Failure to Protect Civilians

Intercommunal fighting is a form of criminal activity that the state has a responsibility to prevent and punish. More generally, the state has a responsibility to protect civilians from violence, and to ensure accountability for crimes committed and compensation to victims.[29] After decades of war and underdevelopment, in many parts of Southern Sudan this is a huge challenge.

Human Rights Watch found that the local, state, and regional GoSS authorities knew a conflict was brewing. As early as February 1, 2009, Lou Nuer leaders publicly threatened they would attack if the authorities did not disarm the Murle, whom they described as “the primary cause of insecurity in Jonglei state.”[30] In early March Lou Nuer youth sent a warning message to Murle youth, who in turn informed the Pibor commissioner and state authorities.[31] The commissioner of Wuror county told Human Rights Watch he also informed state authorities that armed Lou Nuer youth had mobilized, and requested more police support but received no answer.[32] Police authorities in Bor told Human Rights Watch they received notice of the attack four days before it occurred.[33]

GoSS and state-level authorities did not take steps to prevent the conflict or protect civilians. High-level political and community leaders did not visit the communities to calm tensions, or take other steps that could have prevented the conflict. The police were insufficient to address the conflict. Their presence in locations outside of Bor is minimal, with only 50 police in some counties and fewer than 10 police officers in Likwongole payam at the time of the attack.[34]

The Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is to comprise 33,000 police with 3,000 per state, regardless of population.[35] Jonglei has an estimated population of 1.3 million.[36] SSPS deployment is patchy, however, and police need better equipment, transportation, and training in methods for enforcing law in the context of cattle-raiding communities.[37]

The SPLA, an over-sized military that the GoSS is trying to downsize in line with CPA requirements, is more numerous in Jonglei in part because the GoSS deployed them to prepare for a previous disarmament campaign. Hundreds of soldiers now man several bases at locations close to where the fighting occurred in March and April. However, during both the attack and counter-attack, SPLA authorities instructed the commanders not to intervene.[38] “There was no SPLA protection,” recalled one Murle witness to the attack on Likwongole.[39] Lou Nuer witnesses and victims of the attack on Likwongole described how the SPLA provided them with shelter but did not intervene to stop the attacks.[40] The commander in Akobo reportedly received similar instructions when armed Murle counter-attacked in April.[41]

GoSS and state authorities told Human Rights Watch the SPLA have standing orders to not intervene, arguing that the armed civilians would have out-numbered and out-gunned the soldiers.[42] Indeed, SPLA soldiers have come into conflict with armed civilians on many occasions. In June soldiers came under heavy attack from armed Nuer groups in Upper Nile resulting in more than 40 deaths.[43] Authorities also speculated the Lou Nuer soldiers, among the ranks of the SPLA in Likwongole, would have joined the attackers based on their ethnicity had they been allowed to intervene.[44] The SPLA forces in Likwongole and Pibor are majority Nuer and Dinka, both of which have had a historically difficult relationship with the Murle. The GoSS fact-finding committee reported that some Lou Nuer soldiers did participate in the looting of Likwongole.[45]

Notwithstanding these reasons for non-intervention, there are many examples in which the SPLA did deploy soldiers to address intercommunal fighting.[46] The SPLA routinely deploys soldiers to perform law and order functions where police are insufficient to do the job in many parts of Southern Sudan.[47]

The GoSS’s policy response to these intercommunal conflicts has been to focus on disarming civilian populations. President Salva Kiir announced in May that the GoSS intends to conduct a region-wide disarmament campaign to stop intercommunal killing.[48] Forcible disarmament has in the past led to more violence and human rights abuses, notably in Jonglei, in 2006, when an SPLA-led disarmament campaign brought soldiers and “white army” militia into conflict, killing an estimated 1,600 people while recouping only twice as many weapons.[49] GoSS authorities told Human Rights Watch they are currently planning a peaceful process in consultation with local communities but details have yet to be announced.[50]

However, disarmament alone does not address all causes of violence. Intervention by political and community leaders is key. GoSS and Jonglei state authorities did not intervene before the conflict to calm tensions despite being warned of the likelihood of violence. It was only after the April counter-attack on Akobo that UNMIS, GoSS, and state authorities significantly increased visits to promote peacebuilding between the communities. As of June the Southern Sudan Peace Commission and state authorities were working with UN and international agencies and traditional authorities toward a peace conference and on the return of abducted persons.[51]

While these efforts are critical, Jonglei peace conferences in the past have not been sufficient to end the cycle of cattle-raiding and other violence between the communities. The near total absence of accountability is another important factor perpetuating the violence. To date, possibly preoccupied with plans for a peace conference, GoSS and state authorities have not taken steps to legally prosecute any individual members of the communities for organizing and carrying out the March and April attacks. In spite of the lack of judicial institutions in the affected areas, GoSS authorities could, for example, dispatch judicial personnel to work with local police and traditional authorities.

Role of the United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMIS, a UN peacekeeping force deployed to Sudan in 2005, is mandated to monitor the CPA and protect “within its capabilities” civilians who are “under imminent threat of physical violence.”[52] However, to date, UNMIS has primarily focused on its “good offices” and CPA monitoring functions. As of June 2009 the mission was still in the process of defining its civilian protection activities.

UNMIS staff knew about the conflict between Lou Nuer and Murle in the months and weeks prior to the March and April violence, but did not foresee the scale and severity.[53] With their base in Bor more than 150 kilometers from the attack sites, they were not present in the communities. UNMIS increased its engagement by visiting locations in Lou Nuer and Murle territories several times following the March attack. However, these visits were not sustained or frequent enough to prevent the April counter-attack by Murle on Akobo county, or to investigate the effects of the violence in Pibor county. UNMIS did not use its air assets to visit the dozens of other attack sites in Pibor county that are inaccessible by road. The death toll of 453, reported by local authorities, therefore remains unconfirmed by the UN.

UNMIS’ response following the April counter-attack on Akobo county was more pro-active. It deployed some 120 civilian and military staff to temporary team sites at Pibor and Akobo.[54] This higher level of engagement is critical for UNMIS to protect civilians, as it is mandated to do. Its protection activities could include, for example, support to mediation, provision of safe havens, and helping the GoSS and local counterparts establish rule of law.[55] In Pibor, the UNMIS presence helped prevent escalation of a clash between armed Murle youth and SPLA soldiers, sparked by an argument over fishing on May 19.[56]