X. Role of International Stakeholders

Both the UN Security Council (in its resolutions) and BINUB have repeatedly pushed for a definitive peace agreement, suggesting it should be the government’s foremost priority.[263] While such a peace agreement will almost certainly carry important human rights dividends, international attention on the peace process has at times not been matched by concern about human rights abuses, including killings and arrests seen as too “minor” to affect its outcome. Focus on the peace process should not detract from attention to ongoing abuses against local level political activists, including FNL and CNDD-FDD members, and the problem of impunity that facilitates such abuses.

The FNL’s return to combat in April 2008 was widely criticized and subsequent steps forward in the peace process have been widely lauded by the UN and foreign governments. However, there have been few public reactions to killings and other acts of violence pitting CNDD–FDD supporters against FNL supporters in Kinama, Kamenge, Nyabikere, Nyamurenzi, and Kayogoro.[264] FNL violence against their own members has also often gone unnoted, including the killing of Abraham Ngendakumana in February 2009 in the midst of negotiations.

South Africa has played a key role in the peace process, providing both negotiators and peacekeeping troops under the aegis of the African Union (AU). Following the abduction of JPH member Jean Baptiste Nsabimana in January 2009 by FNL fighters in a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) vehicle, in the company of a South African peacekeeper, the AU issued clear instructions to peacekeepers to avoid any complicity in FNL crimes.[265] The incident was deeply embarrassing for the AU, but AU Ambassador Mamadou Bâ refused to accept any AU responsibility for allowing the abduction to take place. He said the peacekeeper had not been disciplined, as “we don’t sanction people the first time.”  The ambassador told Human Rights Watch it was difficult to track the use of JVMM vehicles, and that in any case, “Problems of FNL versus FNL are not our business.”[266]

In September 2008 Human Rights Watch raised concerns about the lack of attention to political violence in rural areas to a senior diplomat in Bujumbura, suggesting such violence might increase in the lead-up to elections if met with impunity. He responded frankly: “The diplomats don’t care about what happens in the interior of the country.”[267] However, in January 2009, several diplomatic missions raised concerns with Burundian officials about the militia-like activities of CNDD-FDD Youth League members in Kirundo and Makamba provinces, a promising development after previous inattention.[268]

In monthly meetings on human rights organized by OHCHR, members of the diplomatic community in Bujumbura have long expressed concern about the problem of impunity for past crimes, but have failed to take concerted action. In February 2008, responding to the surge of killings in Bujumbura, several members of the diplomatic community present at one such meeting proposed a joint letter from BINUB, the African Union, and the European Union to President Nkurunziza expressing concern that impunity for past crimes was contributing to current violence. Though others present at the meeting expressed support, they proceeded to back out one by one. Over a year later, no such letter had been delivered, though impunity remained a problem.[269]

The response of foreign diplomats to political repression of opposition groups has also been varied. Some even welcomed the expulsion of 22 opposition parliamentarians in June 2008, seeing it as an opportunity to get Parliament working again, despite the illegality of the move, and few have reacted to the July 2008 arrests of two of those parliamentarians, Pasteur Mpawenayo and Gérard Nkurunziza, on questionable charges.[270] The November 2008 arrest of Alexis Sinduhije, who had traveled widely in Africa, Europe, and the United States, caught the attention of diplomats. The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union responded quickly with statements condemning the arrests as politically motivated and in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[271] However, they have paid little attention to the arrests of minor opposition party activists in the interior.

Human rights officers working under the joint aegis of BINUB and OHCHR have often been assiduous in reporting on and advocating locally for an end to abuses, but BINUB has not often made use of their wealth of information to publicly denounce abuses.[272] BINUB did not sign on to the joint letter on impunity, discussed above. A report on freedom of expression, drafted by human rights officers in 2008, has not yet been published due to disagreements over the timing of the report and the politically sensitive nature of some material within.[273]

UN human rights officers have organized weekly meetings attended by representatives of the police, the army, the SNR, the office of the Prosecutor, Burundian human rights NGOs, and Human Rights Watch to discuss some of the abuses documented in the report. These meetings were instrumental in addressing police, SNR, and FDN misconduct vis-à-vis Palipehutu-FNL and opposition parties, at times leading to the liberation of those detained arbitrarily.

The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Burundi, Akich Okola, highlighted concerns that unresolved political tensions could dissolve into widespread election related violence at a meeting of the diplomatic community on January 28, 2009. Diplomatic missions intend to send delegations of election observers to monitor the situation in the months leading up to the elections as well as during elections themselves.[274] A UN official expressed concern to Human Rights Watch that as of this writing, the UN had not yet been invited to assist in organizing the elections.[275]

The UN and donors, most notably the UK Department for International Development (DFID), have dedicated substantial resources to Burundi’s judicial system. While new courthouses were built and judicial personnel attended human rights trainings, the lack of independence of the judiciary, and ongoing impunity for human rights abuses, remained as obstacles to the delivery of justice in most of the cases documented in this report.

Donors also contributed to more questionable institutions. The Peacebuilding Fund, a fund established by bilateral donors to support the objectives of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and administered in Burundi by a Steering Committee composed of donors, Burundian officials, and BINUB representatives, agreed in late 2007 to provide US$500,000 to the intelligence service (SNR), in spite of extrajudicial executions and torture attributed to that agency. Some members of the steering committee pushed for funds to be linked to accountability for past abuses, but the majority refused, allowing continued impunity for the serious human rights violations attributed to the SNR between 2005 and 2007.[276]

International actors should already turn their attention towards ensuring the 2010 elections meet regional and international standards allowing the people of Burundi to freely exercise their civil and political rights and to vote for the candidates of their choice.  Impunity and lack of judicial independence are underlying concerns which need addressing to prevent human rights abuses during the pre-election period. In addition, national and international observers should be operational well before the official election period so that issues such as politically-motivated arrests, election-related violence, irregularities in voter registration, and media bias can be raised and dealt with prior to voting.  Donors should ensure that the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) plays a proactive role in investigating such irregularities in a timely manner, referring cases to the judiciary where necessary.