Summary
“They don’t come with a gun and say sign this document [party membership] but there are one hundred ways of putting pressure.”
—Aid official, Addis Ababa, June 16, 2009
On May 23, 2010, Ethiopian citizens will vote in the first parliamentary elections in Ethiopia since 2005, when the post-election period was marred by controversy and bloodshed. At least 200 people were killed in June and November 2005, the vast majority by security forces during protests over alleged election fraud, and the government arrested an estimated 30,000 people.
Over the past five years the Ethiopian government has restricted political space for the opposition, stifled independent civil society, and intensified control of the media. As this report describes, this has been a long-term policy with the relative freedom of the 2005 pre-election period standing out as an anomaly. Repression has gained greater momentum as the 2010 elections approach, with the government taking measures to avoid a replay of the events of 2005.
Opposition supporters have been attacked and arbitrarily detained and high-profile incidents have garnered some international attention. For example, Birtukan Midekssa, leader of the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party, was re-arrested in December 2008 for allegedly violating the terms of her pardon and is now serving a life sentence. However, repression is usually much more subtle and insidious, involving threats, harassment, closure of offices, breaking up of meetings, and denying individuals access to state resources unless they are linked to the ruling party. In 2009, harsh new legislation affecting civil society and the media was enacted that constricts the ability of individuals to expose and criticize continuing serious violations of human rights in Ethiopia. These punitive measures restrict the rights to freedom of expression and association, have silenced independent voices, and contribute to chilling freedom of speech and opinion more broadly.
In the nearly 20 years that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been in power, Ethiopia’s government has taken steps to promote economic development and has introduced the technical framework of democracy. The 1995 constitution incorporates a wide range of human rights standards, and government officials frequently voice the state’s commitment to meeting its human rights obligations. But these steps, while important, have not ensured that Ethiopia’s citizens are able to enjoy their fundamental rights.
As this report shows, in practice, Ethiopia’s citizens are unable to speak freely, organize political activities, and challenge their government’s policies—through peaceful protest, voting, or publishing their views—without fear of reprisal. Democracy’s technical framework will remain a deceptive and hollow façade so long as Ethiopia’s institutions lack independence from the ruling party and there is no accountability for abuses by state officials.
The Ethiopian government claims that the country is moving toward democracy—albeit slowly, given the many challenges it faces. But despite the lip service given to democracy and human rights, respect for core civil and political rights such as freedom of expression and association in Ethiopia is deteriorating.
This report, based on research in Ethiopia in 2009 and drawing on more than 12 years of documentation by Human Rights Watch and other organizations, presents an assessment of patterns of human rights abuses that will impact the environment in which the 2010 elections will be held. It traces the ways in which the ruling EPRDF’s total control of local and district administration has been used to monitor and intimidate individuals at a household level, punish and undermine the livelihoods of citizens who do not abide by the ruling party, and create a climate of fear that suppresses freedom of expression and opinion.
Human Rights Watch interviews with residents of more than 50 kebeles (a village or neighborhood usually containing several hundred households) in three different regions of Ethiopia consistently point to a complex and multi-layered strategy aimed at preventing political opposition and dissent. Kebele councils are the primary unit of administration; they are a crucial mechanism for control over the rural communities that constitute 85 percent of Ethiopia’s population. In Ethiopia’s strict hierarchical society, challenging these officials was virtually unthinkable for decades.
Today, kebele officials wield a massive amount of power over their constituents in a myriad of ways, in a system where the line between state and ruling party is usually non-existent. Kebele officials determine eligibility for food assistance, recommend referrals to secondary health care and schools, and provide access to state-distributed resources like seeds, fertilizers, and other essential agricultural inputs. They also run the community social courts, which deal with minor claims and disputes at the kebele level; local prisons; and, in some places, local-level militia that are used to maintain law and order.
These broad powers have been consistently used to punish and ostracize those perceived to support the political opposition. Since 2005, state resources have also been used to press individuals to join the ruling party so that they can benefit from access to services, jobs, and economic activity. Between 2005 and 2008, when the kebele and woreda (district) elections were held, the EPRDF’s party membership more than quadrupled, from approximately 760,000 to more than 4 million members in just three years. In these local elections in 2008, the EPRDF first expanded the number of available positions on kebele and woreda councils and then won more than 99.9 percent of the 3.5 million seats, thus consolidating its control of the local administrative structure. The practical implication of this development is that in an average kebele, one of every 10 residents—almost one member of every family—is now both a kebele official and EPRDF member.
The 2010 elections are viewed as an important benchmark by many observers inside and outside the country. For the EPRDF, now in its nineteenth year in power, the elections present an opportunity to distance the country from the political turmoil and negative publicity of 2005 and consolidate an effectively single-party state. For international donors, who consider Ethiopia a key strategic partner in the volatile Horn of Africa, the elections will provide a test of their policy of increasing development aid while insisting on “quiet diplomacy” in the face of Ethiopia’s deteriorating human rights record.
But for many Ethiopians, election day is likely to be far less meaningful; a veneer of democratic pretension hiding a repressive state apparatus. Key developments affecting the result of the elections will have occurred long before election day, and will impact their lives long after the last vote is counted.
The government of Ethiopia regularly denies that many of the abuses documented in this report are taking place. In both public statements as well as in meetings with Human Rights Watch, Ethiopian government officials have dismissed allegations that opposition supporters are subjected to intimidation and assault as efforts to discredit the election, and have disputed the characterization of Ethiopia’s democratic space as “diminishing.” The government also defends the new legislation it has enacted, arguing that the Charities and Societies Proclamation does not infringe on freedom of association and will promote “indigenous” Ethiopian organizations.
Despite their public silence, many diplomats privately concur with Human Rights Watch’s concerns about the pre-election environment, telling Human Rights Watch that the May elections are a “foregone conclusion.” Yet with a few exceptions, most governments and international donors have failed to consistently raise the worsening human rights situation as an urgent priority.
Although there are just two months remaining before polling day, the government and its international partners can still take key steps to improve the electoral environment and begin the long-term reforms needed to improve respect for human rights in Ethiopia. Among other measures, the government could instill greater confidence in the electoral process by immediately releasing persons detained for the peaceful expression of their political views; by publicly calling on all government officials and EPRDF members to cease attacks and intimidation of political opposition, independent civil society, and the media; and by supporting independent efforts to investigate and publicly report on incidents of abuse, including by international electoral observers. Donors should urgently press for these steps to be implemented.
In the medium- and long-term, concerned governments need to conduct a fundamental reappraisal of the nature of the Ethiopian government’s mechanisms of control, the impact of its policies on civil and political rights, and the subsequent impact of political repression on their own strategies and goals for engagement with Ethiopia.