staff in 2000. NPA cleared around 2,200,000 square meters of land in 1999. In the last quarter (October to December) they cleared 369,414 square meters of land, 7.2 kilometers of road, 277 AP mines, eighty-three UXO, and 1,615 items of small arms ammunition. In 1998-99, NPA received $7.8 million in funds from Norway ($4 million), Denmark ($1.5 million), Sweden ($1.3 million), and the Netherlands ($1 million).
3) The HALO Trust:215 The British-based NGO HALO is in the process of completing a comprehensive re-survey of the four northern provinces of Mozambique, and will be publishing a full report towards the end of 2000. HALO survey teams have re-surveyed all the known suspect sites, and have interviewed local authorities in every district in the four provinces. Preliminary results are encouraging and show that a large proportion of previously reported dangerous areas are in fact safe and mine free, as evidenced by agricultural activities and housing on the areas and the total absence of any accidents to humans or livestock.
Currently HALO has 7 manual teams, 3 survey/EOD teams deployed on tasks prioritized with the provincial and district authorities. During 2000 HALO also deployed 3 mechanical clearance teams. The mechanical teams equipped with armoured Volvo front loaders are now working in Zambezia and Nampula, and it is planned to extend their work into Cabo Delgado and Naissa in 2001.
HALO expects that by 2002 operations in Niassa and Zambezia will be in the final phase of clearance and HALO is working towards establishing small mobile multi-disciplined teams that will be able to react on call out to suspect areas or items.
4) Handicap International (HI): This NGO based in France employs 135 staff in five demining teams, including one specialized in Level 2 technical survey, in Inhambane province. HI carries out "proximity demining" which cleared areas of high concern for the local community including infrastructure, such as schools and wells, and land. HI hopes to add a supplementary team of sixteen deminers to work in the north of Inhambane province, where the Save river flooded in February and March 2000, and a mine detection dogs capacity is also planned. Between 1997 and 2000 HI received funding from donors including: the European Commission ($1.2 million from 1997-1999); Région Nord pas de Calais ($8,380 in 1998); Sweden ($674,950 from 1998-1999); The Netherlands ($500,000 from 1996-1999 and $177,000 for 2000) and Canada ($956,000 in 2000-2001).
5) Menschen gegen Minen (MGM):216 Germany-based NGO MgM has prepared a $1.37 million proposal to clear 110 kilometers of railway Songo to Matambo in Tete, and 235 kilometers of road and the German government has pledged $600,000 for Phase I budget. Phase I comprises 52 kilometers of railway bordered by minefields which zig-zag in an uncertain way somewhat parallel to the railway.
6) Mechem:217 In 1999, South African-based commercial clearance company Mechem completed the clearance of the mined areas around Massingir dam in 100 working days over a total period approaching six months. This involved clearance of mined areas within a four kilometer radius of the dam, in which the priorities were the dam itself, the adjacent airfield, roads and access tracks and inhabited/developed areas. The three-phase program surveyed 790,000 square meters of suspected mined area and eventually cleared 89,634 square meters of land with just eighteen deminers, destroying approximately 190 AP mines and 170 UXO. In 1999, Mechem cleared 790,000 square meters at Masingir.
7) Mine Tech:218 This Zimbabwe-based commercial company carried out four or five different projects in Mozambique in 1999. UNDP/CND (IND) funded its clearance of mined areas to facilitate the construction of a power line between Xai Xai and Inhambane. Mine Tech cleared 242,611 square meters under and around the power lines. The German government entity GTZ funded an Integrated Humanitarian Demining for Development project in Manica and 25,318 square meters were cleared around three villages. GTZ funded the clearance of one village minefield with integrated manual and MDD techniques supported with mechanical bush clearance, and cleared 176,280 square meters.219 MOTRACO funded Mine Tech clearance of 340,000 square meters around electrical pylons between Infulene to Komatipoort. This project and the UNDP/IND work carry over into 2000. Mine Tech carried out some community mine-awareness work and Level 2 survey work near Gorongosa, both funded by GTZ. In 1999, Mine Tech cleared a total of 784,209 square meters.
8) RONCO Consulting Corporation:220 Through a U.S. Department of State contract, RONCO is providing six mine detecting dogs and support to the ADP's Mine Detection Dog Program, including personnel training, development of management systems and provision of equipment, supplies and facilities. This task order will be completed by August 2000.
9) Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias de Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda (CGTVA):221 In 1999, this Portugal-based commercial company received funding from Denmark to carry out Quality Assurance and some small clearance activities.
10) Emprensa Mocambicana de Desminagem:222 In 1999, this Mozambican commercial company received $600,000 funding from Austria for demining, training, and awareness in Marromeu, Chibababva, and Buzi, in Sofala province.
11) Afrovita:223 In 1999, this Mozambican commercial demining company received $375,000 from Switzerland to work in Matalane and Gorongosa.
12) Special Clearance Services (SCS): 224 This Zimbabwe-based commercial mine clearance company has operated in Mozambique since 1996. In 2000 it was taken over by Armor Holdings Ltd. and relocating to South Africa. It hopes to win contracts in Mozambique.
13) Lince Lda:225 This is subsidiary company of BRZ International and has conducted mine clearance and verification work for two contracts, at Motraco and at Ressano Garcia. It has also conducted Quality Assurance work in Beira and Marraquene.
14) Qualitas:226 Qualitas is a subsidiary company of BRZ which is "in the process of being accredited in Mozambique to work on QA contracts for IND."
15) Necochaminas: This Mozambican demining NGO was established by former Mozambican Special Armed Forces personnel but it is not known if it has undertaken any mine clearance operations yet.
16) International Demining: International Demining is managed by South African businessman Frank Lipko. It is not currently accredited to the IND and is not engaged in any mine action in Mozambique but it believed to have sought work there.
17) Africa Deminers: This commercial company was originally called TNT. Africa Deminers is managed by South African businessman Gabriel Schroeder. It was contracted in 1999 by a road construction company to clear the new road from Maputo to Ressano Garcia on the border with South Africa. In late 1999 Africa Deminers is believed to have lost its accreditation with the IND.
18) The Forcas Armadas da Defesa de Mozambique (FADM). Recognizing that Mozambique needs a long term demining capacity, the United States has been providing training and equipment to the 1st Battalion of the Mozambican infantry. In 1999 the U.S. fully equipped 200 deminers. The FADM deminers have not yet deployed.
In 1994, Handicap International took over coordination of mine awareness throughout Mozambique and created the National Coordination Program of Education Activities to Prevent Mines and UXO Accidents (PEPAM). PEPAM is an HI project run in collaboration with the Mozambican Red Cross and the Ministry of Education, as well as over eighty-six national, provincial, and local partners.
Phase III of the HI's Mine Risk Education (MRE) program was completed in 1999. MRE ran from January 1998 to December 1999 with a budget of $2.5 million from France, Sweden, Norway, Finland, USA, Switzerland, Australia, UNDP, and UNICEF. MRE targeted at risk rural populations, students, the various mine clearance agencies and actors involved in mine awareness. MRE also fed information and feedback into the National Demining Commission, the Ministry of Education, and the Mozambican Red Cross.
HI started an emergency mine awareness campaign following the February-March 2000 floods. Five mobile teams worked in IDP's camp in Gaza and Inhambane province in order to reduce the risk of incidents following displaced mines along the rivers.
Mozambique is a case study in a project entitled "Assistance to Mine Affected Communities" by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The PRIO study of mine affected communities is funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.227
Despite fears that the February and March 2000 floods would result in an increase in mine casualties, the number of landmine casualties in Mozambique continues to decline. In 1999 the decline was quite dramatic, falling from 133 casualties in 1998 to 60 casualties in 1999, according to IND. In 1999 there were 23 incidents in mine clearance operations resulting in 23 injured and five fatalities.228 In the last quarter of 1999, one death, that of a deminer in Maputo province, and seven injuries were recorded.229
Data on mine accidents is collected under the PEPAM system housed at the IND, with technical assistance from HI which collects, verifies and analyses accident report forms.
Many of the incidents are in Maputo province, which by Mozambican standards is densely populated. In September 1999 the Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines called for better demarcation of minefields and suspected mined areas in the region of Ressano Garcia, which borders South Africa.230 The border areas were heavily mined during the war, and South Africa is an attractive place for Mozambicans seeking work who cross the border illegally.
Landmine casualties by province for 1998 - 1999231
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| Maputo |
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| Gaza |
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| Inhambane |
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| Sofala |
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| Manica |
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| Tete |
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| Zambezia |
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| Nampula |
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| C.Delgardo |
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1) Handicap International (HI). HI has operated in Mozambique since 1986, when, at the request of the government, it established two orthopedics centers in Inhambane province. By 1992, HI had built two transit centers where patients could stay while being treated at the orthopedic centers. In total, six orthopedic centers have been established by HI in the cities of Vilanculos, Inhambane, Lichinga, Tete, Pemba, and Nampula. HI has been pursuing a policy of integrating these six centers within the Ministry of Health. HI has arranged for four of its technicians to attend a course in Lyons to upgrade to Category I in 2000.
2) POWER. This UK-based NGO arrived in 1995. POWER oversaw the running of four former ICRC centers and was responsible for the production of polypropylene orthopedic components at its Maputo orthopedic center. In 1997 the four POWER centers fitted 703 prostheses representing about 80 per cent of national production.232 POWER estimates that there is a need to produce at least 3,000 prostheses per year. Current production levels, combining HI and POWER-type limbs, are less than 1,000 per year.233 Preliminary analysis of a 1997 survey in Inhambane and Maputo provinces by researchers from Dalhousie University, Canada, suggests that only 20.7 per cent of amputees were using a prosthesis without difficulty, while 36.4 per cent of respondents had not received any rehabilitation treatment at all.234
In late 1998 POWER renegotiated its agreement, withdrawing from direct involvement in the four centers which now fall under the Ministry of Health. POWER, however, continues to provide materials for the manufacture of limbs, both for these four centers and those of HI.
There has been investment in its staff. Two Category II prosthetists/orthotists are attending a four year course at Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland to upgrade to Category I. This makes, with the three sponsored for training by HI in Lyon, five of the twenty-four Mozambican Category II prosthetists/orthotists being overseas in 2000. There are currently sixteen in 2000 providing support for the ten centers around the country.
POWER moved offices to the new Associação dos Deficientes Moçambicanos (ADEMO) center in Maputo in 1999. ADEMO now has 63,000 members. POWER's objective is to strengthen ADEMO's management and financial capacity and to jointly initiate a Council for Action on Disability, which, it is hoped will eventually replace POWER.235
POWER also hopes to open in 2000 a new ortho-prosthetic center in Chimoio in Manica province. This will be a private, nonprofit operation managed by the Council for Action on Disability. POWER is piloting a program to train amputees to work with donkeys and carts in street cleaning.
3) Jaipur Limb Campaign. This UK-based NGO promotes the use of appropriate technology in prosthetics provided in developing countries. With funding from the National Lottery and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Mozambican Red Cross Society (CVM) it opened in 1999 a Jaipur rural orthopedic project at Manjacaze, Gaza province. This center will fit Jaipur limbs, using staff trained in the technique in India.
It is government policy to have one ortho-prosthetic center in each of the ten provinces. The center at Vilanculos in Inhambane is to be closed during 2000 while the opening in 1999 of clinics in Gaza and Manica fulfill this policy.
4) Landmine Survivors Network. This U.S.-based network to support landmine survivors became registered in Mozambique in May 1999 and officially began its activities, including conducting interviews of landmine survivors in Quelimane city, Zambezia province.236
It is the responsibility of the Ministry for Coordination of Social Action to make patients aware of the availability of prosthetic and orthotic services and to assist their travel to the centers. The Ministry has available a number of transit centers, at which patients can stay free of charge while receiving treatment, but this system is currently not running well-- mostly because of a lack of resources.237
National Disability Laws and Policy
In Mozambique, ex-military personnel with disabilities enjoy special legal status and state pensions that are not available to the rest of the disabled population. Rules and regulations recognizing the rights of persons with disabilities have existed for many years in a range of national legislation covering the education, labor, financial, transportation, military and health sectors. However, national disability organizations (which, in 1998, created a national forum to coordinate advocacy on disability rights), suggest that these rights and services exist more on paper than in practice.
The national coordinating agency for assistance to persons with disability is the Ministry of Coordination for Social Action (MICAS). With funding from Coopération Française, HI established the Institutional Support Program (PAI) to provide technical assistance to MICAS on disability matters in 1996. Three projects have been supported by PAI including the SIRT program now operating in all provinces to provide information, referrals and transportation of disabled persons to health facilities and transit centers. Under a second PAI initiative, MICAS has proposed the creation of a national disability card, which is intended to help persons with disabilities access government services.
In 1991, a national disability policy was developed by MICAS, but for political reasons failed to gain government approval. Through PAI's third project, the policy has since been redrafted and it is expected that Parliament will approve a national disability law establishing fundamental rights and principles relating to persons with physical and mental disabilities. Part of the proposed legislation foresees the creation of a National Council on Disabilities that would act as an advisory body to government and include the participation of representatives of the disabled community.238
Key developments since March 1999: Angolan UNITA rebels and Angolan government troops have used landmines inside Namibia. The number of mine incidents in Namibia has increased dramatically since December 1999. Mine clearance operations have continued and in February 2000 the U.S. completed its training program. Namibia had not submitted its Article 7 transparency measures report which was due by 27 August 1999.
Namibia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 21 September 1998. Although there is no formal national legislation passed, the treaty has become part of national law under the terms of a provision in the Namibian Constitution.
Namibia had not submitted its Article 7 transparency measures report which was due by 27 August 1999. The Namibian Campaign to Ban Landmines has been unable to establish whether any submission is being prepared and its inquiries have received no response from either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Defense.239
The country participated in the First Meeting of States Parties held at Maputo on 3-7 May 1999 by sending an officer from their Ministry of Defense. Namibia did not attend any meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. Namibia is not known to have made any statements regarding the Mine Ban Treaty or a ban more generally in 1999 or 2000. Namibia voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54 B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
Namibia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Namibia denies that it has produced or exported antipersonnel mines.240 Lingering questions regarding PMD-6 mines either assembled or produced in Namibia have not been resolved.241
As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999, Namibian officials claim that all AP mines were destroyed by May 1998, and only a small stockpile has been retained for training purposes.242 At the same time, there had been reports about a substantial stockpile of AP mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD-6 AP mines stored at Grootfontein Military Base. In March 1999, in his annual report to Parliament, the country's Auditor-General, who carried out an inspection of the controversial ammunition storage at the Grootfontein Military Base, stated that "there were slack controls over some of the most dangerous arms and ammunition in the base."243
In late 1999 Namibia gave permission for its territory to be used by Angolan government troops as a base for attacks on UNITA positions in southeastern Angola.244 Angolan government forces were permitted to use Namibian military bases and other facilities to store and transfer weapons and ammunition to combat zones in the southeastern regions of Angola as well as in the northeastern parts of Namibia.
Angola's UNITA rebels responded to this by conducting military operations in northern Namibia including laying landmines.245 UNITA has been accused by the Namibian authorities of having planted AT and AP mines in the Kavango and Caprivi regions of the country.246
According to the police since December 1999 AP mine incidents have increased by "an alarming 12.01%."247 An examination of the mines in these incidents strongly pointed to UNITA's use:248
· improvised AT mine consisting of a two kilogram block of TNT explosives connected with South African manufactured military detonating cord to a pressure release fuze of Bulgarian origin;
· Chinese Type 72;
· South African Claymore-type mines with a mechanical pull-switch of Bulgarian origin;
· South African R2M2 AP mine. These mines were manufactured in 1978 and were in an immaculate condition and appeared to have been recently taken out of a crate. Several others found of 1987 origin, all kept under good storage conditions. According to Military Intelligence in South Africa these mines were traced to consignments given to UNITA before majority rule;
· TM-57 with a pressure switch of Bulgarian origin attached to South African manufactured military detonating fuze. This mine was possibly a South African recycled mine, dating to pre-Namibia independence when it is alleged the South African Defense Force removed the explosive content of captured Soviet mines, refilled them with inferior explosives and gave them to UNITA.
In February 2000 the U.S. Embassy "strongly urged" its citizens to avoid the "entire northern border of Namibia," adding that "UNITA has staged violent cross-border raids and planted landmines."249 In this period the U.S. Embassy, Volunteer Services Overseas (VSO) and European missions pulled out their nationals from the Ohangwena region. Telephones in rural areas of Kavango, including at hospitals were also affected by the use of landmines. Technicians, fearful of attacks by suspected UNITA rebels and their landmines refused to service faulty phone lines. Only in April did they resume their work once the security forces provided escorts.250
On 11 April 2000, suspected UNITA rebels blew up electricity pylons, bringing the construction industry to a standstill in Caprivi and Kavango. Two women were injured after stepping on AP mines left by the assailants in the area.251 On 29 May 2000 a landmine exploded in the middle of Ntara Catholic church just after a service finished. Twenty-six-year-old Renate Nekaro stepped on the AP mine while leaving church and lost her right foot. Eight others were slightly injured. This incident brought to sixteen the number of mine victims that week in Kavango.252 In the same period an NGO worker witnessed three landmines put across a road with a tripwire to ensure that the first car driving in the morning would set off the mines.253
Not all freshly placed mines may have been laid by UNITA rebels. On 19 April 2000, a news report on the local NBC radio quoted Ambrosius Haingura, a regional counselor, as cautioning that "UNITA rebels should not be blamed for all the criminal activities in the Kavango region."254 Haingura was reacting to a landmine incident and attacks on civilians two days previously. In May several Angolans linked to the Angolan military were put on trial in Rundu for possessing and using landmines for criminal gain.255
Use by Angolan Government Forces
There have been reports of possession and use of AP mines inside Namibia by Angolan government troops. Two members of the Angolan Armed Forces were charged with possession in May 2000. Also in May, two other members of the Angolan Armed Forces were arrested following a robbery and an AP mine incident at Ntara village. 0
Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations that Namibian forces have used mines inside Namibian territory. Nor is Landmine Monitor aware of any allegations of use of mines by Namibian forces in Angola, during their joint operations against UNITA. In January 2000 the media reported on a joint operation inside Angola and published pictures of Namibian and Angolan government soldiers said to have been injured in mine explosions near UNITA's former bush base at Jamba in southeastern Angola.1
Angolan forces, however, have used mines against UNITA. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, such as Namibia, may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation, such as Angola, that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention." Moreover, Namibia could be in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty if it were to permit Angolan forces to stockpile antipersonnel mines inside Namibia, or to transit AP mines across Namibian territory, or to use AP mines on Namibian territory.
Although most of the forces fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo have been accused of laying landmines, Landmine Monitor is not aware of any allegations of use by Namibian troops supporting the government forces of Laurent Kabila. But, it does appear likely that Kabila's forces have used antipersonnel mines, and possibly others foreign armies fighting on the side of the government. (See Landmine Monitor report on DRC). Again, Namibia could be in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by virtue of engaging in joint military operations with any armed force that uses antipersonnel mines.
Namibia should make clear the nature of its support for any foreign forces that are using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with Angola and the DRC. As a party to the treaty, Namibia should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
An assessment mission from the UNMAS visited the country toward the end of 1999. UNMAS concluded, "The landmine situation in Namibia constitutes neither a humanitarian emergency nor a major obstacle for development." It stated, "The mine problem in Namibia is finite, well known and could be solved relatively quickly given the appropriate resources and co-ordination. Therefore, Namibia could become the first, or one of the first, mine-affected countries to declare itself mine free."2
However, as noted above, there is a growing problem in the Kavango and Caprivi districts due to conflict involving Namibian, Angolan, and UNITA forces. Mines and UXO are still present in the densely populated Kaokoland, Owambo, Kavango, and Caprivi Strip districts in the northwestern, northern, and northeastern regions of the country as a result of twenty-three years of conflict between Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) and South African troops.
Although more than 60% of the country's population inhabits these areas, only a small fraction could be described as "affected" in terms of occasional explosions, leading to civilian casualties, as well as destruction of livestock.
Most of the mined areas are unmarked. This includes the areas where mine clearance operations were underway.3 Nine former military bases of the South African Defense Force (SADF) were properly marked as they were protected by antipersonnel mines. However, civilians had since removed most of fencing around such bases in order to make their own fences at home. Records, including maps of such minefields, were handed over to the incoming Namibian government in 1990 by the SADF.
The U.S. began funding a range of mine action programs in 1995. This included "train-the-trainer" programs for mine clearance, establishment and operation of a national demining office, equipment, and mine awareness programs. Total U.S. funding through 1999 was $8.3 million. This included $1.053 million in fiscal year 1999 (October 1998-September 1999) for mine clearance along the power pylons in the northwestern parts of the country. An additional $300,000 will be contributed in fiscal year 2000, and $100,000 more in 2001, for mine clearance along the power lines.4 The sole recipient of this U.S. funding is the Namibian government. The U.S. Defense Department training program was completed in February 2000.
There is no policy, criteria, strategy, or practice governing the allocation and use of mine action funds or in-kind contributions. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Defense are responsible for receiving funding donated for mine action in the country. There appears to be cooperation between the two institutions. Whereas the Ministry of Defense is responsible for mine clearance, the Ministry of Information is responsible for mine awareness education.
Apart from the U.S. government and the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), a British NGO, neither the government nor any other organizations or individuals in the country are known to have made financial and other in-kind contributions to humanitarian mine action in the country. On 16 June 1999, MAG donated $2,000 to the NCBL to monitor military mine clearance operations along the 409 power pylons in the northwestern parts of the country. Namibia does not appear to have any domestic resources for mine action.
Mine clearance operations have been underway in Namibia since 1989.5 >From March 1995 to February 2000, the U.S. carried out a "train-the-trainer" program.
The clearance around nine former military bases conducted between 1995-1998 destroyed 2,383 antipersonnel mines and 1,107 UXO.6 The clearing of the berms and minefields around 409 power pylons as part of a second mine clearance program were declared as "success" by the Ministry of Defense. On 28 October 1999, the State Secretary for Defense informed a conference of the SADC Mine Action Committee that a total of 3,161 antipersonnel mines and 1,107 UXO have been destroyed since the program began in 1998. 7 Of these, 1,214 were destroyed from 200 of the 409 pylons.8
Namibia has hosted demonstrations and field tests of several demining technologies. MgM, a German mine clearance NGO, tested its ROTAR sifter in September 1999. Previously, the U.S. provided prototype machinery called a "berm processor" to mechanically clear landmines from berms surrounding 409 electrical pylons.
There are no procedures to ensure that land cleared of mines is transferred to those who are entitled to it. The prime beneficiaries of mine-cleared land would be the local communities. In the absence of a demographic survey it is impossible to quantify the effect of mine clearance in the country. Except in one case where the former SADF base at Omahenene was converted to be used as headquarters of a women's development project and offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, none of the other former bases have been put to specific civilian use.9
Some communities are not satisfied with the mine clearance as mine explosions do occur even in areas said to have been cleared. At least two mine explosions have occurred in the Ohangwena and Omusati regions, which were declared "mine free" in 1998 by the Namibian Defense Force.10 An antitank mine explosion occurred at Onengali Village, in Ohangwena Region in November 1999.11 Several people were injured near Etunda in the Omusati Region in January 1999.12
The number of mine incidents in Namibia has increased dramatically since December 1999. According to the police since December 1999 AP mine incidents have increased by "an alarming 12.01%."13
According to the Namibian police, two soldiers were killed while ten women and children were injured in thirteen separate mine incidents between 13 December 1999 and 2 March 2000 in the Kavango and Caprivi regions.14
According to the Namibian Red Cross between December 1999 and mid-May 2000 landmines in northern Namibia's Kavango region have injured eighty-nine people, including Angolan soldiers and civilians.15
On 10 April 2000, the Explosives Unit of the police released a report detailing mine incidents in the Kavango and Western Caprivi regions between January and April 2000. According to the report, twenty-three persons were injured while three died from such mine incidents during that period.16
On 29 June 2000, the Namibia Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) was informed by relatives that at least two Namibian soldiers died in the DRC when they stepped on "friendly" antipersonnel mines of unknown origin allegedly planted by Zimbabwean soldiers there.
The Office of the Chief Inspector of Explosives records show that from 1989-1999, there were 106 people killed and 254 injured in mine and UXO explosions.17 The data shows 87% of all accidents were due to UXO, not mines.
According to the NDF there was no "single casualty" or injury on the part of the NDF deminers.18
According to Ms. Batseba Katjioungua, Director of Social Services, Ministry of Health and Social Services, no donor funding was received to care for the over 2,000 mine victims in the country.19 However, the Namibian Red Cross in June 2000 announced that it, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were conducting an assessment of the needs of amputees.20
The government has not yet adopted any national legislation regarding persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation is primarily responsible for the coordination on disability matters.
Key developments since March 1999: Niger has not submitted its Article 7 report, which was due by 27 February 2000. Peace agreements signed in 1998 called for demining of the northern areas, but no mine clearance is believed to have taken place yet.
Niger signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 23 March 1999. The treaty entered into force for Niger on 1 September 1999. It has not undertaken any national implementation measures. Niger has not yet submitted its Article 7 transparency report, which was due by 27 February 2000. In January 2000, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent the reporting form to the Strategic Studies section of the Ministry of Defense to complete and that the report would be submitted by the due date.21
Niger participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with a delegation of officials from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. It has not attended any of the treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in 1999 and 2000. While Niger supported pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998, it was absent from the vote on the UNGA resolution in support of the treaty on 1 December 1999.
Niger is not a party to Amended Protocol II of the the Convention on Conventional Weapons, nor is it a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
While Niger is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines, its armed forces are believed to stockpile AP mines. The government has not provided information on the quantity or types of mines held in storage.
While Niger's political situation stabilized somewhat in December 1999 when a new government was inaugurated, non-state actors in the north and east of the country continue to be active, including the Tuareg and Toubou rebels. Antipersonnel mines have been used in the past, allegedly by both the Niger Armed Forces and the rebels. Although there have been new victims to uncleared mines, Landmine Monitor could not establish if these were victims from mines laid in 1999 and 2000 or from mines laid before this time. According to an NGO called "Democracy 2000," the Sahara Revolutionary Armed Forces (comprising FARS and Toubou rebels) laid AP mines to protect their bases in the Aïr mountains in the north and central regions of the country and in the Ténéré area of in the Sahara desert.22
Peace agreements signed with the FARS Toubou rebellion in N'Djaména in 1998 included provisions for demining of the northern areas of Niger affected by mines, but no mine clearance is believed to have taken place yet. Niger is mine-affected not only from recent armed conflict, but also from mine-laying dating back to World War Two.
The Niger Armed Forces kept records of mine victims in 1999 but exact details are not publicly available. Democracy 2000 told Landmine Monitor that five people were maimed by AP landmines and cared for at the Gamkallé military garrison in Niamey, and that a civilian truck hit an AT mine near the Libyan border, causing the death of at least three people.23
Key developments since March 1999: Rwanda ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 13 June 2000. There have been allegations of Rwandan use of mines in the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, especially in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani. Rwanda denies any use. >From 1995 to February 2000, 16,983 mines and UXO were cleared in Rwanda, and about 5,000 hectares of land. Three prefectures that were the most affected are now 90% cleared. In April 2000, the National Demining Office reported that clearance operations had been postponed since December 1999 due to lack of explosives. The U.S. military completed its demining training program in February 2000. In 1999 and 2000, there have been twelve mine casualties.
Rwanda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 June 2000. There is not believed to be any domestic implementation legislation in place in Rwanda. Rwanda's Article 7 transparency measures report will be due by 22 July 2001.
Rwanda was absent during the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999. It was also absent from the vote on a similar resolution in 1998 but voted in support of pro-ban resolutions in 1996 and 1997.
Rwanda participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999 in a delegation led by Col. Emmanuel Bem Habyarimana of the Ministry of Defense. In a statement to the plenary, Col. Habyarimana stated that "mines continue to destroy the lives of innocent people. This is the reason that my country is prepared to fight with much vigor against the existence of arms."24 He described the National Demining Office (NDO) created in Rwanda, and said that "there over 800,000 mines throughout Rwanda, in the country side, pastures, forests, valleys. The [NDO] has destroyed 270,000 mines."25 However, a recent report from the National Demining Office stated that there were about 50,000 mines in the country, and 16,983 mines had been destroyed.26
Rwanda has not participated in any of the ban treaty intersessional Standing Committee of Experts meetings. Rwanda is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Rwanda is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The UN records thirty-nine types of mines being found in Rwanda from Belgium, China, former Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Italy, Pakistan, former Soviet Union, and the U.S. Italian and former Soviet mines are the most common.27 Rwanda has imported antipersonnel mines. Details on the size and composition of Rwanda's current stockpile of AP mines are not available.
For the past two years, Rwandan military forces have been supporting the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie) opposition forces in their fight against the government of Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).28 There have been allegations of use of mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC, particularly in June 2000 when Rwanda and Uganda, former allies in supporting Kabila, engaged in conflict.
In early June 2000, a fierce battle between Rwandan and Ugandan armies for control of the northern DRC city of Kisangani left more than 500 people dead, most of them civilians.29 Observers have reported use of mines in that battle. (See Landmine Monitor report on DRC). A UN official told Landmine Monitor that Uganda and Rwanda had both used mines in the fighting over Kisangani.30
Ugandan Army spokesman Phinehas Katirima accused the Rwandan army of planting landmines to blow up the Tchopo bridge in Kisangani, "The fact that the wire connected to the battery that was to be used to detonate the mines ended up in the Rwandan army defences is a clear indication of the Rwandan motives.... Our positions were north of the bridge and the wires connecting the landmines to the batteries are south of the bridge where the Rwandans were. It is a shame to attempt to blow up a bridge."31 >From this description, it is not clear if the devices were in fact landmines, or whether they were antipersonnel or antivehicle mines, or whether they were victim-activated or command-detonated mines. Antivehicle and command-detonated mines are permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty.
The UN Observer Mission in Congo (MONUC) stopped civilians from using the bridge and sent for demining experts from Kinshasa.32 Two days later, the bridge was reopened after it was reported cleared in "a successful demining operation carried out by RCD" according to a humanitarian source.33 Four days later a rebel RCD spokesman, Kin-Kiey Mulumba, told media, "Our main troops are going to leave the center of the city.... We shall leave behind the de-mining teams and some force at the two airports."34 This raises the question of what the demining teams are staying to remove.
Outside of Kisangani, in August 1999 local people in the Bukavu area from Ngando village told Landmine Monitor that they believed Rwandan soldiers planted a mine on a path frequently used by Interahamwe militiamen.35 A cow detonated the landmine.
Landmine Monitor Report 1999 noted that Namibia and Zimbabwe had accused both Rwanda and Uganda of use of mines in the DRC. At that time Rwanda and Uganda were allies in the conflict.36
Rwandan military officials have repeatedly denied allegations that Rwanda used AP mines during the operation in the DRC. One official told Landmine Monitor that Rwandan troops do not lay mines in the DRC and that Rwanda is committed to the 8 April 2000 Lusaka Agreement.37 Article 2 of the Lusaka Agreement states that the parties involved in the DRC war shall not place any additional minefields, barriers, or protective obstacles. It also states that "provision of all data on minefields by all parties (to include detailed maps of the minefields) is one of the conditions required to enable staff planning for disengagement."38
Prior to the Lusaka Agreement, a September 1999 cease-fire agreement for the DRC was signed by a Joint Military Commission (JMC), including Rwanda, which formally prohibits the use of AP mines. The agreement says in part, "Each party to the agreement shall give instructions to its forces [and to forces] it supports or which are on the territory under its control to prohibit all kind of reinforcement of troops, the supply of arms, ammunitions and other war materials as well as the laying of mines."39 The agreement further states that, "Each party to the agreement shall communicate to the JMC or if not possible, by confidential mail delivered by hand to the OAU Secretariat, in a period of time not exceeding 10 days from 12 October 1999, maps of the minefields which its force have deployed as well as forms, along with documented and scaled maps, on the positions occupied by their forces or by any other force or armed group on the Congolese territory under its control."40
It appears likely the rebel RCD forces supported by Rwanda have used antipersonnel mines. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another armed force that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."
Rwanda should make clear the nature of its support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with those forces. Rwanda should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
Rebel Use
Rebels and former soldiers who fled to the DRC (Zaire) in 1994 used landmines in Rwanda during the 1994 war and since.41 Isolated incidents in the northwestern region in the Rwerere, Rubavo, and Nyamyumba communes were reported in 1996 and 1997, but Landmine Monitor is not aware of reports in 1999 and 2000.
Prior to 1990, there was no landmine problem in Rwanda. The current problem is the result of conflict over the past decade between the majority Hutu ethnic group and the minority Tutsi. The most mine-affected areas are in the northeast (Umutara and Kigali), in the city of Kigali and in the northwest (Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). A recent report from the National Demining Office (NDO) stated that there were about 50,000 mines in the country.42
The NDO keeps a database and a country map on mined areas and updates this database every month, including the casualty incidences. The number of mines and UXO are recorded and the figure made known to the public through the awareness campaign.
U.S. demining assistance to Rwanda began in 1994 with extensive military support to establish the NDO, mine awareness training, a computer-based data collection and records management system, and a train-the-trainer program.43 The U.S. has provided about $14 million to the Rwandan demining effort since 1994, mostly in the form of equipment, training, and supplies. The U.S. military completed its demining training program in February 2000. The planned allocation of U.S. funds in Fiscal Year 2000 is $253,000, down from $750,000 in FY 1999.44
In the past UNHCR and UNICEF funded a portion of the mine awareness program, but there was no funding from these bodies in 1999 or 2000. A one-year funded UNICEF program was handed over to the NDO. The NDO has started lobbying UN agencies to get them involved in mine action activities.45
Humanitarian mine action is carried out by the National Demining Organization, established in 1995. The NDO works under the Ministry of Defense and is supported by the government. While it draws policies from the government, it operates as an independent program and sets its own priorities. The NDO is the coordinating body of mine action nationwide, and is the only recognized body dealing with mine clearance and training. It works in close collaboration with the local administration, the Ministry of Defense and some NGOs. NDO is responsible for the implementation of plans decided by the government in consultation with local administration.
Between September 1995 and February 2000, 16,983 mines and UXO were cleared in Rwanda.46 It is estimated that 5,000 hectares of mainly arable land have been cleared.47 The government provides human resources to the NDO with allowances and salaries to 110 soldiers deployed in humanitarian mine action operations. Manual detectors and dogs are used in the demining operations.
Since December 1999, mine clearance has been limited because the NDO supply of explosives for demining ran out. In April 2000, the NDO reported that because of the lack of explosives, clearance operations have been postponed since December last year. Since then, the NDO was devoting its efforts "to carry out survey, mine awareness, marking areas and collecting reports from population."48 Nevertheless, the NDO reported that 482 mines and UXO were cleared in January 2000 and 199 mines and UXO were cleared in February 2000.49
Most mine clearance has taken place in Mutara, Byumba and Kigali prefectures. Several trading centers such as Muvumba have been demined for re-occupation by the local population. Power lines have been cleared. Large resettlement areas are being cleared. For example, areas are being cleared for the resettlement of 1,500 people in Kibungo and 600,000 people in Ruhengeri. The main roads from Gatuna to Kigali, from Gitarama to Kibuye, from Kigali to Gisenyi, and secondary roads have all been cleared. Several tea plantations in northeast have been cleared. Three prefectures that were the most affected--Kigali town, Kigali rural and Umutara--are now 90% cleared. People are farming and grazing their cattle without fear. Many new villages have been built.
Mine clearance in the northwestern part of the country has been delayed by insecurity in the region and also by limited financial resources. Planning has been underway to resume mine clearance operations in the northwest region of the country, specifically in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures. Demining here is seen as urgent because more than 600,000 people have to be resettled in Ruhengeri, and because this region has always been the breadbasket of the rest of the country.50
Since 1995, the U.S. military has assisted in training 115 Rwandan deminers. The U.S. military completed its demining training program in February 2000. The training program carried out by the U.S. included surveying, mapping and marking, demining procedures, dog handlers, and mine awareness. One of the bigger problems faced by deminers is that of they lack appropriate means to clear vegetation (bushes) and the government has asked the U.S. to provide vegetation cutters. Two deminers were injured in the course of their work. One stepped on a TS-50 antipersonnel mine in 1996 in Tumba and the other stepped on a TS-50 antipersonnel mine in 1997 in Jali.
Mine awareness is carried out through the development and distribution of messages through radio programs, posters, T-shirts, and brochures. Once the product has been developed, it is often pre-tested, mainly with pupils and adults in market places, by way of a questionnaire and face-to-face interviews to ascertain the veracity of the messages. About sixty people have been trained as mine awareness educators. NDO has signed a contract with ORINFOR (Rwanda's Information Office) worth $103,000 for mine awareness campaign advertisement per year.51 At the community level locals are encouraged to report to NDO when they see "strange objects."
The strategy is to combine demining operations with community mine awareness education campaigns to facilitate the detection of mines and sensitize communities about the dangers of these devices. The main targets of the mine awareness education programs are women and children because most domestic chores in Rwanda, such as collecting of fuel wood, fetching water and farming, are still in the domain of women and children.
Mine causalities have decreased by 80% in areas where mine awareness teams have been effective.52 The significant reduction is the result of an aggressive awareness program that was conducted with the cooperation of the affected community and mine clearance programs.
In 1999 and 2000, there have been twelve mine casualties, eleven men and one woman. For the period 1990 to 1998, the NDO has recorded 550 mine fatalities.53 For the same period, the Central Hospital in Kigali registered 1,759 victims who have received amputations and 692 who have received prosthetic devices.54 Based on analysis of casualty data, it is estimated that there are 2.345 mine victims per 10,000 people in Rwanda.
Victim assistance is not a priority of the NDO but is carried out by NGOs including Mulindi Japan One Love Project and Handicap International.
Mulindi Japan One Love project
is comprised of five Rwandans and four Japanese. Its objective is to help
disabled people by providing prostheses and promoting their socio-economic
integration. The Project began in 1996. It was initially funded by $194,958
and was later sponsored with a government of Rwanda donation of $36,206
while another local NGO provided $2,785. In addition to this financial
assistance, a partnership with a Japanese Group was established and raw
materials provided for the manufacture of orthopedic equipment. Disabled
people are involved in the sale and distribution of the produced equipment.
The Ministry of Social Affairs identifies disabled people and sends them
to get the appliances free of charge. The Demobilization Service also identifies
and sends disabled and demobilized soldiers to the project. The National
Security Fund organizes support for those injured in the course of their
work but must pay for this service. Private individuals are required to
pay a certain fee. The fund for genocide survivors has its own budget and
takes care of the genocide survivors.
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14
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Some 85 percent of the project beneficiaries are landmine victims but many who live in remote areas are not informed of these services or cannot afford to travel to Kigali. A test mobile service has been started in Nyagatare. Nine of the eleven staff working in administration and in the workshop are disabled. The project is building a guesthouse for the disabled and non-disabled that will provide accommodation, meals, and recreational facilities.
Handicap International has been involved in landmine action in schools and hospitals in Rwanda since 1994. It provides orthopedic services to the Centre Hospitalieu de Kigali, fourteen district hospitals and three independent units.56 About 90 percent of the prosthesis provided by Handicap International go to landmine victims.
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Key developments since March 1999: It appears that new mines have been laid by MFDC rebels in the Casamance Province in 1999 and 2000. Senegal denied use of antipersonnel mines by its troops in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, as reported in Landmine Monitor Report 1999. In the Banjul Declaration of 26 December 1999, the Senegalese government and MFDC committed to no use of antipersonnel landmines in the future, but the government claims that rebel use continued at least into February 2000. In August 1999 a National Commission was created to oversee implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. A military mine clearance pilot project was launched on 1 July 2000. There were some fifty-nine victims of AP mines registered in 1999, a huge decline from 195 in 1998.
Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998. The government participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in May 1999, where its delegation vigorously denied allegations in the Landmine Monitor Report 199958 that it was likely that the Senegalese army had used mines during its intervention in Guinea-Bissau in the conflict that began in June 1998.59
There is currently no domestic law for the implementation of the MBT. There is, however, a clause in the penal code regarding illegal possession of explosives. This clause preceded the entry into force of the MBT, but is applicable to possession of antipersonnel landmines.60
In August 1999 a National Commission was created and tasked with oversight of implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.61 The commission is chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Exterior, and has representatives of the executive and legislative branches, as well as ministries directly or indirectly concerned with the issue of landmines.62 The commission is a permanent body that will meet twice a year and whose mandate is to report on the country's progress in complying with the MBT.63 One of the commission's duties will be to define the terms of a new implementation law.64
Senegal submitted its report to the UN as required under Article 7 of the treaty on 1 September 1999. The report covers the period 1 March-30 August 1999.65 Senegal has attended two of the ten intersessional meetings in Geneva of the Standing Committees of Experts (SCE), one on stockpile destruction and one on mine clearance technology.
Senegal acceded to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and its Amended Protocol II, on 29 November 1999. It did not attend the First Annual Conference of States Parties to the amended protocol in Geneva in December 1999. Senegal is a member of the Conference on Disarmament and has supported action on the landmine issue there.
A number of NGOs have actively supported the MBT in Senegal.66
Production, Transfer, Stockpiling
Senegal does not produce antipersonnel landmines.67 It has also stated that it "does not buy, [and] does not sell" AP mines.68 While there is no official transfer of landmines in the country, government officials have charged that mines have reached MFDC (Mouvement des forces democratiques de la Casamance) rebels in Casamance Province in Senegal through Guinea-Bissau.69
Senegal claims to have no stockpiles of landmines.70 Senegal's Article 7 report states that it is retaining no mines for training purposes, as permitted under the MBT. However, a military official told Landmine Monitor that some landmines unearthed in Casamance have been deactivated and are used for training the military. Their number was not be specified.71 Some observers believe that it is likely Senegal has a stockpile, at least for training purposes.72
According to Lieutenant Colonel
Fall, Commander of the Légion at the Ziguinchor Gendarmerie, the
MFDC rebels have AP mine stockpiles.73
Minister of Internal Affairs, General Mamadou Niang, also points out that
until 1974, Guinea-Bissau laid landmines on the border of Casamance and
some important arms cache hiding places still exist today; former soldiers
from Guinea-Bissau still know the location of these caches, unearth the
landmines and sell them for their own profit, according to Gen. Niang.74
Landmines were used in the fighting in Casamance Province throughout the 1990s.75 It appears that new mines have been laid by MFDC rebels in the province in 1999 and 2000.76 According to government officials, the mined areas are on the Cap Skirring - Ziguinchor - Kolda road and on the border between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. The landmines found during mine clearance operations or as a result of landmine incidents are from Belgium, Spain, France and Russia. Improvised devices have also been found.77
The government states that new use of landmines occurred in several municipalities up to February 2000.78 The latest accident was on 27 February 2000 when a military vehicle struck an antitank mine in Kolda department resulting in three dead and four wounded. Another military vehicle was damaged in January 2000 on the road between Elenkine and Oussouye, in the Oussouye department.
The use of landmines is one of the issues being tackled in the current negotiations for peace in Casamance. The MFDC would participate in the work of the National Commission created to oversee the application of the Mine Ban Treaty.79 According to Colonel Ndaw, the two belligerent parties could reach an agreement regarding the issue of landmines.80 In the Banjul Declaration of 26 December 1999, the Senegalese government and MFDC committed to no use of antipersonnel landmines in the future.
The MFDC rebels have never formally denied their use of mines.81 The MFDC use AP mines "in a conventional manner," laying them in small amounts around their positions or in order to protect themselves while withdrawing. Mines are also used to protect economic assets, such as cannabis fields. Farmers linked to the MFDC have laid mines to protect their assets from theft and the army. 82 Livestock bandits, who steal between 300 and 400 head of cattle each week, may also lay mines in order to discourage or delay any attempt of pursuit by the army or the farmers.83
Cashew production is also affected by antipersonnel landmines. The army sometimes forbids the farmers to access their fields for fear that they are mined. The MFDC is suspected of laying mines in the areas surrounding the fields or to have spread rumors that they have laid mines in order to steal the crops. Occasionally mines are laid to settle personal vendettas,84 and a mine incident in Bignona is attributed to a dissident minority of the MFDC trying to upset the peace talks.85
The MFDC claims that the Senegalese military has mined several sectors in Casamance.86 The Senegalese authorities have always categorically rejected these accusations. All the officials met by Landmine Monitor were definite: the Senegalese army has no point in laying mines on its own territory.87 A Colonel stated, "Since the independence, the use of antipersonnel landmines is against the conception of the Senegalese army."88 General Mamadou Niang added that the use of landmines is prohibited and enjoys no exceptions.89
One Senegalese NGO has claimed that the Senegalese army used mines in Casamance in 1997 and 1998, but used precise maps to recover them when needed.90 However, civilians interviewed in Casamance by the Landmine Monitor did not know of the army laying mines.91
Use by Senegalese forces in Guinea-Bissau
During the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999, the Senegalese delegation vigorously protested Landmine Monitor's conclusion that Senegalese troops had likely used antipersonnel mines during their intervention in Guinea-Bissau in June 1998.92 Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw told Landmine Monitor that laying landmines would be against the principles of the Senegalese army. He also noted that the strategic logic goes against the use of mines in that circumstance, arguing that landmines are never laid during an attack but rather in case of troops withdrawing, and the Senegalese army was attacking during the 1998 events.93
Landmine Monitor welcomes the unequivocal commitment of Senegal to never use antipersonnel landmines and anticipates full and effective implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty on Senegal's part. Landmine Monitor believes that there was compelling, though not incontrovertible, evidence that led to its conclusion that Senegal had likely used antipersonnel mines in 1998 in Guinea-Bissau, prior to becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. 94
The Senegalese government is not currently funding humanitarian mine action programs. Senegal has limited resources in relation to the need.95 Senegal has received no bilateral funds or in-kind contributions for mine action. The Military Engineering Department is seeking financial assistance from the European Union.
The EU is considering support for mine clearance activities, in addition to the European Fund for Development programs fostering economic development in Casamance. On 31 January 2000 the EU delegation in Dakar sent a letter to the Finance Minister in support of granting funds to mine clearance activities, but as yet it has not received a reply.96
France has supported the
KAGAMEN organization, which is assisting mine victims.97
ECHO has supported Handicap International's (HI) mine awareness program
in the country in 1999 with Euro 300,000. French Cooperation also granted
FF 2 million for the activities of HI in Casamance.
HI's epidemiological survey of mine accidents in Casamance was publicly released to the press and international community in Dakar on 18 July 2000.98 HI's programs have been systematically gathering information to help identify the priorities and the needs for a mine action program in the area.99
There are no guiding strategies or policies regarding mine action. The Senegalese Army's current mine clearance techniques are outmoded and accidents occur.100 According to Colonel Ndaw, mine clearers usually use pitchforks and a long stick as a prodder. The Army's Engineering Department has drawn up a "Project regarding the Participation of the Military Engineering Department to the Works of Depollution and Restoration of Road Infrastructures in the Regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda. (Details of the intervention considered and Assessment of the Needs)." This project was prepared in March 2000 and is being modified before being sent to the European Union delegation in Dakar.101
A military mine clearance pilot project was launched on 1 July 2000; 400 men will clear the road from Ziguinchor to the border with Guinea-Bissau in the sector of Nyassia. Most of the clearance will be by hand. The bomb disposal experts have limited protective gear and a few metal detectors.102
Marking of mined areas remains a pressing issue, as the mines are randomly laid.103 In the absence of any organized mine clearance action in the area, HI is currently carrying out an awareness campaign which includes encouraging residents to report on mined or suspected site and to indicate where landmines are and mark them by simple means such as branches laid across the road in a significant manner or attaching a piece of cloth that can easily be seen to a stick vertically driven into the ground.104
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
There were some fifty-nine victims of AP mines registered in 1999, a decline from 195 in 1998.105 Treatment is provided at the hospital in Ziguinchor. The civilian victims can be sent to Dakar, depending on the seriousness of the injury. The military victims are automatically transferred to Dakar where they are taken care of in a special ward.106
After treatment, most of the civilian victims go home. Because of a lack of national resources, these victims will receive no support for future medical needs.107 Military victims are the only ones whose medical expenses and other support are provided for. This assistance consists of a small disablement pension paid to the victim or to the victim's family if he or she dies.108 National and international NGOs provide some support for civilian mine victims.109 KAGAMEN has been supporting mine victims since June 1999.
HI is currently carrying out a medical support program for the mine victims at the regional hospital in Ziguinchor. The program's objective is to improve the physical rehabilitation of the disabled in Casamance.110
The national association of Senegal's physically handicapped is supporting legal proceedings in defense of the handicapped. The association hopes to get the government to pass a law to protect the disabled. There has been no progress on that objective since the change of government in 2000.111
Seychelles signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified the treaty on 2 June 2000. The Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alan Bayette, said ratification was made after the National Assembly had immediately enacted the treaty.112 The Seychelles sponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in December 1999. It did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It has not attended any meeting of the Intersessional Standing Committees of Experts. The Seychelles provided its consent to be bound by CCW Amended Protocol II (landmines) on 8 June 2000. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Landmines are not a problem in the Seychelles and the country is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. The Seychellois armed forces are not thought to hold any stocks.
Key developments since March 1999: South Africa served as co-chair of the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. It continued to play an important role in promoting universalization and effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. South Africa is emerging as a leader in the field of mine detection and mine clearance equipment and technology.
South Africa was the third country to sign the Mine Ban Treaty on the 3 December 1997. The National Assembly ratified the treaty on the 5 May 1998, and the National Council of Provinces on the 11 May 1998. On the 26 June 1998, South Africa deposited its instrument of ratification.
Under its Constitution, South Africa is bound by all international agreements it signs once both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces have approved them, at which time the international agreement becomes national law.113 South Africa reports that it is now in the process of developing enabling implementation legislation.114
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a "Landmine Coordinating Committee" in order to "formalize the earlier inter-departmental and NGO arrangement on the antipersonnel mine issue [and to ensure that] our joint efforts in co-ordination will assist in clarifying our objectives and factors that will be involved regarding funding and the organization of actions to be undertaken."115 The South Africa Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL) is now a permanent member of this Committee.
South Africa's Foreign Minister, together with those of Austria, Canada, Mozambique and Norway, issued a joint statement on 1 March 1999 welcoming the entry into force of the treaty. The then Foreign Minister, the late Alfred Nzo, added that the treaty, "will significantly contribute to eradicating this scourge from the African continent, thereby assisting the socio-economic advancement of its people who have been so gravely afflicted by the use of these deadly weapons."116
The government sent a delegation to the First Meeting of States Parties (FMSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in May 1999. At that meeting it was made co-chair (with Canada) of the Standing Committee of Experts (SCE) on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. As well as co-chairing those meetings, it has been an active participant in the all of the various meetings of the other SCEs designed to foster the implementation of the treaty.
South Africa submitted its report on implementation measures to the UN as required under Article 7 on 1 September 1999. It has not submitted a second report to cover the period 1 September - 31 December 1999.
South Africa cosponsored and voted for the December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had with previous pro-ban UNGA resolutions.
South Africa is a state party to CCW and its protocols, including Amended Protocol II. It participated in the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II that was held in Geneva on 15-17 December 1999. It submitted its report as required under Article 13 prior to that Conference.
South Africa is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) but does not believe that any useful purpose would be served by negotiating a transfer ban in the CD and thus having three international treaties dealing with landmines.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
South Africa is a past producer and exporter of AP mines.117 Today it no longer has an antipersonnel landmine production capability.118 Antipersonnel landmine production stopped in 1995 and the assembly lines have been stripped.119 In order to prevent any further production all moulds of plastic components have been recovered from outside suppliers.120
On 19 May 1997, former Minister of Defense, Mr. Joe Modise informed the OAU's First Continental Conference of African Experts on Landmines, in Kempton Park, Johannesburg, that the SANDF had 313,779 antipersonnel landmines of all kinds on its inventory. The total value of these mines amounted to approximately 47 million rand. The stocks included 238,746 AP mines (HE), 13,038 practice AP mines, 48,484 Jumping mines (J69); 2,059 practice Jumping mines (J69); and 11,434 foreign mines.
Destruction of these stocks was completed on 30 October 1997. The South African National Defense Force (SANDF) retained a limited number of AP mines for training of soldiers to deal with AP mine threats during peacekeeping operations, as well as for the development of effective demining equipment, demining research purposes and military/civilian education purposes.121
In 1997, the SANDF transferred 5,000 of its retained mines to Mechem for "research and training purposes."122 Mechem has used a total of 170 AP mines for demonstration and training purposes.123 As of 1 September 1999, South Africa reported a live antipersonnel mine stockpile for training of 4,830. The South African National Defense Force has also retained 10,992 RPM2 "empty casings...for the training of members of the SANDF."124
According to South Africa's Article 7 report, between March 1999 and September 1999 a further total of 2,586 antipersonnel landmines were destroyed in controlled explosions by the SANDF. South Africa stated that 140 of those mines were "part of an illegal arms cache discovered in mid May 1999 in KwaZulu-Natal Province and immediately destroyed."125
Operation Rachel
A total of 6,351 antipersonnel mines have been destroyed under a joint South African-Mozambican program called Operation Rachel. To combat illicit weapons trafficking being used to fuel crime, the two countries signed an agreement in 1995 allowing their police forces to undertake joint operations to find and destroy weapons within Mozambique left over from the war. South Africa is paying the bulk of the costs and is providing expertise on weapons and explosives disposal and destruction, which happen on site.126
The African National Congress (ANC) is the first and only liberation movement and now ruling party in government in the world to publicly apologize and express sincere regret for civilian deaths and injuries resulting from the use of antipersonnel landmines.
Through South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) a number of individuals on both sides of the conflict have applied for amnesty from prosecution for their use of landmines against political activists and innocent civilians. Individuals who survived landmine incidents were able to tell their stories and express their feelings about what happened to them and their families and how they felt about the international ban on antipersonnel landmines. While former servicemen admitted laying mines in neighboring countries during successive conflicts,127 the former apartheid government and Defense Forces failed to take any responsibility for their use of AP mines, both within and outside of the country, and did not apologize for their use of the weapon.
During the FMSP Jackie Selebi, then Director-General of Foreign Affairs, announced: "To ensure that South Africa effectively manages the implementation of the Treaty obligations, a South Africa Mine Action Centre is in the process of being established under the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The objective of the Centre will be to act as a forum where compliance with international instruments on landmines will be monitored; to facilitate and identify appropriate mine action projects; and act as a clearinghouse for all mine action requests received by South Africa."128 As of July 2000, the center was still in the process of being established by the Landmines Coordinating Committee.
South Africa, in response to the problem of mines during the border wars, developed mine detection systems and a range of mine-protected vehicles that are reputed to be among the best in the world, including the Hyena, Hippo, Buffel, Casspir, Mamba and the Ribbok - a civilian farm vehicle.129
South Africa's countermine philosophy is based on these principles: (1) Mine awareness training before, during, and after clearance operations; (2) Detection of mines with best equipment available; (3) Marking of detected mines; (4) The neutralization of mines; and (5) Demining auditing and the protection of deminers.130 It has never had the leading edge on humanitarian demining technology, but rather in military countermine technology.131 However, according to Ronnie Kasrils, Deputy Minister of Defense from 1994-1999, now that apartheid has come to an end, "[W]e are grateful that a democratic South Africa can redress the wrongs of the past and make a major contribution by assisting countries with mine clearance."132
In 1999, a representative of the South African government attended the Bad Honeff 2 discussions in Germany; the Bad Honeff guidelines seek to place various aspects of mine action in the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction and development.
One of South Africa's pre-eminent companies in the area of mine action is Mechem Consultants, a specialized engineering division and subsidiary of the South African state-owned arms company, DENEL. Mechem has been involved in research and development for over twenty-eight years mainly in the detection of landmines, the protection against landmine explosions, and clearing of minefields. It is also linked to the past research, design and development of antipersonnel landmines for the (previous) South African government and military.
Mechem has in the past been contracted by UN agencies, government, and private electrical or road-building companies to conduct demining operations in various countries including Mozambique, Angola, Bosnia, Croatia, and Northern Iraq.
In addition to Mechem there are several other South African-based firms offering mine action services. In 1999, the Pretoria-based BRZ International, which has been linked to Saracen,133 conducted mine clearance work in Angola, Croatia, Northern Iraq, Kosovo and Mozambique. It has also sent assessment missions to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.134 The regional office of Carlos Gassmann Tecnologias De Vanguarda Aplicadas Lda (CGTVA) is also located in South Africa and has worked in Mozambique during 1999. TNT De-mining is one of the newest demining companies in South Africa and focuses mainly on the training of demining personnel at all levels. The Institute for Military Engineering Excellence in Southern Africa (IMEESA) is also located on the outskirts of Pretoria and at its center provides amongst other services, training in demining, mine awareness programs, management of demining projects and surveying.
Mine Action Research & Development and Technology Transfer
South Africa is emerging as a leader in the field of mine clearance equipment and believes that it possesses leading demining technology and expertise as well as medical capability and experience to assist mine victims. Mechem's Vernon Joynt is credited with inventing armour able to withstand the Yugoslav TRMP-6 "tank-killer" mine, which had been a curse to UN peacekeepers in Bosnia. 135
In February 1999, a US interagency team of humanitarian demining experts, including representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, State Department, and US European Command, visited South Africa. The purpose of this visit was to familiarize the team with South African demining research and development (R&D), and operations; and to conduct meetings on possible areas of cooperation between the two countries. This initiative was an outgrowth of the US-South Africa Bi-national Commission (BNC), which is chaired by US Vice-President Al Gore and South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki.136 According to John Zavales, of the US Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, "Given South Africa's enlightened and progressive efforts at demining they can clearly make a significant contribution to Humanitarian Demining. The US trip was a useful first step in expanding cooperation in this area between the U.S. and South Africa, which hopefully will result in further combined efforts."137
In 1998, Sweden acquired four South African Mamba mine protected armored personnel carriers for use in peacekeeping in the Western Sahara. The Mambas were produced by Reumech OMC to be used by Sweden's United Nations troops.138 In March 1999, the US Defense Department awarded Mechem a $494,000 contract to field test a mine sniffing electronic dog's nose, which is being developed by the Pentagon's research agency.139 Mechem is to supply the Pentagon's Advanced Research Project Agency with its unique Mechem Explosive and Drug Detection System (MEDDS) and training and laboratory assistance. The system consists of concentrating explosive or drug vapors into sample tubes and presenting them to specially trained "sniffer"' dogs for identification.
In January 1999, South Africa and the Japanese government met at the first session of the new SA-Japan partnership forum designed to intensify contacts between Pretoria and Tokyo. Senior officials participating in the partnership forum agreed on closer cooperation in demining in southern Africa.140 In May 1999, DENEL represented the SA defense industry on a high-profile SA trade delegation visit to Libya, to pursue a market for SA's equipment for clearing landmines in Libya, where thousands of landmines planted during the Second World War pose a serious problem.141 Also in 1999, the South African government exported mine protected vehicles to a private mining company for the protection of personnel in Angola.
Other key South African research and development companies include:
· RSD, a division of Dorbyl Ltd, which has produced amongst other items, the Chubby Mobile Mine Detection and Clearing System;
· Reutech Defense Industries (RDI) manufacturers of, for example, the MIDAS - handheld Mine Detector (PIMD) and the Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (VMMD2000);
· Vickers OMC (the successor to Reumech OMC) which has produced a range of Mine Protected Vehicles including the RG-31 Nyala, the Mamba, the Kobra and the Casspir;
· Armscor (marketing, sales as well as being the competent authority which conducts independent testing of all South Africa Mine Protected Vehicles); and,
· The Center for Scientific Information and Research (CSIR) which is currently researching the possibility of a multi-sensor mine-detecting suite consisting of ground penetrating radar, infrared and metal detector sensors. Focusing on the Southern African region, and in particular, on countries like Angola and Mozambique, the project aims to develop technology to detect landmines, in particular antipersonnel mines with minimum or no metal content.
The South African Constitution forbids discrimination based on an individual's disability.142 Statistics on the number of South Africans living with disabilities resulting from landmine incidents are unavailable. However, research into disability generally estimates that between five and twelve percent of South Africans are moderately to severely disabled. Few services and opportunities exist for people with disabilities to participate equally in society. "The backlog of disability services is so long and the lack of services so acute that the economic advantage of providing rehabilitation services might not become apparent for a number of years."143
A research project on assistive devices found that in South Africa there are little or no policies and protocols to guide service development.144 While there are a large number of Disabled Peoples Organizations (DPO) in South Africa, they are under-resourced in terms of funding and tend to be concentrated in urban areas.145 Being involved in the wars of liberation, South Africa has built up a unique experience of the medical aspects of landmine warfare. The South African National Defense Force's Medical Services (SAMS) believes that it can make a significant contribution to the medical support of mine clearing operations and the treatment of the victims of landmines.146
At least one South African Company, Tactical Medical Developments, undertakes research and develops products specifically designed for use by medical personnel in a military environment and for mine clearance operations.
South Africa provides a number of international humanitarian organizations, including the World Food Program, UNHCR, the OAU Refugee Contingency Fund, UNICEF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with financial aid aimed mainly at the SADC region.
The ICRC has received a number of donations specifically for the rehabilitation of landmine survivors in the SADC region including R400,000 ($58,224) for year 1999/2000.
Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Swaziland on 1 June 1999. The United States trained forty demining instructors from August to October 1999.
The Kingdom of Swaziland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and deposited its instrument of ratification on the 23 December 1998. Thus, the treaty entered into force for Swaziland on 1 June 1999. In its Article 7 transparency report, Swaziland reports that "[l]egislation is presently being drawn up."147 Swaziland submitted the Article 7 report, which was due by 27 November 1999, on 16 February 2000. It covers the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 January 2000. Swaziland voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999, as it had on similar resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Swaziland attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in a delegation led by its High Commissioner to Mozambique. It also participated in the Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operation of the Convention in January 2000.
A number of NGOs in Swaziland have been involved in the movement to ban landmines, including the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society and the Swazi affiliate of the Southern African Churches in Ministry with Uprooted People.
Swaziland is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but officials told Landmine Monitor that Swaziland intends to join Amended Protocol II (Landmines).148 It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use
Swaziland has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In the Article 7 report, Swaziland confirmed that it has never possessed antipersonnel landmines, including any retained for training.149
Swaziland has a limited landmine problem.150 A small minefield exists just east of the Lomahasha Customs point near the town of Mananga on the border with Mozambique in the northeast of the country. The minefield is approximately 10 kilometers long and 50 to 100 meters wide. In a letter to the Landmine Monitor researcher dated 12 June 2000, Army Spokesman Lt. Khanya Dlamini indicated that Swaziland intends to "demine along the border between Swaziland and Mozambique from Lomahasha Border post to Great Usuthu River South-East of Swaziland." While the number of landmines in this area is unknown, in 1997 it was estimated to contain ten uncleared mines.151 In June 1999 an additional eight landmines were reported found.152 Lt. Dlamini told Landmine Monitor that while the number of mines is unknown, it contains POMZ mines and unexploded ordnance/booby traps; he also stated that a Level One survey has been conducted.
The extent of spillover from Mozambique border minefields needs to be investigated. Retired Director of the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society, Thandiwe Dlamini has been approached to examine whether there are more minefields along the common border with Mozambique and if there have been any recent casualties as a result of landmine incidents in that region.153
On 1 June 1998, the U.S. government's Humanitarian Demining Interagency Working Group approved Swaziland for humanitarian demining assistance. In late 1998, a pre-deployment site survey was conducted in Swaziland by a U.S. team. The program start-up phase was delayed due to the need to transfer funds to relieve the suffering in Central America caused by Hurricane Mitch. The program is valued at $1,710,000 of which $210,000 has been transferred to the trust fund at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). It is available to the government of Swaziland to support mine action undertaken by the Swaziland forces trained by the U.S. military personnel. As of March 2000, Swaziland had not submitted a request to use the funds.154 U.S. Department of Defense funds ($828,000 in FY 1999 and $289,000 in FY 2000) cover the expenses of U.S. personnel deployed to conduct the training and are not used to acquire large items of equipment. Limited funds can be used to purchase small items of equipment (protective garments, visors, headgear) needed to conduct training.155
In its Article 7 report, Swaziland reported that forty demining instructors of the Umbutfo Defence Force were trained by American soldiers from August to October 1999 and "[a]t the end of that course they went to a suspected mine area to mark it, warning members of the public about the danger zone." 156 Two U.S. Department of Defense personnel trained the Swazi Army Engineers in "mine clearance, mine identification, communications, medical care and basic mine awareness educational programs."157 The team also provided training on minefield survey tools and techniques and combat lifesaver training. After a site visit to the area on the 6 April 2000, representatives of the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society confirmed that the minefield is "properly guarded and with clear warning signs for the people living near the area. Members of the Umbutfo Defence Force stationed near the border keep the area clear of overgrowth and warn residents of the danger of the landmines by regular patrols."158
The Article 7 report noted that a refresher course would start 1 February 2000 but this was delayed until May 2000 due to the devastating floods that struck Mozambique and northeast Swaziland in February and March 2000. Swaziland Sergeant Maphilisa Dlamini, stationed in Siteki, near the border with Mozambique indicated that the floods had moved some landmines and said that members of the military would verify the situation when they are deployed to the area in May 2000.159
The May demining training exercise was conducted by three U.S. soldiers. The Article 7 report indicated that another course would take place in which Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force instructors would train between 40 to 60 personnel. 160
No demining has started yet.
Swaziland does not have a national Mine Action Center but the Umbutfo Swaziland Defence Force is responsible for mine action activities. The experience of clearing the minefield is aimed at enhancing Swaziland's capacity to contribute to future peacekeeping activity.161
The Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross provides information on the current mine clearance operation through its weekly radio programs which reach the communities near the minefield.
Interviews by Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society with inhabitants near the Mozambique border confirm that there have been no injuries or deaths due to landmines in the last ten years.162 The death of a woman and injuries to several men prior to this period have been validated by authorities at the Good Shepherd Hospital.163 The Swazi Government has not adopted national legislation for persons with disabilities.
Key developments since March 1999: Togo ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 March 2000. Togo has stated that it has a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.
Togo signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. On 29 March 1999 the National Assembly unanimously passed Law N° 99-005 authorizing ratification of the treaty. The instrument of ratification was deposited on 9 March 2000. The treaty enters into force for Togo on 1 September 2000. Its Article 7 transparency measures report will be due by 28 February 2001. While the ratification legislation did not impose any domestic implementation measures, officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that they are aware of the need to take measures to properly apply the Mine Ban Treaty.164
Togo attended the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in May 1999. It did not participate in any of the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva in 1999 or 2000. Togo voted for UN General Assembly Resolution 54/54B in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1999.
Togo is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, but not Amended Protocol II. It is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
In a response to a request for updated information, Togo's Ministry of Defense confirmed that Togo does not produce or transfer antipersonnel mines, but does possess a small quantity of AP mines for training.165 The National Army told Landmine Monitor that it has never used AP mines.166
On 20 April 1999 an explosion of two devices reported to be antipersonnel mines near the private residence of the Head of State killed one person.167 The National Army said that the explosion was caused by grenades abandoned by terrorists.168
Togo is not mine-affected. According to the Ministry of Defense, the Army has mine clearance ability.169 Ninety-nine engineers have been trained in mine clearance in France and in Togo, sponsored by the Togolese government.170 In 1998 and 1999 the Army helped to mark out mined areas in Guinea-Bissau as part of the African peacekeeping force of ECOMOG.
Key developments since March 1999: The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Uganda on 1 August 1999. There have been allegations of Ugandan use of mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani. Uganda denies any use. There is evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in 1999 and early 2000 by Lord's Resistance Army rebels entering Uganda from Sudan. There is no organized mine clearance underway in Uganda, but mine awareness activities are better coordinated and expanding. Mine casualties dropped significantly in 1999. Uganda has not submitted its Article 7 report, due on 28 January 2000.
Uganda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and submitted its instrument of ratification to the UN on 25 February 1999. The treaty thus entered into force for Uganda on 1 August 1999. The government has not yet put implementation legislation in place. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Ugandan law, the treaty is merely persuasive and not binding until domestic legislation has been passed.171 Landmine Monitor was informed that the treaty has been forwarded to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for incorporation into domestic law, but the process is a long one, passing first through the cabinet and then to parliament for enactment.172 No timetable was given for this process.173
Uganda participated in the First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo, Mozambique on 3-7 May 1999. The government has not participated in any of the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committees of Experts of the MBT. NGOs and other agencies in the country have been actively involved in promoting ratification and effective implementation and monitoring of the treaty.174
Uganda's Article 7 Report to the UN was due on 28 January 2000. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for preparing the report, then providing it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.175
Uganda voted for December 1999 UN General Assembly resolution 54/54 B promoting the treaty, as it had on past pro-ban UNGA resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
The government is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but has not ratified its Amended Protocol II (1996).176 Uganda is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling
Uganda claims to have stopped production of AP mines and to have destroyed all AP mines manufactured at the government-owned National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) at Nakasongora.177 Brigadier Ivan Koreta, Director General, Internal Security Organization (ISO), and Lt. Katsigazi in December 1999 affirmed that the production line at NEC has been completely converted into production of dry cell batteries. An independent inspection of the facility has yet to be made, and to date, the batteries have not been introduced into the market nor is their brand name known.178
According to the U.S. State Department, NEC, "built with aid from China's Wabao Engineering Corporation, makes ammunition and small arms. Uganda claims it stopped production of landmines in 1995, but reports persist that the factory still produces them and provides them to consumers in the Central Africa/Great Lakes region."179 Landmine Monitor is unaware of any reports of continued production of AP mines.
Previous imports of AP mines were from various sources including Russia and Korea.180 Military officials say that a large quantity of AP mines and UXOs have been gathered from different army units around the country by the UPDF and transferred to Jinja Army Depot for storage pending destruction.181 In January 2000, it was reported that an unidentified Ugandan official said that there are 50,000 AP mines stockpiled and that their destruction has begun.182 The military is reportedly seeking assistance in destroying this stockpile because it lacks the capacity to do so.183
The Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) has issued an order to all UPDF unit commanders prohibiting the use of AP mines.184 A Ugandan official has stated to Landmine Monitor that the UPDF is not using AP mines against the various rebel groups that operate out of Sudan (Lord's Resistance Army-LRA, Uganda National Rescue Front-UNRF, West Nile Bank Front-WNBF) or the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), which operates from the Democratic Republic of Congo.185 There has been no credible evidence that the government has used mines inside Uganda.186
In 1999 and 2000 the Namibian Defense Ministry and others accused Uganda of laying mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).187 There were reports of use of mines in June 2000 in the hostilities between Rwanda and Uganda over the city of Kisangani, held by the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) forces. (See Landmine Monitor Report 2000--Democratic Republic of Congo). A UN official told Landmine Monitor that Uganda and Rwanda had both used mines in the fighting over Kisangani.188 The RCD rebels claim that Rwandan and Ugandan troops left more than 4,000 antipersonnel landmines in the town after clashing there from 5-11 June, but state that they have found most of the mines close to a former Ugandan army base on the road to Bangoka airport.189 These accusations have not been verified.
In December 1999, military officers interviewed for this report insisted that the UPDF is under strict instructions against the use of AP mines.190
It is uncertain if Congolese rebels who collaborate with UPDF use antipersonnel mines. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, such as Uganda, may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another entity, such as Congolese rebels, that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."
Uganda should make clear the nature of its support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with these armed forces. As a party to the treaty, Uganda should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Monitor obtained eyewitness accounts of the use of AP mines by the LRA and ADF rebels during 1999 and in January-February 2000. Landmine Monitor research in Gulu District suggests that the LRA were using AP mines to avenge attacks on their families and relatives.191 Local media also reported new use of mines by rebels infiltrating Gulu and Kitgum Districts in December 1999 and February 2000. In one incident, four people were injured by AP mines in Ngotoo Park, Kitgum District, as they were returning to the Lacekot Camp for IDPs after collecting food.192
Police and UPDF sources based in Gulu also reported that during a new incursion of LRA rebels from Sudan in February 2000, unknown quantities of AP mines were brought over the border and subsequently used by the rebels. Survivors were reportedly being admitted to hospitals in Gulu and Kitgum Districts. They also reported that the rebels had brought with them new types of AP mines, which they claimed had wounded some rebels trying to lay them because they were unfamiliar with the devices.193
In February 2000, UPDF Major-General Jeje Odongo reported that his forces had killed twenty-six LRA rebels and captured twenty-eight others with an assortment of weapons including twenty-five AT mines and AP mines during a December incursion.194
On 16 January 2000, UPDF and police captured two SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) commanders in Arua town in northwestern Uganda in a raid that had been prompted by finding two antipersonnel mines in an Arua township villages two weeks earlier.195
On 11 June 2000, the Ugandan army reported killing six LRA rebels in the northern part of the country who were attempting to cross back into Sudan with a number of Ugandan villagers who had been abducted by the rebels. Weapons, including four antipersonnel mines, were recovered in the operation.196
A number of organizations are indirectly contributing to humanitarian mine action.197 These include the Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS), UNICEF, WHO, World Vision, Save the Children-Denmark, International Service Volunteers Association (AVSI), Jesuit Refugee Service, National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU), Action Aid, and Medicines sans Frontiers. Government departments are also involved.198
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), through the Canadian Network for Injury Survey (CNIS), contributed US$66,000 to the Injury Control Center-Uganda (ICC-U) for two years in 1999 for mine awareness, first aid training, landmine situation analysis, and anthropological research on landmines in Gulu and Arua districts. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) made a contribution of US$5,000 for a landmine injury survey, mine awareness, training, and victim assistance (1999-2000) through AMHEC (IPPNW-Uganda). In addition the Charity Project, through MAG (UK), provided US$3,500 to AMHEC for strengthening the Uganda Campaign to Ban Landmines (UCBL) and for its mine awareness education.
At present there is no policy, strategy, or practice concerning allocation and use of mine action funds or in-kind contributions. However, some of the NGOs and Ministry of Health have formed an informal committee on landmines, chaired by the Ministry of Health, which plans to use donated funds in a transparent and coordinated manner.
Uganda has not directly received any funding or in-kind contributions for mine action programs. There is no domestic budget for mine action.199 At present it is not possible to quantify the need because the magnitude of the landmine problem is not completely known; the situation is complicated by the fact that the LRA uses mines in a random fashion and thus any specific mined areas are unknown. No survey has been carried out to assess the problem.200
A special unit of the mechanized battalion of the UPDF carries out mine clearance whenever an area is suspected to have a mine problem.201 There is no on-going survey, marking or clearing of mines, and at present there is no national mine clearance plan or mine clearance priorities. Some important areas like roads have been cleared.202 According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Ugandan military acquired a Chubby mine clearing vehicle from South Africa in 1999.203
The main mine action operations in Uganda are coordinated by the Uganda Campaign to Ban Landmines (UCBL) and the Ministry of Health and mainly are programs for mine awareness and victim assistance. The cooperative effort between the UCBL and Ministry of Health has a loose mandate to coordinate the relevant organizations. The Ministry of Health coordinates first aid training, and continuing medical care and rehabilitation activities. Both the UCBL and the Ministry of Health are responsible for all affected areas in the country but do not have specific funding for coordination.204
Mine awareness or risk education programs are under way in the country. Mine awareness is being undertaken by NGOs, including AMHEC, Injury Control Center Uganda (ICC-U), Uganda National Association of Community and Occupational Health (UNACOH), AVSI, URCS, the UN field office, and the ICRC, as well as the UPDF and various ministries.205 These projects are in the mine-affected districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Kasese, Bundibugyo and Fort Portal. The ICC-U, IPPNW, ICRC, and AVSI fund the NGO programs, and the government funds the UPDF and Ministry of Health programs. The UN country office also funds a limited training program on mine awareness.
Mine awareness programs initially were not well coordinated and targeted, but currently activities are coordinated and targeted toward communities and displaced people most at risk. So far twenty mine awareness educators have been trained for Gulu and thirteen for Kitgum districts. Funds allowing, it is planned to have 125 trainers for Gulu District and 100 trainers for Kitgum District, by the end of August 2000, to train more groups of people as mine awareness educators at the grassroots level.
This coordinated program has also used the print and electronic media. Awareness messages have been prepared, translated into the local language (Luo) and field-tested, and have been printed on posters, ready for distribution throughout the two main affected districts. The printing was paid for by UNICEF.
The actual number of people who have received mine awareness education is not known. The coordinated programs adhere to both National and International guidelines, such as those of UNICEF. A preliminary mine awareness assessment was conducted by ICC-Uganda in July and August 1999 among communities in Gulu district prior to mine awareness activities, which indicated low levels of mine awareness and negative attitudes to mine victims. Post-program evaluation is contemplated.
Many people have been killed and maimed by AP mines especially in northern (Kitgum, Gulu and Adjumani districts) and western Uganda (Kasese district), but there is no centralized information about the number of mine victims.206 At the Gulu Orthopedic Workshop, which was rehabilitated by the Italian NGO AVSI and handed over to the Ugandan Ministry of Health, 201 out of the 622 amputee patients recorded by November 1999 were landmine victims.207
Landmine Monitor Report 1999 had reported a decreasing trend in mine victims in Kitgum and Gulu districts between 1996-1998.208 During 1999 it appears that the number of landmine casualties has continued to decrease. A survey was carried out in the affected districts covering the period between January 1999 and April 2000. In Kitgum hospital no new mine injuries were recorded between March and December 1999.209 According to Dr. J.J. Kilama, Acting Medical Superintendent at Gulu hospital, no new mine casualties were reported there between March and December 1999.210 This was corroborated by the UN country report.
Although no new mine victims were treated in the district hospitals of Kitgum and Gulu by December 1999, Landmine Monitor received information from the local community and health staff that a few isolated mine incidents occurred during the early part of 1999 in remote areas on the border with Sudan, and the victims died before getting medical attention.211
The reduction in mine incidents may be because most of the people in the two districts have been living in protected villages;212 also, rebel activities have declined in the past two years. Data gathered by the Landmine Monitor from Kasese district, where ADF rebels are most active, showed a decline in casualties too: from seventeen casualties in 1997 and twenty-eight in 1998, to only one in 1999.213 A few cases were reported from Kabarole and Bundibugyo districts in 1998, but none in 1999.214
In the West Nile region (north-western Uganda) in Arua, Moyo, Adjumani and Nebbi districts the pattern is the same, with very few new mine casualties 1999 (i.e., at Arua Hospital three, Nebbi Hospital one, and none from Angal, Adjumani and Moyo Hospitals, but Moyo Hospital did report two cases involving antitank mines). Also according to records from the two military hospitals at Bombo and Mbuya, no new AP mine casualties were reported in 1999.
Casualty figures increased after 22 December 1999, when a group of about some 200 LRA rebels crossed back into Kitgum and Gulu districts in Uganda from Sudan and started terrorizing civilians, resulting in new casualties being reported and property destroyed.215
One of the victims, Mika Otto216 a teacher in Lacekot sub-county, Kitgum district, died and another victim, James Odok, 42, was hospitalized in Gulu Hospital with his right foot blown off, plus multiple wounds on his buttocks and his left foot.217 There was another incursion of the LRA from Sudan in February 2000 according to local NGOs based in Gulu. The total number of people wounded or killed by mines is not known but is small compared to the population of the areas affected and Uganda overall.
The rights of the disabled are protected by Uganda's Constitution and eight disability laws.218 Funding of health care and medical treatment in Uganda for the disabled comes either directly from the government or through donations through government ministries.219 Additionally, there is an inter-ministerial committee on disability, which involves three ministries: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development; and the Ministry of Education and Sports; the National Union of Disabled Persons of Uganda (NUDIPU) serves as the secretary of the committee. Also, a National Disability Council, which is to coordinate all disability efforts in the country, is being established through legislation that is about to be presented to the parliament.
The Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) is an association of veteran soldiers that works with the government. It has a medical rehabilitation program for soldiers who get disabled during war. The victims can obtain assistance through a program funded by the Danish International Development Association. The UPDF has a casualty unit in Mubende specifically for disabled soldiers and a smaller one in Nakasongola. The Ministry of Defense also has its own military hospitals at Mbuya, Gulu and Bombo, where the government funds services for the disabled soldiers.
Orthopedic workshops, such as those in Mulago, Mbale, Gulu, Fort Portal, and Mbarara University produce devices for the disabled, which must be paid for by the individuals who need them. While services for the disabled are quite costly, they can receive a fifty percent subsidy through NUDIPU, the Government, and and other organizations.
Key developments since March 1999: Major mine clearance operations started in March 1999. After a slow, accident-plagued beginning, by mid-July 2000 a total of 3.8 million square meters of land had been cleared. Koch Mine-Safe deminers suffered twenty casualties between February 1999-July 2000. Zimbabwe has served as co-rapporteur of the SCE on General Status and Operation of the Convention. Delays in passage of Zimbabwe's pending Mine Ban Treaty implementation bill have held up the start of AP mine stockpile destruction. There continue to be allegations of use of AP mines by Zimbabwean troops in the DRC.
Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 June 1998. It participated in the First Meeting of State Parties in Maputo in May 1999, with the Deputy Foreign Minister leading the delegation. It its statement to the Meeting, Zimbabwe reaffirmed its commitment to the AP mine ban, stating that it was "unequivocally committed both to implementing its own obligations under the convention and to cooperating with others in finding a lasting solution to the problem."220
At the FMSP, Zimbabwe was nominated to serve as co-rapporteur (with Belgium) of the newly created Standing Committee of Experts on the General Status and Operations of the Convention. After the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, it will become co-chair of this important body. It has also attended meetings on victim assistance and mine clearance.
The government submitted its first report as required under Article 7 on 11 January 2000, covering the period from August 1999-January 2000.221 It reported that implementation legislation, the "Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Bill, 1999" is "awaiting clearance from the Law Officers before it is enacted to effectively incorporate the provisions of the Treaty into Zimbabwe's domestic laws."222 The delay in passage of this legislation, according to officials, has placed limitations on their actions to fully comply with the treaty, particularly with regard to stockpile destruction.223
Zimbabwe voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 54/54B supporting the MBT in December 1999. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but has not been a noted supporter or opponent of efforts to begin negotiations on a mine export ban there.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling
Zimbabwe was not a significant past producer or exporter of landmines.224 Its Article 7 report states that it has a stockpile of 4,792 mines: 446 South African R2M2 AP mines inherited from the Rhodesian regime and 4,346 PMD-6 mines, from the former Eastern Bloc. There have been reports that Zimbabwe stockpiled other mine types.225
There is contradictory information in the report on the number of mines that the army will retain for training. Forms B (on current stockpiles) and G (on planned destruction) indicate that 700 AP mines will be retained: 500 PMD-6 and 200 R2M2). But Form D (on mines retained for training) indicates 946 mines will be kept, including all 446 of R2M2 mines.226
The destruction of the 3,846 AP mines was scheduled to be completed in 2000, in two phases. During the first six months, 3,000 type PMD-6 mines were scheduled to be destroyed, and during next six months the remaining 846 PMD-6 as well as the 246 R2M2s would have been destroyed.227 But this plan has not been implemented because the implementation legislation has not been passed.
There has been no response to attempts by NGOs to solicit an invitation to monitor the destruction.228
There is concern regarding the involvement of Zimbabwean troops in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in support of the government of Laurent Kabila. Landmine Monitor 1999 reported that there had been a number of unsubstantiated allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in that conflict by Zimbabwe, which the government vigorously denied.229 More recently, according to one source, there were accounts of Zimbabwean troops planting defensive minefields around Mbuji Maya when they feared that city would be captured by rebels in 1999.230 Landmine Monitor has not seen these accounts and cannot verify them. In June 2000, the Namibia Campaign to Ban Landmines was informed by relatives that two Namibian soldiers died in the DRC when they stepped on "friendly" antipersonnel mines allegedly planted by Zimbabwean soldiers.
While there is no concrete evidence of use of AP mines by Zimbabwean forces, it is clear that antipersonnel mines have been and continue to be used in the DRC conflict, likely by DRC government forces and possibly by others aligned with them.231 (See Landmine Monitor report on DRC).
The so-called SADC Allies, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, are involved in the fighting. Angola has publicly admitted to new use of AP mines in the war against UNITA in its own country. The ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party, such as Zimbabwe, may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation, such as the DRC or Angola, that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."
Zimbabwe should make clear the nature of its support for foreign forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear its views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of its joint military operations with the DRC and Angola. As a party to the treaty, Zimbabwe should state categorically that it will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.
Landmine Problem/Survey and Assessment
Since the end of the liberation struggle in 1980, Zimbabwe has lived with a legacy of seven minefields along its borders with Zambia and Mozambique. Maps of the minefields are in the possession of the current government. A series of validation exercises have been undertaken since 1980 that have confirmed the general patterns and type of AP mines laid.232 The minefields and the priority that they have been given for clearance purposes are indicated below:
Table 1.
|
|
Location |
|
|
|
|
Msengezi-Mukumbura-Rushinga-Ruenya |
|
|
|
|
Stapleford Forest-Mutare-Vumba Mts. |
|
|
|
|
Burma Valley |
|
|
|
|
Junction Gate-Muzite Mission-Jersey |
|
|
|
|
Malvenia-Crooks Corner-Limpopo |
|
|
|
|
Victoria Falls to Mlibizi |
|
|
|
|
Kariba Power Station |
|
|
In 1993 the EU funded a survey of the "Cordon Sanitaire," a series of six border minefields totaling 766 km, carried out by the then newly-formed Zimbabwean firm of Mine-Tech, which was given just three months in 1994 to survey the minefields.234 Mine Tech did not conduct a Level 1 or Level 2 survey, and did not visit or "survey" the entire length of the minefields, but did complete the work and handed over a final report on schedule.235 While it contains some significant inaccuracies, the report does present a broad-brush description of the minefields, and includes maps and diagrams and broad assessment of likely problems in their clearance.
The survey found that Zimbabwe has an estimated 1.5 million AP mines, 10,000 Ploughshare mines and an unknown number of UXO in the ground. These are still assumed to be within the general area of the seven border minefields with the odd mine washed out by floods into the hinterland. (Floods from Cyclone Elaine have been particularly heavy in the Eastern Highlands bordering Mozambique, affecting minefields in areas 1-5.)
The cordon-sanitaire minefields consist of a 25m wide strip of ground laid with three rows of blast antipersonnel mines at a density of around 5,500 mines per kilometer, this minefield was fenced on both sides by a game fence of three strands of steel wire supported on thin steel posts set in concrete. Also attached to the fence was an intruder alarm system linked to control points, which fed information to patrol teams. By 1997 virtually all this fencing had been removed by local people or had disintegrated. Mines in the cordon were the South African R2M2 and the Portuguese M969.236 The Italian VS-50 was also laid. The cordon-sanitaire minefield is backed for most of its length by a second "Ploughshare" minefield containing three rows of large fragmentation mines mounted on steel pickets one meter above the ground. The fragmentation mines are laid with 30 meter-long tripwires and each mine is protected by three blast mines (see diagram). The mine density in this minefield is around 100 fragmentation mines and 300 buried blast mines per kilometer. In some areas, the minefield has been found to run into Mozambique for stretches up to 8 km in length.
In November 1999, UNMAS and UNDP's resident representative conducted an assessment mission of the problem in the country.237 In its Joint Assessment Mission Report issued in February 2000, it was noted that political attention is not focused on eradicating mines in Zimbabwe. Although the country possesses a credible local capacity for mine clearance, there is not a national mine clearance plan, and it lacks a body with a mandate to articulate and manage mine action. Consequently, current clearance activity is a result of ad-hoc and sometimes donor-driven initiatives without consultations with the affected people or groups otherwise associated with the mine problem. The assessment noted that the government appears to have "no intention of creating" a national mine clearance coordinating body,238 nor has the government been active in coordinating its landmine problem within the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Currently, one army engineer platoon of the Zimbabwe National Army and Koch Mine-Safe, a commercial demining company, carry out mine clearance operations in the country. In 1999, the army engineer platoon of 200 soldiers, funded by the US, cleared 6,000 AP mines in Area Six from a twenty-six kilometer tract that has since been handed over to the Victoria Falls town council.239 However, officials admit that the area cleared is a small percentage of the problem and predict that at this rate of about 8,000 square meters per day when adequate logistical support is available,240 it would take "ten years to complete the work."241 Already, the platoon is operating on a shoestring budget of Z$11 million (US$285,714).242 The U.S. government donated $1.743 million to mine action in Zimbabwe in 1999 and has a further allocation of US$1.006 million for FY2000. The U.S. has also budgeted an estimated $1 million for FY 01.243 Plans to create a second demining platoon in 2000 are under consideration.244
Clearance is also being carried out by Koch Mine-Safe, which won a European Development Fund supported contract to clear a top-priority, 359 kilometer-long minefield in northeastern Zimbabwe on the border with Mozambique.245 The contract tender, issued in late 1997, called for the clearance of ten million square meters over the length of the minefield, to be completed within eighteen months and at a fixed price. Additionally, a contract for quality assurance of the clearance was given to a British company, Bac Tec.
Koch was to begin operations in October 1998, but due to problems in assembling teams246 and logistics, they were not able to deploy personnel (three hundred staff, including their three self-supporting teams of fifty deminers each) until March 1999, already six months late. Under the Ministry of Defense contract, they are restricted to three working teams, and mechanical methods were to be allowed only if the land was checked by normal clearance methods as well and it could be ensured that environmental damage caused by mechanical clearance was minimal.
Following a number of early mine incidents, operations were halted to reassess procedures. Work recommenced in April/May 1999 and clearance moved slowly for four months. By the end of May, 0.25 percent of the ten million square meters of land had been cleared, already eight months into the contract. There were several contributing factors to the slow rate of clearance: a very high number of false signals;247 the abnormally heavy summer rainfall of January and February 1999, which led to an outbreak of cholera and the closing of the site; and finally Koch had under-estimated the logistical difficulties of the operation. Also, it had not been anticipated that they would have to cut and build access roads to the minefield.
Koch's operations were roundly criticized for what appeared to be an unacceptably high accident rate. Between March and June 1999 there were twelve incidents. Over half of the accidents occurred during excavation in the minefield, but the primary cause of a third of the accidents could be blamed on inadequate supervision, poor standard operating procedures (SOPs), or lax discipline, i.e.: "management error." Notably serious injuries happened while handling mines during practice, partly because of using unsafe SOP.248 A total of twenty people were injured in eighteen accidents between February 1999 and July 2000. Fourteen involved minor injuries. Two of the seriously injured died in the hospital, one from pneumonia contracted in recuperation. Following the visit of an EU consultant in May 1999 and the introduction of a manager from the Boskalis Group, safety and productivity improved greatly.
Soon after deployment in March 1999, Koch explored the potential for mechanical clearance and based on an environmental impact assessment which concluded that approximately one-third of the minefield was suitable for mechanical clearance, purchased a Veilhaben Mine Collector which went into operation in October 1999. Currently, two of Koch's teams work as manual teams, mostly on the Ploughshare minefield, and the third team follows the mine collector.
In February 2000, seventeen months through the eighteen-month contract, Koch had cleared less than one-third of their contract area (2.6 million square meters from a total of 10 million square meters). With agreement from all parties, the EU and the Ministry of Defense extended the contract to February 2001.
On average (over both the cordon sanitarie and the Ploughshare minefields) Koch's teams are lifting and destroying one mine per fifty-eight square meters. In the cordon sanitaire minefield this broad average rises to one mine per twenty square meters, and the mechanical team working in the center of the cordon sanitaire clears one mine per twelve square meters on average; spot densities can be more than twice this figure. The mechanical team currently processes 20,000 square meters of ground per day; the following team covers 12,000-12,500 square meters per day and destroys over 1,000 mines per day.
Two things characterize the current clearance program: The very high density of mines and number of mines being cleared. In June 2000, Koch Mine Safe cleared 421,000 square meters. By mid-July the team had cleared a total of 3,809,281 square meters of land. No "missed mines" have been reported by BacTec who assess ten percent of land cleared.
Other Zimbabwean Mine Action Firms
In addition to Mine Safe there are a number of other Zimbabwe based companies offering mine action services.
Mine-Tech: Founded in 1992, Mine-Tech is based in Harare, and conducted the EU-financed study of the border minefields in 1994 and 1995. It has not cleared mines in Zimbabwe in 1999 and 2000 although it employs mostly retired Zimbabwean soldiers; it has conducted mine survey, awareness and clearance in Mozambique, Somaliland, and Bosnia.
Rom-Tech: This is a small Harare-based firm, which had been trying to develop a mine resistant vehicle, the Pookie. It has been sub-contracted by Koch to assist in clearance of the border minefields.
Special Clearance Services: Special Clearance Services has conducted mine clearance work in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In 2000 it was taken over by U.S.-based Armor Holdings and relocated to South Africa.
Security Devices: This firm, based at Msasa, Harare, has since manufactured humanitarian demining equipment, particularly an apron and visor, since 1997. The U.S. Army, Mine-Tech, MgM in Angola and HI in Mozambique use the visors.
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance
Since independence in 1980, some 13,000 landmine incidents have been recorded, but independent research has indicated that these statistics are understated by as much as forty percent.249 Despite the deterioration and removal of previously protective fencing material along the minefield, many people know the general location of the mines, which has led to a decrease in injuries. In the Victoria Falls area, for example, the provincial hospital had not dealt with any landmine injuries from April through November 1999.250 As noted above, in the Koch demining operations, between February 1999 and July 2000, a total of twenty people have been injured in eighteen accidents.
Landmine survivors are treated by the public health system. There are two national hospitals that are designated referral centers; eight provincial and fifty-six district hospitals. The first community based rehabilitation project was initiated by the Zimbabwe Red Cross Society in 1982 and later handed over to the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare. It has gradually expanded to offer services for people with disabilities in forty-nine of Zimbabwe's fifty-five districts. But all medical services are currently under resourced. 251 Artifical limbs are expensive and most people in the mine-affected areas cannot afford them (a prosthetic leg is about Z$8,000/US$210 and an arm, double that). Some NGOs and the ICRC and local Red Cross have offered subsidies to help victims.
On 28 May 2000, the National Council for the Disabled urged the government to inform landmine victims to collect their compensation, which is lying uncollected at the Council's offices. The council noted that victims from the 1970's liberation war had not collected their checks, and its Deputy Chairperson, Farai Cherera, said, "Over the last seven years, my organization has been receiving reports of landmine victims who have been dismissed from the national army. The money is there, but most people entitled to this compensation are not getting it due to ignorance."252 She has also called upon the central statistics office to update its records on landmine victims.
52 Interview with Colonel Mathias Adjou-Moumouni, Ministry of National Defense, Cotonou, 28 April 2000.
53 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A. "Aucune mesure juridique en la matière n'existe aujourd'hui."
54 Interview with Joseph Agani, official in charge of antipersonnel mine policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cotonou, 18 July 2000.
55 Letter from Joseph H. Gnonlonfoun, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Jean Noel Sersiron, President, Handicap International, dated 9 September 1999.
56 Email from Isabelle Daoust, Coordinator, Advisory Service, ICRC office in Abidjan.
57 Interview with Colonel Mathias Adjou-Moumouni, Ministry of National Defense, Cotonou, 28 April 2000.
60 Interview with a government official, Gaborone, 20 March 2000.
61 Interview with Colonel J. T. Masisi, Botswana Defence Force, Gaborone, 26 November 1999.
64 Interview with Mr. C. Gabanakemo, the Executive Secretary of the Botswana Council for the Disabled, Gaborone, November 1999.
65 Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance, online update, 20 June 2000.
66 Interview with Mr. P. Moswetsi, Acting Secretary General Botswana Red Cross Society at BRC offices in Gaborone, 6 December 1999.
68 Name withheld at the request of the interviewed official.
69 Interview with Psacal Benon, President of the parliamentary governmental party Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès, 15 December 1999.
70 Interviews with Sawadogo Mahama, Head of the Europe-America-Oceania Service, Directorate General of Political, Legal and Consular Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ouagadougou, 12 November and 14 December 1999.
71 Letter from ICBL Coordinator Elizabeth Bernstein to Foreign Minister, Burkina Faso, dated 24 November 1999. Interview with Sawadogo Mahama, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ouagadougou, 5 January 2000.
72 Interview with Mr. Harouna Ouédraogo, Chief of Cabinet, Ministry of Defense, Ouagadougou, 9 November 1999.
73 Parliamentary Debate, 29 July 1998.
74 Statement by delegation of Chad to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999.
75 Landmine Monitor was told by local sources that there could be several hundred thousand mines in stock, but Landmine Monitor has no means of assessing the accuracy of such a claim. Likewise, Landmine Monitor was told that some 3,000 antipersonnel and antitank landmines were destroyed in early 2000, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify that information.
76 The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software has been provided to the HCND but it is not yet operational.
77 Republic of Chad, Mine Action Chad presentation, December 1999.
78 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Haut Commissariat National au Déminage (HCND), "Mine Action Chad: Program Overview," prepared for Donors Conference, New York, 29 October 1999, p. 1.
79 UNDP/HCND, "Chad Mine Action: Program Overview," October 1999, p. 14.
81 Ibid. The Survey Action Center lists the U.S., the UN Foundation, and the United Kingdom as donors. See SAC appendix to Landmine Monitor Report 2000.
82 U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 8.
83 U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 1.
84 "CHAD: Mine Action Country Profile," UNDP website accessed 29 July 2000, http://www.undp.org/erd/mineaction/.
85 UNDP/HCND, "Mine Action Chad: Program Overview," October 1999, p. 1.
88 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network for West Africa, "IRIN-WA Weekly Roundup 5 covering the period 31 January - 4 February 2000."
89 UNDP/HCND, "Chad Mine Action: Program Overview," October 1999, p. 11.
90 Interview with an official from the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Ndjamena, 21 March 2000.
91 UNDP/HCND, "Mine Action Chad: Program Overview," p. 2.
97 Law No. 99-431 - 6 July 1999.
98 Borderau d'envoi N° 809 RE/AJC/AH/2, 24 March 2000.
99 Interview with General Bendji Joseph Mockey, Cabinet Director, Ministry of Defense, Abidjan, 8 March 2000.
102 Telephone interview with Colonel Gilbert Canovas, Defense Attaché, French Embassy, Yaounde (Cameroon), 3 May 2000.
103 Interview with Handicap International/Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan, 13 March 2000.
104 Interview with Office of Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djibouti, 23 February, 2000.
105 "Addis Readies for War in the Air," Indian Ocean Newsletter, ION 842, p. 8-9.
106 Nation (Djibouti government weekly publication), 28 March 1998; French military sources.
107 News of the destruction was broadcast on Djibouti Radio and Television. The destruction of landmines by the French Army in Djibouti was also witnessed by three delegates from France's National Commission on Landmines. See also, "La France détruit ses dernières mines antipersonnel," French Ministry of Defense, press file, 20 December 1999.
108 Radio France International (RFI), various reports, Radio Television de Djibouti (RTD), various reports.
110 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999 p. 33-34 for more details.
111 Information on the types of mines used in Djibouti was given by Djibouti military officials on the government appointed Mine Action Taskforce.
112 Information on mined zones was given by Djibouti military officials and members of the Mine Action Taskforce.
113 Discussion between Landmine Monitor and Dahir Osman, President of ASOVIM, 13 March 2000.
114 U.S. Department of State, 9 December 1999 Humanitarian Demining IWG Fact Sheet.
116 Interview with Mustfa Barkhat, ICRC Djibouti, 8 May 2000.
117 Telephone interview with government official, Malabo, 25 July 2000.
119 Interview with Adjudicator-General of the Armed Forces, Col. A.B. Donkor, Accra, 6 February 1999.
120 Telephone interview with government official, Conakry, 26 July 2000.
121 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p.36.
122 Interview with Caleb Sello, Lesotho Defence Force, 13 March 2000. This was confirmed by Lesotho in its written statement. Fax from L. Mosala, Foreign Affairs, Lesotho to Noel Stott, South African/International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Ref. FR/UN/21, 7 July 2000, p. 1.
123 Statement by Thomas Thabane, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho, to the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, 3-7 May 1999, pp. 3-4.
126 "The rebels claim to have about 2,000 AK-47 rifles, limpet mines and landmines, rocket-propelled grenades, small-calibre rocket launchers, bombs, mortars and anti-aircraft launchers." See Sechaba Ka'Nkosi, "Inside the Camps of the Lesotho Rebels," Electronic Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 2 October 1998.
127 Telephone interview with Sechaba Ka'Nkosi, 7 March 2000.
128 Confidential interview with a representative of the Lesotho Defence Force, 13 March 2000.
129 Statement by Lesotho to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000, p. 1.
130 See African Contemporary Record, 1981 - 1982, (London: African Publishing Company, 1981); "An Enemy Again," Lesotho Weekly, 3 December 1982; "Landmine Victim Dies," Rand Daily Mail (South Africa), 7 December 1982; and M. Morris & T. Combrinck, Use of Explosive Devices in Sabotage and Terrorism in South Africa 1981 - 1986 (Cape Town: Terrorism Research Centre, 1986).
131 Statement by Lesotho to Landmine Monitor, 7 July 2000, p. 2.
133 Statement by Foreign Minister Thabane to the FMSP, 3-7 May 1999, p. 3.
134 Statement by Joe Mulbah, Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism, Republic of Liberia, undated, faxed to Landmine Monitor/Human Rights Watch, 31 July 2000.
135 Telephone interviews with diplomatic sources, Monrovia and Freetown, 20 July 2000.
136 On 4 June 1999 President Charles Taylor set up a committee to oversee the destruction of these weapons, which had been stored at the Liberian Industrial Free Zone Authority. Radio Liberia International, Monrovia, in English 0700 gmt, 4 June 1999.
137 Associated Press, 27 August 2000; "UN: Secretary-General welcomes on 18 October weapons destruction program in Liberia," M2 Presswire, 20 October 1999. The destruction process was filmed by a Norwegian film company, TV Communication; interview with TV Communication director Bjorn Roar Bye, Oslo, 11 November 1999.
138 A Monrovia-based lawyer interviewed by Dutch-freelance journalist Bram Posthumus in March 2000 stated that in 1997, twenty-five landmines were retrieved and destroyed in Voinjama area of Lofa County.
139 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Dutch freelance journalist Bram Posthumus, who assessed the landmines situation in Liberia in March 2000.
140 U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p.A-2.
141 Interview with John Stewart, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Monrovia, March 2000.
142 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by journalist Bram Posthumus.
143 Telephone interview with Mme Elena Rajaonarivelo, Madagascar Mission to the UN, New York, 31 March 1999.
144 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, July 1993, p.121.
145 Letter from Mr. M.D. Chibwana, Principle Foreign Service Officer for Political Affairs (UN matters), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, 28 February 2000.
146 Interview with Ernest Mungo Makawa, Treaties Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, 12 May 2000.
148 Statement by Z. K. Medi to the FMSP, Maputo, 3 May 1999, pp. 4-5.
149 Interview with Ernest Mungo Makawa, Treaties Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lilongwe, 12 May 2000.
151 Interview with Brigadier N.W. Banda PSC, Army Chief of Staff and Col. H.L. Odilo, Deputy Chief of Staff, Kamuzu Barracks, Lilongwe, 20 January 2000.
152 Statement by Z. K. Medi to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
153 Interview with Brig. Banda, Army Chief of Staff, and Col. Odilo, Deputy Chief of Staff, Lilongwe, 20 January 2000.
154 Ibid.; see also Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 39.
155 Interview with Col. H.L.Odilo, Lilongwe, 10 April 2000.
156 Interview with Col. R. Chimowa, Spokesman, Ministry of Defense, Lilongwe, 11 May 2000.
157 Interview with Col. R. Chimowa, Spokesman, Ministry of Defense, Lilongwe, 11 May 2000.
159 Telephone interview with Mr. Samasékou, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mali, 14 November 1999.
160 Statement by the Delegation of Mali to the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, pp. 3-4.
161 Identified as 3,225 mines antipersonnel a pression et 1,902 mines antipersonnel a traction. Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, p. 5.
162 Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, p. 5.
164 Official Journal, N°944, 15 February 1999.
165 Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade press release No. 186, "Axworthy Welcomes 100th Ratification of Landmine Convention," 27 July 2000.
166 Osservatario sul commercio delle arme report, Italy Toscane IRES.
167 Interview with three mine clearance specialists, 26 December 1999.
168 U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 - Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 11; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet: "Meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Demining 10 December 1998."
169 Interview with Peter John Crittenden, U.S. liaison officer, U.S. Embassy, December 1999.
170 U.S. State Department, Hidden Killers, September 1998, p. A-2.
172 Statement to Landmine Monitor, 27 April 2000, p. 2. Fax from Ms. P. Soogree for the Supervising Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Question for Landmine Monitor 2000," Ref: TS/M/67/1, 27 April 2000.
173 Interview with Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul, Head of Multilateral (Political) Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Port Louis, 27 March 2000.
174 "Traite sur les mines antipersonnels - Maurice n'a toujours pas soumis de rapport," Le Mauricien, 3 December 1999.
175 Statement by Hon. Rajkeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Republic of Mauritius to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, p. 3. Shortly after the release of Landmine Monitor Report 1999, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the ICBL a letter congratulating the ICBL on the report, which it described as a "major contribution." The letter noted, however, that the report gave the wrong name for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The letter was immediately placed in the "Comments and Clarifications" section of the Landmine Monitor web site. Landmine Monitor apologizes for this error. Letter from B. Gokool for Supervising Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, to Coordination Team of the ICBL, Ref: TS/M/67/1, 13 May 1999, p. 1. Go to http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/comments.html
176 Statement to Landmine Monitor, Ref: TS/M/67/1, 27 April 2000, p. 3.
177 Statement by Hon. Rajkeswur Purryag to the FMSP, Maputo, 3-7 May 1999, p. 3.
178 Interview with Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Port Louis, 27 March 2000.
179 The government of Canada allocated US$10,000 in order to provide technical assistance to the government of Mozambique in compiling its first Article 7 Report. The flood emergency situation at the beginning of 2000 resulted in a major set-back in the production of the report. However, Canada was informed in May 2000 by an official of the National Demining Institute that an English version of the report had been prepared and would be forwarded to the United Nations. Email from Mines Action Team, DFAIT to Human Rights Watch (Mary Wareham), 21 July 2000.
180 See ICBL, "Report on Activities: First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, Mozambique, 3-7 May 1999," September 1999, 121 pages.
181 Statement by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of Mozambique, at the opening ceremony of the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
182 See ICBL, "Report on Activities: Second General Meeting of the ICBL, Maputo, Mozambique, 8-9 May 1999," September 1999, 40 pages.
183 Statement by Ambassador Carlos Dos Santos, "Speakers Stress Financial Challenge Posed By Landmines as Assembly Takes Up Report Of Secretary-General On Assistance In Mine Action," Press Release GA/9662, 18 November 1999.
184 For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 45.
185 South African Press Association, 25 May 2000.
187 Landmines produced in the following countries have been found in Mozambique: USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, China, Italy, Belgium, France, U.K., Portugal, U.S., South Africa, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Austria. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 45.
188 "Minas E Desminagem em Mocambique: Actas do seminario sobre o impacto socio-cultural e economico das minas e da desminagem em Mocambique, organizado pelo Arpac, IDRC e IND," February 2000.
189 CND Bulletin No. 8, March 1999.
190 Southern Mozambique Flood Affected Area Map, 1:400,000 scale, IND/ADP, Maputo, 16 March 2000.
191 CND Bulletin No. 8, March 1999.
192 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Statement, Maputo, 11 March 2000.
193 Interview Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, Chief technical Advisor, ADP, Maputo, 13 April 2000.
194 CNN News Bulletins, March 2000.
195 Interview with Nico Bosman, Program Coordinator, UNOPS, Johannesburg, 6 June 2000.
197 Interview with Mike Wilson, Manager, CIDC National Level 1 Survey, Maputo, 12 April 2000.
198 Email from Richard Kidd, Manager, Survey Action Center, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 27 July 2000.
199 Interview with Mike Wilson, Manager, CIDC National Level 1 Survey, Maputo, 12 April 2000.
201 Interview with Mike Wilson, Manager, CIDC National Level 1 Survey, Maputo, 12 April 2000.
203 Email from Alistair Craib, Consultant to the European Union, April 1999.
204 Interview with Artur Verissimo, Director, IND, Maputo, 11 April 2000.
205 U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 3; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 12. U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: "United States Increases Humanitarian Demining Assistance to Mozambique," 10 May 2000.
206 Interview with Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, Chief technical Advisor, ADP, Maputo, 13 April 2000.
207 All data gathered from interviews in Mozambique and South Africa in 1999 and 2000. Note: Figures in italics are estimates or totals for programs lasting over one year.
208 Email from Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, CTA, ADP, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.
209 CND data, See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 48.
210 Note: Figures in italics are Landmine Monitor extrapolations.
211 "Desminagem consome mai de 27 milhoes de dolares/ano," Noticias, 17 January 2000.
212 Interview Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, Chief technical Advisor, ADP, Maputo, 13 April 2000.
213 Email from Lt. Col. Derek Baxter, CTA, ADP, to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham), 1 August 2000.
214 NPA 4th Quarter Report, 1999 Mozambique Demining, Maputo.
215 Email from Alan Macdonald, Africa Desk Officer, HALO Trust to Landmine Monitor (Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch), 25 July 2000.
216 Interview with Peter Puggy Fuyane, Project Director, MgM Mozambique, Maputo, 11th April 2000. Email from Hendrik Ehlers, Director, MgM, 11 May 2000. See also, www.mgm.org.
217 Interview with Mike Thusi, Program Manager, Mechem, Johannesburg, 7 June 2000.
218 Interview with Chris Pearce, Director, Mine Tech, Johannesburg, 6 June, 2000. Email from Michael Laban, Project Manager, Mine Tech, 6 June 2000.
219 GTZ stands for Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit Gmb. It is the implementation arm of German government overseas development aid.
220 RONCO Newswire, "RONCO Continues Work On State Department Demining Contract In Mozambique," Washington, March 2000.
221 Interview with Mr Pretorius, Project Manager, CGTVA, Johannesburg 6 June 2000.
222 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Alberto Manhique, Coordinator, Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines.
223 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by Alberto Manhique, Coordinator, Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines.
224 Interview with Noel Philp, Director DSL, London, 20 June 2000.
225 Interview with Bill Pelser, Director, BRZ, and Julius Krahtz, Operations Manager, BRZ, Pretoria, 7 June 2000; BRZ International Ltd, "Humanitarian Mine Clearance Profile," BRZ302, Doc Edition:B.
226 Interview with Bill Pelser, Director, BRZ and Julius Krahtz, Operations Manager, BRZ, Pretoria, 7 June 2000.
227 Ananda S. Milliard, "Community Impact in Mozambique: The Process of Identifying and Using Socio-Economic Indicators," Paper presented at "The Road Forward: Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Southern Africa," Conference hosted by SAAI, Johannesburg, 8 June 2000. See also Ananda S. Millard and Kristian Berg Harpviken, Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities Project (AMAC), PRIO, "Use of Socio-Economic Analysis in Planning and Evaluating Mine Action Programmes: The Case of Mozambique," Report for the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) submitted to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Oslo, 8 May 2000.
228 Noticias, 17 January 2000.
229 Data provided to Landmine Monitor by IND, 13 April 2000.
230 "Campanha Mocambicana quer maior celeridade," Noticias, 29 September 1999.
231 Data provided to Landmine Monitor by IND, 13 April 2000.
232 POWER Mozambique project pamphlet, undated.
233 Interview with Max Deneu, POWER Country Manager, Maputo, 20 January 1999.
234 Findings reproduced in POWER Mozambique project pamphlet, undated.
235 Michael Boddington, "Sustainability of Prothetic and Orthotic Programmes in the Low-income World: The Case of Mozambique," Journal of Mine Action, Fall 1999.
237 Michael Boddington, "Sustainability of Prothetic and Orthotic Programmes," Journal of Mine Action, Fall 1999.
238 Interview with Pascal Torres, PAI Project Coordinator, MINEC, Maputo, 12 January 1999.
239 Letter by Phil ya Nangoloh, NCBL Coordinator addressed to the Minister of Defense, 16 February 2000.
240 Verbal denial (regarding research and production) by Defense Minister Erkki Nghimtina during a meeting with the NCBL, 12 January 1999.
241 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 65-66.
243 "No explosives threat, says Defense," The Namibian, 9 March 1999.
244 "Angola: New concerns as fighting rages along southern border", IRIN, 22 December 1999; "Sergeant killed in UNITA attack," The Namibian, 22 December 1999; "Civilian killings spark concern," The Namibian, 22 December 1999; "Unita 80 percent destroyed, says Angolan army chief," The Namibian, 21 December 1999; "Angolan fighting spread into Namibia," The Independent Online, 20 December 1999.
245 "Angola's UNITA Rebels Say They Will Go on Harassing Namibian Civilians," Die Republikein (Namibian Newspaper), 4 February 2000, distributed in English by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2000.
246 Replying letter from the Inspector General of the Namibian Police addressed to the Director of Administration of the National Society for Human Rights, 2 March 2000.
247 "Report On Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents: Kavango Region, January-April 2000," Chief Inspector of Explosives, 10 April 2000.
249 U.S. Department of State, "Namibia - Consular Information Sheet," 19 May 2000.
250 "Foreign Missions Remove Workers in North," Africa News Service, Windhoek, 14 February 2000.
251 The Namibian, 12 April 2000.
252 "Landmine Explodes Inside RC Church," Africa News Service, Windhoek, 30 May 2000; "Landmine Injures 11 People," IRIN, 29 May 2000.
253 The Namibian, 30 May 2000.
254 A. Maketo, Namibian Broadcasting Company radio news report, 1900, 19 April 2000.
255 "Angolans Face Terror Charges," IRIN, 24 May 2000; journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes obtained similar accounts from local residents of Angolan government complicity, interview 6 June 2000; Publico, 10 May 2000.
0 For accounts of use by Angolan troops in an operation in northern Namibia see: "Namibia: Angolans face terror charge," IRIN, 24 May 2000; journalist Pedro Rosa Mendes obtained similar accounts from local residents, interview, 6 June 2000; Publico (Lisbon), 10 May 2000; National Society for Human Rights (Namibia) Press Release, "Kavango Atrocities Update I," 23 May 2000.
1 "Two more FAA casualties," The Namibian, 4 February 2000; "Namibia Wary of Insecurity After 10 Years of Peace," Pan African News Agency, 25 January 2000; "Namibia: Government reiterates support for Angola," IRIN, 24 January 2000; "SPFF Clash with UNITA rebels," New Era, 14-16 January 2000, pp. 1-2.
2 UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission Report: Namibia, 6 April 2000, p. 3.
3 "Marking the First Anniversary of Mine Ban Treaty," NCBL/NSHR, 28 February 1999; The Namibian, 2 March 1999.
4 U.S. State Department, "Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2001," 15 March 2000; U.S. State Department, "FY 2000 NADR Status," 5 May 2000; interview with Ms. Ruby Aspler, Director, American Cultural Center, U.S. Embassy Windhoek, 15 March 2000.
5 "Mine Awareness Campaign," speech by Lt. Col. M K Nashandi, Commander, Engineer Regiment, Oshikango, 18 September 1998.
6 Defense Minister, Erkki Nghimtina, "Message on Mine Awareness Campaign," Information Campaign on Mines & UXOs, 23 September 1998, p. 2.
7 "Demining in Namibia's north a great success," Windhoek Observer, 29 October 1999; "Power Plus," The Namibian Online, 13 December 1999; "1,214 Mines Destroyed from 200 Pylons so Far: Demeaning operation on Good Course," New Era, 13-16 December 1999; "Over 1,200 Mines Destroyed in Namibia's Etosha," Pan Africa News Agency, 11 December 1999.
8 "Over 1,200 Mines Destroyed in Namibia's Etosha," Pan Africa News Agency, 11 December 1999; "1,214 Mines Destroyed from 200 Pylons so Far: Demining Operation on Good Course," New Era, 13-16 December 1999; "Power Plus," The Namibian, 13 December 1999.
9 "Omahenene Receive Close to N$500,000," New Era, 10-12 March 2000.
10 "Nam edges closer to being proclaimed landmine-free," The Namibian, 31 August 1998, p. 5.
11 "Villagers fearful after mine blast," The Namibian, 16 November 1999.
12 "5 Injured," New Era, 11-14 January 1999 and "Four hurt in explosion," The Namibian, 11 January 1999, p. 1.
13 "Report On Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents: Kavango Region, January-April 2000," Chief Inspector of Explosives, 10 April 2000.
14 Replying letter from the Inspector General of the Namibian Police addressed to the Director of Administration of the National Society for Human Rights, 2 March 2000.
15 The Namibian, 29 June 2000.
16 Chief Inspector of Explosives, "Report on Anti-Personnel Mine Incidents, Kavango Region," January-April 2000.
17 UNMAS, Joint Assessment Mission: Namibia, 6 April 2000, p. 9. See also, "Demining in Namibia's north a great success," Windhoek Observer, 29 October 1999.
18 "1,214 Mines Destroyed from 200 pylon so far De-mining operation on good course," New Era, 13-16 December 1999.
19 Interview with Ms. Batseba Katjiuongua, Director of Social Services, Ministry of Health and Social Services, 23 February 2000.
20 The Namibian, 29 June 2000.
21 Interview with Ado El Hadj Abou, Head of the Division for United Nations and International Conferences, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 January 2000.
22 Interview with Ali Sékou Maina, Program Director, Democracy 2000, Niamey, 10 March 2000.
24 Statement by Colonel Bem Habyalimana at the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, May 1999. Unofficial translation by Landmine Monitor editing team.
26 Rwanda National Demining Office, Progress Report, 2 April 2000.
27 For the full list, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 162.
28 See country report on Democratic Republic of Congo.
29 "Congolese Rebels Agree to Pullout From Battered City," Associated Press (Igali, Rwanda), 26 June 2000.
30 Telephone interview with UN official Kisangani, 28 July 2000.
31 Emmy Allio, "Congo Kinshasa Tchopo Bridge Mined," New Vision (Daily Kampala newspaper), 19 June 2000.
33 "DRC: Kisangani's main bridge reopens," IRIN-CEA Update 951 for the Great Lakes, 22 June 2000.
34 "Congolese Rebels Agree to Pullout From Battered City," Associated Press, (Igali, Rwanda), 25 June 2000.
35 Interview with Bali Munenwa, Chibanda/Kaziba, 27 December 1999.
36 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.194-195.
37 Interview with Col. Karenzi Karake, Kigali, 12 April 2000.
38 Plan for the Disengagement and Redeployment of Forces in Democratic Republic of Congo, (Lusaka Agreement), signed on 8 April 2000.
39 Agreement for a Ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Joint Military Commission Decisions of the Sessions, part 2.6, September 1999.
41 See, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 163; see also, Human Rights Watch, "Rwanda," Human Rights Watch World Report 1997, p. 46.
42 Rwanda National Demining Office, Progress Report, 2 April 2000.
43 U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY 2001 - Bureau of African Affairs," March 15, 2000; U.S. Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," April 1999, p. 14.
44 Ibid., U.S. Department of State, "FY 00 NADR Project Status," p. 3.
45 Interview with Susan Page, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Kigali, 27 April 2000.
46 Rwanda National Demining Office, Progress Report, 2 April 2000.
54 The data from the Kigali Central Hospital includes amputations and prosthetic fittings for all causes, Service de Readaption Recueillies Aupres de Mukakabera M. Claire.
55 One Love Project, 1999 Annual Report.
56 Interview with Deo Butera, Director, Handicap International, Kigali, February 2000.
57 Handicap International, 1999 Annual Report.
58 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp.74-78.
59 "Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation Following Some Allegations Contained in the 1999 Report of ICBL, First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on A.P. Land Mines," Maputo, 5 May 1999, (Non-official translation); see also Press Release in Le Soleil, a Senegalese governmental daily newspaper, 10 May 1999.
60 Interview with Mr. Abdou Salam Diallo, Head of the United States Division, Dakar, 3 July, 2000. (Diallo was Counselor representing Senegal at the FMSP.)
61 Order no. 05403 of 5 August 1999, on the creation of the national commission in charge of the application, at the national level, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction signed in Ottawa on December 5, 1997. Order no. 07828 of 27 October 1999, abrogating and replacing order no. 05403 about the creation of the national commission in charge of the application, at the national level, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction signed in Ottawa on 5 December, 1997.
62 Order no. 07828 of 27 October 1999, Art. 3. These ministries include: Armed Forces, Domestic Affairs, Justice, Agriculture, Economy, Environment, Health, Family, Social Action and National Solidarity.
64 Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Director of Study Control and of Legislation, Ministry of Armed Forces, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.
65 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, submitted on 1 September 1999.
66 Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO); Organisation Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (ONDH); Solidarité Partage; SOS Paix en Casamance; KAGAMEN and other international NGOs, such as Handicap International.
67 Article 7 Report, Form D; interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000; interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000.
68 Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation, Maputo, 5 May 1999.
69 Interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000; interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.
70 Article 7 Report, Form B; interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000; interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000.
71 Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.
72 RADDHO, a human rights NGO active on ban issues, has written several letters to the government over last three years seeking information about the existence of AP mine stockpiles in Senegal, to which there have been no reply. RADDHO doubts that there is no stockpile of mines, especially for military training. Interview with Alioune Tine, Executive Secretary of RADDHO, Dakar, 4 July 2000. In discussions in Maputo in May 1999 about the ICBL's conclusion that Senegal used mines in Guinea-Bissau, no member of the Senegalese delegation made the claim that Senegal did not have AP mines.
73 Interview with Lt. Colonel Fall, Commander of the Légion at the Ziguinchor Gendarmerie, March 2000.
74 Interview with Gen. Mamadou Niang, Minister of Internal Affairs and former Ambassador in Guinea-Bissau, Dakar, 4 July 2000.
75 For details on past use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 76-78.
76 Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.
77 Interview with Lt. Colonel Fall, March 2000.
78 Interview with Colonel Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February 2000.
79 Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February 2000.
81 Interview with a former member of the Senegalese army, July 2000.
82 Interview with Daniel Sagna, Director of the Fishing School, Godomp, 8 July 2000; interview with a member of the Catholic Mission in Simbandi, district Sedhiou, 8 July 2000.
84 Interview with the population in Casamance, 8-9 July 2000.
85 Interview with Commandant Kamoungué Diatta, North Front, December 1999.
86 Interview with Abbot Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, Ziguinchor, March 2000.
87 Interview with Mr. Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000; interview with Col. Ousmane Sarr, Dakar, 4 July 2000.
88 Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, February and 3 July 2000.
89 Interview with Gen. Mamadou Niang, Minister of Internal Affairs and former Ambassador of Senegal in Guinea-Bissau, Dakar, 4 July 2000.
90 Interview with Alioune Tine, RADDHO, Dakar, 4 July 2000.
91 Interviews with local communities in Casamance, 8-9 July 2000.
92 "Statement Made by the Senegalese Delegation Following Some Allegations Contained in the 1999 Report of ICBL," Maputo, 5 May 1999, (Non-official translation).
93 Interview with Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000. The ICBL questioned this logic, since Guinea-Bissau forces, which Senegal was supporting, were using mines. A former high-ranking member of the Senegalese military staff told Landmine Monitor in July 2000 that use of mines could have been part of the war logic. Stressing that he was speaking hypothetically, he said the Senegalese army could have found a stockpile of landmines during its operations in Guinea-Bissau and used those mines to defend its security perimeter around the city of Bissau. Interview with a former member of the Senegalese army, July 2000.
94 Landmine Monitor notes that Senegal, while denying use on its part, acknowledged that Guinea-Bissau troops employed mines in 1998. In that respect, it should be noted that the ICBL has expressed concern that a Mine Ban Treaty State Party may be violating the treaty by virtue of participating in a joint military operation with another nation that uses antipersonnel mines in that operation. Under Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party may not "under any circumstance...assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity that is prohibited to a State Party under this Convention."
95 Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000; interview with Col. Ousmane Sarr, Dakar, July 4, 2000.
96 Interview with Andrea Nicolaj, Counselor of the EU Delegation in Senegal, Dakar, 5 July 2000.
97 Information gathered during the Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines in Casamance, RADDHO, Dakar, April 1998.
98 Email from Handicap International to Landmine Monitor, 1 August 2000.
99 Handicap International, "Presentation of the Program in Casamance," July 2000, p. 3.
100 Interview with Abdou Salam Diallo, Dakar, 3 July 2000.
101 Interview with Col. Sarr, Dakar, 4 July, 2000.
103 Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000.
104 Interview with S. Wyseur-Gueye, Ziguinchor, 9 July 2000.
105 Interview with Sophie Wyseur-Gueye, Ziguinchor, 9 July, 2000.
106 Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July, 2000.
107 Interview with the Director of the Regional Hospital of Ziguinchor, Ziguinchor, March 2000.
108 Interview with Col. Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw, Dakar, 3 July 2000.
110 Interview with Sophie Wyzeur-Gueye, Ziguinchor, 9 July, 2000; interview with Mr. Andrea Nicolaj, Counselor of the EU Delegation in Dakar, 5 July 2000; interview with Yatma Fall, President of the Association Nationale des Handicapés Moteurs de Sénégal, Dakar, 5 July 2000.
111 Interview with Yatma Fall, Dakar, 5 July 2000.
112 Telephone interview with Alan Bayette, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Victoria, 26 July 2000.
113 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 14 231(4), (Wynberg: Constitutional Assembly, 1997).
114 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, for the reporting period 1 March 1999-1 September 1999, submitted 1 September 1999.
115 Letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Noel Stott, SACBL, 17 November 1997.
116 "Anti-Personnel Mine Convention Enters Into Force," Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Press Release No. 46, 1 March 1999.
117 For information on past production and transfer, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 83-84; see also, Alex Vines, "Ethics and Other Considerations for De-mining in SADC," paper delivered to an international conference, "Towards Cost-Effective De-mining: an Evaluation of Experiences and Techniques," Johannesburg, April 1998; see also, Martin Rupiya, Landmines in Zimbabwe: a Deadly Legacy, (Harare: SAPES Books, 1998), p. 25.
118 Article 7 Report, submitted 1 September 1999.
119 Information Supplied by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Directorate, 5 May 2000.
121 South African National Defense Force, "Fact Sheet: South Africa's Initiatives on Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines," 8 September 1999; see also, Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 September 1999.
122 Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 September 1999.
126 M. Chachiua, Arms Management Programme: Operation Rachel 1996 - 1999, (ISS: Halfway House, 1999) p. 40. V. Gamba, Small Arms in Southern Africa: reflections on the extent of the problem and its management potential, (ISS: Halfway House, 1999) p. 66.
127 "Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission," Cape Town: Juta, 1998. In its final report the TRC found that the ANC landmine campaign in the rural areas of the Northern and eastern Transvaal in the period 1985-1987 could not be condoned as it resulted in a gross violation of human rights. The Commission however also acknowledged the ANC for abandoning its landmine campaign in light of the high civilian casualty rate.
128 Jackie Selebi, Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Statement to the First Meeting of States Parties, Maputo, Mozambique, 3 May 1999.
129 Vernon Joynt, Divisional General Manager, Mechem Consultants, "Written response to questions tabled by the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines," 22 October 1997.
130 Ronnie Kasrils, "South Africa and a Landmine Free Southern Africa," address at conference "Towards Cost Effective Demining: An evaluation of experiences and techniques," SAIIA, 22-23 April 1999.
131 Center for Conflict Resolution, "Demining Workshop Report," 16 March 1998.
132 Ronnie Kasrils, "South Africa and a Landmine Free Southern Africa," address to the conference "Towards Cost effective Demining, An evaluation of experiences and techniques," SAIIA, 22 - 23 April 1999.
133 Saracen was linked to the now disbanded private military company, Executive Outcomes.
134 BRZ International Ltd, "Humanitarian Mine Clearance Profile," Doc: BRZ302, Edition B, undated.
135 "Landmines - everybody's hidden enemy," Eurostatry Show, Daily News, 25 June 1996.
136 John G. Zavales, Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Department of Defense, "United States Interagency Team Visits South Africa," March 1999.
138 E-mail from Hendrik Ehlers to MGM people against landmines network, 8 November 1998.
139 Simon Barber, "Mechem to test Pentagon's $25 million dog," Business Day, 4 March 1999.
140 J. Stephen Laufer and Louise Cook, "Japanese firms still see SA as a trade base," Business Day, 18 January 1999.
141 "DENEL to visit Libya and `sell SA,'" Business Day, 24 May 1999.
142 South African Constitution, Section 9.
143 Margie Schneider, Disability Review (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1997).
144 P. McLaren and S. Philpott, Assessing Assistive Devices Services: a review of eight provinces in South Africa (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1998). See also, M. Claassens and M. Schneider, Services Provided for disabled People by National and Provincial Government Departments (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1998).
145 R. Morgan and D. Everrat, Audit of NGOs of and for People With Disabilities (Braamfontein: C A S E, 1998).
146 G. M. Scharf, "The South African Medical Service's Doctrine, Expertise, Advice and Assistance on Mine Warfare and the Treatment of the Victims of Mine Warfare," Paper Presented to the United Nations' International Meeting on Mine Clearance, Geneva, July 1995.
147 Swaziland Article 7 Report, Form A, submitted 16 February 2000.
148 Telephone interview with Ismail Matse, Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 January 2000.
149 Swaziland Article 7 Report, Forms B and G, 16 February 2000.
150 Some sources have listed Swaziland as mine free. According to the UN Country Database, Swaziland is not mine-affected. In 1993, the U.S. Department of State stated that Swaziland "has no landmine problem" but in 1998, it revised this to "affected." U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, 1993, p. 159 and U.S. Department of State, Hidden Killers, 1998, p. A-2.
151 Thandiwe Dlamini, "Statement to the OAU Conference on the Legacy of Anti-personnel Landmines," 19 - 21 May 1997.
152 "Danger: 8 More Landmines Found at Lomahasha," The Swazi Observer (national newspaper), 8 June 1999.
153 Telephone Interview with Thandiwe Dlamini, retired director of the Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society, 7 March 2000.
154 Email from Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, U.S. Department of State, 3 April 2000.
155 Email from Colonel Tom Stott, Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy, via Helen Savva, Reference Specialist, Public Affairs Office, Information Resource Center, U.S. Embassy, Pretoria, South Africa, 16 March 2000. See also, Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2000, p. 38.
156 Swaziland Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 February 2000.
157 Email from Colonel Tom Stott, via U.S. Embassy, Pretoria, South Africa, 16 March 2000.
158 Thandiwe S. Dlamini and July Ginindza, "Update on the Situation of Landmines in Swaziland," Unpublished paper, Baphalali Swaziland Red Cross Society, 5 May 2000.
159 Dlamini and Ginindza, "Update on the Situation of Landmines in Swaziland," 5 May 2000.
160 Article 7 Report, Form I, 16 February 2000.
161 Maria Raphael, Senior Program Manager, U.S. Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, "Address to the Southern Africa Development Council," Gaborone, Botswana, 15 April 1999.
162 Dlamini and Ginindza, "Update on the Situation of Landmines in Swaziland," 5 May 2000, p. 1.
164 Interview with Elom Akpalou, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lomé, 25 April 2000.
165 Letter to Landmine Monitor from Assani Tidjani, General de Brigade, Ministry of National Defense, N° 314/MDN/CAB/00, 6 April 2000.
167 Tata Hounkanli, "Lomé: Un homme tué par deux fortes explosions aux abords de Lomé II," CROCODILE, (Lome), 22 April 1999.
168 Letter to Landmine Monitor from Assani Tidjani, Ministry of National Defense, 6 April 2000.
169 Interview with General Assani Tidjani, Ministry of National Defense, Lomé, 20 March 2000.
170 Interview with Colonel Bitenewe, Advisor, Ministry of National Defense, Lomé, 14 June 2000.
171 Interview with Mrs. Eunice Kigenyi Irungu, Foreign Service Officer, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Kampala, 19 December 1999.
173 Interview with Mrs. E.K. Irungu, MOFA, Kampala, 27 April 2000.
174 This includes UNICEF, URCS, IPPNW- Uganda, AVSI, UNACOH, and SCF-Norway.
175 Interview with Mrs. E.K. Irungu, MOFA, Kampala, 27 April 2000.
176 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 90-96.
177 Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta, Director General, International Security Organization (ISO), and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.
179 "Arms Flows to Central Africa/Great Lakes," Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, November 1999, available at: www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_pm/fs_9911_armsflows.html.
180 Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.
182 The East African, 19 January 2000.
184 Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta, and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.
185 Interview with Mrs. E.K. Irungu , Kampala, 19 December 1999.
186 Interviews in March and April 2000 with local people and leaders in Gulu during mine awareness workshops.
187 The East African, 17-23 January 2000.
188 Telephone interview with UN official in Kisangani, 28 July 2000.
189 "Rebels say more than 4,000 Mines Left in Kisangani," AFP (Kisangani), 21 July 2000, in FBIS.
190 Interview with Brig. Ivan Koreta and Lt. Katsigazi, Kampala, 23 December 1999.
191 Patricia Spittal, Canadian Network for International Surgery/ICC- Uganda, views from group discussions, (unpublished data).
192 Community-based NGOs in Gulu and Kitgum districts and local leaders stated that the LRA planted these mines.
193 These reports have been supported by various sources from Kitgum and Gulu districts, for example, participants who have been attending mine awareness education workshops in Gulu town (March and April, 2000). See, Patricia Spittal, (unpublished data) - District & Community Leaders, Medical workers, Mass Media (December 1999 - April 2000, Gulu).
194 Justin Moro and J. Oweka, "Sudan Relocates Kony Camp," New Vision, 3 February 2000.
195 "Uganda: Northwest officials to send suspected Sudanese rebel commanders home," The Monitor (newspaper), as reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 January 2000.
196 "Uganda army kills rebel guerrillas," Reuters (Kampala), 11 June 2000.
197 "Indirect" support refers to the fact that some organizations assist mine victims and/or affected communities through their primary activities, which have not been specifically targeting mine victims.
198 These include Gender, Labor and Social Development, Disaster Preparedness and Defense and Health. Interview with Mrs. M. A. Nadimo, Ministry of Refugees and Disaster Preparedness, Kampala, 21 December 1999.
199 Interview with Mrs. M.A. Nadimo, Ministry of Refugees & Disaster Preparedness, Kampala, 21 December 1999; interview with Peter Oyaro, Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development, Kampala, 20 December 1999.
200 Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, ISO, Kampala, 5 December 1999.
201 Lieutenant Magara, Public Relations Officer, 4th Division, UPDF Gulu, Gulu (town), February 2000.
202 Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, ISO, Kampala, 5 December 1999.
203 The East African, 19 January 2000.
204 Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN-Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi , Kampala, 5 December 1999.
205 Ministries of Health, Labor, Gender & Social Development.
206 Faxed messages from Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator; interview with Lt. Katsigazi, ISO, Kampala, 5 December 1999.
207 The East African, 19 January 2000.
208 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 94-95.
209 Hospital records - Kitgum, 1999, reviewed in visit during survey period.
210 Interview with Dr. J.J.Kilama, Acting Medical Superintendent, Gulu Hospital, during survey period.
211 Interviews with medical personnel, Kitgum, during survey period; Daouda Toure, UN Resident Coordinator.
212 Protected villages are camps for the internally displaced protected by security forces.
213 Hospital records, Kagando Hospital, Kilembe Hospital, St. John's Ambulance, Kasese, reviewed in visit during survey period.
214 Virika Hospital, Kaborole Hospital, DDHs-Kabarole, Fort Portal Orthopedic Workshop, visited during survey period.
215 New Vision, 2 January 2000; The Daily Monitor, 4 January 2000.
216 The Daily Monitor, 4 January 2000.
218 Uganda Constitution and various acts of Parliament.
219 Interview with Benson Ndeziboneye, NUDIPU, Kampala, 4 January 2000; interview with Peter Oyaro, Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development, Kampala, 20 December 1999.
220 Statement of the Hon. Nicholas Goche, Deputy Foreign Minister, First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 3 May 1999.
221 Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7 Report, submitted 11 January 2000, covering August 1999-January 2000.
222 Article 7 Report, Form A, 11 January 2000; telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Tom Munongwa, Engineers Director, Harare, 25 April 2000. It was pointed out that the process of destroying the AP mines has awaited the passing of the Bill into law.
223 Interview with Lt. Col Tom Munongwa, Harare, 26 April 2000. See also Article 7 Report, Form G, which reads: "The destruction programme is subject to the enactment of the APM Prohibition Bill which is now nearing submission to Parliament, after which it will be approved by the Head of State."
224 See, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 97-99.
225 Article 7 Report, Form B, 11 January 2000. LM Report 1999 cited a Human Rights Watch interview in 1997 with an Army official, in which the official said Zimbabwe stockpiled POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, RAP 1, RAP 2, VS-50, M969 and ZAPS antipersonnel mines. According to Andy Smith, independent mine action consultant, interviewed on 3 July 2000, the ZDF Engineer School at Pomona Barracks near Harare holds stocks of M969, R2M, VS50, PMA, PMA2 and PMNs.
226 Article 7 Report, Forms B, D, and G, 11 January 2000. Discrepancy on the submission verified with Ministry of Defense Official, Lt. Col T. Munongwa, 26 April 2000.
227 Article 7 Report, Form G, 11 January 2000.
228 Letters from Martin Rupiya to Permanent Secretaries of Ministries cited, 18 October 1999.
229 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 99-100.
230 Interview with U.S. intelligence specialist on DRC, London, 23 June 2000.
231 "Regional Round Up," De-Mining Debate, South African Institute of International Affairs, 1-8 July 1999, p. 9.
232 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 101-103.
233 Priority for the clearance of the CAPCO minefield has been relegated to the Army Engineers Squadron when they have built enough capacity, as it is located within an enclosure that does not necessarily risk the civilian population.
234 Interview with Chris Pearce, Director, Mine-Tech, Johannesburg, 6 June 2000.
236 Both mines are classified as minimum metal mines.
237 The assessment was conducted with the full support of government over the period 18 November to 26 November 1999 and published in February 2000.
238 UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report: Zimbabwe, UN Mine Action Service and UNDP Resident Representative, Mission of 18-26 November 1999, p. 3.
239 Matthew Takaona, "Army and Private Companies clear 26,000 landmines," The Sunday Mail, 12 March 2000, p.5. There is a discrepancy in the amount of kilometers of land cleared. On the one hand, during a Landmine Monitor field survey interview on December 1999, it was reported 26 km had been cleared. But in a presentation the same month on the problem by Lt. Col. Munongwa, 21 km were reported as cleared and yet the Sunday Mail report of 12 March 2000 quotes 20 km as having been cleared in Victoria Falls.
240 UNMAS Joint Assessment Mission Report, Zimbabwe, p. 10.
241 Lt Col. T. Munongwa, Acting Director, Zimbabwe National Army Engineers Corps, Presentation on National Landmines Problem, Victoria Falls camp, 24 December 1999.
242 Current rate of exchange stands at US$1:38.
243 Human Rights Watch, "Clinton's Landmine Legacy," A Human Rights Watch Short Reort Vol. 12, No. 3, July 2000, p. 27.
244 U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2001 - Bureau of African Affairs," 15 March 2000.
245 In 1997 Koch Munitionsbergrungs was a former East German defense contractor with experience in clearing ranges of UXO in Germany; they had no direct experience of clearing minefields or of work in Africa. All information on its work in Zimbabwe comes from Brian Mounsor and Temba Kanganga, Project Managers at Koch Mine Safe, Harare, unless otherwise stated.
246 Koch had problems assembling their manual teams because initial salaries offered were low. With a small available pool of experienced deminers in Zimbabwe, ultimately Koch had to do more training than anticipated, and as a result, there is now a small flow of Koch Mine Safe -trained deminers joining other companies.
247 Interview with Temba Kanganga. Deputy Project Manager of Mine Safe at "The Road forward: Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Southern Africa," South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 8 June 2000.
248 Data from Andy Smith, DDIV database, 4 June 2000.
249 Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 109.
250 Interview with Dr. Kulkarni and Sister-In-Charge, Ms. Sikosana, Victoria Falls Hospital, 4-6 December 1999.
251 Apart from the field interviews with the different hospitals located in the mine-affected areas, Landmine Monitor also wrote to the Permanent Secretary of the Health Ministry on 18 November 1999, seeking his comments on victim assistance, but to date there has been no reply.
252 "Landmine Victims Not Collecting Compensation," Zimbabwe Standard, 28 May 2000.