August 17, 2010

The Vicious Cycle: Embezzlement and the Corrupt System of “Returns”

This thing [corruption] is like a disease in all of us. —Police sergeant in Lagos, November 27, 2008

A number of mutually reinforcing factors conspire to fuel the rampant levels of corruption within the Nigeria Police Force. The combination of inadequate funding for the police force and embezzlement and mismanagement of existing funds leaves appallingly little to run essential police operations. In part to cover this deficit, the rank-and-file police demand bribes and extort money from members of the public. The systemic practice whereby senior officers demand monetary “returns” from their subordinates further drives these abuses. The prevailing culture of corruption and lack of effective oversight—weaknesses that allow police officials at all levels to evade justice—perpetuate police corruption and its associated abuses.

Human Rights Watch interviewed police officers who described how they joined the police to serve their country but have since become disillusioned by the level of unprofessionalism and misconduct that pervade the police force. A police sergeant in Lagos lamented, “I wanted to be a policeman to serve my motherland, but we’re not doing that.”[229] Similarly, a police corporal in Lagos noted: “When I wear my police uniform and am in the midst of civilians, I feel ashamed of myself … I don’t feel proud of what I’m doing.”[230] The police sergeant told Human Rights Watch he longed for the police force in which he worked and risked his life to be “a dignified force.”[231]

Concerns about the deeply embedded nature of police corruption were echoed by a former member of the Police Service Commission, who said, “Everyone’s in on the game.”[232] A former senior police official who had investigated corruption in the force maintained that most police officers engage in some form of corruption:

There are extremely few who are able to overcome and resist it—very, very few. Some will be very perverse, some will be more direct, some will be a little bit decent, but most do take money. That is the reality. Every policeman who goes to work goes with the expectation that he will take money home that day, one way or another.[233]

While abuses by the rank-and-file, discussed above, are the most observable manifestations of police corruption, two other key dynamics—large-scale embezzlement by mostly senior officers and the corrupt system of returns—underlie and indeed drive many of these abuses.

High-Level Embezzlement of Police Funds

Senior police officials have embezzled and misappropriated staggering sums of public funds meant to cover basic police operations. Several high-level police officials ranging in rank from commissioner of police to inspector general of police have over the years been credibly implicated in and, in at least one case, convicted of the theft of police funds. In most of these cases, however, the federal government and the police leadership have failed to properly investigate, prosecute, or discipline implicated officers, much less take tangible steps to prevent future cases of embezzlement of police funds.

The Case of Former Inspector General Tafa Balogun

The most notorious case of embezzlement by a police officer of funds destined for the police force is that of former inspector general of police (IGP) Tafa Balogun. The case led to his resignation as IGP in January 2005, a position he had held since March 2002. In April 2005 he was charged by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) with the theft of more than $98 million during his time in office as IGP. Much of this money came directly from the police force budget.[234] Balogun was also accused of having laundered through shell companies large sums of money from bribes and kickbacks he had received while in office.

A former member of the Police Service Commission described how “Tafa Balogun made policing a business.”[235] One of Balogun’s front companies, for example, was later convicted of laundering a 30 million ($227,000) bribe paid by the Societe Generale Bank of Nigeria after Balogun had threatened to withdraw police protection from the bank’s headquarters.[236]

On November 22, 2005, Balogun pleaded guilty to charges of failing to declare his assets in a plea bargain agreement with the EFCC and was sentenced to six months in prison.[237] Eight of his front companies were also found guilty of money laundering and the court ordered the seizure of his assets reportedly worth in excess of $150 million.[238] This staggering theft of police funds and resources that could have gone toward legitimate police expenditures would have been enough to fund the total budgeted operating costs of the police force—apart from personnel costs and capital projects—for nearly two and a half years.[239] The conviction was a landmark case in the anti-corruption campaign.

The Case of Kenny Martins and the Police Equipment Fund

Various efforts have been made over the years to improve the police force by purchasing vehicles and equipment with private-sector funding. The most notable and infamous example was the Presidential Committee on Police Equipment Fund, set up in 2006 by then-president Olusegun Obasanjo and headed by the president’s brother-in-law, Kenny Martins.[240] The fund raised some 50 billion ($387.5 million) from a combination of government funds and private donations.[241]

Martins and his fellow fund administrators, however, were accused of squandering and embezzling vast sums of money from the Police Equipment Fund. A report by the Nigerian House of Representatives accused Martins and the fund administrators of siphoning off at least 1 billion ($7.8 million) for their personal use, and transferring to various individuals and companies at least 1.3 billion ($10 million) “for purposes other than police matters.”[242] The House of Representatives report alleged that the fund purchased hundreds of vehicles—including at least 100 BMWs and luxury sport-utility vehicles—that went to people who had no connection with the police.[243] In May 2008, the police charged Martins and his deputy with fraud.[244] At this writing, the case is still awaiting trial. The EFCC in June 2008 also charged Martins, his deputy, and a former permanent secretary in the Ministry of Police Affairs with the embezzlement of public funds.[245] A high court in Abuja dismissed the charges in November 2009, but the EFCC has appealed the case.[246]

Other Corruption Scandals

Several other former police officials have been implicated in the misappropriation of police funds. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) launched an investigation in 2008 into allegations that 43 million ($325,758) of 557 million ($4.2 million) in state funds transferred in 2006 for the purchase of arms, ammunition, and equipment for the police in Bayelsa State were misappropriated by officials in the Nigeria Police Force and Ministry of Police Affairs.[247] In May 2009, an ICPC official confirmed to Human Rights Watch that the case was “nearing prosecution.”[248]However, at this writing, the ICPC has not filed charges against any of the former officials investigated in the case, nor has the ICPC given any public response regarding the status of the investigation.[249]

In June 2007, another corruption scandal within the Nigeria Police Force emerged after a police constable at Force Headquarters was caught with a bag containing 900,000 ($6,977). According to documents from an internal police investigation seen by Human Rights Watch, the constable claimed that the money was for an “unnamed” deputy inspector general of police (DIG). Police investigators searched the office of the police commissioner in charge of budget and found 21,650,000 ($167,829) in cash stuffed inside a carton and box. The police investigation report alleged that “The money was being clandestinely evacuated piecemeal [from Force Headquarters] through a constable when intercepted,” and the Force Disciplinary Committee recommended that the outgoing police commissioner in charge of the budget office be dismissed and prosecuted for theft.[250]

After reviewing the case, the Police Service Commission (PSC), however, reversed the disciplinary action against the police commissioner, finding that the internal police “investigation was shoddy” and possibly “a deliberate attempt to nail the officer” without establishing any incriminating evidence against him. The PSC questioned why the police had failed to name the DIG who was said to have been the intended recipient of the 900,000, and concluded that it “may be evidence of a cover up” by the police.[251] At this writing, there has been no further investigation into the matter.

Embezzlement Starving Police of Needed Funds

The embezzlement of vast amounts of public funds destined for the police force indirectly impacts Nigerians’ enjoyment of human rights protections by limiting the capacity of the police to conduct criminal investigations and provide protection from violent and other forms of crime. Left with limited investigatory capacity and forensics laboratories in disarray, the Nigerian police routinely resort to extortion in part to fund basic police services, and to torturing criminal suspects as their primary tool for collecting evidence.

An assistant commissioner of police who has investigated numerous cases of corruption told Human Rights Watch that budgeted funds meant for essential operations are routinely “diverted and stolen by the police officers.” The 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform found that the police funds are routinely “frittered away through mismanagement.”[252] Other police officials noted that the operational deficiencies experienced by the rank-and-file in police stations throughout Nigeria were less a result of high-level embezzlement, and more due to insufficient resources for too great a need. Despite large budget increases to the police, these officers said, the budget was still insufficient to adequately support police operations on the ground.[253]

While Human Rights Watch is not in a position to determine appropriate funding levels or estimate the proportional impact from the theft of police funds by senior-level police officials, it is clear that the negative implications of this deficit is significantly worsened by embezzlement of funds on the part of senior police officials.

Many of those interviewed noted the stark difference between the resources available to high-level police officials and rank-and-file police officers. During a May 2009 visit to the Lagos State police command, a Human Rights Watch researcher observed how the dingy, under-supplied police stations located throughout Nigeria are far removed from the ornately decorated office of the police commissioner, with its plush leather couches and $50,000 Tandberg 50-inch dual plasma monitors.

Interviews with police officers, civil society leaders, lawyers, and judges working in the criminal justice system suggested that rank-and-file officers receive very few resources to conduct police operations. Junior police officers in Lagos, for example, routinely complained about the police administration’s failure to provide nearly all essential supplies and equipment needed to carry out their work. A sergeant working at an administrative post in a police station in Lagos State explained:

We get none of what we need to do our job; we have to buy everything. We don’t get pens; complaint sheets, we buy; bail bond sheets, we buy; fuel, we buy it. Bonuses for Christmas or Ramadan, forget it. When you get sick we treat ourselves; police officers who are wounded on duty die unless you have family to treat you.[254]

These sentiments were echoed by a police sergeant who had been posted in four state commands. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, he said that the police may provide a patrol vehicle, but “[f]rom the time I have been in the police force—20 years—I have never seen the government fund the fuel or vehicle maintenance and supplies.”[255] A prominent civil society leader and lawyer in Lagos described how he once witnessed a police officer ask his client for “money to buy candles,” and on another occasion saw an officer remove a light bulb from the fixture, explaining to a second officer, “I paid my money to buy that bulb … if you want light, buy your own!”[256]

© 2010 BASATI / Human Rights Watch

A high court judge in Lagos with years of experience within the criminal justice system, and who had presided over several key corruption cases, noted that in his experience: “The police do not get money to run operations.”[257] The director of a civil society organization working on policing issues agreed:

Many of the police units and departments don’t have a budget to carry out their function. In the absence of a budget, they have to find ways of raising money to carry out these activities, including things as basic as fueling their vehicles and following up on leads. To do this, they devise quite a number of ways, which include extortion at the roadblocks and also making the complainants fund the investigation.[258]

One police sergeant in Lagos lamented: “You go on patrol and meet your superior, and ask him for fuel. He will say, ‘Where will I get it from?’ So it is up to you to find a way to get fuel.”[259] Some police officers, including this police corporal with nine years of experience on the force, justified police extortion: “They [our superiors] never provide us fuel. That is why we are taking money. I can’t use my own money, so we go outside to chase for money.”[260] A director of a civil society organization that works on policing issues explained, “In the final analysis, it is almost impossible within the environment of a limited budget to [tackle extortion].”[261]

Other people interviewed disagreed that the lack of funding to cover operating costs is fueling corruption and suggested that extortion is mainly used by police officers for their personal enrichment. A prominent human rights lawyer in Kaduna, for example, noted:

The money budgeted for their operations is grossly insufficient, but that doesn’t mean the money they collect is used to run their operations. When somebody demands money by menace, is threatening to frame you of armed robbery or shoot you, of course whatever he collects from you cannot be for anything good.[262]

Several civil society leaders, and most junior police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch cited poor salaries, benefits, and working conditions as factors driving the police to extort money from the public.[263] But the Nigerian government has made significant strides in improving salaries over the past few years. In 2007, the starting monthly salary for a police constable, the lowest rank in the force, was approximately 8,000 ($62). By 2008, it had been increased to 26,158 ($217).[264]

A “Ghost House” for a Forensic Lab

The lack of financial support and the mismanagement of existing resources for one key investigative department—forensics—has had dire consequences for many Nigerians in a criminal justice system where torture remains the primary tool for collecting evidence. The government’s forensic laboratories lie in a state of complete disarray and there is only one forensic pathologist in the entire police force. [265] The 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform agreed with this bleak assessment of the forensics capacity of the Nigerian police: “The laboratory currently looks like a ghost house, with little or no activity going on. It had remained in a dismal state, with the existing equipment inadequate and obsolete, while the seven departments [in the laboratory] appear to exist only in name.” [266] The Ministry of Health also operates a forensics laboratory in Lagos, but it has fared no better. According to the 2008 Presidential Committee, the laboratory “lacks adequate equipment, working materials and qualified staff to operate successfully.” [267] These two forensic laboratories serve a country of approximately 150 million people.

Through a combination of an insufficient budget for essential police services and the mismanagement and theft of those budgeted funds, much of formal policing methods in Nigeria have come to a standstill. The 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform found that the police are generally “unable to use scientific methods of observation, investigation and analysis to detect and interpret physical evidence relating to crime found at crime scenes.”[268] The committee concluded that the dearth of trained personnel and equipment largely led to their excessive reliance on “confessions forcibly extracted from suspects.”[269] A human rights lawyer in Lagos echoed these sentiments: “One of the main reasons torture continues is because of its utility to the police right now. It has taken the place of forensic evidence. In the absence of money to conduct meaningful investigations, they use torture.”[270] A prominent civil society leader working on policing issues argued that the Nigeria Police Force has had ample funds over the years to improve its capacity to conduct professional criminal investigations, but police funds that could have been used for these purposes have instead been stolen and squandered by senior police officials.[271]

Corrupt System of Monetary “Returns”

Police officers ranging in rank from constable to assistant commissioner of police described to Human Rights Watch the existence of a scheme of “returns” throughout the police hierarchy, by which superiors demand their subordinates pay informal sums from the money made from bribes and extortion at police posts. Sometimes these amounts influence the process of placement and transfers to posts by the assigning officer. In many cases, superior officers set monetary “targets” for their subordinates and remove from their posts those who fail to meet them. The returns then move up the chain of command as officers who take returns from their subordinates in turn pay their superiors for the same reasons. Several police officers and civil society leaders working on policing issues in Nigeria identified the system of returns as a key dynamic underlying, and indeed driving, the extortion and related abuses perpetrated by Nigerian police officers at all levels.

Human Rights Watch interviewed nine police officers, including two in senior posts, as well as a former senior police official who investigated cases of police corruption and an intelligence operative in the State Security Service, who either personally paid returns or confirmed the existence of the system of returns in the Nigeria Police Force. They characterized the problem as widespread, pervasive, and deeply embedded into the practices of the force. An assistant commissioner of police referred to this practice as “institutional corruption” that “drives the lower ranks to extort money from the public.” Similarly, the former senior police official who had investigated cases of high-level police corruption characterized the problem as follows:

The corruption, the returns, this whole thing, it is so pervasive, so deep, it is what is running the force. It is what is keeping the entire police force going because every posting is determined by that. Every officer who is posted has to make money for him to remain in that post, or if you are not in a good posting, you must struggle to get a good posting.[272]

The 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform found that “The taking of bribes and their passage up in the rank structure has almost become institutionalized” in the Nigeria Police Force.[273] According to the former assistant commissioner of police, “The top hierarchy of the force knows these things exist.”[274] A police corporal with eight years of experience in the police force told Human Rights Watch, “They have this business of returns in all the stations I’ve worked in—Ogun, Oyo, and Lagos [states]—it’s the same system.”[275] Another police corporal with nine years of experience on the force in Kwara State and Lagos State said, “All the stations that I have worked at, I have had to pay returns.”[276] Civil society leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch agreed. The head of a civil society organization who works closely with rank-and-file police officers noted that “The upper level officers have built a network of sharing proceeds derived from corruption among themselves. They all feed fat on it.”[277]

While Human Rights Watch was unable to ascertain how far bribes and money extorted by the rank-and-file advance up the chain of command, several police officers, including an assistant commissioner of police who investigated police corruption, believed it goes all the way up: “The returns are from the lowest level to the highest. The smallest man gives to the DPO [divisional police officer], the DPO to the commissioner of police, and the commissioner of police to the inspector general.”[278] Those in the junior ranks who paid returns to their superiors generally also held the view that the returns went to the top.[279]

Police Recruitment: “All about the Money”

Corruption in the police force often starts during the process of recruitment. To be accepted as a trainee, candidates frequently must pay bribes to the recruitment officers. A police constable in Lagos, who joined the force six years ago, described to Human Rights Watch how he had to bribe a recruiting officer: “After I submitted the application, a police officer said the superiors had already chosen their officers and that I would have to pay if I wanted in. I had to pay 20,000 ($159) to an inspector in Ikeja [in Lagos State].”[280] Based on the experience of many new recruits he has talked with, a police sergeant in Lagos explained, “As a civilian wanting to enter the force, the [recruiting] police officer will demand money to join up. New recruits have to pay to get in the force … from 50,000 to 100,000 ($417 to $833).”[281]

The civil society leader who has worked with rank-and-file police officers pointed out that “Recruitment is not done on the basis of merit—many don’t have proper credentials—they must know someone or give money.”[282] The payment of bribes by recruits sets a precedent for corruption in their work to come. As a former member of the Police Service Commission explained, from the point of entry into the force the recruit learns that police work is “all about the money.”[283]

Payment of Bribes to Obtain and Remain in Lucrative Posts

Once new recruits enter the police force they often have to bribe their superiors to be assigned to lucrative posts—assignments where police officers have ample opportunities to demand bribes and extort money from the public—or to be considered for promotions. A post is considered to be lucrative either as a function of the particular assignment—for example manning a roadblock or directing traffic—or due to their geographic locations, such as commercial centers or regions of the country where the police are more likely to come into contact with wealthy individuals, businesspeople, or market traders.[284] A police corporal in Lagos State explained:

The best posts are traffic and patrol. The traffic officers … are the ones who make good money. Look at me, I’m not shining, but they are shining. They have money to eat 10 times a day and they dress nice. Sometimes I hear them talking at the station: “I arrested them last night and he give me 20,000 ($167). I didn’t even expect it-oh!” People really want those postings. Sometimes they give money to their superiors to get what they want.[285]

Similarly, a police sergeant assigned to an administrative post in a Lagos police station described what a lucrative posting is:

Within our station, traffic is the most lucrative department. This is because they have most dealings with the public. Some of them who are even younger than me get 1,000 ($8) every day. They give nothing of this to me. I hear them talking about how much they get…. They’ll say, “Oh today I make money-oh, let’s drink beer…. I done do well today.”[286]

A former senior police official who had investigated cases of police corruption described to Human Rights Watch how, in his experience, the process of obtaining duty-transfers generally works:

You buy the posting. For example, you know which roadblocks give money. If you want to be posted there where you can make more money, you must give the person doing the posting money … for you to get to that roadblock you must pay your way to enter. And for you to remain there you must continue to pay.[287]

Once a police officer has been assigned to a specific post, the officer is often expected to make monetary returns to the superior officer to remain in the post or to secure a promotion. Those who fail to meet them will be transferred out of the post and a new officer transferred in.

The former police official who had investigated this practice explained how the system of returns likewise applies to senior officers: “The DPO [divisional police officer] who is in charge of the police station, if he wants to remain the DPO at that place, has to find a way of bribing those at the state headquarters.” He further noted that a state “commissioner of police on his own has to find a way of having good placing with [force] headquarters” by paying the officials in Abuja where the posting is done. He explained that police officers posted to northern states are “desperate” to be transferred to states where economic activity is greater such as Lagos or state commands in the east.[288]

Human Rights Watch interviewed several police officers who described having been given monetary targets by their superiors. According to a 28-year-old police corporal in Lagos, “The boss tells us there is a particular amount that each officer must bring.”[289] Another corporal working on a surveillance team in Lagos described his experience with the system of returns:

There are five of us in the team: two constables, one corporal, one sergeant, and one inspector. At the end of the week there is usually a return that we give to our superiors. At the end of each day we count the money on the way back as someone is driving. We give it to the inspector. At the end of the week the inspector then gives to the DSP [deputy superintendent of police]. The DSP then pays to the DPO [divisional police officer]. My boss, the inspector, tells me that the DSP says he has to pay to his boss. We all put in a donation and give 5,000 ($33) a week to our superior. If we don’t do that, they will change us.[290]

Similarly, an intelligence officer with the State Security Service in Anambra State described what he observed at one of the divisional police headquarters in Onitsha:

The DPO [divisional police officer] set up different teams. Each team had to give returns to the DPO each week. If they failed to pay the amount given as a target, they would be removed from their “nice” posts. The person who led the team would drop the envelope at the DPO’s office. There would usually be four, five, or six [police officers] in a team. Some teams gave back 20,000 ($132), at times 15,000 ($99). It depended on the amount given to them before they started the work for the week.[291]

A police constable who drives a police van in a seven-person surveillance team in Lagos explained how his team divided up the money derived from extorting ordinary citizens, including what was given to their superior:

At the end of the day before going to the station, we park behind the station and count the money together. We will now take the “return,” out of the money…. The superior among us then gives it to the superior at the station— the sum is usually around 4,000 ($33) a day—and the remaining we would now share it. The highest I got in one day was 5,000 ($42); other days, just 2,500 ($21). The amount we got depended on the amount left over [after the return].[292]

Police officers who fail to pay returns to their superiors or meet the targets specified by them are sometimes “punished” and sent to less desirable posts where they have less chance to make money through extortion and bribes. A police constable in Anambra State described what happened to him:

If we don’t pay returns each week, we will be removed. There is a certain amount requested every week that you have to pay. The head of the team is the one who has to pay the return. In my last post I refused to pay my returns and they removed me to desk work. If you are not giving anything, they will be suffering you a lot and put you where you can’t get even one naira.[293]

The former senior police official who had investigated cases of high-level police corruption, observed that in his experience, police officers at all levels participate by paying their superiors in a corrupt struggle to remain in preferred positions: “Those in the poorer states are desperate to go there and unseat you. There’s this ongoing competition…. This [system of] returns is how it happens.”[294]

Denial of Problem by Senior Police Leadership

The senior police leadership, for the most part, denies the existence of the corrupt system of returns in the Nigeria Police Force. In an interview with Human Rights Watch in May 2009, the Lagos State police commissioner strenuously refuted that police officers “make returns” to superior officers: “That is not true…. Nobody does that. If I get such reports, that DPO [divisional police officer] is finished. We have human rights sections and a provost here. No junior officer has ever reported to me that they are asked to give money.”[295] Similarly, the chairman of the Police Service Commission told Human Rights Watch, “I have heard of this but have not received any complaints.”[296]

On the other hand, a senior official at the Police Service Commission acknowledged that “The commission is aware that many police officers picked up on the street [for extortion] make returns to their superior officers.”[297] The police force public relations officer in Abuja alluded to a key problem when investigating these cases: “It is difficult to prove such cases, because it is the junior officer found with the money and then it is his word against the superior officer’s word.”[298]

Whether due to the difficulty of establishing such cases or the leadership’s willfully turning a blind eye to these corrupt practices, the police have failed to hold accountable senior officers who demand or accept returns from their subordinates. A senior official at the Police Service Commission told Human Rights Watch that he was not aware of any cases in which a senior officer had been disciplined, let alone prosecuted, for taking returns from a subordinate officer.[299]

Funding the Nigeria Police Force

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) receives substantial funding from federal government allocations each year, which are augmented by vast sums of money from the state and local governments as well as from private-sector donations and trust funds. If properly allocated, these combined revenue sources could provide adequate resources for essential police services in Nigeria. But the police administration has failed to disclose in any transparent manner the sources, amounts of revenue received from them, or use of these funds. It appears that much of these resources are lost to theft and mismanagement.

Federal Government Allocations

When Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the NPF budget stood at 22.6 billion ($235.4 million).[300] A decade later, the police budget, at 210.7 billion ($1.4 billion), had ballooned five-fold.[301] Most of the increased funding was earmarked toward personnel costs.[302] Police salaries and benefits in 2009 accounted for 82 percent of budgeted expenditures.[303] The increase in personnel costs reflected the dramatic growth of the police force—approximately 230,000 police officers were added to the force during the decade—but also significant increases in salary levels.[304]

Source: Federal 2008 and 2009 Budget and 2008 Presidential Committee on the Reform of the Nigeria Police Force (1999-2007).[305]

In addition to personnel costs, the police budgeted 32.1 billion ($212.6 million) for operating costs and capital expenditures in 2009.[306] Budgeted costs heavily favored high-end purchases and expenditures with limited direct benefit to the public, such as 2.7 billion ($18.1 million) for the purchase and outfitting of an additional police helicopter and 206 million ($1.4 million) budgeted for international travel.[307] However, substantial funds were also allocated to cover the general operating costs of the police force including 1 billion ($6.6 million) for fuel and 849.6 million ($5.6 million) for maintenance of its fleet of 8,126 police vehicles—the annual equivalent of $812 and $689 per vehicle for fuel and maintenance, respectively.[308] Even if the budgeted amounts would not meet 100 percent of actual operating costs, it is clear that substantial funding from federal government allocations does exist for police operating costs, including fueling and maintaining police vehicles.

State and Local Government Funds

In addition to the NPF federal budget, state and local governments provide considerable funds to the Nigerian police. The 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform found that in some cases state government funding covered at least 50-70 percent of police operating costs within the state.[309] In Lagos State, for example, the police commissioner told Human Rights Watch that the state government provided most of the police vehicles in the state, as well as fuel, armored personnel carriers, bullet-proof vests, and salary subsidies for police personnel.[310] The local government councils in Lagos State also donated more than 100 patrol vehicles to the police in 2009.[311]

Other Sources of Police Funds

Federal, state, and local government funds have been augmented by various public and private sector trust funds. The Lagos State government, for example, established a trust fund in 2007 that has raised 5 billion ($33.1 million) for policing and security operations.[312] The most prominent trust fund, however, was the 50 billion ($387.5 million) Police Equipment Fund established in 2006 by then-President Olusegun Obasanjo and headed by the president’s brother-in-law.[313] As described above, much of the money ended up squandered or stolen.

Lack of Transparency and Financial Oversight of Police Funds

According to several civil society leaders, senior government officials, and police officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, there is little transparency or financial oversight for how the $1.4 billion police budget, and the vast sums of money allocated to the police from state and local governments, and other funding sources are actually expended. They noted how this lack of transparency helps mask and greatly facilitates the embezzlement of funds for essential police operations by senior officers.

In 2009, the then-Minister of Police Affairs Ibrahim Lame told Human Rights Watch that there has been serious neglect in the financial oversight of the police and that police reform would require a “total surgical operation.”[314] The “decentralization of the budget is necessary,” he said. “The Ministry [of Police Affairs] must be over and above the police. If not, there will still be problems.”[315] A director of a civil society organization working on policing issues likewise observed that “financial accountability is very weak both within the force and within the oversight mechanisms.”[316]

A former senior police official who served in senior positions at Force Headquarters and presided over internal investigations of corrupt practices within the police force described to Human Rights Watch how, in his experience, police funds are allocated to cover operating costs within the police force:

When the money comes, the inspector general of police decides the way he wants to spend it. They send to a state commissioner an amount that is supposed to be for the running costs of the state command. That [money] is not accountable. What does he do with that? He will sit down, take for his own office, and spend it the way he likes, then he will give to the deputy commissioner and the assistant commissioner, and it goes like that, but nobody is told what you need to do with it. The whole idea of auditing is not there…. In the case of the divisions, the money goes to the divisional police officer and he takes it alone. He doesn’t even bother to give it to the divisional crime officer, because they are making their own money.[317]

While assigned to a high-level posting, he was routinely sent money from his superiors and never asked to account for it:

“At [name of post withheld] they would send me 500,000 ($4,667)—just like that…. They will say they’ve given it to me for those things that are needed—buying paper, pencils—it is supposed to be used to run your office, but it’s a system that is completely broken down…. [There is] no accountability, no transparency. Even the auditors are given money, so much money. The internal police auditors are part of the whole scheme.[318]

Human Rights Watch requested copies of the most recent audit reports, and comment from the inspector general of police on steps taken to improve financial oversight and ensure that budgeted funds go toward their intended purposes, but neither the reports nor the information was provided.[319]

The National Assembly has statutory oversight over the implementation of federal budget appropriations, including federal allocations to the Nigeria Police Force. The House of Representatives Public Accounts and Public Affairs Committee is responsible for budgetary oversight but has failed to follow through with public hearings into financial mismanagement of federal funds by the police leadership.[320]

[229] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[230] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[231] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[232] Human Rights Watch interview with former member of the Police Service Commission, Abuja, August 12, 2008.

[233] Human Rights Watch interview with former senior police official, October 6, 2009.

[234] “Nigerian ex-police chief charged,” BBC News, April 4, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4409291.stm (accessed February 2, 2010); and Human Rights Watch interview with former EFCC official, 2009.

[235] Human Rights Watch interview with former member of the Police Service Commission, Abuja, August 12, 2008.

[236]Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Tafa Adebayo Balogun et al., charge sheet, April 1, 2005, count 46 (on file with Human Rights Watch); and Bashir Adigun, “Former Nigerian police chief sentenced to six months in jail for graft,” Associated Press, November 22, 2005.

[237] Adigun, “Former Nigerian police chief sentenced to six months in jail for graft,” Associated Press, November 22, 2005.

[238] “Nigerian ex-police chief jailed,” BBC News, November 22, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4460740.stm (accessed November 7, 2009). As part of the plea bargain agreement, Balogun pleaded guilty to the lesser charges of failing to declare his assets, while his front companies received the more serious charges of money laundering. Section 18 of the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004, provides that a corporate body may be found guilty and punished for offenses under the Money Laundering Act. Where a corporate body is convicted of an offense under the Money Laundering Act, the court may order the closure of a corporate body and its assets forfeited to the federal government.

[239] The total police operating budget in 2005—apart from personnel costs and capital projects—was 8.3 billion ($63.1 million). 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 25.

[240] “Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions on the Petition by Festus Keyamo, Counsel on Behalf of Godson Ewulum, Alleging Fraud in the Operation of the Presidential Committee on Police Equipment Fund,” House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions, 2008, p. 2. The Police Equipment Fund was later changed by Kenny Martins to a private foundation known as the Police Equipment Foundation, allegedly without government consent.

[241] Yusuf Alli, “EFCC Issues 7-day Deadline for Return of PEF’s Cash, Cars,” Nation (Lagos), June 20, 2008, http://www.efccnigeria.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=178&Itemid=2 (accessed November 4, 2009). “Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions on the Petition by Festus Keyamo,” House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions, p. 23.

[242] “Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions on the Petition by Festus Keyamo,” House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions, pp. 25-27.

[243] Ibid., pp. 10, 16, and 21; and Alli, “EFCC Issues 7-day Deadline for Return of PEF’s Cash, Cars,” Nation (Lagos), June 20, 2008.

[244]See Ise-Oluwa Ige, “N50bn Pef Fund - Police Arraigns Kenny Martins, Dumuje,” Vanguard (Lagos), May 7, 2008.

[245] See Godwin Tsa, “Martins, Dumuje, Others Docked, Remanded in EFCC Custody,” Daily Sun (Lagos), June 24, 2008, http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2008/jun/24/national-24-06-2008-002.htm (accessed June 9, 2010).

[246]See Sunday Benjamin, “N7.740bn Fraud: Court Frees Kenny Martins, Others,” Daily Trust (Abuja), November 24, 2009, http://www.news.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10101:n7740bn-fraud-court-frees-kenny-martins-others&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=119 (accessed June 9, 2010); and Ikechukwu Nnochirim, “Kenny Martins - EFCC Appeals Judgment,” Vanguard (Lagos), December 1, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200912010526.html (accessed June 9, 2010).

[247]See Dayo Thomas, “ICPC Quizzes Ex-IG, Ehindero,” ThisDay (Lagos), April 3, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200804030649.html (accessed July 26, 2010); Sunday Isuwa, “Ehindero Admits Fixing N557m in Bank,” Leadership (Abuja), April 3, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200804030678.html (accessed July 26, 2010); Musa Simon Reef, “Ehindero in Fresh Trouble - May Be Declared Wanted By ICPC,” Daily Trust (Abuja), October 5, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200810060300.html (accessed July 26, 2010).

[248] Human Rights Watch interview with senior official at the ICPC, Abuja, May 5, 2009.

[249] A senior ICPC official told Human Rights Watch in June 2010 that the case was “still under investigation.” Human Rights Watch interview with senior ICPC official, Abuja, June 29, 2010.

[250] According to the police investigation, on June 7, 2007—the police commissioner’s last day in office—900,000 was found on his driver, a police constable, as the constable was leaving the budget office at Force Headquarters. The police then searched the budget office and found the additional cash inside the office. The commissioner stated that the money was the balance of funds provided to the Nigeria Police Force for the 2007 elections and was being used by the police for “public relations” purposes. Decision of the Force Disciplinary Committee, November 27, 2007 (reviewed by Human Rights Watch).

[251] In February 2009, the PSC reversed the dismissal and instead ordered the compulsory retirement of the police commissioner. Decision of the Police Service Commission, February 2009 (reviewed by Human Rights Watch).

[252] 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 31.

[253] Over the past decade, the federal government has substantially increased the police budget as the size of the police force has rapidly expanded during this period. See section below on funding for the Nigeria Police Force.

[254] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[255] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 28, 2008. The sergeant had worked in Cross River, Delta, Imo, and Lagos states. He noted one exception where the Lagos State government provides funds for fuel and maintenance of vehicles of the Rapid Response Squad (RRS). Similarly, a police corporal working in the investigations department in a Lagos State police station told Human Rights Watch that unlike the patrol units, the investigation department does not even have a vehicle—“the complainant has to pay for everything,” he said. Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[256] Human Rights Watch interview with Joseph Otteh, November 27, 2008.

[257] Human Rights Watch interview with High Court judge, Lagos, November 24, 2008.

[258] Human Rights Watch interview with prominent civil society leader who works on policing issues, Lagos, April 2009.

[259] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 28, 2008.

[260] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, April 10, 2009.

[261] Human Rights Watch interview with Innocent Chukwuma, executive director of the CLEEN Foundation, Lagos, April 14, 2008.

[262] Human Rights Watch interview with Festus Okoye, executive director of Human Rights Monitor, Kaduna, April 29, 2009.

[263] A police sergeant in Lagos, for example, told Human Rights Watch, “This problem is caused by our salaries. If we’re paid very well, nobody can take a bribe.” Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[264] 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 109. In comparison, in 2009, the starting monthly salary for an entry-level school teacher in Nigeria in 2009 was 27,557 ($182). Human Rights Watch interview with Peter Obidiegwu, deputy press director, Ministry of Education, Abuja, July 14, 2010.

[265] Human Rights Watch interview with Innocent Chukwuma, Lagos, August 1, 2008.

[266] 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 148.

[267] Ibid., p. 148.

[268] 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 146.

[269] Ibid., p. 146.

[270] Human Rights Watch interview with Joseph Otteh, November 27, 2008.

[271] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Innocent Chukwuma, Lagos, June 3, 2010.

[272] Human Rights Watch interview with former senior police official, October 6, 2009.

[273] 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 196.

[274] Human Rights Watch interview with assistant commissioner of police, Abuja, May 5, 2009.

[275] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, November 27, 2009.

[276] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, April 10, 2009.

[277] Human Rights Watch interview with civil society leader, November 24, 2008.

[278] Human Rights Watch interview with assistant commissioner of police, Abuja, May 5, 2009.

[279] A sergeant in Lagos, for example, told Human Rights Watch that he believed, “At the end of day, the traffic officers give money to their boss, the divisional traffic officer, who then gives it to the DPO, who returns it to the area command, then to the commissioner of police, and then to the IG [inspector general].” Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2009.

[280] Human Rights Watch interview with police constable, Lagos, November 28, 2008.

[281] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[282] Human Rights Watch interview with civil society leader, November 24, 2008.

[283] Human Rights Watch interview with former member of the Police Service Commission, Abuja, August 12, 2008.

[284] Human Rights Watch interview with prominent civil society leader who works on policing issues, Lagos, April 2009.

[285] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[286] Human Rights Watch interview with police sergeant, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[287] Human Rights Watch interview with former senior police official, October 6, 2009.

[288] Ibid.

[289] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, November 27, 2008.

[290] Human Rights Watch interview with police corporal, Lagos, April 10, 2009.

[291] Human Rights Watch interview with officer in the State Security Services, Onitsha, April 21, 2009.

[292] Human Rights Watch interview with police constable, Lagos, November 28, 2008.

[293] Human Rights Watch interview with police constable, Onitsha, April 22, 2009.

[294] Human Rights Watch interview with former senior police official, October 6, 2009.

[295] Human Rights Watch interview with Marvel Akpoyibo, Lagos State commissioner of police, Lagos, May 4, 2009.

[296] Human Rights Watch interview with Parry Osayande, chairman of the Police Service Commission, Abuja, May 5, 2009.

[297] Human Rights Watch interview with senior official at the Police Service Commission, Abuja, July 17, 2009.

[298] Human Rights Watch interview with Emmanuel Ojukwu, force public relations officer at Force Headquarters, Abuja, May 5, 2009.

[299] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Obi Ume-Ezeoke, then-director of the Police Discipline Department, Police Service Commission, Abuja, October 17, 2009.

[300] See 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 25.

[301] Federal Budget 2009, Appropriation for “Police Formation and Command,” http://www.fmf.gov.ng/ViewExternalLink.aspx?id=ViewExternalLink.aspx?id=http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng (accessed November 4, 2009); and 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 25.

[302] The police personnel budget increased from 16.2 billion ($168.8 million) in 1999 to 172.8 billion ($1.1 billion) in 2009, a nearly ten-fold increase. The non-personnel police budget increased from 6.4 billion ($66.7 million) to 32.1 billion ($212.6 million) during this same period, representing a still-significant four-fold increase. See Federal Budget 2009, Appropriation for “Police Formation and Command”; and 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 25.

[303] The police force budget is divided into two categories of expenditures: “Recurrent Expenditures” and “Capital Expenditures.” Recurrent expenditures include salaries and benefits, supplies and materials, fuel and maintenance costs, and all other operational expenses. Capital expenditures largely comprise the funding of construction projects and the purchase of vehicles and equipment.

[304] Since 2007 the starting monthly salary for a police constable, the lowest rank in the force has been increased from approximately 8,000 ($62) to 26,158 ($203). 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 109.

[305] The drop in funding in dollar terms from 2008 to 2009 is due to exchange rate fluctuations between the Nigerian naira and the US dollar. In naira, the 2008 police budget was 186.0 billion and was increased in 2009 to 210.7 billion.

[306] Federal Budget 2009, Appropriation for “Police Formation and Command.”

[307] Ibid.

[308] Ibid.

[309] 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Main Report, p. 199.

[310] Human Rights Watch interview with Marvel Akpoyibo, May 4, 2009. Similarly, a state government program in the northern state of Kaduna, known as Operation Yaki, donated 100 patrol vehicles and 250 motorcycles to the police between 2007 and 2008. Funding through Operation Yaki also subsidizes the salaries of 3,000 of Kaduna’s approximately 13,000 police officers. Samuel Aruwan, “Kaduna Budgets N153 Billion for 2009,” Leadership (Abuja), February 4, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902040329.html (accessed November 1, 2009); and Human Rights Watch interview with Aminu Lawan, Kaduna State police public relations officer, Kaduna, April 29, 2009.

[311] See “Fashola Launches Platform for Ordinary Nigerians to Donate to Security Trust Fund,” Lagos State government press release, October 16, 2009, http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/index.php?page=news&nid=191 (accessed November 1, 2009).

[312] See Joseph Jibueze, “LSSTF Spends N5b on Security,” Nation (Lagos), August 11, 2009, http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/13692/1/LSSTF-spends-N5b-on-security/Page1.html (accessed November 1, 2009). The Lagos State Security Trust Fund is comprised of both public and private funds. The Lagos State government provided over 3 billion to the fund. “Fashola Launches Platform for Ordinary Nigerians to Donate to Security Trust Fund,” Lagos State government press release, October 16, 2009, http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/index.php?page=news&nid=191 (accessed November 1, 2009).

[313] “Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions on the Petition by Festus Keyamo,” House of Representatives Committee on Public Petitions, p. 2.

[314] Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahim Lame, Abuja, May 4, 2009.

[315] Ibid.

[316] Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Innocent Chukwuma, June 3, 2010.

[317] Human Rights Watch interview with former senior police official, October 6, 2009.

[318] Ibid.

[319] Letter from Human Rights Watch to Inspector General of Police Ogbonna Onovo, January 8, 2010. On March 26, 2010, Human Rights Watch received a written response from the Force Public Relations Office Emmanuel Ojukwu, stating, “Your enquiry contains 66 questions, of which I am afraid the exigencies of service may not now permit response to all of them. Also, in compliance with extant laws, I am not at liberty to oblige some of your requests that border on security.” No information was provided in response to Human Rights Watch’s questions concerning financial audits and transparency.

[320] Human Rights Watch interview with Ibrahim Auwal Musa, executive director of the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, September 25, 2009; and telephone interview with Innocent Chukwuma, May 13, 2010.