III. Challenges to Realizing Accountability

The frequent resort to violence in Côte d’Ivoire to resolve disputes on issues ranging from politics to land conflict has laid bare the weakness of the rule of law in the country, further fueled by the lack of credible justice for the grave crimes committed during the decade of violence preceding the 2010 elections. Even before the 2010-2011 post-election crisis, the judicial system was plagued by insufficient material and financial resources, inefficient proceedings, the politicization of its personnel, inadequate case management systems, corruption, and poor public perception. The enormity of the task of re-establishing the rule of law swelled following the post-election crisis.[95]

In the country’s south, seventeen of the twenty six courts were partially damaged or looted during this period; courts effectively ceased to function. In the north, judges and prosecutors had only begun to return to their posts after more than seven years during which the Forces Nouvelles rebel group controlled that part of the country, including de facto policing and judicial functions. Many court officials in the north once again abandoned their posts after conflict resumed. Many prisons in the south were also damaged when armed groups from one side or the other broke them open to create chaos or to target new recruits. By conflict’s end, few prison facilities continued to function in the south; in the north, only three of the eleven prisons were operational prior to the crisis.[96]

Since taking office, President Ouattara’s government has taken steps to address these glaring deficiencies. The government has increased from 2 to 3 percent the amount of the national budget allocated to the justice sector over a five year period.[97] Similarly, donors have poured millions of dollars into the justice sector to support national rehabilitation efforts of the entire system. In April 2012 the Ministry of Justice finalized a national justice sector strategy, which forms the basis for interventions in the justice and prison sectors by the government, the United Nations, the European Union, and other partners from 2012 to 2015.[98] At this writing, the corresponding action plan, which identifies how the priorities will be implemented and will serve as a roadmap for international partners supporting justice reform, had yet to be finalized by the Ministry of Justice.[99]

As mentioned above in Section II, President Ouattara has specifically flagged in his rhetoric the need for independent and impartial justice to address the pervasive problem of impunity for grave crimes. The Special Investigative Cell, the National Commission of Inquiry, and the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission are indeed steps in that direction. But the lack of meaningful accountability against pro-Ouattara forces for atrocity crimes underscores the growing chasm between rhetoric and reality. More concrete action is needed to realize independent and impartial justice.

There are a number of areas where the Ouattara government and donors could provide practical assistance to see results when it comes to accountability for serious international crimes. As a general point, given the complexity of pursuing serious international crimes, all of those engaged in prosecuting, trying, and defending against allegations of serious international crimes would benefit from targeted, practical training to develop their capacity. These trainings should address real needs as identified by the practitioners working on these cases. For instance, prosecutors could be trained in how to use existing modes of liability under Ivorian law to target senior officials who ordered or failed to adequately respond to the commission of serious international crimes.[100] Workshops on the elements of crimes and modes of liability in the Rome Statute and relevant defenses—for prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers—as compared to domestic law could also be beneficial.

Other areas where the government— with donor assistance as needed— could provide material and technical support to help judicial and prosecutorial authorities strengthen their ability to pursue serious international crime cases include: strengthening judicial and prosecutorial independence, strengthening prosecutions by signaling for prosecutors the need to put in place a more effective and transparent prosecutorial strategy, improving investigative capacity by providing material and technical support as needed, solidifying the legal basis of the Special Investigative Cell, improving the fair trial rights of defendants, establishing an effective system for witness protection, and bolstering security for judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. Each of these areas will be discussed in more detail below.

Strengthening Judicial and Prosecutorial Independence

Judicial independence, meaning the real and perceived ability to act without political influence, is the cornerstone of democracy, good governance, and rule of law. Judges must also be able to withstand temptation to circumvent the law for personal gain, both in appearance and reality. It is only when judges and prosecutors can and appear to operate free from influence or corruption that they are able to adjudicate cases impartially—key preconditions to inspire public confidence in the administration of justice. Independence and impartiality are critical when it comes to trying serious international crime cases, which are especially sensitive because they are often committed along ethnic or political lines and their masterminds may continue to occupy positions of power.

At the same time, these core principles are weakest in countries emerging from conflict or violence resulting from the complete breakdown of the rule of law, like in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, senior Ministry of Justice officials interviewed by Human Rights Watch pointed to two pivotal judicial decisions as symbols of the politicization of the judiciary: first, in 2000, when the Supreme Court declared Alassane Ouattara, among others, ineligible to stand in the presidential elections; and second, in 2010, when the Constitutional Court nullified the results of the Independent Electoral Commission and declared President Gbagbo the winner of the election.[101] Civil society activists and government officials said that both decisions reflected the lack of independence of the judicial system and helped trigger the onslaught of politico-military violence that resulted in the commission of mass atrocities.

Côte d’Ivoire’s constitution recognizes a separation of power between the executive and the judiciary and guarantees the independence of the judiciary, consistent with international standards.[102] In practice, while there are judges that act independently, one civil society activist underscored to Human Rights Watch that they are the exception rather than the rule.[103] According to the United States (US) State Department, political interference was rampant during the Gbagbo government, as was widespread corruption among judges and prosecutors more concerned about career advancement than implementing the law.[104]

There has been little change in the perception of the judiciary since President Ouattara took office: as one civil society activist put it, the “actors have changed, but the system remains the same.”[105] Several of those interviewed for this report highlighted that because prosecutors by law operate under the authority of the minister of justice, it is extremely difficult for them to act independently.[106] The fact that neither the procureur de la république nor the military prosecutor has brought any cases against pro-Ouattara forces for violent crimes committed during the crisis only reinforces the perception that prosecutors are reluctant or unable to open sensitive cases against individuals close to the executive.[107]

The Ouattara government has taken steps to strengthen judicial independence, most notably by drafting a law on the High Judicial Council (le Conseil supérieur de la Magistrature, CSM)—the body governing the appointment and discipline of judges, with the goal of protecting their independence. The draft law would implement the president’s obligation under the constitution to follow the council’s advice when selecting judges.[108] At this writing, the draft legislation was still pending. While the passing of the law would be a positive step, the president and the chair of the National Assembly would still hold the power to appoint a majority of judges to the CSM. As such, a more neutral process of appointing judges to the CSM is needed to bolster the institution’s—and ultimately the judiciary’s—independence.[109] The government has identified strengthening the independence of the judiciary, including through amending the constitution, as a priority in its April 2012 strategy document mentioned above.[110]

In addition, the government has appointed an inspector general to oversee judicial and corrections services. [111] As of January 2012 the inspector general can initiate an investigation at his or her own initiative, in addition to being tasked to do so by the minister of justice. [112] In October 2012 the government announced that disciplinary proceedings had begun against eight judges for abuse of power, extortion of funds, and corruption . [113]

As for prosecutors, as noted above, while all prosecutors operate under the authority of the minister of justice, this should not be interpreted as the system sanctioning undue political interference in the work of prosecutors. As the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has noted, where the prosecution is subordinate to executive authority, “it is important to develop clear and adequate policy guidelines as well as codes of conduct and ethics, so that the parameters for action and the authority of the respective actors are clearly defined so as to detect, challenge, and remedy any violation or abuse of authority that may arise.”[114] An independent and impartial case assignment system is also important to protect prosecutors from undue interference.[115]

Human Rights Watch urges the minister of justice, in collaboration with the procureur général and the procureur de la république, to take steps to protect the impartiality and independence of prosecutors, including through developing and consistently implementing policy guidelines and codes of ethics outlined above, as well as through establishing an independent and impartial system for assigning cases. Further, the security of tenure for prosecutors is closely linked to their perceived and actual independence. Their dismissal should be subject to strict requirements, which includes a framework for dealing with internal disciplinary matters and complaints against prosecutors, who should be able to challenge decisions relating to their careers.[116] In this regard, the government may want to consider establishing a section of the CSM for prosecutors.[117]

Other long-term initiatives are needed to affect a cultural shift in the judiciary and in the executive when it comes to combatting a culture permissive of corruption and political interference.[118] In this regard, the CSM should consider ways to sensitize judges and prosecutors, such as through workshops or other training seminars, about its mandate, possible threats to judicial and prosecutorial independence, and the consequences of succumbing to political interference or corruption. Officials in the executive should consider similar measures to sensitize political officials about why the separation of powers is essential and what should and should not be done to support it.

In his 2012 report to the UN Human Rights Council, the independent expert on the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire notably referenced the importance of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary in adjudicating crimes from the post-election crisis.[119] His 2013 report also highlighted in greater detail concerns about ongoing impunity for government forces and the lack of impartial justice to date.[120] As he continues his work on justice for serious crimes in Côte d’Ivoire, the independent expert should consider monitoring the issue of judicial independence and impartiality in particular. Indeed, shedding more light on the obstacles to judicial and prosecutorial independence and providing recommendations to address them could help national authorities more effectively tackle these issues, with donor support as needed.

Further, given the longstanding weakness of the judicial system when it comes to independence and impartiality, President Ouattara should consider engaging the mandate of the UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. An important part of the work of the UN special rapporteur is conducting country visits to assess in greater detail the situation of the judiciary and the wider legal system and, where appropriate, make recommendations for its improvement.[121]A country visit can be initiated in two ways: through a request to visit by the UN special rapporteur to the government concerned or by a government directly inviting the UN special rapporteur. Both scenarios require the government’s consent before the mission takes place.[122]

Strengthening Prosecutions

Developing a More Comprehensive Prosecutorial Strategy

A well-developed prosecutorial strategy is essential to define priorities and develop guidelines to pursue these priorities. Since serious international crimes, by their nature, involve hundreds and potentially thousands of victims, developing a sound strategy is especially important to direct finite prosecutorial resources to best effect. Non-confidential elements of the strategy should also be published to cultivate public understanding of the strategy—important to build trust and facilitate investigations—and to manage expectations among victims about what the justice system can deliver.[123]

However, in a place like Côte d’Ivoire where the justice system has not functioned effectively for a number of years, there is limited experience to draw from when developing such a strategy. Given this limited experience, coupled with the sensitivities associated with pursuing pro-Ouattara forces, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Special Investigative Cell has mirrored the International Criminal Court (ICC) in adopting a sequential approach to its prosecutions: first, cell staff told Human Rights Watch, prosecutors will focus on pro-Gbagbo forces, followed by those suspected perpetrators of serious international crimes among the Ouattara supporters.[124] This has been reflected in the Special Investigative Cell’s work to date, with charges brought only against defendants from the Gbagbo camp.

As discussed above, almost all civil society actors interviewed for this report have flagged their frustration with the ongoing impunity for one side of the conflict.

The pursuit of the sequential approach has eroded trust in the independence and impartiality of the Ivorian justice system. This mistrust makes it less likely that victims and witnesses will readily come forward, requiring investigating judges and judicial police to be more proactive in building cases against pro-Ouattara forces. Indeed, staff in the Special Investigative Cell indicated that while the office makes no distinction among victims when it comes to pursuing cases, few victims of crimes committed by the FRCI have come forward with information about possible crimes.[125]

Vague promises about eventually targeting those on the Ouattara side are not enough to quell many Ivorians’ rising impatience with the status quo. Developing and implementing a more comprehensive prosecutorial strategy—one that includes criteria used by prosecutors to make decisions about case selection—is essential. To do so more effectively, staff in the Special Investigative Cell, under the leadership of the procureur de la république and with government and donor support as needed, should consider conducting a mapping exercise to develop a comprehensive list of crimes committed by region during the post-election period, pinpointing individual suspects where possible.[126] Such a mapping could provide the basis for the formulation of initial hypotheses of investigation by giving a sense of the scale of violations, detecting patterns, and identifying potential leads or sources of evidence.[127] The National Commission of Inquiry’s report and confidential annex may have done this to a degree and can provide a useful starting point for this exercise. However, since the commission was not vested with a judicial mandate, the Special Investigative Cell will likely need to undertake some additional work to successfully build criminal cases against individual perpetrators.

Based on the findings of the mapping exercise, staff in the Special Investigative Cell could identify more specific priorities for the office, such as pursuing the most serious crimes, targeting senior officials, or prosecuting certain crimes that have special significance in Côte d’Ivoire, including attacks on minorities and gender-based violence.[128] The strategy could also include information about the factors the office considers when implementing these priorities, such as the availability of witnesses, the quality of evidence, and the legal complexity of the case.[129] Based on a more comprehensive strategy document, the procureur de la république and the investigating judges could then develop a more strategic investigative plan—essentially guidelines on how to structure investigations and collect evidence to support the priorities identified in the strategy document in accordance with the applicable legal standards.[130]

Non-confidential portions of both the mapping exercise and the prosecutorial strategy should be published to increase understanding about the office’s work, build trust in its ability to execute its mandate independently and impartially, and manage expectations about what can be achieved.[131] Should the procureur de la république continue to pursue a sequential approach—despite the concerns raised by civil society and others about the negative consequences of this strategy—the strategy document for the Special Investigative Cell should include specific information about why this approach remains valid. Further, proceeding sequentially when it comes to charging perpetrators should not compromise the immediate collection of evidence against all perpetrators.

In late February 2013, the head of the Special Investigative Cell told Human Rights Watch of her commitment to develop a prosecutorial strategy, with assistance from key partners including the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI), and the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).[132] This commitment, which is welcome, should be operationalized as soon as possible, and should include disseminating non-confidential portions of the strategy to the broader public as discussed above.

Improving Investigations

Under Ivorian law, investigating judges are the primary investigators of allegations of criminal conduct, with assistance by the judicial police as needed.[133] The investigating judge can be put in charge of a case by the prosecutor or civil parties.[134] The investigating judge compiles a dossier or file of the information relevant to the alleged crime and will pass the file on to the prosecutor if he or she determines that the relevant legal threshold to proceed has been satisfied.

There are currently three investigating judges assigned to the Special Investigative Cell; when under the previous minister of justice, the ministry promised an additional three investigating judges, but this had not been finalized at this writing. The modest staffing of the Special Investigative Cell that exists at present seems insufficient to address the large number of criminal allegations stemming from the post-election period alone. Yet Ivorian authorities further increased its caseload in 2012 after giving it jurisdiction over “attacks on state security” related to alleged plans for a coup d’état and the spate of attacks on military installations beginning in August 2012. Human Rights Watch believes that the Ministry of Justice should appoint additional staff to the Special Investigative Cell, including investigating judges, as soon as possible.

Staff in the Special Investigative Cell have made some effort, including through radio and newspaper advertisements, to encourage witnesses to come to its office in Abidjan and give evidence.[135] At the time the research for this report was conducted, very few witnesses or victims of crimes committed by the FRCI had come forward to the Special Investigative Cell’s office in Abidjan.[136] There is no system of witness protection available, which has a chilling effect on the willingness of witnesses to come forward.[137]

According to officials in the Special Investigative Cell and the Ministry of Justice, investigating judges from the Special Investigative Cell have undertaken field missions to several regions of Côte d’Ivoire in order to interview witnesses from both sides.[138] Field investigations are essential and should be intensified, especially since many victims and witnesses are scattered across the country and cannot easily travel to Abidjan to give a statement. But in addition to traveling outside Abidjan, investigating judges and judicial police must be able to build confidence in communities affected by crimes, especially those committed by the FRCI. One way to achieve this is to recruit judicial police from all communities affected by the post-election crisis, since at this writing all 20 judicial police in the Special Investigative Cell come from ethnic groups considered to be pro-Ouattara.[139] Recruiting judicial police from ethnic groups across the country could help victims feel more confident that their concerns will be addressed impartially.

Similarly, the Special Investigative Cell should consider using female judicial police as much as possible when investigating gender-based crimes. Investigating judges and judicial police should also be trained on how to assess the risk to victims and witnesses, approaching them in a way that does not compromise their safety or cause further trauma.

Further, investigative teams are currently divided by region, but this may not effectively uncover the criminal network that facilitated the commission of crimes—a network where orders to commit crimes were executed across different geographic regions. As such, it could be useful to designate an additional investigative team to coordinate and pursue linkage evidence, meaning evidence linking the “trigger pullers” on the ground with those who gave the orders, across all regions.[140] This may necessitate a request by the Special Investigative Cell for additional resources from the Ministry of Justice, which should be seriously considered.

Regularizing the Authority of the Special Investigative Cell

As mentioned above, the government created the Special Investigative Cell through an interministerial order. It is attached to the Tribunal of First Instance of Abidjan. However, an interministerial order does not carry the same normative weight as a formal law or even a presidential decree. As such, questions have been raised as to the Special Investigative Cell’s authority to investigate cases outside of Abidjan.[141] This was less of a problem in the early days of the cell’s operation, as its investigations were largely based in Abidjan.[142] However, as investigations continue throughout the country, the government should reaffirm the Special Investigative Cell’s authority to investigate the crimes it was mandated to pursue, including violent crimes, through a formal law.

Legal Reforms to Strengthen the Fair Trial Rights of Defendants

Respect for internationally agreed upon rights of the accused ensures judicial processes are, and appear to be, fair and credible.[143] The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Côte d’Ivoire is party, outlines a number of rights that must be respected to ensure a defendant has a fair trial.[144] Failure to uphold these rights in law and practice risks casting a shadow over efforts to hold perpetrators to account. There are several key areas in the Ivorian Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale) which the government should reform to better protect defendants’ fair trial rights.

Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the process of investigating violent crimes is divided into two phases: pretrial investigation and trial. Pretrial investigation comprises two levels: first, investigation by the investigating judge and second, if appropriate, investigation by the Chamber of Accusation.

The investigating judge is put in charge of a case by the procureur de la république or a civil party and is tasked with confirming the identity of suspects and examining the evidence supporting the charges against them.[145] If the investigating judge determines that the alleged offense(s) qualifies as a crime, he or she orders the procureur de la république to transfer the case record, along with all evidence, to the Chamber of Accusation.[146] The Chamber of Accusation conducts a second level of investigation, during which it may order new investigative actions and issue subpoenas, arrest warrants, pretrial detention orders, and summons to appear.[147]

If the Chamber of Accusation determines that there are sufficient grounds to proceed to trial, it forwards the case to the court of first instance in matters involving the most serious domestic crimes, known as the cour d’assises.[148] Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the cour d’assises is a non-permanent court that is supposed to convene in the building of the Tribunal of First Instance every three months.[149] It is composed of a president, two professional judges, and nine lay jurors (three of whom are alternates).[150]

The cour d’assises system as it exists in Côte d’Ivoire is problematic for all defendants of serious crimes, including those related to the post-election crisis, for a number of reasons. First, while the cour d’assises is supposed to convene every three months, in practice it has only convened twice since 2000, in large part because the process is cumbersome and costly.[151] For high-profile cases—such as the case involving Simone Gbagbo—it may be possible to convene the cour d’assises using discretionary funds outside of the ordinary budget for justice matters.[152] However, the majority of defendants already in custody appear likely to remain in pretrial detention until the cour d’assises meets or the law is changed. This violates a defendant’s right to have a trial within a reasonable time under article 9(3) and 14(3)(c) of the ICCPR.[153] The fact that pretrial detention is used for suspects as a rule in Côte d’Ivoire rather than the exception exacerbates the problem.[154]

Further, there is no obligation on the court to provide reasons when deciding upon an accused’s guilt or innocence. Instead, the judges and the jury listen to the oral evidence together, vote on the accused’s guilt or innocence and present the decision to the accused in court.[155] During this procedure, judges and jurors have equal positions on questions of fact; their collective responsibility is supposed to be a guarantee of the fairness of the trial.[156] If a conviction is obtained, then the judges and the jurors rule on the appropriate penalty. Decisions by the cour d’assises are also not subject to appeal.[157] The absence of an avenue of appeal to a higher court violates article 14(5) of the ICCPR, which guarantees that every person convicted of a crime has the right to have his conviction and sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.

Even prior to the conflict, problems with convening the cour d’assises compromised both victims’ and defendants’ rights. Under Ivorian law, the cour d’assises has jurisdiction over rape cases. After several years of the court not convening, there was an enormous backlog of rape suspects in pretrial detention. The “solution” greatly compromised victims’ right to justice: Offenses were redefined and downgraded to “attacks on purity” (attentat à la pudeur), which could be tried before a lesser court. As a result, the resulting penalties for those convicted were significantly more lenient than they would have been for rape.[158] In dealing with serious international crimes from the post-election crisis, as well as sexual violence cases, the Ivorian government must find a solution that allows the gravest of crimes to come to trial as quickly as possible.

The Ministry of Justice identified the reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a priority and formed a working group in late 2012 to address the issues identified with respect to the cour d’assises.[159] Both the EU and the UNOCI have provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice in its attempts to reform the Code of Criminal Procedure. One recommendation that has emerged as a result of this assistance is the establishment of a permanent criminal chamber composed of five professional judges, who would have to provide reasons for their decisions and a right of appeal.[160] The provision of reasons is especially important to ensure defendants involved in complex cases involving serious international crimes have a meaningful right of appeal.

In addition, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, legal representation for defendants in criminal cases is only mandatory at the cour d’assises phase.[161] The result is that indigent defendants are only entitled to access legal aid at this late stage of proceedings, which risks compromising the quality of representation provided. Ivorian authorities should make the provision of a lawyer for defendants in criminal cases mandatory at an earlier stage of the proceedings. Similarly, Ivorian authorities should ensure that indigent defendants are entitled to legal aid at this earlier stage.[162] Since the majority of lawyers are located in Abidjan, the legal aid provided should take into account the fact that lawyers may have to travel to other parts of the country to effectively represent their clients.[163]

Establishing a Framework for Witness Protection and Support

Trials of serious crimes can be extremely sensitive and create risks to the safety and security of witnesses and victims who may testify to deeply traumatic events. In Côte d’Ivoire, while the law provides some sanctions for the intimidation of witnesses, there is no system of witness protection in law or as a matter of practice.[164] Senior Ministry of Justice officials interviewed for this report acknowledged that the absence of witness protection has likely already compromised the willingness of witnesses to come forward, especially victims and witnesses of crimes by pro-Ouattara forces.[165]

There are a number of steps the government can take to improve the protection and security of witnesses in the immediate and longer terms. In the short term, the government, with support from donors as necessary, should sponsor trainings for prosecutors, investigating judges, and police investigating serious international crime cases on how to assess the potential risks to witnesses and on discrete security measures that can be used in investigations to prevent or minimize the emergence of risks. Similar trainings should be provided to judges and other staff working on serious international crimes regarding in-court measures that can be used to protect witnesses and minimize trauma. Other areas that could benefit from support from Ivorian authorities include the provision, where beneficial or preferred by the witness, of police escorts by specially trained and vetted officers for witnesses traveling to and from court, as well as the establishment of a safe house(s) for witnesses facing temporary threats to their safety.

As with all capacity building initiatives, these trainings should be practical and based on an assessment of real need, ideally in collaboration with the practitioners the training is meant to target. In this regard, ICC staff may have valuable insight to share—both in assessing the risks to witnesses and in suggesting techniques to minimize them. Indeed, ICC representatives have already provided a presentation about witness protection measures to staff in the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR), although this has not yet been done for staff in the Special Investigative Cell.[166]

Over the longer term, Ivorian authorities should consider drafting a law(s) for the protection of witnesses. Areas that should be covered include procedures to assess the risk to witnesses; facilitating court appearances, including through the use of pseudonyms and private courtroom sessions as needed; and measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and autonomy of the proceedings, while still ensuring a fair trial, including the right of all persons to be able to challenge the evidence and witnesses against them.[167] The law(s) should also provide physical protection and psychological assistance before, during, and after the proceedings.

Ivorian authorities should also consider creating a neutral witness protection unit—operating for all witnesses, whether they are testifying on behalf of the prosecution or defense—to handle witnesses in the judicial process and with authority to facilitate the relocation of witnesses to third countries as needed. Creating and tasking a specialized unit within a tribunal’s registry to manage the protection of witnesses inside and outside of the courtroom can consolidate experience and standardize practice when it comes to handling witnesses. Further, for witness protection to function properly, separation from the investigation, confidentiality of procedure and operations, and organizational autonomy from regular police are all essential.[168] All three factors are aimed at safeguarding sensitive information relating to protected witnesses by limiting the number of people with access to such information. This minimizes the risk of disclosure. The benefits of creating such a unit potentially extend well beyond the managing of witnesses in cases of serious crimes and could include other sensitive or high profile cases.

Providing Security for Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Lawyers

Judges and prosecutors cannot work independently or impartially if they fear for their safety. The risk of retribution is even greater for judges and prosecutors involved in cases of serious crimes, given the gravity and sensitive nature of the underlying crimes. In Côte d’Ivoire, judicial security is very limited.[169] The consequences of the limited judicial security available have already been felt: in August 2012, heavily armed assailants attacked the home of an official in the Special Investigative Cell.[170]

At present, there is no dedicated force to provide protection to judges and prosecutors. Protection for judges to the extent that it exists relies on the personal relationship between the president of each tribunal and the police in the area where the tribunal operates.[171] The government should bolster security for judges and prosecutors working on serious international crime cases as a matter of priority, with support from donors as needed. Further, as was done with the Special Investigative Cell, the government should consider vesting the authority to try serious crimes in violation of international law with a limited number of judges. In addition to consolidating resources and building specialized expertise, it would be much easier to develop and implement protection protocols for a specified number of judges actually working on serious international crime cases.[172]

Ministry of Justice officials should also consider providing protection as needed for defense attorneys working on serious international crime cases; given the sensitivity of the crimes involved, they are likely to receive threats that could compromise the representation of their clients.