This report focuses both on the violence that has accompanied the land occupations of the last two years, and on the adverse effects that the fast track land reform process has had for the one of the constituencies it was supposed to benefit: the rural poor. The report does not describe general violence against the political opposition, except insofar as it is related to the fast track reforms.
Eye witness testimony collected by Human Rights Watch in July 2001 confirmed reports collected by journalists and other human rights organizations concerning violence that had taken place in the context of land occupations. According to the Commercial Farmers' Union, which represents (largely white) farm owners, at least 829 "violent or hostile" incidents had taken place on commercial farms up to the end of September 2001.78 This violence has been worst in Mashonaland Central.
War veterans and Zanu-PF militia occupying commercial farms have intimidated, assaulted, and in some cases killed white farm owners. These assaults have been widely reported, both in Zimbabwe and internationally. According to human rights groups and the Commercial Farmers Union, at least seven farmers have been killed in political violence since the beginning of 2000.79 Many of the farmers targeted have been prominent supporters of the MDC: the farm of MDC MP for Chimanimani Roy Bennett, for example, has been occupied by police and army troops. Farm owners have been assaulted and threatened and their farms occupied whether or not their farms have actually been listed for acquisition by the government. President Mugabe has repeatedly singled out white Zimbabweans as enemies of the state.
The first two farmers were killed in April 2000. David Stevens was shot dead at point blank range by settlers who had occupied his farm at Macheke, south of Harare. A few days later, the farm of Martin Olds, in Nyamandlovu, near Bulawayo, Matabeleland, was invaded by more than one hundred Zanu-PF militia led by war veterans. According to a spokesperson for Zanu-PF, Olds opened fire, hitting five of the invaders with shotgun pellets, who then fired back. Neighboring farmers, who came to the scene after Olds radioed for help indicating he had been shot, but could not gain access, insist that Olds was defending his house as the intruders attempted to break into it. Police arrived at the house while the gunfight was ongoing but did not intervene. When the house was set alight, Olds was forced outside, and was shot twice in the head at close range. The intruders then left the farm, not seeking to occupy it. In July 2000, Olds' widow fled Zimbabwe and applied for asylum in the U.K. In March 2001, Olds' mother, Gloria Olds, was shot dead on the same farm, which she had refused to leave.80 The most recent farm owner killed was Robert Fenwick, from Kwekwe, in the Midlands, in August 2001. No arrests have been made in connection with any of these murders.
In some cases, white farmers have assaulted those occupying their land. In one prominent case in July 2001, farmer Philip Bezuidenhout, of Odzi, near Mutare, allegedly deliberately ran over and killed Fabian Mapenzauswa, a settler on his farm.81 Bezuidenhout was arrested and charged with murder. The case has not yet come to court. In other cases, farm workers have themselves organized to drive away the settlers, and injuries have occurred in the context of these clashes.
Overt attacks on white farmers-which have attracted greater international and national publicity than those on black Zimbabweans-have reduced in recent months. However, extortion of money from commercial farmers has increased, with the implied threat of violence behind the demands for money.82 Throughout the process of land occupation, however, most victims of the violence have been poor, rural, black Zimbabweans.
In June 2000, the National Employment Council for the agricultural industry (a tripartite body of government, employers, and unions) published a report noting that, as a result of the farm occupations, at least 3,000 farm workers had been displaced from their homes, twenty-six killed, 1,600 assaulted, and eleven raped. The majority (47.2 percent) were supporters of the MDC; nearly as many (43.6 percent) had no political affiliation; a few (4.7 percent) were Zanu-PF supporters.83 Farm workers have continued to be the victims of violence during farm occupations: the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum documented the deaths of four farm workers (including security guards and game scouts) and numerous assaults during 2001.84 The CFU reported twenty farm workers killed as of May 2001.85
As in the case of violence against white farm owners, violence against farm workers is linked to the support given to the MDC by commercial farmers and, by perceived implication, by their workers too. In many areas, it seems that farm workers have been targeted for violence both so that the assailants could take over their homes, and in order to deprive the white farm owner of numerous potential allies who have a stake in keeping their jobs and might therefore support the farm owner in resisting government policy. Weaknesses in the organizational representation of farm workers have also made them vulnerable to assault and intimidation.86
One male farm security worker described how he was threatened and assaulted:
A woman nurse at a clinic on one commercial farm was beaten by war veterans who were looking for the farm's office:
Interviews by Human Rights Watch confirmed numerous other reports that the occupiers of farms force farm laborers and their families to attend political meetings and demonstrate their support for Zanu-PF, on pain of assault if they refuse. A farm worker described this:
Even where there is not overt violence, farm workers are intimidated:
There are also cases in which farm workers, communal area residents, or MDC supporters have attacked and beaten those occupying a farm. Such incidents have often resulted in reprisals, in some cases reportedly including police.91 Monitoring of reported cases by human rights groups indicates that the majority of victims continue to be opposition supporters; however, each and every case of violence deserves equal investigation.
Human rights NGOs report continued violence connected with farm occupations since the visit of Human Rights Watch to Zimbabwe in July 2001.92 Similarly, on December 10, 2001, the Commercial Farmers' Union reported that, since September, "the situation on commercial farms has continued to deteriorate, with ongoing incidents of violence, intimidation, extortion and disruption to farming activities."93 Some human rights groups noted a shift in patterns of violence away from commercial farms to the communal areas and towns by early 2002, and a UNDP technical team commented that "acts of lawlessness on large-scale commercial farms now appear to be decreasing."94
An ongoing feature of violence in the rural areas is the systematic harassment, intimidation, and assault of opposition activists, primarily supporters of the principal opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Human Rights Watch obtained numerous testimonies confirming reports of Zimbabwean human rights groups to this effect. Farms have been among the locations targeted for such assaults, since white farm owners are among the prominent supporters of the MDC and their financial resources have been deployed on behalf of the opposition:
Many rural people from communal areas and farms also reported to Human Rights Watch that there is a chain of command that operates amongst the war veterans and their supporters. War veterans and youth supporters form a gang or militia with a structure of command when they invade a farm. A war veteran is appointed as the base commander for a zone of the occupied farm. People in the area have often known these war veterans for a long time and are able to identify them. The war veteran is accompanied by other Zanu-PF supporters, usually young men. The youth are under the instructions of the war veteran whose base becomes a site for control of inhabitants in the resettled area; in some cases, training of youth by veterans is reported.96 These war veteran militias use tactics of terror, force, and intimidation to gain and retain access to a farm. The farms that have been seized are then used as bases for war veterans to assault and intimidate perceived opposition supporters in surrounding communal areas or on neighboring farms.
In Mashonaland East, elderly women and their families were the target of war veterans militia based on an adjacent commercial farm. These villagers from communal areas have been subjected to repeated beatings and cannot return to their homes because of the presence of war veterans. A former resident described this:
Several people from the same village reported that they could not return to their farms because there were war veterans militia living on the farms and they had a base there. Other villagers told how they had been held hostage in such camps.
In other cases, the war veterans militia living on farms cause problems in a less directed way: "the war veterans are causing trouble around here. They come from the farm that has been resettled during the day to the bottle [liquor] store, and in the evening they start up trouble. We try to get help from the police, but they do nothing."99
Reports of the training of ruling party militia have increased in recent months; as have reports of the terrorization of anyone believed to be a potential opposition supporter, whether in rural or urban areas. Human Rights Watch is concerned that an infrastructure for ongoing political and criminal violence has been laid. It will be much harder to restore peace than it has been to mobilize violence for political purposes. An end to impunity is urgently needed.
Although the Zimbabwean government has called for peaceful coexistence between farm owners and the new settlers, it has dismissed violence against farm workers and farm owners as an unfortunate cost of long-overdue land reform that has been obstructed by white farm owners. Rural militias led by the war veterans can usually count on noninterference or limited intervention by the police when they commit acts of political violence.
On October 6, 2000, President Mugabe, using his presidential powers, issued an amnesty for politically motivated crimes committed between January 1, 2000 and July 31, 2000, the period of the campaign for the February 2000 referendum and the June 2000 parliamentary elections. The amnesty did not cover murder, rape, and robbery.100
Some victims of violence who had returned home during the period of relative calm that followed the June elections were again victimized by people who had been arrested and were then released following the amnesty. One displaced women of fifty-four described how she and her family members were beaten and driven from their land in Mashonaland East in June 2000. "A group of Zanu came, some from the nearest farm and some from the locality, beating people up and saying `you people are supporting other parties, we only want one party in this country.'" She said the police were initially very unresponsive but eventually arrested six people, and the woman and her family, who had fled to Harare, returned home. "Then after the amnesty they started coming back saying we don't want you here."101 Accordingly, they were forced to leave again.
The government dismisses allegations of police failure to act. A senior official in the Department of Land stated to Human Rights Watch that: "I'm not aware of any dereliction of duty on the part of the police.... you can't have a police post on every farm."102 Yet human rights groups report that the police have become increasingly partisan.103 In January 2001, police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, who had initially adopted the attitude that farm occupations were a political matter which could not be handled by the police, stated, "I support Zanu-PF because it is the ruling party."104 In December 2001, Chihuri accused the opposition of involvement in terrorism.105
Political interference in police work has been reported by opposition parties and human rights groups, as well as by some current and former police officers. Amnesty International researchers interviewed one former police officer who described his experience:
One resident of a communal area in Mashonaland East described what happened when he reported a crime carried out by war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters based on a nearby farm:
The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum reported a similar case in which a special constable attempting to carry out an arrest was assaulted:
A farm foreman told Amnesty International that:
There are numerous reports of police failure to apprehend perpetrators of violence, or to arrest suspects only to release them without charge and without registering the case number and providing it to the complainant. Even when police have intervened to protect those threatened by violence, few arrests have been made of the alleged perpetrators since the amnesty. In repeated cases, farm workers and opposition activists told Human Rights Watch how police said the assaults were "political" and that as a consequence they would not intervene. Among the complaints they made were:
These reports are supported by some individuals who have worked in government. One former district administrator, who said he had resigned because he did not like the increasing lawlessness of government policy, commented:
By early 2002, there were also increasing reports to human rights groups of beatings and torture carried out by the police.117 Generally, impunity seemed to continue unabated; though human rights groups had been able to obtain court orders for the police to arrest known perpetrators of violent crime, with success in getting the police to act in some areas (notably the Midlands).118
By contrast, where MDC activists have been accused of perpetrating violence, including in cases where they are alleged to have retaliated against harassment by war veterans, police action has usually been swift, especially by contrast with the inaction against Zanu-PF supporters alleged to have committed offenses.119 Several white farmers have been arrested on various criminal charges following clashes with people occupying farm land.120 In one case noted by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum:
In some cases, there are allegations that police have worked with war veterans in carrying out land occupations. One worker who described being held hostage by war veterans militia on a farm for a number of months claimed that the Central Intelligence Organization was involved in directing the war veterans.
Reports to human rights NGOs and journalists describe the involvement of police and soldiers in assisting some land occupations, and in some cases in looting of commercial farms.
Journalist Basildon Peta of the Independent (London and Johannesburg) told Amnesty International:
A former army officer, who said he was forced to leave the force because of his opposition to Zimbabwe's intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, told human rights researchers how the army had been involved in fast track land reform. In addition to senior army officers being involved in the official land acquisition coordinating committees, he said:
Even when farms have never been designated for acquisition, or have been delisted following negotiations between the farm owner and the government, or where courts have ordered evictions, police have often not removed occupiers from the farms unless given instructions to do so by political authorities backed by Zanu-PF. The UNDP technical team noted that it had been presented "credible evidence" that the toleration of the police of occupations of farms in violation of the law had substantially reduced in the last quarter of 2001.125
The government states that the process of fast track land reform is designed to meet the needs of disadvantaged black Zimbabweans. The desire for land is evident from numerous testimonies, including from people who support opposition parties which have officially opposed the process of fast track reform. As one thirty-nine-year-old villager who supported an opposition party, said: "Do I want land? Yes, I will run. We like that so much. We want to plow because we have poor soils."126
Yet, testimony from witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch raises serious doubts as to whether those benefiting from the fast track program are those who are supposed to be first in line according to the government's stated development plans. The first problem witnesses identified was the party-political channels for access to the forms for applying for land and discrimination in the allocation of plots. The second problem was the key role of the war veterans militias in distributing and allocating land, the same militias that villagers, opposition activists, and farm workers claim are responsible for violence and intimidation. In practice, the official structure for allocating land through civil service and elected officials (such as the rural district councils), is often superseded by informal processes governed by the war veterans and their associated ruling party militia. Because these processes are effectively unregulated, beneficiary selection can become highly politicized.127
The blunting of the distinction between government and the ruling party in the structures responsible for allocating land under the fast track program poses further problems. This overlap between the ruling party and government has been a feature of Zimbabwean politics for some time now, as reflected in an interview with a senior government official.
The perception among many people interviewed by Human Rights Watch was that land allocation was tied to support for the ruling party.
At district level there can also be tension between elected and appointed government officials and the war veterans and other structures put in place for the fast track process. A councilor in Chimanimani, Manicaland, told Human Rights Watch that:
The councilor suggested that an initial emphasis on fairness from the district administrator (DA) had in practice yielded to political considerations in implementation:
In some cases, the political function of the war veterans appears to override the administrative role of local government, influencing the selection criteria for beneficiaries of land redistribution along party-political lines. An ex-district administrator claimed that party-political control of land allocation undermines local government authority:
Testimony from rural people showed a widespread perception that the dominant role of Zanu-PF and the war veterans in the process made support for Zanu-PF a criterion for beneficiaries. It is also clear that the local government structures are not in full control of the war veterans directing land occupations. In some cases, when the official structures have ruled that occupiers should leave a farm, since the occupation was against the official criteria set down, police charged with ensuring that the occupiers leave have been forced to back down in face of threats from the war veterans militia.
In addition, many fear the consequences of becoming involved in a process in which a substantial role is played by people responsible for visiting violence on them and their neighbors. Many villagers from communal areas said they needed land but felt that it was difficult for them to apply now because they did not feel comfortable with the central role of the war veterans in allocating land. Some opposition supporters indicated that they would like to get land under different political circumstances but couldn't participate now given the political violence in the country. A thirty-three-year-old woman villager who had been beaten by war veterans said she wanted land but did not feel she could apply:
Another respondent told how opposition supporters felt they could not approach the war veterans for land:
Most respondents said that land was offered via meetings run by war veterans. "The channel is the war veterans, that is the framework."134 In some cases Zanu-PF cards were required:
MDC activists felt that they would not be eligible to get land because they supported the opposition:
In several areas, according to cases reported to Human Rights Watch, the "fast track" plots were being handed out not only to landless people from the communal areas or war veterans (for whom government policy officially reserves 20 percent), but also to the police, army, CIO, civil servants such as agricultural extension workers (who are involved in demarcating plots), and traditional leaders. A former district administrator described this:
An MDC activist from the Chimanimani constituency told Human Rights Watch how he applied for land. He said he was happy to do so, despite his party's opposition to the fast track program, since the land in question was a planned resettlement scheme and not a farm occupation. He said he was rejected because of his opposition affiliation:
Many NGO experts made similar claims of party-political allocation of land:
Discrimination in selection of beneficiaries is facilitated by the fact that there are no published records of deliberations or of the reasons for selection or rejection of applicants for land at each step in the formal process. The process is not transparent, and there is no provision for an appeal if an application is rejected.140
The government has in some cases halted land occupations undertaken in the context of the general endorsement of land redistribution, but not orchestrated by its supporters, and expelled the new settlers. Police have evicted settlers on the Matopos Rhodes Estate, a state-owned national park in Matabeleland South. The land was previously Zapu property and is claimed by the members of Inqama, a movement to restore the capital of Mzilikazi, the founder of the Ndebele kingdom. According to one new settler there, war veterans led the invasion of a former farm, and after they had occupied the area tens of other families joined them, only to be removed by police:
In August 2001, police again forcibly evicted settlers on the Rhodes Estate.142
Many of those taking advantage of the fast track land reform program are individuals or families who have a genuine need of land to cultivate. According to press reports and other anecdotal evidence, it seems that discrimination against those who have not demonstrated loyalty to Zanu-PF may have decreased, as the fast track program has progressed. However, the testimony collected by Human Rights Watch and other organizations reveals that in many cases others who have equal or greater needs were not benefiting, because they were frightened of violence from the war veterans militia, or because they were not prepared to show support for the ruling party.
Gender Issues in Allocation of Land
A land redistribution and resettlement program should ensure that women are given the opportunity to hold land in their own right on equal terms with men. In October 2000, the government stated that it would ensure a 20 percent quota for women to benefit from the fast track resettlement program, raising hopes in this regard.143 This commitment was never implemented: there is no legal or administrative framework in place to ensure gender equality in the distribution of resettlement land. The policy documents and laws setting out the basis of the fast track program make no mention of gender issues.
Zimbabwe's Women and Land Lobby Group has criticized government policy on and the results of past land resettlement schemes from a gender perspective:
There are no studies available of the effects of the fast track resettlement scheme on women specifically. However, the lack of infrastructure such as schools and markets in the resettled areas is likely to affect women more seriously than men, since women are the principal subsistence farmers, are less likely to have access to casual cash-paid work, and are more responsible for child care. Some accounts suggested that some of the young men who had left to take up plots in the fast track resettlement farms had abandoned their wives in the communal areas and taken new women as partners; alternatively, that women had accompanied their husbands, but finding that the situation in the resettled areas was worse then the home they had left, had returned to their previous houses.145 Because women are not regarded as having title to land they are vulnerable to men who wish to exploit their labor either in the communal or resettlement areas.
Other accounts indicated that some women seeking allocation of a plot under the fast track scheme had been forced to exchange sexual favors to get on the redistribution lists and that war veterans and Zanu-PF militia members had raped women in the course of the land occupations. In April 2000, for example, two girls aged sixteen and eighteen were raped at a school in Mutoko where war veterans and other people were gathered waiting to be allocated land. The alleged perpetrators were arrested about one week later, when the girls reported to the police. Attempts by lawyers to follow up on the prosecution of the cases with the police were met only with insults.146
The participation of women in the resettlement program, and the violence to which they have been subjected urgently needs further investigation. Impunity for sexual assault and rape must be ended, and issues of discrimination addressed.
Displacement and Marginalization of Farm Workers
The large-scale occupation of commercial farms since early 2000 has meant that workers' wage employment on the farm is often ended. In some cases, they are allowed to remain on the farm, but cannot work and are not paid; in others, they are displaced, and must find a place to shelter as best they can. As a union organizer commented, "They have been caught in between because their workplace is their home and they have no rural places to go to."149 Farm workers are also "caught in between" as regards their political affiliations: because of their dependent situation, they may feel obliged to show support for the political party favored by the farm owner, and thus become vulnerable to violence from supporters of other parties, whatever their own beliefs.
One NGO expert commented that not as many farm workers had initially been displaced as was expected, because resettlement was "largely a paper exercise in which people are allocated plots but not taking them up."150 By October 2001, however, the Commercial Farmers' Union estimated that 75,000 people (13,636 families) had been either forced off the land or laid off because of the shut down of farming operations.151 The Zimbabwe Agricultural Welfare Trust, established in late 2001, claims that between February 2000 and December 2001, about 350 large-scale commercial farms had to close operations, affecting about 15,000 farm worker families.152 The United Nations noted that by January 2002, the number of farm workers displaced was estimated at 30,000 families.153 Though all of these figures must be regarded as estimates, the problem is clearly serious.
Farm workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch reflected these concerns:
Even farm workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch who had lost their jobs showed some appreciation of the war veterans' actions in cases in which their employer had a bad record in labor relations: "The war veterans came for the land, and also they said because the farmer is not working hand in hand with his workers, the conditions of working are not good. Sometimes I agree with them, the working conditions are bad... and at other farms the situation is better."155
The Labour Relations Act has been amended and new regulations promulgated in early 2002 to provide that the owner of a farm whose land is compulsorily acquired by the government of Zimbabwe pay the benefits due to employees when they are laid off. Previously, the law required the acquiring authority to take over responsibility for the legal obligations towards workers on the farm on conditions no less favorable than those existing before.
Many farm workers who are not Zimbabweans by descent (even though they may have or be entitled to acquire citizenship) have no access to the structures that allocate plots in the communal areas. Farm workers are thus among those with the greatest need for land. Surveys suggest that most farm workers would choose to stay on the farm where they are employed, with a plot of land to which they have title, even if they also continued to work in the commercial farming sector.156 In 1999, the government land policy framework for the first time acknowledged the need for farm workers to be resettled as well as those from communal areas, and recognized that those who entered the country as indentured labor from 1953 to 1963, and their children, are entitled to citizenship.157
But farm workers have not been among the groups targeted to benefit from the fast track program. As of October 2001, official government statistics indicated that only 2,122 of the 123,979 households recorded as resettled (that is, 1.7 percent) were farm worker households.158 GAPWUZ, the General, Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union of Zimbabwe, which claims 100,000 members, in a paper presented to a September 2001 conference, characterized the fast track land reform program as "the biggest challenge currently facing farm workers in Zimbabwe.... There are approximately 2 million people that can be labeled under the farm working community, and it is frightening to note that the land reform programme is silent as to the fate of the same."159 GAPWUZ has made various recommendations to ensure that farm workers would be protected during the fast track process, including setting aside at least 20 percent of the land acquired for farm workers (along the lines of the same quota allocated for war veterans).
Although farm workers are not precluded from applying for land under the fast track process, the problem for those who cannot prove their citizenship is that the process of registering for land formally involves registration with the council of the communal area from which they come, with no additional mechanisms put in place to enable them to access the new allocations easily.160 Moreover, those farm workers who are not of Zimbabwean descent have additional problems, since if they are displaced from the farm they have no other place to go. Zimbabweans, on the other hand, usually have the possibility of returning to their family's land in a communal area. As one farm worker commented:
Another farm worker complained at the policy of favoring war veterans:
In practice, however, some farm workers have taken the opportunity to acquire land-at least temporarily-through the unofficial systems operated by the war veterans. However, the offer of land may be tied to a pledge of allegiance to Zanu-PF:
Sometimes these inducements to sign up for Zanu-PF were linked with threats of assault.
A woman worker on a farm in Marondera told human rights researchers:
As in the case of the situation of women within the fast track program, the particular problems of farm workers need further investigation, and urgent action to redress discrimination.
The mobilization for land occupations has created problems for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and unions seeking to work with farm workers and others in rural areas. During the referendum of 2000, GAPWUZ participated in voter education, an activity which tarred them, and through them the farm workers they addressed, with the brush of support for the MDC. The union claims that GAPWUZ shop stewards have been intimidated in by-election areas.166 GAPWUZ claimed that a new government-backed union federation, the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) has deliberately undermined its efforts to organize in commercial farming areas.167
Many nongovernmental organizations that conduct development-related activities amongst poor rural people have had their activities disrupted. NGOs say that the climate of fear created by war veterans is not conducive to development and educational activities in these rural communities. As a result virtually all groups have suspended activities. War veteran militias investigate activities around fast track resettlement areas which for NGOs sometimes constitutes an implied threat.
NGOs working on development issues or working with farm workers who have attempted to become involved in support for those who have been resettled or in the process of land allocation have been ejected or threatened.169 NGOs have been forbidden from carrying out voter education in rural areas. Zimrights, a national human rights organization, has been ordered to cease human rights education activities in Masvingo and other rural districts.170 The rights of election observers to operate freely have been greatly restricted for the March 2002 presidential elections.171
In November 2001, the government announced that humanitarian organizations would be banned from distributing food in rural areas, where there is an acute need for assistance, claiming that aid distribution would be used as an excuse to campaign for the MDC. Churches have openly defied this edict. Roman Catholic Archbishop Pius Ncube charged that "the hunger is caused by the government's hypocrisy. It wants to distribute food assistance itself, so as to buy votes. It does not care how many people die as long as it can stay in power."172
79 Human Rights and Zimbabwe's June 2000 Election (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, January 2001); Political Violence Report December 2001 (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, January 2002); Human Rights Watch telephone interview with CFU, February 12, 2002. Another two white farmers have been killed in uncertain circumstances.
80 "Death at dawn: the agony of Zimbabwe," Guardian (London), April 19, 2000; "Hounded out of Africa," Times (London), December 18, 2000; Andrew Meldrum, "Mother killed on same Zimbabwe farm as her son," Guardian, March 5, 2001.
91 For example, police reportedly assaulted farm workers and villagers at a farm in Mhondoro after they had challenged war veterans and Zanu-PF supporters who stopped them from taking firewood. "Police attack villagers," Daily News (Harare) June 22, 2001.
108 Politically Motivated Violence in Zimbabwe, 2000-2001: A report on the campaign of political repression conducted by the Zimbabwean Government under the guise of carrying out land reform (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, July 2001), annex I.
119 The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum has reported on the selective implementation of justice where crimes allegedly perpetrated by MDC members result in swift arrests while no persons are arrested or tried in the case of crimes allegedly perpetrated by members of ZANU-PF. Politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe 2000-2001. A report on the campaign of political repression conducted by the Zimbabwean Government under the guise of carrying out land reform (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. August 2001); Enforcing the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, September 2001).
135 Human Rights Watch interview, Harare resident, July 16, 2001. Party cards are increasingly required even to be able to travel in the rural areas, where youth militia stage informal roadblocks and demand that travelers demonstrate their loyalty to the ruling party. See for example Basildon Peta, "Party cards run out as Mugabe enforces loyalty," Independent on Sunday (London), January 20, 2002, as well as reports from the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.
143 The government-owned Daily News quoted Minister of Local Government Ignatius Chombo as stating that single women would be allocated 20 percent of land acquired by the government for resettlement and that there would be joint ownership of land by spouses, in accordance with official policy statements. IRIN, October 29, 2000.
144 Women and Land Lobby Group, "Report on WLLG workshop on Women's Land Rights, held 27-28 November 2000," (Harare, WLLG, 2001), as quoted in Gender and Constitutional Issues (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, January 2001), p.15.
147 Dede Amanor-Wilks, Zimbabwe's Farm Workers and the New Constitution, February 12, 2000, available on the Africa Policy Information Center home page, www.africapolicy.org, accessed December 21, 2001; UNDP Interim Mission Report, January 2002, p.35.
148 Nevertheless, only 59 percent of farm workers' children attended primary school in 1997, compared to 79 percent of children in communal areas and 89 percent of urban children. Land, Power and Poverty: Farm workers and the crisis in Zimbabwe (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), 2000), p.23.