November 25, 2003

SUDAN, OIL, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

GLOSSARIES
The Concession Holders
Past Players:
MAP B: OIL CONCESSIONS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN SUDAN AS OF AUGUST 2002
Map C: OIL ACTIVITY AND THE SCENE OF WAR IN WESTERN UPPER NILE, AS OF OCTOBER 31, 2002
Map D: Ethnic Geography In Western Upper Nile..
Main Rebel and Militia Forces in Southern Sudan Named in this Report
Key Southern Individuals Named in This Report
Key Non-Southern Individuals Named in This Report
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
SUMMARY..
The Displaced
Sudan's Land and Peoples
Oil in Sudan: The Corporate Holdings
Government Strategy of Divide and Displace
Government Revenue from Oil and Expenditures on Arms
Corporate Responsibility
Talisman and the Canadian Government
The Role of the U.S.
Postscript: Peace Talks Update 2003
PART I: OIL IN SOUTHERN SUDAN:101
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS101
BACKGROUND... 101
Blocks 1, 2, 4, and 5A and 5B: Oil Geography101
Human Population106
Maps and Tax Records of Nuer and Dinka Presence107
The Living Patterns of Dinka and Nuer114
Relations between Baggara, and Nuer and Dinka116
Independence, Civil War, and the Addis Ababa Agreement118
THE CHEVRON PERIOD: 1974-92123
Overview.. 123
Chevron Oil Concessions 126
Southern Fears about Oil Development128
Resumption of Civil War130
Formation of SPLM/A  in Ethiopia, 1983132
Government Use of the Baggara as a Forced Displacement Tool, 1980s134
Chevron Attempts and Fails to Develop the Oilfields144
Overthrow of President Nimeiri, Chevron Pulls Out, 1985148
Civil War and Political Developments149
Elections 1986, Military Coup 1989149
SPLA Control of Western Upper Nile150
Government Use of Paulino Matiep's Nuer Militia152
Government Army Displacement of Nuer from the Oilfields, 1990154
SPLM/A Split; Riek Machar Heads Breakaway Faction, 1991155
THE ARAKIS PERIOD: 1992-98160
Overview.. 160
Arakis Energy's Struggle to Develop the Oilfields162
Early Problems for Arakis, 1992-93162
Formation of GNPOC Consortium, 1996164
Divide, Displace, and Destroy in the Oil Areas166
Army/Muraheleen displacement, 1992-98166
The 1996 Political Charter and the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement171
Contested Elections and Displacement by the Nuer Militias, 1996-98177
PART II: OIL FUELS THE WAR.. 182
OIL DEVELOPMENT AND DISPLACEMENT.. 182
IN BLOCK 5A, 1996-98182
Overview.. 182
Lundin (IPC) Enters the Scene, 1996183
The Significance of the GNPOC Pipeline185
Block 5A Operations in 1998186
Fighting and Displacement of Nuer Communities in Block 5A, May-October 1998190
Government Depopulates Block 5A, 1998191
Government Army and Paulino Matiep Militia in Ler, 1998194
Relief Agencies Note Forced Displacement and Devastation in Western Upper Nile, 1998204
THE WUNLIT NUER-DINKA RECONCILIATION PROCESS, 1999210
Overview.. 210
The West Bank Nuer/Dinka People-to-People Peace and Reconciliation Conference, February-March 1999211
Purpose of the Wunlit Conference211
Participants at the Wunlit Conference215
Proceedings and Resolutions at the Wunlit Conference219
OIL SUCCESSES FOR GOVERNMENT DESPITE REBEL MILITARY OPPOSITION: TALISMAN STEPS IN, 1998-99223
Overview.. 223
Talisman Becomes New Lead Partner for Blocks 1, 2, and 4, Mid-1998225
Government Inaugurates Oil Pipeline in Heglig, May 1999229
Government Inaugurates Khartoum Oil Refinery, June 1999230
First Oil Exports Flow from Sudan, August 1999231
Incidents of Pipeline Sabotage, 1999233
Government Relations with Southern Militias, 1999237
Divisions in Paulino Matiep's Bul Nuer Militia, October 1998-September 1999237
Government Foments Division of SSDF Into Smaller Nuer Militias239
Dispute over Block 5A Oilfields between Government and SSDF, Early 1999241
Government Calls for Military Volunteers to Defend Oilfields, 1999244
DISPLACEMENT AND DEVASTATION IN BLOCK 1, 1999247
Overview.. 247
Government Campaign of Forcible Displacement from Block 1, February-July 1999247
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OVER BLOCK 5A,260
April-June 1999260
Overview.. 260
Battle for Control of Block 5A: First Rebel Attack on Oil Operations Since 1984; Lundin Evacuates, May 1999262
Fighting Begins As Army Troops Attempt to Occupy Oil Rig267
Government Army Occupies Lundin Drilling Site; Militia Forces Chase Civilians and SSDF Rebels to a Distant Corner of Block 5A.. 272
Each Side Accuses the Other of Instigating Fighting in Block 5A, May 1999274
Civilians Displaced from Block 5A, May-August 1999278
Nuer Civilians Flee to Mayandit, then to Dinkaland278
Dinka Warmly Welcome Displaced Nuer, Slow International Relief284
Other Displaced Nuer Embark on Hazardous Journey to Nyal and Ganyliel287
Other Human Rights Abuses Linked to Displacement, 1999289
Rape and Other Abuses Against Women290
Government Use of Antipersonnel Landmines295
Rebel Treatment of Prisoners297
Rebel and Government Militia Recruitment of Child Soldiers299
OIL-CAUSED REALIGNMENT OF SOUTHERN REBEL FORCES AND ESCALATION OF WAR, LATE 1999304
Overview.. 304
Rapprochement Between the SPLM/A and SSDF 1999305
Renewed Fighting in Block 5A, July 1999308
Khartoum Peace Agreement Talks Fail Again314
Pro-Government Militia Commander Peter Gatdet Mutinies Against Paulino Matiep and Government, September 1999315
Cmdr. Peter Gatdet's Troops Attack Oil Areas and Oilrig in Block 1, October 1999321
Government Recruitment and Diplacement in the Oilfields, October 1999323
Government Army Displaces Athonj and Other Villages Near El Toor Oilfield, Block 1, 1999323
Calls for Mujahedeen Volunteers325
Nuer Peace Talks; Formation of the Upper Nile Provisional Military Command Council, November 1999327
Fighting Continues between Southern Rebels and Government in Blocks 1 and 4, November 1999330
THE OIL ROAD: NUER DISUNITY AND OIL DISPLACEMENT INCREASE, 2000334
Overview.. 334
Riek Machar Resigns from Government and Forms Sudan People's Defence Forces/Democratic Front, February 2000335
Government Offensives in Support of Road Building for the the Oilfields, 2000339
Fighting Along the Oil Roads, April 2000341
Nuer Forces, Armed by Others, Return to Fighting Each Other, July-October 2000351
SPDF Forces Receive Government Ammunition to Fight SPLA, June-July 2000351
Government Completes All-Weather Road to Ryer/Thar Jath353
A Journalist Travels the Oil Road, April 2001354
Government-Armed Offensive Leaves Tens of Thousands of Civilians Uprooted, 2000357
MORE PEACE EFFORTS, MORE FIGHTING IN THE OILFIELDS: 2001-2002364
Overview.. 364
Political Developments Related to the Oil War366
Southern Efforts to Unite Southern Militias in Government Territory366
Wunlit Threatened by Continued Intra-Nuer SPLA/SPDF Fighting, February 2001368
SPLM/A and SPDF Talks and Merger, 2001-2002370
U.S. Peace Initiative Under Senator Danforth, September 2001-May 2002375
Military DevelopmentsBlocks 1, 2, and 4: GNPOC.. 377
Use of GNPOC Airstrips383
Block 5A, Early 2001386
The Military Tide Turns Toward the Rebels in Block 5A, Late 2001-2002; Lundin Suspends Operations Again388
Government Counter-offensive in Block 5A, 2002, Displaces Civilians392
Displacement Crisis in Oil Areas Because of Fighting, 2001-2002401
Oil Developments410
Oil Production Increases in Blocks 1, 2, and 4410
Lundin Makes a "Significant Oil Discovery" in Block 5A in 2001, Suspends Operations Again in 2002412
New Blocks to be Exploited413
PART III: HUMAN RIGHTS CONSEQUENCES OF OIL DEVELOPMENT416
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW   416
Overview.. 416
Numbers of Nuer and Dinka Displaced from Oil Blocks in Western Upper Nile/Unity State417
1998-1999418
2000-2001420
2001-March 2002422
The Illegality of Forced Displacement under International Humanitarian Law   424
Contractually-Incurred Obligations Forbidding Forced Displacement427
Oil Operations as a Military Objective429
Relief Politics and Abuses in the South430
Government Flight Bans and Bombings of Relief Locations in Western Upper Nile433
Rebel Manipulation of Relief448
Overview.. 456
TABLE 1: SUDANESE GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1999-2002458
Oil Revenues Soar459
Government Ability to Stem Post-2005 GNPOC Production Decline Hinges on Block 5A and Other New Production463
Government Military Spending Almost Doubles in Two Years, Using Up 60 percent of the Oil Revenue464
Government Uses Oil Wealth for Arms Imports and Industry468
Sudan Suspected of Acquiring Polish Tanks Intended for Yemen, August 1999470
Government Revenue from Oil, Development Applications?473
IMF Audits474
Government Uses Oil Revenue to Buy Friends475
Increased Government Bombing of the South478
Bombing in 1999478
Increased Bombing in 2000481
Bombing Condemned, April 2000486
U.S. Attempts to Obtain an End to Civilian Aerial Bombardment, 2001/2002489
NEGLECT OF THE ENVIRONMENT.. 497
Environmental Issues Regarding the Sudd and the Jonglei Canal497
Warnings about Environmental Impact of Oil Extraction500
Talisman's and GNPOC's Limited Environmental Impact Assessment, August 1998503
Block 5A: Lundin Claimed Environmental Impact Study Done505
Satellite Evidence of Alteration to the Environment and Drying Out of River/Stream Bed508
PART IV: FOREIGN CORPORATE COMPLICITY, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SUPPORT510
TALISMAN AND CANADA, 1998-2000510
Talisman's Decision to Invest510
Talisman Failure to Investigate Allegations514
What Riek Machar Said He Told Talisman, 1998-99515
What Gov. Taban Deng Said He Told Talisman, 1999519
The Campaign Against Talisman520
Canadian Government Promises Action on Talisman, March-April 1999520
Talisman Annual Meeting May 1999522
U.N. Expert Criticizes Oilfield Human Rights Abuses, October 1999527
Canadian Government Issues Policy Statement on Sudan, October 1999; Talisman Signs Code of Conduct, December 1999529
Southern Politicians in Khartoum Denounce Oil Companies, November 1999534
Talisman Takes Oil Analysts on Company Tour of Sudan, November 1999536
The Harker Report541
Canadian Government Announces Toothless Sudan Program, February 2000545
U.S. Criticizes Canada549
Canadian Initiative at U.N. Security Council Blocked, April 2000550
TALISMAN "HUMAN RIGHTS" AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, 2000-2002552
Talisman Annual Meeting, May 2000553
Talisman Meets the Sudan Government; GNPOC Signs Code of Ethics, December 2000555
Talisman Human Rights Monitoring558
Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2000, Sudan (April 2001)559
Compensation Payments (Pipeline Only)560
Development Initiatives and Relief Donations562
Talisman Condemned at Annual Meeting 2001568
Canadian Government Response570
Cynical Satellite Images, 2001574
Talisman Annual Meeting, May 2002576
Talisman Pulls Out, October 2002578
LUNDIN: WILLFULLY BLIND TO DEVASTATION IN BLOCK 5A.. 581
Lundin's Concession581
Lundin Hides the Situation of Armed Conflict in Block 5A.. 582
Lundin Denies Revelations about Forced Displacement in Block 5A, 2001589
Lundin's "Oil Policy on Sudan" Substitutes for a Human Rights Policy596
Talisman Buys Lundin's Non-Sudan Assets, June 2001597
Lundin Suspends Operations Due To "Insecurity," January 2002-April 2003599
Lundin Community Development Program... 602
CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN SUDAN: ARMS AND OIL.. 605
Arms Trade between China and Sudan606
China's Need to Acquire Foreign Oil Reserves607
China's First Initial Public Offering on the N.Y. Stock Exchange Backfires612
CNPC Erects a "Firewall" to Satisfy Activists614
Opposition Undercuts PetroChina Initial Public Offering, March 2000617
2001619
CNPC Participation in Government Refinery621
OTHER OIL COMPANIES622
Petronas: Partner in GNPOC, Lundin, and Block 5B Concessions622
OMV (Sudan): Excited about Thar Jath Discoveries626
TotalFinaElf: Courted by Khartoum Government629
Royal Dutch/Shell632
THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMACY REVIVED... 633
Overview.. 633
Clinton Administration Policy on Sudan634
U.S. Bombs Khartoum, August 1998636
U.S at the U.N.638
U.S. Congress Gets in on the Act639
Campaign Against Oil Investment645
Pressure to Sell Off Talisman Shares645
The Campaign for Capital Market Sanctions651
Talisman Sued by Displaced under the Alien Tort Claims Act in New York656
U.S. Aid to Sudanese Rebel Groups657
U.S. Special Envoy for Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan: May 2001662
U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan: September 2001665
U.S. Policy in Sudan, 2002666
EUROPEAN UNION... 673
E.U.-Sudan Political Dialogue674
E.U. Leadership at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights680
PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS688
CONCLUSION... 688
RECOMMENDATIONS696
I. Minimum Benchmarks696
Displacement696
Transparency699
II. Failure to meet benchmarks699
To the European Union and its member states (notably Sweden, Austria, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and the governments of Canada, China, and Malaysia, and any other state where oil companies operating in Sudan are headquartered:699
III. Additional Recommendations700
To the companies:700
To the Government of Sudan:701
To the United States:703
To the Canadian Government:704
To the governments of Canada, China, and Malaysia:705
To the European Union and its member states, notably Sweden, Austria, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom:705
To the members of the United Nations Security Council:706
To the World Bank:706
To the rebel forces: the SPLM/A and other anti-government armed groups:706
APPENDIX A: CHART OF BOMBING CONDUCTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN, 2000-2001708
APPENDIX B: International Monetary Fund, Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.. 714
APPENDIX C: CHRONOLOGY: OIL, DISPLACEMENT, & POLITICS IN SUDAN   723
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS753