Posting and Assigning Civil Servants: Criteria According to Business Process Re-Engineering

1.    Educational Background (25%)

-         Qualifications – 15%

-         Relevant work experience – 5%

-         Quality of personal file – 5%

2.    Motivation for Change and Democratization (35%)

-         Efforts to know and acceptance of government policies and strategies – 10%

-         Cooperativeness and willingness to participate in team work – 8%

-         Acceptance of the civil service reform and implementation in practice – 10%

-         Avoidance of traditional and unprogressive thoughts – 7%

3.    Conduct/Good manner (15%)

-         Effective utilization and care of institutions’ property – 3%

-         Performance in work and role model to others – 5%

-         Free from drugs and alcohol – 3%

-         Free from gossip and clique-ism – 4%

4.    Service Performance (25%)

-         Efficiency and interest in providing appropriate service according to new standardized procedures – 10%

-         Problem solving and accomplishing tasks within a given time frame – 5%

-         Hostility and politeness – 5%

-        Accomplish work speedily and respect work time – 5%

A World Bank official critical of the program funded by his office questioned the emphasis the BPR scorecard placed on conduct. “Fifty to seventy percent of score on BPR depending on behavior? Come on, that’s ridiculous,” the official said. “It is not a professional [set of] criteria at all…. In the long term you will produce a new generation that cannot think.”[206]

A Ministry of Capacity Building official working in the regional government of SNNPR explained the mechanisms for conducting the BPR reviews. He said that there was a committee comprised of sector bureau leaders of the regional government chaired by the vice president of the regional administration, but that the real work of assessing staff was supervised by the technical committee, which was “full of EPRDF cadres.”[207] While a good idea in principle, he said it was “devastating the civil service” at the zonal and district level.[208]

Another serving official in the Amhara regional government described the same process:

It is not a secret, everybody knows what BPR means…. You need 35 percent on the attitude side, your contribution to government and so on, what they mean is your contribution to the party. If you are not a member of the party, you get zero, if you join you get 35 percent so you are already at an advantage on the performance side. Even if you score 50, full marks, on performance you cannot go through. It is a mechanism to get you to join them. They want everyone to be nervous, so they join.[209]

The strategy then appears to be to publicly post lists of employees who have been suspended on full pay to allow them to reflect on their position:

The whole of the civil service is nervous. You can forget about performance-based management, efficiency, customer service, or targets. Everyone is simply worried about politics, there is no other concern, BPR is destroying efficiency, not improving it. They want you to be terrified.[210]

Ethiopians fear reprisals if they complain to the government. Even so, by September 2009 the then-Ethiopian Human Rights Council (now the Human Rights Council) had received 400 complaints about unfair dismissals due to BPR procedures within two ministries alone—the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[211] Complaints were also arriving at the Office of the Ombudsman regarding layoffs and unfair dismissals.[212] A senior Ministry of Agriculture official based in Addis Ababa told Human Rights Watch that he resigned after he was downgraded in the BPR process: “How can I put up with that? So I resigned. They asked me so many times to join the party—I don’t want to, I was fed up.”[213]

As of December 2009, several groups totaling more than 100 former employees of the federal Revenue and Customs ministries had filed court cases against the government for unfair dismissal. Three sacked ministry employees told Human Rights Watch that they felt political discrimination was a factor after refusing to join the EPRDF. One said, “We are out of the chain—the EPRDF club—within the ministry, that’s why we lost our jobs. If you are a member of that chain, you will continue in your job, regardless of your performance.”[214] Another added, “Almost all of those remaining are members of the EPRDF, it is impossible to get a job these days if you are not a member.”[215]

Belete Etana, the former vice-chair of the public accounts committee in the House of Peoples’ Representatives, told Human Rights Watch: “BPR is a system to put loyal people in the right places in the civil service and to purge those who are not loyal to the system.”[216]

The Amharic press has leveled numerous allegations of discrimination in BPR. Opposition lawmakers have also raised the issue in parliament.[217] Yet the World Bank, which funds BPR as part of PSCAP, seems to have a different interpretation. A World Bank official responsible for administering the PSCAP program and BPR within it told Human Rights Watch: “Yes, people are being pushed out. The information I’m getting is that there are a lot of moribund, useless people. Whether they are then replaced with party people I have no evidence. I am told that it has happened.”[218] This official showed little concern when informed that ruling party members were being moved into the vacancies, and did not have any strategy for limiting or even investigating such outcomes. Indeed, despite much anecdotal evidence that the ruling party is misusing the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme for solidifying control, quashing dissent, and limiting rights, the World Bank has yet to proffer a strategy for monitoring the program’s politicization and discriminatory use.

A former World Bank official who had worked in the Ethiopia office said:

I have colleagues who have expressed great concern about the politicization of the civil service…. It is probably fair to say that as long as the capacity of the civil service to deliver is unaffected, they are not too worried about the politicization.[219]

Politicization of Judicial Training

The Justice Sector Reform Programme, another sub-program of PSCAP, is designed to improve the judiciary’s efficiency and professionalism. According to donors, significant progress is being made in the technical aspects of the program, such as computerization of procedures and reductions in the backlog of cases. A consultant for a project funder agreed that progress on judicial management was “excellent.”

Human Rights Watch did not examine the program itself, but is concerned about an incident in which trainee judges were allegedly fired for political reasons—raising questions about whether the program is too focused on technical benchmarks and not enough on the need for a professional and independent judiciary.

Three trainee judges told Human Rights Watch that they and 28 others were unfairly dismissed by the Regional Supreme Court of Amhara for publicly objecting to the political content of the judicial training curriculum. The official reason provided by the court was lack of discipline. The trainees said that part of the training focused on the EPRDF ideology of Revolutionary Democracy, and was conducted by party officials, not legal scholars. “Three times the trainers told us publicly to join the EPRDF. They want every judge to be a member of the party and they want you to do what they say, not what the law says,” said one trainee. The trainee judges said that the lecturer was also a regional government official, and that they were accused of being opposition supporters when they concluded—in an answer to a classroom exercise on the subject—that the former opposition Coalition for Unity and Democracy was not a terrorist organization under the new anti-terror law.

The trainee judges said that normal disciplinary procedures had not been followed when they were subsequently fired. “We were dismissed, no warning nothing, and a circular sent to all government institutions that we are law breakers, not to hire us,” one trainee said.[220] The 28 trainee judges, including the three interviewed by Human Rights Watch, were named in a court circular, seen by Human Rights Watch, which forbids any other public institution from hiring them. The three had since tried to get work in private teaching institutions, but said that their new employers had been threatened and they were fired again.

A senior civil servant in the Amhara regional government familiar with their case confirmed their version of events:

They were dismissed unfairly, it was wrong. They were sacked because they came into conflict with the interests of the regime. Officially, they were sacked for ill-discipline but there was no evidence of that. They asked questions, and the authorities feared that they would cause a disturbance among the other students.[221]

One of the trainee judges said, “What they are doing is not reform of the judiciary but the corruption of the judiciary and indoctrination of judges.”

A donor involved in funding the Justice Sector Reform Programme said:

You hear rumors about the politicization of the judiciary, but how would a donor find out, who is going to tell them? The ones who are out of the country are the ones talking about it; it is risky for a judge to come to a donor here.[222]

The senior civil servant reiterated this point: “The World Bank does not know about the politicization of the program. Who will dare to tell them?” He said he was involved in one donor-funded training project to raise awareness of the social courts (woreda level):

People were trained, but they were not trained in justice, they were trained in EPRDF ideology. It is the same all over…. I feel sorry for the donors, because they give money but where is it going? It goes into private bank accounts, or even if it is spent on “awareness raising” or “capacity building,” it is raising awareness of the party, or building the capacity of the party, not the society.[223]

Repression as Policy

The discrimination is official. It is very sad, some neighbors get services, loans, and so on because they support one party and others do not. Discrimination is daily life for the public, but there is no place to complain. If you speak, you get more problems.

–Belete Etana, former EPRDF parliamentarian, October 16, 2009

Local and national government officials from opposite ends of the country all seem to speak from the same script when it comes to the partisan administration of government services, whether regarding identification cards, teacher training, university entrance, or fertilizer and the safety net. This consistency indicates a systematic government campaign to compel support for the ruling party and convey that those who sympathize with the political opposition should expect nothing from the government.

Most donor officials who spoke with Human Rights Watch acknowledged such a situation existed. “It’s obvious it [the control and politicization] comes straight from the top,” said one.[224] However, this awareness does not seem to have led donors to rethink the effects of their development assistance in solidifying a one-party state that severely restricts the civil and political rights of citizens, and has built a highly centralized apparatus that can project power into the most remote village. A recent International Crisis Group report noted:

In spite of formal policy and rhetoric, Ethiopia has only nominally devolved decision-making power to local levels. All important political decisions must be taken at the centre or be in line with central policies…. A well-organised party network extends from the federal to the regional, from the regional to the woreda, and from the woreda to the kebelle and sub-kebelle levels.[225]

The EPRDF-controlled central government uses its near-total grip on revenue and public expenditure to control regional policies. All the regions (and the woredas beneath them) depend on block grants, the timing and disbursements of which are controlled by the center.

Ethiopia has used its development programs to expand and consolidate a party structure that depends on the center. The party and government have provided educational and administrative opportunities that have benefited loyal local officials and civil servants.[226] Local administrations take few decisions on their own initiative, and plasma video-conferencing in every woreda means that the center can better project its views and decisions across the country.

The linking of livelihoods to political affiliation has been part of an overarching EPRDF strategy since the 2005 electoral debacle, when the party underestimated support for the opposition. The EPRDF multiplied its membership from 700,000 in 2005 to over 5 million by 2010 (one in seven of the adult population). [227] And it encouraged people to join the party, essentially by holding their livelihoods hostage. In 2009, the government also restarted the “voluntary” contributions to government-controlled development associations that purportedly carry out community development work, but which some people see as a further unwelcome tax. [228]

In the run-up to the May 2010 elections, the government sought to politicize schools, media, civil society, and even the private sector.[229] Whatever the accuracy of the claimed 99.6 percent electoral victory, it is clear that the government controlled the process differently than it did in 2005, within a tight public space in which voting was explicitly linked to economic survival.[230] A long-term observer of Ethiopian society and politics explained:

[People] feel they have no right to choose. As they often say: “God only decides who rules,” so an election is futile…. The winner will find out even though the ballot is secret, the election winner has mysterious ways of knowing how each person voted. It could then take revenge on the “culprits” which means putting no less than their survival at risk. This is because all public services, from education to fertilizer, from health care to loans, depend on the good will of local officials of the Party-State, up to and including access to the peasant farmer’s only means of production—land.[231]

In an interview with Human Rights Watch in December 2009, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi denied that there was a policy of discrimination in services and resources to suppress dissent. He added that policy guidelines for local officials are very clear, and that—while he could not vouch for every party member—any individual who violates them would be expelled from the party. “If we get credible reports, we will investigate, not to please anyone, but to ensure the credibility of our party,” he said.[232]

However, a former Ministry of Agriculture senior official and a serving senior official in the Amhara regional government both told Human Rights Watch that all government employees and party workers understood the link between livelihood and party membership. The former Ministry of Agriculture official, who is not a member of any political party, said:

The government controls the economy and they use employment opportunities as a tool of control as well. They offer you the loan or the premises for the micro-business project, then after two or three months they give you the party form for joining. If you don’t join, you are out of that place…. You get work if you are EPRDF.[233]

Opposition political parties have long alleged that the central government has orchestrated this exclusion and politicization.[234] One UDJ official told Human Rights Watch:

Orders are coming from a high level, this is not simply the initiative of the kebele officials—they follow orders. We get info from some of our members who moonlight as EPRDF members and tell us what is discussed at kebele meetings, and the orders that are given from above about us.[235]

The Donor Response

Often we all say, “What are we doing supporting this government? We should get out.” But no one is going to leave. What is the alternative? They have made good strides on the Millennium Development Goals—we help them with that, but it is a big compromise.

–European donor official, Addis Ababa, September 22, 2009

Donor officials responded in a variety of ways when asked about development assistance for Ethiopia and its effect on respect for human rights. Some acknowledged the problem, but did not give adequate consideration to addressing it; some acknowledged and dismissed the problem; and some did not acknowledge it at all.

However, this issue has a history. Donors have long acknowledged the possibility of politicization. Five years ago, aid was suspended and programs redesigned purportedly because of that risk. Today, the same challenges remain, and the freedom and survival of Ethiopia’s most vulnerable citizens are at stake.

In late 2009, allegations of the politicization of the safety net program and food aid resurfaced in the media, and in private from Human Rights Watch’s meetings with donors in Addis Ababa.[236] The response of Ethiopia’s major donors was to demand investigations, while that of the government was to flatly deny the charges. It later promised to take steps if presented with evidence, but avoided establishing a commitment to investigate.[237]

In response, in late 2009, donors commissioned their own investigation, conducted in consultation with the Ethiopian government. The study consisted of desk-based research into four programs: Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), Protection of Basic Services (PBS), Humanitarian Relief Programme, and the Enhanced Outreach Strategy of the Targeted Supplementary Food Programme. It aimed at examining “the robustness of the systems and safeguards … which various programs have in place to prevent, detect and address distortion.”[238] Published in July 2010, the study made clear that, “It is not an investigation. It does not seek to prove or disprove allegations of distortion.”[239] Rather it was an evaluation of how donors would go about checking for politicization of their programs, and whether those systems were working.

The study found that the budget support program (PBS) and the safety net program (PSNP) had “relatively robust accountability systems,” but that the relief feeding and supplementary feeding programs faced “important challenges in their accountability systems.”[240] It concluded that the challenge for development partners was to “respond to donor-country demands for accountability while working in ways that also enhance the accountability of partner country governments, through democratic processes, to partner country citizens.” It added that the appropriate response to this challenge was “to invest in domestic accountability: making use of country systems; ensuring that the appropriate safeguards are in place; seeking to strengthen country systems where necessary; and periodically reviewing how the systems are working.”[241]

Donors have already been doing precisely that—investing in domestic accountability—without success.

The Democratic Institutions Program (DIP)—designed to build domestic accountability by supporting parliament, the Office of the Ombudsman, and other institutions—is widely considered a failure; one Western donor official described it as “hopeless.”[242] Moreover, the EPRDF’s 99.6 percent victory in May 2010 and the passage of the repressive Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO law) makes a mockery of political rights in Ethiopia and any pretense by the government and donors to build the capacity of independent governmental and civil society institutions.

Other DIP-supported institutions, such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the National Electoral Board, might benefit from the technical capacity building that the DIP provides for staff and offices. However, these institutions require independence from the government—both real and perceived—in order to function appropriately and fulfill an accountable and effective role. The DIP has failed to promote this crucial element; indeed, donor officials admit that promoting structural independence is not even a DIP goal.[243]

Even before the May 2010 elections, several donors privately suggested that the DIP be suspended because it was “a disaster.”[244] As one diplomat said, “If you want to suspend something, if you want to send a message to the government on democracy and human rights, the DIP is it.”[245] If donors were considering suspending the DIP before the elections, then the election outcome and Human Rights Watch research suggests that the program should be suspended immediately.

On March 19, 2010, Human Rights Watch wrote to the World Bank and all major donors to its programs summarizing this report’s preliminary findings and requesting a response.[246] The Development Assistance Group (DAG), in a reply the following month, stated that there were “clear safeguards in place to ensure that aid resources are used properly to achieve intended results.”[247]

However, closer analysis of the DAG study, as well as the views of donor officials themselves, contradict the assertion that accountability systems are working. Moreover, as described above, officials responsible for PBS, PSNP, and other programs in Addis Ababa told Human Rights Watch that the monitoring mechanisms for all these programs would not detect politicization if it were happening.[248]

The July 2010 study commissioned by the DAG said it was responding to allegations from opposition party leaders and Human Rights Watch briefings, as well as information gathered by the US embassy in Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, and SNNPR regions.[249] It said that:

Development partners have an obligation to take seriously allegations of political distortion in order to meet their responsibilities to their taxpayers and to the people of Ethiopia. Dismissing the allegations as politically motivated would not be credible, and—in an environment where those who seek to bring forward their complaints may fear to be at risk of detention and punishment—inferring from an absence of evidence that there is no political distortion would be disingenuous.[250]

But the study later undercuts this strong rhetorical stance by insisting that the responsibility for investigating specific allegations of politicization lies with the Ethiopian government, not donors, for whom it would be “overstepping our responsibilities and remit.”[251]

Flawed Monitoring

All donor programs are implemented and monitored with the Ethiopian government. Even “independent” donor monitoring of service delivery and program outcomes is done in conjunction with the government, and with its permission. As a result, it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which independent evaluators would find information critical of how these donor-funded government programs operate.

As the aid management study points out, people are afraid to complain about political discrimination in their villages. Those who spoke to Human Rights Watch would only agree to do so in a safe and secure environment far from their home. As Kenichi Ohashi, the World Bank’s Ethiopia director, told IRIN News, “Unless you go and do some undercover investigation you’re not likely to find it.”[252]

There are also issues relating to the extent of the problem. Much donor discussion of aid distortion centers on lack of donor knowledge of the scale of the problem. Donors suggest that they would be prepared to do something about the problem if it were widespread, but at the same time acknowledge that they have no way of knowing if it is. Human Rights Watch research not only suggests that its scope could be considerable, but that donors are complacent about uncovering the extent to which their assistance is reaching the intended beneficiaries and is being used for partisan political purposes.

Protection of Basic Services

The Protection of Basic Services (PBS) program, like all major aid programs, contains a range of monitoring mechanisms that look at financial accountability and service delivery. Government and donor commitments and progress are assessed through bi-annual Joint Review and Implementation Support (JRIS) missions. In 2009, the Ethiopian government also completed a Financial Transparency and Accountability Perception Survey to investigate citizens’ understanding of local government budgets and see how satisfied they were with the service and responsiveness of local administrations.[253]

The “fairness test” is the principal way that PBS is controlled for political capture. This analyzes distributions by woreda to monitor for political bias by making sure that distributions are consistent with “transparent federal and regional formulae.”[254] The DAG asserted in its letter to Human Rights Watch that there is no evidence of deviation from the formula and that, “Were there political bias in the system, it would be expected that woreda voting patterns would correlate with how much budget they receive. However, this has also proven not to be the case.”[255]

This conclusion is undermined by the fact the EPRDF controls every woreda in the country, and can discriminate against any household or kebele within these administrative areas. A “fairness test” that only examines resource allocation by district does not capture such discrimination at the household level, a fact acknowledged by both a senior official at a leading funder of PBS and a senior official responsible for PBS at the World Bank. The latter told Human Rights Watch that existing monitoring mechanisms “would not capture the kind of politicization you’re talking about.”[256]

The July 2010 DAG study also points out that the safeguards in PBS “would not pick up on access to employment or access to goods and services being shaped by political affiliation or on PBS funds being misused for political training and education.”[257] This is crucial because these are precisely the areas where Human Rights Watch research shows that politicization occurs. In short, PBS funds are at risk of misuse by woredas. It is therefore disconcerting that the donor study concludes in the same paragraph that, contrary to the general thrust of the report, safeguards in PBS “would appear to be working well.”[258]

PBS and Social Accountability

“Social Accountability” is a model of monitoring that promotes accountability through public or community participation. In Ethiopia, the project envisioned NGOs tasked with monitoring basic service delivery and helping hold officials to account.[259] The 2008-2011 Country Assistance Strategy says that this component of the PBS program will “focus on establishing civil society’s role in social accountability, improving the interface with government at national and woreda levels, and giving greater latitude for communities to determine development priorities.”[260]

The idea of subcontracting NGOs to monitor local government was driven by donors’ awareness of the risks involved in providing large sums to local governments without independent checks as to how the money was being used, as well as a desire to see more accountability at the local level, while acknowledging that they could not play that role themselves.[261]

Component 4, as this NGO monitoring scheme is known in the World Bank document, is currently still in its pilot stage. It involves 12 organizations that, between them, have 41 other partner organizations working in around 100 woredas.[262] Two donor officials told Human Rights Watch that it is not yet a viable monitoring mechanism on a broad scale, and is achieving less than they had hoped.[263]

A significant reason for this is the government’s passage of the repressive CSO law, which was adopted in January 2009.[264] First proposed several years ago, the CSO law imposes draconian restrictions on NGO activity, including requiring them to re-register, and forbidding them from receiving more than 10 percent of their funds from foreign donors if they engage in broadly defined human rights, advocacy, conflict resolution, or governance activities. In other words, the law permits NGOs to carry out technical service delivery activities in the development sector, but bars them from activities that pertain to state policy, functioning, and accountability.[265]

The CSO law was partly conceived to address gaps in the regulatory framework for associations. However, the legislation went far beyond Ethiopia’s technical regulatory needs. Initial drafts of the law prompted considerable concern from donors, especially when the text also barred “foreign” NGOs—defined to include domestic NGOs receiving foreign funding—from participating in economic development and poverty alleviation activities.[266] The language, which would have meant all donor development aid passed through the state, was removed after strong donor advocacy. Still, the final text that Ethiopia’s parliament adopted in January 2009 maintained restrictions on human rights and advocacy activity.

Some observers saw the CSO law’s restrictions on NGO monitoring and advocacy as a response to donors’ attempts to minimize their own evaluative role and empower civil-society groups as agents of social accountability.[267] An academic noted:

Component 4 has been a complete failure. Publishing budgets at grassroots is nonsense. Component 4 actually made Ethiopian NGOs a target. Donors wanted them to do the dirty work for them.[268]

When Ethiopia promulgated the restrictive CSO law, the Netherlands and some other donors threatened to withdraw support for phase two of PBS.[269] Sweden followed through.[270] The Ethiopian government assured the World Bank that the draft law would not affect social accountability activities.[271] However, since the law’s adoption, several of the country’s most prominent human rights activists have fled the country, its most prominent human rights groups have dramatically reduced operations and removed human rights activities from their mandates, and an unknown number of organizations have closed entirely.

While donors initially lobbied hard—in private—against the draft CSO law, they have since become complacent about its devastating effect on civil society in Ethiopia, and issued only mild public criticisms.[272] Several European ambassadors even sought to defend the law in meetings with Human Rights Watch.[273]

Currently, the 12 organizations selected by the Ethiopian government to carry out the program evaluations called for under Component 4 are, for the most part, NGOs and “mass-based” civil society organizations, which in Ethiopia are perceived as party-affiliated and controlled.[274] In 2009, they monitored only service delivery, not the politicization of aid distribution.[275] The social accountability model of project evaluation might have been well intended, but has become almost meaningless since the passage of the CSO law.

Productive Safety Net Programme

A donor official responsible for the PSNP in Addis Ababa told Human Rights Watch that there were “many rumors” about the manipulation of aid circulating among development partners that monitored the safety net program. Despite this, politicization was “not a criterion for monitoring,” he said.[276] Another donor official said, “If people were excluded for political reasons, I don’t think the rapid response teams would pick it up.”[277]

The official donor response from the DAG to concerns expressed by Human Rights Watch said that the latest independent impact assessment of PSNP had compared households receiving public works transfers with those that did not. It showed that:

Those in the former category were poorer on a number of levels… If there was widespread patronage or discrimination one would expect a deviation in these figures but these survey findings show that on the whole the program is reaching the intended target group in terms of poverty levels.[278]

However, this impact assessment did not examine the alleged politicization of aid delivery. It is a difficult challenge for donors since only a small number would need to be excluded for political reasons in order to send a repressive message.

There is a program mechanism, the Kebele Appeals Committee, which reports to the woreda and comprises people from the kebele cabinet.[279] A person who is dissatisfied after making a complaint can take the matter further, to the woreda council, which is supposedly separate from the Food Security Task Forces, which decide which households participate in PSNP.

However, this mechanism is compromised because the party controls the kebele and woreda structures at the local level. Interviewees told Human Rights Watch that they either did not bother to appeal to the authorities, or were turned away when they did. Respondents frequently said woreda officials referred them back to the kebele.[280] The Overseas Development Institute study examining the safety net program also described this “circular pattern” of referring appeals back to the kebele.[281]

In the Ethiopian government’s 2009 Financial Accountability and Transparency Survey, 88 percent of respondents said that the safety net selection process was fair.[282] However, the ODI study looked at the appeals mechanisms and found that “overall they are failing to provide an efficient or effective appeals structure.” In a revealing statistic, it also said that, of those households that did not lodge an appeal about targeting, 79 percent said that they did not do so because there was either no one they could complain to, or they did not know who that person was.[283] The study also documented social pressure on people not to appeal, overt threats to those who did, and cases of people forced to rescind appeals.[284]

Even if the Ethiopian government opinion surveys are accurate and objective, donors concede that “they do not disprove outright that kebele officials could control beneficiary lists” for PSNP and for relief feeding programs.[285] Apart from the Ethiopian government’s own opinion surveys, there remains no way of knowing whether or not there is widespread politicization. At a minimum, what is needed is independent monitoring (without the participation of the Ethiopian government) of the politicization risk, with spot checks, and wide monitoring of those excluded to find out why.

Public Sector Capacity Building Programme

Monitoring of the Public Sector Capacity Building Programme (PSCAP) does not address politicization at all. When asked how donors controlled for politicization in PSCAP, the DAG provided no response. [286] The manipulation of PSCAP funding would be hard to catch in simple fiscal monitoring of the program. It is the content of activities that is at issue: partisan political propaganda in schools and in civil service trainings; “professionalization” programs that are actually ruling party indoctrination. As a consultant for a major donor examining PSCAP said:

The accounting might say “fuel,” but fuel for what? … Much of the money is on per diems or travel expenses but you don’t know training in what, the content. The meticulous auditing of the project won’t catch that. They should look at the content of the program. I don’t think this is a secret. People know this is happening but they just can’t stop it. I’ve been stonewalled. No one wants to give me budgets. We don’t look at the content of the training any more than we look at textbooks.[287]

To ensure that they are not funding partisan political indoctrination, donors should more carefully investigate politicization of PSCAP by conducting an independent study that looks specifically at the content of the “bulk training” done under the program and systematically interviewing civil servants and teachers who took part in the program.

A qualitative assessment of the Business Process Re-Engineering (BPR) staff evaluation program is also needed. Given all the allegations about BPR’s use as a political tool, donors should seek to interview a wide cross-section of those dismissed through BPR procedures to find out why they have been fired. Donors should also push the government to rescind clauses in existing BPR proclamations that prohibit appeal upon dismissal, and press for those dismissed under BPR to be allowed to appeal the decision and have a fair hearing before an appropriate employment tribunal.

General Education Quality Improvement Project

In the General Education Quality Improvement Project (GEQIP), donors allocate funds on the basis of an agreed formula to make sure that Ethiopia’s regions and institutions are not treated unfairly.[288] While this controls for one kind of political bias (regional or institutional), it does not monitor, let alone prevent, the way in which individual teachers may be denied training opportunities financed by GEQIP based on their political beliefs or union membership. Were this happening on a large scale, donors would have no way of knowing.

What is needed is monitoring that involves interviews with teachers eligible to participate in the Teacher Development Program funded by GEQIP and possibly teachers moving through the teacher training colleges in the country to assess their perceptions of the political interference in their profession and any discrimination they may have encountered. In addition, donors should assert a pre-condition for further donor funding for the program: the Ethiopian government’s implementation of longstanding decisions from the International Labour Organization and immediate registration of independent teachers’ unions such as the National Teachers’ Association.[289]

Not Just Monitoring

While improved monitoring is important and would produce better information about realities on the ground for donors, focusing only on monitoring the delivery of individual projects and programs obscures the wider picture of development and political repression in Ethiopia.

The Development Assistance Group study on aid management concludes with a discussion: “How much to invest in accountability?” It says development partners should make decisions about the proportion of funds to invest in accountability to prevent distortion on the basis of “systematic and context-specific assessments about the prevalence and cost of distortion (in the short and long term) and the cost of reducing distortion.” It adds, “Decisions … should take account of the relative costs and benefits of investing in program-specific accountability systems, or investing in a country’s own accountability systems.”[290]

Donors should recognize that Ethiopia’s own accountability systems are moribund, and that the principal barrier to detecting distortion is not donor funds or lack of them, but the Ethiopian government: the fear it instills, and the restrictions it places on donors, opposition parties, and on domestic NGOs (the true domestic accountability systems, now defunct) that would independently evaluate government activities.

The challenge of monitoring is a symptom of the larger challenge that faces donors operating in a highly restricted and state-controlled environment.

Better monitoring would improve donors’ understanding of the situation in areas that they are rarely allowed to visit, except when accompanied by government officials. As a World Bank official told Human Rights Watch, “What happens on the ground is rarely captured on paper.”[291] He criticized donors’ lack of understanding of the Ethiopian political context and said, “We need to do much more monitoring, not this weekend ‘Monitoring and Evaluation.’ [Donors] complain and find fault and then start new projects.”[292] The need for better information is even more important given the restrictions on independent media, the government’s obstruction of independent investigators, including international journalists, and the impact of the CSO law on the few Ethiopian human rights organizations that were monitoring and investigating human rights violations in the country.

In 2005, donors suspended all budget support to the government due to concern their programs would be politicized. In the 2010 DAG study, donors asked whether or not their systems would detect politicization if it were occurring: in all key areas, the answer was, despite positive sounding conclusions, “no.” Yet the programs continue.

The next section considers an alternative strategy for policymakers toward Ethiopia.

Alternative Strategies for Policymakers

Donor governments remain unwilling to address the negative consequences of their role in Ethiopia. First, donors themselves claim their relationship with Ethiopia isone of shared values, and that the Ethiopian government is committed to their idea of development.[293] Second, donor agencies appear firmly committed to funding programs regardless of whether they may be underwriting repression counter to their own agencies’ policies.

Western governments seeking to assist the Ethiopian population are admittedly in a difficult position. Without international efforts to provide food assistance to between 10 and 20 percent of the Ethiopian population through emergency feeding programs and the PSNP safety net program, there is little doubt that millions of Ethiopians would face even more severe food shortages. Donors need to be able to help those at risk without contributing to the government’s oppression of the population. It is time that donors begin to confront this crucial issue and devise solutions.

Faced with this difficult challenge, donors have been all too ready to ignore the human rights context, increase aid, and hope for a change of direction by the EPRDF. The current 2008-2011 Country Assistance Strategy for the World Bank, which sets the framework for donor engagement, envisages a return to even less conditionality through direct budget support. This donor policy is based on a view of Ethiopia as a “democratizing” nation. This sentiment, reflective of general donor strategy, suggests wishful thinking, not fact. Existing donor strategy toward Ethiopia is based on flawed assumptions and ignorance of donors’ own assessments.

For example, the 2008-2011 Country Assistance Strategy clearly states that the trajectory of Ethiopia’s democratic transition would be shaped by local elections in April 2008 and parliamentary elections in May 2010. [294] But the conduct of both elections sharply undermined any suggestion that Ethiopia is “democratizing.” Both polls saw fundamental flaws and serious and widespread violations of human rights. [295] Even before the elections, an official from a leading donor government admitted that there had been “no improvement on political governance” since 2005. [296] The elections have indeed been crucial in shaping the environment in Ethiopia—by cementing EPRDF’s complete control of every village in the country.

The donor policy of direct budget support that is based on perceived “shared values” has had many critics over the years.[297] In Ethiopia, the debate is not simply about whether budget support is an effective way to deliver assistance, but whether the method of delivery contributes to government repression. The EPRDF maintains its authoritarian grip with donor money support. And yet Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is seeking a lifting of the 2005 restriction on budget support as well as increased funding from donors.[298] A return to direct budget support in the current circumstances should not even be on the donors’ agenda.

Some World Bank board members and donor nations have attempted to fill the human rights blind spot in the bank’s global operations by starting the Nordic Trust Fund to examine how human rights relate to the bank’s core work and mission. According to an exploratory study, “A baseline survey of Bank staff confirmed that staff are interested in human rights, that they view much of their work as having a human rights angle, but have little or no knowledge of the formal legal and institutional human rights foundations and are interested in learning more, especially as it relates to their on-going work.”[299] The Trust Fund suggested selecting some existing World Bank programs for a pilot scheme to mainstream human rights into bank operations. The bank’s Ethiopia programs, in particular the Protection of Basic Services and Productive Safety Net Programme, would be good places to start.

A new donor strategy should begin with acknowledging at the policy level that the EPRDF government is an agent of both development and political repression, and that both elements need to be considered. First, donors need to take into account that ruling party politicization does not merely occur in specific programs, but applies across the board. Reforms such as creating new appeals mechanisms and citizen rights cards, or training parliamentarians, will mean little unless broader human rights are addressed. Second, revising state laws and policies that unnecessarily restrict independent civil society and the media take on urgent importance. And finally, donors need to work together to press for deeply rooted reforms.

Donors should address the politicization problem at a macro level. According to a former World Bank official:

There needs to be a donor-wide response. How is access to services being filtered across the country? You should not “project-ize” it. How do you respond more strategically to the choices the government makes restricting freedoms of association and expression?[300]

When the Country Assistance Strategy is renewed (the current one expires in 2011), donors should first tackle the Ethiopian government’s strategy of economic development without human rights.

In most countries, civil society provides an alternative channel to state programs for delivering development assistance. But the government has neutralized NGOs through the CSO law and other means. An official working on PSNP said, “The only solution is third party involvement,” but that option has been cut off.[301] Another said, “Donors need CSOs. They need to diversify their support. But all of them want to survive—donors and CSOs—they are all worried about the short term … they are very docile and very divided.”[302] The US State Department inspector general put it best when he noted:

The lack of political freedom in the country makes it difficult for the [embassy’s political] section to find local partners it can work with on democracy and human rights issues. This is demonstrated most strikingly by the law limiting foreign work with nongovernmental organizations, forcing the embassy to focus more on the programs that it can implement, rather than those that are most important.[303]

Getting the CSO law rescinded or drastically amended should be a central part of donors’ approach to Ethiopia in the future. This would not only permit an alternative channel for aid distribution, but would help ensure that Ethiopians can freely associate, express themselves, and again work on critical human rights and governance issues, as is their right.

Lastly, donor countries will exert far more influence on the government if they act together rather than separately. Norwegian diplomats were ejected from Ethiopia in 2007, and donor officials regularly express anxiety about the consequences of speaking frankly to the Ethiopian government. Even though there is a formal grouping of donors—the DAG—there has been considerable division among donor governments regarding recent decisions, with many partners feeling that a few donor nations have undermined donor unity with their open support for the EPRDF.

It is obviously unacceptable that under Ethiopia’s donor-supported development programs, people may literally starve because of their political beliefs. Yet, despite saying that their aid “must not be subject to political distortion,” donors to date appear to be willing to pay that price.[310]

Ultimately, if donors care about Ethiopia’s long-term development so that all its citizens can benefit, it is essential that there is democratic space, in which Ethiopians can participate and decide their own future, as well as economic and social rights that exist alongside civil and political rights. As declarations at the international level point out, and as donor policies themselves make clear, development without freedom is not true progress.

Acknowledgements

This report was written by Ben Rawlence, researcher in the Africa division at Human Rights Watch, based on research carried out by Ben Rawlence; Leslie Lefkow, senior researcher and Horn of Africa team leader; and Georgette Gagnon, former Africa director. The report was edited by Leslie Lefkow and Rona Peligal, acting director of the Africa division. It was reviewed by Jim Ross, legal and policy director; Iain Levine, program director; and Danielle Haas, program editor. Additional editorial assistance was provided by Thomas Gilchrist and Amy Auguston, associates in the Africa division. Grace Choi, Anna Lopriore, and Fitzroy Hepkins provided production and photo assistance. John Emerson designed the map. Four anonymous external reviewers provided comments on a draft.

We would like to thank all the Ethiopians and donor officials who agreed to be interviewed for this report, in some cases at great risk to their freedom, their livelihood, or their career. We would like to salute in particular the brave Ethiopians who made this report possible.

Annex 1: Human Rights Watch to Development Assistance Group, March 19, 2010

Kenichi Ohashi Country Director World Bank P.O. Box 5515 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

RE: Politicization of donor-supported government services in Ethiopia

Dear Mr. Ohashi,

Human Rights Watch would like to share with you the main findings of our recent research in Ethiopia. You are an international donor that provides financial and technical support to Ethiopia’s government services, and as such, we would be interested in receiving your feedback on points detailed at the end of this letter for possible incorporation in a Human Rights Watch report for publication in mid-2010.

Please also find enclosed our forthcoming report on political repression in Ethiopia and its impact on the May 2010 elections entitled ‘One Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure’: Violations of Freedom of Expression and Association in Ethiopia. This report, to be released on March 24, is the first of two reports (the other report to be released in mid-2010 as noted above) Human Rights Watch plans to publish on violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly in Ethiopia.

The enclosed report touches on the issue of the Ethiopian government’s leveraging of state resources for partisan political purposes. It describes the manner in which the Ethiopian government excludes opposition supporters from access to state resources and services and the politicization of the civil service and education sector, for example, by requiring employees to attend trainings on party policy and conditioning training and promotional opportunities on ruling party membership. Human Rights Watch’s second report, planned for release in mid-2010, examines in greater detail this politicization of government services in Ethiopia and its human rights consequences. The main findings of the second report are summarized below and we are requesting your feedback on these findings.

Summary of Key Findings

Human Rights Watch’s in-depth research in three regions of the country found that the government is systematically using government services as a tool of repression. We documented numerous examples of kebele and woreda officials excluding opposition members from food for work programs, punishing farmers with the “wrong” political outlook by withholding seeds, fertilizers, and loans and discriminating against teachers and civil servants who refused to join the ruling party.

Human Rights Watch found that despite government denials, these patterns of discrimination appear to be well known throughout all levels of government and are at a minimum tolerated and at worst sanctioned at the highest levels. Moreover, many of the government donor representatives supporting programs affected by these problems appear to be aware of the patterns but accept human rights violations as the price of engaging in development activities in Ethiopia.

Several multilateral programs administered by the World Bank contribute to the financing and reform of the government agents and services that, according to our research, Ethiopia is using in a repressive fashion. The programs are:

• Protection of Basic Services Program (PBS) [US$3364.1m of which IDA/IBRD US$540m][311]
• Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), [US$1730.4m of which IDA/IBRD US$480m]
• Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) [US$397.8m of which IDA/IBRD US$100m]
• General Education Quality Improvement Project (GEQIP) [US$417.3m of which IDA/IBRD US$50m]

As you know, all World Bank programs are delivered within the framework of the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for Ethiopia. The current strategy covers the period 2008-2011 and its objectives are to foster economic growth, improve access to and the quality of basic services, reduce vulnerability, and foster improved governance. As you also know, PBS is delivered through a block grant from the federal to the regional governments, consisting (in 2008/09) of 36 percent donor funds and 64 percent Ethiopian government funds.[312] PSNP, PSCAP, and GEQIP are delivered through federal ministries and regional governments, also involving matching funds from the Ethiopian government,[313] and total international contributions comprise around a third of Ethiopian government expenditure.[314]

In our view, the heavily embedded nature of the donor relationship with Ethiopian government structures means that politicization or “political capture” of aid programs should be a high priority for donors; it also means that donors have significant financial leverage to require the government to meet basic standards of fairness, non-discrimination, and respect for human rights in its delivery of basic services, civil service reform, and allocation of state resources.

HRW’s Research Methodology

Our findings are based on interviews with more than 200 individuals during three separate research missions in Ethiopia between June and December 2009. Two researchers spent a total of five and 10 weeks each in Ethiopia. They interviewed a range of witnesses who described the leveraging of government services and jobs for political purposes including farmers, food insecure villagers, students, teachers, civil servants, and business people; they included members of the ruling party, opposition parties, and persons unaffiliated to any political parties. Our researchers also met with Ethiopian human rights activists, Ethiopian and foreign journalists, diplomats, foreign aid officials, opposition politicians, serving and retired Ethiopian government officials, and members of the Federal House of Representatives.

We interviewed residents of 53 kebeles in 27 woredas in the regions of Amhara, Oromia, and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), as well as numerous people from Addis Ababa and several from Dire Dawa. Several other individuals were interviewed in Europe and the United States. The accounts from rural residents interviewed were echoed by government civil servants (serving and former) in regional and national government who spoke to HRW on condition of anonymity, as well as opposition and former ruling party supporters who had previously served in government.

Human Rights Watch would be prepared to share more details about interlocutors and locations visited in person, however, security concerns prevent us from doing so on the public record. Ethiopia is one of the most challenging countries in the world to carry out human rights research and the consequences for victims and witnesses of speaking out about their situation can be extremely serious.

For example, in December 2009 farmers from Tigray region who had allegedly complained to the regional government about denial of participation in the PSNP program for political reasons tried to meet with international groups. The government detained and threatened the seven farmers and security agents also detained and threatened with deportation a journalist who subsequently attempted to interview the same group of farmers.

As detailed in the attached report, the Ethiopian government has put enormous pressure on individuals known to have provided information to human rights groups or diplomatic officials including those who contributed to the 2009 US State Department country report on human rights conditions in Ethiopia. It should be a matter of grave concern for all donor representatives working in Ethiopia that any kind of independent information gathering, and particularly human rights research, carries such risks and must be conducted in secrecy. Human Rights Watch highlights this issue because while we urge you to conduct your own monitoring and investigation of the abuses described in this letter, we underline the need to take meaningful precautions to protect the confidentiality and security of those individuals met with, particularly in Ethiopia’s rural areas.

Overview of Research Findings

Human Rights Watch documented patterns of discrimination and politicization of aid that took a number of forms:

• Partisan distribution of agricultural inputs
• Partisan access to micro-credit facilities
• Partisan access to the productive safety net program (PSNP)
• Use of state educational facilities for political purposes
• Political indoctrination of school students
• Political repression of teachers
• Use of the Business Process Re-engineering program (BPR) as a means of purging individuals who fail to support the ruling party

State and party functions are fused in Ethiopia. As described in the attached report, the government uses the structure of woreda and kebele officials—and a new tier of sub-kebele structures—to control the population at the level of the household. The kebele and sub-kebele officials are, in principle and practice, responsible for supervising and approving access to seeds, fertilizer, micro-credit, safety net programs, relief food, and educational opportunities, as well as providing recommendation letters for all citizens in the kebele seeking jobs, business permits, housing, land, and issuing ID cards. As such, state/party officials have significant influence over the livelihoods of citizens.

Human Rights Watch found evidence of kebele and sub-kebele officials systematically abusing their power and authority for political purposes:

Partisan distribution of agricultural inputs

In all the areas Human Rights Watch visited, we found that kebele and woreda officials used or implemented services supported under the PBS program (seeds and fertilizers) in a discriminatory manner. The local government’s exclusion from these services of farmers who were not members of the ruling party or were known to have supported the opposition in 2005 was described with consistent regularity and in strikingly similar terms in 15 woredas (seven in Amhara, seven in SNNPR, and one in Oromia). Kebele and woreda officials (kebele chairmen, development agents) repeatedly told farmers interviewed by HRW that they did not receive inputs because of their political affiliation. Their complaints to local officials were ignored.

In our view, discrimination in service delivery not only undermines development outcomes but also violates the terms of Ethiopia’s commitment to its citizens and to the donors who are supporting its people. A key objective of PBS II is “improving equity and equality (inclusion) in core basic social services,” for Ethiopia’s vulnerable rural population.[315] Politicization of those same services runs directly counter to this goal.

Partisan access to micro-credit facilities

Informants reported the ruling party’s use of access to micro-credit as a tool of social control and repression in eight woredas (five in SNNPR, one in Oromia, and one in Amhara). Two micro-credit organizations that were mentioned repeatedly in connection with partisan allocation of loans were Dedebit (affiliated to the ruling party) and Omo Micro-Finance. Farmers and youth reported to Human Rights Watch attempts to apply for loans being refused on the grounds that they were not members of the ruling party.

Many different programs exist for delivering micro-credit products in Ethiopia, including the Household Asset Building Program (HABP) under the purview of the PSNP program that delivers credit through “multipurpose cooperatives as well as the government administrative system and microfinance institutions.”[316] We would urge donors to ensure that any credit facilities supported by international funds are not subjected to government manipulation and pressure and that access to micro-credit facilities is equitable.

Partisan access to the productive safety net program (PSNP)

Human Rights Watch received accounts of discrimination in access to PSNP activities in 16 woredas (five in Amhara, 10 in SNNPR, and one in Oromia). Kebele chairman, appeals committee chairman and woreda officials denied access to people seeking to participate in the safety net program in all areas visited in similar terms. Those in charge of the lists told people outright that they had not been accepted because of their political views, or their names were included only to be struck off at a later date when the woreda office returned the lists. People spoke of two lists—official and unofficial—used in distributions. In woredas in both SNNPR and Amhara aggrieved residents told HRW that they filed cases in woreda courts for discrimination in PSNP access.

Members of the ruling party in two different woredas in SNNPR told Human Rights Watch that they paid their EPRDF party dues solely to be included on the beneficiary list for relief food and that payment receipts were required to be included on the list. Interviewees also reported that either they did not appeal their exclusion from PSNP because “everybody knows” that opposition supporters cannot get it, or in cases where they did report exclusion, the person designated for handling appeals was a member of the ruling party, or, apologized and said they were powerless to help.

PSNP is targeted at the most vulnerable chronically food-insecure households. Donors acknowledged to Human Rights Watch that problems have arisen in targeting, but claim that overall their program monitoring shows that the safety net is reaching those who need it. At the same time however, some donors told HRW that exclusion on political grounds is not a criteria for monitoring. Without a reliable way of assessing the initial reasons for exclusion, or the delivery of relief food distributed under PSNP, there is no way of knowing if the claims that PSNP is used as a political tool are true. On the evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch, those claims appear to have some basis.

Human Rights Watch welcomes the opening of an investigation by donors into these allegations, urges donors to ensure the investigation is credible, and to make the necessary adjustments to their monitoring to take into account these risks.

Use of state educational facilities for political purposes

In every region Human Rights Watch visited and in Addis Ababa, interviewees mentioned mass trainings of civil servants, teachers, and students during 2008 and 2009 on the ruling party’s ideology of “revolutionary democracy.” These trainings are commonly described as ‘sensitization on government policies and strategy’ but are in fact overt propaganda meetings of the ruling party where attendees are pressured to join the ruling party. Teachers and civil servants described being forced to attend party political trainings and threatened with unspecified consequences if they did not join the ruling party. They told HRW that speakers at the meetings were, “government officials, security people.” HRW found that in teacher training colleges and civil service colleges, political training of other government and party cadres is taking place on a large scale.

Since school budgets are supported under the PBS program[317] and school improvement and teacher training is one of the components of the GEQIP education project,[318] donors should be concerned that partisan political activities are taking place during school time and on school premises. Moreover, several regional government officials in different regions told HRW that PSCAP funds were the main source of financing for these mass propaganda trainings. PSCAP did finance “bulk training of local officials, electorates, public servants, and other stakeholders.”[319] Although the PSCAP program closed in July 2009, implementation continues through 2011. Donors should be concerned at the potential use of such trainings for partisan political purposes; building the capacity of the government and building the capacity of the ruling party by forcing civil servants to join is not the same thing. Donors should ensure that any renewals of the PSCAP program prevent its use as a tool to limit freedom of association and belief.

Political indoctrination of high school students

Teachers and students in all areas described to HRW week-long compulsory sessions during school time in 2009 for party political training of high school students. All students above grade 10 were required to attend trainings at their schools on revolutionary democracy and EPRDF policy on economic development, land, and education. They were paid a per diem of 25 Birr to attend the five-day training. At the end of the week the children were asked to join the ruling EPRDF party. Some students interviewed by HRW were under the impression that they needed the party membership cards to gain admission to university—legally they do not, but in practice it is clear they do.

Teachers told HRW that certain positions within schools are reserved for party members such as head teachers, school accountants, and civics teachers. Civics teachers and classes in particular because, they claim, the curriculum is adapted for party political purposes and introduces the students to the EPRDF and revolutionary democracy.

School budgets and teachers’ salaries are covered in part by PBS funds.[320] Teacher training and curriculum development is partly supported through the General Education Quality Improvement Program.[321] Discriminating against teachers on the basis of their political beliefs and politicizing the curriculum restricts the rights to freedoms of expression and association and in our view risks undermining the goal of the GEQIP to “improve teaching and learning conditions.”[322]

Political repression of teachers

Teachers in all provinces reported to HRW that teachers are forced to contribute a percentage of their salary, whether they want to or not, to the government-controlled Ethiopian Teachers’ Association. They also expressed concerns about their superiors and ruling party members repeatedly harassing and telling them to join the ruling party, and having training opportunities denied because they were not members. Once signed up, union and EPRDF dues were automatically deducted from their salary. Teachers in Oromia reported being forced to join the ruling party (OPDO) and told that if they did not join they would be suspected as OLF sympathizers.

Teachers who join the independent National Teachers’ Association, which the government has refused to register, and other independent minded teachers who criticize the government or refuse to join the ruling party have had their opportunities for promotion and training stopped. Teachers requesting promotion or training opportunities and denied on political grounds, were openly told by superiors that their political activities or lack of a political ‘contribution’ to the party was the reason for the denial. At teacher training colleges, trainee teachers believe that joining the ruling party is a requirement for entry, as it is for university.

Funding for schools and teachers salaries is a major part of PBS spending while teacher training—both on-the-job and pre-qualification training—is supported by the General Education Quality Improvement Program. In our view, politicization of trainee teachers through various means and the harassment of teachers for their political views is not consistent with the goal of improving teaching and learning conditions.[323] Donors should insist on respect for freedom of expression and association in the education sector.

Use of Business Process Re-engineering program (BPR) as a means of purging the civil service of opposition supporters

BPR is part of PSCAP’s component 1, which supports civil service reform to “promote the development of an efficient, effective, transparent, accountable, ethical, and performance oriented civil service.”[324] However, many donors, journalists, teachers, civil society activists, and serving civil servants described the BPR process as a political weapon in the hands of the ruling party, whereby a program designed to remove moribund staff is also being used to selectively fire dissenters and opposition members. Human Rights Watch spoke to a number of donors involved in funding BPR, officials involved in running BPR in their agencies or ministries, and a dozen civil servants who claimed they had been unfairly dismissed for political reasons as a result of BPR procedures. While those who lose their jobs may have a vested interest in crying foul, the officials and donors running BPR acknowledged it was open to political manipulation.

Based on our research, HRW is concerned that this program is being used for political purposes. HRW is also concerned that donor officials responsible for BPR whom it interviewed have received reports of politicization of the program and appear to have no strategy for monitoring the problem despite the potential for it to be used to purge dissenting voices from the civil service.

Our findings suggest that the politicization of: fertilizer; the safety net program; micro-credit; training and promotion of teachers and other civil servants; university entrance; and, high-school students restricts the ability of citizens to exercise their basic rights to freely associate, assemble, express themselves, and hold political beliefs. The consequences of these cases reverberate beyond the individual hardship endured by the affected individuals. Only one farmer needs to be denied seeds or one mother denied a safety net placement for the chilling message to reach the whole village: dissent carries a heavy price. Even where instances of individual persecution or discrimination may be few, the effect on all Ethiopians is wide and significant for the human rights situation throughout the country.

Ethiopian Government Response

In interviews and meetings with Human Rights Watch, Ethiopian government officials denied allegations of discrimination in access to resources and services, claiming that there was no policy of systematic patronage or punishment of the opposition. They noted that while they cannot vouch for every party member, telling HRW, “If we get credible reports, we will investigate, not to please anyone, but to ensure the credibility of our party.”

Inadequate Donor Monitoring

Human Rights Watch interviewed many donor officials responsible for funding and monitoring the PBS, PSNP, and PSCAP. All diplomats and aid officials told HRW that they had heard rumors, or in some cases stated that they accepted that politicization of government services, education, and BPR takes place. All donors acknowledged that their existing monitoring mechanisms would not detect the exclusion of individuals from distributions, loans, or the safety net for political reasons, not least because existing monitoring of all multilateral programs is done in conjunction with the government. “Politicization is not a criteria for monitoring,” one donor official told HRW.

Following donors’ suspension of direct budget support following the election violence and government crackdown in 2005, the original rationale for the Protection of Basic Services program providing district level, sector specific budget support instead of federal level direct budget support was in large part a result of concerns that, “In the uncertain environment following a contested general election in Ethiopia in 2005, Development Partners suspended direct budget support based on an assessment that it could be vulnerable to political capture or diversion from the core priority of basic service delivery.”[325]

The PBS program documents proposed several ways of mitigating that risk. One was a ‘fairness test’ to analyze distributions by woreda to monitor for political bias.[326] The other was ‘social accountability’ using NGOs to monitor service delivery under Component 4 of the PBS I program.[327] Component 4 is still in the pilot stage and the woreda fairness test analyses distributions by woreda, not within each kebele, cell, or household. Human Rights Watch’s research suggests that donor concerns of politicization were correct but that the mechanism for monitoring it in the PBS program is inadequate. As a result of the evolution of party mechanisms of control to the level of household cells, the government can implement discrimination in a highly sophisticated manner, by household, kebele or woreda not necessarily only at the woreda level. The ‘fairness test’ would not capture such discrimination.

As you are aware, the risk that any assistance delivered through the fused state/party apparatus serves a political as well as a developmental agenda, or that the government’s intention to curb freedom of expression and association could supersede the goal of serving the whole population equitably, is ever present in Ethiopia. It is apparent that existing methods of delivering and monitoring assistance do not sufficiently account for this high risk.

In December 2009, following public reports of allegations of discriminatory access to aid-funded services, donors launched an investigation into ‘distortion’ of aid programs in two phases, the first phase to be completed by March 2010. This exercise is welcomed, however, serious questions remain about its mandate and effectiveness given that investigations are being conducted in conjunction with the government authority suspected of authoring the problem.

Request for Feedback

In particular, Human Rights Watch would be grateful for your feedback on the following questions:

How do you ensure your funds are not used for patronage or in a discriminatory fashion, particularly given that these multilateral programs are, by design, implemented and monitored in partnership with the Ethiopian government? Might you consider united insistence by donors on independent monitoring of donor-funded programs?

Do you envisage making any changes to your program’s monitoring systems, in light of acknowledgements by donor officials that existing monitoring mechanisms do not adequately capture politicization of PBS, PSNP, PSCAP, and potentially in other donor programs?

Given that aid delivered through government structures dominated by the ruling party risks being politicized, and given that the CSO proclamation has reduced the pool of independent NGOs willing or able to work with donors, are you considering diversifying your channels of development spending in Ethiopia? Are you considering making a new, united call for the CSO law to be rescinded?

How do you propose to address the risk of kebele officials controlling beneficiary lists in the safety net program, including in relief food distributions that use the same structures?

As the previous 2006-2008 Interim Country Assistance Strategy was drawn up to focus on protecting basic services and did not provide direct budget support because of the risk of “political capture” of funds, why does the existing strategy (CAS 2008-2011) envisage a return to direct budget support before 2011? What has changed in the assessment of the risks of political capture? If such a return to budget support is proposed how will you ensure that any such change has a positive impact on the human rights situation in the country while also helping to support basic service delivery?

We welcome your response and any other comments you may wish to bring to our attention regarding our findings, ideally within the next four weeks, by April 20, 2010, and in advance of our report to be published in mid-2010. Human Rights Watch may publish your response unless you specifically request that it be kept confidential. As mentioned above, we reiterate that we would be pleased to discuss our findings in more detail in person.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Georgette Gagnon Africa Director, Human Rights Watch

CC:

Embassy of France to Ethiopia

Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Ethiopia

Royal Danish Embassy to Ethiopia

Embassy of Norway to Ethiopia

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ethiopia

Embassy of Canada to Ethiopia

Embassy of the United Kingdom to Ethiopia

Embassy of Italy to Ethiopia

Embassy of Ireland to Ethiopia

Embassy of Sweden to Ethiopia

Embassy of Finland to Ethiopia

Embassy of Spain to Ethiopia

Delegation of the European Commission to Ethiopia

Embassy of the United States to Ethiopia

Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Netherlands Development Organization (SNV)

European Commission

Spanish Agency for International Development (AECID)

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs-DANIDA

Irish Aid

US Agency for International Development (USAID)

Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

UK Department for International Development (DFID)

Agence Française de Développement (AFD)

Mrs. Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili, Vice President for Africa Region, World Bank

Executive Directors, World Bank

Annex 2: Development Assistance Group to Human Rights Watch, April 20, 2010