XI. Need for Accountability: Identifying the Main Perpetrators of the September Violence

The crimes documented in this report—including extrajudicial killings, sexual and gender-based violence, unlawful detention, torture, and enforced disappearances of persons and bodies—are all serious crimes under international and domestic law, regardless of whether they are committed in times of peace or war.

Guinean security forces were responsible for the killing of an estimated 150 to 200 unarmed civilians, for brutal sexual violence, and for numerous other abuses on September 28, 2009, and in the days that followed. The dearth of any apparent threat or provocation on the part of the demonstrators, in combination with the organized manner in which the security forces carried out the stadium attack—the simultaneous arrival at the stadium of different security units, the coordinated manner of deployment to strategic positions around the stadium in anticipation of the fleeing demonstrators, the failure to use non-lethal means of crowd dispersal, and the presence of officers, including a minister tasked with security responsibilities—suggests that the crimes were premeditated and organized. These were not the actions of a group of rogue, undisciplined soldiers, as has been argued by the Guinean government.

Legal Considerations

The right to life, enshrined in article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the most fundamental of all human rights.[237] Article 6 of the ICCPR requires that the right to life “shall be protected by law,” and that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”[238] Extrajudicial, summary, and arbitrary killings are absolutely prohibited in times of peace and war.

The only international human rights treaty to specifically mention rape as a human rights violation is the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, which Guinea signed in December 2003 but has not yet ratified.[239] However, rape and sexual assault are forms of torture and other prohibited ill-treatment. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” among its potential crimes against humanity, which covers acts committed in peacetime or wartime.[240]

An enforced disappearance occurs when security forces or other state agents arrest, detain, or abduct a person (or a person’s body) and then refuse to acknowledge their actions or disclose the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person.[241] An enforced disappearance is a continuing crime until the “disappearance” is resolved and the fate of the affected person is established.

Crimes against Humanity

The evidence of the scale of killings and severity of other abuses committed by Guinean security forces on and after September 28, 2009, as documented in this report, suggests that these abuses amount to crimes against humanity.

Such crimes, under international customary law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, are certain acts, including murder, rape, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. [242] Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can also be committed during times of peace, if they are part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Command Responsibility

The circumstances of many of the killings and abuses described in this report suggest that they were committed with either the consent or an explicit order from Guinean military commanders as high as CNDD President Moussa Dadis Camara. Regular criminal responsibility should mean that anyone who ordered, or was otherwise directly implicated in a crime, should be held criminally liable for those crimes. Furthermore, for serious international crimes, including crimes against humanity, the principle of “command (or ‘superior’) responsibility” applies. This holds commanding officers and others in positions of authority criminally responsible when crimes are committed by forces under their effective command and control, they should have known about the crimes, and they fail either to prevent the crimes or prosecute those responsible.[243]These principles of criminal liability of commanders should apply also to any domestic efforts at accountability.

Right to Accountability

The many victims of gross human rights violations committed during the September violence in Guinea have the right to an effective remedy under international law, which requires effective investigation and prosecution of crimes such as extrajudicial killings, “disappearances,” sexual and gender-based violence, or torture.[244] The state is therefore obligated to take the necessary investigative, judicial, and reparatory steps to identify perpetrators of serious criminal offenses and bring them to justice. This obligation is independent from the expressed wishes of victims, who, for various reasons, including intimidation by state actors such as the security forces themselves, may not press for prosecutions.

If violations rise to the level of crimes against humanity or other international crimes, as the evidence suggests for the September violence in Guinea, all states have an obligation to ensure that those crimes are punished and that those responsible are held accountable.

National Efforts at Accountability for the September Violence

Immediately after the massacre, and under intense pressure from outraged international actors, CNDD President Moussa Dadis Camara vowed to conduct a probe into the events of September 28.[245] An initial attempt to form a national commission of inquiry, on October 7, was rejected by opposition parties and civil society.[246] On October 30, a new 23-member independent national commission of inquiry was created by decree and tasked with investigating the events on and in the days after September 28.[247] The decree made no mention of whether the commission would make recommendations about accountability. The commission’s members were announced on November 2 and included magistrates, lawyers, forensic experts, and five international representatives with consultative status.[248]

Victims, diplomats, and members of Guinean civil society interviewed by Human Rights Watch expressed extreme skepticism as to whether the national commission of inquiry was capable of operating independently, or, given the apparent involvement of high-level CNDD officials in the violence, interested in establishing the truth. There was an overwhelming sense that witnesses testifying before the national commission would face considerable risk of reprisal by state actors, and, as a result, many witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch vowed not to cooperate with it. Interviewees were equally skeptical about the ability of the Guinean judicial system to hold accountable those implicated in the killings, rape, and other abuses committed in the course of the September violence.

The Guinean judicial system has historically failed to hold accountable those responsible for ongoing or past violations by state actors, most notably by members of the security forces who have enjoyed near-complete impunity for serious crimes, including murder. Since the CNDD came to power in December 2008, there has been a further weakening of the judiciary due to meddling by the military, an official call for vigilante justice to be meted out against suspected thieves, and an attempt by the government to set up an informal, parallel judicial system run by the military from the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp. This historical failure to act, coupled with a weak judiciary characterized by a lack of independence from the executive branch, inadequate resources, and corruption, in large part fueled the culture of impunity that gave rise to the September violence, and undermines the victims’ hopes for redress.

Individuals Whose Criminal Responsibility Should Be Investigated

In the course of its investigation, Human Rights Watch identified a number of Guinean officials whose criminal responsibility relating to the crimes committed on and in the days after September 28 should be investigated. The particular criminal responsibility of the individuals listed below requires further investigation, and full and fair trials.

CNDD President Captain Moussa Dadis Camara

CNDD head Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, who is also the commander in chief of the Guinean armed forces, was not observed by those interviewed by Human Rights Watch to be present at the stadium or sports complex during the events on September 28, 2009. He was widely believed to have been at the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp while his Presidential Guard and other factions of the security forces perpetrated the killings, sexual violence, and other abuses described in this report.

Speaking to journalists in the days following the massacre, Dadis Camara denied personal responsibility for the abuses because he was not present at the stadium on the day of the massacre: “I, myself, was not at the stadium” (“Moi-même je n’étais pas au stade”).[249] Dadis Camara also blamed opposition leaders for going ahead with the demonstration in defiance of a ban he had issued on demonstrations for that day.[250] Moreover, the military leader attempted to distance himself from any blame on the grounds that he was no longer in control of an army that had “taken him hostage.”[251]

The evidence points toward Dadis Camara playing a central role in the September 28 massacre at the stadium and the events that followed. The 1 a.m. telephone call on September 28 that he made to opposition leader Sidya Touré instructing him to cancel the rally, in addition to the negotiations with opposition leaders right up to the start of the crackdown demonstrate that Dadis Camara had a major role in the CNDD’s response to the September 28 opposition rally before it took place. The perpetrators of the massacre were commanded by his aide de camp and head of his personal security, Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakité, then one of his closest confidants (see below). Diakité is believed to have departed with his red berets from Camp Alpha Yaya, where Dadis Camara is based, and it is highly unlikely that he would have done so, and carried out such a brutal massacre, without the knowledge of his superior, Dadis Camara.

Aside from any possible responsibility for giving orders to the troops who carried out the abuses, Dadis Camara is also implicated under the principle of command responsibility for his failure to prevent or prosecute the crimes. At this writing, he has failed to ensure that a single person is investigated, much less prosecuted, for the atrocities committed on September 28 and the days that followed. On December 3, Dadis Camara was wounded during an altercation with Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakité at the Koundara military camp.[252]

Presidential Guard and Their Commanders

The vast majority of the abuses committed on September 28, 2009, and in the following days, including the widespread killings and sexual violence, were committed by members of the Presidential Guard. The Presidential Guard is an elite military unit comprised of several hundred men. Under former President Conté, the Presidential Guard was situated within a unit called the Autonomous Presidential Security Battalion (Bataillon autonome de la sécurité présidentielle, BASP), and were largely from the Sousou ethnic group. They were one of several elite units that typically wore red berets; the others being the Autonomous Battalion of Airborne Troops (Bataillon autonome des troupes aéroportées, BATA) and the Rangers. After the CNDD coup in December 2008, the BASP ceased to function as it did before, and many of the erstwhile commanders were detained without charge for long periods of time by the CNDD. In the weeks after the coup, Dadis Camara began replacing many of the BASP members with soldiers who were known and trusted by himself and his entourage. Many, but not all, soldiers of the newly constituted Presidential Guard were from ethnic groups in the forest region.

The Presidential Guard, or red beret troops, who entered the September 28 Stadium on the day of the massacre were commanded by Lieutenant Abubakar “Toumba” Diakité (more popularly known simply as Toumba), at the time a close confidant to CNDD President Dadis Camara who has served as Dadis Camara’s personal aide de camp and the head of his personal bodyguard. Diakité personally led the red berets into the stadium, was with the red berets when they fired directly into the crowds of demonstrators, led the group of red berets responsible for the beating and detention of the opposition leaders, and personally witnessed the rape of many women at the stadium without intervening to stop the violence. Dozens of witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including opposition leaders detained personally by Diakité, placed him at the scene of the September 28 killings and rapes, and described his personal responsibility for the events. On December 3, an altercation between Diakité and Dadis Camara occurred at Camp Koundara during which Diakité fired upon Dadis Camara, wounding him in the arm and head.[253] At this writing, Diakité is being sought by military authorities after he fled into hiding; his whereabouts are unknown.

A second red beret official, Second-Lieutenant Marcel Kuvugi, believed to frequently serve as Dadis Camara’s personal driver, also played a role in the massacre, particularly in the targeted attack on the opposition leaders at the stadium. According to several opposition leaders, Kuvugi violently attacked them on the podium inside the stadium, and then struck Sidya Touré on the head when he was inside Diakité’s car outside the stadium. When the political leaders were taken to the Ambroise Paré Clinic for first-aid treatment, Kuvugi demanded that they be brought directly to the military camp instead, and threatened to shoot them and throw a grenade at them if they got out of the car at the clinic.

The minister for presidential security, Captain Claude “Coplan” Pivi, is the titular most senior commander of the red beret force in charge of presidential security, and thus carries command responsibility for the actions of the Presidential Guard. There are conflicting reports about whether Pivi was present outside the stadium on September 28. However, there is little doubt that Pivi did play a role in the crackdown that followed, including in the attacks on the homes of political leaders on the evening of September 28, when he and red berets loyal to him were seen at the attack on the home of opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo.

Anti-Drug and Anti-Organized Crime Unit of the Gendarmes

Gendarme Captain Moussa Tiégboro Camara has since January 2009 been tasked with tackling drug trafficking and serious crime. His official title is minister in the presidency in charge of fighting drug trafficking and organized crime (ministre à la présidence chargé de la lutte anti-drogue et du grand banditisme). Captain Tiégboro gained infamy in June 2009 when he called on youths to set up vigilante brigades and mete out vigilante justice against suspected thieves.[254] Gendarmes personally commanded by Tiégboro on at least two occasions used lethal force against opposition supporters converging on the stadium, resulting in the deaths of at least three unarmed protestors. Later, Tiégboro and gendarmes in his unit entered the stadium together with members of the Presidential Guard. The gendarmes in his unit took an active part in the massacre, and, to a lesser degree, in the sexual violence that followed. Several witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they saw Captain Tiégboro inside the stadium while many of the serious abuses described in this report, including murder and rape, were taking place.

Mobile Intervention and Security Force (CMIS)

The Mobile Intervention and Security Force (Compagnie mobile d’intervention et de sécurité, CMIS) is a police unit numbering about 300-400 individuals who have received specialized training in crowd control and posses riot control equipment, including armored vehicles and tear gas. The CMIS is commanded by Ansoumane Camara.[255] CMIS police officers played a minor role in attempting to prevent opposition supporters from reaching the September 28 Stadium on the morning of September 28. CMIS armored vehicles began the assault by firing tear gas from their specially equipped vehicles into the stadium, and allegedly participated in the attack on the stadium itself, although only a few witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch accused them of involvement in the atrocities.[256]