II. Background: Return to War

By mid-2006, the 2002 ceasefire agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE was in tatters, as major military operations by both sides resumed in the country's north and east. Initial fighting occurred in the northern Jaffna peninsula and Trincomalee district, before the Sri Lankan army undertook an offensive against LTTE-controlled areas of Batticaloa district in the east.

In July 2007, the Sri Lankan government announced the "liberation" of eastern Sri Lanka from the LTTE[6] and refocused its military offensive on the LTTE's stronghold in the north, the Vanni. The Sri Lankan armed forces first sought to take control of the western seaside district of Mannar, and by early 2008 they began retaking territory in the Vanni itself. Sri Lankan forces made significant gains against the LTTE, and by October 2008 had recaptured most of the territory west of the main north-south A9 highway that divides the Vanni.

As government forces advanced, the LTTE withdrew to fortified positions in the jungles east of the A9 highway. With most of western Vanni under government control, Sri Lankan forces converged on the LTTE administrative headquarters of Kilinochchi. Despite numerous government claims that Kilinochchi would soon fall,[7] at the time of writing, government and LTTE forces remained dug in. Casualty information from either side is rarely credible, but the government decision in mid-October to stop releasing its military casualty figures suggests that its own losses may be high.

Concerns about Civilian Casualties

All parties in Sri Lanka's armed conflict are obliged to abide by international humanitarian law, the laws of war.[8] Because of the sharp restrictions on humanitarian agencies, the media, and human rights groups in the Vanni, there is very little information available on the numbers and causes of civilian casualties from the fighting. The Sri Lankan armed forces have used heavy area shelling and aerial bombing against the LTTE, including numerous attacks on Kilinochchi.[9] The LTTE has frequently shelled areas held by the government, including near the district capital of Vavuniya.[10] Religious officials and others have reported a significant number of incidents with single-digit civilian casualties (see below); despite the wide use of artillery and airpower during the recent offensive, there have been no credible reports of individual attacks causing high civilian casualties, and nothing comparable to the November 8, 2006, shelling of the Kathiravelli School in Batticaloa district, investigated by Human Rights Watch, which killed 62 civilians.[11]

A number of civilian deaths from Sri Lankan artillery and air attacks have been reported to Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch does not have information whether LTTE forces deployed among the civilian population or the extent to which their restrictions on civilian movement have contributed to the civilian casualties. A Sri Lankan armed forces artillery attack on August 8, 2008, in the vicinity of the Mullaitivu General Hospital and district offices, resulted in the death of an 18-month-old child and injuries to at least 16 civilians, including the Mullaitivu Government Agent, Imelda Sukumar. An August 30, 2008, artillery attack hit the Puttumurripu displaced persons camp, nine kilometers from Kilinochchi, killing five displaced persons, including two infants.[12] A Sri Lankan air force bombing around Kilinochchi on October 10 killed three female civilians, including Arumainathan Chadrathevi, a 46-year-old teacher, her nine-year-old daughter Achchika, and Usha Manokaran, 33, and wounded several others.[13] Other reported incidents of civilian casualties have been difficult to confirm because of the virtual prohibition on access to the Vanni put in place by both sides.

Sri Lankan military authorities have insisted that they abide by the requirements of international humanitarian law by taking measures to avoid civilian casualties. So long as access to the region is denied to independent observers, such claims cannot be verified. Vanni residents have in any case become accustomed to the conduct of hostilities, knowledge they have used to reduce death and injury from the fighting. Sri Lankan army area bombardments are somewhat predictable-shells are fired in a slowly advancing grid pattern, giving civilians familiar with this tactic time to flee in advance of the shells. Aerial bombings are often preceded by spotter planes, effectively warning the population of impending attacks. In addition, almost all civilians in the Vanni have constructed rudimentary "bunker" shelters, often on the orders of the LTTE. And the LTTE in September relocated all civilians from its embattled administrative center Kilinochchi after the town came under sustained government bombardment; Kilinochchi's hospital functioned until late October, when its patients and staff were transferred to Dharmpuram.

Civilians trapped in the Vanni also face battlefield dangers beyond the bombardments, including from ground combat between the LTTE and Sri Lankan armed forces; incursions by so-called Deep Penetration Units of the Sri Lankan army that have been blamed for a number of killings of civilians; and the widespread use of Claymore mines, often triggered by tripwires that do not distinguish between military targets and civilians.[14] And humanitarian agencies have expressed concern that continual displacement and constant exposure to shelling, bombing, and ground-fire have caused large-scale psychosocial trauma among the displaced population, particularly children.[15]

As the civilian population becomes more concentrated in a smaller area of land, and the fighting moves towards them, the potential for large-scale civilian casualties will greatly increase. Both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan security forces have an obligation under international humanitarian law to allow civilians to leave areas where combatants are deployed, and to take all feasible precautions to minimize the risk to the civilian population.